

Canadian  
Forces  
College

Collège  
des  
Forces  
Canadiennes



## WHO'S AFRAID OF THE BIG-BAD-WOLF: AFTER THE ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA IN 2014, IS NATO STILL A CREDIBLE DETERRENT FOR A RESURGENT RUSSIA

Wg Cdr Adam Smolak

**JCSP 44**

***Exercise Solo Flight***

**Disclaimer**

Opinions expressed remain those of the author and do not represent Department of National Defence or Canadian Forces policy. This paper may not be used without written permission.

© Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2018.

**PCEMI 44**

***Exercice Solo Flight***

**Avertissement**

Les opinions exprimées n'engagent que leurs auteurs et ne reflètent aucunement des politiques du Ministère de la Défense nationale ou des Forces canadiennes. Ce papier ne peut être reproduit sans autorisation écrite.

© Sa Majesté la Reine du Chef du Canada, représentée par le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2018.

EXERCISE *SOLO FLIGHT* – EXERCICE *SOLO FLIGHT*

**WHO'S AFRAID OF THE BIG-BAD-WOLF: AFTER THE ANNEXATION  
OF CRIMEA IN 2014, IS NATO STILL A CREDIBLE DETERRENT  
FOR A RESURGENT RUSSIA**

Wg Cdr Adam Smolak

*“This paper was written by a student attending the Canadian Forces College in fulfilment of one of the requirements of the Course of Studies. The paper is a scholastic document, and thus contains facts and opinions, which the author alone considered appropriate and correct for the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of any agency, including the Government of Canada and the Canadian Department of National Defence. This paper may not be released, quoted or copied, except with the express permission of the Canadian Department of National Defence.”*

Word Count: 5470

*“La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale.”*

Compte de mots: 5470

**WHO'S AFRAID OF THE BIG-BAD-WOLF: AFTER THE ANNEXATION  
OF CRIMEA IN 2014, IS NATO STILL A CREDIBLE DETERRENT  
FOR A RESURGENT RUSSIA**

*...a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma*

- Winston Churchill

Churchill's oft quoted statement about Russia from 1939 remains as true today as it ever was. Western nations often struggle to interpret Russian foreign policy and fail to predict Russian actions, such as those seen in Ukraine. The quote however, goes on to say "... but perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest." Realist theory in International Relations would seem to extoll the virtue of this quote, focussing on the state's national interest in international discourse. However, constructivist theorists would argue that "interests are the product of identity"<sup>1</sup> and this is particularly useful when considering Russia. Only through the understanding that Russia self-identifies as a Great Power can we hope to unlock the enigma. The implications of NATO's lack of understanding and appreciation of Russian intent are self-evident. If the organization is going to provide a credible deterrence in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, it should consider Russian actions in recent conflicts, such as Ukraine and Syria, and establish how they reflect Russian policy, strategy and military doctrine.

This essay will examine the way Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 and the use of so called 'Hybrid Warfare,' considering whilst it does so, the usefulness of this term when analysing Russian actions. It will look at the ways in which Russia exercised its power over Ukraine, not only militarily, but diplomatically, economically and informationally. In each case, NATO was unable, or unwilling, to effectively respond as Russia annexed part of a country which had

---

<sup>1</sup>Ted Hopf, "The promise of constructivism in International Relations Theory," in *Approaches to International Relations Volume III* (London: Sage Publications Ltd., 2009), 221.

expressed interest in joining the Alliance. The fact that NATO neither deterred nor responded to the “illegal annexation,”<sup>2</sup> calls into question the continued relevance and credibility of the organization. Having analysed the means used by Russia to annex Crimea, the essay will go on to look at the current foreign policy actions of Russia in Europe and Western Asia and consider the efficacy of NATO as a deterrent to further Russian aggression and expansionism. The essay does not tackle the potential employment of Russian nuclear weapons. Whilst there is an acknowledgment that Russia is a major nuclear power, the manner in which these weapons may be employed is too complex to be contained herein and merits further, separate, analysis.

NATO proved to be an effective deterrent to Soviet power during the Cold War, and since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the organization, under US leadership, has grown in strength and numbers.<sup>3</sup> However, despite the superior forces available to NATO, both numerically and technologically, it did not deter Russian action in Crimea, in fact NATO expansion in the region is arguably to blame, at least partially, for what happened.<sup>4</sup> NATO must adapt if it is to deter further Russian aggression or expansion, particularly in ex-Soviet States. NATO is a military alliance and Russia has exercised more than military power in recent times. Events currently unfolding in Syria highlight the need for a strong united alliance that is able to respond to Russia without unwittingly escalating an already complex and dynamic situation. NATO was a successful deterrent force during the Cold War but this essay contends that it must adapt if it is to remain relevant and credible in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

---

<sup>2</sup>Russia stands accused of “breaking the first principle of international law – that countries may not acquire territory or change borders by force.” Gov.uk, “Four years since the illegal annexation of Crimea: article by Boris Johnson,” last modified 22 February 2018, <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/four-years-since-the-illegal-annexation-of-crimea-article-by-boris-johnson>.

<sup>3</sup>NATO has expanded since the end of the Cold War; 13 new states have joined and the organization now consists of 29-member states.

<sup>44</sup>John Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis is the west’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That provoked Putin,” *Foreign Affairs* 93 No. 5 (Sep/Oct 2014): 81.

## WHAT IS HYBRID WARFARE AND HOW DID RUSSIA USE IT IN UKRAINE?

The speed and effectiveness of the annexation of Crimea left NATO asking some serious questions about its ability to deter and, if necessary, respond to Russian military action.<sup>5</sup> The way in which Russia successfully combined military and non-military means to quickly annex Crimea with minimal use of conventional military force, has led many in the West to question whether this is a ‘new style of warfare.’<sup>6</sup> This, in turn, has led to the use of the term ‘hybrid-warfare’ to describe Russian actions. But is this really anything new? In order to determine whether or not the West is sufficiently postured to deter further Russian aggression, it is necessary to analyse Russian actions and establish whether or not they represent a new type of threat.

‘Hybrid-Warfare’ is an often-used term but its usefulness in describing recent Russian actions is questionable. Canada’s Defence Policy defines ‘Hybrid Warfare’ as follows: “Hybrid methods involve the coordinated application of diplomatic, informational, cyber, military and economic instruments to achieve strategic or operational objectives.”<sup>7</sup> This describes a state achieving its aim by not only using military means, but also by incorporating the other levers of power at its disposal. This concept is far from new and is by no means unique to Russia, in fact within Canadian Military Doctrine, it is comparable to a “Whole of Government” approach: “The Canadian Government integrated approach to crisis situations that incorporates instruments of national power: diplomacy (e.g. DFAIT), military (DND/CF), and economic (e.g. CIDA).”<sup>8</sup> Using the term Hybrid-Warfare unhelpfully conjures images of a new and sinister methodology,

---

<sup>5</sup>ForeignPolicy.com, “Where’s NATO’s Strong Response to Russia’s invasion of Crimea?” last modified 18 March 2014, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/03/18/wheres-natos-strong-response-to-russias-invasion-of-crimea/>.

<sup>6</sup>The Washington Post, “The ‘New’ Type of War that Finally has the Pentagon’s Attention,” last modified 03 July 2015, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/the-new-type-of-war-that-finally-has-the-pentagons-attention/2015/07/03/b5e3fcda-20be-11e5-84d5-eb37ee8eaa61\\_story.html?noredirect=on](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/the-new-type-of-war-that-finally-has-the-pentagons-attention/2015/07/03/b5e3fcda-20be-11e5-84d5-eb37ee8eaa61_story.html?noredirect=on).

<sup>7</sup>Department of National Defence, D2-386/2017E, *Strong secure Engaged: Canada’s Defence Policy*, (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2017): 53.

<sup>8</sup>Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-000/FP-001, *Canadian Forces Joint Publication 01: Canadian Military Doctrine*, (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2011): 6-4.

but the use of “non-military instruments in War is neither new, nor specific to Russia.”<sup>9</sup> Further, interpreting Russian action in this way is to perhaps give it greater credence than it deserves:

Interpreting Crimea as evidence of a grander master plan of Russian ‘hybrid warfare’ is reminiscent of the west’s enemy image of the Soviet Union, which viewed the Soviet leadership as a chess master that was vastly superior in terms of centralisation, organisation and coordination. As it turned out, the Soviet Union’s leadership centralisation and strategic foresight was not as strong as had been presumed.<sup>10</sup>

It is true that Russia effectively combined military and non-military means in the annexation of Crimea. However, it is necessary to consider the context pertinent to specific actions before completely dismissing Western defence as ineffectual and presenting to Vladimir Putin the accolade of ‘grand-master’.

The use of military and non-military means is nothing new, in fact, as has been pointed out in a paper written for the *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, “much of this ‘new’ warfare is old wine in new bottles.”<sup>11</sup> However, the speed and efficiency of Russian action in the annexation of Crimea was impressive and perhaps highlights the changing character of warfare. It is therefore necessary to consider the possibility that Russia is able to exercise its power in such a way that presents them with an advantage over NATO, despite the latter’s numerical and technological superiority.

---

<sup>9</sup>Bettina Renz and Hanna Smith, “Russia and Hybrid Warfare: Going beyond the label,” *Aleksanteri Papers* (2016): 22, <https://www.stratcomcoe.org/bettina-renz-and-hanna-smith-russia-and-hybrid-warfare-going-beyond-label>.

<sup>10</sup>*Ibid.*, 9.

<sup>11</sup>Oscar Jonsson and Robert Seely, “Russian Full-Spectrum Conflict: An Appraisal after Ukraine,” *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 28 (2015): 4. <https://sakpol.files.wordpress.com/2015/03/jonsson-seely-2015-russian-full-spectrum-conflict.pdf>.

NATO is a military alliance of 29 states and although there is strength in sheer volume of force available, the size of the organisation can lead to a complicated and cumbersome decision-making process, particularly within the political sphere. Juxtaposed against this is a unity of purpose within Russia which enables the successful linkage of military and non-military means from Strategic direction through to tactical action. In fact, “Russia, unlike other actors, can subordinate everything from media broadcasts and oil extortion to intelligence operations and conventional means to the same political goal.”<sup>12</sup> Therefore, we must not only consider which levers of power were used by Russia but also the way they linked to the overall grand strategic plan. By considering Russian actions in Crimea using the DIME paradigm, we can consider their effectiveness and assess whether or not NATO is correctly postured to deter further aggression and expansionism.

## **EXERCISING DIPLOMATIC POWER**

The Crimean Peninsula has been subject to political wrangling, instability, and outright war since the time of the Tsarist Russian Empire. Its geographically strategic position in the centre of the Black Sea, with a deep warm water port in Sevastopol, makes it the perfect home for the Russian Black Sea Fleet. As the only year-round, warm water, deep port Russia has access to in the region, coupled with the fact that nearly 60% of inhabitants are ethnic Russians,<sup>13</sup> it should come as no surprise that Russian foreign policy advisers have historically taken an active interest in what goes on in Crimea.

---

<sup>12</sup>Oscar Jonsson and Robert Seely, “Russian Full-Spectrum Conflict: An Appraisal after Ukraine,” *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 28:1-22 (2015): 7, <https://sakpol.files.wordpress.com/2015/03/jonsson-seely-2015-russian-full-spectrum-conflict.pdf>.

<sup>13</sup>John Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis is the west’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That provoked Putin,” *Foreign Affairs* 93 No. 5 (Sep/Oct 2014): 81.

In 2009, Jakob Tolstrup published a paper on Russian foreign policy in its ‘Near Abroad,’ a term used to describe ex-Soviet Union states with which Russia maintains a heightened level of interest. Tolstrup posits that Russian foreign policy towards these states comes down to either a policy of *managed stability*, where the maintenance of a pro-Russian status quo is the aim, or *managed instability*, where the purpose is to change the status quo to one more favourable to Russian interest.<sup>14</sup> Either policy serves to undermine the legitimate governments of the respective state. This theory helps to situate Russian action in Ukraine and Crimea.

Within Crimea, Russia used extensive political leveraging to foster an environment of instability from which it could ultimately emerge as a form of saviour. Russia did this by providing undercover support to pro-separatist groups as well as maintaining a large number of civilian and military intelligence agents in the region.<sup>15</sup> A leaked report from the U.S. embassy in Kiev in 2006 highlights the nature of subversive Russian influence at the time:

However, nearly all contended that pro-Russian forces in Crimea, acting with funding and direction from Moscow, have systematically attempted to increase communal tensions in Crimea in the two years since the Orange revolution. They have done so by cynically fanning ethnic Russian chauvinism towards Crimean Tartars and ethnic Ukrainians, through manipulation of issues like the status of the Russian language, NATO, and an alleged Tatar threat to “Slavs,” in a deliberate attempt to destabilize Crimea, weaken Ukraine, and prevent Ukraine’s movement West into institutions like NATO and the EU.<sup>16</sup>

---

<sup>14</sup>Jakob Tolstrup, “Studying a Negative Actor: Russia’s management of stability and instability in the ‘Near Abroad,’” *Democratization* 16 No. 5 (October 2009): 922, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13510340903162101>.

<sup>15</sup>Anton Bebler, “Crimea and the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict,” *Romanian Journal of European Affairs* 15 No. 1 (March 2015), 39, [http://rjea.ier.ro/sites/rjea.ier.ro/files/articole/RJEA\\_2014\\_vol15\\_no1\\_art.3.pdf](http://rjea.ier.ro/sites/rjea.ier.ro/files/articole/RJEA_2014_vol15_no1_art.3.pdf).

<sup>16</sup>Wikileaks, “Ukraine: The Russia factor in Crimea-Ukraine’s “Soft Underbelly,”” last modified 07 December 2006, [https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06KYIV4489\\_a.html](https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06KYIV4489_a.html).

Whilst Russia fostered instability in Crimea, Russian political influence was simultaneously exerted on the Ukrainian government in the run up to the events of 2014.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union there have been political tension between Russia and Ukraine relating to the status of Crimea, including basing rights for the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol and the use of military facilities in Crimea by Russian personnel.<sup>17</sup> Crimea, as has already been stated, is of great military value to Russia, so when Ukraine was promised eventual entry into NATO in 2008,<sup>18</sup> it is not surprising that Russia responded. For example, in April 2008 Putin said: “The presence of a powerful military bloc on our borders, whose members are guided by article 5 of the Washington Treaty, will be seen as a direct threat to our national security.”<sup>19</sup>

Ukraine only moved away from NATO membership after the largely pro-Western government of Yushchenko was voted out in 2010 and replaced with the more pro-Russian government of President Yanukovich. Shortly after coming to power, Yanukovich declared that Ukraine would no longer be seeking membership of NATO. Furthermore, he went on to extend the stay of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in Crimea for several decades.<sup>20</sup> It is unclear to what extent Russia exerted its influence in the run up to the 2010 election, however it has been argued that

---

<sup>17</sup>Anton Bebler, “Crimea and the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict,” *Romanian Journal of European Affairs* 15 No. 1 (March 2015), 39.

<sup>18</sup>Reuters.com, “NATO promises Ukraine, Georgia entry one day,” last accessed 16 April 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato/nato-promises-ukraine-georgia-entry-one-day-idUSL0179714620080403?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews>.

<sup>19</sup>En.Kremlin.Ru, “Press Statement and Answers to Journalists’ Questions Following a Meeting of the Russia-NATO Council,” last modified 04 April 2008, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24903>.

<sup>20</sup>Belfercenter.org, “How Russia’s Red Line in Ukraine Got Real,” last accessed 16 April 2018, <https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/how-russias-red-line-ukraine-got-real>.

Moscow exploited Ukraine's dependence on Russian oil and gas, forcing price increases and imposing sanctions, in order to pave the way for Yanukovich's eventual election.<sup>21</sup>

After the election, Russia, now content with the status quo, pursued a policy of *enforced stability* as follows:

After Victor Yanukovich was elected President of Ukraine, the subsequent penetration of high governmental offices by Russian citizens, the increased financial dependence of Ukraine on Russia and the expanded cooperation between the two military-industrialized complexes reduced the need for annexation.<sup>22</sup>

However, despite exerting this influence, Russia was unable to maintain the stability of the Yanukovich government. In 2014, after demonstrations and riots from a pro-Western section of Ukrainian society, President Yanukovich, fled the country, helped by his ally, President Putin, who said, "I will say it openly – he asked to be driven away to Russia, which we did."<sup>23</sup>

In the days that followed Yanukovich's departure, Russia was quick to denounce the interim government as "terrorists" and "extremists," with Russian Prime Minister, Dmitry Medvedev, stating that: "If you consider Kalashnikov-toting people in black masks who are roaming Kiev as the government, then it will be hard for us to work with that government."<sup>24</sup> Medvedev went on to make his feelings on the legitimacy of the new Ukrainian authorities very clear, as well as his feelings towards some Western nations:

---

<sup>21</sup>Randall E. Newnham, "Pipeline Politics: Russian Energy Sanctions and the 2010 Ukrainian elections," *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 4 (2013): 115, <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1879366513000110>.

<sup>22</sup>Anton Bebler, "Crimea and the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict," *Romanian Journal of European Affairs* 15 No. 1 (March 2015), 40.

<sup>23</sup>BBC News, "Putin: Russia helped Yanukovich to flee Ukraine," last accessed 16 April 2018, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29761799>.

<sup>24</sup>The Guardian, "Russia denounces Ukraine 'terrorists' and West over Yanukovich ousting," last accessed 16 April 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/24/russia-ukraine-west-yanukovich>.

Some of our foreign, Western partners think otherwise, considering them to be legitimate authorities. I do not know which constitution, which laws they were reading, but it seems to be an aberration . . . Something that is essentially the result of a mutiny is called legitimate.<sup>25</sup>

This political stance stoked the fires of chaos in Ukraine whilst casting doubt over the legitimacy of its interim government in the international arena. This, in turn, helped set the scene for Russia to exploit the temporary power vacuum and general confusion in Kiev, in order to carry out its plan to annex Crimea.<sup>26</sup> However, Russia never announced or admitted its plan, in fact Putin blatantly denied it at a news conference on March 14<sup>th</sup>, 2014.<sup>27</sup> Putin was able to undermine any action that could be undertaken by the West by claiming that anything Russia did was part of a “humanitarian mission to protect ethnic Russians in Crimea,”<sup>28</sup> in particular there was no military response, as he had cast sufficient doubt as to what was unfolding.

By the time Russian intentions were made clear, it was too late. A referendum for secession was held which conveyed a degree of legitimacy on the outcome. The terms of the referendum were likely dictated by Russia, as they didn’t include the possibility of Crimea remaining part of Ukraine within the existing structure. Further, no impartial institutional observers were present and all media in Crimea was under Russian control by the time the

---

<sup>25</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>26</sup>Anton Bebler, “Crimea and the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict,” *Romanian Journal of European Affairs* 15 No. 1 (March 2015), 40.

<sup>27</sup>National Public radio, “Putin says Those aren’t Russian Forces in Crimea,” last accessed 16 April 2018, <https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/03/04/285653335/putin-says-those-arent-russian-forces-in-crimea>.

<sup>28</sup>*Ibid.*

referendum took place.<sup>29</sup> Russian diplomacy negated the great power of the West through skillful manipulation of international norms. Furthermore, this coordinated political and military action from Russia was undertaken in concert with the sophisticated use of state propaganda, as Russia flexed another of its levers of power, this time in the information domain.

## **INFORMATION AS A WEAPON**

As has already been stated, many experts in the West use the term Hybrid Warfare to describe Russian actions. However, prior to 2014, the term Hybrid Warfare was only used in Russian discourse in reference to the threat from the U.S. or trends in the way the U.S. waged war.<sup>30</sup> Russian doctrine instead acknowledges the changing character of war through a number of ideas which have come together under the term “New Generation Warfare (NGW)” (voini novogo pokoleniia), sometimes referred to as “Gerasimov doctrine.”<sup>31</sup> It is important to consider the terminology when analysing Russian action in Ukraine in order to minimise the risk of imposing a Western way of thinking upon Russian operations. International Relations scholar, Dmitry Adamsky, argues that western understanding of Hybrid Warfare is based upon empirical evidence gathered from Israeli and Western combat experience in the Middle East, and that this is fundamentally different from Russian actions:

While Middle Eastern actors have been driven by the prospect of “victory by non-defeat,” the Russian NGW theory of victory, in contrast, minimizes kinetic

---

<sup>29</sup>Anton Bebler, “Crimea and the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict,” *Romanian Journal of European Affairs* 15 No. 1 (March 2015), 42.

<sup>30</sup>Dmitri Adamsky, “Cross Domain Coercion: The Current Russian Art of Strategy,” *Proliferation Papers* No. 54 (November 2015): 21, <https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/pp54adamsky.pdf>.

<sup>31</sup>*Ibid.*, 22.

fighting but seeks to defeat the adversary, emphasizing non-military forms of influence, and maximising cross-domain coercion.”<sup>32</sup>

Therefore, Russian emphasis is on defeating the enemy through a mixture of kinetic and non-kinetic, or non-military means. The ratio of non-military and military measures is four to one, highlighting the emphasis placed on the non-military.<sup>33</sup> Within these non-military means, the “informational psychological struggle”<sup>34</sup> plays a leading role in defeating the enemy.

In accordance with Russian NGW the “main battlefield in today’s warfare is perception, and the strategic calculus of the adversary is its centre of gravity.”<sup>35</sup> Therefore achieving control of the information environment is a critical element of NGW, control of domestic and international media is central to this. When Putin came to power he began to consolidate control of Russian domestic and international media, particularly the three national television networks, which are now owned either directly by the state or by state owned *Gazprom*.<sup>36</sup> The Kremlin also established *Russia Today* to “carry its message to a global audience.”<sup>37</sup> The consolidation, and inherent control, of the media increased during the war in Ukraine,<sup>38</sup> thereby ensuring that events within Crimea were reported, both domestically and internationally, exactly as the Kremlin wanted them to be.

---

<sup>32</sup><sup>32</sup>Dmitri Adamsky, “Cross Domain Coercion: The Current Russian Art of Strategy,” *Proliferation Papers* No. 54 (November 2015): 22, <https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/pp54adamsky.pdf>.

<sup>33</sup>Flemming Splidsboel Hansen, “Russian Hybrid Warfare: A Study of Disinformation,” *DIIS Report 2017* No. 6 (2017): 29, [http://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/950041/DIIS\\_RP\\_2017\\_6\\_web.pdf](http://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/950041/DIIS_RP_2017_6_web.pdf).

<sup>34</sup>Dmitri Adamsky, “From Moscow with coercion: Russian deterrence theory and strategic culture,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* Vol 41 (2018): 40, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2017.1347872?journalCode=fjss20>.

<sup>35</sup>*Ibid.*, 41.

<sup>36</sup>Scott Gehlbach, “Reflections on Putin and the Media,” *Post-Soviet Affairs* 26 No. 1, (May 2013): 80, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.2747/1060-586X.26.1.77>.

<sup>37</sup>Oscar Jonsson and Robert Seely, “Russian Full-Spectrum Conflict: An Appraisal after Ukraine,” *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 28:1-22 (2015): 13.

<sup>38</sup>*Ibid.*, 12.

In the run up to military action in Crimea, Russia mounted an information campaign, both internally and externally, to denounce and discredit the Ukrainian government. The kremlin portrayed them as “pro-fascist and anti-Russian,”<sup>39</sup> Putin himself backed this up in his speech in March 2014, when he referred to the interim government in Ukraine as “Nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes and anti-Semites,” he even went on to say that they were “ideological heirs of Bandera, Hitler’s accomplice during WW2.”<sup>40</sup> As well as undermining the Ukrainian government in Crimea, internal messaging emphasized the danger to ethnic Russians in Ukraine, thereby legitimising the requirement to take action and ensuring broad domestic support. Running in parallel to the domestic messaging campaign of the Kremlin was a disinformation campaign which served to introduce doubt and uncertainty in the international media as to what was unfolding in Crimea.

At a press conference on March 4<sup>th</sup>, 2014, Putin emphatically denied that there were Russian soldiers on Crimean soil, stating instead that they were “local self-defence units,” when asked about the similarity to Russian uniforms he said that: “There are many uniforms that are similar. You can go to a store and buy any kind of uniform.” Putin then went on to deny that there was even a possibility of Crimea becoming part of Russia.<sup>41</sup> Putin’s denial was, however, accompanied by the thinly veiled threat of force. When questioned regarding the deployment of troops to the border and the use of armed force he said:

So far there is no need for it, but the possibility remains. I would like to say here that the military exercises we recently held had nothing to do with the events in

---

<sup>39</sup>*Ibid.*, 13.

<sup>40</sup>En.kremlin.ru, “Address by President of the Russian Federation,” last modified 18 March 2014, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603>.

<sup>41</sup>En.Kremlin.Ru, “Vladimir Putin answered journalists’ questions on the situation in Ukraine,” last modified 04 March 2014, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20366>.

Ukraine. This was pre-planned, but we did not disclose these plans, naturally, because this was a snap inspection of the forces' combat readiness.<sup>42</sup>

This is an example of Russian rhetoric backed up by its other instruments of power, i.e. the very presence of troops so close to the border of Ukraine is strategic messaging in itself.

Events in Crimea also showcased the ability of Russia to operate within the emerging digital sphere of the information domain. The use of hired commentators and bloggers to promote the Kremlin's ideology on the internet was prolific. One commentator claimed, through a leaked document, that Russia used a \$19 million budget to employ 600 people; each one was to comment daily on 50 news articles, manage six Facebook accounts, and tweet 50 times a day on 10 Twitter accounts.<sup>43</sup> This underlines, once again, the Russian State's ability to promote strategic messaging through a variety of means, and sits in stark contrast to the liberal democracies of NATO members, whose free media culture will never be controlled in the same way. Russia has the means, the control and the will to act in the information domain; the same can be said for the use of economics to exert its influence.

## **THE POWER OF ECONOMICS**

Russia has no qualms about flexing its economic muscles in order to wield power and exert its influence in international relations, particularly in its near-abroad. Events in Ukraine provide a stark example of the power Russia has in this domain. This essay has already

---

<sup>42</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>43</sup>Buzzfeed News, "Documents Show how Russia's Troll Army Hit America," last modified 02 June 2014, [https://www.buzzfeed.com/maxseddon/documents-show-how-russias-troll-army-hit-america?utm\\_term=.nynw4532k#.rp5jdnBQE](https://www.buzzfeed.com/maxseddon/documents-show-how-russias-troll-army-hit-america?utm_term=.nynw4532k#.rp5jdnBQE).

discussed the propensity of Russian foreign policy to interfere in the domestic state politics of its neighbours. In Ukraine, Russia used economics to destabilize and undermine the pro-western government of Yushchenko, in order to pave the way for a government more sympathetic to Russian interests. This section will focus on how Putin attempted to retain Crimea by wielding his economic power over Ukraine, exploiting the latter's dependence on Russian energy, particularly natural gas.<sup>44</sup>

Russia's ability to use energy sanctions against Ukraine is tied to the Soviet era, when all of the Union Republics were linked to Russian oil and gas pipelines as part of a unified national economy.<sup>45</sup> When the USSR fell, it left the economies and industries of its former members highly susceptible to Russian price increases; within Ukraine, the reliance on Russian natural gas was particularly strong.<sup>46</sup> Yushchenko's pro-western policies put him at odds with the Kremlin from the beginning of his term in office and Putin was quick to point out that, "Yuschenko was welcome to seek a closer alliance with the West and turn his back on Russia, but he should understand that if he did so, Russia was under no obligation to subsidize its energy exports to Ukraine."<sup>47</sup>

In 2005, Ukraine was paying as little as \$50 per 1000 cubic meters of gas, substantially less than the market price in the West of \$230 per 1000 cubic meters.<sup>48</sup> When, after 15 years of stable prices, the Russian state-owned provider, Gazprom, demanded that Ukraine pay the

---

<sup>44</sup>Randall E. Newnham, "Pipeline Politics: Russian Energy Sanctions and the 2010 Ukrainian elections," *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 4 (2013), 115.

<sup>45</sup>*Ibid.*, 116.

<sup>46</sup>*Ibid.*, 116.

<sup>47</sup>Marshall Goldman, *Petrostate: Putin, Power and the New Russia*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 144.

<sup>48</sup>Reuters, "Timeline: Gas crises between Russia and Ukraine," dated 12 January 2009, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-ukraine-gas-timeline-sb/timeline-gas-crises-between-russia-and-ukraine-idUSTRE50A1A720090112>.

market rate, it meant a significant increase in costs, amounting to some \$3 – 5 billion a year.<sup>49</sup> Ukraine fought the increase, insisting on paying the lower rate which had been agreed during previous contracts. However, when their contract ended in 2005 and no agreement had been reached, Russia “simply cut off all gas shipments to the country.”<sup>50</sup> This sudden act shocked the world as millions of Ukrainian households went without heat, factories stopped operating and west European gas supplies were affected. The crisis was only averted when Ukraine succumbed to Russia and agreed to pay \$95 per 1000 cubic meters.<sup>51</sup> Russia turned the gas back on but didn’t drop the pressure on Yushchenko. Prices continued to rise year after year and another dispute in 2009 led Russia to once again punish Ukraine by cutting off the gas. This time it took almost three weeks before the conflict was resolved and the gas restored.<sup>52</sup>

In the end, Russia forced Ukraine to pay the same price for their gas as western Europeans, meaning that from 2005 to 2010, the price Ukraine paid for Russian gas had risen by over 500%.<sup>53</sup> The impact on the country was significant, both physically and psychologically. The economy of Ukraine was shaken, and its GDP plummeted by 15% in 2009. Yushchenko’s presidency was unable to withstand the economic battering it had been subjected to at the hands of Russia, and in the 2010 elections he was soundly defeated. Yushchenko’s replacement, Yanukovich quickly reversed the pro-western policies of his predecessor and re-aligned with Russia. He was rewarded with a sharp reduction in natural gas prices of 30% for the next 10

---

<sup>49</sup>Marshall Goldman, *Petrostate: Putin, Power and the New Russia*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 144-145.

<sup>50</sup>Randall E. Newnham, “Pipeline Politics: Russian Energy Sanctions and the 2010 Ukrainian elections,” *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 4 (2013), 118.

<sup>51</sup>Reuters, “Timeline: Gas crises between Russia and Ukraine,” dated 12 January 2009, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-ukraine-gas-timeline-sb/timeline-gas-crises-between-russia-and-ukraine-idUSTRE50A1A720090112>.

<sup>52</sup>Randall E. Newnham, “Pipeline Politics: Russian Energy Sanctions and the 2010 Ukrainian elections,” *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 4 (2013), 119.

<sup>53</sup>*Ibid.*

years,<sup>54</sup> thus proving that Russia was not averse to adopting a carrot and stick approach to wielding economic power.<sup>55</sup> Russia successfully destabilized the pro-western government of Yushchenko by exploiting Ukraine's dependence on Russian gas and crippling their economy. However, it was unable to provide sufficient economic reward to maintain a pro-Russian leadership in Ukraine. In 2014, pro-western separatists ousted Yanukovich and forced him to flee the country, therefore Russian economic power was not strong enough to sufficiently influence Ukraine, instead it was forced to employ its final lever of power. Russia would use its military to ensure that Crimea did not fall to the west, but it was not the conventional use of military that NATO was accustomed to or prepared for.

## **MILITARY POWER**

Russia utilised a number of levers of power in the time leading up to the annexation of Crimea. Diplomatic power was wielded to create instability, economic power to create domestic unrest and informational power to link all actions to a carefully controlled and coherent strategic message. However, whilst using all of these non-kinetic elements of power, there was still a large, highly capable, military force waiting in the wings. Russia's Armed Forces underpinned its actions in Crimea and, although the greater weight of effort was applied to non-kinetic means, military kinetic force was still a critical factor which enabled victory.

Russia never declared war on Ukraine, nor did it declare its intent to annex Crimea, but in February 2014, "armed individuals seized key points on the peninsula, disarmed Ukrainian

---

<sup>54</sup>*Ibid.*, 120.

<sup>55</sup>Randall Newnham, "Oil, Carrots, and Sticks: Russia's Energy Resources as a Foreign Policy Tool," *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 2 (2011): 134, <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S187936651100011X>.

military forces, and took control of territory.”<sup>56</sup> Russia used a combination of Special Operations Forces (SOF) and so called civilian ‘self-defence forces’, to practise what is known in Russia as *maskirovka*, that is, the “ancient operational art of concealment and camouflage in the conduct of conventional operations.”<sup>57</sup> The way they mounted the operation successfully deceived the population of Crimea into thinking that they were “native self-defence forces or indigenous police units”<sup>58</sup> whilst at the same time confusing the leadership in Ukraine sufficiently to delay any response. Moreover, the international community writ large were unsure as to what was unfolding because of the skillful use of deception to create plausible deniability.

On the 1 March, the office of the UN Secretary General issued a statement about the “rapidly unfolding events in Ukraine,” calling for the “restoration of calm and direct dialogue between all concerned.”<sup>59</sup> However, by this point the Russian military operation to annex Crimea had been underway for almost a full week. Russian military forces were massed on Ukraine’s eastern border under the premise of a snap inspection, which Putin ordered on February 26<sup>th</sup>.<sup>60</sup> This large-scale military exercise was used specifically as a diversion and cover for troop movements. Russian SOF seized the Crimean Parliament under the pretense of being local self-defence militia on February 27<sup>th</sup>, Russian soldiers, again without markings, surrounded a major air base the same day, and the next morning a convoy of three Mi-8 transport helicopters and

---

<sup>56</sup>Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, “Crimea and Russia’s Strategic Overhaul,” *Parameters* 44 No. 3 (Autumn 2014): 83, [http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/issues/Autumn\\_2014/11\\_BruusgaardKristin\\_Crimea%20and%20Russia%27s%20Strategic%20Overhaul.pdf](http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/issues/Autumn_2014/11_BruusgaardKristin_Crimea%20and%20Russia%27s%20Strategic%20Overhaul.pdf).

<sup>57</sup>Michael Kofman, Katya Migacheva, Brian Nichiporuk, Andrew Radin, Olesya Tkacheva and Jenny Oberholtzer, *Lesson’s from Russia’s Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine*, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2017), 23.

<sup>58</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>59</sup>United Nations Secretary General, “Statement Attributable to the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General on Ukraine,” dated 01 March 2014, <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2014-03-01/statement-attributable-spokesperson-secretary-general-ukraine>.

<sup>60</sup>Michael Kofman, Katya Migacheva, Brian Nichiporuk, Andrew Radin, Olesya Tkacheva and Jenny Oberholtzer, *Lesson’s from Russia’s Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine*, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2017), 8-9.

eight Mi-35M attack helicopters crossed into Ukraine without permission. Later, on the 28<sup>th</sup>, Russian forces seized Simferopol airport and cancelled all civilian flights.<sup>61</sup> In other words, by the time the UN were making their statement, Russia had already boxed in Ukrainian forces, seized critical government infrastructure and were in control of travel into and out of Crimea.

The annexation would not be complete until the referendum was held on March 16<sup>th</sup>, but for all intents and purposes Putin was already in charge in Crimea. Moreover, up until that point he had achieved this without the use of overt military force. Under the principles of *maskirovka*, Putin maintained plausible deniability and kept the West and NATO guessing as to what his real intent was. The speed of Russian action, combined with a degree of plausible deniability, meant that there was no meaningful reaction from the West, until the introduction of Sanctions in July 2014. This has implications for NATO, particularly if Russia has found a new way to wage war in its near-abroad which undermines the strength of NATO as a deterrent.

## IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO

NATO was formed in 1949 in response to the rising power and communist expansion of the Soviet Union; initially it consisted of 12 Western States but membership has since grown to 29.<sup>62</sup> In 1955, the Soviet Union, along with affiliated communist nations, formed the Warsaw pact as a rival alliance. This political division of the European continent was to last until the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in 1991.<sup>63</sup> NATO's original focus was on "collective defence and the protection of its members from threats emanating from the Soviet

---

<sup>61</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>62</sup>North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Member Countries," last modified 26 March 2018, [https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/topics\\_52044.htm.n](https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/topics_52044.htm.n)

<sup>63</sup>History.com, "Formation of NATO," last accessed 26 April 2018, <https://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/formation-of-nato-and-warsaw-pact>.

Union.”<sup>64</sup> With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the organization’s focus has moved towards the “rise of non-state actors” and “new security threats,” but collective defence remains at the “heart of the Alliance.”<sup>65</sup> This is important, because after the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO expanded its membership to include a number of ex-Warsaw Pact states. Russia did not expect this to happen, it has never lost interest in these states and to this day, harbours a sense of betrayal over NATO’s expansion<sup>66</sup>.

Russia, unsurprisingly, sees itself as a great power; it is geographically vast, a permanent member of the Security Council, a potent military force and a nuclear superpower. Putin has often lamented the fall of the Soviet Union, going so far as to call it the, “greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century.”<sup>67</sup> He wants to ensure that Russia maintains its rightful place in the world and, in particular, its rightful place in the European continent. When Ukraine tried to join NATO, Putin acted decisively, but what does this mean to NATO? What can NATO learn from Crimea, and is it reasonable to expect further expansionism? Could Russia’s aggressive rhetoric in its near-abroad lead to unwanted escalation?

Russia’s actions in Crimea show that it is capable of acting decisively when its perceived national interests are threatened. They also highlight a unity of command from the strategic to tactical level by incorporating both military and non-military means to achieve national effects. NATO would be hard pressed to emulate this holistic approach, as Hoffman, a professor at the US National Defense University points out: “NATO is a military alliance and the game is being

---

<sup>64</sup>North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO’s Purpose,” last modified 18 April 2018, [https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/topics\\_68144.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/topics_68144.htm).

<sup>65</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>66</sup>Mary Elise Sarotte, “A Broken Promise: What the West Really Told Moscow About NATO Expansion,” *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 2014), 90. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-08-11/broken-promise>

<sup>67</sup>BBC News, “Putin Deplores Collapse of USSR,” last updated 25 April 2005, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4480745.stm>.

played on a different field.”<sup>68</sup> However, the factors pertaining to Crimea do not readily equate to other areas:

The circumstances of the Crimean annexation presented Russia with substantial advantages, which have only partial analogues elsewhere in former Soviet Republics. These factors included the confined geography of the peninsula, its proximity to Russia, and its existence as a separate political unit within Ukraine.<sup>69</sup>

This means that Russia would not be able to fully employ the same tactics elsewhere. Whilst it is possible to surmise the effectiveness of Russian mobility, logistics and SOF and the “speed at which national decisionmaking [*sic*] results in use of force,”<sup>70</sup> Ukraine actually “tells us little about the warfighting ability of Russia’s armed forces against a conventional opponent.”<sup>71</sup> What Ukraine does show us is that Russia is capable of coordinating its state levers of power in an integrated manner in order to reach formulated goals.

NATO has stated its concerns about Russian behaviour beyond activities in Ukraine and accuses Russia of reducing the stability and predictability of the Euro-Atlantic security environment.<sup>72</sup> Russian military activity in the form of snap exercises, not unlike the one called in 2014, continues along NATO borders and has been accompanied by violations of Allied airspace.<sup>73</sup> NATO has responded by boosting its presence in the East and Southeast in, what it

---

<sup>68</sup>The Washington Post, “The ‘New’ Type of War that finally has the Pentagon’s Attention,” last modified 03 July 2015, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/the-new-type-of-war-that-finally-has-the-pentagons-attention/2015/07/03/b5e3fcda-20be-11e5-84d5-eb37ee8eaa61\\_story.html?noredirect=on](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/the-new-type-of-war-that-finally-has-the-pentagons-attention/2015/07/03/b5e3fcda-20be-11e5-84d5-eb37ee8eaa61_story.html?noredirect=on).

<sup>69</sup>Michael Kofman, Katya Migacheva, Brian Nichiporuk, Andrew Radin, Olesya Tkacheva and Jenny Oberholtzer, *Lesson’s from Russia’s Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine*, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2017),xi.

<sup>70</sup>*Ibid.*, 30.

<sup>71</sup>*Ibid.*, 31.

<sup>72</sup>North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Relations with Russia,” last updated 27 March 2018, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_50090.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50090.htm).

<sup>73</sup>*Ibid.*

describes as, “the biggest reinforcement of Alliance collective defence in a generation.”<sup>74</sup> This additional presence underpins the Alliance’s commitment to collective defence. A further source of concern for NATO is Russia’s military intervention in Syria, where Putin continues to prop up the Assad regime despite significant international pressure.

Russia has a major military presence in Syria, ostensibly to stop the *Jihadist* upsurge of Islamic State terrorists (ISIS), but also to protect its ally and project its influence in the Mediterranean. The West is also fighting in Syria to rid the world of ISIS but is openly opposed to the Assad regime. Russia questions Western motives for intervention, fearing the “spectre of a Libya-style US-led NATO intervention in Syria.”<sup>75</sup> The potential for error leading to escalation in Syria carries with it a huge risk. Russia has already reached out to allies in Beijing in anticipation of an “escalating great power struggle”<sup>76</sup> and in May 2015, Russian and Chinese (PRC) Navies conducted their first ever joint naval exercise in the Eastern Mediterranean.<sup>77</sup> The risk of escalation came to the fore again recently, when allegations of chemical weapons use by Assad’s forces resulted in a bombing strike by UK, US and French forces. The NATO Secretary General supported the actions taken against the Syrian regime<sup>78</sup> whilst Russia maintained that the attacks were “staged.”<sup>79</sup> This political stand-off between Russia and NATO is reminiscent of the Cold War, and whilst there is no evidence that we are entering another Cold War, they should not be downplayed.

---

<sup>74</sup>North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Boosting NATO’s Presence in the East and Southeast,” dated 02 March 2018, [https://www.nato.int/cps/fr/natohq/topics\\_136388.htm?selectedLocale=en](https://www.nato.int/cps/fr/natohq/topics_136388.htm?selectedLocale=en).

<sup>75</sup>Yossef Bodansky, “Russia, Syria and the West: Finally at the Crossroads?” *Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy* No 9, (2015): 5, <https://www.questia.com/magazine/1P3-3834219731/russia-syria-and-the-west-finally-at-the-crossroads>.

<sup>76</sup>*Ibid.*, 11.

<sup>77</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>78</sup>North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Statement by the NATO Secretary General on the actions against the Syrian regime’s chemical weapons facilities and capabilities,” last modified 14 April 2018, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news\\_153661.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_153661.htm).

<sup>79</sup>BBC News, “Syria ‘Chemical Attack’: Shooting delays OPCW visit to site,” last modified 18 April 2018, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-43792120>.

Russia is a potent force in the world, and its influence in the European continent is significant. Putin has shown that he will act to protect Russian interests and will use military force when required. NATO, on the other hand, has shown no such willingness to act. The Alliance must find a way to show its collective strength as a cohesive alliance if it is to deter further Russian aggression. It must be alive to Russian actions across the full spectrum of state employed power and recognise its own weakness in the application of non-military means if it is to compensate in other ways. NATO can still be an effective deterrent but it must evolve to meet the challenges presented by Russia in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

## CONCLUSION

This essay has questioned the ability of NATO to deter Russian aggression and expansion, concluding that the alliance must adapt in order to meet the changing character of war in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Russia has proven adept at combining its levers of power, both military and non-military, and coordinating them to meet strategic goals. To date, NATO has not mounted an effective response.

The methodology employed by Russia in Ukraine is often referred to as 'Hybrid-Warfare,' however this is a Western term. A more appropriate term comes from within Russia's own vernacular. New Generation Warfare, or *voini novogo pokoleniia*, focusses on defeating the enemy using a combination of kinetic and non-kinetic means. The emphasis is on the non-kinetic, utilising diplomatic, economic and informational means. This was demonstrated to devastating effect by the swift and efficient operation to annex Crimea in 2014. Russia applied diplomatic pressure to destabilize the Crimean Peninsula, whilst simultaneously exerting its influence in the Ukrainian Parliament. Russian attempts to use economics as a weapon by

controlling the gas supply to Ukraine were less successful. The economic and psychological effects of switching the supply off were significant but not enough to retain a pro-Russian government in Ukraine. In the information environment, Russia proved to be adept at utilizing both traditional media and the emerging digital sphere of social media. A closely controlled and coordinated information campaign was successful in undermining the Ukrainian government in Crimea and ensuring domestic support for action, whilst at the same time manipulating the international media to mask Russia's true intentions. These actions culminated in the use of military force, which NATO was either unable or unwilling to respond to.

Despite the emphasis on non-kinetic means, Russia has shown that it is willing to use its military to achieve its goals. Russian actions are backed by the underlying threat of a large, capable, conventional force, with the threat of nuclear weapons ever-present. Russian military action in Syria is a stark reminder of the complex nature of conflict in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, where the risk of error leading to escalation is significant and should not be underestimated. NATO, under U.S leadership, stands as the only real deterrent to further Russian aggression and despite its limitations, it is still a formidable military force. However, the organization must undergo a considerable amount of self-critical analysis in order to ensure that it remains effective in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. NATO's ability to respond to non-military acts of aggression and the speed at which it can respond once military force has been used, are two particular areas which merit further research.

A unipolar world led by the United States, in which NATO stands unopposed, is as unlikely now as it was at the height of the Soviet Union's power. The Cold War may be over but Russia is still an aggressive world power which may yet present a threat to international security

and stability, a threat which has changed over time and will continue to do so. The Alliance must also evolve if it is to remain relevant and effective.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### Books

- Marshall Goldman, Marshall. *Petrostate: Putin, Power and the New Russia*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- Hopf, Ted. "The promise of constructivism in International Relations Theory." In *Approaches to International Relations Volume III*: 218-243. London: Sage Publications Ltd., 2009.
- Kofman, Michael, Katya Migacheva, Brian Nichiporuk, Andrew Radin, Olesya Tkacheva and Jenny Oberholtzer. *Lesson's from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2017

### Journals

- Adamsky, Dmitri. "Cross Domain Coercion: The Current Russian Art of Strategy." *Proliferation Papers* No. 54 (November 2015): 1-44.  
<https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/pp54adamsky.pdf>.
- Adamsky, Dmitri. "From Moscow with coercion: Russian deterrence theory and strategic culture." *Journal of Strategic Studies* Vol 41 (2018): 33-60.  
<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2017.1347872?journalCode=fjs20>.
- Bebler, Anton. "Crimea and the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict." *Romanian Journal of European Affairs* 15 No. 1 (March 2015): 35-54.  
[http://rjea.ier.ro/sites/rjea.ier.ro/files/articole/RJEA\\_2014\\_vol15\\_no1\\_art.3.pdf](http://rjea.ier.ro/sites/rjea.ier.ro/files/articole/RJEA_2014_vol15_no1_art.3.pdf).
- Bodansky, Yossef. "Russia, Syria and the West: Finally at the Crossroads?" *Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy* No 9 (2015): 5. <https://www.questia.com/magazine/1P3-3834219731/russia-syria-and-the-west-finally-at-the-crossroads>.
- Bruusgaard, Kristin Ven. "Crimea and Russia's Strategic Overhaul." *Parameters* 44 No. 3 (Autumn 2014):81-90.  
[http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/issues/Autumn\\_2014/11\\_BruusgaardKristin\\_Crimea%20and%20Russia%27s%20Strategic%20Overhaul.pdf](http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/issues/Autumn_2014/11_BruusgaardKristin_Crimea%20and%20Russia%27s%20Strategic%20Overhaul.pdf).
- Gehlbach, Scott. "Reflections on Putin and the Media." *Post-Soviet Affairs* 26 No. 1, (May 2013): 77-87. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.2747/1060-586X.26.1.77>.
- Hansen, Flemming Splidsboel. "Russian Hybrid Warfare: A Study of Disinformation." *DIIS Report 2017* No. 6 (2017). [http://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/950041/DIIS\\_RP\\_2017\\_6\\_web.pdf](http://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/950041/DIIS_RP_2017_6_web.pdf)

- Jonsson, Oscar and Robert Seely. "Russian Full-Spectrum Conflict: An Appraisal after Ukraine." *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 28 (2015): 1-22.  
<https://sakpol.files.wordpress.com/2015/03/jonsson-seely-2015-russian-full-spectrum-conflict.pdf>.
- Mearsheimer, John. "Why the Ukraine Crisis is the west's Fault: The Liberal Delusions That provoked Putin." *Foreign Affairs* 93 No. 5 (Sep/Oct 2014): 77-89.
- Newnham, Randall. "Oil, Carrots, and Sticks: Russia's Energy Resources as a Foreign Policy Tool." *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 2 (2011): 134-143.  
<https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S187936651100011X>.
- Newnham, Randall E. "Pipeline Politics: Russian Energy Sanctions and the 2010 Ukrainian elections." *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 4 (2013): 115-122.  
<https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1879366513000110>.
- Renz, Bettina and Hanna Smith. "Russia and Hybrid Warfare: Going beyond the label." *Aleksanteri Papers* (2016). <https://www.stratcomcoe.org/bettina-renz-and-hanna-smith-russia-and-hybrid-warfare-going-beyond-label>.
- Sarotte, Mary Elise. "A Broken Promise: What the West Really Told Moscow About NATO Expansion." *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 2014): 90-97.  
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-08-11/broken-promise>
- Tolstrup, Jakob. "Studying a Negative Actor: Russia's management of stability and instability in the 'Near Abroad'." *Democratization* 16 No. 5 (October 2009): 922-944.  
<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13510340903162101>.

### **Electronic Sources**

- BBC News. "Putin Deplores Collapse of USSR." Last updated 25 April 2005.  
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4480745.stm>.
- BBC News. "Putin: Russia helped Yanukovich to flee Ukraine." Last accessed 16 April 2018.  
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29761799>.
- BBC News. "Syria 'Chemical Attack': Shooting delays OPCW visit to site." Last modified 18 April 2018. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-43792120>.
- Belfercenter.org. "How Russia's Red Line in Ukraine Got Real." Last accessed 16 April 2018.  
<https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/how-russias-red-line-ukraine-got-real>.
- Buzzfeed News. "Documents Show how Russia's Troll Army Hit America." Last modified 02 June 2014. [https://www.buzzfeed.com/maxseddon/documents-show-how-russias-troll-army-hit-america?utm\\_term=.nynw4532k#.rp5jdnBQE](https://www.buzzfeed.com/maxseddon/documents-show-how-russias-troll-army-hit-america?utm_term=.nynw4532k#.rp5jdnBQE).

En.kremlin.ru. "Address by President of the Russian Federation." Last modified 18 March 2014. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603>.

En.Kremlin.Ru. "Press Statement and Answers to Journalists' Questions Following a Meeting of the Russia-NATO Council." Last modified 04 April 2008. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24903>.

En.Kremlin.Ru. "Vladimir Putin answered journalists' questions on the situation in Ukraine." Last modified 04 March 2014. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20366>.

ForeignPolicy.com, "Where's NATO's Strong Response to Russia's invasion of Crimea?" Last modified 18 March 2014. <http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/03/18/wheres-natos-strong-response-to-russias-invasion-of-crimea/>

Gov.uk. "Four years since the illegal annexation of Crimea: article by Boris Johnson." Last modified 22 February 2018. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/four-years-since-the-illegal-annexation-of-crimea-article-by-boris-johnson>.

History.com. "Formation of NATO." Last accessed 26 April 2018. <https://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/formation-of-nato-and-warsaw-pact>.

National Public radio. "Putin says Those aren't Russian Forces in Crimea." Last accessed 16 April 2018. <https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/03/04/285653335/putin-says-those-arent-russian-forces-in-crimea>.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "Boosting NATO's Presence in the East and Southeast." Last modified 02 March 2018. [https://www.nato.int/cps/fr/natohq/topics\\_136388.htm?selectedLocale=en](https://www.nato.int/cps/fr/natohq/topics_136388.htm?selectedLocale=en).

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "Member Countries." Last modified 26 March 2018. [https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/topics\\_52044.htm.n](https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/topics_52044.htm.n).

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "NATO's Purpose." Last modified 18 April 2018. [https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/topics\\_68144.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/topics_68144.htm).

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "Relations with Russia." Last modified 27 March 2018. [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_50090.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50090.htm).

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "Statement by the NATO Secretary General on the actions against the Syrian regime's chemical weapons facilities and capabilities." Last modified 14 April 2018. [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news\\_153661.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_153661.htm).

Reuters.com. "Timeline: Gas crises between Russia and Ukraine." Last modified 12 January 2009. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-ukraine-gas-timeline-sb/timeline-gas-crisis-between-russia-and-ukraine-idUSTRE50A1A720090112>.

Reuters.com. "NATO promises Ukraine, Georgia entry one day." Last accessed 16 April 2018. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato/nato-promises-ukraine-georgia-entry-one-day-idUSL0179714620080403?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews>.

The Guardian. "Russia denounces Ukraine 'terrorists' and West over Yanukovich ousting." Last accessed 16 April 2018. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/24/russia-ukraine-west-yanukovich>.

The Washington Post, "The 'New' Type of War that Finally has the Pentagon's Attention." Last modified 03 July 2015. [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/the-new-type-of-war-that-finally-has-the-pentagons-attention/2015/07/03/b5e3fda-20be-11e5-84d5-eb37ee8eaa61\\_story.html?noredirect=on](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/the-new-type-of-war-that-finally-has-the-pentagons-attention/2015/07/03/b5e3fda-20be-11e5-84d5-eb37ee8eaa61_story.html?noredirect=on).

Wikileaks. "Ukraine: The Russia factor in Crimea-Ukraine's "Soft Underbelly"." Last modified 07 December 2006. [https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06KYIV4489\\_a.html](https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06KYIV4489_a.html).

### **Government Publications**

Canada. Department of National Defence. D2-386/2017E, *Strong secure Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy*. Ottawa: DND Canada, 2017.

Canada. Department of National Defence. B-GJ-005-000/FP-001, *Canadian Forces Joint Publication 01: Canadian Military Doctrine*. Ottawa: DND Canada, 2011.