THE CANADIAN PEACEKEEPING IDENTITY – MYTH OR REALITY

Maj Ian Summerfield

Example:

JCSP 44
Exercise Solo Flight

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Maj Ian Summerfield

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Introduction

Following the Second World War, the United Nations (UN) was created to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.”¹ The UN quickly established itself as the world’s main body for the furtherance of peace with the first peacekeeping mission established in 1948,² and the UN Security Council (UNSC) has since authorized over 60 additional missions.³ In Canada, peacekeeping has become a source of national pride. However, while Canadians take great pride in the nation’s peacekeeping accomplishments, the common understanding of what peacekeeping is has largely been based on myths and misunderstanding. Canadians’ search for a national identity has led to an overemphasis on peacekeeping rhetoric, which has not always aligned with the facts of what the Canadian military was engaged in on their “peacekeeping” missions.⁴ This misunderstanding was especially evident in the Canadian military deployments to the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, where activities ranged from peacekeeping to peace enforcement.

Although peacekeeping is noble and often required, Canada solely as a peacekeeping nation seems to be at odds with history, where Canada has been eager to contribute troops to fight in wars. This paper will discuss how Canada is a nation that does engage in peacekeeping,

³ Ibid.
but it is also a peace enforcement nation that will use force when required to protect its values and interests. It will begin by outlining how peacekeeping fits within the concept of peace support efforts, followed by a discussion of Canada’s history of peacekeeping and how peacekeeping became enshrined in the national psyche of Canadians. Lastly, this paper will explore Canada’s involvement in the former Yugoslavia to analyse how the Canadian peacekeeping identity diverges from reality.

Before delving into the discussion of what constitutes peacekeeping, it is important to outline the scope of this paper. Peacekeeping is a vast and, for many, a controversial subject, which requires addressing prior to moving forward. Although this paper will outline some historical examples in discussing how Canadians began to perceive their nation as a peacekeeping nation, the intent is not to provide a full history of Canadian peacekeeping contributions. In addition, this paper will avoid the debate as to whether Canada should be involved in peacekeeping or more broadly, UN missions. Although it is acknowledged that there have been challenges in the past with UN missions, this paper will purposely avoid stepping into the argument. Finally, this paper will not address the usefulness of the UN in conducting peacekeeping operations. It will challenge the common definition of peacekeeping understood by Canadians, but it will not engage it the argument as to whether the UN is an effective organization for running peacekeeping operations. This paper will instead focus on Canadians’ perception of peacekeeping as their national identity and how they are misusing terminology.

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5 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) refers to these activities as peace support efforts whereas the UN uses the term peace and security activities. This paper will use the NATO terminology; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Peace Support, Edition A, Version 1 – AJP-3.4.1 (Brussels: Nato Standardization Office, December 2014), 1-2; United Nations, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations – Principles and Guidelines (New York: UN, 2008), 17.
Although peace support efforts involve more than just military forces, the focus of this paper is only on military aspects of the missions.

**Peacekeeping**

Prior to discussing Canada’s role in the furtherance of peace, it is important to establish what peacekeeping is and where it fits within the spectrum of efforts. Although the UN Charter does not directly mention peacekeeping, it has “has evolved into one of the main tools used by the United Nations to achieve [peace and security].”6 This section will briefly outline the spectrum of peace support efforts.

Within the UN Charter, Chapters VI and VII cover the deployment of military forces for the purpose of maintaining peace and security. Chapter VI centres on the “pacific settlements of disputes” through the use of “negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, [and] judicial settlement.”7 Chapter VI focuses on the peaceful resolution of conflict with all parties consenting. In contrast, Chapter VII deals with “threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.”8 Chapter VII is meant to compel a nation to comply with the norms of international peace and security. Chapter VII involves economic sanctions, “the severance of diplomatic relations,” and the use of force “to maintain or restore international peace and security.”9

Although the term peacekeeping is often used for UN missions, the term is one of several options within the spectrum of peace support efforts. These efforts can be seen as occurring prior

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8 Ibid., 9.
9 Ibid., 9.
to a conflict, during a conflict, and post conflict or after a ceasefire has been signed.\textsuperscript{10} The following outlines the spectrum of peace support efforts recognized by the UN and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Prior to a conflict, the main effort is conflict prevention, which “involves the application of structural or diplomatic measures to keep intra-state or inter-state tensions and disputes from escalating into violent conflict.”\textsuperscript{11} The Center for International Peace Operations also refers to this effort as “mediation or facilitation at the political level” to reduce the chance of conflict occurring.\textsuperscript{12}

Following the commencement of a conflict, there are two efforts that are used to assist in ending the conflict to maintain international peace and security. The first is a diplomatic effort known as peacemaking, which “involves diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement.”\textsuperscript{13} The second is peace enforcement, which “involves the application…of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force…to restore international peace and security in situations where…[there is] a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression.”\textsuperscript{14} In addition to military force, other coercive measures including sanctions are often used.\textsuperscript{15} Because peace enforcement is conducted without the consent of one or more of the parties of the conflict, it requires UNSC authority under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., 19.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 18.
\textsuperscript{15} ENTRI, \textit{Handbook In Control: A Practical Guide for Civilian Experts...}
\textsuperscript{16} North Atlantic Treaty Organization, \textit{Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Peace...}, 1-4.
Post conflict, peacekeeping is used “to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers.”\textsuperscript{17} As peacekeeping is designed to “to prevent the recurrence of conflict,” relies on the consent of the major parties of a conflict, and follows a ceasefire; it is often conducted under Chapter VI of the UN Charter.\textsuperscript{18} Although many see peacekeeping as a military activity, it is a combination of military, police, and civilian elements “working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace.”\textsuperscript{19} The other major effort post ceasefire is peacebuilding, which is predominantly a civilian-led activity done in conjunction with peacekeeping,\textsuperscript{20} and “addresses the underlying causes of conflict.”\textsuperscript{21}

Peace support efforts encapsulate all of these aspects and amount to the efforts of the international community to preserve order, peace and stability. They range from purely diplomatic efforts to combat operations that deal with threats to international peace and security. The remainder of this paper will demonstrate how, despite Canadians’ use of peacekeeping terminology, which has contributed to a national peacekeeping identity, its military efforts have been across the spectrum of peace support efforts rather than simply the subcomponent of peacekeeping.

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\textsuperscript{17} United Nations, \textit{United Nations Peacekeeping Operations...}, 18.
\textsuperscript{20} ENTRi, \textit{Handbook In Control: A Practical Guide for Civilian Experts...}
\textsuperscript{21} North Atlantic Treaty Organization, \textit{Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Peace...}, 1-7.
\end{flushright}
Canada and Peacekeeping

Canadians’ attachment to peacekeeping did not simply occur but has built up over decades and entrenched into Canadian psyche through education, public institutions, and government rhetoric and communications. This section will outline how Canadians began to think of themselves as a peacekeeping nation and provide some context from past missions.

Peacekeeping as a concept began in 1948 with the establishment of the first UN military observation mission in Palestine.22 Since this first mission in 1948, there have been over 60 additional UN peacekeeping missions,23 with 15 operations currently ongoing in 2018.24 While Canada has participated in UN peacekeeping missions since 1948, the recognized start of Canadian peacekeeping in many people’s minds was during the Suez Crisis. With Lester Pearson winning the Nobel Peace Prize for the suggestion of creating an international police force to deal with the crisis, the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) was established and Canada committed troops to the force.25 Despite the prior existence of peacekeeping, many Canadians believe peacekeeping to be a Canadian invention because of Pearson’s work,26 contributing to the notion that Canada is a peacekeeping nation. Following the Suez Canal, the next large-scale Canadian peacekeeping deployment was to Cyprus in the 1960s.27 The Cyprus mission was especially significant as the belligerents, Greece and Turkey, were both members of NATO. Similar to

22 Sean Maloney, Canada and UN Peacekeeping..., 21.
23 United Nations, “Peacekeeping Missions....
26 Sean Maloney, Canada and UN Peacekeeping..., 8.
27 Ibid., 104-127.
Suez, the Cyprus mission saw peacekeepers placed between two belligerent forces, while the remaining peacekeeping missions in the Cold War were more focused on observation missions.\(^{28}\)

Following the Cold War, established norms were disrupted and built-up tensions led to numerous conflicts. This rise in conflicts resulted in an increase of new peace support missions, and thus Canada’s participation also increased substantially.\(^{29}\) Canada’s commitment to peace support efforts, including peacekeeping, was spread across the world. From the Former Yugoslavia in Europe, to Somalia and Rwanda in Africa, to Cambodia and East Timor in Southeast Asia, Canada’s commitments reached across the entire globe.\(^{30}\) During the 1990s, Canada was one of the top troop contributing nations in peace support efforts with a peak of 3,300 troops deployed on peacekeeping operations in July 1993.\(^{31}\) As UN missions surged in the 21\(^{st}\) century, Canada’s commitment did not increase as it did following the Cold War. Afghanistan took much of the Canadian military effort and the Canadian contribution was reduced to individual deployments, shrinking to an all-time low of 41 military personnel in March 2018.\(^{32}\) Peacekeeping operations have not been without a cost, as Canada has lost a total of 114 people on peacekeeping operations.\(^{33}\)

Although Canada’s history of involvement indicates a commitment to peacekeeping, it alone does not explain where the peacekeeping identity came from. Canada has a long history of

\(^{28}\) Ibid., 9-10.
\(^{30}\) Joseph Jockel, Canada and International Peacekeeping (Washington: Center for Strategic & International Studies Washigton, 2006), 69-77
involvement in non-peacekeeping activities, such as the First and Second World Wars, Korea, NATO deterrence against the Soviet Union, and the Gulf War—therefore it must be more than history that created the national peacekeeping identity. In fact, during the Cold War, Canadian participation in peacekeeping was dwarfed by the money and resources dedicated to deterring the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{34} In addition, most of Canada’s peacekeeping activities during the Cold War were short-term operations with limited commitment from Canada.\textsuperscript{35} It has also been argued that Canada’s commitment to peacekeeping in the Cold War was designed on its commitment to NATO and North American Aerospace Defence (NORAD) in an effort to deny the Soviets influence.\textsuperscript{36} These arguments indicate that it was not simply participation in peacekeeping that created Canada’s identity. In order to identify the link between history and the peacekeeping identity, one must look at the political and media rhetoric used in Canada about peacekeeping.

\section*{Development of the Peacekeeping Identity}

To understand how the Canadian peacekeeping identity was established, it is important to understand how the history of peacekeeping has been presented to Canadians. Colin McCullough, in his book \textit{Creating Canada’s Peacekeeping Past}, outlines how political rhetoric and the media presented peacekeeping and how it built the Canadian peacekeeping identity.

While the political opinions surrounding the Canadian response to the Suez Crisis and peacekeeping were initially split, eventually the “rhetoric of peacekeeping presented Canada as a

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\item \textsuperscript{34} Sean Maloney, \textit{Canada and UN Peacekeeping...}, 10.
\item \textsuperscript{35} Ibid., 9.
\item \textsuperscript{36} Ibid., 9, 246.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
nation of ‘Blue Berets’.” As Canada’s peacekeeping in the Suez Crisis put them on the opposite side of British opinion, there was substantial disagreement in Canadian politics at the time. Peacekeeping became part of a larger debate between Liberals and Conservatives about Canada’s full independence from the British Empire. After the initial debate about historic ties to Britain and Canada’s independence, the Conservatives came around, eventually praising the work done by the Canadians at the Suez Canal. After this initial debate over peacekeeping, and some slightly different views under Pierre Trudeau and Jean Chrétien, there was little disagreement over Canada’s participation in peacekeeping by either Liberals or Conservatives. Politicians routinely painted a rosy picture of peace support efforts, emphasising humanitarian aspects rather than telling Canadians the whole story, which emphasised Canada as a peacekeeping nation. This relative consistency in Canadian political rhetoric helped to lead to broad public acceptance of peacekeeping.

Although political rhetoric may have set the tone, it alone did not produce a peacekeeping identity. As the media puts a spin on politics, the message Canadians received from the media played a substantial role in creating the identity. Much like the political rhetoric, initial coverage of peacekeeping was two-sided. The coverage displayed Canada’s role in the Suez Canal as either good for Canada’s national identity as it moved away from the British Empire, or it portrayed Canada as turning its back on Britain. Eventually the media coverage, much like the political rhetoric, stabilised into “a combined nostalgic, functional, and progressive discussion of peacekeeping to express [a] particular conception of Canada [which] … encouraged Canadians

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38 Ibid., 27-29.
39 Ibid., 34-52.
to see themselves as suited for all peacekeeping endeavours."\textsuperscript{41} In addition, editorial choices to increase ratings worked to ensure that Canadians could relate to international stories. This led to many international stories about conflicts being portrayed through Canadian peacekeepers instead of focusing on the conflicts themselves.\textsuperscript{42} McCullough argues that after the initial debate in the press about peacekeeping, the Canadian media settled on a discourse that saw peacekeeping as a way of distinguishing Canada’s national identity. As such, the media “contributed to an overly rosy view of Canada’s potential as a world peacekeeper …, [which] helped solidify the bonds between Canadian[s] and Canadian peacekeepers."\textsuperscript{43}

The political rhetoric and media coverage was backed with a consistent and positive coverage of peacekeeping in school curriculum.\textsuperscript{44} This strong, consistent message across various platforms, combined with Canadians’ willingness to grasp onto an identity not associated with the British, enshrined peacekeeping within the Canadian identity.

**Case Study – Former Yugoslavia**

With the source of Canada’s peacekeeping identity established, the remainder of this paper will demonstrate, by analysing the Canadian participation in the Former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, that the Canadian peacekeeping identity is misguided.

Yugoslavia was formed in 1918 as a result of the fall of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires. The country existed for most of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, first as a kingdom,
followed by a Soviet-style government (yet not fully within the Soviet orbit). With the collapse of the centralized communist authority during the 1980s, nationalist movements developed in each of the separate republics. In 1991, this nationalistic sentiment led to the beginning of the breakup of Yugoslavia, first led by declarations of independence from Slovenia and Croatia, followed by Macedonia and Bosnia. Yugoslavia finally completely ceased to exist when Montenegro declared independence in 2006, resulting in the establishment of Serbia and Montenegro as independent states. The former Serbian region of Kosovo declared independence from Serbia in 2008, but this remains disputed by many in the international community.

Although the secession of Slovenia resulted in little violence, the situation in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo was very different. This section will examine Canada’s military involvement in all three locations.

Canada’s involvement during the breakup of the former Yugoslavia presents a unique case study to examine the Canadian peacekeeping identity. The Canadian military was involved in peacekeeping and peace enforcement, providing a good opportunity to study how Canadians viewed and felt about different types of operations. The missions were conducted at the same time Canada was committing to UN missions throughout the world and therefore present a glimpse into the larger deployments and attitudes that occurred in the 1990s. The deployments to the Balkans also represent Canada’s largest deployments at the time and were well covered by the media, making the missions particularly useful in examining overall public perceptions.

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Croatia

In 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared independence from Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav Government deployed the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) in an attempt to maintain the integrity of its nation. The Yugoslav Government rapidly abandoned their goals in Slovenia and turned their attention to Croatia where they reinforced Serb militia groups, attempting to disrupt the Croatian independence movement and protect ethnic Serbs. The resulting war led to a stalemate by early 1992, and subsequently a ceasefire, with the Croatian government not able to gain control of the Serb areas.\(^\text{47}\)

With the ceasefire established, the UN, acting under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, established a peacekeeping force, UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), to secure UN protected areas (UNPA), to ensure fighting did not resume and to protect civilians.\(^\text{48}\) The UNPROFOR mission was established to separate the two sides in the ceasefire and ensure both sides lived up to the agreement. The mission in Croatia was a classic Pearsonian peacekeeping mission, much like was seen at the Suez Canal in the 1950s and later in Cyprus: “In April 1992, [the Canadian Battle Groups (BG)] began to man checkpoints, conducted patrols and monitored the activities of Serb and Croat military forces.”\(^\text{49}\) The mission involved Canadians as peacekeepers and the deployment of engineers to clear mines.

Support for the mission in Canada was high. The Progressive Conservatives were in government at the time of mission commencement, and the Liberals and New Democratic Party

NDP) complained that the government was not acting fast enough to establish the force. The political parties were largely in line with the public’s opinion. A Gallup poll conducted in September 1992 indicated “64 per cent of Canadians would have accepted the use of weapons by the Canadian forces to enforce peace in Yugoslavia.” This support is not surprising as it is perfectly in line with the peacekeeping identity many Canadians believe to be true.

If the mission in Croatia had continued without incident, it would be a good example for the Canadian peacekeeping identity. However, things changed when the Canadian BG was moved to UNPA Sector South. The Canadian troops, unlike many other nations, deployed with “its full compliment of war-fighting weaponry and equipment,” which made it a good fit to move to the more volatile region. “Within hours of arriving in Sector South, … [the BG] met a major Croatian offensive in the area known as the ‘Medak Pocket’.” The Croats were attempting to take advantage of political stalemates to gain terrain but the Canadian BG was deployed as a show of force to prevent the Croat advance. Acting in self-defence, the BG countered the Croat forces, resulting in 27 dead on the Croat side. The BG eventually was eventually awarded the Commander-in-Chief Unit Commendation in 2002 for their conduct in the operation.

53 Lee Windsor, “Professionalism Under Fire…, 27.
54 National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, “The Battle of Medak Pocket…
56 National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, “The Battle of Medak Pocket…
At the time of the operation, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) was dealing with the aftermath of the disastrous Somalia mission and was eager to avoid any negative press coverage. “That a Canadian [BG] was returning from a mission during which they [had] actually killed another country’s soldiers was … a political land mine.”57 This was in spite of the fact that the unit’s conduct was in line with their peacekeeping mission and did not deviate from the rules of self-defence.58 Despite the earlier public support for the use of weapons, politicians were hesitant that the reality of such a mission would be met with broad support from Canadians. This concern that Canadians would not support the actions of the Canadian peacekeepers kept the politicians and the military from revealing the exemplary actions of the unit. The government and the military’s cover-up and hesitation to reveal what occurred indicates that there is disconnect between the Canadian public perception of what peacekeeping is and its reality. What occurred in Croatia fell directly in line with the spirit of peacekeeping where the Canadian BG enforced its mission by putting itself in harms way, using minimum force in self-defence to maintain a fragile ceasefire.

Bosnia

Bosnia’s population is divided largely into three ethnic groups: Serbs, Croats and Muslims. After the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, Bosnia had to decide whether to remain in Yugoslavia and be dominated by the Serb majority or declare independence, risking a Bosnian Serb uprising.59 In light of the choices, the Bosnian Government declared independence,

which resulted in the Bosnian Serb population, afraid of being dominated by the Muslims, beginning a civil war in which they laid siege of the capital Sarajevo for almost four years. They sought to expand their territory through the ethnic cleansing of the country, building concentration camps and brutally murdering mostly Muslims, but also Croats along the way. The siege of Sarajevo attracted much of the attention of the international community, which kept the atrocities being committed elsewhere out of the media spotlight. Yugoslavia assisted the Serbs by providing them with weapons and equipment. Initially the Muslims and the Croats were both victims of the Serb aggression and were allies in the fight. This changed in 1993 when the Croats and the Muslims turned on each other. In the end there was a three-way conflict throughout the country, each ethnic group terrorizing the civilians of the ethnic other.

The UN’s initial response was to arbitrate a deal between the Bosnian Government and the Bosnian Serbs to establish a peacekeeping force, under UNPROFOR, to secure the Sarajevo Airport and bring humanitarian aid into the besieged city. The agreement was one-sided and was never intended to affect Serb operations. It “was narrowly conceived as providing protection for the airport and support for humanitarian aid deliveries, not protection for the city’s besieged population.” Away from Sarajevo, the Serbs set up concentration camps to facilitate their ethnic cleansing. When a journalist filmed the first images of the camps in 1993, the world was shocked to see emaciated people behind barbed wire, reminding them of the horrors of the

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61 Ibid., 170-193.
64 Carol Off, *The Lion The Fox and The Eagle...*, 176
65 Peter Andreas, *Blue Helmets, Black Markets...*, 35.
Nazi atrocities of the Second World War.\textsuperscript{66} This led to an expanded UNPROFOR mission to other parts of Bosnia in an effort to facilitate humanitarian aid. Although the UNSC did authorize the use of force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter,\textsuperscript{67} the UN decided “UNPROFOR troops would follow normal peacekeeping rules of engagement, which authorize them to use force in self-defence.”\textsuperscript{68} One of the results of the weak mandate was the genocide in the town of Srebrenica, despite the UN troops that were stationed there. The Serbs separated 8,000 men and boys from the population then systematically murdered them while they bussed away the women and children.\textsuperscript{69} Eventually, NATO used airstrikes in support of UNPROFOR to force an end to the violence and the mission transitioned to a UN-authorized, NATO-led force. The Implementation Force (IFOR) and later the Stabilization Force (SFOR) were authorized through Chapter VII of the UN Charter and had the required rules of engagement of a peace enforcement mission to both protect itself and to ensure compliance with the peace agreement.\textsuperscript{70}

Canada’s commitment to the operations in Bosnia began with the initial deal to open the Sarajevo Airport, where a Canadian Battalion was redeployed from Croatia and filled the first rotation of peacekeepers at the airport. The mission was not a regular peacekeeping mission as, despite the agreement between the two sides, the fighting continued and the deal was completely one sided. There was simply no peace to keep. The Canadian commander had insisted the Canadian troops bring heavy weaponry to the mission and authorized more liberal rules of

\textsuperscript{66} Carol Off, \textit{The Lion The Fox and The Eagle...}, 205.
\textsuperscript{68} United Nations, “Former Yugoslavia – UNPROFOR...”
\textsuperscript{69} Adam Jones, \textit{Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction...}, 437.
engagement to ensure the accomplishment of their mission.\textsuperscript{71} The initial deployment to Sarajevo was short lived and Canada’s contribution changed to a Battalion facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance around Sarajevo and through eastern and central Bosnia.\textsuperscript{72}

Operations in Bosnia had the support of all the political parties in the House of Commons at the time.\textsuperscript{73} That said, the governing Liberals preferred to change the mission into a more classic Pearsonian peacekeeping mission, whereas the NDP, Bloc Quebecois, and many members of the Reform Party considered the mandate to be weak and supported changing the mission into a peace enforcement operation in order to force a peace deal.\textsuperscript{74} This lack of political consensus on the issue indicates there was, in fact, no single overarching Canadian peacekeeping identity. This disconnect with a single peacekeeping identity was further reinforced when the governing Liberals eventually contributed Canadian troops to the NATO-led IFOR and SFOR peace enforcement operations. A national identity should have wide-reaching consensus, and the political disagreement at the time would indicate that despite Canada’s involvement in many peacekeeping missions, there was not political consensus on a peacekeeping identity.

Kosovo

The former Yugoslavia continued to break up, with the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo seeking independence in 1998. The Yugoslav Government attempted to avoid a breakup of their


\textsuperscript{72} National Defence and the Canadian Forces, “Details/Information for Canadian Forces (CF) Operation United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)..."

\textsuperscript{73} The Reform Party originally wanted to redeploy Canadian troops out of the Former Yugoslavia but many or their members later changed their position to supporting the mission, in line with the other parties.

\textsuperscript{74} House of Commons Debates, Debates, 35\textsuperscript{th} Parl., 1\textsuperscript{st} sess., 133 no. 007 (25 January 1994); Nicholas Gammer, \textit{From Peacekeeping to Peacemaking...}, 177-181.
nation by sending in its military to control the situation. The situation escalated as “Yugoslav
forces violently broke-up peaceful demonstrations and increasingly intimidated civilians, the
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) attacked Yugoslav forces in a guerrilla campaign.”75 The
international community demanded that the violence stop but Yugoslav forces continued their
activities, resulting in “hundreds of civilians [being] killed and over 300,000 forced out of their
homes.”76 The UNSC responded by passing resolution 1199, demanding that all parties in the
situation cease their aggression, but did not authorize the use of force to stop them.77 NATO used
this resolution as justification to launch Operation Allied Force in the spring of 1999.78 The
operation lasted 78 days and targeted Yugoslav forces and their ability to conduct operations in
Kosovo.79

NATO conducted its operations without “seek[ing] or receiv[ing] Security Council
authorization, and it was not acting in self-defense [sic],”80 which has led many to argue that the
conflict was illegal. The concept of responsibility to protect would not be enacted until after the
Kosovo campaign, and therefore there was no legal framework to rely upon to justify the NATO
mission. The only legal backing NATO had was the defeat of a draft Security Council resolution
condemning the bombings by a margin of 12 to three, which indicates the broad support within
the international community for the bombings.81 Many argued that the bombing campaign

75 National Defence and the Canadian Forces, “Details/Information for Canadian Forces (CF) Operation
ALLIED FORCE (NAEWF),” accessed 12 April 2018, http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/od-
bdo/europe/ALLIED-FORCE-NAEWF-eng.asp.
76 Ibid.
78 National Defence and the Canadian Forces, “Details/Information for Canadian Forces (CF) Operation
ALLIED FORCE (NAEWF)…”
80 David Wippman, “Kosovo and the Limits of International Law,” Fordham International Law Journal 25,
No. 1 (2001), 131.
81 Adam Roberts, “NATO’s ‘Humanitarian War’ over Kosovo,” Survival 41, no. 3 (autumn 1999), 105
caused more refugees and civilian casualties, exacerbating the issues on the ground.82 Once the bombing campaign led to the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo, NATO began a peace enforcement mission called force Kosovo Force (KFOR), sanctioned by the UNSC to restore peace.83

Canada was an active contributor to both missions, providing personnel and aircraft to participate in the bombing campaign and participating in KFOR.84 All political parties supported the participation with many in the opposition condemning the government for taking too long to act.85 Polling indicates the public shared this support. A poll taken immediately following the operation showed overwhelming support for Canada’s involvement in NATO.86

Although justified under humanitarian grounds, the Canadian involvement in Kosovo can hardly be seen as peacekeeping. Despite its shaky legal grounds, it is clearly a peace enforcement mission that was done for humanitarian reasons and to maintain peace, rather than to keep peace between opposing, but not warring, factions. The willing and enthusiastic participation of Canada in the campaign is hardly the actions of a state whose identity is solely peacekeeping.

As these three case studies reveal, Canada’s involvement in the Former Yugoslavia involved UN peacekeeping, UN sanctioned peace enforcement, and unsanctioned peace enforcement through NATO. Canadians’ support for the missions calls into question the Canadian peacekeeping identity. Ironically, the one mission that was clearly traditional

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82 David Wippman, “Kosovo and the Limits of International Law…,” 134.
84 National Defence and the Canadian Forces, “Details/Information for Canadian Forces (CF) Operation ALLIED FORCE (NAEWF)…”
peacekeeping was in Croatia and the Canadian Government withheld information from Canadians for fear they would not approve. In Bosnia, opinion was split as to whether the mission should be more in line with traditional peacekeeping or become a peace enforcement mission—regardless, Canadians broadly supported the mission. Kosovo was a peace enforcement mission from the start. Canada’s position throughout its operations in the Balkans demonstrates that there was much diversity of opinion in Canada with respect to peace efforts abroad, which leads one to question the claims that Canada’s identity is based solely peacekeeping. A more appropriate identity would be one of peace support, for, as these examples show, Canada has long been engaged in peace support missions, whether those involve traditional peacekeeping or peace enforcement. As such, these examples reveal that Canadians adherence to a peacekeeping identity is misguided; instead, Canada should hold a strong peace support identity.

Conclusion

Canada has a long history of peacekeeping, for which it should be proud. However, it also has a long history of other types of military engagements in the name of peace. Canada was an active participant in the Boer War, the First and Second World Wars, Korea, the Cold War, the Gulf War, and Afghanistan. In addition, Canada has often engaged in other peace enforcement missions, as it did in the Former Yugoslavia. The history of Canadian international military involvement throughout the world simply does not justify a national identity of peacekeeping.

Canadians’ lack of understanding of peacekeeping has led to many thinking that Canada is, simply put, a peacekeeping nation. As the Canadian engagement in the Former Yugoslavia
shows, Canada is a nation that does peacekeeping, but it is also a peace enforcement nation that will use force when required to protect its values and interests. Peacekeeping appears to fit well in the narrative of a nice Canada, even if history and reality do not support this identity. Canada has been largely absent from peacekeeping since the 1990s operations, which further represents a lack of peacekeeping identity.

Canadian’s contributions to international peace and security may not all fall under the narrow category of peacekeeping, but they do fit under the broad category of peace support. Rather than Canadians being proud of peacekeeping alone, they should more accurately embrace an identity of a nation who supports peace in general. Peace support efforts are all conducted under the noble aim of reducing suffering, maintaining peace, and establishing peace where war has broken out. As Canada supports all the activities under peace support efforts, it would represent a more logical national identity to embrace.

The purpose of this paper was not to discourage support for peacekeeping in Canada, nor does it attempt to discourage future participation in peacekeeping missions. Canada should be involved in peacekeeping operations when it is in the national interest and it has the capacity to do so. It should also not hesitate to be involved in peace enforcement operations, or act in mutual self-defence under NATO in support of its national interests and in support of its allies. There is no question that Canada could do more than it has for peacekeeping since the 1990s; however, the government must manage military deployments to meet all of Canada’s objectives, which may not include contributions to every peacekeeping mission.

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Understanding the reality of Canada as a peace support nation, this paper sets the stage for further research into how Canada’s peacekeeping identity is tied to the wider Canadian identity by looking at the struggle to define Canada as an independent nation with its own policies: first, through independence from Britain in the post Second World War years through peacekeeping at the Suez Canal, and now, to distinguish itself from the US, who is often seen as an aggressor. Exploring these links would, perhaps, further highlight how Canada’s peacekeeping identity has become so entrenched in who Canadians understand themselves, and their nation, to be.
Bibliography


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