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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES  
Advanced Military Studies Program 10

**Get On With It: The Need to Re-Energize the Integration of Other Government  
Department Personnel with Canadian Forces Operational Functions.**

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## ABSTRACT

The modern battlespace is a place that requires new and integrated approaches in order for Canada to succeed. The Canadian Government launched its strategic direction through policy statements in which they announced a new way of approaching the national response to international crises. This is now termed the Whole-of-Government approach, where the stakeholders would work together through interagency cooperation for both the planning and execution phase of an operation.

The benefits of this policy have yet to be realized at the operational level. There currently is a lack of interagency coordination, oversight or permanent working groups. This is perpetuated by a void of interagency doctrine, training or collective professional development. These factors will be demonstrated in this paper using current published studies that illustrate the need to move on this issue with haste. While successes are highlighted at the tactical level in the actions of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, there is as yet limited progress at the operational level.

This issue is not solely a Canadian affliction. Allied nations have taken on this problem with varying levels of success. While the American experience has been similar to the Canadian one, the British and Australians lead the way. Their nations have mandated operational level interagency cooperation complete with training, resources, professional education and permanent working and command and control relationships that ensure military, police, judicial, development and aid agencies work cooperatively within national interests and towards national goals.

This paper lays out the roadmap of how Canada could best approach this issue. We must get on with it or risk becoming victims of our own inaction.

*No man is entitled to the blessings of freedom  
unless he be vigilant in its preservation*

*General Douglas MacArthur*

Warfare has evolved in recent history from a symmetrical force-on-force conflict to include an asymmetrical construct. This has forced western democratic nations such as Canada to rapidly adapt to the changes required to fight and win in the modern battle space. These challenges have presented a new operational environment. General Charles Krulak of the United States Marine Corps coined the term the Three Block War where he stated that soldiers must not only fight in combat, but must also assist in the delivery of humanitarian assistance in addition to conducting peace support tasks. In the modern battlespace, we must now also include Information Operations (IO). Working within this new construct allows for a holistic response to these new challenges. For the Canadian Forces (CF) in the midst of Transformation, the kinetic aspects of operations continue to be accomplished while the work in the other three areas is gaining in intensity.<sup>1</sup> CF personnel have become cognizant of the fact that they are best able to complete these non-kinetic tasks in concert with members of other government departments. Working together to achieve the final objective has been recognized as a way to succeed via more efficient and capable methods.

In the Canadian lexicon, the Whole of Government (WofG) approach is used to describe the inter-agency synergy employed in response to emergencies in failed or fragile states, countering terrorism and promoting human security. Recent agreements with other government departments (OGD) have allowed for the integration and training

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<sup>1</sup>Department of National Defence, The Canadian Army - Transformation. Available from [www.army.forces.gc.ca/LF/English/5\\_4\\_1\\_1.asp](http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/LF/English/5_4_1_1.asp); Internet; accessed 17 September 2007.

of military forces in an interagency context. While this strategic direction is a starting point, it is worth asking whether some doctrinal and institutional deficiencies are not precluding to some degree, the realization of this policy at the operational level. This matter is extremely important as Canada will not be able to fight and succeed within the current asymmetric environment in a manner consistent with our national interests unless this issue is resolved.

This paper will show that the effective implementation of the WofG approach is affected by operational level doctrine and institutional gaps that perpetuate a lack of mutual trust between departments, thwarts mutual understanding between departments and inhibit a standardized operational planning process that is essential to the successful execution of WofG operations. This will be demonstrated through a detailed review of the current Canadian situation and several case studies found in national and allied publications, reports and articles.

The demonstration of the argument is threefold and is designed to lead the reader from the strategic overview to the operational deficiency. Part One details the current strategic direction and frames the requirement for integrated operational level coordination. Part Two discusses the modern threats that Canada faces and highlights the WofG tactical level successes while illustrating the ad-hoc nature of the current WofG operational level process. Part Three discusses the requirement for interagency operational level doctrine, points to allied successes and proposes means for resolving this issue. This method will clearly show the linkages between the strategic level and what is required at the operational level, while providing for greater multi-national insights to this complex issue.

## **Canada's Whole of Government Approach in the Current Reality.**

### **Canada's Strategic Initiative**

A review of the current Canadian strategic direction is necessary in order to set the lack of operational level interagency cooperation in context. This review will focus on the asymmetrical threats noted in current documents and will detail initiatives and policy statements that have yet to reach maturity. The strategic policy for institutionalized interagency cooperation is best described in one document, Canada's International Policy Statement (IPS) in which the government articulated direction for the coming years.<sup>2</sup> It should be noted that while the current minority government of Prime Minister Harper has not fully endorsed this document, they have not issued amendments to it either. Within this document is a clear recognition that the nation is at risk from both state and non-state actors within an asymmetric environment. The risk to innocent civilians is significant as failed and fragile states impact world events. Today, Canada is heavily committed in one of those fragile states: Afghanistan.

Within the IPS is the notion that the Canadian Forces (CF) must fight in non-conventional ways. The "Three Block War" is addressed, as is the asymmetrical thought that:

"Today's front lines stretch from the streets of Kabul and the rail lines of Madrid to our own Canadian cities. These new threats will be met with a forward looking and integrated approach across departments and levels of government designed to protect Canadians and contribute to global security."<sup>3</sup>

The policy statement lists among its key initiatives an increase in Canada's diplomatic contributions to the resolution of regional disputes exploited by terrorists and

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<sup>2</sup> Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement*, (Updated August 23, 2007) [Statement on-line]; available from <http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/ips/ips>; Internet; accessed 30 September 2007, n.p.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, n.p.

to provide technical assistance to fragile states willing to combat terrorism through a new Counterterrorism Capability Building Program anchored in Foreign Affairs. Along with this new initiative, the IPS states that Canada will take advantage of every available tool including intelligence, law enforcement, financial institutions and military force.<sup>4</sup>

Working with the concepts of the Three Block War and IO, this illustrates the numerous instruments available to implement the WofG approach. These abilities will be focused on helping fragile states build new institutions and structures that contribute to security and economic growth.

The IPS also discusses another key initiative of the Government of Canada. It states that it will establish a Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) to plan and coordinate the swift and integrated civilian responses to any international crisis. START is to be linked between federal departments, especially National Defence and CIDA.<sup>5</sup> The START program will ensure that planning can be made available for early responses along with the deployment of personnel. However, while the IPS discusses in general terms the benefits of the START program, it clearly fails to point to, nor does it give specific guidance on, how this program will be implemented.

It is from direction such as the IPS that the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) issued his CF Collective Training and Exercise Guidance. In a CDS memo dated 30 July, 2007, direction was given regarding interagency training and exercises that will increase collaboration and interoperability. This specific direction mandates an increase in operational level capabilities achieved through interagency exercises. The CDS writes

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<sup>4</sup> Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement*, [Statement on-line]; available from <http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/ips/ips-overview5-en.aspx>; Internet; accessed 30 September 2007, n.p.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid, n.p.



that “Force Generators...must harness and synchronize training activities to deliver, in priority, units and task Forces (TF) highly skilled in joint, interagency and combined operations.” He further states that critical to the CF success is our ability to “interoperate with our OGD partners.”<sup>6</sup>

Both of these documents recognize that failed and fragile states lack any professional security force. Any existing force will require reform and rebuilding in the aftermath of an international intervention. These security forces not only include the military and paramilitary, but also police forces at various jurisdictional levels, the criminal justice system, intelligence agencies, the legislative functions and many of the required oversight organizations. The Canadian Forces may not take the lead in a majority of tasks as the necessary skill sets reside in OGD for many of the professionalization tasks. The concern for the operational commander is how best to employ these WofG capabilities within an organization so that all are working with a common focus towards the established end-state.

Any activities that come from operating at the operational level within a WofG approach obviously require joint and detailed planning. The strategic direction noted above demands comprehensive cross-departmental cooperation between National Defence, Foreign Affairs and the Canadian International Development Agency. However, only in the CF is there a unified pool of resources from which planning can take place.<sup>7</sup> This lack of OGD dedicated resources at the operational level impairs strategic thinking at the highest levels as each department may evaluate WofG activities

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<sup>6</sup> General Rick Hillier, *CF Collective Training and Exercise Guidance (CTEG) 2008/2009*. National Defence Headquarters: file 4500-4, DMCS No. 73825, 30 July, 2007, 3.

<sup>7</sup> Dr. Ann Fitz-Gerald, “The Centrality of Security Sector Reform in Post-Conflict War-to-Peace Transitions: Implications for the Military,” <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/seminars/2004/fitz-gerald.htm>; Internet accessed 21 September 2007, 3.

against its own aims. Without a WofG planning cell, the three departments will not be able to affect influence over each other and may prolong the current practice of ad-hoc WofG responses to international operations.

The IPS clearly outlines the necessity for a WofG approach to interagency cooperation and points to the benefits derived in making this institutional change. However, this process has stalled at the operational level and the historical ad-hoc method of addressing a government response to crises continues. Acknowledging the necessity of the WofG approach at the operational level is necessary to succeed in the modern environment. It is within this level of headquarters that the campaign planning and operational art exist in a multi-agency context and the successes can be achieved.

### **Canadian Operational Art**

When Canada deploys personnel internationally to aid failed or fragile states, the implied desire is to capitalize on the synergy realized in their cooperation. Any interagency operational headquarters will have to manipulate many variables in order to succeed. This will require a familiarity with doctrine and best practices realized through permanent, as opposed to ad-hoc, working relationships.

The Canadian Forces publication entitled *Canadian Forces Operations* clearly articulates the differing levels of conflict. It defines the operational level of conflict as:

the level at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives and initiating actions and applying resources to bring about and sustain those events. They ... provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Department of National Defence, B-GG-005-004/AF-000 *Canadian Forces Operations* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2000), 1-5.

While the operational level of conflict may be clearly defined, the definition and employment of the operational art is more difficult. Canadian Forces Operations helps in this regard through their description:

Operational art is the skill of translating this strategic direction into operational and tactical action. It...is that vital link between the setting of military strategic objectives and the tactical employment of forces on the battlefield through the skilful execution of command at the operational level. Operational art involves the design, planning, and conduct of campaigns and major operations. Operational level art requires commanders with broad vision, the ability to anticipate, and a careful understanding of the relationship of means to ends. Using operational art, the commander applies intellect to the situation to establish and transmit a vision for the accomplishment of the strategic objective.<sup>9</sup>

Since the end of the Cold War, the CF has been forced to adapt to asymmetric warfare. No longer is the military likely to face a similarly equipped opponent in a military versus military campaign. Today's battles are most probably fought in large urban areas against a variety of forces; examples include opposing military, paramilitary, neighbourhood militias and criminal gangs. And, due to the ever-quicken pace of operations, operational level planners do not have the luxury of working through issues at a gentle pace. Pierre Lessard argues that in today's operational environment, any ad-hoc approach to the operational level campaign design involving the WofG approach is clearly insufficient. A permanent inter-agency grouping is required to properly execute the required tasks efficiently. Multiple federal level agencies must begin to work together in the near term, creating an in-depth understanding of capabilities, mutual trust and professional development.<sup>10</sup>

Howard Coombs writes that operational military planning staffs "...must be subordinate to the imperatives of multiple non-military agencies"<sup>11</sup> during the post-

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid. 3-1.

<sup>10</sup> Pierre Lessard, "Campaign Design for Winning the War...And The Peace," *Parameters* 35, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 45.

<sup>11</sup> H.G. Coombs, *Perspectives on Operational Thought*. (Toronto: Canadian Forces College, 2004), 18/73.

conflict stage of a multi-national intervention. It is through the campaign plan that the links between the multiple efforts of differing agencies can progress towards the end-state. These must be planned prior to execution and manipulated throughout in order to achieve the necessary effects.

The WofG approach should be embraced with planning staffs from all major contributing departments permanently collocated to enable the commander and enhance his ability to utilize operational art. This allows for the efficient use of personnel and resources. While the discussion up to now has detailed the requirement, a review of the current threat is necessary to enhance understanding of why Canada must re-energize its operational level integration.

## **The Threat**

### **Operational Threat Constructs**

The modern operational environment has changed from a symmetrical to an asymmetrical battlespace. The relevance of this factor is that it is at the operational level where the coordinated planning to achieve the end-state and to counter the opponent's effects will be developed. Therefore, it is crucial to develop a detailed understanding of how exactly the current asymmetrical threat is formed.

It is apparent that there is no single definitive source that is able to define asymmetrical threats. For the purposes of this paper, asymmetric threats will be contrasted from symmetric warfare where opposing forces seek similar goals through similar actions and dissymmetrical warfare where conflicts involve opposing armed

forces of different sizes which have similar goals but use different levels of resources and actions to attain them.<sup>12</sup>

C. Primmerman attempts to define asymmetric threats within three criteria. First, an asymmetric threat must involve a weapon, tactic or strategy that a state or non-state actor could and would use against a nation. Second, it must involve a weapon, tactic or strategy that a nation (Canada) would not employ. By extension, this means that Canada would not employ the weapon, tactic or strategy even if we had the means to deliver it. If Canada would not combat this threat by reciprocating in kind, the weapon, tactic or strategy meets the criteria of been asymmetric. Finally, the threat must involve a weapon, tactic or strategy, which if not countered, will have a serious impact on operational capabilities and can therefore be stated to be a threat.<sup>13</sup>

Pierre Pahlavi expanded on this definition in his discussion on asymmetric threats in the information age. He stated that “asymmetry is the product of the dissymmetry of material strength; in other words, it results from an inequality in traditional military capabilities.”<sup>14</sup> One’s opponents will move their struggle to a secondary plane in order to exploit any perceived weaknesses. In Canada’s current operational environment, the field of warfare now include the internet and national public opinion, all of which have been manipulated by our opponents through a variety of media.

Asymmetric threats can be broken down into the following three groupings allowing for individual examination. Equipment and resource asymmetric threats include

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<sup>12</sup> France, Defense Department, *The 30 Year Prospective Plan: A Summary* (2006); available from [www.defense.gouv.fr/.../48526/481370/file/the\\_30\\_years\\_prospective\\_plan\\_a\\_summary\\_pp30\\_chapitres\\_e\\_n.pdf](http://www.defense.gouv.fr/.../48526/481370/file/the_30_years_prospective_plan_a_summary_pp30_chapitres_e_n.pdf); accessed 2 October, 2007, 10.

<sup>13</sup> C.A. Primmerman, *Thoughts on the Meaning of “Asymmetric Threats”*, Report prepared for the Department of the Air Force (Lexington, Mass., MIT, 2006), 5.

<sup>14</sup> Dr. Pierre Pahlavi, *The 33-Day War: An Example of Psychological Warfare in the Information Age*, *Canadian Army Journal*, Vol. 10.2 (Summer 2007): 9.

the use of chemical weapons and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Examples of these types of attack are the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo cult's release of sarin gas into the Tokyo, Japan subway and the weekly roadside IEDs that Canadian and coalition forces deal with in Afghanistan. Operational forms of asymmetric threats include environmental and computer attacks. Examples of these are the Kuwait oilfield fires set by the retreating Iraqi forces at the end of the first Gulf War and the seemingly constant attempts by many different parties to attack the computer systems of Canada. Strategic level asymmetric threats may include state-sponsored and funded terrorist groups continuing to attack Canada with the apparent tactic of prolonged fighting, playing on Western nations' aversion to on-going casualties and funding of a war without end.<sup>15</sup>

The current operating environment requires a clear understanding of asymmetrical threats at all levels. Failure to respond appropriately leaves Canada at risk to attack. This discussion has highlighted the variables of asymmetrical threats. While it has been demonstrated that there is an institutional gap at the operational level, the tactical level has enjoyed some degree of WofG successes.

### **Operational Concerns versus Tactical Successes**

The lack of urgency noted in the implementation of the WofG approach at the operational level is not indicative of what is occurring within the areas of professional development and tactical level operations. To be fair, this WofG initiative has seen successes and will continue to evolve.

With the current training of Canadian military officers at the operational level, it can be argued that the institution has prepared itself for the threats it now faces. Formal

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<sup>15</sup> C.A. Primmerman, *Thoughts on the Meaning of "Asymmetric Threats"*, Report prepared for the Department of the Air Force (Lexington, Mass., MIT, 2006), 8-9.

courses at the Canadian Forces College teach the Operational Planning Process and Operational Art to several hundred military officers every year. This formally prepares military officers to accept staff and command positions within an operational level headquarters and to function efficiently. With the exception of the Canadian Security Studies Programme taught at the Canadian Forces College, a weakness is that these courses do not include students from CIDA and Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Their absence perpetuates cultural barriers and fails to promote any working relationships.

Experience gained on overseas WofG operations is currently lost as OGD personnel return from deployments to their Canadian work assignments. Operational synergy does not extend past the theatre boundaries to be reflected within Canadian domestic operations nor in the continued integration of OGDs once the international operation has closed out. This perpetuates the doctrinal and institutional deficiency that holds back the realization of the strategic direction at the operational level. This is a serious concern and places Canada at risk should reform at the operational level fail to be re-energized.

However, Canada has moved forward in the evolution of the WofG approach. Vanguard Magazine cited BGen D. Fraser in noting that for Canada, the 3D concept has been evolutionary.<sup>16</sup> In the non-permissive environment of Afghanistan, the international community is being forced into the integrated approach by necessity. It is not just the

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<sup>16</sup> BGen David Fraser, "The Evolution of 3D: The military's new paradigm," *Vanguard Magazine*, (September 2006) [journal on-line]; available from <http://www.vanguardcanada.com/Evolutionof3DFraser>; Internet; accessed 20 September 2007, n.p.

Canadian team members that work together; rather the Afghan government is also represented. Each piece of the coalition puzzle brings different strengths to the table.

At the tactical level, the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) now includes Foreign Affairs, CIDA, the RCMP and Correctional Services Canada. This team is able to act quickly to help promote stability and security for the Afghan people. BGen Fraser noted that a lesson learned was that we needed to build a “new team of teams”... with the Canadian government working together.<sup>17</sup> His observation that he did not lead the team but rather facilitated it points to the expertise that resides in the other government departments for non-military matters. This approach is not something that emerged overnight. It is the realization that independent actions by various government departments conducted over a number of international deployments into Bosnia and Kosovo did not meet expectations nor did the sum of the experiences of those involved get passed along to others as lessons learned or doctrine.<sup>18</sup>

One of the key successes in this WofG approach is the ongoing professionalization of the Afghan police forces. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police have placed a Superintendent and several constables within the PRT in Kandahar to help tackle the complicated task of helping the Afghans build a credible, professional civilian police force where warlords once meted out justice. The RCMP has made contacts with and is mentoring the Afghan National Police (ANP), the Border Police (ABP) and the National Highway Police (AHP). They monitor the police activities, organize training

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<sup>17</sup> BGen David Fraser, “The Evolution of 3D: The military’s new paradigm,” *Vanguard Magazine*, (September 2006) [journal on-line]; available from <http://www.vanguardcanada.com/Evolutionof3DFraser>; Internet; accessed 20 September 2007, n.p.

<sup>18</sup> R. Parkins and C. Thatcher, “Common Narrative: Canada’s integrated approach to Afghanistan.” *Vanguard Magazine*. (July 2007) [journal on-line]; available from <http://www.vanguardcanada.com/CommonNarrativeMulroney>; Internet; accessed 26 September 2007, n.p.



secessions and provide peer mentorship at all levels. While the Germans are leading the national level police reforms, it falls to the Canadians in Kandahar to establish police sub-stations and attempt to ensure all the police forces in the local area are brought up to international standards.<sup>19</sup>

Clearly, the Canadian Forces are not in a position to mentor these Afghan police forces to any state of professionalization. The RCMP has a long history of international policing operations and these coupled with their professional expertise illustrate their unique capabilities and contributions to the WofG approach in operations.<sup>20</sup> While these capabilities are used to best advantage overseas, they are usually lost when the member is re-deployed to Canada and posted to a detachment to conduct normal framework policing.

With the emphasis on a WofG approach to the Afghan operation, it is not surprising that the highest levels of government are involved. Mr. David Mulroney, now a senior executive with Foreign Affairs stated that prior to Afghanistan, the three departments of CIDA, Defence and Foreign Affairs were allowed to do their own thing when serving together in operations. This lack of coordination and focus merely allowed to the status quo to be maintained. Acknowledging that this clearly did not work in anyone's best interest, Mulroney stated that the current thought is to develop a single Government of Canada approach that is compelling in its ability to shape the programs on the ground.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Chris Thatcher, "Professionalizing the Afghan Police," *Vanguard Magazine* (January 2006) [journal on-line]; available from <http://www.vanguardcanada.com/ProfessionalPolicingThatcher>; Internet; accessed 20 September 2007, n.p.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid, n.p.

<sup>21</sup> R. Parkins and C. Thatcher, "Common Narrative: Canada's integrated approach to Afghanistan." *Vanguard Magazine*. (July 2007) [journal on-line]; available from <http://www.vanguardcanada.com/CommonNarrativeMulroney>; Internet; accessed 26 September 2007, n.p.

Critics could state that this previous state of affairs is still reflected at the operational level currently in Afghanistan. This approach is dependent upon a progressive evolution that admittedly cannot produce results overnight. However, while progress to date is commendable, it is not going far enough. Mulroney states that Afghanistan will influence how we conduct future international operations and notes that “CEFCOM...represents the Forces institutional memory when it comes to work. There is no need to reinvent the wheel after each deployment.”<sup>22</sup> While this sounds admirable, it is found wanting. CEFCOM is an operational level headquarters with many tasks. A percentage of its staff officers are rotated with each annual posting schedule. Any hope of retaining an institutional memory along with the requisite lessons learned is flawed if things remain the same. It is only through the integration of a WofG operations centre will there be an ability to capitalize upon the lessons learned. The fact that there is no existing WofG planning cell within CEFCOM headquarters reveals how hollow Mr. Mulroney’s statements are.

The requirement for a WofG operational planning cell is echoed in the reports written after the 2002 G8 Summit held in Kananaskis, Alberta. Colonel David Barr noted in regards to interagency planning that it was between the CF and RCMP where there was the greatest room for improvement. Barr stated that “...cooperation was excellent, but cooperation is one thing and joint planning is another.”<sup>23</sup> Barr notes that in conjunction to increasing joint planning abilities is the requirement for a unified command, both in structure and location. Not to do so, as in the case of the G8 Summit,

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid, n.p.

<sup>23</sup> Colonel David Barr, “The Kananaskis G8 Summit: A Case Study in Interagency Cooperation,” *Canadian Military Journal* (Winter 2003-2004), 43.

complicated coordination, direction and the overall control of the forces in place.<sup>24</sup>

These lessons learned from past operational level WofG experiences must be re-visited and acted upon by ensuring they are captured in doctrine and procedures.

### **Canadian Interagency Research**

It is acknowledged that prior to any modification of how government departments conduct their business within the WofG approach, research must be conducted that will identify best practices and allow for the capturing of lessons learned. This methodology is prudent when viewed in light of the current operational construct. It is also relevant as the research will aid in identifying supported and supporting departments to a WofG operation.

The Canadian Forces Experimentation Centre recently held a series of multi-agency exercises with the aim of providing military, diplomatic, development and non-governmental organizations an understanding of the issues and complexities of working together within a complex operation. The Multinational Experimentation (MNE) series is part of a program initiated through the U.S. Joint Forces Command in 2002 that sought to refine the conduct of multinational effects-based operations. The scope of the experiment was to focus all military and non-military agencies to achieve a common aim and objective in difficult circumstances. The latest experiments occurred between February 27 and March 17, 2006 and included eight nations and a NATO contingent linked together in a networked experiment to assess effects-based multinational missions. This holistic view of conducting operations documented the skill sets of all the participants and gained insights into the opponent's military capabilities, along with the operational

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid, 44.

area's infrastructure, economy, cultural and political issues. This common understanding of more-than-military issues is vital in reducing the risk to Canada's national interests.<sup>25</sup>

Another Canadian project however, highlights the lack of progress in interdepartmental operational capability: the Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group (IMSWG). The 2002 study detailed the information exchange requirements between departments and agencies with mandates in marine security. The study notes "...the pace of progress has been glacial in the face of legal and bureaucratic stumbling blocks."<sup>26</sup> This study caught the attention of the Auditor General who noted that "Coordinating the efforts of the agencies involved is acknowledged as critical to their overall effectiveness."<sup>27</sup> These comments acknowledge the major cultural shifts that are required to ensure an operationally effective response to the strategic direction.

These experiments and studies find that while the government wishes to achieve a strategic aim through operational level effects, those effects do not have to be delivered by the military. In many scenarios, it was the military that was supporting the other agencies. The MNE experiment found a growing level of trust both amongst the participating militaries and between the military and non-military agencies. While this is re-assuring, it is not always the case. Further experiments are expected to occur in 2008 involving an African failed state scenario. It will involve participation from the government departments that have the necessary expertise in that area of the world. It falls into line with the stated aim of the government to use a WofG approach with

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<sup>25</sup> Chris Thatcher, "Multinational Experiment offers Holistic Picture of Afghan Operations," *Vanguard Magazine*, (January, 2006)[journal on-line]; available from <http://www.vanguardcanada.com/MultinationalexperimentoffersholisticpictureofAfghanoperations>; Internet; accessed 28 September 2007, n.p.

<sup>26</sup> Greg Aikins, "Network-Centric Operations and Interdepartmental Marine Security," *Canadian naval Review* volume 1, no. 3 (Fall 2005), 22.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid*, 22.

intervention operations<sup>28</sup> and works toward a permanent WofG relationship aimed at the protection of Canadian interests and its citizens.

It has been shown that Canada has rightly identified the WofG approach as the most effective method of responding to the current threat environment. Further, the most efficient method of developing an integrated campaign plan and implementing operational art demands permanent WofG working groups. The implication of this is a profound cultural shift in how the various departments should conduct themselves. The argument strengthens the central question highlighting institutional deficiencies that block the realization of the WofG policy at the operational level.

### **Searching for the Answer**

While the current operations in Afghanistan are returning critical lessons learned, it is through experiments such as that noted above that some of the increased uncertainty of asymmetric warfare can be reduced by re-visiting doctrine. Additionally, working within an allied context allows for a cross pollination of best practices. This section will tie the issues noted above with specific recommendations that can re-energize the operational level integration of OGDs.

### **Interagency Doctrine**

Doctrine should succinctly state the collective knowledge of how the nation conducts operations. While doctrine is usually discussed in a strictly military sense, it is becoming more apparent that doctrine must include the inter-relationships with the OGDs that will partner with Defence when deploying domestically or to failed or fragile states.

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<sup>28</sup> Chris Thatcher, "Multinational Experiment offers Holistic Picture of Afghan Operations," *Vanguard Magazine*, (January, 2006)[journal on-line]; available from <http://www.vanguardcanada.com/MultinationalexperimentoffersholisticpictureofAfghanoperations>; Internet; accessed 28 September 2007, n.p.

The historian and strategist J.F.C. Fuller stated “...the central idea of an army is known as its doctrine...which to be effective must be elastic enough to admit of mutation in accordance with change in circumstances. In its ultimate relationship to the human understanding this central idea or doctrine is nothing else than common sense-that is, action adapted to circumstance.”<sup>29</sup> While Fuller probably did not have the WofG approach in mind when he wrote this, his idea that doctrine must be flexible to meet changing requirements is key to adapting how we operate in today’s threat construct.

In asymmetric warfare, surprise and uncertainty are raised to a new level. Doctrine must therefore provide a way to think about asymmetry. It must address the WofG operational context that will reduce the uncertainty of working against a highly skilled and unpredictable opponent. Through experiments like the one noted above, coupled with operational deployments and interagency working groups, emerging interagency doctrine should prepare all of the participating departments with the ability to respond to uncertainty effectively.

Emerging interagency doctrine should not predict the nature of future conflicts. It should attempt to forecast the opponent’s traits and a body of collective knowledge that the WofG approach requires to respond effectively to the very chaotic environment. Emerging doctrine should also detail how we might expect to operate based on past experiences and provide the link between research, theory, history, experimentation and practise. It forms a definitive body of knowledge that allows past experiences to be most effectively applied. Finally, doctrine provides a common understanding and language that easily allows each department to understand what should be accomplished. Doctrine

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<sup>29</sup> J.F.C. Fuller, *The Foundations of the Science of War*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, reprinted 1993), 254.

must not only provide the operational concept, but also a philosophy on how WofG must operate. This will capitalize on the strengths of the WofG force and orient it for success.<sup>30</sup>

It is clear that operating in an asymmetric environment such as Afghanistan requires a rapid response to these new threats. There is little time or opportunity once deployed to find out each others strengths and weaknesses. This must be accomplished prior to deploying through close inter-agency association that allows personnel to find mutual trust with their peers and the ability to think critically and act together as one when the time for action arrives.

Ancker and Burke write that to be effective in today's asymmetric environment, doctrine must be developed that addresses several points. Firstly, the doctrine must have an operational focus that is more than just high-intensity warfare. It must reflect the ability to counter any opponent's threat with a capability. Secondly, doctrine must reflect the forecasting of probable enemy actions rather than the enemy's predictability. The current operations have shown that the opponent is able to learn from past outcomes and is therefore anything but predictable. The ability to address the "why" will allow leaders at all levels to better prepare themselves for the immediate future.<sup>31</sup>

Doctrine must also emphasize the necessity to prepare by being creative. It is clear that on many occasions a military kinetic response may not be the best option and may in fact even solidify the opponent's resolve. Doctrine must be able to educate all concerned about the second and third order effects their actions will have. The chances

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<sup>30</sup> Col. C.J. Ancker III and LTC M.D. Burke, "Doctrine for Asymmetric Warfare," *Military Review*, (July-August 2003): 19.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid*, 24.

of unintended consequences increase relative to the uncertainty of the operation.<sup>32</sup>

Therefore, doctrine must mitigate risk by rapidly addressing emerging threats via interagency organizations that are permanent in nature.

The CF's current efforts of ensuring recent practices are reviewed and disseminated in a timely manner must be expanded to include the WofG approach. Obviously, merely having doctrine that addresses the current operational environment is not sufficient. We must effectively produce an all encompassing program that allows for the WofG to become involved in the education and professional development that will allow assimilation of knowledge. This includes, but is not limited to the inclusion of OGD personnel on Canadian Forces College courses and inter-departmental secondments between operations centres. These active learning environments will ensure that all are better prepared to meet the uncertainty of future deployments.<sup>33</sup>

### **The Multinational Experience**

While searching for a method that will properly fulfill strategic direction, it is helpful to look at other nations who are currently experiencing similar issues. While their individual methods may not entirely fit the Canadian requirement, one could find applicable methodologies that may inspire or allow a reduction in the risk to Canada.

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) launched a study in 2006 studying the whole of government approach and found a number of striking items of interest. Each department was seen to have a different cultural environment due to internal processes and procedures. There was a tendency for all departments to resist horizontal integration and instead revert back to the comfort of the

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<sup>32</sup> Ibid, 24.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid, 25.



vertical work place. Budgetary and interdepartmental rivalries also impacted on the ability to secure operational level integration. Finally, it is clear that governments who do not have an integrated approach will not successfully realize the potential of any intervention in failed states. Assessing joint inter-agency abilities and requirements holistically will go a long way to ensuring strategic goals are properly translated into theatre objectives.<sup>34</sup>

While the above noted OECD study found issues within the functioning of interagency cooperation, individual nations report a variety of issues and successes. The United States is currently facing a situation akin to that in Canada. James Carafano states that agreement is reached without too much difficulty at the policy level in Washington. He cites as an example the establishment of the Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs) through policy directives that have the responsibility for drug interdiction along the coastlines of America.<sup>35</sup>

While this strategic initiative has been successful, it is at the operational level that success is not realized. Past experiences dealing with the Cold War did not require much in the way of interagency cooperation with the result that agencies had vertical, but not horizontal relationships. Carafano cites the most recent example of Iraq where interagency cooperation remains terribly flawed. The United States military forces, the Coalition Provisional Authority and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) all developed large and complex reconstruction projects. However, each agency had their own vision, campaign plan and method of acquiring

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<sup>34</sup> Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, *Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States* (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2006), 11.

<sup>35</sup> James Jay Carafano, *Herding Cats: Understanding Why Government Agencies Don't Cooperate and How to fix the Problem*, Heritage Lectures No. 955 (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation), July 26, 2006, n.p.

personnel and materiel for their projects. The uncoordinated result reflected operational mismanagement and lack of focus that could be traced back to the lack of shared knowledge and practices. Coupled with a lack of trust or familiarity that prior interagency cooperation would have promoted, the current situation remains dire.<sup>36</sup>

It is the United Kingdom that appears to be leading the way in interagency cooperation at the operational level. A Department for International Development document states that partnership based cooperation between civilian and military forces is vital and must involve continuous planning. Further, it states that the defence and public security policy must be framed within an overarching national policy context. This requires an inter-agency response combining finance, foreign affairs and the national security forces. Finally, those attempting to meet the requirements of policy need to acquire the skill sets of differing departments and assess how the government is best able to respond to emerging security threats.<sup>37</sup> This implies that there is a requirement for a new career path that includes all departments, where one is able to acquire necessary job knowledge and skill sets.

Fitz-Gerald states that the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for International Development have all been placed in what is referred to as the Global Conflict Prevention Pool. This strategic initiative was taken to ensure that these departments would work in a cooperative and synergistic manner. These departments work jointly within public sector agreement targets and are tasked and managed by Cabinet committees and joint steering teams of officials in each department

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<sup>36</sup> Ibid, n.p.

<sup>37</sup> United Kingdom, Department for International Development, *Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reforms* (London: U.K. Stairway Communication, ISBN 1 86192 473 9), 22.

who guide the planning process.<sup>38</sup> Therefore, strategic efforts to enable those working at the operational level have succeeded to the point where the various departments are working in close cooperation to ensure a coordinated government response to a crisis.

The Australian approach to inter-agency cooperation at the operational level is also markedly progressive. Air Chief Marshall Houston noted that Australia is working to expand their networks to include other agencies in a “national effects-based approach.” He further noted that the Australian Defence Forces will move from a joint force to an integrated force with their creation of the Headquarters Joint Operations Command in Bungendore, New South Wales.<sup>39</sup> The aim of this new initiative is to employ the national resources in the most effective and efficient manner.

The Australian approach clearly concedes that the defence department will not always be in the best position to be the lead agency in operations. Further, Australia understands that defence must work intimately with the OGDs to develop this multi-agency approach at the operational level. Representatives from the federal police force, foreign affairs and trade have become completely integrated as permanent members of the planning and operations staffs of the new headquarters.<sup>40</sup>

Much of the U.K. and Australian experience could be used within Canada. A new career stream with each member acquiring the skill sets and job knowledge of the various departments might decrease mutual distrust currently perpetuated by vertical hierarchies. Coupled with a permanent integrated operational headquarters, Canada could re-energize its current void in operational level integration. However, implementing the joint

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<sup>38</sup> Ann M. Fitz-Gerald, *Addressing the Security-Development Nexus: Implications for Joined-Up Government*. Policy Matters 5, no. 5. Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy (July 2004), 14.

<sup>39</sup> Australia, Chief of Defence Force, *Joint Operations for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* (Canberra May 2007). Available from [www.defence.gov.au/publications/FJOC.pdf](http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/FJOC.pdf); Internet; accessed 27 September 2007, n.p.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid*, n.p.

steering teams as oversight committees could prove to be problematic. Each Canadian department has its own culture and mandates. Unless strong leadership could be exerted by Cabinet Committees, inter-departmental rivalries could further inhibit this process.

### **The Way Ahead**

It has been shown that the requirement exists to re-energize the operational level WofG approach in order to reduce the risk to Canada's national interests. The nation is fighting a global war on terror, where we must not only dislocate our enemies militarily, but must also work collectively with political, economic, social and information variables. The operational level commander must include the civil, political and moral issues in his campaign design. In order to succeed, the operational level commander must also be cognizant of the diplomatic, informational, military and economic factors within the battlespace. Other agencies and their differing perspectives will allow for different approaches to what once was a strictly military matter.<sup>41</sup>

The Australian experience shows that broadening the J9 branch to include other government experts on economic, cultural, historical and public administration would go a long way to ensuring a permanent planning capability within operational headquarters. Framed within the Commander's vision and guidance, up-to-date understanding and application of all the elements of national power (Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic) against the opponent's environment should produce the desired effects. This will ensure that three key elements are addressed. The commander and his staff will work with theatre and international partners to produce an operational level campaign plan with clearly defined ends, they will define the desired conditions, or ways, to

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<sup>41</sup> General (Ret.) Gary Luck, *Insights on Joint Operations: The Art and Science. Best Practices*, Report Prepared for U.S. Joint Forces Command (Joint Warfighting Center, September 2006) 2.

achieve these ends and working within the WofG approach, the commander will develop a set of actions and orchestrate the campaign plan to produce the desired effects that ultimately achieve the objectives, the means.<sup>42</sup>

The operational art exercised by the Commander must increasingly use the skill sets of an integrated J9 branch. These experts will provide the Commander with options to better allow him to conduct the operational campaign in a manner that enhances nation building by experts. This inclusive approach infers that we all understand the requirement for interagency work. This also implies extending personal relationships and establishing trust and confidence to ensure success. Interagency cooperation cannot be left solely to the deployment portion of the operation, but rather must be fostered through permanent interagency working groups allowing each to lead as necessary.

One of the main avenues to develop integrated action and relationships is to establish a shared body of common knowledge, practices and experiences amongst the departments. The military achieves this through joint service education and assignments. No such joint interagency professional development program currently exists. As previously noted, a joint interagency exercise is a start, but falls well short of integrated WofG courses taught at the operational level.

Tamas noted that the military and CIDA have very divergent educational systems; the military's is extensive while the development agency has none. CIDA does not train its development workers and there is no career path for aspiring development workers to

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<sup>42</sup> Ibid, 10.

move progressively through more complicated assignments.<sup>43</sup> Permanent interagency working groups and integrated professional development would help to resolve this issue.

Part of any cooperative educational system must be the teaching of the department's culture and power relationships. Tamas notes that the word "sir" and all that it implies is not part of the development workers lexicon. This highlights the need for an integrated professional development institution and permanent cooperative working groups that build mutual trust and understanding. It also highlights the need for the establishment of an alternate career path for development officers whereby they gain the necessary skill sets over a number of years of increasingly complex operational level interagency deployments.<sup>44</sup>

In order to make the WofG approach better reflect the strategic direction, it is time to establish a structure that best supports Canadian national interests. This must facilitate interagency operations both domestically and internationally, while still maintaining combat effectiveness. LGen (Ret.) Crabbe et al. noted in January 2007 that situational awareness is a victim of the current fragmented Canadian command structure. It is arguable that this fragmentation is a significant contributor to the operational level doctrine and institutional gaps that negatively impact the WofG approach. Further study is required to determine the effect this doctrinal void has on closing the institutional gap.

There should be movement towards gaining a common operating structure that exploits networked enabled operations. While it is acknowledged that current CF transformation is straining personnel resources, a common command centre would not only enhance situational awareness, it would aid in the integration of interagency

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<sup>43</sup> Andy Tamas, *Development and the Military in Afghanistan: Working with Communities*, Ottawa, ON: Strategic Advisory Team Afghanistan CIDA, 7 September, 2006, 7.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid, 8.

operations. LGen (Ret.) Crabbe et al. noted that “as a priority, it is recommended that a single and common command centre be created for Canada COM, CEFCOM and CANSOFCOM. And, a failure to do so could constitute significant operational risk for the CF”<sup>45</sup> and by extension Canadian national interests.

## **Conclusion**

This paper began with the idea that Canada requires immediate action to re-energize the operational level implementation of the WofG approach. It reviewed the linkages between the given strategic direction and the slow pace of operational implementation. It also emphasized the risk to Canada within the current asymmetrical environment should this pace of reform not be re-energized. The experiences of Canada’s allies were reviewed with the conclusion that while each nation strives to meet the aim, for some, it remains incomplete at the operational level. Finally, some recommendations were made that allowed for a logical and paced improvement in our ability to effectively respond to crises via an operational level headquarters.

The current ad-hoc nature of piecing together the WofG approach to Canadian operations is neither in keeping with recent strategic direction nor with the recent best practices noted. With the 2010 Vancouver Olympics on the horizon, we should be collectively acting to provide a combined operational level headquarters that utilizes best practices, addresses doctrine and leads the way, no matter which department is the lead agency. While Heritage Canada has assumed the lead for the Olympics, the security planning task has been devolved to the R.C.M.P. Without due regard for horizontal WofG consultation, this approach is rife with danger.

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<sup>45</sup> LGen R. Crabbe (Ret.), VAdm. L. Mason (Ret.) and LGen. (Ret.) F. Sutherland, *A Report on the Validation of the Transformed Canadian Forces Command Structure*, Report Prepared for the CDS, (31 January, 2007), 61.

Experimentation, training and exercises have been mandated and are essential to improve collective understanding. However, they are no substitute for action. Permanent planning and working groups coupled with formal professional development courses and a new development career path will go a long way to enhancing the operational level abilities. The risks involved are too great to carry on as we currently are. Within the current Canadian ad-hoc model, the successes could be attributed to certain personalities that understand the requirement and the necessity to act with speed. However, this may not always be the case and the requirement to institutionalize the process is urgent. This is in no way a criticism of the current tactical level initiatives underway in Afghanistan. The Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team is a success because it is able to act within the WofG approach. Development within an insecure environment requires more than just military boots on the ground. The successes at the strategic and tactical levels are encouraging. However, it is at the operational level that we must get on with it.

Canada, along with its allied nations, has made some progress. Having taken WofG to heart, it is now time to institutionalize the approach for both nation building and national security.



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