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THE CANADA-U.S. DEFENCE RELATIONSHIP OF THE 21ST CENTURY: A DIVORCE OF CONVENIENCE OR A RENEWAL OF THE VOWS?

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AMSC 1

Research Essay

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By

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THE CANADA-U.S. DEFENCE RELATIONSHIP OF THE 21ST CENTURY: A DIVORCE OF CONVENIENCE OR A RENEWAL OF THE VOWS?

> *There is no need to regret the fading of much of the Canadian-U.S. defence relationship. After all, it is the result of victory in the Cold War – a victory which amply justified the close collaboration in those decades. Moreover, the decline of this relationship will have benefits for both countries and a positive impact on any future military collaboration.*[1]
>
> Joel L. Sokolsky and Joseph T. Jockel

INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War has triggered unprecedented change in the world affairs and "has made for a more complex international security environment."[2] One of the rock solid elements of the Cold War era for Canada and the United States was the unique and special defence relationship between the two countries.[3] Co-operation with the United States in North American defence has been considered essential for Canada during this period to guarantee its security. But it is factors such as geography, history, trust, values and beliefs that have been the main reasons for this partnership, not only in the defence of North America but also when Canada was venturing into the international security arena.

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[1] Joseph T. Jockel and Joel J. Sokolsky, The End of the Canada-U.S. Defence Relationship, Occasional Paper Series, Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, Kingston (1996): 16.

[2] David G. Haglund, "No Compass, Just an Anchor: Canada and the Centre-Periphery Question," Canadian Defence Quarterly (September 1994): 10.

[3] The 1994 White Paper echoed this, stating: "[f]or more than five decades, Canada and the United States have cooperated in the defence of North America and in support of international peace and stability. The benefits of this relationship are as valid today as ever before." Government of Canada, 1994 Defence White Paper, Minister of Supply and Services Canada, Ottawa (1994): 25.

Recently, scholars Jockel and Sokolsky stated that "[t]he Cold War Canada-U.S. defence relationship, just like the 50-year struggle that necessitated and sustained it, is over."[4] Although not all scholars and military analysts would agree with this conclusion, it is nevertheless clear that the post-Cold War era has brought about the conditions to alter the stable and predictable defence relationship between Canada and the United States. The review of this relationship is the essence of this paper. It will be shown the Canada-United States defence relationship of the future will likely be weakened from what it is today, being less important strategically for the United States and, if Canada does not assign the necessary resources, considerably eroded from Canada's perspective. Nevertheless, the resulting mutated defence relationship must remain a necessary one, chiefly because of the invariants of the unique strategic situation that exists between Canada and the United States that dictates political and military co-operation in several domains.[5]

The Canada-U.S. defence relationship is made of many inter-twined components, whether it be at the political national security level, the military strategic level, and at the operational level. These components contribute to, and to a large degree define, the mosaic that constitutes the long-standing Canada-U.S. defence relationship. For the purpose of the analysis undertaken in this paper, the relationship will be examined in four parts that cover when taken as a whole the essential factors that will affect this relationship into the next century. Because of limitations of space in this essay, not every single entity of this relationship could be analysed and, accordingly, only the most influential ones that impact on future of the Canada-U.S. defence relationship will be reviewed. These are: the defence of North America and the Canadian

[4] Jockel and Sokolsky: 1.
[5] For those readers interested in a complete bibliographic history of Canadian-American relations, see James P. Hull, "From many, two: A bibliographic history of Canadian-American relations," American Studies International Washington (Jun 1998): 4-22.

sovereignty; the new Canadian "human security" policy; the dwindling Canadian military capabilities and; and a number of bilateral co-operation defence arrangements.

THE DEFENCE OF NORTH AMERICA AND CANADIAN SOVEREIGNTY

If there is one theme that has been consistent in the Canadian defence white papers since 1947, it is the recognition that, given Canada's geographical situation, a continental dimension to Canada's defence and security policies would always be present and that co-operation with the United States would be a cornerstone of Canada's national security.[6] Since the end of the Second World War, Canada's defence policy has been primarily founded upon security partnerships for collective defence, particularly the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).[7] Consequently, the development of the Canadian defence policy has been largely influenced by the evolution of these two organisations, both dominated by the United States. From 1947 on, the year of the publication of the first post-World War II defence white paper, it became evident that the Canada-U.S. defence relationship was already unique in itself and that it would become a main constituent of future Canadian defence policies.[8] By the late 1960s, the Trudeau government hinted that it would take "Canada in a new and independent direction, freeing the country, and the federal budget, from the demands of the Cold War."[9] Despite the rhetoric, by the time it was published in 1971, Defence in the 70s conferred nevertheless as much importance to the Canada-

[6] For a more detailed discussion on the determinants and invariants of Canada's strategic situation, see Paul Buteux, "Sutherland Revisited: Canada's Long-Term Strategic Situation," Canadian Defence Quarterly (Sep 94): 5-9.
[7] David Bashow, Canada and the Future of Collective Defence, The Martello Papers, Centre for International Relations, Queen's University Kingston (1998): 1.
[8] For instance that year, to highlight the importance of the "new" relationship, the government choose to incorporate in his defence policy paper the complete text of Joint Declaration made by the Prime Minister and the President in the House of Commons on defence co-operation between Canada and the United States. See Douglas L. Bland, ed., "Canada's National Defence - Volume I Defence Policy (Kingston: Queen's University, 1997): 51-57.
[9] Quoted in Bland: 151.

U.S. defence co-operation as before.[10] With the Conservatives in power in the mid-1980s, Canada enunciated in the 1987 Defence White Paper the most vigorous defence policy statement since the Second World War. One of the major themes of this document was intended to make the defence effort more responsive to the challenges of the 1990s and beyond, by increasing defence funding and the effectiveness of the Canadian Forces (CF).[11] The anticipated defence-spending spree never took place. Within two years, the 1987 White Paper was obsolete, as the federal government was attempting to wrestle with the finances of the country. By 1993, the Liberals were back in office, and it became clear from the day of the announcement of the cancellation of the EH-101 helicopter acquisition programme that defence would be in for a rough ride in the years ahead. In spite of public pressure and the usual associated rhetoric, the Liberal government surprised many Canadians by publishing in 1994 a fairly pragmatic document. Nevertheless, Douglas Bland labelled the 1994 Defence White Paper "long on rhetoric but short on specifics, especially about the future Canadian military capabilities."[12] Ironically, and perhaps more significantly, the 1994 policy document included a complete and separate chapter entitled "Canada-United States Defence Cooperation", covering several aspects of this unique relationship.[13]

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[10] The wording in the White Paper stated: "The Government concluded in its defence review that co-operation with the United States in North American defence will remain essential so long as our joint security depends on stability in the strategic military balance…Co-operation between Canada and the U.S. in the joint defence of North America is vital for sovereignty and security." Government of Canada, Defence in the 70s, Information Canada, Ottawa (1971): 25.

[11] Government of Canada, Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada, Minister of Supply and Services, Ottawa (1987): II. The closing paragraph to the 1987 Defence White Paper summarised well the prospects that this new policy would bring to Canada, if and when implemented: "Canadian security and sovereignty will be better served. Canada will become a more responsible ally. We will have a firmer basis from which to contribute to peace and freedom."

[12] Bland: 281.

[13] Moreover, the White Paper confirmed the sour reality that the dream of a more robust defence capability was not affordable in Canada, at least not for this century. The 1994 Defence White Paper concluded that: "The Canadian Forces will maintain core capabilities to protect the country's territory and approaches, and to further national objectives. Given that the direct military threat to the continent is greatly diminished at present, Canada will reduce the level of resources devoted to traditional missions in North America." 1994 White Paper: 49.

Many commentators, including groups and coalitions of Canadians, were advocating a significant change in the force structure of the Canadian Forces. With the end of the Cold War, the sentiment for many Canadians was, and still is, that there is no longer any direct military threat to Canada's territorial and political integrity and, consequently, there is no longer a need for urgency in continental defence co-operation. Paul Buteux perhaps best summarises the mood of many at the time in that: "Canada had been provided in the early 1990s with a unique opportunity to make choices about its defence policy and its international military contribution, unhampered by decisions made forty years ago and conditioned by historical circumstances that no longer exist."[14] Others, like David Dewitt stated that "there must be a rethinking of Canada's military and broader relationship with the United States."[15]

The resources assigned to Defence were indeed significantly reduced,[16] but in practical terms, the assets allocated to assert Canada's sovereignty and contribute to the defence of North America changed relatively little.[17] For instance, Air Command was mandated in the White Paper to reduce the CF-18 fighter aircraft fleet's expenditures by 25 per cent within a few years.[18] The reduction took place but, in the end, the impact on Canada's ability to contribute to its share of the NORAD missions was minimal.[19] Further, there are definite plans to upgrade both the CF-18 and the CP-140 fleets early in the next century to extend their respective life

[14] See Paul Buteux, "Sutherland Revisited: Canada's Long-Term Strategic Situation," Canadian Defence Quarterly (Sep 1994): 8.
[15] Donald B. Dewitt, "Cooperative Security: A Canadian Approach to the Promotion of Peace and Security in the Post-Cold War Era." Canadian Defence Quarterly (March 1994): 17.
[16] Total National Defence budget went from a peak of $13.5B in 1988 to $9.4 B in 1998 (figures in $1997), a reduction of 32 per cent when economic adjustments are incorporated; source: Making Sense Out Of Dollars, 1997-98 edition, NDHQ Ottawa, Directorate of Costing Services (1998).
[17] A more detailed aspect of the CF force structure review will take place in the third part of this paper.
[18] 1994 White Paper: 48. The Canadian-based component of the CF-18 force had grown by over 30 aircraft with the repatriation of the CF-18s from Europe in the early 1990s.
[19] Similar reductions took place within the U.S. Air Force commensurate with the Canadian reductions; these reductions followed a reduced readiness posture due to a reduced threat to North America. See Haglund: 10.

another 10 to 15 years.[20] As for Canada's navy, paradoxically, it will soon be in the best shape in years to conduct sovereignty missions such as surveillance of Canada's waters and coastlines and to participate in operations with the United States.[21] Hence, the argument of many scholars and military analysts that Canada is neglecting to assign military resources to assert its sovereignty and partake in his share of North American defence is not founded, yet. [22]

Canada's relationship to the United States is certainly the most important component in the Canadian national security policy. As Michael Tucker stated in 1988, in an article that still has much relevance today: "Canada's heightened involvement in continental defence measures … and other Canadian-American defence agreements has been impelled by the historic understanding that this country as a matter of sovereignty and prudence must not neglect American security concerns."[23] Accordingly, it is very difficult, perhaps even impossible, to construct any credible scenario in which a major problem involving the defence of Canadian values or territory is not at the same time a matter of vital interest to the United States. For many Canadians, however, the benefits of having the Americans as partners and ready to come to the rescue is not always viewed as a benefit: "[w]here Canada in particular is concerned, the word sovereignty evokes images of domination by the United States…it suggests nationalist feelings

[20] These plans are not funded, as will be discussed in the third part of the paper. See National Defence Headquarters Ottawa, Defence Planning Guidance 1999 [http://131.137.255.5/vcds/dgsp/dpg/dpg99/chap2_e.asp] article 203. Further, the government recently announced the planned acquisition of new SAR helicopters.

[21] J.L. Granatstein, For Efficient and Effective Military Forces, Report to the Prime Minister – A Paper prepared for the Minister of National Defence, Government of Canada (1997): 13. All 12 Canadian patrol frigates have now been delivered, the modernisation of the four command and control destroyers is completed, the delivery of the 12 maritime coastal vessels will be completed in 1999, and the first delivery of four UPHOLDER class submarines in expected in 2000. The Request for Proposal for the replacement of the Sea King fleet is expected to be announced within the year.

[22] For this critical review on Canada's defence capabilities, see Douglas Alan Ross, "Canada and the world at risk: depression, war and isolationism for the 21st century?," International Journal (Winter 1996-7): 1-24.

[23] Michael Tucker, "Canadian Security Policy," Canada Among Nations 1988, Ottawa, Ont: Carleton University Press, 1988): 60-79. Tucker's paper also includes two excellent discussions, one on arctic sovereignty and the second on the concept of security/sovereignty for Canada.

of resentment."[24] Indeed, the most potent rushes of Canadian opinion in defence of sovereignty have been prompted by American violations in Canadian arctic waters, the S.S. Manhattan in 1969-70 and the U.S.C.G. Polar Sea in 1985.[25] The decision in 1987 to purchase nuclear submarines that could operate year-round for months at a time in the arctic waters was based to respond to the American infringement and the need to assert Canadian's sovereignty in the arctic.[26]

Investing precious defence dollars to be able to detect and counter challenges to Canada's sovereignty takes care of the concerns of the Canadian domestic audience and provides the resources necessary to attenuate American security concerns. The real concern for DND for the future lies in the fact that successive defence budgets reductions are seriously limiting the military options for Canada, in terms of equipment re-capitalisation and retention of certain military capabilities. Buteux, for one, argues that Canada still requires the military wherewithal to practice defence cooperation with the United States on terms that are not overwhelmingly determined by Washington. He further emphasises that the end of the Cold War might in fact have created a situation that may require Canada to do somewhat more in the way of defence than less. The reasoning of this apparent contradiction lies in the reduced geo-strategic importance of Canada to the United States, and the diminished urgency and priority of continental defence in American strategic thinking. The eventual result "will be that

[24] Franklyn Griffiths, "Canada as a Sovereign State," Canadian Foreign Policy (Spring 1994):19.
[25] For a broader discussion on other security issues affecting Canada, see David Leyton-Brown, "Canadian Defence Policy if the 1990s: The North American Dimension," Canadian Defence Quarterly (August 1991): 19-23. Undoubtedly, there were likely frequent Soviet infringements, but it is assume that these were expected and *de bonne guerre* during the Cold War era.
[26] For a more complete discussion on this issue, see S. Mathwin Davis, "Nuclear Submarines for Canada," in Haglund and Sokolsky, The U.S.-Canada Security Relationship, Westview Press, (1989): 215-238.

collaboration in the direct defence of the continent will continue its already marked decline into strategic marginality."[27] Needless to say, not everyone agrees with this premise.

Indeed, without much fanfare, in 1996, Canada and the U.S. re-signed the most recent iteration of the NORAD agreement. Mr. Axworthy, the Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister, acknowledged the outstanding benefits derived from such an accord:

> In recent years, the United States has been a very good friend of Canada, and it has very generously taken into consideration our interests…The NORAD agreement itself will provide us with the opportunity to jointly work on new technologies for aerospace warning, to ensure that some of the new concerns that we have about rogue states and their nuclear capacity can be clearly identified, and to deal with questions of drug interdiction. So it does demonstrate the ability to constantly upgrade and improve those institutions that we have established over the years to serve our joint interests.[28]

Some critics contend that Canada had no option but to sign up to the arrangement. Douglas Ross, in his critical review of Canada's foreign and defence policies, explains that "[n]o doubt because of the rapidly declining ability of the Canadian military to project force or even exert control over Canadian territory and airspace, policy-makers in Ottawa realised that NORAD renewal had to be on whatever terms the Americans offered… Only capability can inspire serious consultation and cooperation on vital issues."[29] Perhaps there is some truth in this statement but the reality is that NORAD is still important strategically and militarily to Canada

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[27] Buteux: 8. With the Soviet threat dormant, this aspect of defence is considerably less important for the Americans; most U.S. defence documents of recent years barely make a mention of North American co-operative defence. See the discussion on this issue in Jockel and Sokolsky; the author also reviewed the Annual Report to the President and the Congress, Library of Congress, Washington, 1998, and there is no specific mention of continental defence in the National Security Strategy.

[28] Speech given at the signature ceremony. Quoted in "The U.S. and Canada renew the NORAD agreement," U.S. Department of State Dispatch, Washington, Vol 7 No 14 (1 Apr 1996): 164.

[29] Ross: 11.

and, as David Bashow writes, NORAD "is a germane, fiscally responsible undertaking, control of continental airspace being much more effective and efficient when done as a cooperative undertaking. Various areas of mutual interest, such as global warning of ballistic-missile launches, surveillance of space, and research and development of ballistic-missile defence systems represent potential areas for expanding bilateral cooperation."[30] Further, as Tucker pointed out in writing about Canada's decision in 1987 to modernise the North Warning System, "participation in NORAD strengthens Canadian sovereignty vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and the United States."[31]

Canada will thus enter the 21st century with membership in a longstanding collective defence commitment, at a relatively low cost for the benefits Canada derives from the partnership. Barring unexpected developments in Canada, Ottawa will re-sign the agreement when it is due for renewal in 2001. The more contentious issue for Canada in the years ahead is to decide how much to participate, if at all, in the Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) initiative with the United States.[32] The Canadian government is growing more comfortable with BMD and has publicly expressed interest in participating in a missile defence system for North America.[33] Bashow is also of the opinion that the issue is gaining momentum bilaterally between the two countries, and the recent increased threat of international terrorism and

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[30] Bashow: 60; for a detailed breakdown of the costs, see Bashow: 18-19. Moreover, one of the most significant and yet largely intangible benefits achieved by NORAD is the considerable goodwill it generates between the two countries. For instance, twice a year, Canadian and U.S. Air Force senior officers meet for two days of bilateral talks on issues of mutual interest; Canada is the only country with which the U.S conducts these level of talks. Similar talks also take place at the Joint Chief of Staff levels, and with the other environments.

[31] Tucker: 76.

[32] For the most recent analysis on this issue, see James Fergusson, "Getting it Right: The American National Missile Defense Programme and Canada," Canadian Defence Quarterly (Summer 1998): 20-24. For simplicity, the term BMD will be used throughout this paper, although for term really encompasses both the National Missile Defence (NMD) and Theatre MD. Canada's interest is in MND. See Fergusson: 20.

[33] Bashow: 15. For a condensed discussion on NORAD and TMD, see Bashow; for an historical perspective, see Joseph T. Jockel, Security to the North: Canada-U.S. Defense Relations in the 1990s, Michigan State University Press (1991): chapters IV and V.

proliferation of nuclear ballistic missile capabilities around the world might be sufficient to sway Canadian opinion in the years ahead.[34] There may be few options available for Canada and, like it or not, Canada will be forced to deal with the issue soon.[35] James Fergusson, in his recent article on the American National Missile Defense, contends that the future of NORAD may be at stake depending on Canada's decision to participate in BMD or not. On the possibility of Canada's option to attempt to free-ride the program by the nature of its strategic geographical location, he points out that ".... a free ride is a direct threat to Canadian national interests and defence requirements because it entails the possible collapse of the strategically and politically vital defence relationship with the United States. Fundamentally, the future of NORAD will become an issue."[36] The future NORAD is certainly one of those elements that will have much influence on the Canada-U.S. defence relationship in the years ahead and Canada's decision to continue to participate will be critical if Canada wants to maintain an active role in North American defence.[37]

Canada has shown over the past 20 years that it is prepared to dedicate adequate resources to the protection of its sovereignty. Since the 1950s, Canada has also managed to find sufficient resources to financially support its share of the commitment to NORAD, and this despite drastic defence cutbacks. To be truthful, there is little room for manoeuvre for the Canadian government on this issue. Canada has often acknowledged through policy documents and past actions that it "should never find itself in a position where, as a result of past decisions, the defence of our national territory has become the responsibility of others."[38] If the defence of

[34] Proliferation in the Asian sub-continent is one, as is North Korea, and the uncertain political situation in Russia.
[35] See Fergusson: 20, on the Clinton's administration policy of 3+3, three years for research and three years for deployment (deployment would be only if the threat calls for it).
[36] James Fergusson 24. See also George Lindsey, "Ballistic Missile Defence in the 1990s," Canadian Defence Quarterly (September 1995): 6-11 for a succinct historical and technical review of BMD.
[37] Participation of Canada in the space programme will be discussed in part IV of the paper.
[38] 1994 White Paper: 15.

North American continues to remain important enough for Canada to assign the resources this issue demands, Canada can be expected to continue to be recognised by the United States as a full partner. The problem will be to find the resources to do so, as will be discussed in the third part of the paper.

THE HUMAN SECURITY POLICY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

The defence relationship between the two countries is obviously more than sovereignty and continental protection. Canada and the U.S. are active participants on the world scene through alliances like NATO or multilateral fora such as the UN. Moreover, Canadians and Americans have been in wars and peacekeeping operations together for almost 50 years starting with the Korean War, the Gulf War, and with the UN in missions such as those in the Middle East, in Europe and in Haiti. After all, Canada and the U.S. have common interests, values, economic partners, and it is thus customary for these two countries to join together to protect their strategic vital interests.[39] There are clear signs, however, that both countries are shifting toward more independent foreign and defence policies as we approach the 21st century.[40] This autonomy is now frequently resulting in divergent views on how to progress issues on the future international security agenda. There are several broad and important implications for both Canada and the U.S. of these foreign policy shifts, and it is not difficult to project that different views on a number of strategic issues would ultimately affect the Canada-U.S. defence relationship.[41]

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[39] Other more recent examples of this combined participation are the Haiti mission (albeit for different strategic reasons for each country) and the involvement in Bosnia.
[40] Haglund: 10.
[41] For a broader discussion on this issue, see Kim Richard Nossal, "'Without regard to the interests of others': Canada and American Unilateralism in the Post-Cold War Era," The American Review of Canadian Studies (Summer 1997): 179-197.

Since the arrival in power of the Liberal party in 1993, Canada's national security policy priorities have shifted, placing more emphasis on the notion of "human security", to the detriment of the traditional concept of security espoused for the past fifty years. In 1996, Mr. Axworthy, as Canada's newly appointed Foreign Affairs Minister, presented a new vision of security, proposing that human security is more than just the military threat and that future challenges to Canadian security are increasingly likely to be of a non-military nature, that is, economic, environmental and demographic.[42] Further to the human security agenda, Canada has been pressing its "soft power" concept on the international scene, advocating that knowledge and information confer international influence and, in the world of diplomacy and security, "soft power" represents a position that relies more on negotiations rather than coercion - powerful ideas rather than powerful weapons.[43] These new Canadian initiatives have annoyed the United States.[44] A recent Washington Post article, published after the Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister suggested for NATO to consider revamping its nuclear weapons strategy, stated: "Axworthy, a former academic and a vocal critic of old-fashioned Realpolitik, has become something of a thorn in the side of U.S. policymakers."[45]

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[42] Axworthy, as part of his address to the UN General Assembly. see Axworthy, Lloyd, "Canada and human security: the need for leadership", International Journal (Spring 1997): 184. This concept was first introduced by Mr Axworthy, as Liberal Party external affairs critic, in 1992. See "Canadian Foreign Policy: A Liberal Party Perspective", Canadian Foreign Policy, (Winter 1992/93): 7-14. Axworthy was outlining at the time a new foreign policy which eventually found its way into the Chrétien Government's foreign policy statement of February 1995, under the title *Canada in the World*, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada and the World Ottawa (1995): 24.

[43] See Louis Nastro and Kim Richard Nossal, "The Commitment- Capability Gap: Implications for Canadian Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era," Canadian Defence Quarterly (Autumn 1997): 19. and from Pearlstein: A26.

[44] Three examples are cited in a recent Washington Post article, and include: the outmaneuvering of the U.S. to secure passage of a global treaty ban on the use of land mines; a request by Canada for NATO to re-consider its first use of nuclear weapons policy, and the pressing of a strong new International Criminal Court. See Steven Pearlstein, "Canada Seeks Shift in NATO Nuclear Policy," Washington Post (24 Oct 1998): A26.

[45] Pearlstein: A26.

The enunciation of the human security policy, reflective of the fundamentally different new world order of the post-Cold War era, has important consequences for Canada.[46] As summarised by Keating and Gammer, "the response of Canadian government to the post-Cold War security issues suggests a profound change in Canada's foreign policy, one that adopts a radically different approach to civil wars and human rights violations in foreign countries."[47] Unfortunately, indications are that this policy was prepared without adequate consultation, if any, with National Defence.[48] The mere fact that the policy was announced after the publication of the 1994 Defence White Paper would seem to give credence to this thesis. More importantly, however, it is the realisation that the application of a more independent and radically different Canadian foreign policy will likely mean different roles for the Canadian Forces. As stated by Mr Axworthy:

> [t]he changes on the international scene and in internal American politics demand that we exercise our responsibilities, and if we must set ourselves apart from the United States when our interests are at stake, then so be it. The situation in the world today no longer demands our unconditional loyalty to the U.S. leadership in the higher interest of global security.[49]

Although some will argue that this "human security" policy change is perhaps temporary, it seems more evident than ever that the shift is permanent for Canada and reflective of the world order of the 21st century. Much has been written since the early 1990s on the current world

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[46] See Nastro for a detailed analysis of the impact as it relates to the commitment-capability gap of the CF.
[47] Tom Keating and Nicholas Gammer, "The 'new look' in Canada's foreign policy," International Journal (autumn 1993): 720-748.
[48] See Keating and Gammer: 747; see also Myriam Gervais and Stéphane Roussel, "De la sécurité de l'État à celle de l'individu: l'évolution du concept de sécurité au Canada (1990-1996)," Revues Études internationales (mars 1998): 25-51and, Alasdair Maclaren, "Le Canada doit concilier sa politique étrangère et sa politique de défense", Perspectives Internationales (mars-avril 1997): 22-26.
[49] Llyod Axworthy, "Between Globalization and multipolarity: the case for a global, humane Canadian foreign policy," Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. [http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/english/foreignp/humane.html] (1996): 4.

disorder and several analysts and scholars are indeed supporting the "human security" thesis. Some experts are going even further and argue that military power will not be the threat to world security in the 21st century.[50]

Michael Ignatieff, who has travelled the world extensively in the past years in search for clues to the direction of the new world disorder, has outlined that world organisations and new global media like Cable News Network (CNN) have helped create a popular demand for international interventions, and "have essentially changed the very scope of modern conscience."[51] The impact of this awakened conscience on the foreign policy of nations has been apparent, as is the situation with Canada. Moreover, in quick successions, Western countries have been drawn into one ambitious intervention after another,[52] and it is perhaps natural for Canada, considering its history of peacekeeping, to take a leadership role to promote this new human security policy.[53] The reason for involvement of the international community is often blamed on the "CNN factor", whereby vivid television images of international events serve to galvanise Western audiences and fuel a pressing need for United Nations and Western government action.[54] Because of the Western public perception that the United States has the resources and the ability to "do something", rightly or wrongly, Washington tends to be the most

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[50] See Paul Kennedy, Preparing for the 21st Century, HarperCollins Toronto (1993), and Arthur H. Westing, "Canadian Security in a Broadened Context," Canadian Defence Quarterly (Dec 1996): 13-22.

[51] Ignatieff has looked carefully at how the Western nations become involved in these missions of global humanity through the medium of television, how this comparatively new medium has changed how most people in the developed world receive their news, and how it has enormous power to shape public opinion. For a more detailed study, see Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior's Honour: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience, Toronto: Viking, Penguin Group (1998): 89-91.

[52] Unfortunately, the drawback with the new human security approach is now starting to be fully realised by the international community as failures in military and humanitarian interventions become more frequent.

[53] For a fascinating discussion on the limit of Liberalism in the new security context, see Robert Latham, "Getting Out From Under: Rethinking Security Beyond Liberalism and the Levels-of-Analysis Problem," Millennium Vol. 25 No. 1 (1996): 77-108.

[54] For a discussion on this issue, see Ignatieff, and Louis A. Delvoie, "Canada and International Security Operations: The Search for policy Rationales," Centre for International Relations, Queen's University (1998) in a paper to be published soon.

affected by the CNN virus. The bug is highly contagious, and because of the uniqueness of Canada's geography and cultural links with the U.S., Ottawa is often engaged with the U.S. in their military interventions.[55] While Canada's foreign policy is being applied in a different fashion, it is also important to understand where the American foreign policy is heading.

As Haglund writes, it is not just Canada that has been reassessing the basic tenets of its security policy, "[t]he United States has been undergoing a similar round of soul-searching."[56] Until 1991, the desire to contain Soviet expansionism was the foundation of US foreign policy, and by extension that of Canada.[57] Now, in the post-Cold War world, such external threats are absent and the US foreign policy is based to a greater extent on domestic interests and values. The freedom to exercise policy choices, not available before 1991, is clearly evidenced both in the U.S. and in Canada in the application of their respective foreign policy. Since the Somalia tragedy, and following much criticism of UN peacekeeping,[58] the U.S. Government has attempted to sustain public support for traditional peacekeeping by making it more responsive to American objectives in promoting "a more selective and effective approach to multilateral peace operations."[59] In line with this new approach of pragmatic internationalism, the White House set out to review peacekeeping while at the same time sustaining domestic support for it by asserting a new leadership role for America at the UN. U.S. domestic factors are becoming a more potent force in shaping foreign policy, with external factors being less determinative.

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[55] Indeed, except for a few operations, such as Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989, Canada has been an active participant with the Americans for a variety of, but not necessarily the same, reasons; Haiti in 1995 is a perfect example.
[56] Haglund: 10.
[57] This policy shaped not only defence strategies, but it also influenced trade policies, aid programs, cultural initiatives and a host of other policies. See Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?," Foreign Affairs (Summer 1993): 49.
[58] On the aspect of peacekeeping in America, as Sokolsky writes, "[t]here is little doubt that American support for UN peacekeeping has declined from the early days of the Cold War." Joel J. Sokolsky, "The Clinton Administration and UN Peacekeeping," Canadian Defence Quarterly (Sep 96): 6.
[59] Sokolsky: 11. Accordingly, the White House issued in 1994 Presidential Decision Directive 25 for that purpose.

The issue in the debate between the diverging Canadian and American foreign policies is essentially how each country prefers to advance international issues and resolve inter-state problems. While multilateralism seems to be the *modus operandi* of Canada, the U.S. on the other hand is suspicious of this process, and sometimes hostile to the principal agent of multilateralism, the United Nations, and its expanded role in global affairs. [60] By its actions, the UN infringes on U.S. sovereignty, limits their flexibility and too often reflects a consensus that is perceived to oppose American interests. [61] In short, while the UN is at the centre of Canada's foreign policy, and by extension of the Canadian defence policy, this is not the case for the United States. While Canada and many Western nations have decided on new directions for their foreign policy, the Americans are frequently criticised should they choose to adopt the same degree of independence in their foreign and defence policies.[62] The leadership they are expected to exercise in world affairs is certainly curtailing their ability to chart their own way. For the Canada-U.S. defence relationship, the impact of the ongoing "battle" between Canada's internationalism in world affairs and American isolationism is significant.

First, driven by diverging foreign policies, the employment of the military forces is likely to be for different purposes for each country. While the U.S. might be asked to exercise leadership in terms of critical resources in order get an operation under way rapidly, Canada, with limited capabilities, might be left behind to take over later, as was the case in Haiti in 1996,

[60] As Senator Dole said: "[t]he American people will not tolerate American casualties for irresponsible internationalism." Quoted in Schlesinger, Arthur Jr., Back to the womb? Isolationism's renewed threat," Current, Nov 1995.
[61] The U.S. is more and more isolated at the UN, and this is one of the main reason for their withholding of payments to the UN. Examples of this recent isolationism are Washington's failure to support the Ottawa Convention to ban anti-personnel mines and the opposition to the International Criminal Court. See Beth A. Fisher, "The United States and the Ottawa Process," Canadian Foreign Policy (Spring 1998): 51-68.
[62] See Martin Walker, "A new American isolationism?," International Journal (Summer 1997): 391-410.

or to perform secondary support roles. David Dewitt and David Leyton-Brown have indicated that Canada's lack of truly multi-purpose, combat-capable military resources will have a "corrosive influence" on Canada in fulfilling its role in the international community, limiting Canada's roles and leaving to others the more dangerous tasks.[63] Second, if American involvement in world affairs continues to be influenced more by domestic interests, the potential for friction between the two countries will increase.[64] In the end, the Americans might not be inclined to give any preferential treatment to a country that criticises them. Open criticism, as has been often the case with Minister Axworthy over the past few years, always runs the risk of causing deterioration in relations: people generally do not like to be preached at, and particularly not when they are think that they are right.[65] Several tangible benefits of the Canadian-U.S. defence relationships are realised through the goodwill of the Americans.[66] Third, with the campaign for a new era of "soft power" which is often seeking the higher moral ground on international issues, Canada tends to annoy the U.S., and this approach and the ensuing deteriorated relationship could definitely affect Canada's standing within NORAD, NATO or other similar fora. The fact that Canada was absent from the strategic decision circles - the Contact Group - during the discussions on the resolution of the Yugoslavian conflict, even with significant military forces in the air and on the ground, speaks for itself. [67]

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[63] Quoted in Nastro and Nossal: 19.

[64] This criticism is certainly not new but has increased significantly in recent years. It will also be interesting to see how this will play at the UN Security Council with Canada having recently obtained one of the two rotating non-permanent seats. See Nossal, "Without regard....," for a more complete discussion on Canada's criticism of the U.S.

[65] Nossal: 194.

[66] To give one example of this goodwill, the U.S. provided Canada with strategic air-to-air refuelling for the initial deployment of CF-18 to Bosnia, with no cost recovery except for the fuel.

[67] David and Roussel argue that Canada has been more and more marginalized since the end of the Cold War. They discuss that they have had little influence on the conduct of ground operations and little in the diplomatic efforts, whereby in the past we would have been more active. Their thesis is that Middle Powers are loosing influence in this new era. See Charles P.David and Stephane Roussel, "Une espèce en voie de disparition? La politique de puissance moyenne du Canada après la guerre froide," International Journal (Winter 1996/97): 66.

Finally, the last link in the international arena impacting on the defence relationship between Canada and the United States is NATO, and it is having less and less significance in the defence relationship. "Even if Europe has been dethroned as the supreme organiser of Canada's security policy",[68] Canada will likely continue to participate in NATO for the precise reason of multilateralism and to maintain its membership in collective security fora. With the broadening of the alliance, Canada is coming close to realising the alliance of its dreams: a political community sustained more upon the basis of common values and interests than upon the need to respond to a common threat. More importantly, NATO still holds out the prospect of imposing low costs, and few risks, upon Canada.[69] Because NATO is getting progressively more a political alliance than a military one, the potential for increased diverging views between the two countries is real, as was demonstrated by the recent request by Canada for NATO to review its nuclear use policy.

Canada has recently embarked on a path in world security issues that appears at times at odd with the U.S. Although it is too early to assess the impact of the diverging Canadian and American policies on the future of the defence relationship, there are clear signs that Canada's strategy could have important repercussions on the state of this relationship. For sure, Canada's recent actions are weakening this special defence relationship.

THE DWINDLING CANADIAN MILITARY CAPABILITY

[68] Haglund: 16.
[69] The debate if Canada should, or not remain in NATO will not be discussed further here, because of a lack of space. For a more elaborate discussion, see David G. Haglund, "The NATO of its dreams," International Journal (Summer 1997): 464-482.

Since the end of the Second World War, the Government has consistently maintained that "Canada needs armed forces that are able to operate with the modern forces maintained by our allies and like-minded nations against a capable opponent - that is, able to fight 'alongside the best, against the best'."[70] This pledge was closely linked to our commitments to contribute effectively, as equal partners, to NATO or NORAD, and to be able to operate effectively with coalition forces, especially the American forces. [71] For many years, defence decisions and resources were directed toward collective defence missions, and although NATO and NORAD commitments were not the only tasks confronting the CF, these provided the principal defence planning criteria.[72] The ability of the Canadian Forces to operate with the U.S. forces and be perceived as an equal associate in mutual defence matters has always been very important to the Canadian military, and stems from our shared contribution to both world wars.

With very limited defence resources in the coming years, military planners will have extremely difficult choices to make in determining which military capabilities Canada wishes to retain for the future. These challenges will be even more daunting as they attempt to link the capabilities with the new foreign policy objectives envisaged in the international security arena. Ultimately, by the nature of Canada's unique defence relationship with the United States, the resulting CF force structure and capabilities will be another determinant that will impact this relationship in the 10 to 15 year timeframe, albeit more at the operational than the strategic level. The reasons are explained in this part of the paper.

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[70] White Paper 1994: 14.
[71] This insistence has frequently been by the senior military leadership, See Bland, Canada's National Defence: 285, for a brief discussion on the ambitions of senior military leaders to find reasons for building 'general- purpose combat forces' suited to international warfare.
[72] Bland: 109.

DND and the CF remain committed to achieving the objectives set out in the 1994 Defence White Paper. But the challenges are serious and daunting. As mentioned before, DND has been at the receiving end of substantial defence reductions since the early 1990s. The capital element of the defence budget is facing unprecedented pressures to the point where as Douglas Ross states "essential combat capabilities will be lost."[73] In only ten years, the capital portion of the Defence budget has being reduced by almost 40 percent.[74] The capital slice of the budget is now perilously close to dipping below the dreaded 20 per cent level, the budget level considered the minimum for DND to be in a position to provide enough purchasing power to replace aging equipment and systems.[75] Unless the government agrees to reduce DND personnel below the White Paper levels,[76] this funding ratio is likely to continue to drop as a larger portion of the funding is allocated to the personnel portion to the detriment of the capital portion.[77] There are no signs that this trend is reversing. The problem of a reduced capital envelope will be further exacerbated by the need to keep pace with the advances in military technologies necessary to be able to continue to operate with Western coalition forces such as the United States. Indeed, there is little doubt that the operational effectiveness of any armed forces in the next century will be highly dependent on technology and will require expensive investments.[78] If this is not enough in itself, the inability of the Department to afford suitable equipment would not allow, as the

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[73] Ross: 4.

[74] From approximately $3.4 B in fiscal year 1988/89 to $2.1B in fiscal year 1997/98. Data in 1997 dollars; source: Making Sense Out Of Dollars, 1988/89 to 1997-98 editions.

[75] The preferable target is 25 per cent, with some advocating 30 per cent as the ideal level.

[76] These are 60,000 regular force military personnel, 30,000 reservists and 20,000 civilians.

[77] There are fairly high expectations within the ranks of the department that funding will be increased in the personnel portion following the release of the SCONVA report on quality of life of CF members, dipping more into the capital portion. The only other option is to reduce operations and maintenance, which is also being seriously considered for DGP 00/01. Os an aside, the capital portion of the defence budget was a low 9 per cent in 1973.

[78] Two recent examples of expenditures to ensure both relevance and inter-operability with our allies is the decision to acquire precision-guided munitions for the CF-18 following the lessons learned from the Gulf War (minimizing damage outside the target area is another reason), and to install self-defence protection suites on our CC-130 aircraft for the Bosnia and African operations. Further, the CF is struggling to find adequate resources to fund the expensive systems life extension for both the CF-18 and the CP-140.

Office of the Auditor General recently indicated, CF personnel to perform the functions required of them within acceptable levels of risk.[79]

For the first time since the publication of the 1994 White Paper, the DND Defence Planning Guidance (DPG) has implicitly acknowledged the seriousness of the situation, and the impact this may have:

> The Government has stated that multi-purpose combat-capable forces need not, and should not, cover the full spectrum of possible military capabilities. The CF will thus only maintain core capabilities suited to a wide range of defence roles.… Modernization efforts will focus on those operational capabilities that clearly support approved roles and tasks so that essential capabilities are not lost due to rust-out or obsolescence.[80]

The drift between the nature of the threat and the means to achieve Canada's security policy is clearly important, and all the more evident when one compares Canada's foreign policy objectives with those of the 1994 Defence White Paper. Although it seems that the occasional conflict between foreign affairs and defence in terms of co-ordinating the political objectives of Canada's security policy with the actions of National Defence is not new in Canada,[81] this time there is a marked difference. As noted by Oliver:

> While foreign affairs has been pushing vigorously its vision of a new multilateralism and Canadian involvement in soft security, and sustainable

[79] See Peter Kasurak and Nicholas Swales, "Reforming the Department of National Defence: A View from the Audit Office," Canadian Defence Quarterly (Spring 1998): 23. The recent crash of the Labrador helicopter, killing all aboard, was attributed by the opposition parties in the House to the Government's inability to provide adequate and safe resources to the CF.
[80] Defence Planning Guidance 1999: article 201.
[81] For example, see Alasdair Maclaren, "Le Canada doit concilier sa politique étrangère et sa politique de défense", Perspectives Internationales (mars-avril 1997): 22-26.

development, it has been notably quiet in addressing publicly questions of military security, alliance commitments, and the linkages between military capability and broader foreign policy objectives.[82]

In times of budget restraint, it is quite reasonable to assume that the Government will want to use whatever few means it has available to achieve the most effective foreign policy use. However, to satisfy the foreign policy goals, the CF will have to adjust and ultimately realign its military capability.[83] Despite the 1994 White Paper rhetoric that the Government is committed to maintaining combat-capable forces, the reality is that the CF is slowly, but surely, being squeezed by the limitations of the Defence budget into a third-rate combatant force. Meaningful changes to the armed forces of this country are taking place mainly because senior officials have no choice, given the reduced defence budgets. This pacifist doctrine has not yet made its way formally into the current government's policy documents, but it does not need to. The shift to a gentler force is taking place, slowly but surely, and this through the most severe budget constraints since the early 1970s.[84]

These developments, the results of inadequate defence funding and what is perceived by many Liberals to be a comparatively benign post-Cold War era, will over time do serious

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[82] Dean F. Oliver, "The Military After Somalia," Leadership and Dialogue, Hampson and Molot, eds., Oxford University Press Toronto (1998): 111.

[83] Perhaps, though, this outcome is predictable. Mr. Axworthy, then Liberal Party External Affairs critics and now one of the most influential cabinet ministers in the Government, wrote the following in 1992, regarding the CF to restructure the CF to seek a more consistent balancing of the ends with the means: "[t]here must be a serious realignment and reordering of national priorities. The extravagant expenditures by the Canadian Government on weapons systems that are of questionable relevance to contemporary realities…is a recent example of how this government is not assigning resources or defining strategy with an effective foreign policy...To facilitate this redefining of role and resources we advocate that the budget allocation for peacekeeping activities become a major component of the defence budget. Out of this can grow a clearer correlation between our new expanded role in international security and what kind of equipment we purchase, what kind of training is provided, what kind of facilities are dedicated.Axworthy. See Axworthy, "Canadian Foreign policy: A Liberal Party Perspective": 12.

[84] The policies of retrenchment of the Canadian military outlined in *Canada 21: Canada and Common Security in the Twenty-First Century* were, according to Ross, embraced by many leading members of the Liberal party: "[t]he result of this profoundly imprudent development, coupled with the public relations disaster of the Somalia Inquiry has been the destruction of the Canadian armed forces as a usable, militarily consequential instrument." Ross: 2.

damage to Canada's ability to operate with U.S. and coalitions forces. The application of the new Canadian foreign policy, when combined with limited funding to replace war-fighting equipment is going to fundamentally change the character of the Canadian Forces and the nature of the military operations the CF will be engaged in. [85] War-fighting would definitely be out and, in addition to sovereignty tasks, a selective approach to international peacekeeping would likely favour support functions and police action, and leave to others the opportunity for heavy fighting.[86] Bland, who was a member of the well-financed and powerful Canada 21 Council, writes that " a defence policy for Canada should be based on the idea that Canada cannot and need not maintain multi-capable 'general purpose' armed forces for a wide range of threats…. Canada could concentrate its military efforts on national capabilities and could design armed forces suited to Canada's national interests."[87] Perhaps this is precisely what Canada should endeavour to do, and to develop niche military areas to be able to make a small and meaningful contribution in future coalitions.[88]

In fact, the Chrétien Government has frequently stated publicly that Canada would be more selective in participating in out-of-country peacekeeping operations. The marginal role played by Canada during the Gulf War, especially the lack of participation by the ground forces,

[85] Not every one agrees with this position; for a different perspective, see Brian Macdonald, "Canadian Strategic Policy and the Clash of Civilizations", Canadian Defence Quarterly (Spring 1997): 27.
[86] There are concerns that by adopting a different and lighter force posture and carrying out smaller assignments, the army would damage its ability to carry out its primary mission – to participate in a major war. One can easily argue, as many senior military personnel have done since 1993, that in doing so there is a degrading of war-fighting capabilities and a danger that these kind of activities could gradually undermine the army's war-fighting capacity in a subtle but fundamental ways; in short, the toughness, aggressiveness, quick decision-making are the opposite of the tact, diplomacy, patience and caution needed for the peacekeeping duties.
[87] Douglas Bland, "A Strategy of Choice: Preparing the Armed Forces for the 21st Century," Canadian Foreign Policy (Spring 94): 109-132.
[88] The CF have been moving in this direction since 1945. If one compares to the U.S. or the U.K. for instance, there are a significant number of capabilities that Canada has been shedding away over the years. For instance, aircraft carrier operations, low altitude parachute system extraction, war-fighting at the brigade level, to name only a few.

was precursor to a new era.[89] Indeed, the current DPG 1999 plans call for the elimination of core ground combat capabilities with the eventual retiring of the Leopard tanks and the over-250 pieces of artillery, and their replacement with a more manoeuvrable armoured combat vehicle.[90] As stated in the DPG, one hopes that "this focus will ensure that the land force remains a capable fighting force able to operate with the modern armed forces maintained by Canada's allies."[91] As for the air force, it is currently struggling to find the resources within the defence budget to pay for the systems life extensions on both the CF-18 and the CP-140. The upgrades are so important for the future of Canada's air force that it might involve reducing actual readiness posture in the years ahead so that it can redirect funding from operations and maintenance to re-capitalisation programmes.[92] Using the CF-18 SLE as an example of the challenges that the CF will face in the years ahead, one author writes: "…. Interoperabilities with Canada's allies "is a key operational requirement. This requirement dictates a series of technology enhancements, as well as the need for new systems…. In the absence of such technologies, the CF-18 will be unable to participate in coalition operations, such as those in the Persian Gulf and Bosnia."[93] In the end, the lack of spending on equipment will be problematic for the Government: "it not only puts Canadian lives at risk, but also send strong messages to allies about what Canada is willing to contribute."[94] The lack of military capabilities and credibility is already limiting the options for achieving foreign policy goals or initiatives which require the use of military assets, and this situation will worsen in the years ahead. [95]

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[89] Although the air force participation, in conducting combat air patrol (CAP) over the Persian Gulf area, was a perfectly contribution to the coalition, which can be characterised as a specialist role.
[90] see Major J.R.S. Jean, L'Armée canadienne dans les conflits futurs, New Horizons Project, Toronto, Ont: Canadian Forces Command and Staff College, 1998.
[91] DPG 99: article 204.
[92] William C. Weston, "CF-18 systems life extension: Need or nonsense," Canadian Defence Quarterly (Winter 1997): 13-15 for an excellent summary of the importance to the Air Force of this upgrade.
[93] Weston: 15.
[94] Nastro and Nossal: 19.
[95] Douglas Alan Ross goes as far as arguing that "Canadian leaders are opting out of any effective contribution to collective defence, collective security, and international development. By doing so they are only likely to accentuate the tendency in the United States towards unilateral decision-making", see Ross: 21.

The Canadian military capability is more than pure hardware. The capabilities are very closely linked to U.S. technological developments, doctrine and culture. Many authors and analysts are predicting a revolutionary change in the art of war not simply from the ineluctable march of technology but from a change in doctrine, war-fighting culture and organisational structure of the military. As the U.S. military continues to progress,[96] and the Canadian military continues to become less relevant as a multi-purpose combat-capable military force, the drift between the two military cultures will accentuate, slowly, but surely. Canada has been borrowing ideas, doctrine, operational processes, equipment and training methods from the United States for the better part of the last 50 years, because it made sense to both countries.[97] The participation in joint and combined exercises has also been highly beneficial to Canada and, although there are no signs on the horizons that at this level of the defence relationship this is going to change in the short term, a lack of capability would preclude the CF from future participation.

As Jockel indicated a few years back, [t]he United States has never been happy with the low level of Canadian defense [sic] spending. But U.S. officials recognize that they have little to no leverage with Canada in this area."[98] Nevertheless, it is fairly certain that a reduced military capability and the assignment of quasi-military roles to the CF that risk turning the military into what J.L. Granatstein has called a "glorified gendarmerie" will mean a different relationship with the U.S. military by the year 2010. It would be naïve for Canada to think otherwise.

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[96] For a taste of the future see Williamson Murray, "Thinking About Revolutions in Military Affairs," JFQ (Summer 1997): 69-76; and William W. Hartzog and James G. Diehl, "Building the 21st-century heavy division," Military Review (Mar/Apr 1998): 91-105.

[97] There are also a large number of exchange programs at the military levels between the two countries.

[98] Joseph T. Jockel, "Canada-U.S. Defense Relations in the 1990s," in Joel J. Sokolsky and Joseph J. Jockel, eds. Fifty Year of Canada-United States Cooperation (Lampeter UK: Edwin Mellen Press: 1992): 387.

OTHER BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS… AND SPACE

As indicated at the outset, the Canada-U.S. defence relationship is composed of several additional bilateral defence arrangements. While examining these arrangements at the time of the 1994 White Paper, the Government came to several conclusions including, *inter alia*, that these continue to serve Canada well, that they allow the CF to maintain the ability to work closely with U.S. counterparts, but that certain arrangements require updating.[99] In this final and fourth part, a number of other elements will be analysed briefly. These are: the relevance and future of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD), of the Defence Development Sharing Arrangement and, more importantly, the potential for increased co-operation in a number of space-related activities between the two countries.

The PJDB was the first agency through which President Roosevelt's grandiose political gesture brought to life defence co-operation between Canada and the United States.[100] Today, as the senior bilateral defence agency and advisory body on continental security, it remains somewhat a mystery. Christopher Conliffe argues that the Board has been effective for only six years (1940-45) and that it has since evolved through five phases, from the war years to uncertainty, the last thing, decline, eclipse and limbo.[101] The fundamental weakness of the Board is not having a clear role and more executive authority and "that it has been reduced to housekeeping or make-work activity."[102] The Board has essentially been relegated to address trivial military issues rather than the strategic issues it was originally intended to address.

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[99] 1994 Defence White Paper: 21.
[100] Christopher Conliffe, "The Permanent Joint Board on Defense, 1940-1988," in David G. Haglund and Joel J. Sokolsky, The US-Canada Security Relationship (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1989): 162.
[101] Conliffe: 163.
[102] Conliffe: 163.

Conliffe is of the opinion that the Board is of little use and that it should have been abolished several decades ago. In spite of this, however, he admits that perhaps it is the mere existence of the Board that is more significant that the practical and concrete achievements. In any event, it is a relatively minor element of the defence relationship, and will have no impact on its future.

During the late 1950s and early 1960s was created the Defence Development/Production Sharing Arrangement (DD/DPSA)[103] which sought to promote co-operation between the two countries through "an extensive network of defence production, research, and development arrangements."[104] The Vietnam War was undoubtedly the greatest single influence on the Canada-U.S. defence economic relationship, and highly beneficial to Canada economically. Overall, Middlemiss is of the opinion that this relationship has been a highly successful one for both countries, while Fergusson in a more recent paper, argues that "the defence-industrial strategy…. has been what might be described as a piecemeal policy surrounding the defence-industrial relationship with the United States (DD/DPSA), the search for Industrial and Regional Benefits through defence spending, and an underlying 'Buy Canadian' environment."[105] In short, he argues there have been inconsistencies and that structural forces in both countries present a serious obstacle to any serious strategy. On the procurement side, however, with little Canadian defence industrial capabilities in Canada and an "off-the-shelf" policy, there is a now the possibility of purchasing complete weapon platforms and systems from offshore countries (with minimal industrial regional benefits), further pushing the Canada-U.S. defence industrial relationship into marginality.[106] In short, while the defence industrial aspect of the relationship

[103] For a historical background to Canada-U.S. defence co-operation, see Dan Middlemiss, "The Road from Hyde Park: Canada-U.S. Defense Economic Cooperation," in Joel J. Sokolsky and Joseph J. Jockel, eds. Fifty Year of Canada-United States Cooperation: 175-206.
[104] 1994 White Paper: 24.
[105] James Fergusson, "The Missing Dimension of the White Paper: A Defence-Industrial Strategy," Canadian Defence Quarterly (June 1995): 6.
[106] Fergusson: 7.

was a key and perhaps influential component of the defence relationship 30 years ago, it is now a very small one.

Undoubtedly, the domain with the best potential for growth between the two countries is Space. Although Space has been ancillary in Canada's thinking, it is now growing in leaps and bounds in both the military and commercial fields. Canada has recently published a new DND Space Policy specifically designed to increase emphasis in Space.[107] The 1994 White Paper states that "space has emerged as an increasingly important component of the global security environment."[108] The other key development related to Space is the 1996 renewal of the NORAD Agreement between Canada and the United States which acknowledges that "the use of space is key to NORAD's ability to maintain a credible defence for North America and provide for a number of space-related activities."[109] The signature in October 1997 of an MOU between Canada and the United States is another indication of the rapid developments in the co-operation between the two countries. The DND space policy further acknowledges the particular importance of the bilateral relationship between the two countries and the "CF will, therefore, examine with special attention opportunities for cooperation with the United States."[110] With it participation in NORAD, Canada is provided with a unique opportunity, unlike any other country, to develop its military space expertise. Two main concerns will face DND in the coming years. First, Canada will have to invest sufficient resources to be able to make a meaningful financial contribution to expand the co-operation. Unlike certain other aspects of North American defence, the U.S. does not need Canada's participation to move ahead. Second,

[107] Government of Canada, Department of National Defence Space Policy (Ottawa: National Defence, September 1998).
[108] 1994 Defence White Paper: 25.
[109] DND Space Policy: covering letter: 1.
[110] DND Space Policy: 7.

the issue of the "militarisation" of space could become contentious as the United States attempts to fulfil its national military objectives.[111] With the ABM Treaty and customary international law being very restrictive in this regard, Canada would likely take the high moral ground and decline to participate. In the end, however, it will be nearly impossible for Canada to decline the special opportunity that the bilateral NORAD command provides to partake in this program and, accordingly, one can expect the defence relationship in this domain to gather momentum in the coming years. Even if it means that Canada has to invest some resources!

CONCLUSION – FUTURE TRENDS IN THE DEFENCE RELATIONSHIP

There is plenty of evidence to suggest that the elaborate structure of collaboration that has been built over a fifty-year period has provided Canada with influence and leverage on the Americans beyond what a simple comparison of military capabilities would first suggest. It is also seems fairly manifest from the discussion in this paper, and as stated by Jockel and Sokolsky in 1996, that the nature of the Canadian-U.S. defence relationship will change in the years ahead.

The changing strategic environment has significantly reduced the importance of continental defence for the United States. The international security situation has planted the seeds for a new Canadian foreign policy, at odds in its application with the United States. While Canada continues to remain internationally engaged using multilateral institutions to do so, the United States is becoming more and more isolationist. The situation is likely to amplify in the years ahead as U.S. domestic policies and issues continue to dominate the agenda and influence the American foreign policy. On the Canadian front, unless additional resources are brought to

[111] Steve James, in a presentation to the Advances Military Studies Course, 29 October 1998.

bear, the Canadian Forces will be slowly eroding into marginality with a defence budget that is one of the smallest of the Western industrial nations. Without much notice, the Liberal government is progressively moving the Canadian Forces toward a third rate military force, using the subtlety of the budgetary process to achieve this. Continued erosion of the Canadian military will eventually mean a significantly weakened defence relationship with the United States. Fortunately, a number of areas such as NORAD and maritime co-operation are expected to remain vibrant, and in other areas, such as space, increased co-operation in the next century can be expected in the next century.

As was discussed in this paper, the Canada-United States defence relationship is indeed a complex product of arrangements created, designed and shaped during other eras starting as early as 1940, when President Roosevelt made the historical phone call to Prime minister King. The end of the Cold War has brought about unprecedented change in the world security environment. But it is more than the security environment that shapes this special defence relationship, and other significant changes taking place in the world are contributing to put pressure, one way or another, on the relationship. The total landscape has changed and continues to transform itself almost daily, and so will the defence relationship. The United States and Canada had built a very strong defence partnership based upon the many shared interests and values. Given the myriad of common interests shared by Canada and the United States it is normal at times to focus on the points of disagreements on foreign and defence matters between the two countries. The reality is that the convenient marriage in areas of defence matters that came into being in the late 1940s between Canada and the United States is definitely not over. But it is certainly weakening and this erosion is not necessarily solely of Canada's making, but rather a reflection of the new strategic context facing the world and North America. Nevertheless, there is optimism that the century-old invariants between the two countries such as geography, values and trade will ensure

that the relationship continues well into the next century. It is, to a certain measure, up to Canada to decide.

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Bashow, David L. Canada and the Future of Collective Defence. Kingston, Ont: Queen's University, Centre for International Relations, Martello Papers, 1998.

- This pamphlet by a Canadian air force LCol offers an insider's perspective on Canadian defence and security policy at the century's end. The pamphlet essentially covers two aspects of Canada's defence, namely NORAD and NATO. Bashow argues that Canada gets several benefits from NORAD, but that continuation in the evolving NATO might not be in the interests of Canada.

Bland, Douglas L., ed. Canada's National Defence – Volume 1 Defence Policy. Kingston, Ont: Queen's University, 1997.

- An annotated collection of government statements on Canadian defence policy; they trace the history of the ideas behind the Canadian defence policies since 1947. The papers also explain what the leaders thought about Canada's defence, and Bland offers his own assessments of these statements.

Canada 21 Council. Canada 21: Canada and Common Security in the Twenty-First Century. Toronto, ON: Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto, 1994.

- Canada Council 21, a neo-liberal coalition of Canadians, provides a proposed force structure for the CF on the verge of the publication of the 1994 White Paper. Canada 21 certainly drew the most attention in late 1993 for their proposal to drastically change the structure of the CF, to a lighter military force.

Conference of Defence Associations. Canadian Security – A Policy for the 21st Century. Ottawa: Ont: Conference of Defence Associations, 1993.

- In the wake of the 1994 White Paper, a pamphlet reviewing the security issues facing Canada and a proposal for the restructuring of Canada's armed forces to meet the challenges of the years ahead.

Cooper, Andrew F. Canadian Foreign Policy – Old Habits and New Directions. Scarborough, Ont: Prentice Hall Canada Inc., 1997.

- A more recent book on Canada's foreign policy, including a complete chapter on the evolution of peacekeeping as a foreign policy tool.

Dewitt, David B., and David Leyton-Brown, eds. Canada's International Security Policy, Scarborough, Ont: Prentice Hall Canada, 1995.

- A most complete book with articles by many respected scholars that cover all aspects of Canada's security policy. Of note is the fact that some articles are somewhat dated in that they were written before the publication of the Liberal Party's defence policy. A must book for the student of Canada's security issues.

Haglund, David G., and Sokolsky, Joel J., ed. The US-Canada Security Relationship. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989.

- Albeit dated, the book provides interesting articles on the Canada-U.S. security relationship before the impact of the end of the Cold War was fully factored in.

Ignatieff, Michael. The Warrior's Honour: Ethic War and the Modern Conscience. Toronto: Viking (Penguin Group), 1998.

- Ignatieff, in a most readable book, discusses how Western nations become involved in UN humanitarian missions; how TV has changed how most people receive their news; how this hot medium shape public opinion; how the UN has attempted to deal with the national and ethnicity situations; and how a modern country can come apart when politicians push the power of ethnicity to the point of conflict.

Jockel, Joseph T., and Joel J. Sokolsky. The End of the Canada-U.S. Defence Relationship. Kingston, Ont: Queen's University, Centre for International Relations, Occasional Paper No. 53, 1996.

- Jockel and Sokolsky outline that the Canada-U.S. defence relationship is centered around two elements, namely the protection of North America and the defence of Western Europe. The changes taking place in these two areas are reviewed, including the future of UN peacekeeping. They argue that the Cold War co-operation is coming to an end, but not the military links between the two countries.

Jockel, Joseph J. Security to the North – Canada-US Defence Relations in the 1990s. East Lansing, MI: Michigan State Press University, 1991.

- Albeit dated in some areas, the book is an assessment of how Canada and the United States may continue to cooperate in the next century. The author, an American, admits that the book was written in a period of transition in world affairs. The book is interesting because it includes two chapters on the origins and deepening of the Canadian commitment-capability gap.

Keating, Tom. Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy. Toronto, Ont: McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1993.

- A review of the sources of multilateralism in Canada's tradition. Chapter 6 is the relevant chapter for defence discussing security issues in a nuclear alliance, including continental defence aspects and NATO.

Nossal, Kim Richard. The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy. 1985. Scarborough, Ont: Prentice Hall Canada Inc., 1997.

- An excellent book that covers most aspects of Canada's foreign policy and which was recently updated as a third edition. Although the book has little to say about defence, chapter 3 provides an interesting discussion on Canada's power in the world, including a section on Canadian-American relations.

Sokolsky, Joel J., and Joseph T. Jockel, eds. Fifty Years of Canada-United States Defense Cooperation, Lampeter, U.K: Edwin Mellen Press, 1992.

- A series of articles prepared for a conference with an American audience. The book offers a good dosage of articles that review the history of the relationship from different angles. Includes a review of aerospace and maritime defense. The last article by Jockel offers some new angles for the future defense relationship.

Published Articles

Axworthy, Lloyd. "Canadian Foreign Policy: A Liberal Party Perspective." Canadian Foreign Policy, Vol. 1, No. 1, Winter 1992/93, pp. 7-14.

- An article which outlines the early views from Mr. Llyod Axworthy, then as the Liberal Party foreign affairs critic, on where Canada should go in the future. He suggests a more independent foreign policy for Canada and expresses definite views about the direction on the future military force structure.

Axworth, LLoyd. "Canada and human security: the need for leadership." International Journal, Vol. LII, Spring 1997, pp. 183-196.

- An outline of Canada's new foreign policy focusing more on human security and less on collective security. The article includes key statements about future direction of policy and likely implications for the military.

Black, Conrad. "Taking Canada Seriously." International Journal, Winter 1997/98, pp. 1-16.

- A critical review of Canada's foreign policy including our relationship with the United States, and other parts of the world. Argues that Canada has devoted too much energy to multilateral organisations to the detriment of our bilateral relations, such as with the U.S.

Bland, Douglas. "A Strategy of Choice: Preparing the Canadian Armed Forces for the 21st Century." Canadian Foreign Policy, Vol. 2, No. 1, Spring 1994, pp. 109-136.

- Written on the wake of a new Canadian defence policy, this article espouses the views proposed by *Canada 21*, proposing a conceptual framework for the development of an efficient and effective CF structure.

Bobrow, David B., and Boyer, Mark A. "International System Stability and American Decline." International Journal, Vol. LIII, No. 2, Spring 1998, pp. 285-305.

- The authors review the current American decline to contributing to world stability (such as foreign aid, debt relief and international peacekeeping) and see muted optimism in the years ahead.

Buteux, Paul. "Sutherland Revisited: Canada's Long-Term Strategic Situation." Canadian Defence Quarterly, September 1994, pp. 5-9.

- Buteux reviews the Sutherland's categories of invariants of Canada's long-term strategic situation in the hope of providing some signposts for the future direction of Canada's national security policy. His final argument is that if Canada is to continue to play in the major league and exercise relational power, then the post-Cold War order still depends in important ways on the existence and exercise of military power.

Clark, Joe. "The first international country." International Journal, Autumn 1997, pp. 539-45.

- Clark is arguing that there is more to fiscal prudence, and that Canada's political assets are becoming more relevant to the international community at a time when pre-occupation with trade diminish the priority Canada gives them. Recommends a more activist policy for Canada.

Cohen, Eliot A. "A revolution in warfare." Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 2, Mar/Apr 1996, pp. 37-47.

- Argues that a revolution in military affairs is taking place in the U.S. and outline its components.

Copeland, Daryl. "Globalization, enterprise and governance." International Journal, Winter 1997-8, pp. 17-37.

- Copeland discusses the nature of borderless nations and of globalization and their impact for the future for Canada.

Critchley, Harriet W. "The Future of the Canadian-U.S. Defense Relationship: A Canadian Perspective." Canada-U.S. Outlook, Vol. 2, No. 2, February 1991, pp. 43-49.

- This elementary paper reviews past defence policies and attempts to project the future of Canadian defence policies in a post-Cold War era. Critchley argues correctly that Canada will decide to assign top priority to sovereignty with collective security as a second issue. In the end, the Canada-U.S bilateral relationship to a superpower in a unipolar world will mean changes for Canada.

David, Charles-Philippe, and Stéphane Roussel. "Une espèce en voie de disparition? La politique de puissance moyenne du Canada après la guerre froide." International Journal, Vol. LII, Winter 1996/97, pp. 39-68.

- This article reflects about the place of middle powers in the after-Cold War era. The authors argue that the end of the Cold War and the end of the bi-polar world have removed the conditions that allowed middle powers to play a specific role, different from that of the bid powers.

Dewitt, David B. "Cooperative Security: A Canadian Approach to the Promotion of Peace and Security in the Post-Cold War Era." Canadian Defence Quarterly, March 1994, pp. 11-18.

- Dewitt reviews the international security environment as of 1994, and proposes a Canadian approach to peace, security and defence policy. He summarises by arguing for the need of better harmonisation of defence and foreign policies.

Evans, Graham. "The Vision Thing: In Search of the Clinton Doctrine." The World Today, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Vol. 53, Aug/Sep 1997, pp. 213-216.

- Graham reviews the contradiction in Clinton's foreign policy, and argues that the essence of the current American doctrine is trade and open markets.

Falk, Richard. "The Grotian Moment: Unfulfilled Promise, Harmless Fantasy, Missed Opportunity?" International Insights, Vol. 13, Fall 1997, pp. 3-35.

- The author reviews the hypothesis that we have reached a Grotian Moment, bringing a new world order challenging the supremacy of sovereign territorial states. Discusses the consequences of globalization.

Fergusson, James. "Getting It Right: The American National Missile Defense Programme and Canada." Canadian Defence Quarterly, Summer 1998, pp. 20-24.

- This most recent article provides an update on the status of the ballistic missile defense initiative and the American national missile defence. The article is excellent to understand the background to the dilemma facing Canada today in deciding or not to participate in the program through NORAD.

Fergusson, James. "The Missing Dimension of the White Paper: A Defence Industrial Strategy." Canadian Defence Quarterly, June 1995, pp. 6-10.

- Fergusson argues for the need for a better coordinated defence industrial strategy in Canada. He discusses issues such as off-the-shelf purchases, licenced production, and an expanded R&D strategy.

Fisher, Beth A. "The United States and the Ottawa Process." Canadian Foreign Policy, Vol. 5, No. 3, Spring 1998, pp. 51-68.

- The article provides an excellent explanation as to why the US did not sign anti-personnel mines convention. Discusses how U.S. foreign policy is shaped, and its future direction. The article concludes by stating that U.S. foreign policy will be largely shaped by domestic factors, at the expense of external factors.

Gervais, Myriam, and Stéphane Roussel. "De la sécurité de l'État à celle de l'individu: l'évolution du concept de la sécurité au Canada (1990-1996)." Revue Études Internationales, Vol XXIX, No. 1, March 1998, pp. 25-51.

- This article reviews Canada's evolution from the concept of cooperative security to human security. The paper indicates that this new conceptual evolution was not supported by a clear assessment of the consequences and problems in the implementation of the policies. This could explain many problems in the actual security policy of Canada.

Griffiths, Franklyn. "Canada as a Sovereign State." Canadian Foreign Policy, Vol. 2, No. 1, Spring 1994, pp 15-43.

- Griffiths reviews the changing face of sovereignty for Canada and argues that Canada's sovereignty requirements have change in ways that demand a transfer of resources from defence to culture and communications.

Haglund, David G. "Here comes M. Jourdain: A Canadian grand strategy out of Molière." Canadian Defence Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 3, Spring 1998, pp. 16-22.

- Haglund argues that a Canadian grand strategy makes sense conceptually in the Canadian context and that the country has and continues to possess a grand strategy that entails some intriguing implications for Canadian defence policy in the post-Cold War era.

Haglund, David G. "The NATO of its dreams?" International Journal, Summer 1997, pp. 464-482.

- Haglund argues that Canada has blown hot and cold on the question of NATO, and discusses why. He addresses the important question of the transformation of the alliance, and argues that the organization can be regarded more as a political organization than a military one. He looks at the future of the organization and the possible pressures of the United States.

Haglund, David G. "No Compass, Just an Anchor: Canada and the Centre-Periphery Question." Canadian Defence Quarterly, September 1994, pp. 10-16.

- Haglund discusses the international security environment and specifically how both Canada and the United States will be able to choose or maintain foreign policies that are presently overly Eurocentric. He concludes by saying that Europe has been dethroned as the supreme organizer of Canadian security policy.

Hartzog, William W., and James G. Diehl. "Building the 21st-century heavy division." Military Review, Vol. 78, No. 2, Mar/Apr 1998, pp. 91-??.

- An article which describes Task Force 21, the concept of a new digitized division for the 21st century.

Hull, James P. "From many, two: A bibliographic history of Canadian-American relations." American Studies International, Washington, Jun 1998, pp. 4-22.

- Hull offers a bibliographic history discussing several books related to growth, culture, colonisation, international relations, trade and other topics.

Huntington, Samuel P. "The Erosion of American National Interests." Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 5, Sep/Oct 1997, pp. 28-49.

- Huntington reviews the factors affecting American national interests and argues that the U.S. will need to devise a foreign policy grand strategy, move away from isolationism and commit major resources to the defence of national interests.

Jockel, Joseph T. "Canada and the United States: Still Calm in the 'Remarkable Relationship'." Canada Among Nations 1996, Ottawa, Ont: Carleton University Press, Carleton Public Policy Series No. 19, 1996, pp. 111-134.

- Jockel addresses the many elements that constitute the Canada-U.S relationship and demonstrates that the relationship is healthy with few contested elements. Jockel includes a brief section of the essay on military relations.

Kagan, Donald. "Are US Forces Overstreched? Roles and Missions." Orbis, Vol. 41, No. 2, pp. 187-198.

- A review of the uses of U.S. military forces, especially the impact of peacekeeping. Argues that the formulation of a clear national grand strategy to suit the international situation is required.

Kaplan, Robert. "The Coming Anarchy." The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 273, No. 2, pp. 44-76.

- An article that is somewhat of a classic. Kaplan reviews the conditions bringing about the anarchy of the new world order. He regards the recent disorders of Africa and the Middle East as world order signatures for the future.

Kasurak, Peter, and Nicholas Swales. "Reforming the Department of National Defence: A View from the Audit Office." Canadian Defence Quarterly, Spring 1998, pp. 23-29.

- A summary of the latest auditor general review of DND.

Keating ,Tom, and Nicholas Gammer. "The 'new look' in Canada's foreign policy." International Journal, Vol. XLVIII, Autumn 1993, pp. 720-48.

- The authors review the evolution of Canadian foreign policy and the profound change that took place in the mid-1990s, and argue that the 'new look' has not been uncontroversial, and without adequate consultation with National Defence. The article also reviews the Canadian response of the international community's request to humanitarian interventions of the past years.

Krause, Keith. "Canadian Defence and Security Policy in a Changing Global Context." Canadian Defence Quarterly, June 1994, pp. 6-12.

- A review of the international context and Canada's foreign and defence policy. The author concludes that there exists no overarching framework between Canada's foreign and defence policies to guide Canada explain its multilateral and international commitments.

Latham, Robert. "Getting Out From Under: Rethinking Security Beyond Liberalism and the Levels-of-Analysis Problem." Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 1996, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 77-108.

- Latham, in discussing today's apparent need to expand security and redefine the post-Cold War security agenda, argues that the liberal tradition is not a good place to begin thinking about how to pursue global security, because liberalism is marked too much by the centrality of the state.

Leyton-Brown, David. "Canadian Defence Policy if the 1990s: The North American Dimension." Canadian Defence Quarterly, August 1991, pp. 19-23.

- The article reviews the security environment and those elements that constitutes the Canada-U.S. defence relationship. Leyton-Brown raised the point that threats to Canada's territorial sovereignty originate in the U.S., as well as other threat such as economic and cultural. The point argues that security interests go beyond those which can be served by military instruments.

Lindsey, George. "Ballistic Missile Defence in the 1990s." Canadian Defence Quarterly, September 1995, pp. 6-11.

- A review of the history behind BMD and its significance for Canada..

Odom, William E. "Transforming the Military." Foreign Affairs, July/August 1997, Vol. 76, No.4, pp. 54-64.

- Odom critically reviews the recent article by the U.S. Defense Secretary and proposes a major reallocation of defense resources to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War world.

Macdonald, Brian. "Canadian Strategic Policy and the Clash of Civilizations." Canadian Defence Quarterly, Spring 1997, pp. 24-27.

- The article reviews Samuel Huntington's thesis on the *Clash of Civilizations* and its link to the Canadian strategy policy. Macdonald argues that Canada should rethink its current military downsizing and rather go about reorganising its forces to give actual meaning to the 1994 White paper's promise of being able to fight 'alongside the best, against the best.'

Macnamara, Donald. "Canada's Domestic Strategic Interests." Canadian Defence Quarterly, June 1994, pp. 13-16.

- The author reviews briefly Canada's domestic strategic interests, whether they may arise at hime or abroad. The article helps the reader understand the security issues, the risks and threats to Canada.

McDougal, Barbara. "Canada and the New Internationalism." Canadian Foreign Policy, Vol. 1, No. 1, Winter 1992/93, pp. 1-6.

- An énoncé of the Conservative Government, arguing that Canada need to recognize that how societies are organized internally affect their ability as nations to co-exist peacefully. A vision of "new internationalism" is proposed based on the concept that viable structure for peace must be based of the understanding and respect of human rights.

Michelson, Melissa R. "How Americans Think About Foreign Military Involvement: The Case of Bosnia." International Studies Note, Spring 1998, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 1-9.

- This article examines the influence of elite rhetoric and media framing on public opinion about the Bosnia troop deployment, focusing on the use of analogies.

Nastro, Louis, and Kim Richard Nossal. "The Commitment-Capability Gap: Implications for Canadian Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era" Canadian Defence Quarterly, Autumn 1997, pp. 19-22.

- The authors review the impact of the capability deficiency within the CF and its implications for the application of a new foreign policy. The authors argue that the commitment-capability gap will impose serious restraints on Canada's ability to participate activily, militarily on the international scene.

Norton, Roy. "Posture and Policymaking in Canada-US Relations: The First Two Mulroney and Chrétien Years." Canadian Foreign Policy, Vol. 5, No. 2, Winter 1998, pp. 15-36.

- A review of the Conservative and Liberal record on the Canada-U.S relationship from acid rain to arctic sovereignty to SDI.

Nossal, Kim Richard. "'Without regard to the interests of others': Canada and American Unilateralism in the Post-Cold War Era." The American Review of Canadian Studies, Summer 1997, pp. 179-197.

- Nossal traces the nature and extent of Canada's anti-unilateralism campaign in the mid-1990s. It examines what drove this policy, arguing that the concerns expressed by the Chrétien government during this period reflected merely a desire to express opposition for domestic political consumption, but rather because Ottawa is concerned about the implications of American unilateralism.

O'Brien, Kevin A. "The NORAD Agreement: Reviewing the Canada-U.S. Aerospace Defence Partnership." Canadian Defence Quarterly, March 1995, pp. 27-31.

- A review of the issues for renewal as Canada prepared to decide on renewing the agreement. The author makes a number of recommendations to ensure the relevance of NORAD for Canada.

Oliver, Dean F. "The Canadian Military after Somalia." Leadership and Dialogue, Canada Among Nations 1998, Hampson and Molot, eds, Oxford University Press, Toronto: Ont, pp. 99-117.

- Oliver reviews the status of the CF after the Somalia scandal, highlighting several important developments in Canadian military affairs and elaborating on the divergence between Canada's foreign policy and defence policy.

Perry, William J. "Defense in an Age of Hope." Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 6, November/December 1996, pp. 64-79.

- The former U.S. Secretary of Defense reviews that where the U.S. military is heading in the 21st century. Argues for a firmer grasp of the pivotal role of preventive defense in the new world. He contends that the U.S. must maintain strong, ready, forward-deployed, conventional armed forces.

Potter, Evan H. "Niche diplomacy as Canadian foreign policy." International Journal, Vol. LII, Winter 1996/97, pp. 25-38.

- Potter argues that to maximize its influence in an era of fiscal austerity, Canada will have to be more selective about the many international spheres in which it plays, hence niche diplomacy. He suggests a few areas for this kind of diplomacy.

Reinicke, Wolfgang H. "Global Public Policy." Foreign Affairs, November/December 1997, Vol. 97, No. 6, pp. 127-138.

- The author argues that the territorial state may become redundant, that the administration of sovereignty has changed, and that a global public policy to deal with globalization is required.

Ross, Douglas Alan. "Canada and the world at risk: depression, war, and isolationism for the 21st century." International Journal, Vol. LII, Winter 1996/97, pp. 1-24.

- Ross writes a most critical analysis of Canada's foreign and defence policy, listing a number of developments that have done grave damage to Canada's power, position, and influence over high political issues on the global agenda. His closes by stating that any version of realist threat analysis Canadian foreign and defence policy since 1991 deserves a failing grade.

Schlesinger, Arthur Jr. "Back to the Womb? Isolationism Renewed Threat." Current, Nov 1995, pp. 24-28.

- This article discusses the reasons for the recent US isolationism, its history and the impact for the future. He argues that if Americans reject the idea of collective security, the world will most likely become more unstable and dangerous.

Sicherman, Harvey. "The Revenge of Geopolitics." Orbis, Vol. 41, No. 1, Winter 1997, pp. 7-14.

- A review of the U.S. foreign policy under President Clinton and a discussion on the return of geopolitics. Argues that alliance and coalition diplomacy must be the top priority for the Clinton's administration.

Sokolsky, Joel J. "The Clinton Administration and UN Peacekeeping." Canadian Defence Quarterly, September 1996, pp. 6-13.

- Sokolsky explains the reasons why the US changed their peacekeeping policies and how the U.S. selects certain UN peacekeeping missions to others. The objectives of President Decision Directive 25 are reviewed and their impact for U.S. defense.

Soklosky, Joel J. "Ogdensburg Plus Fifty and Still Counting." Canadian-American Public Policy, No. 8, December 1991, pp. 1-45.

- Sokolsky discusses the evolution of the Canada-U.S. defence relationship in the post-war period vis à vis U.S. security policy and Canadian defence policy. Specifically examines the arrangements for air and maritime defence. Looking into the future he considers that changing strategic conditions will have little effect on both continental aerospace defence and maritime defence.

Tucker, Michael. "Canadian Security Policy." Canada Among Nations 1998, Ottawa, Ont: Carleton University Press, 1988, pp. 60-79.

- Although dates, the article still has much relevance and is excellent is explaining the challenges facing Canada's security policy. The author discusses at the dilemma of the commitment-capability gap, arctic sovereignty and NORAD. Sovereignty and security for Canada are well explained

Walker, Martin. "A new American isolationism?" International Journal, Summer 1997, pp. 391-410.

- Walker reviews the apparent sources of U.S. isolationism and is of the opinion that the real new source of internationalism for the U.S. is rooted in geo-economics rather than geopolitics. The U.S. is becoming guarantor of a global economic system.

Westing, Arthur H. "Canadian Security in a Broadened Context." Canadian Defence Quarterly, December 1996, pp. 13-22.

- Westing argues that the major hazards to Canada's national security are not military but environmental and affected by other elements of social security.

Other Sources

Conference of Defence Associations. Canadian Security: A Policy for the 21st Century. Ottawa, Ont: Conference of Defence Associations, 1993.
- A short review of the issues impacting Canada's security policy.

Cooper, Major D.A. Formulating a New Defence White Paper. New Horizons Project, Toronto, Ont: Canadian Forces Command and Staff College, 1998.
- Recommendations for the formulation of future defence papers, incorporating elements of the U.S., Australia and New-Zealand processes.

Delvoie, Louis A. "Canada and International Security Operations: The Search for Policy Rationale."
- Delvoie argues that Canada has failed to develop a new policy framework and criteria to determine why, when and where Canada should engage its armed forces in international security operations. Delvoie shows a number of examples of recent operations to make his point.

Gray, Colin S. Canada in a Dangerous World. Toronto, Ont: The Atlantic Council of Canada, 1994.
- A document which provides a coherent approach to the development of a broadly supported defence policy. Gray advocates that Canada builds fault-tolerant "balanced" forces.

Jean, Major J.R.S. L'Armée canadienne dans les conflits futurs. New Horizons Project, Toronto, Ont: Canadian Forces Command and Staff College, 1998.
- A review of the conditions that contributed to the actual shape and structure of the Canadian Army and a proposal for a reviewed force for the next century. A more specialized and lighter army is proposed.

Government of Canada. Department of National Defence Space Policy. Ottawa: National Defence Headquarters, 14 September 1998.
- The newly published DND space policy.

Internet Sources

Axworthy, LLoyd. Between globalization and multipolarity: the case for a global, humane Canadian foreign policy. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. [http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/english/foreignp/humane.html]. December 1996.
- Axworthy reviews "Canada and the World" and enunciates a revised Canadian foreign policy. Axworthy argues that the structural changes shaking the international system are generating new threats to world security demanding a new approach to traditional security policies.

Cohen, William S. Annual Report to the President and the Congress. [http://www.dtic.mil/execsec/adr98]. 1998
- The annual report on the U.S. military.

ABSTRACT

The end of the Cold War has triggered unprecedented change in the world affairs and has made for a more complex international environment. One of the most stable elements of the Cold War era was the unique and special defence relationship between Canada and the United States. Needless to say, the end of the Cold War has brought about the conditions necessary to alter this relationship. This paper examines the challenges facing the Canada-United States relationship at the dawn of a new century. The relationship is made of several linked components that are reviewed in the paper. These are: the defence of North America; the new Canadian human security policy and the "soft power" approach to diplomacy; the eroding Canadian military capabilities and; a number of bilateral co-operation arrangements such as space and the Permanent Joint Board on Defence. The paper argues that Canada is engaged in new directions in their foreign and defence policy and that these changes have the potential to significantly weaken the Canada-United States defence relationship. Nevertheless, there is optimism that the century-old invariants between the country will ensure that the relationship will continue into the next century. The paper concludes by stating that it will be largely up to Canada to decide.