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Research Essay

Leading a Multinational Force Without Leaving Anyone Behind- The Human Dimensions of Marginalisation

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> Proficiency in command at the operational level requires the ability to integrate the operations of different environments (and often allied forces) towards the achievement of campaign objectives.[1]
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> Land Force Doctrine Manual- Command- 1996

INTRODUCTION

The proliferation of the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions in the early 1990s resulted in an ever-increasing demand for peacekeeping forces. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali reported in his 1995 update to the UN that countries contributing military and police personnel went from 26 in 1988 to 76 in 1994. He also indicated that the number of military personnel deployed went from 9,570 to 73,393 over the same period.[2] This increased demand brought along significant changes specifically with regard to the member states contributing troops. In June 1994, the top three contributing states were France, Bangladesh and India with the latter two deploying respectively over 7,000 and 5,000 troops.[3] However, by 1998, the Secretary–General indicated that the total number of troops deployed had dropped to a more manageable level of 14,500 military and police personnel. This decrease is attributed to the winding down of several major UN missions. On the other hand, he also indicated that the number of missions had actually risen from 15 to 17 in the previous year.[4] The surge in peacekeeping of the early 1990s highlighted a number of problems. Paramount among these, was the problem of getting those countries considered regular contributors to volunteer troops and equipment. For example, in the last few years, the Canadian Government has taken deliberate decisions not to participate in some specific UN peacekeeping and related operations. These decisions were taken in the light of ambiguous results in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Somalia and Rwanda and the downsizing of the military and growing pressure on Canadian defence

spending.[5] This reality had been reflected in that same 1995 report to the UN when Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali noted that:

> As regards the availability of troops and equipment, problems have become steadily more serious. Availability has palpably declined as measured against the Organisation's requirements. A considerable effort has been made to expand and refine stand-by arrangements, but these provide no guarantee that troops will be provided for a specific operation. For example, when in May 1994 the Security Council decided to expand the United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR), no one of the 19 Governments that at that time had undertaken to have troops on stand-by agreed to contribute.[6]

There were a number of incidents where troops from Third World countries showed up for a mission lacking the most basic equipment such as uniforms, winter clothing, personal weapons, communication equipment and /or armoured personal carriers. This resulted in severe criticism about their effectiveness. As these troops were quickly marginalized, there was a muted criticism by some existing contributors that some developing countries had been often too willing to deploy troops abroad under UN auspices, as a source of training and hard currency. As such, there was and there still is an argument that unevenly trained personnel coupled with the unavailability of basic operating equipment will preclude effective operations.[7]

AIM

This paper will demonstrate that the key to manning future UN missions is to provide troops from Third World countries with adequate training, equipment and a proper code of conduct. This will ensure that they are prepared to function effectively. Through strong leadership, the Operational Commander must eradicate the practice of 'marginalizing' troops from Third World countries and properly integrate all of the contingents in order to ensure the overall effectiveness of his forces.

This paper originally intended to focus only on the issue of marginalization of troops from Third World countries. Research quickly showed that this was a more complex issue. It is intertwined with many others problems at the organizational and structural level that both span the strategic, operational and tactical level. Trying to deal solely with marginalization would turn out to be too simplistic an approach. Thus, after providing a limited historical context to show that the challenge of leading a coalition force is nothing new, the paper will discuss some human aspects leading to marginalisation. It will provide a few examples of past problems and some of the major reforms initiatives of the UN. The paper will then cover human factors at the contingent and headquarters levels and provide a few of the ideas being developed to improve the overall effectiveness of the troops being deployed for a mission. The paper will point out key gaps that can only be addressed at the operational level for the commander to have a credible force. Credibility is achieved by having adequately trained and properly equipped troops following a proper code of conduct throughout the mission. While the UN has made significant progress in working with third World countries prior to a deployment, there are still areas that must be addressed by the operational commander during the mission. The discussion will be mostly at the operational level as any attempt to try to address all of the reforms associated with utilisation of peacekeeping contributors at the UN level is beyond the scope of this paper.

DISCUSSION

Assembling and leading a multinational force is not a new challenge. For many years, cultural bias, religion, deep seated racial prejudices and long historical memories have made the integration of the different 'elements' of any multinational force a real challenge. Throughout history, countries have created coalitions and fought together for a common cause. Going back

to Greece at the time of Alexander, the cities States of Athens, Sparta and Thebes that saw 'state of war' as a normal relationship between neighbours would join in a common crusade against the Persian Empire.[8] More recently, one can look at the Allied coalition during both the First and Second World Wars. Only a few years ago, the assembly of a multinational force to fight against Iraq during the operation Desert Storm offers another example. There was a political need to integrate both Egyptian and Syrian troops into the Pan Arab Division. This represented a major challenge for the coalition force. In all cases, the issues of the capability and competence or tasks to be assigned to the different members of the alliance were always in the equation. For example, the Italian campaign of World War II was the first joint operation conducted by the Allies. At the onset, it was reported that the American troops and their commanders had not made a good impression on British generals. Some British officers were referring jokingly of their American colleagues as 'Our Italians.' This ultimately resulted in a protracted campaign where the Allies generals were more often than not trying to outdo each other instead of uniting their forces to fight the Germans.[9] More recently, the inter-services rivalry in the United States was such that Congress had to pass a law to force 'jointness' showing that even within a country, integrating elements with different 'cultures' can prove to be a daunting challenge.

The deployment of a multinational force under the UN has always been a delicate and complicated matter. Louis Delvoie summarized it best when he stated that the shortcomings of the United Nations Headquarters as planners, executor and sustainer of peacekeeping operations were well-nigh legendary.[10] Therefore, the innuendo and complaints about the training and equipment of the troops from developing countries are not necessarily unfounded; the question, though, is whether or not these complaints are misplaced or based on hidden agendas of the

critics. There is a need to investigate these complaints in light of inter-group relationship to assess the issues and to develop, if necessary, the guidance and the procedures to ensure the overall effectiveness of the troops.

A multinational force will always be faced with a number of issues that stem from inter-group relations and dynamic. In a peacekeeping mission that falls in the category of military operations other than war, the difference in cultures, languages, religions, military values and level of expertise will be accentuated. Inter-group relations may be problematic and will require the constant attention of the force commander and his senior staff.

Inter-group relations while being influenced by the composition of the groups themselves are subject to a number of tendencies. The most common tendencies are ethnocentrism, social isolationism, prejudices and stereotyping and marginalisation. Quite often, a given tendency will feed on another one. Thus, the ethnocentric approach of judging others from one's own perspective might very well include a number of prejudices and/or stereotypes. For example, Western culture has long considered itself to be far more technologically advanced than any of the other cultures and many Westerners have developed a number of stereotypes about the technologically challenged people of the Third World. Marginalisation is a unique tendency that it is perceived as a response, reaction or coping mechanism resulting from the other tendencies. By itself, it has a power dimension as stated by Dr Pinch:

> Marginalised groups or individuals are those that are viewed by more dominant groups as having little power. However, those very groups may possess critical skills or competencies for mission success and their exclusion will weaken partner accomplishments. More dominant partners should be sensitive to this possibility and seek to include the contributions of less powerful groups in peace operations.[11]

Marginalisation and ostracisation (which can be considered as marginalisation to the extreme) are aspects of group behaviour that are not discussed very often in military circles. These types of behaviour can simply be defined as the refusal to associate with, the isolation or the rejection of an element of a group for whatever reasons. This isolation can take a number of forms from highly visible to barely noticeable actions. It can vary from subtle treatment, polite exchanges and/or total exclusion to outright hostile acts toward a particular group or individuals. Usually, it is based on the other tendencies discussed above and will appear along racial, cultural and/or religious lines. It also can be based on expected skills, values or behaviour. In most cases, there is a significant amount of 'ignorance' implied.

Leaders at all levels have a critical role to play in dealing with the issue of marginalisation. After all, they are ultimately responsible for the cohesiveness and effectiveness of their group, unit or contingent. However, they are often as much a part of the problem. By taking an ethnocentric view while promoting the 'individual character' of their units and/or supporting regimental, service (Army, Navy, Air Force) or national values to the extreme, they can create a justification for putting down the other elements of a mission. There is a fine line between the promotion of one's own 'tribe' through positive approaches and the denigration of the 'other tribes' in order to make one's own group look good. More often than not, that line is crossed. When this happens, there can be a very negative impact on the group, unit, contingents and the mission. In a multinational environment, unless one is aware and sensitive to the issue of marginalisation, more harm than good is done. With over 74 potential contributor countries to select from for a peacekeeping mission, the risk of marginalisation is increasing.

Generalisation about the incompetence of Third World countries probably falls into the stereotype or prejudice category. The definition of incompetence can be a very narrow term. The original members of the "peacekeeping club" who are slowly getting out of the business seem to have their own agenda or don't necessarily have the high moral ground in assessing competency. For example, they have shown a great tendency to interfere with the operational chain of command on a very regular basis. This is a type of behaviour that has upset many force commanders especially when contingent commanders have effectively refused to obey lawful commands.[12] Social isolationism by providing uneven responses to a number of crises throughout the Third World has also upset a number of developing countries. A few authors are going as far as to argue that this post-Cold war interventionism from the great powers has been a shallow pretext for extending their influence over Third World countries.[13]

Thus, it is now appropriate to look at the records and to see evaluate the performance of the troops from Third World countries. A trend seems to be emerging with the deployment and employment of peacekeepers from Third World countries where many Western experts doubt of their abilities to be effective in operations. This can be illustrated by the comments from Skjelsbaek who in 1990 reported:

> It goes without saying that the quality of national contingents differs significantly. They come from countries with different military traditions and very different authority structures in the armed forces. In some national contingents the general level of education is much higher than in others. Difference in language skills is a considerable problem.
>
> Official UN documents are mute on this issue. In my experience, officers who have served in peacekeeping forces are also reluctant to talk about them. Disclosures of large variations in competence among national contingents could cause very serious political problems and could easily jeopardise an operation. I know of no systematic and independent research in this field. However, the problem exists, and a discussion of possible remedy is called for.[14]

More specific comments have been made about contingents where missions have been plagued with the problem of ineffective troops. Mats Berdal was quite forthcoming in his paper "*Whither UN Peacekeeping"* by providing a few excellent examples of such cases when he noted that:

> In Cambodia the first Bulgarian battalion, and to a lesser extent contingents from Ghana, Tunisia and Indonesia, are widely regarded as having done more damage than good to the UNTAC cause.
>
> …In Yugoslavia, inadequate training and poor disciplinary standards in certain units have resulted in reduced level of operational efficiencies, as well as some deeply embarrassing episodes for the UN… The fact that a sanctions regime had been in force in the former Yugoslavia has created an incentive for UN personnel to engage in illegal trading, bribery and corruption. The most publicised case was that of Colonel Viktor Loginov and his Russian battalion deployed in Sector East in Croatia which was found to be deeply involved in the organisation of illegal rackets and underground dealing in weapons and fuel. This was not, however, an isolated incident. While members of the Nigerian battalion have been removed after involvement in drug dealing, the Ukrainian battalion in Sarejevo has been involved in extensive and illegal bartering activities.[15]

In Cambodia, the Bulgarian troops were characterised as recently released convicted criminals. Their behaviour became so intolerable that they had to be evicted from the theatre of operation and had to be given UN escorts for their own protection on the way out of the theatre.[16] This is probably a case of a well-deserved marginalisation.

As well, Marianne Heiberg reported on black market activities by troops that resulted in pilfering of United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) equipment and supplies on a large scale. She argued that pilfering could not only be considered only as a way of compensating for low salaries but as a confluence of additional factors that included motivation and training for UN peacekeeping service, deficiencies in military leadership and cultural variations concerning what was or was not acceptable behaviour.[17]

All of the above examples make it clear that there were and there are still problems associated with deployed troops on peacekeeping missions. However, these examples also raise a number of questions. Why were some of these incidents tolerated or allowed to continue for so long? What should the Operational Commander have done? Did he have the power to take immediate action? It is clear that although prompt action was called for, it was not always taken. But it is also clear that these incidents were not limited to Third World countries as troops from Russia, Ukraine, and even Canada have been at one point or another at the centre of some controversy in a peacekeeping operation. Is it not human nature to remember only the stories that reinforce one's point of view but to politely forget those that don't quite fit one's perception?

Nonetheless, the UN realised that there were problems and by the mid-1990s, the UN was driven to undertake a serious reform of its peacekeeping operations. Although the overall reform of peacekeeping operations at the UN level is outside the scope of this paper, it is important to understand the portion that deals with the proposed reforms on providing contingent troops to the Operational Commander. First, there was considerable thought given to finding a way to speed up the World's response to crisis. The initial concept of the Secretary-General to create a UN standby army has been unsuccessful and will most likely remain so for the foreseeable future.[18] As a result, the efforts now have focused on improving the Standby Agreement System and the development of a rapid reaction force, the latter being based on a Canadian proposal. On these fronts, there has been significant progress with 74 Member States pledging over 100,000 personnel within the framework of the system. Moreover, within that context, the headquarters of a United Nations Standby Forces High Readiness Brigade was

opened in Copenhagen in September 1997. Finally, the Secretary-general was still pursuing funding for creating a rapidly deployable mission headquarters.[19]

In the meantime, the UN has pursued the concept of *ad hoc* arrangements by asking organisations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) or the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to lead the more complex missions. In the case of NATO, Third World countries are integrated as part of the 'coalition force' normally under the NATO Combined Joint task Forces (CJTF) model. In these operations, troops from the Third World are at a distinct disadvantage, not being up on the latest NATO doctrine, procedures and more often than not lacking the equipment to ensure interoperability.[20]

While the above activities have the potential to significantly improve the overall effectiveness and responsiveness of the UN, there are still a number of issues that flow from this wind of change. They deal mainly with the human factors involved in peacekeeping operations. As mentioned above, while a review of the peacekeeping literature showed that not much has been documented on the subject, there are a few snippets that point to the challenges facing the Operational Commander in this area. These challenges are in two separate areas; first, at the contingent level and second, at the headquarters level. These will be addressed in turn.

There are a number of factors that characterise a contingent. Among the most significant factors are military culture (professional versus conscript armies), culture, historical experience, language, religion, economic remuneration, motivation and political system (democratic, monarchist, communist or autocratic systems). All of these factors affect the inter-groups

dynamics that develop during a mission. At the contingent level, achieving a high level of proficiency normally requires good leadership, adequate training and appropriate resources. Based on the earlier examples of problems encountered at the contingent level, it is possible to extract the major criticism against these troops. The most common problems were illegal trading, bribery, corruption, poor discipline and military incompetence. Let us focus on the first three of these problems that can be considered criminal conduct at least by most western standards. With reference to the problems related to criminal conduct, an interesting point was made by Indar Rikhye, a former Commander of the United Nations Emergency Force, when he commented on Marianne Heiberg's remarks on some of UNIFIL's contingents. He explained that:

> …She has elaborated on the motivation of the soldiers, which includes a prevalence of greed and crime. Since soldiers are human, a body of soldiers constitutes a society, and as such, exhibits all human strengths and weaknesses. Thus the question to ask is whether or not there is greater and corruption in UNIFIL. Heiberg informs us that there is. If this is the case, then the UN command must set it right.[21]

Thus, it is clear that most of the discipline problems related to criminal behaviour that have plagued a number of missions are a responsibility of the chain of command. This opinion was re-enforced by the comments of Major-General MacInnis, a former Deputy Commander of United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), when he outlined the importance of the rule of law and described a workable solution:

> Respect of the rule of law is something which we in peacekeeping have taken for granted. With the expansion of the number of countries willing to participate in peacekeeping operations, however, and especially because of the changing nature of peacekeeping itself, we ignore this essential characteristic at our peril. Nothing breaks down the credibility off a force faster than illegal or inappropriate activity on the part of its members. In this respect, the perception of wrongdoing can be as damaging as the proof of it.
>
> Peacekeeping forces must follow a three-track approach: first, to ensure that regulations and procedures are in place to thwart or at least dissuade those tempted to engage in improper

activity; second, to educate the force to ensure that all members are aware of the conduct required; and third, to be seen to investigate in a serious manner each and every complaint or allegation made. The very fact that UNPROFOR has been seen to take allegation of improper conduct seriously has been, in my opinion, a boost to our credibility. It is a fact however that certain contributors either have no legal means to discipline their personnel while on UN duty ou-of-country, or the on-site means to carry out credible investigations into alleged wrong doing by their peacekeepers.[22]

Based on the above suggestions from MGen MacInnis, a force commander who pay close attention to the discipline aspect of his mission can therefore go a long way in eliminating one of the major weakness of Third World contributors.

At this point, a quick discussion of whether the reforms at the UN level discussed in the earlier section would really make a difference at the operational level. The question is really whether these reforms would avoid the deployment of poorly trained or ineffective troops in the future. Unfortunately, at first glance, this is most unlikely to happen. For example, in reviewing the list of the Members States who have signed on as part of the Standby Arrangement, all of the countries that have been criticized in the past are included. One of them, Ghana, is part of the group that has gone as far as negotiating a Memorandum of Understanding formalising the details of their contribution. Thus, the situation has not changed very much as the point had been made before that the problem was not so much the setting of standards for selection for UN peacekeeping. The real difficulty was and still is in enforcing these standards.[23] However, on the issue of standard, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations has been working very hard at setting up training programmes and regular pre-deployment inspections to improve the overall quality of the troops deployed. This has been possible given the current surplus of available troops and lower demand. The real test will be when the "volunteers" don't want to show up for a mission.

Thus, it is important to remember rules that have been established in the past when establishing a peacekeeping mission. Paramount among these is the fact that a Force commander, who is appointed by the Secretary-General and subject to confirmation by the Security Council, has no say in the selection of the troops' contributors.[24] This authority remains with the Secretary-General, who has continued to insist on the principle of 'wide representation' of countries in order to show the support of the World community and thus give more legitimacy to these operations. However, the consent of the host countries is also required. Another problem associated with the current Standby Arrangement system is the preponderance of infantry troops being offered and the acute shortage of specialised units and personnel in key areas: HQ support, Engineers, Logistics, Communications and Air Services.[25] Thus, the *ad hoc* selection process will probably continue in the future.

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troops.[26] Expanding on this evaluation methodology by including observations based on recent peacekeeping operations would present the way and means of screening troops for future operations if the political will was there to do so. Nonetheless, the result of the evaluation should be provided to the Operational Commander so that he would be fully familiar with the capabilities and limitations of his troops. It has long been recognised that this type of information is vital for a Commander. For example, Montgomery wrote:

> It is necessary to remember that all divisions are different; some are good at one type of battle, others are good at another type of battle; the art lies in knowing what each division is best at, and having the right divisions in the right place at the right time.[27]

Once a Commander knows the strengths and weaknesses of his troops, he is in a much better position to develop an appropriate training programme to deal with the gaps that he might be concerned about. In the case of peacekeeping, this is a must.

In that process, providing the commander with an accurate assessment of the capability of the various contingents will remain a sensitive task. Going back to the point on inter-group relations, such reviews and assessments can be subjective and politically very sensitive. Higher standards, better reporting on the type of troops available and a potential for inspection of troops prior to deployment are good initiatives. These initiatives should contribute in providing more efficient troops on the ground. However, the right type of troops that are properly equipped and trained at the required standard are not always available, and the expediency of compromising on the quality of the troops in order to achieve higher political aims will remain. Thus, it is essential to have an in-depth evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of each contingent as well as an appropriate training and development programme.

The UN's effort to reform can only accomplish so much. Realistically, as much if not more could be accomplished at the operational level through good leadership. Recognising the inherent complexity in leading a multinational force, the United States' military have identified a number of key points that the Operational Commander (Joint Task Force Commander) must address. The US doctrine on the subject as enunciated in FM 100-23 highlights this very well when it states that the effectiveness of multinational operations will be improved by:

- Establishing rapport and harmony among senior multinational commanders. Only commanders can develop such a personal, direct relationship. The keys are respect, trust, and the ability to compromise. The result will be successful teamwork and unity of effort;

- Respecting multinational partners and their ideas, culture, and customs. Such respect (consideration and acceptance) shows each partner's importance to the alliance or coalition;

- Assigning missions appropriate to each multinational partner's capabilities. Multinational partners' opinions should be sought during the planning process. National honor and prestige may significantly impact mission assignment.

- Ensuring that multinational partners have necessary resources to accomplish their assigned missions. Cross levelling among partners may be required;

- Ensuring concerted action though liaison centers. The ability to communicate in a partner's native language is important because it enhances and facilitates liaison;

- Enabling all partners to operate together in the most effective manner and to make the most efficient and economical use of resources. Standardisation agreements are the result of rationalisation, standardisation and interoperability (RSI) efforts in alliance. These agreements may be appropriate for rapid adoption by coalitions;

- Ensuring all multinational members' efforts are focused on a common goal to produce unity of effort; and

- Knowing and understanding the capabilities of multinational partners as well as or better than you know the belligerent parties- from movement and manoeuvres to logistical support.[28]

There is an urgent need to develop a similar UN doctrine along with the associated documentation, starting with an update to the Peacekeeper's Handbook. This could be added to the self-paced training courses for peacekeeping sponsored by the UN. The current package includes eight self-contained courses covering subjects such as the principles of peacekeeping, conflict resolution, cultural awareness, negotiation, coping with the effect of mines, the non-use of force and other topics.[29] This should be linked to the development of UN standard operating procedures (SOP) that can be used as a template for a new mission. A code of ethic should serve as the basis for developing the minimum standard of discipline. Although some people have been concerned about the 'political' implications of dealing with undisciplined troops and have argued that this is normally a national prerogative, the example of the Bulgarian troops showed that ultimately undisciplined troops could undermine a mission. Therefore, it should be clear that the Operational Commander has the authority and the power to act and to deal with such issues, as it is his duty to do so in order to protect the remainder of the troops. As pointed out by Gustav Hägglund, peacekeepers are only as strong as their weakest links, since it is often against the weak link that violent acts are directed.[30]

The last human factor that should be mentioned is the observation that contingents tend to operate as 'fiefdoms' which can really be considered as a very ethnocentric tendency that has evolved because of the nature of peacekeeping. Beldar developed this argument very well when he analysed the operational level and reported that:

> Infantry battalions have been the basis operational unit in all peacekeeping forces with exception of small-scale observer missions. With their own headquarters and support companies, individual battalions have proved sufficiently self-contained and versatile to conduct traditional peacekeeping operations. …Consequently, individual battalions have tended to operate with a high degree of autonomy. *This has been heightened by differences in language, training and disciplinary standards* (my emphasis) as well as by the tendency for national

authorities to maintain direct control over their own contingents in the field. Battalion commanders have thus been able to enjoy substantial independence in relation to their Force Commander. The limited unity of command and the creation of 'fiefdoms' within a force have been further reinforced by deep-seated cultural differences among contingents.[31]

These types of issues have highlighted the responsibility of the Force Commander to build a cohesive, efficient and integrated military unit.[32] This present a significant problem as the belligerents might attempt to use such divisive factors to drive a wedge among the contingents. Consequently, trying to back up a contingent can be a problem as there is a lack of trust among the various units of the force.

The impact of all of these factors on a specific mission can best be illustrated by looking at the ill-fated example of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). In early April 1994, a section of ten Belgian peacekeepers came under heavy attack from a stronger Rwandan military force. After surrendering to the government forces, they were disarmed and later brutally murdered. In a subsequent court martial of a senior Belgian officer, it was established that one of the key factors in assigning this task to the Belgian contingent had been the limited operational capability of a Bangladeshi battalion. The Court also established that although the Officer had attempted to improve the operational effectiveness of the Bangladeshi unit by developing a training program supervised by one of his own officer, it was still tactically unthinkable to assign the escort task to that unit. However, the chain of events that resulted from this incident ultimately led to the total 325 191.45966 T536Tj0d4ed t3the total 325 193.40 0 T536Tj0d4ed

At the multinational headquarters level, the problems discussed above are exacerbated by a few more complications. The first contentious area lays with the staffing of the senior or critical positions as these positions are highly sought after and normally allocated based on the size of the contributor's contingent. These jobs are seen as status symbols and although the contributors are supposed to provide their most experienced and qualified personnel this is not always the case. The second area of contention is the staff system inherent to the headquarters. The UN has yet to develop its own system and with the contributing nations having very different systems, this has been a challenge. Some staff have also shown up with very limited or no staff training at all. Major-General Milner, a Canadian who commanded the UN force in Cyprus from 1989 to 1993, in discussing these issues made the point that it was extremely difficult to put his team together when he lacked qualified people. He also recognised that he had to do the best he could. He relied on his Chief of staff to train his staff officer, to conduct exercises and to make sure that these officers would come up to speed. He went on to say:

> By the way, military staff training does not necessarily fit an officer for UN work. There are differences in the way the UN does things. I think it is essential that staff training be dedicated to UN operations. Organisations such as the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Centre in Corwallis, Nova Scotia have gone a long way toward solving this problem.[34]

It would seem that Canada could play a key role in this area by building on the excellent work being done at the Peacekeeping Centre. In the same way that Canada took the lead to advance the rapid deployment force, it could follow up on the development of a training program for the staff system. For example, the two weeks militia staff course could be used as a starting block. Using the concept of training the trainer, it might be possible to provide this package to the Force Commander as a tool to train and qualify all the staff that are assigned to his headquarters. With regular feedback, the course could evolve and set the UN minimum standard for staff officers.

The question of the operational language at the headquarters level also needs to be addressed. Although the UN has six official languages (Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish), most missions have used English, French or Spanish as the official working language. For example, in identifying the lack of English-language knowledge as a minor deficiency, Snayna, Niblack and O'Malley were re-enforcing the view that there is a move afoot to make the English language as the primary 'interoperability language' at the operational level. However, even within the western countries this is a sensitive point.[35] There is a need to tackle the language issue. For example, the development of SOPs and templates in a bilingual format of the form English/French, English/Russian or English/Spanish, etc… would seem to be a minimal requirement. The employment of interpretors and translators is rarely mentioned except in dealing with the belligerents. The need might be as critical within the force.

Cultural differences as well as different motivations have been significant barriers to the effective operations of headquarters. This has normally resulted in two emerging groups. The first one, normally the inner sanctum, is based on the 'capability' of the officers to operate within the staff system and has been in charge of the operation. The second group, due to [in]competence, language, attitude and culture, has been left out and given either menial tasks or simply no tasks at all. This has created significant problems and normally has required the full attention of both the Force Commander and his COS. General Milner made that point when he stated:

> Different languages, different religions, different races, different cultures, different level of experience—how does a Commander bring all these people together and get them to work as a team? That is probably the biggest challenge that faces anyone selected for the job.

The one common aim that the Commander must continue to pound into everyone's head is: set aside your national differences, set aside some of your national pride, you are wearing a blue beret, you are working under the UN flag. That is the common goal. That is the mandate. That is what we are here for. Everyone has got to work toward that common goal.[36]

This approach is not always successful and it is sometime necessary to remove the people who just will not fit in. Ken Berry in discussing the lessons learned from the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), spoke of the bureaucratic rationalisation most often accepted to explain the problem of incompetent staff on peacekeeping operations when he reported that:

> UNTAC's 21,000 personnel ranged from highly qualified professionals to those who were incompetent and, in some cases, a menace to their colleagues and the Cambodian population. *Unfortunately, there were far too many instances of personnel in the latter category not being rejected, possibly for fear of offending contributing countries or simply because there were no alternative personnel available.* Worse for morale within UNTAC was the *appointment (or even "promotion") of such personnel to more comfortable jobs, simply to get rid of them from sensitive areas.* Moreover, the unacceptable behaviour of some military personnel caused resentment and alienated Cambodians. For future operations it is essential that a code of conduct be established for UN personnel.[37]

It is interesting to note that Berry was careful not to single out anyone but that he was also describing different ways and means of marginalising people who were ineffective, often at great costs to the mission. At the end of the day, one would hope that his approach would only be used in the most extreme circumstances although it appears that this very destructive approach is used far too often.

It is now clear that the Commander has the implied task of training and developing the least qualified staff with the goal of reducing the number of people that are part of the outer group. As operations get more complex, a more efficient headquarter is essential. The argument about the Commander not having the time to deal with this issue does not stand up to scrutiny. In an age where the UN in under constant pressures to reform and be effective, the Commander

can not afford to retain or promote ineffective people. There is the argument that there are long term benefits to this type of development as these people return to their countries with a sense of accomplishment and renewed confidence in their capabilities. Finally, by challenging the people that have been left out, the day-to-day functioning of the headquarters can be improved. As their performance improves, they can take on additional responsibilities and contribute to the overall effectiveness of the mission. In a way, making use of all of his resources is after all one of the major tasks of an effective leader.

The real issue is that the right tools have not been available to tackle the problem. Therefore, additional support must be sought. The initial material need to be updated and modular training packages produced. They need to be tested or validated and then translated. These one time costs are necessary investments to ensure that missions will not fail because of the lack of training or expertise of the troops. The concept of training the trainer would also help. The organisational structure of the Force Headquarters might require adjustments in order to include a small training and development cell. This cell would support the COS in ensuring that people are properly trained and qualified for the effective operation of the Force Headquarters. Given that there is already too many staff not being employed productively, finding the people from within the headquarters should be fairly easy.

Different customs and values have been a source of misunderstanding and conflict for a long time and will not be addressed specifically here. The UN has identified 'sensitivity to foreign cultures and traditions' as an important factor for hiring its personnel. Thus, one needs to look at cultural awareness and education at the mission level. Langholtz describes the culture

contrast training exercise for interfacing with the local population.[38] This type of exercise could be a good starting point for dealing with the cultural aspects of the many contingents that will make up a mission. However, it is important to keep in mind that the western culture has often exhibited a 'superiority complex' that has been perceived as cultural colonialism or paternalistic or self-serving.

However, one of the more delicate areas is with the question of establishing a code of UN service discipline. As a minimum, there is a need to establish what are considered minimum values and acceptable behaviour that would translate into a code of ethic. There must be a mechanism to enforce this code, as discipline must be part and parcel of an effective military force. This is where the leadership of the Force Commander would be most important. However, leadership at the operational level will not be sufficient, as the UN must put in place the necessary framework to ensure that Member States understand their obligations. Ken Berry understood this well when he recommended:

> The UN and Members States must also ensure that they provide the best qualified, professional and well-disciplined personnel in order to maintain the credibility of the operation. There should be an obligation on the part of the contributing countries to meet the criteria set by the UN for personnel, and a right by the UN to reject unsuitable or unqualified personnel at the donor's expense. Pre-deployment training to a common UN standard, when this is lacking, should also be regarded as essential. At the very, least, effort should be made to ensure commonality of language used by UN personnel in particular areas, something which did not always occur in UNTAC and which completely undermined any utility those personnel might otherwise have had.
>
> ...For future operations it is essential that a code of conduct be established for UN personnel.[39] This last initiative needs to be tackle at the strategic level first although operational commanders can make a significant contribution by continuously insisting on maintaining the highest standard of discipline within a mission area.

CONCLUSION

This paper has shown that the key to manning future UN missions is to provide troops from Third World countries with adequate training, equipment and a proper code of conduct. This will ensure they are prepared to function effectively. Providing a limited historical context showing that leading a coalition force was not really a new challenge, the paper then discussed some human aspects leading to marginalisation. It provided a few examples of past problems and highlighted some of the major reform initiatives of the UN. The paper then covered human factors at the contingent and headquarters levels and a few of the ideas being developed to improve the overall effectiveness of the troops being deployed for a mission. The paper pointed out key gaps that can only be addressed at the operational level for the commander to have a credible force. Credibility is achieved by having adequately trained and properly equipped troops following a proper code of conduit throughout the mission. While the UN has made significant progress in working with third World countries prior to a deployment, there are still areas that must be addressed by the operational commander during the mission.

In discussing the genesis of the reforms in peacekeeping operations, this paper wanted to demonstrate the importance of the human dimensions in a peacekeeping mission. In the last five years, the UN has made tremendous efforts to improve the effectiveness of its peacekeeping operations. However, the intensive effort to get developing countries to contribute troops has created a number of problems at the operational level. While the criticism levelled against these new contributor countries might be well placed, it is time to try to look for solutions at the

operation bureaucratic changes at the UN level could ever

solve so

al force will remain a complex and challenging task

for any operational commander will have to optim6.87r7 l3Tw 1j191 0 72

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