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Research Essay

The

UNDERSTANDING of COMMAND

from the

CANADIAN and GERMAN PERSPECTIVE

(FINAL VERSION)

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INTRODUCTION

The term “Command” has different meanings: on the one hand it does mean a directive and regulating action on the behavior of others to fulfil a mission or to achieve a goal. On the other hand it could be an institutional body, as, for example, the “Command of the Army”. In the following the first interpretation will be the basis.

“Command is the most important activity in war. Command by itself will not ensure victory, nor drive home a single attack. It will not destroy a single enemy target, nor will it carry out an emergency re-supply. However, none of these warfighting activities is possible without effective command. Command integrates all combat functions to produce deadly, synchronized combat power, giving purpose to all battlefield activities.”¹ This definition must be completed by the fact, that Command in peacetime is equally important. Effective Command in crisis or in war is the result of a good practice, education and training in this matter in peacetime.

The basis for Command is order and obedience. But this is only a legal aspect. Command demands much more: the military leader must have a clear vision, he must respect his subordinates, he must gain their confidence, they must trust in him. Finally, Command includes the duty to take full responsibility and accountability.²

What is the NATO understanding? Let’s have a look into the “NATO bible”:
“Achieving military objectives in peace, crisis and hostilities depends primarily on the ability to

¹ National Defense/Land Force: *Command*. B-GL 300-003/FP-000,1996; p. iii.

² This understanding goes farer than Martin van Crefeld sees the nature of Command in his book *Command in War* (Harvard University Press, 1985), where he sees Command mainly as a process or a system: see chapter 1 (introduction) and chapter 8 (conclusion).

position the best balanced forces at the right place at the right time. Effective employment and support of the deployed forces is dependent on the Command and Control (C2) arrangements established, from the highest to the lowest levels of authority. This Chapter describes the principles on which the C² of Allied joint operations are based.

The terms command and control are closely related and regularly used together; however, they are not synonymous. **Command** is authority vested in an individual. It can be described (but not defined) as the process by which a commander impresses his will and intentions on the subordinates for the purpose of bringing about a particular action. It encompasses the authority and responsibility for deploying and assigning forces to fulfil their missions. **Control** is the authority exercised by a commander. It can be described (but not defined) as the process through which a commander, assisted by the staff, organises, directs and co-ordinates the activities of the forces assigned. ...”^{3 4}

This paper will analyse the basic elements of Command: structure, procedures, style with a special regard to the German concept of “Innere Fuehrung”.⁵

The main basis for the description of the Canadian perspective will be a document called “CFP 300(3) COMMAND”, issued on authority of the Chief of Defence Staff in 1996. “The aim of *Command* is to provide guidance to all commanders, institutions and elements of the Canadian Army in order to adopt a uniform approach to operations as we face the challenges of the 21st Century. It is intended to be a complete reference containing both the description of what

³See NATO-document *AJP-01 Change 1* from June 1998; chapter 2, section IV, no. 0401 + 0402.

⁴ A good reflection about Command and Control can be found in *Putting ‘Command’ Back into Command and Control: The Human Perspective* by Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann, a lecture given at the Command and Control Conference, Ottawa, 26 Sept 1995 (pp. C1 – C19).

⁵ Another possibility to analyze Command can be found in the UK Army Doctrine Publication, Vol 2 *Command*: 1. Aspects of Command with leadership/control/decision-making; 2. Components of Command with moral (human) / physical (technical) / conceptual (doctrine); 3. Command support organization with HQs / staff, advisers, liaison / Command support system.

qualities are needed in a commander as well as the prescription of the various tools available to assist him in the process.”⁶ The basis for the German point of view will be the author’s experience of 31 years of service in the German Army in a large variety of functions and his remembrance of the respective Army regulations.⁷

The thesis for this essay is as follows:

While there seems to be no explicit doctrine for the style of Command in the Canadian Army, the German practice is clearly determined by the concept of “Innere Fuehrung”.

BASIC ELEMENTS

Organization

In the CFP 300(3) in chapter 4 it is stated, that “At its simplest, an organization is *two or more people working together in a coordinated manner so as to achieve group results*. An organization should have a clear role. In addition, all organizations have a human aspect; they therefore require some degree of discipline within a defined structure.”⁸ And in the following this manual identifies five organizing fundamentals:

- 1 Unity of Command
- 1 Cooperation
- 1 Balanced structure

⁶ See National Defense / Land Force: *Command*. ...p. i.

⁷ This approach from only the army perspective seems to be limited. But in fact Command plays its major role in land operations and so the main part of the problem will be covered!

⁸See National Defense / Land Force: *Command*. ...p. 45.

¹ Responsive procedures

¹ Dynamic organization.

These principles should come into effect by a clearly depicted chain of Command, by establishing Command relationships of subordinate formations and units, by a limited (in the sense of easy to survey) span of Command, by a structure which allows on the one hand the creation of ad hoc organizations, but, which, on the other hand, takes into account the penalties in terms of losses of cohesion and decreased tempo with frequent re-grouping.

A large part of chapter 4 is dedicated to “organization in relation to doctrine”. In this section the “framework of deep, close, and rear operations” should help the commander to “relate friendly forces to one another, and to the enemy, in terms of time, space, resources and purpose.”⁹

Another point of interest is the “position of a commander”, which means in fact the answer to the question, whether the commander should go forward or remain in the rear. But while this may be a question on the tactical level, “At higher levels of command, including the operational level, the commander’s decision about where to base himself is less straightforward.”¹⁰.

In the following chapter 5, the staff as a “command support organization” is described. Its two main roles are considered as “assisting the commander” and “helping formations and units”. Further on it is stated: “The Canadian Army does not possess a unified general staff system, as many European nations. There is no formal distinction – either by dress, qualifications or title – between members of the staff and those serving on regimental duty, or between members of the

⁹ Ibid, p. 51.

¹⁰ Ibid, p. 56.

staff and those of a 'general staff'. It is important that the differences are realized between the continental general staff system (NATO) and the Canadian practice of staff responsibilities, given the likelihood of future coalition operations.”^{11 12}

From the German perspective the organization is identical to the Command structure, in the sense of the chain of Command. Consequently the Command assignments are clearly defined

- 1 Operational Command (OPCOM)
- 1 Operational Control (OPCON)
- 1 Tactical Command (TACOM)
- 1 Tactical Control (TACON)
- 1 Coordinating Authority.

These terms and their meanings apply fully to the NATO regulations.

A major point for the German military organization is the staff and its function in the Command process. This has much to do with the existence of “General Staff/ Admiral Staff officers” (“Generalstabsdienst-/Admiralstabsdienstoffiziere”). These selected officers – with only a very few exceptions they have a master degree, some of them even a PhD - have passed a specific training of about two years which enables them to act as adviser of the commander on all levels¹³. During their career, they will change their postings normally every two to three years, including the change from staff functions to a command function and vice versa. This system guarantees a close relationship between the commander and his advisers in the staff, and

¹¹ Ibid, p.70/71.

¹² Concerning the previous quotation it must be remarked, that the NATO-system cannot be regarded as a “general staff system” in the sense of the classical Prussian-German General Staff System!

¹³ “The commander must be supported by obedient, independent and critical advising General Staff officers (‘Fuehrergehilfen’). They provide him with information and advice, prepare decisions, turn them into orders and measures and supervise their execution. If necessary, they urge the commander to decide and act. Their thinking and actions must be guided by his will and intentions and must be determined by his decisions and orders.” *German Army Regulation 100/100*, September 1987, no. 615.

that is why the staff plays a major role in the German Command structure. (But it should not be unmentioned, that this system of General Staff officers has the inherent tendency or risk to isolate a little bit these General Staff Officers from the “normal” senior officers.) Nevertheless it must be clear, that the staff is an element outside the chain of Command, designed to support the commander and not to replace him!

So, what are the differences? The Canadian document summarizes: “The theory of command organization comprises the organization, operational framework (deep, rear and close operation), position of the commander and the concept of deputizing of command. ...”¹⁴ This seems to be a little bit limited and does not reflect the implications in an allied or combined and/or joint operation. Although the staff and his basic functions appear in a special chapter¹⁵ it seems that perhaps the staff does not play such an important role as he does in the German structure.

The German fixation on the staff and the General Staff officers has its roots in the Prussian-German Army and is related to Field Marshal Count Helmuth von Moltke. It was – and still is! – the intention of this system, to increase the quality of command and control authority of commanding officers. Qualified advice during the whole decision-making process by General (and Admiral) Staff officers improves the quality of the commander’s final decisions. It must be stressed, that no General and Admiral Staff officer is entitled to relieve his commanding officer from making a decision on his own and to develop the concept of operations. For both of these, he – the commanding officer – is alone responsible. Perhaps it can be said that the German General Staff system permits the commander to make decisions more effectively. This is his most important task.

¹⁴ See National Defense / Land Force: *Command. ...*, p 58.

¹⁵ See National Defense / Land Force: *Command. ...*chapter 5, p. 68 - 75.

Procedures

The Canadian approach to procedures is laid down in chapter 6: “It is the process by which command is exercised: conducting it properly is an essential skill that must be mastered at all levels of command from section to corps. The decision-making part of the process is **the crucial component** and is required at the military strategic, operational and tactical levels of command and across the spectrum of conflict, including operations other than war and in normal military peacetime activity. Decision-making in the Canadian Army at the lower tactical levels has traditionally been incorporated into Battle Procedure. This publication extends the use of the term *Battle Procedure* to commanders at all levels. ... The essence is that Battle Procedure at all levels is command-led, not staff driven.”¹⁶

The following description of the tools and steps shows a process, which should apply “at every level of command and to problems of any degree of complexity.”¹⁷ This seems to be a rather “heroic” statement and, for example, the Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process (CFOPP) is slightly different.

The German Command procedure is closely tied to the General Staff system. The well structured thinking and sequence of phases in the decision making process is the basis for the mutual understanding of commanders and their “advisers”. The training of this system already starts very early on the cadet-level. It is important to know that this system is not exclusively for the General and Admiral Staff officers but is a basic element within the training for all officers and NCO’s. This guarantees a common thinking and understanding.

¹⁶ Ibid, p. 79.

¹⁷ Ibid, p. 80.

The process is characterized by the following phases:

- 1 Evaluation of the situation
- 1 Planning
- 1 Issue of orders
- 1 Control.

The most important phase is the planning with its starting act of the “assessment”, especially the “mission analysis”. This is not only the answer to the question “what to do” but rather to identify the higher intention, the "master plan" behind it (“why?”). And that includes the examination, whether the given mission is still in line with the actual situation; if not, then a specific initiative is demanded!

Another important element of procedures is a system of clearly defined terms, abbreviations and graphical symbols (for graphical orders). There may not be room for personal interpretations (and following misunderstanding)!

All in all, the German perspective to procedures emphasizes very much a great discipline in this affair. This may be a source for the prejudice of German bureaucracy ... but it may also be the reason for German officers being well accepted as disciplined and effective workers in NATO HQ's!

Again, what are the differences? In fact, they are not important. In both the Canadian and German perspective procedures are a necessary set of regulations to coordinate the work of different persons or elements. The framework of such regulations may vary in details but the intention is the same: to organize a process in which, in a limited time, a maximum amount of information can be gathered, analyzed, evaluated and offered as a basis for decision.

Style

In the present context this term will not be a complete synonym for leadership, although there is a close relationship. Style in this context means a conceptual “philosophical” framework for the execution of Command, a basis for education and training.

The Canadian document states: “To command Canadian soldiers effectively, it is imperative that commanders understand what this soldier is. The Canadian soldier is a volunteer citizen who represents the essential attributes of the society he protects.. Applicable Canadian social values and standards of behaviour, as represented by Government, must be maintained within the army. This is of vital importance in this era of world-wide unrest, military coups and military-political-economic complexity.”¹⁸ This rather short paragraph is the only source to find a guidance for this aspect of Command. Another element of Command is explained more comprehensively: “Our philosophy of command devolves decision-making authority to subordinate commanders better enabling us to deal with the problem of uncertainty and time. The philosophy of command that promotes unity of effort, the duty and authority to act, and initiative is called *Mission Command*.”¹⁹ This then is described in more detail: “Under the Mission Command philosophy, commanders must:

- ◁ Give orders in a manner that ensures that subordinates understand intent, their own tasks and the context of those tasks.
- ◁ Tell subordinates **what effect** they are to achieve and **the reason why** it needs achieving
- ◁ Allocate appropriate resources to carry out mission and tasks.

¹⁸ Ibid, p. 4.

¹⁹ Ibid, p. 9.

- ◁ Use a minimum of control measures not to limit unnecessarily the freedom of action of his subordinates.
- ◁ Allow subordinates to decide within their delegated freedom of action how best to achieve their missions and tasks.”²⁰

Further on in chapter 3, trust (as a “corner-stone”) and mutual understanding were briefly described and identified as essential elements for the practice of Command.

Although these sources seem to be not very rich, concerning the given issue, there is something more. In the "Officer Professional Development Programme / Student Study Guide" for example a study unit of 14 hours deals with "The Profession of Arms", including such topics as "Civil-Military Relations" and "The Military Ethic".²¹ And there is a large variety of other documents discussing the general issue from different perspectives.²² All this gives evidence, that the Canadian Forces is aware of this subject. The obvious lack of a written doctrine does not necessarily mean, that there is no education in this field (although a written doctrine would be a good basis for training and education). The Canadians obviously prefer a more practical approach in this domain than "struggling" with a theoretical framework.

The German approach to the style of Command is decisively influenced and formed by the concept of “Innere Fuehrung” (although this is often translated by “Command/leadership and civic education” the author will stick to the German expression because, in fact, it is very difficult to translate this term literally). When writing about the concept of “Innere Fuehrung”,

²⁰ Ibid, p. 32.

²¹ National Defence, *OPDP 7 / War and the Military Profession*. December 1998 - March, June 1999 (A-PD-050-0D1/PG-007).

²² See for example: Jones, David R. and others, ed. *Ethics and Canadian Defence Policy*. Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Halifax/N.S., June 1992; Thomas, L. E. *The Impact of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on State Institutions and National Security*. National Defence College, Kingston/ON, June 1993; other sources can be found in the exercise series "EX NEW HORIZONS" at the Canadian Forces College.

the term “Citizen in Uniform” must be mentioned. This is known as one of the trademarks of the German Armed Forces and might be regarded as a synonym to the term “Innere Fuehrung”. In the German Armed Forces, it is used to talk about the concept of “Innere Fuehrung“ which, indeed, is focused on the idea of the Citizen in Uniform as the integral and decisive part of this concept.

The terms “Innere Fuehrung” and “Citizen in Uniform” were coined in the course of the build-up of the new German Armed Forces in the Federal Republic in the early fifties. Thus, it is directly linked with the creation of the Bundeswehr, and it is based on two decisive facts: first the historical experience of modern German history between 1919 and 1945, especially the period of National Socialism, and second the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany, the so-called Basic Law of 1949. This Constitution has enacted a new system of values and standards, which puts man as an individual into the very centre of all state activity. This constitutes a radical break with the collectivistic claim of the ideology of National Socialism.

For the build-up of the Bundeswehr, this meant nothing less than integrating the new armed forces into the democratic state in such a manner, that they fully complied with the basic principles of the Constitution. The aim was to apply the new image of man as laid down in the Constitution also to the soldier as a binding principle, to let himself be a Citizen in Uniform and to restrict his constitutional citizen’s rights only to the extent necessary to maintain the function of the German Armed Forces.

It is exactly here, where the mission and obligation of the concept of “Innere Fuehrung” comes in, since the indispensable hierarchical structure of the new armed forces with their principle of Command and obedience had to be reconciled with the liberal basic rights of the citizen. This meant that a structure and internal order had to be established for the Bundeswehr

which was fully in line with the basic principles of the Constitution. Consequently, the code of values and the image of man of the Constitution had to be linked with the principles of Command, training and education in the armed forces and had to be reflected as a new culture in daily military service life.

It is therefore, that three fundamental principles form the German Armed Forces:

1. The common objective of all political parties represented in German parliament has been and continues to be, that no military aggression should ever again be launched from German territory. For the first time in German history, the Constitution has explicitly restricted the mission of military forces to a defensive role. Article 87a of the Basic Law points out that: "The Federal Government constitutes armed forces for the purpose of defence".
2. The Bundeswehr is the army of parliamentary democracy. Germany has a Military Constitution stating that the Armed Forces, being part of the executive power, are clearly subordinate to the primacy of politics conducted by a democratically elected parliament. The priority of political leadership becomes obvious by the fact that Command authority during peacetime is assigned to a civilian Minister of Defence and is to be transferred to the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany in wartime.

Control organisations and mechanisms such as the Office of the Commissioner for the Armed Forces, have been created to prevent political abuse.
3. The soldier is a "Citizen in Uniform". The Constitution does not make any distinction between the fundamental rights of the citizen in civilian clothes and the Citizen in Uniform. The soldier being the defender of the constitutional order and way of life, based on law and

liberty, must be conscious of those values which he must also experience within the armed forces if he is expected to stand up for them and defend them in extreme with his own life.²³

It may be seen from these fundamental principles that the Bundeswehr as an armed force in a democratic state is subject to very specific conditions.

These conditions are reflected in the concept of "Innere Fuehrung", the main objective of which is to reconcile the necessary hierarchical Command conditions of the armed forces with the pluralistic conditions of the parliamentary democracy in such a way that in an ideal case, the soldier and the citizen merge to become one single entity, equally obliged to the objectives of the Constitution. So "Innere Fuehrung" is a concept to transfer into reality the fundamental principles of the Basic Law into the armed forces. The mission of the Bundeswehr to safeguard peace in freedom must be fulfilled in such a way that these principles are also reflected within the armed forces.

The term of "Citizen in Uniform" therefore stands for the concept guiding military Command, training and instruction as well as education:

- It represents the concept of the citizen as a free individual.
- It is the concept of the fighting soldier being the natural defender of the community who shares responsibility for the protection of human rights, knowing that it is absolutely impossible to preserve the dignity of man without freedom.
- And it portrays the image of a politically educated, responsible citizen whose status as a soldier does not affect his ability to understand and access political causes, conditions and possible consequences of his actions.

²³ As a fourth principle could be stated, that the Bundeswehr is an armed force which has from the very beginning been conceived as a conscript force within an alliance. By committing themselves to a conscript army, government and parliament intended to emphasise that one of the self-evident obligations of all citizens is the duty to defend the

Translated into practical everyday life, this means, that the soldier as a Citizen in Uniform is included quite normally in social, public and political life in the Federal Republic of Germany. Extensive relations of a personal nature are maintained with all echelons of public administration and the economic sector as well as with all kinds of clubs, associations and organisations. These relations give evidence of the manner in which the Bundeswehr is integrated into the society. Soldiers are members of political parties, labour-unions or other organisations of society. As conscripts or career soldiers, they participate in activities organised in their garrison towns. In sum: they enjoy the same rights and duties to which every citizen is entitled

All soldiers have the right to vote or run as candidates for elections. The wide range of political activities in which the Bundeswehr-soldiers are engaged corresponds especially to the image of the „Citizen in Uniform“ and demonstrates in an exemplary manner how natural and self-evident it is for soldiers to participate in public life and social activities. The great number of soldiers holding an elected function in local town councils, regional state parliaments or in the Federal Parliament, tends to emphasise this statement.

To avoid any misunderstandings, it must be underlined that these legal provisions do not in any way impair the basic military principle of Command and obedience, as it is necessary to ensure the proper functioning of the armed forces. All servicemen have to obey military orders. However, they share responsibility in executing orders. The so called "unlimited obedience" does not exist any more in the German Armed Forces. In contrary, a German serviceman must refuse to obey to an order that violates the dignity of any human being, regardless of his or her nationality, or if an order includes the execution of a crime.

state against any attack from outside. In addition, conscription contributes to a permanent exchange with society and is thus regarded as an essential element for the integration of the armed forces into state and society.

The Constitution spells out that during the period of service the soldier remains basically endowed with the same fundamental human and civil rights as any citizen. The Constitution at the same time describes the basic rights which might be lawfully restricted for soldiers and only so by statutory law, not by superior command. The soldier, obligated in a special manner by his services, hence becomes a part of the armed forces and not its instrument! In addition, military law provides the soldier with a wide range of possible legal recourse: the right to counter-representation, the right to appeal to the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Federal Armed Forces, but in particular the right of complaint under the Military Grievance Code (Wehrbeschwerdeordnung, WBO). By the Military Grievance Code the soldier is given the opportunity, in a procedure structured in accordance with the principles of due process, to defend himself against inexpedient or unlawful orders and actions of military superiors or agencies.

To achieve all the goals of "Innere Fuehrung", there are a total of 10 fields of application such as Command, personnel management, political education, information and communication etc., which determine practical service life in a special way and which demands a high standard in exercising Command functions from the superiors. The main contents of the various fields of application are summarised in a Joint Service Regulation (ZDv 10/1)²⁴.

The area which is of paramount importance and therefore mentioned as a first priority is Command. Impacting on all other fields of application it is one of the key elements for making the concept of the „Citizen in Uniform“ come alive in practical operations and training activities. It constitutes the centre of any practical Command effort and is the decisive platform for the accomplishment of the military mission.

It has to prove its worth amid the conflicting requirements between the functional challenge presented by the military mission on one hand and the respect of the individual's personality as

well as the justified claims of the soldier as a citizen on the other. It requires from the leader an attitude which is positive and open-minded, giving due consideration to the soldier's personal concerns, addressing equally his heart and his mind.

It presupposes a relationship of trust between the superior and the subordinate and is likely to be particularly successful if the superior gives a convincing example by being open for dialogue, showing personal attention, working hand in hand in the spirit of partnership, by performing his duty in an outstanding manner and by being able to make his soldiers understand the purpose of their mission as well as their role in the context of the overall pattern.

Although "Auftragstaktik" (mission-type tactics)²⁵ has a long tradition in German armed forces²⁶ this style of Command is the logical consequence of the concept of "Innere Fuehrung" and is therefore the overall guideline for executing Command in the Bundeswehr (in peacetime and in any engagement). By practising this style, the principles of co-operation and trust between superiors and subordinates, the acceptance of responsibility and the initiative to do the best become reality.

And once and finally again, what are the differences? Concerning the Canadian understanding of "Mission Command" on the one hand and "Auftragstaktik" on the other the similarity seems to be very obvious. And indeed, the co-operation within the Alliance can only be as successful as it is, when the fundamentals are compatible! (See NATO-document AJP-01, no. 0407: "**Decentralisation**. COMAJF's responsibility for mission accomplishment is indivisible, but delegation of authority to subordinates and their responsibility to act in support of the higher commander's intentions are enshrined in the principle of Decentralisation. Through

²⁴ It is quite clear, that this regulation has a binding character for all services!

²⁵ The opposite – or better to say: the more restrictive – concept is "Befehlstaktik" (order-type tactics).

delegation, commanders generate the freedom of action for subordinates to act purposefully when unforeseen developments arise and exploit favourable opportunities. Decentralisation encourages the use of initiative and promotes timely decision-making. Subordinate commanders with delegated authority need to state clearly their intentions, designate the objectives to be achieved and provide the resources and authority required by their forces to accomplish their tasks. Although the emphasis given to a decentralised command style in the doctrine and practice of different services and nations may differ, joint force commanders and their staffs should employ the principle of delegation. ... ").

Things seem to be a little bit more different in the field of a conceptual framework as an intellectual foundation for the way the soldier sees himself. While the German "Innere Fuehrung" is codified and the official basis for any education (including a special academy for this purpose), obviously the Canadian Forces do not have such a written concept as a compact whole. In the National Defence Act in Part II / paragraph 29 the "means of address" were described but there is no clear imagination in the sense of a picture of the Canadian soldier and his role and function.^{27 28} Indeed, the already cited manual "Command" mentions at different places the necessity of mutual understanding and trust, the "... duty of all commanders to sustain institutional values in their commands."²⁹, the "... responsibility to create and sustain an effective 'climate' within his command."³⁰ But isn't the reason for that only the question of effectiveness/efficiency instead of having in mind a clearly defined imagination of man?

²⁶ "... this principle was brought to Germany by the Hessian soldiers returning home from the American Revolutionary War." See Walter von Lossow *Mission-Type Tactics versus Order-Type Tactics* in *Military Review*, June 1977, p. 87.

²⁷ On the other hand the – German – author found it quite gloomy to find several paragraphs in this document dealing with the "punishment of death" (para 73. – 80.)!

²⁸ Also in the "Queens Regulations & Orders" there is no such comprehensive catalogue.

²⁹ See National Defense / Land Force: *Command*. ...p. 20.

³⁰ Ibid.

CONCLUSION

While in the “technical” aspects of this subject – structures and procedures – the Canadian and German perspective to Command is nearly identical, there seems to be a different approach concerning the “philosophical” background. The German understanding (and practice!) is decisively influenced by the concept of “Innere Fuehrung”. The picture of “Citizen in Uniform” and the training and education in this matter claim an important part in the programs on all levels. The Canadian approach is obviously more dictated by practical thinking instead of establishing a codified conceptual framework. A broad discussion about this subject exists and covers a great variety of perspectives. But, more or less, this discussion touches only the level of the officers, hardly not the NCOs and not at all the privates. The question is, how this latter group is to be integrated in the debate ... and in the respective education/training?

It may be that this German practice has a lot to do with historical reasons and with the fact, that the Bundeswehr is a conscript armed force. And surely, it plays also an important role, that the German Armed Forces had the chance to start from zero some 40 years ago, while the Canadian Armed Forces have a longer grown up tradition.³¹

When Field Marshal Sir William Slim stated “You will be a good commander, you may even be a great commander, but you won’t necessarily have the confidence of your men, especially when things are not going up your way. And the confidence of your men is essential. In order to get that, all those qualities [will power, judgement, flexibility of mind, knowledge] must be based on a simple honesty, on integrity. You have to have this massive and simple honesty. All the really great commanders who have held their men have had it because the only

³¹ Although the new Canadian Constitution of December 1981 has demanded some changes in the military system.

foundations under man which will stand under great stress are the moral ones.”³² The basis for this honesty must be a clear image of man, which is NOT a means to achieve effectiveness but which proves the full respect to the personality of others – subordinates at all ranks ! - as such! This perspective of Command must be the basis for education and intensive training at all levels. A clearly defined picture of the soldier and its codification could be helpful.

³² Field Marshal Sir William Slim *Higher Command in War* in : Military Review, Vol 70, No 5 (May 1990), p. 10 – 21.

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