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RESEARCH ESSAY

NATO'S COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCES AND THE CANADIAN FORCES
LOGISTICS SUPPORT AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

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"But the first thing I tell my junior officers about logistics is, Never assume anything!
The logistician who assumes things quickly goes down the chute."¹

Lieutenant-General William G. Pagonis

Commander Support Command

Desert Shield/Storm

INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War and the disbandment of the Warsaw Pact have removed "the threat of a simultaneous, full-scale attack on all of NATO's European fronts."² This "transformation of the security environment in Europe has had a profound effect on the North Atlantic Alliance"³ and on the global international security environment. As a result, NATO has seen "major reductions in the risks our nations face and consequently in defence budgets and in levels of armed forces."⁴

However, the international security related developments that emerged since then, led the Alliance to acknowledge the fact that its new threat was now the maintenance of a global international security environment. Thus, "in contrast with the predominant threat of the past, the risks to Allied security that remain are multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional, which makes them hard to predict and assess."⁵ "This was recognised in the

decisions of the June 1992 Foreign Ministers Meeting in Oslo and particularly at the January 1994 Brussels Summit which required examination of how the Alliance's political and military structures and procedures might be developed and adapted to conduct more efficiently and flexibly the Alliance's missions, including peacekeeping, as well as to improve co-operation with the Western European Union (WEU) and to reflect the emerging European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI)."⁶ It was at the Brussels Summit that the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) was introduced; this new concept was designed "to make NATO's joint military assets available for wider operations by NATO nations or by the WEU."⁷

"The Alliance's New Strategy as well as the new force structure demand for a substantial increase in multinational force structures and procedures. This must, of course, also be reflected in the logistic systems and structures of NATO and nations. Different modes of multinational support have been developed and have stood their first test during NATO's first peace support operation (PSO) in the former Yugoslavia."⁸ The new concepts for multinational support are: Multinational Support Arrangements, Multinational Integrated Logistic, Lead-Nation and Role Specialist Nation. "Additionally, adequate logistic authorities and responsibilities have been identified for NATO Commanders to give them the tools to properly co-ordinate and control multinational logistic structures and services."⁹

Meanwhile, Canada, due to important economic difficulties and the evolution of the global international security environment, initiated a major and comprehensive

review of its Defence Policy in November 1993. The outcome of this review was the 1994 Defence White Paper which reaffirms, among other defence policy strategic objectives, Canadian contribution to international security: "we should continue to play an active military role in the United Nations (UN), the NATO and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe."¹⁰

The military strategy adopted by the Canadian Forces (CF) to meet the defence policy strategic objectives can be summarised as follows: "the consensus achieved on the way ahead – an effective, realistic and affordable policy, one that calls for multi-purpose, combat-capable armed forces able to meet the challenges to Canada's security both at home and abroad."¹¹ To that end, the Canadian Government has committed Maritime, Land and Air forces as well as support elements to "participate in multilateral operations anywhere in the world under UN auspices, or in the defence of a NATO member state."¹² At the same time, the 1994 Defence White Paper mentioned that: "the Department will continue to seek out new ways to support operational forces."¹³ This is presently being examined through the Department of National Defence (DND) alternate service delivery (ASD) initiatives.

With the emergence of the new NATO multinational logistic concepts and the DND ASD initiatives, it would be prudent to review their impact(s) on operational requirements. This paper will therefore examine the ability of the CF logistics system to integrate into an NATO/CJTF-led combined and joint operation. Because of the vast range and complexity of the many logistic support sub-systems, this paper will only

analyse, from a conceptual point of view, doctrines, structures and capabilities down to Maritime, Land and Air Components.

AIM

The aim of this essay is to demonstrate that the current alternate service delivery initiatives, within the Department of National Defence, will not improve the Canadian Forces logistic support capabilities to fulfil, at the operational level within a CJTF, the Department of National Defence's defence strategy, enunciated in the 1994 Defence White Paper.

PURPOSE OF THE CJTF

In order to examine the new NATO logistic support concepts, an understanding of the CJTF is essential. "The purpose of the so-called CJTF concept ... is to provide separable, but not separate, military capabilities that could be employed by NATO or WEU, enabling the European allies to conduct military operations in the framework of WEU if NATO were unable, or unwilling, to act. The CJTF concept is intended to: provide rapidly-deployable, multinational, multi-service task forces, together with command and control capabilities, drawn from the Alliance's integrated military command structure; enhance the European security and defence identity by making CJTF headquarters and CJTFs – and/or components thereof – available to WEU for specific operations; and, facilitate the incorporation of potential contributions from non-NATO

nations in contingency operations outside the realm of the Alliance's collective defence. The concept is undergoing development trials and it is expected to be finalised in 1998."¹⁴

From the Canadian perspective, the CF elements that could be deployed for a NATO/CJTF mission "may be engaged in up to mid-level combat operations in a range of low to mid intensity conflicts."¹⁵ Mid-level combat operations are defined as "military operations that involves most, if not all, of a nation's forces-in-being and may require the mobilisation of additional resources."¹⁶

DEFINITIONS

To examine interoperability issues between NATO and the CF in regards to doctrine, structure and capabilities, one must understand the following definitions and explanations:

- Multinational Support Arrangements: "these agreements may be concluded bi-and/or multi-laterally among nations and/or between nations and NATO authorities."¹⁷
- Multinational Integrated Logistic Support: "two or more nations agree to provide logistic assets to a multinational logistic force under operational control of a NATO commander for the logistic support of a multinational force. This is an especially attractive support option when one single nation is capable of providing the nucleus of the unit and/or the command

structure, around which the whole unit then can be formed by other augmentations and contingents."¹⁸

- Lead Nation Logistic Support: "one nation, based on capabilities, agrees to assume the responsibility for procuring and providing a broad spectrum of logistic support for all or a part of the multinational force and/or headquarters. In one operation more than one lead nation could be designated to provide a special range of support within a clearly defined functional and regional area of responsibility. A lead nation may also assume the responsibility to co-ordinate logistics of other nations within its functional and regional area of responsibility."¹⁹
- Role Specialist Nation Logistic Support: "one nation assumes the responsibility for procuring a particular class of supply or service for all or a part of the multinational force."²⁰
- Alternate Service Delivery Initiatives: they include examining the CF replenishment system including supply and distribution as well as the Canadian Forces Bases (CFBs) support system. The latter includes the infrastructure, resources conservation, security and military police, personnel administration, food services, lodging, supply, transportation, maintenance, communication and information systems, ranges and training areas and facilities, as well as controller services. Either or both of the CF replenishment system and CFBs support system may be contracted out to civilian agencies to achieve savings.

For the CF, "the correlation between lines and levels of logistic support is roughly as follows: strategic logistics – fourth line, operational logistics – third line and tactical logistics – first and second line support."²¹ "Strategic logistics involves the provision of military forces and the national means to support these forces and their operations"²² up to the seaport and airport point of entries of a theatre or area of operations where operational logistics take over. "Operational logistics involves activities to support forces in campaigns and major operations within a theatre or area of operations."²³ Operational logistics is the link between strategic and tactical logistics. "Tactical logistics is normally left to tactical commanders; however, commanders at higher levels may change combat service support tasks, priorities, apportionment or command relationships to influence the outcome of an operation."²⁴

DOCTRINES

Following an in-depth review of the major doctrinal documents published by NATO and the CF, which are listed in the bibliography, the reader, even one uninitiated in military affairs, will quickly come to the conclusion that both the NATO and CF doctrines are very similar and that interoperability exists down to the Maritime, Land and Air Components.

The new NATO concepts for logistics support are not new to the CF. Being a member of NATO since its foundation in 1949, the CF was a fervent user of co-operative logistics for the support of its elements permanently deployed in the NATO theatre of

war, Western Europe. As for multinational logistics, once again this is not completely new for the CF, which participated in several UN missions. Take for example the CF participation to the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) mission in former Yugoslavia where the French Army was the lead-nation for logistics support, while the Norwegian Army had a role specialist nation support for movement, and the Swedish Army was responsible for personnel administration. As it was evident then, and still is, these different concepts of logistics support generated a great deal of financial and logistics support capability economies. They also stimulated unity of effort, mutual trust and co-operation, which are essential to multinational operations.

While these new concepts are not new to the CF, they raise some concerns when the DND ASD initiatives are considered. As expected, the CF logistic support capabilities that will be committed to an NATO/CJTF-led operation must respect some basic NATO and CF logistic principles. "The main principles that underpin the logistic support concept are Co-operation, Co-ordination, Primacy of Operations, Flexibility, and Synergy"²⁵ to which Visibility should be added as it will be explained later.

"Logistic co-operation between civilian and the military sectors, within and between nations, is necessary to make best use of resources and to minimise duplication of common logistic functions."²⁶ Furthermore, the logistic resources, both military and civilian contractors, must also be reliable. This has not always been the case with civilian contractors, as was demonstrated by Brown & Root in Somalia: "in fact, the contractor started to demobilise during the transition of operations to the UN."²⁷ This would not

have happened with solely military logistics support, whatever the reasons were for the demobilisation. The argument is that while both civilian contractors and military logisticians may leave, the team nature of the military logisticians will work in favour of a military Commander and the other national military forces remaining in the theatre of operations.

"Co-operation at all levels ensures economy of effort, but must be co-ordinated to be effective. This may require the appointment of national representatives or liaison officers at several levels within the support organisation to ensure that nations are aware of and react appropriately to both national and NATO priorities, and that such priorities are harmonised."²⁸ "Even when contributing nations rely solely on national logistics, the NATO commander retains the responsibility to co-ordinate the overall logistic effort."²⁹ For security reasons related to an operation. The Commander CJTF and the national chains of command may deny civilian contractors access to their headquarters. If so than, military logistics personnel would be required in headquarters at all levels, as well as for the interface with civilian contractors. In addition, civilian contractors will also be looking for economic advantage, and that, because his primary loyalty lies with another team, his company. It will be difficult for a Commander to build a team in his headquarters that includes civilian contractors.

To respect the primacy of operations and to achieve flexibility, "operational plans must be established with the knowledge that unexpected events will dictate changes to the plan and concept of execution. As a result, flexibility is important particularly when

developing logistic plans, which must respond quickly and efficiently to even minor changes in the operational scenario.... Thus, formal structures and plans must be developed generically, with sufficient flexibility built-in to allow tailoring to match the changing requirements of different theatres or missions."³⁰ It can be argued that primacy of operations and flexibility to meet operational requirements cannot, except for specialised technical requirements, be met by civilian contractors for several reasons: lack of appropriate equipment, lack of qualified personnel, very limited or no knowledge of warfare, etc. This was the case when the 1R22eR Battle Group (the author of this paper was the commanding officer) opened the Sarajevo Airport in 1992 where the UNHCR employed civilian drivers to deliver humanitarian aids. After one day in an environment of artillery and mortar bombardments as well as tank and small arms direct fire, these drivers left and had to be replaced by CF soldiers. As one can conclude, primacy of operations and flexibility were not the principles of the civilian contractor. Furthermore, the very rigid procurement rules under which contracts are let within the Canadian Government may interfere with Commander operational requirements to call up civilian contractor resources or redirect the support effort because of his inability to modify the contract(s) under which he is supported.

"Synergy is when nations contribute to a common goal with the net benefit being greater than the sum of the separate contributions.... Multinational logistic support in the overall concept should be oriented to the particular logistic strengths of the Contributing Nations."³¹ However, as Lieutenant-General Pagonis, Commander Support Command during Desert Shield/Storm, mentioned: "What's the biggest difference between logistics

in the military and in the private sector? Without a doubt, it's our respective bottom lines, and how we think about them. The military focuses on life and death, whereas business measures profit."³² "If, in short, it is to be capable of coping with the uncertainty that is the result of enemy action and, as such, inherent in war – in that case a certain amount of redundancy, slack, and waste must not only be tolerated but deliberately built in. There are few for-profit concerns that live comfortably with redundancy, slack, and waste."³³ Therefore, commanders and operational planners must determine the strengths of the civilian contractors, in what type of environment they can perform adequately, etc, with the aim of creating the synergy that will allow a commander to achieve his mission. It can also be assessed that war and operations other than war (OOTW) are fought and directed at the operational level. Thus, the interface of military forces and civilian contractors should be between the strategic and operational levels, the seaport and airport point of entries of a theatre or an area of operations.

Visibility is linked to the evaluation of the sustainment capability for an operation. "The NATO commander must have access to information on the status of all assets under his control.... He must develop a clear and accurate picture of available logistic infrastructure.... It also requires the capability of easily passing information between military and civilian national and NATO authorities. Additionally as a means to gain necessary visibility of critical assets, the NATO commander is authorised to require reports and inspections of specified logistic assets as a method of tactical evaluation or to assess operational readiness in accordance with MC 319/1."³⁴ "If nations elect to support contributed forces through a national support system, it remains vital, just as in

multinational logistic operations, that they interface with the NATO multinational logistic co-ordination entity."³⁵ It is doubtful that our Allies will be willing to share information on logistics, which is a very important factor in determining the fighting capability of an opponent, while the security of this information, in the wrong hands, could cause Allies casualties and jeopardise the success of operations.

However, even with the civilian contractors shortfalls mentioned above, it is generally accepted that "as a general comment there is no conceptual or doctrinal reason to exclude the provision of contracted logistics support in any given theatre of operations. Indeed the CF has and will continue to use a variety of methods for the delivery of logistics support for our forces deployed outside Canada. This is normally based on the results of the logistics estimate specific to the mission tasks geography and other theatre characteristics. However, in extrapolating the use of contractor support from the specific to the general, we must consider second and third order effects and potentially unintended consequences of our decisions,"³⁶ as the shortfalls mentioned earlier.

Since the CF has not developed specific doctrine for the employment of civilian contractors, it would be prudent to examine what is being accomplished in this area by one of our Allies, the United States, and to take advantage of the lessons they have learned. "The Army formalised this concept in 1985 in US Army Regulation (AR) 700-137, Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP). The LOGCAP objective is to pre-plan for the use of civilian contractors to perform selected services in wartime to augment Army forces."³⁷ "While the program has been viewed as expensive, this

perception cannot be validated because there is no reliable way to compare the contractor's actual costs with the military's costs to perform the same functions. There also is no effective way to evaluate the costs of LOGCAP versus the benefits it provides to the operations."³⁸ However, "both Allied and Canadian doctrine and practice accept that there are limitations to its use in hostile conflict environments."³⁹ This was also stated during an interview with Lieutenant-General Johnston, Chief of Staff for General Schwarzkopf during the Persian Gulf War and Commander of United Task Force (UNITAF), OPERATION RESTORE HOPE in Somalia: "the use of LOGCAP should be limited to the seaport and airport point of entries to a theatre of operations."⁴⁰

There is another source of civilian support. Host Nation Support (HNS) can provide some of the required manpower and logistics support. However, there can be some limitations to the support provided by HNS as reported by Lieutenant-General Pagonis: "but to the extent that we decide to rely on local and/or contracted drivers, we need to understand fully what we're getting in to. We have to recognise that practicing Muslims won't drive on Thursdays and Fridays."⁴¹ "Clearly, we would have been in a very difficult situation if the host nation had been either 1) poor, 2) hostile or 3) both."⁴² Here are some additional comments from the lessons learned by our American Ally: "support plans that rely on HNS from a Third World nation with a limited infrastructure can create a dangerous situation for the operational commander. Therefore, HNS is not always an acceptable solution and would not have worked in Somalia, Rwanda or Haiti."⁴³

One aspect and probably the most important one is, who is going to provide logistics advice at the operational level to the Canadian Contingent commander if logisticians are replaced by civilian contractors? It is doubtful that a civilian contractor could have the knowledge of the operational art or could understand the logistics implications of a campaign plan as well as non-forecast situations. The following exchange between Lieutenant-General Pagonis and General Schwarzkopf demonstrates clearly the importance of this factor: "still, given your proposed deadline of February 1st, I'm convinced that it's impossible to create new logbases adequate to support two Army corps in the field." "Well, then," General Schwarzkopf said, "what we need to know is exactly how long it will take to get those logbases out there, in position to support a flanking manoeuvre, assuming you started moving out on January 16th. Today is Thursday," the CINC continued, looking at the calendar and then around the room. "We will meet again on Saturday to discuss a revised plan to accommodate these new goals. Thank you for your time, gentlemen."⁴⁴ Thus, it will be impossible for a civilian contractor who has limited or no knowledge of operational level warfare to foresee what has to be done when faced with forecasted and non-forecasted situations to ensure that the CJTF commander would be appropriately supported. Some may argue that civilian contractors may hire former military logisticians to fulfil this operational requirement. This may be true today. However, with the DND ASD initiatives, there will not, in the long term, be any former military logisticians with the required operational level expertise. Furthermore, in the case described above, it should be noted that any civilian contractor's advice might be tainted with corporate interest. A civilian contractor might see issues in terms of profit margin for his company, rather than what is best for the

operation. It can clearly be imagined a civilian contractor rubbing his hands with visions of a big bonus if General Schwarzkopf instructed him to build logbases in the desert to support his attack.

Rear area security is a very important responsibility for the CJTF commander. As for any commander the conduct of a campaign includes, within his theatre of operations, a framework of three space and time areas: deep (enemy's rear), close (the front) and friendly rear where normally the operational level logistics apparatus is located.

"Because administration provides the physical means by which military forces apply combat power, attacks on the support system can often produce the most damage to a military force. It may, in fact, be the centre of gravity of the force."⁴⁵ The CJTF commander "must evaluate his operation with respect to the risks to civilians and the military operation if he must provide troops to protect the contractor's operation. This diversion of armed forces could impede the commander's mission accomplishment. The inability to accurately predict OOTW's volatility creates a situation of uncertainty.

Commanders must conduct risk analyses before selecting LOGCAP solutions. However, civilian contractors should not be totally discounted when the situation turns sour –

Brown and Root proved themselves by performing admirably "under fire" in Somalia."⁴⁶

Nevertheless, Lieutenant-General Johnston confirmed during an interview that: "he had to provide security elements to allow Brown & Root to accomplish its tasks."⁴⁷ As

Lieutenant-General Pagonis succinctly noted: "rational human beings wouldn't make the ultimate sacrifice for Amalgamated Widget Co., Inc."⁴⁸

To summarise, NATO and CF doctrines, including the new NATO logistic support concepts, demonstrate interoperability in regards to doctrinal aspects of logistic support principles. The DND ASD initiatives, in regards to NATO and CF logistic principles, raise many concerns about reliability, operation security, primacy of operations and flexibility, synergy, operational information security, logistics advice to the commander and rear area security, and, altruism. However, ASD is required for specialised technical services and the use of civilian contractors via ASD should be used, based on the logistics estimate, to supplement military logistics, more specifically at the seaport and airport point of entries of a theatre of operations, which will normally be relatively secure. Furthermore, the CF has not developed specific doctrine for the employment of civilian contractors. Thus, the CF should examine the lessons learned by our Allies and then develop the required doctrine.

STRUCTURES

The implementation of the CJTF generated the requirements to develop the appropriate structure to support it while respecting the logistic principles mentioned earlier. "The logistic pillar of the CJTF will be the Multinational Joint Logistics Centre (MJLC), which is undergoing its own parallel series of tests."⁴⁹ There are different organisational options for the establishment of the MJLC. "In principle, the MJLC can be deployed or used in the following options: establish the MJLC capability in the CJTF HQ – CJ 4 by augmenting the CJ 4 staff; as an MJLC integrated in or collocated with the CJTF HQ or other supporting HQ; as a module placed within the Support Command

structure."⁵⁰ In addition and "if needed, the MJLC may be supplemented by component Multinational Logistic Commands (MNLCS)"⁵¹ as follows: MNLCS Maritime, Land and Air. The mission of the MJLC is: "to co-ordinate or control the logistic activities of designated organisations in order to provide support to the operational commander."⁵²

For the CF elements deployed abroad, the "operational level logistic support in a theatre of operations is co-ordinated and provided by a Canadian Support Group (CSG)."⁵³ "The CSG may be comprised of a number of components depending upon the nature of the operation and the level of support required. The CSG Rear component is the Canada based component which functions as the interface between the in-theatre component, the CSG Deployed, and national bases of operations and support agencies. The theatre based component, the CSG Deployed, is responsible for providing CSS to the components of the force and for maintaining a logistics link with the CSG Rear."⁵⁴ "The CSG Detachments (Maritime, Land or Air) would be formed using established resources within the CSG.... Each Detachment would include only the CSG resources necessary to provide the basic operational level support requirements critical to the supported component's mission.... Detachments will normally be formed for short duration and be mission specific."⁵⁵ "When the CF deploys as part of a combined force, the CSG may act in role specialisation or as lead nation for certain supplies and/or services."⁵⁶

Naval operational logistics at the operational level are similar for both NATO and the Canadian Maritime Component. "Logistics support is provided through an intricate pipeline, which includes an initial handling point, an Advanced Logistics Support Site

(ALSS) and potentially several Forward Logistics Sites (FLS). These sites and the transport between them would almost certainly be joint, if not multinational. The ALSS and FLS would be sites chosen to support the conflict as appropriate."⁵⁷

For the Canadian Land Component, the "administration in support of the operational level of conflict encompasses those support activities required to support campaigns and major operations within a theatre or area of operations. Primarily based on the provision of support by military resources, it also includes the linkage with in-theatre allied and host nation military and civilian resources, and with strategic level administrative systems and resources. Administration in support of the operational level of conflict encompasses the in-theatre support beyond tactical administration."⁵⁸ As mentioned before, the interface between the Canadian Land Component and the strategic level is the CSG per se or the CSG via a CSG Detachment Land.

For the Canadian Air Component, "a wing should be able to sustain all routine, deployed logistics functions. However, if the deployment involves an entire squadron or several squadrons (flying squadrons or not), an in-theatre support squadron or wing (Air Combat Service Support organisation) may have to be deployed to provide supplementary first line and second line support. In addition, for large-scale joint or combined operations, a deployed national support group (Canadian Support Group) or national support element (NSE) may be tasked to provide third line in-theatre sustainment support."⁵⁹

As demonstrated, the CF logistics structure adequately meets the logistic support requirements of its Maritime, Land and Air Components through the CSG which will coordinate all aspects of logistics support at the operational level with the CJTF MJLC. This will guarantee interoperability between NATO/CJTF and the CF Support Components.

However, as primacy of operations must be predominant in all logistic support aspects, "flexibility is the ability to adapt logistic structures, functions and procedures to changing situations and concept of operations. The principle of flexibility includes the concepts of alternative planning, anticipation, reserve assets, redundancy, forward support, and centralised control with decentralised execution."⁶⁰ This means that the CSG may be required to provide, in the combat zone, "limited tactical level support to supplement the logistics support capabilities integral to each component."⁶¹ Will the civilian contractor be capable and willing to deploy its employees and its equipment in the combat zone during combat activities? Who will train the civilian personnel? Will the civilian employees be ready and trained to assume local defence of their facilities? These three questions and several others cannot be answered favourably. Furthermore, if required by non-forecasted situations, civilian employees cannot be transformed readily into infantry soldiers as commanders throughout military history have done with their uniformed logisticians. This had been the case in World War II for the Allied force Commanders during the German counter-offensive in the Ardennes.

To summarise, both NATO and CF structures, including the structure for the new NATO logistic support concepts, demonstrate interoperability. However, as a CSG Detachment may be required to deploy in the combat zone, civilian contractors cannot meet the following NATO and CF logistic support principles: primacy of operations, flexibility, co-operation and synergy. This is even more so for non-forecasted situations, when a commander has to transform his support personnel into infantryman.

CAPABILITIES

NATO has no military forces as such and is dependent of its member nations for military forces generation. "All personnel and equipment required to conduct an operation are provided by contributing nations."⁶² Two important factors must be considered when a nation contributes forces, "the readiness and availability of logistic units and personnel should be adapted to the force they support, thereby ensuring the timely support of the force."⁶³ "Therefore, logistic force requirements must be established at an early stage and in consultation with nations, taking into account the need to man the force continuously in the event of a protracted operation."⁶⁴ Even though civilian contractors may be able to accommodate the latter factor, it becomes irrelevant if they cannot meet the conditions of the former as it was explained earlier.

Having established the NATO/CJTF capability requirements, it is time to examine the CF capabilities that exist to fulfil these requirements. "The CSG units are structured to support the largest force to be deployed under the direction of the 1994 Defence White

Paper and further amplified by the 1998 Defence Planning Guide, specifically, a Brigade Group, a Fighter Wing, a Naval Task Group, a squadron of tactical transport aircraft, a Joint Force Headquarters, a Canadian Medical Group (CMG), an Engineer unit, the Security and Military Police Unit (SAMPU) and the CSG, for a total in excess of 10,000 personnel."⁶⁵ "The composition of the CSG will depend on the scale of the operation, the assigned tasks and whether or not the force is participating as part of a Combined/Coalition Force."⁶⁶ "During peacetime, the CSG will consist of cadre elements based on the General Support Group of CC 2 (Land Force Command)."⁶⁷ "The CSG will normally deal only with the different component's support organisation, specifically the Service Battalion (Svc Bn), the Air CSS Squadron (ACSSS) and the Allied Logistics Support Site (ALSS) or Forward Logistics Site (FLS)"⁶⁸, and, I will add the CJTF MJLC for co-ordination purposes.

As mentioned during an interview with Colonel Gervais, the Canadian National Defence Headquarters J 4: "the DND and the CF are supporting the NATO new concepts of logistics support: multinational support arrangements, multinational integrated logistic support, lead nation logistic support and role specialist nation logistic support."⁶⁹ According to him, "the CSG will have to support up to 17,000 personnel"⁷⁰ and not 10,000 personnel as mentioned earlier. "The CSG cadre has developed a Table of Organisation and Equipment (TO&E) in draft form which identifies a requirement for 2,870 personnel"⁷¹ to support the CF Joint Task Force (JTF) identified earlier, that could be deployed to a NATO/CJTF. Furthermore, he also added that "the CSG personnel manning requirement could fluctuate between 1,500 to 4,000 personnel depending on

multinational logistics support as well as military and civilians from the HNS that could be provided to the CF JTF."⁷²

The CF has the capabilities to man the CMG with a nucleus provided by the Canadian Forces Medical Group (CFMG), the Engineer Support Unit (ESU) with 1 Construction Engineer Unit and the SAMPU from either CF national resources or from CF national augmentation resources. CF national resources from Maritime and Air Commands will augment the CSG cadre but the resources will come mainly from Land Force Command. In regards to readiness, "all these organisations are to be ready for deployment within 60 days."⁷³ However, Colonel Gervais mentioned: "that these units would require 90 days to be ready for deployment and that no equipment and no vehicles have been earmarked for them."⁷⁴ When the aspect of readiness is addressed, the British Army came to the following conclusion after the Persian Gulf War: "the need to deploy armed forces throughout the world rapidly will remain and for those deployments to remain credible and sustainable they must be properly supported with logistic troops that are at least at the same state of readiness as the fighting troops."⁷⁵ Therefore, it can be said that without the required equipment and vehicles, the CSG, CMG, ESU and SAMPU could not fulfil the operational level logistic support requirements for the CF military commitments to a NATO/CJTF.

Furthermore, the Armed Forces Council struggling with this issue and the DND ASD initiatives, provided additional guidance: the operational level CF logistics support apparatus will be deployed only in a secure rear area of operations; the CF will examine

the impact of manning the CSG personnel requirement with 20% of reservists; and, that the first and second line logistics support will not be affected by the ASD initiatives.

As was explained earlier, it can never be assumed that the rear area of a theatre of operations will always be secure as it may be subjected to air and ballistic missiles attacks, chemical warfare, sabotage, or airborne and airmobile attacks. The enemy cannot be relied upon to tell us what, where, when and how he will attack a CJTF facility/organisation. With the new weapon technologies available, the AFC guidance is highly suspect and could place inordinate burdens on the CF and on its Allies.

There is no doubt that the DND ASD initiatives and the additional guidance provided by the Armed Forces Council will have important consequences on the CF operational level logistic support capabilities, when compared to the operational requirements established by the NATO and the CF logistic support principles and the 1994 Defence White Paper. NATO dictates that "national levels of logistic resources must be sufficient to achieve designated standards of readiness, sustainability and mobility to provide the required military capability during peace, crisis and conflict."⁷⁶

To that purpose, and to meet the military strategic objectives enunciated in the 1994 Defence White Paper, the Land Force Command has launched an initiative that will allowed the CSG to improve considerably its readiness, sustainability and mobility operational requirements. The Land Force Command is presently splitting its second line support. This will create close support service battalions and transfer the general support

resources, including personnel, equipment and vehicles, to a general support group (approximately 2,000 personnel including approximately 20% reservists). Land Force Command CFBs and elements of Militia units will provide personnel to complete the personnel establishment of the general support group, which is structured for war, OOTW and domestic operations. During peacetime and for the training of the three Canadian Mechanised Brigade Groups as well as for domestic operations, the general support group will be sub-divided under the new Area Support Groups (ASGs) that will be created. Each ASG will become a virtual base encompassing the Land Force Command CFBs of each area as well as a general support battalion from the general support group. This new concept has generated large economies in personnel. As an example, the Land Force Québec Area's ASG has generated since 1994 reductions of 931 civilian and 459 military positions respectively.

Notwithstanding, it should also be noted that due to the large number of missions abroad, undertaken by Canada, the Land Force Command personnel strength was increased considerably by the 1994 Defence White Paper. Thus, the DND and the CF are facing a dilemma. On one hand, there is the Land Force Command initiative which, while generating major savings, will improve considerably the CSG readiness, sustainability and mobility operational requirements by the integration of the general support resources from its second line support with its CFBs logistic support resources; while on the other hand, there is the DND ASD initiatives which aim to generate economies by contracting out CFBs logistic support requirements, thus reducing military personnel strength, equipment and vehicles. Therefore, DND ASD initiatives will not

only prevent the CSG from fulfilling the 1994 Defence White Paper military strategic objectives, but they will also very negatively affect the ratio of the Land Force Command logistics capabilities. This is because the national support element deployed to support the Canadian Contingent abroad is generated from the second line support and the Land Force Command CFBs, which are normally responsible for the third line support. Furthermore, it will also prevent the CF from adequately sustaining the troops deployed abroad for protracted operations.

In regards to the guidance that the CSG be manned by 20% reservists, without the appropriate government legislation to callout these reservists on active duty while protecting their employment, it is doubtful that this guidance could be implemented. This remains true despite the fact that the Land Force Command general support group already includes approximately 20% of reservists. It must also be recognised that most of the reservists are students and thus they are not qualified workers or professionals that could be incorporated easily in the CSG. Furthermore, it is common knowledge that it takes three to four years to produce a trained logistician reservist. On the other hand, the rate of personnel turnover in the Reserve is approximately 30% per year. This is in stark contrast to the American Reserve Component. As Lieutenant-General Pagonis wrote: "our reserve units, which as noted above made up almost three-quarters of my command, were highly talented and motivated. I must emphasise a personal conviction at this point: that we cannot afford to move any more spaces from the active CSS force to the reserve structure. In fact, I'd argue, we must contemplate moving some spaces in the Materiel Management and Materiel Control areas back from the reserve side to the active CSS

structure."⁷⁷ "The Army can't be asked to fight much of a war unless the politicians are willing to let the reserves get called up. That's precisely what happened in the Gulf War."⁷⁸ This is a problem for the CF, especially since it is doubtful that the Canadian Government will ever enact the required legislation.

Finally, "in assessing the viability of contractor support the logistics estimate must consider the threat environment, the mission and its duration, the support requirement, geography, the availability of support from friendly forces and the impact of other CF operations."⁷⁹ But, even when all these factors are met, does this not place a Commander at the mercy of the civilian contractors? As an example, in Haiti, a very peaceful UN mission, Brown & Root provided logistics support. However, during an interview with Lieutenant-Colonel Mike Boomer, a former Canadian Contingent Chief of Staff in Haiti: "the UN had placed a contract with a French firm that was unable to deploy as quickly as it was required and Brown & Root decided to withdraw its logistic support activities, thus forcing the UN to renew its contract with them."⁸⁰ There were maybe, other reasons for the Brown & Root decision. Notwithstanding, it is the deployed troops that would have suffered the consequences and this would have affected the mission as such. Is this an acceptable risk? As said by Lieutenant-General Pagonis: "Good Logistics Is Combat Power."⁸¹

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the DND ASD initiatives will not improve the CF logistic support capabilities to fulfil, at the operational level within a CJTF, the Department of National Defence's defence strategy, enunciated in the 1994 Defence White Paper. Furthermore, the CF does not presently have the logistic support capabilities to support and sustain the Canadian military strategic objectives. In fact, the DND ASD initiatives will exacerbate the actual situation. However, the Land Force Command initiative, the general support group, and not the DND ASD initiatives, will improve considerably the CSG readiness, sustainability and mobility operational requirements. Furthermore, the use of reservists for the CSG may/will improve this situation. But, without the proper legislation to call out reservists while protecting their employment, the improvement will be minor and irrelevant.

The new NATO logistic support concepts will generate financial and national logistic support capability economies. They will also stimulate unity of effort, mutual trust and co-operation, which are essential to multinational operations.

For both NATO/CJTF and the CF, doctrines and structures, including the new NATO logistic support concepts, demonstrate, at the operational level, interoperability which will be facilitated by the co-ordination of support activities among the CJTF MJLC and the CSG. Therefore, the CSG or the CSG via a CSG Detachment will fulfil the operational level logistic support requirements of the CF Maritime, Land and Air

Components. As for the DND ASD initiatives, they raise major doctrinal and structural concerns if civilian contractors are employed at the operational level. They will not likely achieve some basic logistic principles such as co-operation, co-ordination, primacy of operations, flexibility, synergy and visibility to the point that readiness, sustainability and mobility operational requirements that are essential in a theatre of operations, will not be met. The ASD initiatives also raise the question of who will provide logistics advice to the commander and who will co-ordinate and accomplish the rear area security. In addition, it is doubtful that civilian contractor employees will commit themselves to hostilities with the possible loss of life.

Nonetheless, the use of civilian contractors should not be rejected as it can enhance operational capabilities and effectiveness. This will be the case with the use of specialised technical civilian services and the interface between the military logisticians and the civilian contractors at the seaport and airport point of entries of a theatre of operations. However, it is the logistics estimate that should dictate what, where, when and how civilian contractors should be used. In that respect, the CF should examine the lessons learned by our Allies and then develop the required doctrine, as none currently exists.

Furthermore, the DND ASD initiatives will reduce the CF logistic support capabilities, which, even now, cannot fulfil the DND defence strategy, enunciated in the 1994 Defence White Paper. However, the CSG readiness, sustainability and mobility operational requirements could be improved considerably by the Land Force Command

initiative, the general support group, if the two DND ASD initiatives exposed in this paper are cancelled.

Left to their own, the DND ASD initiatives will create an asymmetrical operational force structure, which will be detrimental to the CF. This problem will persist even when the logistic resources are augmented with reservists, as most of the CF reservists are students and not qualified workers or specialists. More importantly, it is doubtful that the Canadian Government will ever adopt the required legislation to call out the reservists while protecting their employment. As Vice-Admiral Garnett, the CF Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, said during the opening address of the Advanced Military Study Course 1, in Toronto, on 11 September 1998: "the CF must protect their combat capabilities, as creating new organisations takes time." As Major-General Thompson noted: "behind all this however, lay the necessity for immense logistic support – the lifeblood of war."⁸²

NOTES

¹ Lieutenant-General William G. Pagonis and Jeffrey L. Cruikshank, Moving Mountains: Lessons in Leadership and Logistics from the Gulf War (Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard Business School Press, 1992), 201.

² North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, NATO Logistics Handbook (Brussels: NATO Headquarters, October 1997), 25.

³ NATO Logistics Handbook, xi.

⁴ NATO Logistics Handbook, xi.

⁵ NATO Logistics Handbook, 25.

⁶ NATO Logistics Handbook, 25.

⁷ NATO Logistics Handbook, 9-10.

⁸ NATO Logistics Handbook, 28.

⁹ NATO Logistics Handbook, 28.

¹⁰ Canada, Department of National Defence, 1994 Defence White Paper (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1994), 27.

¹¹ 1994 Defence White Paper, 2.

¹² 1994 Defence White Paper, 38.

¹³ 1994 Defence White Paper, 42.

¹⁴ NATO Logistics Handbook, 16-17.

¹⁵ Canada, Department of National Defence, B-GG-005-004/AF-013 Logistic Support to Canadian Forces Operations (Ottawa: DND Canada, 8 January 1998), 1-1.

¹⁶ Canada, Department of National Defence, B-GG-005-004/AF-000 Canadian Forces Operations (Canada: Department of National Defence, 1996), 1-3.

¹⁷ NATO Logistics Handbook, 121.

¹⁸ NATO Logistics Handbook, 122.

¹⁹ NATO Logistics Handbook, 121.

²⁰ NATO Logistics Handbook, 121.

²¹ Canadian Forces Operations, 27-2.

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- ²² Canadian Forces Operations, 27-2.
- ²³ Canadian Forces Operations, 27-2.
- ²⁴ Canadian Forces Operations, 27-2 and 27-3.
- ²⁵ North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, AJP-4, Co-ordinating Draft Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, January 1998), 1-5.
- ²⁶ North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, AJP-01, Change 1 Allied Joint Doctrine (MSA, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, September 1997), 20-6.
- ²⁷ Major Camille M.T. Nichols, "The Logistics Civil Augmentation Program" Military Review, (March-April 1996), 68.
- ²⁸ Co-ordinating Draft Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine, 1-3.
- ²⁹ Co-ordinating Draft Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine, 1-17.
- ³⁰ Co-ordinating Draft Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine, 1-4.
- ³¹ Co-ordinating Draft Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine, 1-4.
- ³² Lieutenant-General William G. Pagonis and Jeffrey L. Cruikshank, 210.
- ³³ Lieutenant-General William G. Pagonis and Jeffrey L. Cruikshank, 210-211.
- ³⁴ Co-ordinating Draft Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine, 1-5.
- ³⁵ Co-ordinating Draft Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine, 1-10.
- ³⁶ Colonel R.M. Gervais, Contractors in the Battle Zone Seminar, J 4 Log Closing Comments (Canadian Forces Support Unit Ottawa: Facsimile no. 748, 5 October 1998), 1/3.
- ³⁷ Major Camille M.T. Nichols, 65-66.
- ³⁸ Major Camille M.T. Nichols, 68.
- ³⁹ Contractors in the Battle Zone Seminar, J 4 Log Closing Comments, 2/3.
- ⁴⁰ Interview with Lieutenant-General R.B. Johnston, 8 Oct

⁴⁵ Canada, Department of National Defence, B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Conduct of Land Operations-Operational Level Doctrine for the Canadian Army (Ottawa: DND Canada), 8-2.

⁴⁶ Major Camille M.T. Nichols, 69.

⁴⁷ Interview with Lieutenant-General R.B. Johnston.

⁴⁸ Lieutenant-General William G. Pagonis and Jeffrey L. Cruikshank, 211.

⁴⁹ NATO Logistics Handbook, 17.

⁵⁰ Co-ordinating Draft Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine, 1-26.

⁵¹ Co-ordinating Draft Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine, 1-25.

⁵² Co-ordinating Draft Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine, 1-26.

⁵³ Canadian Forces Operations, 27-7.

⁵⁴ Canadian Forces Operations, 27-7.

⁵⁵ Logistic Support to Canadian Forces Operations, 1-14.

⁵⁶ Logistic Support to Canadian Forces Operations, 1-6.

⁵⁷ Canada, Department of National Defence, MS/MCP 1 Naval Doctrine Manual (Toronto: Canadian Forces Command and Staff College), 4-38/38.

⁵⁸ Conduct of Land Operations-Operational Level Doctrine for the Canadian Army, 8-4.

⁵⁹ Canada, Department of National Defence, Out of the Sun, Aerospace Doctrine for the Canadian Forces (Winnipeg: Craig Kelman & Associates Ltd), 123.

⁶⁰ Canadian Forces Operations, 27-3.

⁶¹ Logistic Support to Canadian Forces Operations, 1-9.

⁶² Co-ordinating Draft Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine, 1-10.

⁶³ North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, MC 319/1 NATO Principles and Policies for Logistics (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 1994), 4.

⁶⁴ MC 319/1 NATO Principles and Policies for Logistics, 4.

⁶⁵ Logistic Support to Canadian Forces Operations, 1-1.

⁶⁶ Logistic Support to Canadian Forces Operations, 1-6.

⁶⁷ Logistic Support to Canadian Forces Operations, 1-15.

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- ⁶⁸ Logistic Support to Canadian Forces Operations, 1-7.
- ⁶⁹ Interview with Colonel R.M. Gervais, 1 October 1998.
- ⁷⁰ Interview with Colonel R.M. Gervais.
- ⁷¹ Interview with Colonel R.M. Gervais.
- ⁷² Interview with Colonel R.M. Gervais.
- ⁷³ Interview with Colonel R.M. Gervais.
- ⁷⁴ Interview with Colonel R.M. Gervais.
- ⁷⁵ Major-General M.S.L. White, Gulf Logistics: Blackadder's War (London: Brassey's, 1995), 249.
- ⁷⁶ Co-ordinating Draft Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine, 1-3/1-4.
- ⁷⁷ Lieutenant-General William G. Pagonis and Jeffrey L. Cruikshank, 209.
- ⁷⁸ Lieutenant-General William G. Pagonis and Jeffrey L. Cruikshank, 100.
- ⁷⁹ Contractors in the Battle Zone Seminar, J 4 Log Closing Comments, 2/3.
- ⁸⁰ Interview with Lieutenant-Colonel M. Boomer, 1 October 1998.
- ⁸¹ Lieutenant-General William G. Pagonis and Jeffrey L. Cruikshank, 221.
- ⁸² Major-General Julian O. Thompson, The Lifeblood of War: Logistics in Armed Conflict (London: Brassey's, 1991), 344.

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