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**The Hole in Whole of Government: Examining the Merits of Applying
Systemic Operational Design to Whole of Government Campaign
Planning**

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ABSTRACT

The Canadian Government's pursuit of a Whole of Government strategy in dealing with failed and failing states is laudable but it lacks the resources to develop, implement and sustain a campaign plan that will guide Canada's participation. This paper will examine the need for a Campaign Plan design that is compatible with the different cultures and approaches applied by Other Government Departments.

The traditional Lines of Operation and Effects Based Approaches have been found wanting in Whole of Government approaches resulting in an examination of Systemic Operational Design as a possible solution to that which ails inter agency planning. The application of Systemic Operational Design is not without a cost as the paper will further demonstrate the need to fully integrate staffs to achieve maximum synergistic benefits. Traditional linear campaign plan models do not meet the dynamic needs of a broader approach and Systemic Operational Design offers an inviting alternative for further consideration.

Whole of Government is no broken but in may have a hole in it that Systemic Operational Design can patch.

Introduction

The 2005 International Policy Statements on Defence and Development speak to a changing world and the need to address Defence, Diplomacy and Development (3D) in a new way¹. The 3D dynamic is also commonly referred to as 3D + C with the C representing Commerce, this paper will only focus on the 3D lines of operation.

Although policy statements exist, there is no measurable effect being achieved at the operational level. Media and government pronouncements on the success of the Development portion are largely focused on what is being accomplished by the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kandahar in the South of Afghanistan as evidenced by the plethora of media clips and newspaper articles routinely available for consumption. Not to take anything away from the PRT which is making great strides but contextually the PRT is a tactical level tool that is achieving tactical and operational level effects in aiding the Battle Group's security Line of Operation.²

This paper will examine the current Canadian approach to 3D and argue that it is achieving neither the strategic nor the desired operational effect due to a lack of established linkage between the departments and that there is a need for a synthesized approach that makes the 3D players partners rather than competitors. For comparative purposes historical examples of 3D will be raised as well as an examination of how Canada's allies pursue Whole of Government participation through the Joint Interagency

¹ Canada. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World – Overview*. <http://www.international.gc.ca>; Internet; accessed 21 September 2007.

² The Canadian Joint Task Force in Afghanistan currently uses a Campaign Plan with three lines of operation; Governance, Security and Development

Multinational and Public (JIMP) domains. Although the current mission in Afghanistan appears throughout the paper it is merely to provide a concrete example of some of the issues plaguing 3D rather than serving as the focus of the study. To further the argument that Whole of Government is not working, in the broader sense, a review of operational design models will be presented to demonstrate that traditional approaches such as militarily led campaign planning are cumbersome and actually hinder the process. Lastly the paper will demonstrate alternative structures and approaches that could be pursued to deliver the desired strategic and operational level effect desired by the Government of Canada as enunciated in the International Policy Statement.³

For a Whole of Government program to achieve the desired synergistic effects the program will need to re-examine how it conducts business and to determine what operational level tools are required to bridge the gap between the strategic level (policy statements) and the tactical level (PRTs). Failure to build the relationships and necessary skill sets will doom the process to failure at the strategic level and will place too much emphasis on the low level tactical accomplishments dressed up as successes greater than they are. The Canadian Forces can influence the future of Whole of Government without running the program on behalf of other government departments (OGDs). To be successful the Canadian Campaign Plan must reflect the inputs of the OGDs and be measurable. Canada requires a Whole of Government doctrine that will bring these disparate elements together to achieve a unified approach.

Part I – Context

³ Canada. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World – Overview*. <http://www.international.gc.ca>

Neither Canada nor the Canadian Forces (CF) has developed and published doctrine for Whole of Government operations. No new guiding documents have been produced to replace existing out dated guidance by either the Strategic Joint Staff or the Canadian Expeditionary Force Command (CEFCOM)⁴. The former Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (DCDS) developed *Direction for International Operations*⁵ which does not mention links to Whole of Government actors. An example of a comprehensive definition that provides a better contextual understanding of 3D was produced by the United States to guide interagency operations:

Interagency coordination forges the vital link between the military instrument of power and the economic, political and/or diplomatic, and informational entities of the US Government as well as nongovernmental agencies. The intrinsic nature of interagency coordination demands that commanders and joint planners consider all elements of national power and recognize which agencies are best qualified to employ these elements toward the objective⁶

It is noteworthy in the aforementioned definition that military commanders and planners are encouraged to seek out the appropriate entity to carry out a portion of the 3D program rather than assume that the military will fill the void.

Whole of Government is not new, federal departments have worked together in the past. 3D is a recent attempt to harness the efforts of multiple departments to work towards a singular goal with a common purpose. To aid in this Canada has established the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) which is embedded within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT)⁷ but it has had minimal

⁴ CEFCOM J7 e-mail to the author 25 September 2007

⁵ *Direction for International Operations*

⁶ Joint Publication 3-08 Joint Doctrine Capstone and Keystone Primer, pp45

⁷ Patrick, Stewart & Brown, Kaysie. *Greater Than the Sum of Its Parts? Assessing "Whole of Government" Approaches to Fragile States*. International Peace Academy, 2007. pp57

impact on influencing the Whole of Government model due to the perceived competing interests with the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)⁸. This inter governmental infighting aside it is noteworthy that START has access to a \$100M fund and is in the process of establishing a staff of approximately sixty personnel which may help to coordinate activity between departments.⁹

The relationship between the military and OGDs has never been a strong one as each competes for a piece of the federal budget. The Department of National Defence (DND) is by far the largest government department with the greatest budget and consequently has the ability to dedicate staff and resources not readily available to other departments when planning for operations. By contrast OGD's are much smaller and are hamstrung in their ability to apply personnel resources against emerging problems or towards contingency planning thereby normally resulting in military led planning cycles. As an example DFAIT is currently projecting that 58% of its management personnel will retire by 2010 and that 37% of the current staff will likely not stay more than 5 years.¹⁰ Such a significant staffing crisis denudes DFAIT of any critical mass necessary to support current challenges as well as taking on new ones.

This enmity is not new nor is it particular to Canada. The complex dance that must be entertained between the military and OGD's has continued for over 100 years as


⁸ Ibid pp68

⁹ Ibid pp66

¹⁰ 2007 Report of the Auditor General Of Canada – May – Chapter 3-Human Resources Management-Foreign Affairs and International Trade. [Http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/20070503ce.html](http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/20070503ce.html); Internet accessed 29 Oct 2007. p. 5.

demonstrated through British military indifference towards the British professional civil servants when planning the expedition to Dongola in 1896.¹¹

Part of the dilemma emanates from a lack of understanding where the military and OGDs interact along the spectrum of conflict while engaged in Whole of Government operations. Figure 1 below is a possible depiction of this interaction.



(Fig 1)

The inter-relationship issues are not limited to OGD's and the military as there are other actors in the medium (battle space) where Whole of Government operations are conducted. Principally these are Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and allies, Allies are more easily dealt with through existing agreements such as NATO or ABCA but NGO's ostensibly remain the free radicals who are not constrained by a hierarchy and willfully contact whichever OGD suits them best. This is not to imply that NGOs are

¹¹ Hamer W.S., *The British Army Civil-Military Relations 1885-1905*. Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1970, pp 41

unstructured and problematic to planning Whole of Government approaches, as with all military planning they are but one of the considerations of enemy, friendly and other forces. More prominent NGO's such as Medecins Sans Frontieres have established structures and firm links to organizations such as the United Nations in order to ensure that they are considered in the planning process¹². From a planning perspective this facilitates and clarifies their role in supporting failed and failing states. Clearly NGOs must maintain an arms distance from governmental organizations in order to retain a degree of independent action. Regardless, there are instances where NGOs must develop relationships with existing governmental bodies rather than working in relative autonomy. This is a delicate balancing act so as not to affect the principled approach of non-partisanship that is the hallmark of NGOs.¹³

An examination of some of Canada's allies demonstrates that they too are in their infancy with respect to Whole of Government planning. In the United Kingdom (UK), their initiatives are spearheaded by the Department of International Development (DFID) and have resulted in the establishment of Conflict Prevention Pools in 2000. Funding for the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP) was initially established at £63 Million whilst the Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP) was funded at £74 Million.¹⁴ On the surface this would seem to be just the impetus required to solve the problem but alas money does not solve all problems. The UK faces problems similar to Canada in that government departments do not necessarily get along and there is a lack of cohesiveness with respect to information sharing. The UK conducts integrated country assessments,

¹² Weiss, Thomas G & Gordenker, Leon. NGO's, The UN & Global Governance. Lynne Reinner Publishers inc, Colorado, 1996, pp 40

¹³ Ibid pp 75

¹⁴ Greater than the sum of its parts – Patrick & Brown pp27

just as Canada does through DFAIT, and these have proven to be an effective tool in the UK to focus OGD support through common situational awareness of failed and failing states.¹⁵ Traditional departmental stovepipes continue to exist and this has slowed down decision making even though DFID has provided the leadership and tools necessary to expedite decision making. Consequently, even though the UK is considered the world leader in Whole of Government they remain short of their own stated objectives¹⁶. If the UK is viewed as world leaders exactly how badly off are the remainder? Further examination of allied Whole of Government approaches in countries such as Australia, France and Germany yields similar results. The lack of “jointness” or a common vision is symptomatic of most countries examined in Patrick & Brown.¹⁷

An internet keyword search provides the impression that the United States has developed more inter agency doctrine than any other nation but this has not necessarily moved its Whole of Government model along with any greater degree of success. In part this is due to the lack of a common strategic vision across government departments and this has hampered efforts to drive up the level of participation.¹⁸ Ironically, although the US policy for Whole of Government was focused abroad as a means of delivering security to the US through stabilization efforts, it took a catastrophe, Hurricane Katrina, to reinforce the need to reinvigorate the Whole of Government process. As a result of Katrina, the inter agency model was tested and found wanting as OGD in-fighting took place resulting in notable failures to deliver aid and to coordinate rescue and

¹⁵ Ibid pp 17

¹⁶ Ibid pp?

¹⁷ Ibid pp 141

¹⁸ Ibid pp 37

rehabilitation efforts.¹⁹ Hurricane Katrina was but one example of uncoordinated efforts leading to catastrophic results; similarly Operation Iraqi Freedom was plagued with the same institutional challenges.

An article published in *Joint Force Quarterly* in 2007 highlighted that the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 was required to drive the US military towards jointness yet no similar statutory guidance exists to influence inter agency cooperation. Although inter-agency planning boards do exist in accordance with US Department of Defense doctrine, they were not exercised until shortly before the commencement of operations in 2003.²⁰ The lack of cohesive planning between CENTCOM and the US Department of State on post conflict operations in Iraq is in part due assumptions as to who had the lead once hostilities would terminate. Consequently post-war planning suffered and was addressed late in the campaign and with inadequate resources.²¹

Canada and her Allies have clearly articulated the requirement for a Whole of Government model to introduce 3D to failed and failing states yet universally it is equally evident that the necessary apparatus to transition from policy to appreciable action at the operational level does not exist. The question remains; is the system broken, does a system exist or are we applying the wrong approach to the problem.

Part II – Applicable Design Models

¹⁹ Dixon, Major Robert G, Monograph *Systems Thinking for Integrated Operations: Introducing a Systemic Approach to Operational Art for Disaster Relief*. School of Advanced military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 2006, pp 54

²⁰ *Joint Force Quarterly*, Issue 44, 1st quarter 2007 pp 106

²¹ Gordon, Michael & Trainor, Bernard, *Cobra II: The inside story of the invasion and occupation of Iraq*, New York, 2006. pp 158

As alluded to previously, in the Canadian context, the military has the greatest capacity to conduct contingency planning and to coordinate large scale operations therefore it becomes an often natural fit to lead the coordination inter agency operations. In this portion of the paper an argument will be made to demonstrate that the military planning process (Campaign Plan Design) may not be best suited to achieving success in Whole of Government operations. For the purposes of the argument the focus is on how the process interacts with governmental goals rather than on how the process influences the opposition Centre of Gravity.


LCol Pierre Lessard argued convincingly that the traditional interpretation of Centres of Gravity (COG) and the use of Lines of Operation (LOO) were counter intuitive to the requirements that need be addressed in stability operations²². His contention is that multiple *Effects Lines* should be prosecuted to clearly delineate Defence from Diplomacy and Development but that in the *measures of effectiveness* there would be natural overlap. What remains to be articulated is how this can be worked into a typical campaign plan.

Traditionally the military has been focused on a standard hierarchy in which direction flows from the strategic to the tactical through operational enablers. The simplified Jablonsky Model²³, modified for Whole of Government, depicted below demonstrates this traditional arrangement. For Whole of Government operations this is difficult to achieve as there is no singular strategic head from which direction will emanate, assuming policy does not equate to direction. Presently direction comes from

²² Lieutenant Colonel Pierre Lessard, Parameters US Army War College Summer 2005 <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/05summer/lessard.pdf>

²³ Coombs, Howard. *Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives Context and Concepts*. Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2005pp 107

government department ministers based upon their interpretation of the strategic guidance and is therefore focused on their individual departmental objectives regardless of the national Whole of Government strategy.




(Fig 2)

The military challenge then is one of translating governmental intent into direction to commanders and staffs so that a comprehensive and cohesive product can be developed. Traditional military thinking drives planners towards determination of a single *Centre of Gravity* emanating from multiple LOO's based upon the Clausewitzian precept that there is a centre of power²⁴. Understanding that OGDs have separate foci, it is reasonable extrapolate there will also multiple corresponding centres of power. Therefore, the array of actors displayed in Fig 2 can be used to demonstrate where some of the centre of power may be drawn from.

²⁴ Clausewitz, Carl von, *On War*. Revised by F.N. Maude London, Wordsworth Editions, 1997



Afghanistan Campaign Framework




Military planners are by nature reductionist in nature, from the earliest days of their military training they are taught to reduce a problem to its lowest common denominator. When considered within the art of campaign plan design it is no wonder that Jomini appeals to military planners. The application of LOOs and Decisive Points (DPs) simplifies the process and provides order to the chaos that exists.²⁶ In this regard a single COG along LOOs with corresponding DP's reduces the chaos to an appreciable level that can be translated into operational direction which is more easily shared and understood. Consequently contemporary campaign plans may be depicted as described in Figure 3.

²⁵ Comd CEFCEM presentation to AMSP 10 07 September 2007

²⁶ de Jomini, Baron Antoine-Henri. *The Art of War*. Westport, Greenwood Press, 91



Aligning Operational Effects



¹⁷ (Fig 3)²⁷

A Whole of Government model has multiple actors and each comes with operational level objectives to be achieved. So where does that leave us as campaign planners? We could continue to force the OGDs objectives into the current model which would provide us a model similar to that proposed by LCol Lessard.²⁸ The Military Effects Line of Operation would remain extant but the Civil Effects Line of Operation would need to be expanded to accommodate a Development Effects Line of Operation as well as a Diplomatic Effects Line of Operation. Synchronization could then be achieved by focusing all the LOOs on agreed upon Campaign Objectives. The question then is, would this work?

²⁷ Comd CEFCOM presentation to AMSP 10 07 September 2007

²⁸ Lessard, Pierre, *Reuniting operational art with strategy and policy : a new model of campaign design for the 21st century*, Canadian Forces College, 2004. pp 43

The challenge that would arise would be assessing how each OGD determines its individual LOO and correlating effects whilst ensuring cohesiveness amongst the actors in order to achieve a synchronized effect. The military is comfortable with its own planning process but it is likely that military planners would not share that same degree of comfort with OGD plans as they have a firm belief that they do not apply the same level of rigour to their planning processes that the military does. Without conducting “Operational Planning 101” for OGD partners how does the military establish common ground? The solution may lie in a combination of approaches.

As demonstrated above, the use of the traditional Jominian application of Lines of Operation towards a Centre of Gravity works but lacks the multi dimensional approach required to accommodate all of the Whole of Government actors. Another approach would be to consider Effects Based Operations (EBO) as a model to develop a Whole of Government campaign plan. EBO states that conflicts can be categorized in three principle domains of physical, cognitive and informational.²⁹ The Development, Information, Military and Economic (DIME) pillars may be more suitable to form the basis of a campaign plan for the purposes of Whole of Government type operations (vice planning to deal with opposing forces). The key element is utilizing EBO as the campaign design tool is the development of agreed upon desired effects. This is not so easily defined though as each OGD has a different characterization of what is important. Elements of EBO are seen in LCol Lessard’s model which is what makes it enticing as the focus is on *effects lines* rather than on COG.

²⁹ E. Smith, Effects Based Operations in Peace, War and Crisis. US Department of Defense, CCRP Publication, (November 2002): pp 160.

The terms *Operations* brings with it a negative connotation for OGDs which are uncomfortable with the military use of language as it is often viewed as harsh and holds a degree of finality within it.³⁰ Consequently Edward Smith has expounded upon his original definition of EBO and now discusses the term Effects Based Approaches in his book *Complexity, Networking, & Effects Based Approaches to Operations*. He espouses that Effects Based Approaches (EBA) are more in line with the types of asymmetric operations being executed today. This type of multi-functional operation may not necessarily directed towards an adversary but encompass the conditions outlined in the Whole of Government approach.³¹ Smith explains that EBA requires a broader understanding incorporating issues such as the following:

- Problems and solutions are linear but complex;
- The reporting of complex subjects and situations will be required;
- The knowledge needed is not just aggregated information but internalized understanding of complex entities and situations;
- This complex understanding must somehow be transmitted; and
- This knowledge must be understood by people: reporters, assessors decision makers and war fighters.³²

Smith spends considerable time extolling the virtues of building networks in order to gain the greatest degree of benefit from EBA. The absence of a viable network will prevent EBO from being effective as none of the information that is gathered can then be turned into a viable product to influence actions.³³ Of all the facets that Smith states as critical to maintaining an effective network, none is closer to military mantras as is *Agility*. Military staffs in general pride themselves on their flexibility and ability to adapt to any form of crisis. Agility is defined as having the following characteristics; robustness,

³⁰ Schnaubelt, Christopher, *After the Fight: Interagency Operations*, Parameters Winter 2005-06. pp 50.

³¹ E. Smith, *Complexity, Networking, & Effects Based Approaches to Operations*. Pp200

³² Ibid 200

³³ Ibid 209

resilience, responsiveness, flexibility, innovation and adaptability.³⁴ Whether or not this is true of OGDs there is likely to be some impact evidenced by the staffing reductions alluded to earlier in the paper. So where does that leave us? Linear thinking lacks adaptability, EBO is suitable but requires a degree of cohesiveness that may not be achievable. As military planners we have a tendency to think in absolutes, military staffs tend to employ either model A or model B. Civilian agencies tend to be more dynamic and are goal focused without necessarily using models.³⁵

The seemingly more agile military staff is juxtaposed against a OGD that potentially has a dynamic approach to solving problems. On the surface the two would appear to be polar opposites unless a methodology could be applied to harness the positive energy that both approaches provide.

An examination of Systemic Operational Design (SOD)³⁶ provides an option that may be better suited to developing a campaign plan in a Whole of Government or inter agency forum. Similar to a System of Systems Approach, SOD encompasses “systems thinking”³⁷ that provides planners an opportunity to examine the problem from multiple perspectives. Principally, the planners will examine a problem by seeking out relationships and tensions that can be exploited. SOD is dependant upon the planners being able to identify what can be leveraged and this may include partner organizations. As discussed previously, the planning that currently is being conducted in Whole of Government tends to fall along traditional stovepipes and this has been enhanced through

³⁴ Ibid 265

³⁵ Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 44, 1st quarter 2007 pp 108

³⁶ Naveh, Shimon. *In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory*. Portland, Oregon: frank Cass 1997 pp5

³⁷ Ibid, pp 13

efforts such as START and the exchange of low level staff.³⁸ As evidenced in the plethora of writing on campaign and operational design, there is always a better mousetrap that can be built and this has led to doctrine shifts every time another seminal piece of doctrinal literature is written.³⁹

In contrast SOD does not espouse a hard wired solution that can be taken into the classroom and passed along to waiting doctrine sycophants heralding the next great step. Rather it is an open discourse on what works and what does not work and it requires participants to openly question the validity of the system in which they are operating.

In this regard in the 1990's DND was thrust down the path of managerial self-assessment and the continual review of our business practices as a way to deal with budget reductions and burgeoning overheads costs. As a consequence, DND organizations went through a tumultuous decade of management strategies as they adapted to the flavour of the day. One of the methods examined during this period was the concept of learning institutions which was presented in *The Fifth Discipline* by Peter Senge.⁴⁰ Senge advocates that organizations learn as they adapt to the circumstances around them and consequently improve their operating capacity. The focus is on long term objectives (strategic output) rather than on short term goals (tactical objectives) which reinforces the necessary systemic thinking required. The challenge for military planners is that SOD also advocates the reaching of consensus which is anathema to military personnel but is a staple product in civilian led agencies.⁴¹ The traditional

³⁸ E-mail, MGen Thibault to author 10 October 2007

³⁹ An online search in *Parameters* for new/emerging military doctrine produced 414 articles pertaining to recommendations to change doctrine approaches to operational design since 1997.


⁴⁰ Senge, Peter M. *The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization*. London, Random House, 1999. 14

⁴¹ Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 44, 1st quarter 2007 pp 108

military plan requires the establishment of a series of operations that lead to an end state, normally the destruction of the opposition's COG whereas SOD does not seek out the COG. Rather it is used to attempt to understand the system in order to manipulate the system into an acceptable model in line with what the strategic sponsor desires (national policy in the case of Whole of Government).⁴²

Previous figures have demonstrated the commonly accepted linear model and the broader ranging model presented by LCol Lessard. Common to both is a natural progression from left to right towards a desired end-state and along predetermined LOO's. A SOD model would also traverse left to right but it would also be prone to back tracking on itself or conducting sudden course corrections depending upon the discourse of the multi agency planning team. Rather than a preordained list of objectives, the SOD model utilizes learning events which are akin to the conduct of a mini system of systems analysis coupled with a determination as to whether the system requires modification to proceed. All of this reinforces the need to remain agile rather than being hidebound to doctrinal models.

⁴² Naveh, Shimon. *In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory*. 21



(Fig 4)

The irony in applying SOD is that those planners who believe they are part of a military renaissance of thinkers may be comfortable thinking outside the box but have not applied these concepts to changing the manner in which planning is conducted. Canada has not turned the corner on applying SOD as demonstrated by the CEFCOM linear campaign plan even though Whole of Government has been in vogue since 2005.⁴³ It is all well and good to quote Jomini and Clausewitz but if you are unable to break the paradigm it will remain *military think* versus *institutional think*.

To conclude this portion of the discourse it has been demonstrated that Whole of Government approaches require non-traditional doctrine. Accepted doctrine and its application is a well used crutch for military planners as it has proven to be successful time and again yet when faced with a Whole of Government approach it is unable to get out of the starting blocks. OGDs do not understand the military fixation with

⁴³ Comd CEFCOM presentation to AMSP 10 07 September 2007

comprehensive and time consuming planning and LOOs.⁴⁴ Neither the traditional LOO with DP's or the Lines of Effort approach is untenable but they may not be best suited to working with OGDs and the fluid dynamic that is the Whole of Government. SOD provides a mechanism to achieve consensus rather than leading from the front and aids in achieving buy-in at the outset and is adaptable to changing influences.

Part III – Where to from Here

In a recent exchange of e-mails with current and former Kandahar PRT Commanders as well as with CEFCOM staff it was explained that Whole of Government integration is in fact being achieved; “we have an LO at CIDA”.⁴⁵ Although a start, it is far from where Canada needs to be and it is demonstrative of the feel good nature of what the PRT is indeed accomplishing. This portion of the paper will examine how to better approach Whole of Government in order to build the relationships that Naveh espouses. This includes establishing a central office for Whole of Government, exercising the concept and finally examining whether embedding personnel in OGDs is worth the effort.

Relationship building is the key to gaining any value using a SOD model and this cannot be achieved on an ad hoc basis as is the current methodology. The overarching policy for 3D advocates closer working relationships in order to achieve synergistic effects, but there are no teeth behind the rhetoric. Committee meetings between OGD senior Staff Officers only reinforce the fact that the departments meet; this is not the worker level. Embedding personnel at the tactical level achieves effect but not at the

⁴⁴ Based upon the authors interaction with a Whole of Government team tasked to draft the Afghanistan Campaign Plan for CEFCOM in Summer 2007.

⁴⁵ E-mail MGen Thibault and J3 CEFCOM to author 10 October 2007

appropriate level. It has been argued that the PRT is achieving strategic effect⁴⁶ whereas this is in reality strategic communication of the tactical effect the PRT delivers. The application of SOD, or any other campaign design model, relies on staff interaction. The application of SOD reinforces the need to build a team that is able to communicate effectively and openly. Bearing this in mind a lead agency should be identified for Whole of Government or an office dedicated to Whole of Government should be stood up in order to prevent any one Department from taking ownership.

An article authored by RAND analysts in *Joint Force Quarterly* in 2007 proposes that the United States stand up a Prevention, Reconstruction, and Stabilization Cell encompassing three pillars: Strategic Planning, Crisis Management, and Coalition Building.⁴⁷ Doubtless this is too rich for Canada but the concept has merit. An office responsible for 3D could draw the resources from the current 3D contributing departments but it would create the necessary synergy by having a singular point of contact. Contingency planning for failing states would no longer be predominantly executed by DND but rather would encompass the 3D partners from the outset. This would have to incorporate START or be responsive to it. Unlike START this proposed organization should be stood up and manned on a fulltime basis rather than in response to pending crisis.

Hurricane Katrina demonstrated that not all departments acted in the best interest of the whole due to their politicization and this hampered recovery and rehabilitation

⁴⁶ E-Mail LCol Chamberlain, Commander Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team, to author 25 September 07

⁴⁷ *Joint Force Quarterly*, Issue 44, 1st quarter 2007 pp 108

efforts.⁴⁸ The lack of inter agency coordination was also prevalent in Iraq as evidenced in the Government Accountability Office Report GAO-07-549.⁴⁹ The lessons learned summary highlighted 212 instances in which issues involving inter agency coordination were formally filed as lessons learned, doubtless there were even more issues that were never filed as is common in the lessons learned milieu.⁵⁰ In the summary of recommendations to the Department of Defense (DoD) six of the eight recommendations pertained to a need to increase inter agency coordination. Interestingly enough DoD partially concurred with all six but never provided wholesale endorsement of the recommendations.⁵¹ The GAO report serves to reinforce the argument that planning remains uncoordinated and that information is not openly shared amongst the agencies which by extension reinforces the argument for a singular responsible organization or dedicated staff body. An argument could be made that the Privy Council Office (PCO) would be the appropriate level or government actor to bridge between the Departments but this is outside PCOs current mandate.⁵²

If a permanent 3D office is deemed unaffordable from the perspective of personnel then the logical solution would be to stand up a dedicated 3D team as soon as possible in the planning process. In the case of a permanent 3D office personnel will need to be posted to the new organization for a period of time that is lengthy enough to build relationships but not so long as to hamper staff turnover as long serving personnel become the institutional memory. In order to achieve the best bang for the buck it will be

⁴⁸ Dixon, Major Robert G, Monograph Systems Thinking for Integrated Operations: Introducing a Systemic Approach to Operational Art for Disaster Relief. pp54

⁴⁹ Government Accountability Office Report AO-07-549 dated May 2007, <http://www.gao.gov>, accessed 18 September 2007.

⁵⁰ Ibid pp49

⁵¹ Ibid pp52

⁵² <http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca>

necessary to make investments in personnel in each of the affected government departments. The RAND article advocates a five year term which may be suitable for Public Service employees but is too long for military personnel as such a lengthy posting would likely adversely affect their careers.

The establishment of the Operational Commands in the CF has driven a degree of “jointness” into the system and this will doubtless have benefits as staffs become exposed to other approaches. Secondment of public service personnel to DND establishments such as the CEFCOM J5 would aid in developing the requisite relationships and open exchange of information early in the planning cycle and as contingency plans are developed. As military personnel are posted out the Public Servant in many ways will become the standard bearer until the new staff is trained up. Doing this will require openness to plans and possibly to intelligence information sharing but this is easily mitigated through proper vetting of security credentials. The challenge that OGDs face is that they are considerably smaller than DND and giving up any personnel has an exponential impact that DND does not necessarily appreciate. Of course such a venture would have to be a quid pro quo investment at the very least to ensure that no particular government department is hard done by in the exchange. Such investments in personnel secondments will alleviate much of the confusion that presently exists in understanding what each organization brings to bear and thereby assists in developing the knowledge based advocated by Naveh in the application of SOD.

The unspoken question amongst CF staff officers who would be affected is how it will impact their careers. Although the challenge may be daunting and a worthy undertaking it is reasonable to assume that a degree of caution Such7e worth01 Tc 9(e)-1ed nlness

there is a reward or at the very least no penalty for jaunting off to an inter agency job. No empirical evidence exists with respect to Canadian staff officers being seconded, therefore the basis of the following analysis is drawn from a RAND study completed on behalf of the DoD to gauge the career impacts on personnel engaged in inter agency positions.⁵³ The RAND study assessed the career promotion impacts on officers who were posted to inter agency positions against those with no inter agency experience. Amongst the major rank level cohort there was a higher promotion rate for those who had zero inter agency appointments versus those with two or more postings who were promoted at the average rate of promotion.⁵⁴ This is more dramatic at the lieutenant colonel level where lieutenant colonels with two or more inter agency postings were not considered competitive for promotion and consequently were not selected for senior service colleges.⁵⁵ The Goldwater-Nicholls Act mandates that US military Officers can not make their way to the O-7 (Brigadier-General) level without having completed a joint/inter agency tour⁵⁶ although it is evident that joint does not necessarily equal inter agency. The conclusion presented in the paper is that efforts be made to determine career models for those exposed to multiple inter agency positions as there will be a negative impact on officer development and a reluctance to assume these positions if it will be a career inhibitor.

The same should hold true for the CF, otherwise the very real risk will exist that there will be an institutional reluctance to accept positions that could be potentially

⁵³ Thie, Harry & Harrell, Margaret & Emmerichs, Robert. *Interagency and International Assignments and Officer Career Management*, RAND Monograph Report, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1116/MR1116.chap2.pdf, accessed 18 September 2007

⁵⁴ Ibid pp70

⁵⁵ Ibid pp75

⁵⁶ Ibid 77

harmful to careers or more dangerously these positions will fall to Officers with minimal career aspirations which is the least desired cohort. The employment of military personnel in OGDs must be defined as worthwhile positions that have positive career impacts due to the complexity of the task. Selection of personnel at appropriate junctures in their career stream is also important in order to ensure that the necessary operational training has been completed otherwise it is recommended that only personnel in DP-3 be considered in order to bring the appropriate skill sets to bear.

Similarly efforts should be made to identify educational opportunities to provide personnel who will be working in inter agency positions with a broader range of skills sets to better understand the environment that they will be working in. The converse is true for public servants in OGDs who will work in or with DND, they should be provided opportunities to attend training at levels commensurate with where they will be working. It would be challenging to pull a public servant away from their billet to attend courses that are months in length but the payback would be substantial and would extend beyond the scholastic benefit. The establishment of networks of staff officers will be critical in building institutional credibility that will pay out for years, both ways. Exposure to courses such as the National Security Studies Programme already occur but generally this is at too high a level, well beyond the level three or four staff officer where the majority of the work is being completed. Participation in portions of the Advanced Military Studies Programme as well as segments of the Junior Command Staff Programme would reap significant pay off.

The personnel dynamics would be challenging in a Whole of Government model but the risk is worth the reward. Networking remains an invaluable tool that cannot be

overstated and should be encouraged through broadened participation. The greatest perceived risk in cross pollinating is in ensuring that military personnel who work in OGDs do not suffer in their career paths otherwise there is a risk of indifference. For the CF it will be critical to ensure that inter agency positions are rewarded and have value at least equal to staff billets in brigade or joint headquarters.

Conclusion

The requirement for unity of approach was outlined in the thesis statement at the outset and it is apparent after reviewing the current state of play and how Whole of Government is addressed that Unity of Command is required as well. Unity of Command will be achieved through the establishment and support of a dedicated organization that drives towards the desired end state with the appropriate tools. It was demonstrated that in its current construct Whole of Government has a hole in it and it is unachievable except in small snippets which do not amount to strategic success. Identification of systemic shortfalls and the subsequent adoption of a systems approach to make use of the energy and expertise of OGD partners are required to make substantive progress. Continued use of accepted campaign planning models will not achieve the necessary cohesion and synergy as they do not take into consideration the system dynamics of all contributors. The personnel who participate in Whole of Government must understand and believe that they have the backing of their departments and that the effort applied will not be wasted. Whole of Government positions must be made attractive and be value added to the

organizations through education and networking in order to reduce the bureaucracy that plagues inter departmental communication.

Whole of Government can work and can achieve effect but the problem must be looked at through a new lens, one that embraces multiple systems and inputs and is not caste along its very comfortable lines of operation. Failure to build a functional model for Whole of Government will leave a hole in the planning process that will prevent the desired end-state from being achieved without extraordinary efforts.

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