



JOINT OR COMBINED DOCTRINE? THE RIGHT CHOICE FOR CANADA

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AMSC 1

Research Essay

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CSEM n° 1

Mémoire de recherche

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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE - COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES

AMSC 1 - CSEM n° 1
1998

Research Essay – Mémoire de recherche

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**Joint or Combined Doctrine?
The Right Choice for Canada**

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Advanced Military Studies Course 1 / Canadian Forces College

5 November 1998

Joint or Combined Doctrine? The Right Choice for Canada

The march to jointness was ordered and obeyed—but then that was also the case with the Charge of the Light Brigade¹

Introduction

Joint operations, joint headquarters, joint staff positions, joint doctrine, things “joint” have become the latest buzz words in the lexicons of western military forces these days. In the United States the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) has established a joint doctrine web site to spread the good word.² In the United Kingdom, the Permanent Joint Force Headquarters is now in place and responsible for planning and executing joint and combined operations.³ In Australia, a new joint Warfare Centre has been given the task of creating that country’s joint doctrine at the operational level.⁴ In Canada, a standing core of a Joint Force Headquarters has been created as an adjunct to the Land Forces 1 Division Headquarters, and National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) has produced its first volumes of Joint Doctrine. The future, it would seem, will be centred on jointness. On the other hand, what may appear as obvious at first blush may not survive a more rigorous examination. As only a few have been prepared to state: “... jointness has become a virtual religion the tenets of which may not be questioned.”⁵ This paper will contend that, despite the current rhetoric, for the Canadian Forces to effectively defend Canada’s interests, combined doctrine is more important than joint doctrine.

To establish the basis of this contention, it is important that the terms “joint” and “combined” are clearly defined. The NATO definitions of both of these terms are currently undergoing revision to simplify the concepts. These revisions will almost certainly be reflected in Canadian doctrine after NATO confirms them. For that reason, it is the definitions for Allied Joint Publication 01 that will be used in this paper:

joint: Adjective used to describe activities, operations, organisations, etc in which elements of more than one Service participate. (AJODWP 97)⁶ *See also combined.* (italics in the original)

combined: Adjective used to describe activities, operations, organisations, etc in which the forces or agencies of more than one nation participate. Also called multinational. (AJODWP 97) *See also joint.* (italics in the original)

An essential element of these definitions is that NATO refers the reader of each term to the other. It follows then that an understanding of both terms is necessary to understand either, and that the two terms are inextricably linked together.

A third term that requires definition early in this paper, because it will be often used, is “doctrine.” Since this term is not currently undergoing revision within NATO, the Canadian and NATO definitions are identical:

doctrine: Fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application.⁷

Historical Perspectives

Joint operations are far from new. The Canada of today is, in part, a direct result of Wolfe's joint campaign against Montcalm.⁸ More modern examples of joint operations can be found in the Pacific campaign of World War II with Jimmy Doolittle's raid on Japan,⁹ and in the Mediterranean where Army pilots spotted for Naval gunfire.¹⁰ The cross channel assault on the Normandy beaches was one of the most important joint operations of that war. While these examples serve to demonstrate that joint operations are not unknown, they also serve to highlight that historically, joint operations have been most noticeable by their absence. This contrasts sharply with the current furore over "things joint" and thus warrants close examination.

Prior to the current clarion cry for jointness, the Services each developed their respective versions of doctrine, or those "fundamental principles" by which they would achieve their objectives. These doctrines were shaped by the tools available, be they ships, smooth bore cannon or bi-winged aircraft. The needs and wishes of the government that paid for those tools also shaped the doctrines. As one author expressed it: "[m]ilitary doctrine is embedded in the ethos, traditions, heritage and national roles of the various armies of the world. Because of this, common doctrine is not achievable in the short term."¹¹ The larger world powers used their navies as instruments to project power on the seas and their armies on the land. If and when the need for littoral operations arose, the affected army and navy commanders would discuss the tactics to be used, make such joint arrangements as they deemed necessary, and then execute the

attack. As Allard notes: “[t]he traditional doctrine was, of course, mutual cooperation, which in theory meant little more than the traditional separation of functions at the water’s edge and the invocation of good fellowship and common sense in practice.”¹² This approach was tolerated for years, primarily because adopting an alternative, such as appointing a single individual from one Service to command elements of both Services, was an anathema to the Service being subordinated. Allard again astutely notes that “[t]his was the principle of ‘unity of command,’ a concept so threatening to traditional Service autonomy in the operational sphere that it acquired an almost pejorative meaning ...”¹³

While western militaries were struggling among themselves to find methods that would promote effective joint operations, the Soviets found a solution. Soviet reorganisations in the early 1900s included the post of Commander-in-Chief. He was provided with a unified headquarters, or *Stavka*, to coordinate military operations of army and navy units in a theatre of operations.¹⁴ By World War II: “[t]he major successes of the Soviet Armed Forces were due in good measure to the system of command and control for ground, air and naval forces which had been worked out in theory prior to the war and modified by the hard tests of praxis during the struggle. *Stavka*’s strict centralized control of strategic-operational planning and reserves and the utilization of *Stavka* representatives to coordinate deep operations, employing several fronts, their air armies, and a fleet and/or flotilla(s) where appropriate provided a command system adapted to the scale of warfare on the Eastern Front.”¹⁵ In the post war years, Soviet authors studying WW II: “remain critical of the Allies’ failure to create a unified operational command structure, which would institutionalize cooperation among the ground, air and naval forces... The failure of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan to develop the mechanisms to control theatre

war and provide effective cooperation among the branches of their armed forces is considered an Achilles' heel of their military art which contributed to their final defeat".¹⁶

Canadian military forces fought both World Wars as integral parts of large combined armies, naval operations and air groups. The lack of a serious threat to the North American landmass meant that there was no necessity for a strong, joint, national defence operational level doctrine. Consequently, Canadian foreign policy has concentrated on defusing situations in other countries before their effects could bring the battle to North America. This in turn resulted in a post World War II policy of participating in alliances such as NATO and NORAD, coupled with a strong presence in United Nations peacekeeping efforts.¹⁷ It has been this lack of a serious domestic threat, and the policy of defence through alliance, that has shaped Canadian doctrine to date. Canada's NORAD commitments were a reflection of the US Air Force's view of how to defend the North American continent against air attack. Similarly, Canada's naval defence of North America was tied to the US Navy's viewpoint of how to defend the continent against ships and submarines. Canadian forward strategy was focussed in Europe where its land and air forces integrated into combined armies and air forces with its NATO allies, while its ships practised the defence of the North Atlantic as part of a NATO fleet. As the NATO allies viewed doctrine, so did Canada.

In the years following WW II the nature of warfare changed, and the old single Service doctrines stopped winning wars. The rescue attempt of 53 American hostages in Iran in 1979 ended with eight dead U.S. servicemen, the loss of aircraft and classified information, and no freed hostages. Four years later, attacks on the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, operations in Lebanon and the bombing of the Marine Barracks in that country resulted in over 400 U.S. civilian and military casualties. These two less than successful military adventures caused the U. S. Congress

to decide that there were serious deficiencies in the U.S. armed forces and that some reform was necessary.¹⁸ The assault on the island of Grenada, also in 1983, while an outward success, upon study revealed that there were significant problems in coordinating the efforts of the services to a single end.

The Grenada invasion, Operation URGENT FURY, revealed the extent of the problems of inter-service command, control and coordination among the U.S. forces. United States Marines flying Cobra helicopters had severe problems supporting U.S. Army units because Marine and Army units did not share the lists of frequencies used by the Forward Air Controllers. Even when, by chance, radio contact was made, the fact that the U.S. Marine and U.S Army maps were so different that they did not share a common reference system prevented Marine Air from adequately supporting Army units. In at least one case, a Marine Cobra helicopter crew had to rely on signals given by an army unit on the ground using a hand mirror to find the target.¹⁹ The legendary tale of that conflict reputed that an army unit: “pinned down by enemy fire and unable to communicate with supporting ships and aircraft from the other services, had used the island’s telephone system and one soldier’s AT&T credit card to place a long-distance call to Fort Bragg in order to send a message.”²⁰

The after-action reports of the Beirut bombing and the Grenada Invasion “pointed to systematic failures throughout the chain of command, professional military incompetence, and an inability to communicate operationally and tactically among the services.”²¹ These events led the U.S. Congress to commission a staff study on the U.S. armed services that resulted in a report entitled *Defense Organization: The Need for Change*, known informally as the Locher Report after its chairman, James R. Locher. This was followed by a *Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management* informally known as the Packard Commission (after its chairman, David

Packard.) The combination of the two resulting reports was the impetus for the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act (GNA) of 1986.²²

The GNA is recognised as the: “most important single defense enactment since the National Security Act of 1947 created a permanent post-war military establishment.”²³ This legislation created a framework whereby more power would be centralised in the hands of the Commanders in Chiefs (CINCs) of the Unified and Specified Commands as joint commanders. Through this legislation, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) was also given additional powers. In an unusual twist, the GNA included a legal requirement for officers to serve in joint positions as a prerequisite to promotion to general or flag rank. The legislation stopped short of creating a single Chief of the Defence Staff, as exists in Canada, and continued to keep the services separately administered.

The reasons for not creating a unified and integrated command structure may be attributed to both the concerns of the Congress, and the continued refusal by the services to willingly accept any major reform. For its part, Congress: “feared that too much centralization of authority might inhibit the discretionary authority of Congress over defense matters.”²⁴ At the same time, any suggestion to reorganize the services was “soundly condemned by military insiders and even called “unpatriotic” by some of the Service chiefs who had an obvious vested interest in maintaining and promoting their own parochial interests.”²⁵ Whether it was this resistance to change or some other cause, the GNA generally followed the recommendations of the Packard Commission rather than those of the somewhat more revolutionary Locker Report. Despite the protests, the legislation still provided enough authority to the Chairman of the JCS that he could seize control of the joint writing board and produce joint doctrine for the Services.

As a consequence, the United States is producing volumes of Joint Doctrine. Of particular interest is the assertion in an article posted on the Joint Doctrine Website that “... **joint doctrine is to provide the basis for doctrinal agreements with our allies.**”²⁶ (bold text in original.) In other words, the United States intends to use its *joint* doctrine as the basis for *combined* doctrine with its allies.

Joint Doctrine and Canada

In Canada, the road to joint doctrine has taken a very different path. The government of Canada chose in 1964 to amend the National Defence Act (NDA) to eliminate the three separate Service Chiefs of Staff, replacing them with a single Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) who held executive authority over the three services. In 1965, additional amendments changed the field structure of the military forces in Canada. As noted in the Canadian Forces Operations manual; “[t]he command and base organizations were streamlined to reduce overhead and charged with carrying out the defence roles within the resources available and within the context of an integrated, functionally organized, highly mobile force, rather than a force organized in accordance with the traditions of the navy, army and air force.”²⁷ Although the amendments retained The Royal Canadian Navy, The Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force, this process became known as “integration” and by 1967 was described as: “... the process by which the three Services are brought together under single control and management with common logistics, supply and training systems, operating within a functional command and organizational structure but retaining the legal identities of the three Services and the legal barriers between them.”²⁸

Further revisions followed in 1968. The Canadian Forces Reorganization Act abolished the three separate services, replacing them with a single entity known as the Canadian Forces. It was in this act that the term “unification,” as separate from “integration,” completed the government’s intentions to create a single unified defence force. The processes of integration and unification were refined over the following years, with minor changes. The most significant was a further restructuring of National Defence Headquarters in 1972 that integrated the staffs of the Deputy Minister and the CDS. These actions amalgamated the former Service procurement, pay, terms of service, and other systems into a single ‘joint’ system managed by a ‘purple’ staff in National Defence Headquarters. Of interest were the decisions to revert to naval ranks, followed some years later by a return to distinctive environmental uniforms. These two decisions indicated that to some extent, unification may have gone too far, leaving the Canadian Forces out of touch with its allies.

Most recently, in response to the 1994 White Paper on Defence, a management command and control re-engineering team was established to develop a new command and control structure, and a new resource management process, for DND and the CF. One recommendation of that team was to retain the unified and integrated NDHQ structure. A direct result of that study was the closure of the three Command headquarters. In addition: “[t]he environmental heads, called Environmental Chiefs of Staff (ECS), would be subordinate to the CDS and would have specified strategic functions.”²⁹

In Canada, there has been a recent tendency to jump on the “joint” bandwagon, interpreting “joint” in a manner much different from the way in which it is used by other nations. This may be the result of the fact that current serving officers have become accustomed to living and operating within an integrated and unified force. Thus, to become more “joint”, would

require even more integration of the CF, not just at the NDHQ level as highlighted by the management command and control team, but down through the operational level to the tactical units. The most often cited example that a truly “joint” CF could follow is the United States Marine Corps. For example, in his paper “Jointness: The Need for the Canadian Forces to Go Farther,” Major Wynnyk, noted the intentions 1994 Defence White Paper to provide forces for multilateral operations. From this, he deduced that the “international commitment described within the *1994 Defence White Paper* is similar to the United States Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) concept.”³⁰ While conceding that the size of the CF, and its national and international commitments make a standing MAGTF structure insufficiently flexible for Canadian needs, his preference for a Marine Corps-like “unified chain of command which assigns no pre-eminence to either component”³¹ is clear. Taking Major Wynnyk’s view one small step further, the MAGTF can be used as the model for comparing joint operations, and hence the underpinning joint doctrine, to the 1994 White Paper on Defence, in order to determine if the U.S. Marine version of joint doctrine would serve the Canadian Forces.

The latest version of the Canadian Forces Operations manual highlights that most international operations will be joint and combined in nature. The manual goes on to state that when the Canadian Task Force Commander is functioning as an operational commander, then the entire task force will normally be assigned OPCON to the Commander Combined Joint Task Force. Alternatively, if the Canadian Task Force Commander is not functioning as an operational commander, then the Canadian Task Force elements will normally be assigned OPCON to the Commander Combined Joint Task Force. In this latter case, the Task Force Commander will be the Canadian National Commander and his Joint Task Force Headquarters will serve as a National Command Element.³² In this way the manual identifies that the elements

of a Canadian Task Force may be employed either in a joint or combined manner, but giving preference to neither, not unlike the U.S. Marine joint doctrine.

1994 White Paper on Defence

In order to assess the relevance of a Marine Corps-like Canadian Forces to Canada's defence requirements, it is necessary to review both the mission of the United States Marine Corps (USMC) and the tasks assigned to the Canadian Forces. The USMC identifies its primary role as: "to provide Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms, including integrated aviation and logistical components, for service as part of a naval expeditionary force" and that as such, the Marine Corps "will remain a unique and essential component in support of joint operations."³³ Using that mission statement, then, to describe the USMC role, it is useful to examine the tasks assigned to the Canadian Forces to determine if a task would be better performed by a Canadian Forces that resembled a MAGTF, or one designed to operate as part of a combined force.

For the defence of North America, the White Paper committed the CF to a number of tasks. These included: maintaining the ability to operate effectively at sea, on land, and in the air with the military forces of the United States in defending the northern half of the Western hemisphere; cooperating in the surveillance and control of North American airspace; cooperating in the collection, processing and dissemination of missile warning information within North America; and cooperating in the examination of ballistic missile defence options focused on research and building on Canada's existing capabilities in communications and surveillance;³⁴

While it could be useful in limited circumstances to have a Marine Corps-like CF, the U.S. Marines do not have a significant continental defence role in the air, as this is the purview in the United States of the USAF. Canada's participation in NORAD, with the Canadian

NORAD Region Headquarters co-located with 1 Canadian Air Division, is largely responsible for this task, which would have limited need for a naval expeditionary force. In fact, through the NORAD arrangements and participation in various exercises in Canada and the United States, Canadian air elements are well integrated with USAF doctrine, especially as it applies to air defence. In short, these elements of Canada's defence priorities are best served by a Canadian Forces that is designed to act as part of a combined force under NORAD, especially since the White Paper specifically recognizes that NORAD will assume "operational control over forces made available for air defence."³⁵ At sea, the White Paper notes that: "[t]he maritime dimension of Canada-US cooperation in the defence of North America involves the surveillance and control of vast ocean area on both coasts and the Arctic. This mission is carried out in close partnership with the United States Navy and Coast Guard...."³⁶ The White Paper also notes that cooperation on land is focused on training, enabling the United States and Canadian land forces to have access to each others training facilities, and allow bilateral training initiatives.³⁷

The 1994 White Paper also tasked the CF to be prepared to assist Foreign Affairs and International Trade with the evacuation of Canadian citizens from a hostile area. This task could, under some circumstances, benefit from a joint force as tightly integrated and unified as the USMC. If Canada was operating alone in this operation, then a USMC-like force would be very useful. Alternatively, if Canada was acting in concert with her allies, working to evacuate citizens collectively, then it might prove best to have a Canadian force better prepared to operate in a combined fashion. This is primarily neither a joint nor combined oriented task for planning, but in execution could be either.

To respond to international commitments in the military dimension of international security affairs, the White Paper asserted that Canada would maintain a multi-purpose, combat-

capable force that could participate in multilateral operations anywhere in the world under UN auspices, or in the defence of a NATO member state. In addition, as single units or in combination, one or more of the following elements could be called upon: a naval task group, comprised of up to four combatants (destroyers, frigates or submarines) and a support ship, with appropriate maritime air support; three separate battle groups or a brigade group (comprised of three infantry battalions, an armoured regiment and an artillery regiment, with appropriate combat support and combat service support); a wing of fighter aircraft, with appropriate support; and one squadron of tactical transport aircraft. The White Paper makes it clear that these and all Canadian Forces elements must be able to ‘fight alongside the best against the best.’³⁸

These are the force projection elements of the 1994 Defence White Paper. While both the Canadian Forces Operations manual and the White Paper make it clear that the CF is to be capable of offering the component pieces as joint forces, it is difficult to imagine many cases where this would actually occur. Consider, for example, a joint force comprised of the naval task group and the battle group/brigade group components. While they might provide some mutual support, a Canadian naval task group would have very limited ability to land the army element in anything less than a benign administrative move. Granted, the destroyers could provide a limited amount of gunfire support, and the AOR could provide a kind of floating warehouse as well as a means of sealift. In addition, the anti-aircraft capabilities of the updated Tribal destroyers might also assist an army working close to shore. The army element of such a joint task force could assist in making a port area safe, allowing the naval element a secure port for replenishing the vessels. In general, however, there are few viable force packages that the Canadian elements of a joint navy/army task force could provide. Quite simply, the Canadian fleet of ships is not designed for forced entry landings from the sea. For this, the right tool is a

MAGTF. Training the naval and army elements of the Canadian Forces to act in a joint manner would not make up for the lack of assault landing ships and craft, amphibious and air cushion vehicles, etc. that are part of a MAGTF. Adding Canadian air elements does not improve the situation. The CF lacks the aircraft carriers to take the CF-18 to the battle space, and lacks the medium helicopter lift that makes the MAGTF so potent. In short, the problem is not jointness, it is equipment, and all the joint training in the world will not replace that equipment in this kind of operation.

A joint army/air force task force of the battle group/brigade group with a wing of fighters and a squadron of transport would fare much the same. While the CF-18 could provide Close Air Support or Battlefield Air Interdiction to the army element, such a task force would lack the tank killing power of the A-10 Warthog, and the flexibility of the attack helicopter and AV-8B Harrier. The transport squadron could serve as inter- and intra-theatre support, but it also lacks the flexibility of medium and heavy helicopters. Facing an enemy with any kind of integrated air defence would result in an unacceptably high attrition rate for the aircraft. To survive against an integrated air defence threat, the air element requires specific aircraft capable of suppression of enemy air defences. An army battle group could do a commendable job of securing the rear area base from which the aircraft would fly, but the firepower of a brigade group might be better applied further forward. Again, adding a naval task group to this equation might be useful in some very particular circumstances, but under most circumstances, the lack of specialized equipment would remain a serious problem.

It is true that integral to a Canadian naval task force is an air force helicopter element, and that the naval task force is also routinely supported by fixed wing, maritime air assets. By definition, it is a joint task force in Canada, since all aircraft, their crews and squadron support

personnel are part of 1 Canadian Air Division (1 CAD). Similarly, the helicopter element of a Brigade Group is supplied by 1 CAD, making a Brigade Group with organic air also a joint force. The effect of integration and unification on the CF becomes obvious. In most (but not all) other navies, the maritime air element is integral element of that navy. Similarly, in most other armies, the helicopter element of a Brigade Group is an integral element of that army, and not provided by another service. Such examples demonstrate that, in Canada, jointness already exists to a large degree.

The 1994 White Paper also directs the Canadian Forces to maintain the following specific peacetime commitments to NATO: one ship to serve with the Standing Naval Force Atlantic; aircrews and other personnel to serve in the NATO Airborne Early Warning system; approximately 200 personnel to serve in various NATO headquarters; and to provide the opportunity for Allied forces to conduct training in Canada, on a cost-recovery basis.³⁹

Providing one ship to the Standing Naval Force Atlantic and crews to NATO AEW are clearly combined, not joint tasks. The requirement to provide personnel to various NATO headquarters is not clearly identifiable as either a joint or combined task. While some of these headquarters have a distinctly single Service orientation, most NATO headquarters do reflect a joint flavour. Given, however, that the nations that contribute forces to those headquarters have not achieved a level of unification as complete as the USMC, the joint flavour of the headquarters still reflects Service values.

The 1994 Defence White Paper tasks the CF to provide cost recoverable opportunities for allied training in Canada. To date this has taken the form of the British Army Training Unit Suffield (BATUS), the German Army Training Establishment Shilo (GATES), allied air force training in Goose Bay, and the latest attempts to provide a training program for allied pilots.

While from time to time there are flashes of joint activity in these areas, they remain primarily Service oriented.

The nature of the tasks and missions of the Canadian Forces described above reflect a predominately, though not entirely, combined flavour. Such a simple analysis, however, ignores two major issues. First, recent history has shown that the Canadian Forces may be employed in support of regional emergencies in Canada. The second issue is that as Canada's allies embrace a new era of jointness, Canada must not be left behind.

Domestic Operations

The 1994 White Paper identifies a variety of domestic tasks for the Canadian Forces, including aid to the civil power. A review of two after-action reports for recent domestic operations highlights that there is cause for concern in this area. Operation VOISEY BAY was a joint operation in support of the RCMP during a period of civil unrest in Voisey Bay, Newfoundland, in early 1995. The after-action report reveals that Land Forces Atlantic Area, which was tasked to create a Joint Task Force Headquarters for this operation, was at odds with Air Command over command and control arrangements for the helicopter assets attached to the Joint Force. In the after-action report for the operation, Land Forces Atlantic Area contended that because a 5 Wing Goose Bay Search and Rescue helicopter was attached under operational control to the Joint Force, an Air Command decision to withdraw that helicopter from the Joint Force left the Joint Force Commander without a needed asset. The recommendation of the Commander Land Forces Atlantic Area was to assign air assets under operational command of the Joint Force Commander. In its rebuttal, Air Command noted that: it was not on the distribution list of the after-action report and had to obtain a copy from the RCMP in order to

comment; that the helicopter was withdrawn as a consequence of the need for Search and Rescue assets, of which that helicopter was the last asset in the area to be assigned; and that the reassignment only occurred after consultation with all of the affected parties revealed that there was no immediate forecasted requirement for that helicopter for the Voisey Bay operation. Air Command contended, for its part, that the command and control relationship worked exactly as it should.⁴⁰

The after-action report of Op ASSISTANCE, the Manitoba flooding crisis of 1997, also reveals areas of contention in domestic joint operations. The findings in this report included that the Maritime Component of the Joint Force used latitude and longitude as a coordinate system while the army used map grid references and that “the utility of the Navy hand held GPS kits was severely limited because of this....” The report also noted that “each element had different communications equipment and frequency requirements. The Navy used VHF FM, the army HF, while maritime air used VHF FM and the TAC HEL VHF AM.”⁴¹ These observations are very similar to problems experienced by United States Forces in Grenada, 14 years earlier.

The Op ASSISTANCE after-action report revealed that the army commander, who was assigned the role of the Joint Force Commander, also took issue with the command and control of the component elements. In the after-action report, two views of the command and control relationship were revealed. The Chief of Staff of the Air Component noted that the component method of command and control was the preferred option in the future claiming that: “[c]entralized control of air assets and the air component air tasking process provided excellent service to the land forces.” The next item in this same report is the contention by the G3 of 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group that the component method lead to: “an unnecessarily complex HQ and tasking structure” and that “the most workable model for a JTFHQ is likely to

be the direct method....”⁴² These conflicting views point out that, for domestic operations, the CF needs more jointness, especially in the issues of command and control doctrine, communications equipment and referencing systems.

Given that more jointness is required in domestic operations, it would seem to deny this paper’s contention that the Canadian Forces should concentrate primarily on combined rather than joint doctrine. This, however, is not the case. In fact, as Canada’s allies, especially the United States, work to achieve the degree of joint operations that they require, it is essential that Canada tailor its joint doctrine to ensure that it is compatible with its allies. The communications problems identified during Op ASSISTANCE should not be resolved with a completely “designed and made in Canada” doctrinal solution. It is essential that CF elements be able to communicate not just with other CF elements, but also with their allies when part of a combined force. Therefore, the communications issue must reflect the solution of either Canada’s most likely coalition partner, the United States, or at the very least it must conform to a NATO standard for communications. Any attempt to resolve the issues from a purely Canadian jointness perspective would result in Canadian elements able to communicate with each other effectively on domestic operations, but potentially unable to communicate with coalition partners during an international crises. Similarly the issue of map reference systems must be resolved in a manner compatible with Canada’s allies, to provide a smooth integration into a multinational force.

In addressing the doctrinal issues, and particularly command and control issues, such as whether the direct or component method should be preferred, it would be useful to review the positions expressed by the United States services. The primary advocate of joint doctrine in the United States is the U.S. Army. That service: “sees jointness as a way to ensure that the other

Services remain responsive to Army needs.”⁴³ The U.S. Navy, by contrast, traditionally feared all doctrine in the belief that: “... a binding set of principles might restrict the initiative and independence of the captain at sea--the very foundation of naval combat arms.”⁴⁴ The United States Air Force holds to the tenets that: “strategic aerial bombing can severely cripple an enemy’s homeland, interdict strategic lines of communication, severely damage or destroy an enemy at the front, and generally serve as an effective coercive tool”⁴⁵ and vigorously resists any attempts to reshape that doctrine. For its part, the United States Marine Corps doctrine focuses on bringing: “infantry, artillery, armor, engineers, mechanized units, and aviation together into a balanced, integrated combat effective team...[merged] with Navy amphibious and strike forces...”⁴⁶ In the United States, these different Service doctrines are being reconciled through the series of joint publications. In these publications can be found the decision of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to many of the contentious issues. For instance, the question as to whether, in the United States, the direct or component method of commanding joint operations should be used is resolved in the statement: “the JFC will normally designate a JFACC [Joint Force Air Component Commander.]”⁴⁷ As frustrating as it may be, the Canadian Forces cannot make changes on the major joint doctrine issues at a pace much faster than, or radically different from, Canada’s allies. The assertion by the United States that its joint doctrine will be the basis of combined doctrine with its allies situates the issue for the Canadian Forces.

Summary and Conclusions

The inter-Service rivalries of Canada’s alliance partners through the years have determined the extent to which Canada has embraced joint doctrine. This has been because of Canada’s decision to rely on those alliances for its defence and the resulting integration of the

Canadian Forces into the structures of Canada's two primary defence alliances, NATO and NORAD. Based on the agreed roles within those two alliances, Canada subsequently equipped its forces and trained its personnel to integrate into those alliance structures, primarily as combined forces, and according to the Service doctrines of those allies.

The significant difference between the Canadian Forces and its allies, especially the United States, is the legislative basis of the respective militaries. While, for instance, the United States has separate Service structures, without a uniformed officer commanding all services, in Canada there is only a single unified service, commanded by the Chief of the Defence Staff. Thus while the United States has been undergoing a series of legislative changes to coerce the separate services to become more joint, Canada has already achieved a degree of jointness that the United States has yet to reach. In Canada then, it is important to recognize that the current rush to joint doctrine by the allies is designed to overcome the problems that legislated separate Services in the United States have been perceived to have created. In some ways, allied efforts to promote joint doctrine are designed to match the capabilities of the Canadian Forces integrated and unified system.

Thus, joint doctrine to the United States often deals with the creation of a single Air Component Commander to integrate the activities of that nation's Navy, Marine, Army, Special Forces and Air Force elements into a single, efficient, and effective entity. Similarly, the Land Component Commander would integrate the United States Army element with a United States Marine Corps element. As these integration and unification issues are accommodated, the United States will continue to redefine its joint which it will then use as the basis for creating joint and combined doctrine with its allies, as the U.S. Marine "Joint Doctrine Story" article made clear.

The lesson for Canadian military officers is that joint doctrine initiatives in the United States and other allied countries may be designed to resolve Service issues that are not necessarily problems in Canada. The fact that the Canadian Forces are legally an integrated and unified force has the potential to resolve many of the issues that other militaries are attacking through their joint doctrine. Rather than mimicking these other nations, the Canadian Forces must identify those issues that restrict joint operations in domestic situations and seek to find solutions that will be employed in multinational combined operations.

Above all else, however, the 1994 White Paper assertion that the Canadian Forces will fight 'alongside the best, against the best' demands a combined doctrine, a set of 'fundamental principles' that the Canadian Forces and its allies use to collectively guide their actions to achieve their objectives.

ENDNOTES

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- ¹ Attributed only to a “questioning pundit” in Colonel John E. Greenwood, USMC(Ret), “Editorial: The Evolution of Jointness,” Marine Corps Gazette Vol. 81, November, 1997: 2.
- ² The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Doctrine Web Site can be found at internet URL <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/>.
- ³ Great Britain, Ministry of Defence, British Defence Doctrine Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 0-01 5.10.
- ⁴ Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr. and Thomas-Durell Young, Strategic Plans, Joint Doctrine and Antipodean Insights (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 1995) 17.
- ⁵ Col Mackubin T. Owens, USMCR(Ret), “The Use and Abuse of ‘Jointness’,” Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 81, November 1997: 50.
- ⁶ AJP-01, the (AJODWP 97) indicates that these definitions are not approved within NATO yet but that the Allied Joint Operations Doctrine Working Party submitted them for approval to the Military Agency for Standardization. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Joint Operations Doctrine AJP-01 Change 1, (NATO: Military Agency for Standardization, September 1997) Glossary.
- ⁷ Canada, Department of National Defence, Canadian Forces Operations, B-GG-005-004/AF-000, (Change 0, 1996) GL-E-5.
- ⁸ It was necessity, not just his orders from the British War Minister Pitt, that forced Wolfe to fully embrace a joint campaign in Canada. While Wolfe mustered some 12,000, Montcalm at Quebec had an estimated 15,000. Outnumbered and fighting against a fortified town, Wolfe needed every force multiplier he could find. Fortunately for Wolfe, Vice-Admiral Saunders, his naval counterpart, was prepared to offer the full cooperation of his fleet. That small fleet not only carried Wolfe’s troops from their mounting and assembly bases to the theatre of operations, it also vigorously supported the attack with naval bombardment before the landing phase. It was Saunders’ sailors who manned the boats in the amphibious assault at Anse au Foulon, below the Plains of Abraham, bringing the army to the battle. It was also the navy that was responsible for the deception plan, marking shoals to the east of Quebec as if marking a course for boats to attack at that point. It was, in short, a true joint operation. A full description of the battle and the event surrounding it can be found in: Oliver Warner, With Wolfe to Quebec (Toronto and London: William Collins Sons & Co. Ltd, 1972)
- ⁹ Lieutenant-Colonel James Doolittle trained U.S. Army Air Force crews piloting B25 Mitchel Bombers to take-off in the distances that would be available on an aircraft carrier. On 18 April 1942, Doolittle himself, with 16 B25 bombers and crews, launched from the deck of the aircraft carrier Hornet to attack the islands of Japan, including the capital, Tokyo. See: Christopher Chant ed., “The Doolittle Raid,” The Marshall Cavendish Illustrated Encyclopedia of World War II Vol. 8, 1972.
- ¹⁰ In the Mediterranean theatre during WW II, US Navy pilots flying Curtis SOCs and Kingfishers found themselves outgunned by German fighter aircraft. In order to support the amphibious landings at Salerno in Italy, U.S. Army Air Force P-51 Mustang pilots were trained to spot naval gunfire in support of the landings. For a more complete history, see: Albert R. Buchanan, The Navy’s Air War, (United States, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Harper and brothers, 1946.)
- ¹¹ Steve Bowman, “Historical and Cultural Influences on Coalition Operations,” Problems and Solutions in Future Coalition Operations, ed. Thomas J. Marshall with Phillip Kaiser and Jon Kessmiere, (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 1997) 17.
- ¹² C. Kenneth Allard, Command, Control and The Common Defense, (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1990) 95.

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- ¹³ Allard 95.
- ¹⁴ I. I. Rostunov, Russkii front pervoi mirovoi voiny (Moscow: Nauka, 1976) 113-115, as cited in Dr. Jacob W. Kipp, The Navy and Combined Operations: A Century of Continuity and Change, 1853-1945 (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Combined Arms Centre, originally written for: A conference on Soviet Naval Development sponsored by Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia in May, 1987) 21.
- ¹⁵ V. I. Achkasov and N. B. Pavlovich, Sovetskoe voennomorskoe iskusstvo v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1973) 399, as cited in Kipp 76
- ¹⁶ Ol'shtynsky, Vzaimodeistvie armii i flota, 311, as cited in Kipp 80.
- ¹⁷ see Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada in the World (internet URL: <http://www.dfaic-maeci.gc.ca/english/foreign/cnd-world/menu.htm>) for a review of Canadian alliance relationships and their effect on national policy.
- ¹⁸ Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., Unification of the United States Armed Forces: Implementing the 1986 Department of Defense Reorganization Act (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 1996) 6-8.
- ¹⁹ Ronald H. Spector, U.S. Marines in Grenada 1983 (Washington: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1987) 10.
- ²⁰ U.S. Congress, Defense Organization: The Need for Change, by James R. Locher III, page 365, as cited in Allard 1.
- ²¹ Christopher Allan Yuknis, "The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986 An Interim Assessment," Essays on Strategy Volume X, ed. Mary A. Sommerville, (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1993) 80-81.
- ²² For a brief history on the Locher Report and Packard Commission, their effect on both the Executive Branch and Congress and the resulting Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act, see: Lovelace 9-14.
- ²³ Allard 3.
- ²⁴ Lovelace 14.
- ²⁵ Colonel John Osgood, Retired, The Goldwater-Nichols Act – Managing the Defense Department, (internet URL <http://pw2.netcom.com/~jrosgood/w16.htm> 10 May 98) 1.
- ²⁶ -----, Joint Doctrine Story, (United States Marine Corps internet site, URL http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/docinfo/doctrine_story.htm, undated) 3
- ²⁷ Canada, Department of National Defence, Canadian Forces Operations, (DND Canada, 1997) i.
- ²⁸ Canadian Forces Operations i.
- ²⁹ Canadian Forces Operations ii.
- ³⁰ Major Paul F. Wynnyk, Jointness: The Need for the Canadian Forces to Go Farther, (internet URL: <http://www.cfcsc.dnd.ca/irc/amsc/wynnyk2.html>, 1997) 9.
- ³¹ Colonel Mark F. Cancian in "Is the MAGTF Still Relevant?" Marine Corps Gazette, Vol 80, No. 2 (February 1996), p33, as cited by Wynnyk 9.
- ³² Canadian Forces Operations 1-8.

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- ³³ United States Marine Corps, “Enduring Marine Corps Capabilities, Chapter 1,” in Concepts and Issues, (through internet URL: <http://www.usmc.mil/info.nsf/info>, 1997)
- ³⁴ These tasks are a summary of some of the tasks presented in the 1994 Defence White Paper, condensed in the government’s synopsis document White Paper 94 Highlights and reorganized in this essay. It is unfortunately beyond the scope of this essay to provide a detailed analysis of each task that might have either a joint or combined flavour. This list of tasks and the lists that follow are an attempt to capture those tasks that relate to the issue of whether the CF needs to focus its attention on joint or combined doctrine.
- ³⁵ Canada, Department of National Defence, 1994 White Paper on Defence (Ottawa, Canada Communication Group Publishing, 1994) 23.
- ³⁶ 1994 Defence White Paper 22.
- ³⁷ 1994 Defence White Paper 22.
- ³⁸ 1994 Defence White Paper 14.
- ³⁹ Canada, White Paper 94 Highlights, (internet URL: http://www.dnd.ca/dinfo/dgpa/white_paper_94/highlights.html)
- ⁴⁰ National Defence, The Army Lessons Learned Centre, Lessons Learned and AAR OP Voisey Bay, (Information Warehouse (LLIW/DDLR) CD ROM Version 5.0, November 1997)
- ⁴¹ National Defence, The Army Lessons Learned Centre, Lessons Learned Op ASSISTANCE Annex A Detailed Report, (Information Warehouse (LLIW/DDLR) CD ROM Version 5.0, November 1997)
- ⁴² Major-General N.B. Jeffries, letter to various CF elements, July 1997, in National Defence, The Army Lessons Learned Centre, Lessons Learned Op ASSISANCE Post Operation Report, (Information Warehouse (LLIW/DDLR) CD ROM Version 5.0, November 1997)
- ⁴³ Owens 52.
- ⁴⁴ Rebecca Grant, “Closing the Doctrine Gap,” Air Force Magazine January 1997: 49.
- ⁴⁵ Dr. Don M. Snider, “The US Military in Transition to Jointness,” Airpower Journal Fall 1996: 18.
- ⁴⁶ Greenwood 2.
- ⁴⁷ United States of America, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations, available through URL <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/>, February 1995) II-15.

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