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Research Essay

Emerging Concepts in Operational Support - The Need To Get It Right

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Emerging Concepts in Operational Support - The Need to Get It Right

“At the strategic level, logistics is the foundation that sustains power projection capability. Strategic logistics influences national strategy by affecting the composition, balance, and deployment of combat forces, and the scope and timing of strategic plans.”¹

Introduction

Canadian operational commanders receive logistical support from any combination of national sources, nationally coordinated sources or in-theatre sources. Canada presently has a variety of well-developed processes for providing this support, varying anywhere from environmental organic service support capabilities to a deployed Canadian Support Group (CSG).² These are supplemented in theatre by national re-supply flights and with host nation support. Nevertheless, for areas where national support continues to be required, “[l]ogistics has its roots in the national economy. In this area it is dominated by civilian influences and civilian authority.”³ There is a growing need for a cultural change in industry, the government, the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Forces (CF) with regard to their willingness to participate in new and mutually beneficial partnerships. Exciting new prospects exist for partnership with industry.⁴

Notwithstanding the nature of civilian influences and authority mentioned above, it remains the commander’s responsibility to ensure the success of any Canadian contingent’s mission, and any restrictions or shortfalls created by domestic logistical deficiencies serve only to distract them from their primary focus. The last place domestic logistical deficiencies should

appear is in an operational theatre. This essay will detail how viable strategic logistical processes are vital to any operational level military capability.

Reality is a constant companion whenever government and economic issues related to defence support are discussed. “Structural forces represent a serious obstacle to any articulation of a coherent defence-industrial strategy. These forces represent the complicated interplay of the many government departments and agencies which operate in the area of defence capital, and a variety of wider political and economic considerations that have traditionally driven many capital decisions beyond the control of the Department of National Defence...”⁵ Cultural change is a fundamental requirement for any improvements in the defence-industrial relationship. Innovative partnerships may occur as a result, relationships which are able to beneficially influence the associated regulatory framework within which the relationships exist.⁶

National and international economic and legislative forces shape the Canadian economy. Today, the regular Canadian Forces are being drawn down, yet operational level commanders continue to face the challenge of standing up new deployments or adapting to changes and issues that arise during deployments. While progress has been made in adapting to these challenges, there remains a continuing need to improve or establish new and innovative support processes to maintain operational capability. The reality is that these processes depend upon the capability of the economy and the regulatory framework imposed by the government. If neither of these is capable of supporting increased industrial support for the military, then the changes mandated by defence expenditure reductions may be unsupportable. Success in achieving these changes is tied fundamentally to the economic and legislative choices made by the Federal Government.⁷

Canadian industry exists primarily in a free enterprise system. Free trade market forces shape it within a framework of international economic alliances.⁸ “Canada has a small DIB (defence industrial base), a small market lacks [sic] a broad technology base, and is largely dependent on the U.S.”⁹ The capability of industry to support CF operations, more than anything else, may inhibit some of the emerging support processes for the Canadian Forces.

The Canadian Forces are totally government controlled, and logistic support options are governed by legislation that is largely beyond its’ ability to influence. Consequently, national support for deployed military operations is primarily constrained by federal and provincial regulatory choices. This essay will review some of those policy choices and regulations, and identify their impact on the equipping and support of deployed Canadian forces for wartime and operations other than war.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) definition of logistics – “the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces,” including all aspect of materiel acquisition, provision and disposal, transportation , engineering support, acquisition and furnishing of services and medical and health support will be used for the purpose of this paper.

¹⁰ Significant parallels to engineering and medical support do exist, and should be considered included, rather than excluded, in the issues which follow.

Canadian Industry

“National policy reflects Canada’s interests both in the domestic and international environments...It is the Government’s responsibility to define Canada’s national interests and to

provide the necessary guidance and focus to strategic policy makers and planners. This strategic guidance is essential to influence domestic and international behavior and attitudes.”¹¹ A national strategy of creating “core” industrial capabilities to meet Canada’s needs would appear to be logical extension of this statement if there is to be a meaningful focus for that government involvement. That said, “Canada has long recognized that its own defence market is too small to support a defence industrial base which can meet all of the requirements of the Canadian Forces.”¹² “There are powerful influences on the development of the defence industrial base and upon industrial preparedness planning that lie beyond the national legislative and regulatory environment.”¹³ These realities must be assessed as the Department of National Defence and Canadian Forces move to rely more upon industry for operational support.

Canadian government economic policy reflects a reliance upon trade alliances for economic prosperity. Participation in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) reflects the Government’s resolve to participate in creating “an expanded and secure market...and to contribute to the...development and expansion of world trade ...and broader international cooperation.”¹⁴ The reality is that all major nations are joining or forming regional economic alliances in order to remain economically viable, and to have access to specific industrial resources, in the future.¹⁵

A similar reliance is evident when it comes to national defence procurement as “Canadian defence products consist almost entirely of subsystems and components for American weapon systems.”¹⁶ In light of this reality, the Government has three options

Canadian industrial offsets in the procurement of goods and services or acquire a source from the international marketplace. Canada's support for NAFTA eliminates the option for government-created trade distortions, as NAFTA embraces the principle of open and free markets that precludes the use of national subsidies to artificially support industry.¹⁷

The second option of demanding industrial offsets in federal contracts does work, however, the long-term benefits as an industrial development policy is suspect. Offsets, "a policy whereby nations insist some national benefit (ie, economic/industrial) be derived for them to come to an international agreement on development or procurement...In a sense, nations trade off one element of national sovereignty to improve another and enhancement of the individual DIB can result."¹⁸ While it does provide employment and technology tradeoffs in Canada, the success as a development tool may be short-lived, with the desired capability eroding away once the contracts have been completed. In any event, neither option provides a clear and lasting foundation for the development of a national defence industrial base.¹⁹ Consequently, it may be concluded that the federal government's industrial development policy favours sourcing through an international defence industrial base. It follows, then, that the international marketplace should be an acceptable source for acquisitions and contracted for support, and that related government legislation should reflect this. This frequently is not the case.

Canada has a complex procurement environment where national and regional economic concerns prevail over timely and cost effective acquisitions from international sources. "The approval process within government includes, in addition to DND: the Department of Supply and Services for contract purposes; the Department of Regional Economic Expansion for industrial and economic benefits; the Department of External Affairs; the Treasury Board for financial

approval; and Cabinet.”²⁰ The complexity is magnified further by the fact that each organization has its own regulations and procedures. One of the few options available to DND to change this reality is to attempt to foster a greater cooperation with industry, allowing them to create a responsive industrial environment and to influence the regulatory framework. If this cultural shift is achieved, the acquisition of equipment and logistic support for new or deployed operations would be more readily acquired as the need arises. Operational level commanders would be better served as equipment shortfalls and contracted-for services could be addressed more quickly, and with less staffwork for all concerned.

Reforming the regulatory framework surrounding materiel acquisition only begins to address industry’s ability to support operational needs. Materiel availability is another important component of the equation. “In the matter of military preparedness, military production in Canada has meant reliance upon U.S. technology, U.S. capital, and the willingness of the U.S. to grant to Canada special concessions. A major preoccupation of Canadian diplomacy has been the negotiation of a special relationship with the U.S.”²¹ “Today, Canada is not given quite the same favoured status that was implied in various original agreements.”²² Although a decade old, this comment is becoming even more a reality today. Anecdotal information reveals that the waning nature of Canada’s special relationship is now openly discussed in diplomatic circles in the United States; a decade ago it was more or less an unstated undercurrent in those circles.²³

It would be prudent at this point to mention that there is an element of risk associated with reliance upon foreign industrial bases, even with a strong economy like in the United States. “Dependencies can be found in even the strongest DIBs. Although foreign dependence is not normally associated with the U.S., in areas such as microchips and strategic minerals there is a

growing awareness that NATO and allied defence efforts are highly interdependent resulting from the global economic infrastructure that supports their various DIBs. In some cases, the foreign source of these items is not only outside the U.S., but it is also outside NATO, particularly in the Pacific Rim, a vulnerable area in terms of an Assured Source of supply. In light of Canada's many ties to the U.S., this weakness should be of great Canadian concern too."²⁴ This reality must be kept in mind given the significant reliance Canada places upon the United States for its defence capability. The reliance makes it a Canadian weakness as well.

In the past, military supplies were either procured in bulk or acquired through pre-arranged production schedules based upon historical consumption rates. Once ordered, industry's prioritization for Canadian orders was seldom based upon Canada's operational needs. It was, more often than not, a function of where industry placed it with respect to larger or domestic customer orders. "Historically, DND procures most of its major weapon systems from the U.S. and relies to significant extent on the U.S. for the provision of spare parts for these and other weapon systems... Thus, the degree to which the American base is able to respond to its own customers, can dramatically affect the timely and economical introduction of, and sustained support to, U.S. equipment operated by DND."²⁵ "One of the most fundamental components related to DIP is the establishment of guaranteed sources of supply for the Armed Forces in times of both crisis and war. This requires preplanning, which by its very nature must both identify and address items considered critical to the sustainment of the forces in the field, and in turn the producers of these items."²⁶

Materiel availability for operations is a function of accurately forecasting requirements, or having funds available to make non-forecast procurements if stock, (presuming that the stock

is even available commercially). “In light of the Canada/U.S. ties that exist, Canada should be aware that the weaknesses, ie, the dependencies, of the U.S. DIB. The degree to which the American base is able to respond to its domestic customers, and after that to foreign customers, can dramatically affect the timely and economical introduction of, and sustained support to, U.S. equipment operated by D.N.D.”²⁷ While dealing with materiel availability, the same issue arises for the provision of support services. Unforecast requirements for any deployed operation can easily outstrip available supplies, and leave the operational commander short of what they and their troops require in the field. Innovations that are more recent include the concepts of using just-in-time procurement processes and commercially available off-the-shelf technology instead of specialized equipment manufactured to military specifications. These have served to reduce the costs associated with materiel production and warehousing, but not the issue of materiel availability. There have been no discernible increases in industrial capability and capacity, or in improving the prioritization of military orders, related to these Canadian Forces policy changes.²⁸ Does Canada know where it stands with domestic and foreign producers as the Department of National Defence and Canadian Forces proceed with “just-in-time” procurement strategies?

“The ability of the industrial base to accomplish increased wartime production is an important factor in determining war reserves inventory levels.”²⁹ “A nation’s ability to defend itself is directly related to its industrial base and the extent to which it can be mobilized.”³⁰ The reality of increased operational consumption rates, or an immediate demand for critical components, is that they will likely create shortfalls for the operational commander in the field. Although recent improvements in Canadian Forces policy regarding defence expenditures (single operating budgets, devolved spending authorities, new accounting processes, etc.) have been helpful, they have not improved the ability of the Canadian Forces to quickly acquire materiel

from the most cost effective supplier. A more permissive regulatory framework is still required to facilitate procurement, or even direct priority production of the materiel in question. More flexibility in allowing sole source procurement of commercial materiel, without regard to regional or economic benefits, must be allowed where operational requirements are at issue.

Participation in NATO, the UN and in CANUS bilateral arrangements reflect a national strategy of obtaining defence and promoting international peace and security through alliances. “A capable defence industrial base, structured for emergencies, contributes to deterrence...indirectly, it is an expression of political and social will that enhances national commitment.”³¹ This view may be looked at from both a national and alliance perspective. As a national statement, it would seem to indicate a requirement to develop a core industrial capability, including the industrial expertise and production capacity necessary to support national defence operations. “As a concept, sourcing (sic) has two concerns: importance and availability. A Critical Items List (CIL) relates to the first, and an assured source relates to the second. In practice, the two concerns often overlap. It should not be surprising that for reasons associated with attaining an Assured Source of supply, some NATO countries insist that certain critical items be domestically produced. This is known as Strategic Sourcing. Only then can they be absolutely certain that as far as production and delivery are concerned equipment will be available for military use.”³²

As an alliance statement, the strategy supports obtaining technology transfers and materiel from across a broader alliance defence industrial base as an acceptable alternative to developing core national capabilities. The Canadian reality has been the latter approach, save for niche areas in which Canadian industry has achieved prominence, and it speaks volumes about

national political and social will in these matters. Canada has a varied history of success in the development of major defence industrial base capabilities. While the nation has an enviable history of successful aviation, munitions and shipbuilding industries, amongst others; however, there are only varying traces of these industries that are viable and capable of contributing significantly to defence production today. While these niche capabilities provide an important Canadian contribution to their alliances, they do not add up to a comprehensive defence industrial base for the nation.

The Government's current policy of economic and industrial offsets in defence acquisitions is based as much on fiscal considerations as it is on developing a national defence industrial base. "From the early 1960s on the Canadian industry had become increasingly divorced from the operational requirements of the Canadian Forces. In the words of one analyst," the arms industry in Canada is...not so much a defence industry concerned with Canadian military needs as it is a military industry with economic objectives." The industry's survival was predicated upon an economic, not a military, rationale. Until the mid-1970s, Ottawa had relied upon the market access afforded by the DPDSA (Defence Production Development and Sharing Agreement) coupled with government financial assistance and marketing support to sustain an export-oriented defence industry."³³ Consequently, there is little evidence of success in stemming the exodus of, and decline in, defence-related engineering and technical expertise from Canada. The paucity of work for national shipyards, lack of defence contracts for the aviation industry and the limited overall success in bringing Canadian research and development projects into production over the past four decades continues.³⁴ The net result is a de facto national strategy of relying upon alliance support for technological development and materiel for deployed military operations. Has Canada actually identified such a list, complete

with the assured sources of supply? If one exists, will it be revised before the Canadian Forces become more reliant upon industry for support? It would seem prudent to have this in order prior to basing operational support on a process that may be unable to meet the demand in the medium to long term.

This reliance on external sources for defence materiel raises interesting sovereignty and national influence issues that may impact upon Canada's support for military operations.

"Nations want to be self sufficient with respect to defence policy and view their sovereignty above any international organizations."³⁵ Sovereignty, and the Canadian government's desire to influence international decision-making, are essential ingredients in Canadian foreign policy.

Canada's reliance upon an alliance industrial base for core military technologies creates an environment in which national foreign policy objectives may be moderated by other nations.

"From an alliance perspective, the national sovereignty issue does not bear well on DIP integration. Each nation is bound to attach a different level of importance to defence industrial preparedness, since the goals of each nation vary. Furthermore, nations are unwilling to sacrifice any part of their national interest for the greater good of the alliance unless such an action serves to benefit both."³⁶

Imagine a hypothetical scenario requiring the United Nations to approve a Security Council resolution to provide military forces to assist in humanitarian aid operations in Cuba. The United States refuses to support the resolution, (but does not veto it), and Canada decides to participate. Canada provides a ship, including a maritime helicopter detachment, and an Aurora for maritime surveillance support, in addition to troops on the ground. The Canadian Contingent Commander will be reliant upon good communications for both in-theatre and National

command connectivity. Satellite communications and long-range radios afloat and ashore begin to degrade, as do communications and certain sensors on the aircraft involved, on day two of the operation. An interesting coincidence arises in that American firms either manufactured the affected systems or provided the software for them. Is it conceivable that Canada's sovereign right to determine foreign policy, and to participate in this operation, was affected by external forces? Did Canada contribute to this situation through an alliance-based reliance for core military capabilities? While an unlikely scenario, it does demonstrate how national economic strategies may ultimately affect sovereignty, and could influence the operational capability of the commander in the field.

It may also be worth considering the likelihood of Canada successfully pursuing breach of contract action for logistic support against an alliance partner's company, especially if the failure to meet contractual obligations is related to a difference in political agendas. Again, political and economic factors beyond the control of operational commanders have the potential to adversely impact upon their ability to achieve their mission. Well thought-out economic and alliance strategies are fundamental enablers of military capability; conversely, poorly developed strategies, whether by omission or based upon incorrect aims, only serve to inhibit that capability. Alliance options may well have a limiting effect on national self-determination where differing politics, even amongst allies, become an issue. The development of core national industrial capabilities would be one method for assuring sovereignty in foreign policy and military operations.

Department of National Defence and Canadian Forces

The Department of National Defence and Canadian Forces are nearing the end of a significant five-year defence expenditure reduction program that should see a military of approximately 60,000 Regular and 23,000 Reserve force personnel.³⁷ As with most reductions, the primary focus of the reduction program was on support personnel and organizations, and the concept of alternate service delivery (ASD) gained prominence. In the earlier days, the concept of ASD was taken to mean that if the support or service was not deployable (a core capability), it would be contracted-out to a commercial source as a means of reducing DND/CF overhead. The theory was that the Canadian Forces did not need uniformed personnel and civil servants providing support services that could be obtained through the economy. This concept evolved, or became better understood, to include the options of contracting-in, developing innovative military-industry partnerships and migrating processes to Reserves as the requirement for core, or uniformed, capabilities became better articulated. “The Department of National Defence will adapt better business practices – greater reliance will, for example, be placed on “just-in-time” delivery of common usage items to reduce inventory costs.

The Department will increase the procurement of off-the-shelf commercial technology that meets essential military specifications and standards. Full military specifications or uniquely Canadian modifications will be adopted only where these are shown to be absolutely essential. The Department will also enhance its partnership with the private sector. Where business case evaluations demonstrate potential for increased cost effectiveness, ...support activities currently conducted “in house” will be transferred completely to Canadian industry or

shared with private industry under various partnership arrangements. The Department will continue to seek out new ways to support operational forces.”³⁸

While a viable solution for most domestic operations, and certain deployed operations, this is new and developing territory for the support of Canadian Forces personnel. Indeed, there are significant issues to be addressed if industry is also to become a partner in supporting deployed Canadian Forces operations. These will be explored more fully later.

On the surface, the ASD concept creates unique and unprecedented opportunities to improve the regulatory framework governing Canadian Forces procurement and support processes. “Contracting-in” requires a total review of how “business” is conducted. The concept implies that everything is open to scrutiny, that “non-value added” or “non-essential” tasks can be eliminated and that organizational structure may be changed. In reality, this is only partially true as there is a plethora of regulations that may, or may not, change in support of this initiative. Treasury Board guidelines and Financial Administration Act regulations for financial management and procurement may preclude otherwise viable initiatives, for example. Defence Service Program regulations, and other strategic considerations, will also serve to restrict the NDHQ support staff and contingent personnel. The rigid application of all national regulations, regardless of theatre realities, must be continuously challenged by NDHQ staff to minimize the bureaucratic limitations that will only serve to distract operational commanders from their missions.

A well-trained and equipped Reserve force of 23,000 personnel presents some very good options for the development of alternate support capabilities. Indeed, there are excellent

opportunities to develop and maintain core support capabilities for the full spectrum of military operations. One example would be to develop Reserve capabilities to provide deployed support in areas provided domestically by civilian contractors. Here again, Government commitment and a more flexible regulatory framework governing the employment, protection and compensation of Reserve personnel is required if the Canadian Forces is to achieve the full potential of this option. Government budgetary support is required if the Reserve component of the Canadian Forces is to achieve its target growth, and to have the necessary equipment and training to do its job. Job protection and mobilization legislation is also required to support the force generation and employment of a viable military reserve. Further, Canadian Forces regulations governing the employment and administration of Reserves need to be amended to enable, rather than restrict, the operational employment of Reserve personnel.³⁹ The Canadian Forces continue to be unable to successfully migrate much of the support functions to the Reserve as they lack the necessary resources to achieve the target of 23,000 equipped and trained Reserve personnel. Recent improvements in pay and compensation policies are to be applauded; however, they are only the beginning of what truly is required.

As DND and the CF continue to wrestle with a shrinking resource base, the reliance on civilian contractors for operational support will continue to increase. “Using civilian contractors for logistic support during armed conflict is not new. Contractors were used during the Napoleonic Wars, American Revolution, Civil War, World Wars I and II and the Korean War.”⁴⁰ While not new, this aspect of the ASD concept is not fully understood and does not enjoy the complete confidence of all. There are those who do not believe that contractors will be available to provide essential services, or that they will be available when things become dangerous. In fact, evidence to the contrary already exists in that “during OPERATION RESTORE HOPE in

Somalia, Brown and Root was on the ground the day after the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit came ashore.”⁴¹ Further, the American Logistics Civil Augmentation program (LOGCAP) “uses civilian contractors during wartime and in nonwar operations. Requiring civilians to work for the military in a hostile environment brings a certain amount of risk above what can normally be considered the “cost of doing business.”...However, civilian contractors should not be totally discounted when the situation turns sour - Brown and Root proved themselves by performing admirably “under fire” in Somalia.”⁴² While this may not be the case for every service provider, it does indicate that there will be those who will, for the right price, provide support under most conditions. The selection process and compliance verification mechanisms become the determining factors in selecting the right companies, and in assuring the delivery of the contracted-for service.

The Canadian air force has already included the concept of using contractors in their support doctrine by stating that “During the mobilization phase...The primary source of supply will be civilian industry.”⁴³ Continued progress towards partnership with, and relying on, industry for operational support throughout the spectrum of conflict must be done in such a way that inspires confidence by meeting all requirements from the outset. This is the only way that contractor support will develop into a force multiplier, rather than being seen as a constraint in operational support. “Sound logistics forms the foundation for the development of strategic flexibility and mobility. If such flexibility is to be exercised and exploited, military command must have adequate control of its logistic support.”⁴⁴ It is essential that the military have an adequate say in how future contractor support for military operations evolves if this flexibility is to exist.

On the domestic front, it is vital that the government ensure services no longer available through military sources be available for operations. This may include responsibilities such as directing industrial production, mandating service provision, enforcing national and international contract law and providing compensation and benefits to civilian personnel deployed in support of military operations. The reality is that “contracting for services normally involves more risk than other types of contracting, the standard terms and conditions may have to consider such things as liability and other insurance, anti-trust laws and bonding requirements...security requirements, demonstrations, failure to perform, special or additional services, list of employees, inspection, site inspection, employee strikes, employee identification and access, keys, telephone service, storage, definition of work week including work times, documentation, reports termination, remedies, and payments.”⁴⁵ While some of these responsibilities presently exist, there are aspects of the “new way of doing business” for which legislative protection and assurances may not exist. These must be analyzed, and rectified where necessary, to ensure that the Canadian Forces can continue to operate, and so contingent commanders need not have to worry about related issues while deployed.

“The highly specialized nature of selected Canadian Forces equipment, and the reliance on contractor services to maintain this equipment in peacetime, illustrates the near-essentiality of employing civilian personnel in selected support functions during operations.”⁴⁶ Does the Canadian government have any way of protecting Canadian civilians employed in operational theatres where their life insurance policies will be null and void? While this could be deemed a parent company’s responsibility, it could make service delivery too difficult to bother bidding on or serve to drive costs up significantly. Another concern lies in the potential costs of contracting out. While the initial contract price may appear to be a good value, there is no way to predict

what the future costs will become. The price of initial service contracts transferred to industry may be artificially low as the companies avoid

correctly. A case in point are the lessons learned by the United States Department of Defence as a result of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Operation Ill Wind, an investigation into defence procurement irregularities in the late 1980s. Their defense expenditure reduction program saw the contracting out of significant portions of their contract management process to consultants as a cost-saving measure. "Private firms were hired to write specifications, write statements of work, develop cost estimates and monitor other contractors."⁴⁸ "The pattern of corruption that has emerged from the Ill Wind cases involves classic influence peddling. Government employees received bribes in return for providing consultants with early notice of upcoming contracts and for helping them devise strategies for winning those contracts. The consultants convinced contractors to hire them based on their access to an 'inside source.'...A bribed government employee...could use his influence to determine which firms would be eligible for a contract and, in some cases, could help to determine the winner by inserting specific criteria in a service's acquisition plan, favoring one contractor over another...The corrupt official could provide confidential bidding information so a favored contractor could submit a superior "best and final offer" to win an award."⁴⁹ Once uncovered, a significant review of the existing legislation was required in order to re-establish control. During the U.S. Navy Inspector General's review of the situation it was concluded that too much of the...contract support budget "went for management more appropriately done by government employees."⁵⁰ The Canadian government must learn from the mistakes of others if they are to avoid the same pitfalls as they head down the same road of reductions and contracting out.

Specific Planning Issues

National level planning for CF operations has developed within a regulatory framework based upon historical practices, and from the Canadian Forces experience in operations. Change is the only true constant that may be counted on, and Canada's continued ability to support operations will depend largely on the adaptability of regulations and the flexibility of existing planning protocols to accommodate the changes. In all cases, the emerging concepts of enhanced Reserve employment, innovative partnerships with industry and the provision of contractor services in deployed operational theatres must be enabled. The challenges associated with these changes must be resolved domestically, and preferably before the problems are exported to the theatre of operations and into the operational commander's hands. This would require that the contingent commander, or his contingent logistics staff, be involved in the mission planning process as early as possible. As the individual who must live with the logistic support concept, the commander must be allowed a significant voice in the development of that concept. This will become increasingly important as the concept of deployed contractor support evolves. The composition of the contingent may well have to change. The operational commander will require a contract management capability built in to his staff. Contractual obligations for security and other contractor support must also be factored in, without adversely affecting the personnel required for the actual mission. The imposition of partial solutions upon the contingent commander only makes his job more difficult. Related issues will arise, whether or not the commander has been provided with the resources necessary to deal with them.

The United States Army acknowledges these importance issues in their Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program (LOGCAP). “LOGCAP uses civilian contractors during wartime and in nonwar operations. Requiring civilians to work for the military in a hostile environment brings a certain amount of risk above what can normally be considered the “cost of doing business.” This risk must be analyzed, since it has a direct bearing on the JTF commander’s decision to use a LOGCAP contractor...The JTF commander must evaluate his operation with respect to the risks to civilians and the military if he must provide troops to protect the contractor’s operation. This diversion of armed forces could impede the commander’s mission accomplishment. The inability to accurately predict OOTW’s volatility creates a situation of uncertainty...”⁵¹

Canadian contingent commanders must have the ability to address these realities if they are to be allowed to focus on their primary mission objectives.

Conclusion

Operational commanders require continuous and responsive national logistical support for their Canadian personnel while deployed. Present realities dictate that fundamental cultural changes are required at the strategic level if this support is to be successfully provided in the future. Innovative new partnerships between industry, the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces offer the best likelihood of success, and must be pursued.

¹ Ormerod, Captain Gerald J Jr., “Outsourced Logistics: Maximizing External Support,” Marine Corps Gazette, Volume 81 Number 7, p. 46.

² Support organizations as defined in article 113 of B-GG-005-004/AF-000 Canadian Forces Operations.

³ Milward, Alan S. War, Economy and Society, 1939 – 1945, p. 18.

⁴ Discussion point from an AMSC seminar discussion on Logistics at CFC Toronto 27 Oct 98.

⁵ Fergusson, James. “The Missing Dimension of the White Paper: A Defence-Industrial Strategy,” Canadian Defence Quarterly, (June 1997) p. 6.

⁶ Discussion point from an AMSC seminar discussion on Logistics at CFC Toronto 27 Oct 98.

⁷ Author’s opinion distilled from readings, a BA in Commerce and Economics, 25 years of military service and remaining current on issues related to the evolution of the European Common Market and North American Free Trade Agreement.

⁸ Douglas Greenwald & Associates, ed. The McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Modern Economics, (USA, 1983) pp. 193 & 195.

⁹ Defence Industrial Preparedness Task Force, International Influences, June 1987, p. 87.

¹⁰ AJP-1(A) Allied Joint Doctrine (Change 1-1997) p. 20-1.

¹¹ B-GG-005-004/AF-000 Canadian Forces Operations, p.1-1 art. 101.

¹² Government of Canada, “1994 Defence White Paper,” p. 24.

¹³ Supply and Services Canada, “The Defence Industrial Base Review 1987,” p. vii.

¹⁴ Government of Canada, “The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, Final Text and Analysis,” pp. 3-4.

¹⁵ Author’s opinion distilled from remaining current on issues related to the evolution of the European Common Market, Asia Pacific economics and North American Free Trade Agreement.

¹⁶ Defence Industrial Preparedness Task Force, International Influences, June 1987, p. 5.

¹⁷ Author’s interpretation of article 102 – Preamble and Objectives of The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, Final Text and Analysis, p. 102.

¹⁸ Defence Industrial Preparedness Task Force, International Influences, June 1987, p. v.

¹⁹ Author’s opinion distilled from readings and a BA in Commerce and Economics.

²⁰ Byers, Rod, “The Economics of Defence”, Canada’s Defence – Perspectives On Policy In The Twentieth Century, 1993, p. 265.

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- ²¹ Defence Industrial Preparedness Task Force, International Influences, June 1987, p. 9.
- ²² Ibid, p. 38.
- ²³ Author's recollection of a 1997 discussion with Canadian Defence Liaison Staff in Washington, DC.
- ²⁴ Defence Industrial Preparedness Task Force, International Influences, June 1987, p. 33.
- ²⁵ Ibid, p. 82.
- ²⁶ Ibid, pp. 12-13.
- ²⁷ Ibid, p. xi.
- ²⁸ Author's opinion.
- ²⁹ United States Joint Staff, "Focused Logistics – A Joint Logistic Roadmap, Final Report 1 August 1997," p. 43.
- ³⁰ Defence Industrial Preparedness Task Force, International Influences, June 1987, p. I.
- ³¹ Ibid, p.v.
- ³² Ibid, pp. 12-13.
- ³³ Middlemiss, Dan, "Canada and Defence Industrial Preparedness: A Return to Basics," Canada's Defence – Perspectives On Policy In The Twentieth Century, 1993, p. 250.
- ³⁴ Author's opinion distilled over past 20 years of military service. Opinion evolves from OPDP and employment in areas where the author was involved in related discussions or staffwork. Relevant examples include the Arrow project, and the resultant decline in Canada's aviation industry, the history of Canada's shipbuilding and related CPF and TRUMP projects and recent concern about DND's R&D programs.
- ³⁵ Defence Industrial Preparedness Task Force, International Influences, June 1987, p. 31.
- ³⁶ Ibid, p. vi.
- ³⁷ Government of Canada, "1994 Defence White Paper," p 45.
- ³⁸ Ibid, pp. 41-42.
- ³⁹ Author's opinion based upon NDHQ, and subsequent experience dealing with Reserve issues.
- ⁴⁰ Nichols, Major Camille M., "The Logistic Civil Augmentation Program," Military Review, Volume LXXVI No 1, p. 65.

⁴¹ Ormerod, Captain Gerald J Jr., “Outsourced Logistics: Maximizing External Support,” Marine Corps Gazette, Volume 81 Number 7, p. 49. Brown and Root is one of the international companies in the business of providing contracted for support services. The United States has used their services in lieu of uniformed support capabilities in such places as Somalia and Haiti.

⁴² Nichols, Major Camille M., The Logistic Civil Augmentation Program, Military Review, Volume LXXVI No 1, pp. 68-69.

⁴³ 1 Canadian Air Division, Out of the Sun – Aerospace Doctrine for the Canadian Forces, p. 130 art 1033.7.

⁴⁴ Milward, Alan S. War, Economy and Society, 1939 – 1945, p. 10.

⁴⁵ Lallatin, Carla S. “Privatization: Opportunities and Challenges,” Government Executive, Vol. 19 No. 4, p. 34.

⁴⁶ Department of National Defence, Logistics Doctrine for CF Joint and Combined Operations, art 106.5.

⁴⁷ Author’s opinion based upon 26 years of military service, and from seminar discussions on the subject 27 Oct 98.

⁴⁸ Grier, Peter. Has Privatization Gone Too Far?,” Military Forum, Vol 5 No. 6, p. 35.

⁴⁹ Mecham, Michael. “Ill Wind Guilty Pleas Show Pattern of Basic Corruption,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 3 April 1989, p. 24.

⁵⁰ “No Industry Outrage,” anonymous editorial, Aviation Week & Space Technology , 25 July 1988, pp. 34-35.

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