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NO « COUNTER – HYBRID STRATEGY » REQUIRED ?

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JCSP 44

Exercise Solo Flight

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No “counter – hybrid strategy” required?

Though branded as the next evolution of warfare, the term "hybrid warfare" does not refer to anything new. The term blurs civilizational and political boundaries between political and military actions.¹ With that the associated loss of discrimination is dangerous. It is precisely the distinction and demarcation of law, politics and war which unites the Western nations as a part of the shared value concept and guarantees a peaceful coexistence.² This is exactly where the methods of "hybrid warfare" come in, aiming to sustainably weaken or even destroy this ability to discriminate. However, the term "hybrid warfare" includes both elements of warfare: traditional warfare with military equipment and direct violence, as well as the aforementioned “hybrid methods”, or like the Russian father of the idea of hybrid warfare General Gerassimow said, "non-linear methods".³ This confers a remarkable complexity on hybrid threats and increases uncertainty among stakeholders about how to respond to them. However, war is always complex, dynamic and high-risk and develops in a field of tension of rational, emotional and random circumstances.⁴ The starting point for current definitions and explanations is often the Russian approach in Ukraine, that used the means of hybrid warfare. In the following discussion, the goal is not to explain the specifics of hybrid conflict in the Ukraine but to develop a security

¹ Ehrhart, Hans-Georg, “Postmodern warfare and the blurred boundaries between war and peace” (UK, London: Defence & Security Analysis, Volume 33, 2017 Issue 3, 14.July 2017,), p. 263-275, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2017.1351156>

² Winkler, Heinrich–August, “Was heisst westliche Wertegemeinschaft?”, (Deutschland, Hamburg, Die Zeit, Die Zeit online, Campus, Volume 9, 22.Februar 2007), accessed 21.04.2018 at https://www.zeit.de/2007/09/Was_heisst_westliche_Wertegemeinschaft

³ Klein, Margarete, “Russlands neue Militaerdoktrin. NATO, USA und ‘farbige Revolutionen’ im Fokus.”, (Deutschland, Berlin: SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Deutsches Institut fuer internationale Politik und Sicherheit, SWP Aktuell Vol. 12, Februar 2015)

⁴ Tamminga, Oliver, “Hybride Kriegsfuehrung. Zur Einordnung einer aktuellen Erscheinungsform des Krieges.”(Deutschland, Berlin: SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Deutsches Institut fuer internationale Politik und Sicherheit, SWP Aktuell Vol. 27, Maerz 2015)

policy answer from it.⁵ Therefore, no analysis or definition of the term "hybrid warfare" will be made here, but rather an approach to responding to existing hybrid threats. Therefore, the paper argues that there is no need for a "hybrid counter-strategy". Complex security challenges can only be solved with a "comprehensive - networked approach." Thus, the idea of "networked security" is the answer to hybrid threats. The paper will focus on three key perspectives of "networked security": first, institutional perspectives, secondly, perspective of developing capabilities to tackle hybrid threats, and third, strategic-political perspectives to strengthen resilience. The aim is to explain using the example of NATO and its response to the Crimea crisis that there is no need for a new "hybrid counter-strategy", but rather a "networked security approach". Thus, efficiency and effectiveness of existing structures are at the forefront when it comes to countering hybrid threats.

From an institutional point of view, it is important to adapt processes and structures so that they are resilient and sustainable even in times of crisis. Richard Scott provided a comprehensive framework which helps to understand, how an institution works.⁶ He uses a three-pillar model. The first pillar is the regulative pillar and includes the concept of social predictability. It focuses on formal and informal rules, regulations, laws and decision-making systems. According to Scott, the second pillar is the social order of an institution, the normative pillar, where implicit values and norms are crucial to cohesion. The third pillar of Scott's model is the cultural-cognitive-pillar, focusing on common preconceptions, thought patterns, and

⁵ Major, Claudia und Chritsian Moelling, "Eine hybride Sicherheitspolitik fuer Europa. Resilienz, Abschreckung und Verteidigung als Leit motive.", (Deutschland, Berlin: SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Deutsches Institut fuer internationale Politik und Sicherheit, SWP Aktuell Vol. 31, April 2015)

⁶ Ouellet, Eric and Pierre C. Pahlawi, "Institutional Analysis and Irregular Warfare: A case study of the French Army in Algeria 1954-1960." (UK, London, Journal of Strategic Studies 34:6, 799-824, 2011), DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2011.561078

worldviews that, according to Scott, contribute to maintaining social cohesion.⁷ Taken together, these three pillars of institutional analysis are useful in gaining a better understanding of the actions and decisions within an institution such as NATO.

From a regulative perspective one of the focal points is the involvement of the respective societies. The institution should find solutions to overcome an increasing alienation from civil society. People are the center of our doing and important for ensuring the acceptance and support of the “institutional destination”. To increase their interest in security policy, politicians should address security issues with their constituents, furthermore, officials and officers should publicly raise security issues. Propaganda campaigns that are used as a means of hybrid threat and that are directed against certain social minorities, should be combated through public counter-campaigns with the help of free and independent media. This limited involvement of civil society seems to be another weak point of prevailing institutional thinking.

So-called strategic communications are important: governments must explain to their own citizens what they are doing and why. When they intervene in another country (diplomatically, economically, militarily) they should communicate with citizens there as well. If a certain population is specifically targeted by a propaganda campaign by a foreign actor, or a foreign-funded internal actor, a specific counter-narrative can be developed and a public diplomacy campaign launched. But all of these is something else than propaganda, because a democracy ultimately deserves truth. ... free media will convey that much more effectively and credibly than any government-owned media outlet will ever be able to.⁸

⁷ Scott, Richard, “Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests and Identities.”, (USA, Stanford University, Sage Publications 4th edition, 2014) Chapter 3, p. 55 – 84 accessed 21.04.2018 at https://us.sagepub.com/sites/default/files/upbinaries/56769_Chapter_3_Scott_Institutions_and_Organizations_4e.pdf

⁸ Biscop, Sven, “Hybrid Hysteria” (Belgium, Brussels, Royal Institute for International Relations, Security Policy Brief, No. 64, June 2015), accessed 21.04.2018 at <http://aei.pitt.edu/64790/1/SPB64.pdf>

Looking from a normative perspective, another focal point is the institutional ability to understand strategy-making as a permanent process within the institution itself. It is necessary to rebalance ends, ways, and means with all stakeholders involved. Although NATO established process in order to maintain strategy-making within the institution, however disconnects exists.⁹ Often the cohesion between the process to generate resources and the conduct of military operations is limited, therefore, a mismatch exists between ends and means, and nations do not honestly report their actual military capabilities.

From a cultural-cognitive perspective it is crucial to reflect honesty and critically on the weaknesses within NATO as an organization, and its member states. Due to its perceived uniqueness, NATO has been rather critical of others, but not much of itself.¹⁰ Hence the biggest threat to NATO as an institution is inflicted by the member states its self:

Greatest security challenge that NATO faces frankly is ourselves. If we lack the will, the confidence, the capabilities to stand for our own values, to protect people who share those values and to build a community that is open to anyone. If we fail to do that then we are putting ourselves at risk because it creates opportunities that others can exploit.¹¹

⁹ Lindley – French, Julian, “NATO and the new way of warfare” (Italy, Rom, NDC Conference Report, NATO Research Division – NATO Defence college No 03/15, May 2015), accessed 21.04.2018 at <http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=814>

¹⁰ Hartmann, Uwe, “The Evolution of Hybrid Threat, and Resilience as a Countermeasure”, (Italy, Rom, NATO, Research Paper, Research Division – NATO Defence College, No. 139, September 2017)

¹¹ Volker, Kurt (Ambassador) in Lithuania Tribune: “Biggest Threat to NATO is our own inertia’ – former NATO ambassador”, (Lithuania, Vilnius, The Lithuania Tribune, DELFI, 22.06.2016) accessed 21.04.2018 at <https://en.delfi.lt/central-eastern-europe/biggest-threat-to-nato-is-its-own-inertia-former-nato-ambassador.d?id=71628780>

To overcome this weakness is a precondition for further resilient and sustainable success within the institution. The key is the willingness of all stakeholders and the answer can be found in the institution itself.

NATO could face those challenges by emphasising a comprehensive approach within the institution. The goal should be to achieve better cooperation in spite of divergent institutional interests, limited understanding and different expectations among allies, through improved information sharing, through shared planning and sophisticated education.¹² The resilience of civilian partners, on whom the success of military operations often depends, can be increased if the military is capable of supplementing their activities and taking over their tasks for a limited period of time, if required.

In the fight against hybrid threats, it is logical that in the search for defense mechanisms, more and more countries are banking on international cooperation. It is necessary to share the resulting burdens and to develop common resilient solutions. This is not always easy in the context of a hybrid threat, even against the background of shared values. New skills have to be created despite diverging interests. On the one hand these new skills have to improve conventional capabilities as well as “unconventional” capabilities and on the other hand, if necessary, built up new capabilities. NATO is a good example how a supranational organization has already adjusted infrastructure, command structure and processes to face a hybrid threat successfully.

The burgeoning Cyberspace domain is seen as a field of activity for state or non-state actors who are trying to destabilize whole societies with hacker attacks, internet propaganda and

¹² Hartmann, Uwe, “The Evolution of Hybrid Threat, and Resilience as a Countermeasure”, (Italy, Rom, NATO, Research Paper, Research Division – NATO Defence College, No. 139, September 2017)

disinformation campaigns. Especially the dissolution of this kind of warfare requires a new defense thinking, new skills have to be created. The European Center of Excellence for Counter Hybrid Threats as a common platform of NATO and the EU represents such a new capability.¹³ This also clearly illustrates the comprehensive approach, because here the EU and NATO work together and use common skills to develop new capabilities. Thus, the center sets an important signal for international cooperation against cybercrime. Common strategies against hacker attacks, propaganda and disinformation campaigns instead of the use of military means are the goal.¹⁴ It's about creating coordinated and common defenses against the growing hybrid threat.

When it comes to forces contribution, especially in questions of security policy, international unity is not always easy to establish, as the example of the NATO Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) shows.¹⁵ Within NATO, there was no agreement on the issue of permanent deployment of NATO troops in the Baltic States. While the Baltic States and Poland advocated such a move, Germany and the majority of European NATO member states initially opposed permanent deployment.¹⁶ At present, troop contingents in the Baltic countries are rotating on the basis of the "framework-nation concept".¹⁷ This is a viable solution for a new capacity in the hands of political actors to counter the increased threat posed by the NATO

¹³ Briz, Johannes, "EU und NATO im gemeinsamen Kampf gegen hybride Bedrohung", (Deutschland, Berlin: Information, Kommunikation, Partizipation, 18.04.2017), accessed 20.04.2018 at <http://politik-digital.de/news/eu-und-nato-im-kampf-gegen-hybride-bedrohungen-151999/>

¹⁴ Schultz, Teri, "EU-NATO hybrid threat center launched in Finland", (Deutschland, Bonn: DeutscheWelle, DW-Akademie, 03.10.2017), assessed 20.04.2018 at <http://www.dw.com/en/eu-nato-hybrid-threat-center-launched-in-finland/a-40784773>

¹⁵ North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Public Diplomacy Division (PDD). Press and Media Section, "NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence", (Belgium, Brussels, Media Operations Center, February 2018), assessed 21.04.2018 at https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_02/20180213_1802-factsheet-efp.pdf

¹⁶ Wientzek, Olaf und Arzberger, Leonie, "Die sicherheitspolitische Dimension der Transatlantischen Beziehungen im Kontext der Ukraine-Krise und der Staerkung der GSVP." (Deutschland, Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Auslandsinformationen Vol. 5/2015, Mai 2015)

¹⁷ Framework-nation concept: The idea behind this concept is that multinational contributors are "supported" by one of the larger NATO partners, and additional international forces and contingents provide additional key skills in this framework.

Eastern flank. With that NATO's EFP is supposed to be a symbol of allied strength and cohesion.¹⁸ Guaranteeing the security of NATO's Northeastern flank will be a central touchstone for the Alliance's credibility: "The enhanced forward presence is an integral part of NATO's deterrence and defense posture on the eastern flank. It signals that NATO stands as one, and that an attack on any single Ally will be considered an attack against all."¹⁹

At the same time, the European Allies showed an increased willingness to share military burden by establishing and manning the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF)²⁰, a new NATO capability. The Spearhead is part of the Readiness Action Plan²¹ of the Alliance for an increased readiness, which was approved at the 2014 NATO North summit in Wales as a reaction on the Crimea crisis.²² The VJTF, with its approximately 5000 soldiers in the highest readiness, belongs to the NATO Response Force (NRF)²³, an intervention force for worldwide deployments, consisting of land, air, sea and special forces. In conjunction with NATO's adaptation and reinsurance measures the NRF was also reinforced. The NRF is expected to comprise up to 40 000 soldiers in the future.

¹⁸ Zapfe, Martin, "Hybrid Threats and NATO's Forward Presence" (Schweizerland, Zuerich, Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zuerich, Policy Perspectives, Vol. 4, 07.09.2016), accessed 21.04.2018 at <http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/PP4-7.pdf>

¹⁹ Luik, Juri and Praks Henrik, "Boosting the Deterrent Effect of Allied Enhanced Forward Presence", (Estonia, Eesti, ICDS – International Center for Defence and Security, Policy Paper, May 2017), assessed 20.04.2018 at <https://www.icds.ee/publications/article/boosting-the-deterrent-effect-of-allied-enhanced-forward-presence/>

²⁰ NATO. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. "NATO Response Force/ Very High Readiness Joint Task Force.", (Belgium, Mons: Shape 2018), accessed 21.04.2018 at <https://shape.nato.int/nato-response-force--very-high-readiness-joint-task-force>

²¹ NATO. Public Diplomacy Division (PDD), Press & Media Section. "NATO's Readiness Action Plan.", (Belgium, Mons: Fact Sheet, July 2016), accessed 21.04.2018 at https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_07/20160627_1607-factsheet-rap-en.pdf

²² NATO. Headquarters. "Wales Summit Declaration. Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales.", (Belgium, Mons: Press Release, 05.09.2014), accessed 21.04.2018 at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm?selectedLocale=en

²³ NATO. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. "NATO Response Force/ Very High Readiness Joint Task Force.", (Belgium, Mons: Shape 2018), accessed 21.04.2018 at <https://shape.nato.int/nato-response-force--very-high-readiness-joint-task-force>

In addition, NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs)²⁴ have been set up in Eastern Europe to facilitate, for example, the deployment of reaction forces and to coordinate the future advance storage of military material and equipment. NFIUs are designed to identify logistics networks, transport hubs, and supporting infrastructure to ensure fast response to future threats with lethal means. These liaison units are led by the Multinational Corps Northeast in Szczecin (MNK NE), whose readiness level has also been increased within the NATO Action Plan. This furthermore underlines the international approach to the hybrid threat posed by the Russians in Eastern Europe. The Corps is part of the NATO force structure in Europe. The staff, which does not lead troops in peace, is capable of leading multinational major NATO defense forces within the framework of major defense operation and ready to participate in peacekeeping operations and aid natural disasters.²⁵

This transformation and expansion of the NATO infrastructure as well as the NATO force structure clearly underlines the readiness of the Alliance to face the challenges of hybrid threats by various actors. Therefore the development of a new "hybrid counter-strategy" is not in the foreground, but the benefits from improving and networking existing skills, in the sense of a "networked security policy". This does not exclude the creation of new (military) capabilities (for example in cyber space), but expediently complements existing structures.

By military means alone, hybrid threats can not be successfully countered. An essential feature of hybrid warfare is the use of civil means for military purposes in close

²⁴ NATO. Public Diplomacy Division (PDD), Press & Media Section. "NATO Force Integration Units", (Belgium, Mons: Fact Sheet, September 2015), accessed 21.04.2018 at https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2015_09/20150901_150901-factsheet-nfiu_en.pdf

²⁵ NATO. Allied Joint Force Command. "Multinational Corps Northeast.", (Netherlands, Brunssum: AJFC 2018), accessed 21.04.2018 at <https://jfcbs.nato.int/operations/multinational-corps-northeast>

association with conventional means,²⁶ which are used congruently or serve only as a threat of forces. Thus, the idea of two opposing armies fighting each other symmetrically is outdated. Consequently, conventional forces can not be the first and most important means of defending against hybrid threats. The aim of the hybrid threat is also to bring the conflict into areas where the military capabilities of the enemy, his military strength is less crucial. This tactic is not new and does not differ significantly from irregular or revolutionary warfare, as it is already known from Vietnam war.²⁷ Today, precisely targeting the weakness of the enemy is exploited. In modern Western nations, the vulnerability of our open and democratic societies is probably the most obvious weakness. The boundaries between war and peace are blurring through the use of hybrid methods in order to exploit this weakness,²⁸ which constitute warlike violence, but can not be clearly attributed to an opponent.²⁹ This approach makes it difficult to find an appropriate answer / solution, especially since a large number of these methods raise additional questions of international law.³⁰ However, in order to respond adequately, it is first necessary to analyze where the vulnerabilities of Western societies lie.

²⁶ Major, Claudia und Chrtsian Moelling, "Eine hybride Sicherheitspolitik fuer Europa. Resilienz, Abschreckung und Verteidigung als Leitmotive.", (Deutschland, Berlin: SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Deutsches Institut fuer international Politik und Sicherheit, SWP Aktuell Vol. 31, April 2015)

²⁷ Giap, Vo Nguyen, "People's War, People's Army." (Vietnam, Hanoi, first published in English by Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), p. 20 - 22

²⁸ Ehrhart, Hans-Georg, "Postmodern warfare and the blurred boundaries between war and peace" (UK, London: Defence & Security Analysis, Volume 33, 2017 Issue 3, 14.July 2017), p. 263-275, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2017.1351156>

²⁹ Major, Claudia und Chrtsian Moelling, "Eine hybride Sicherheitspolitik fuer Europa. Resilienz, Abschreckung und Verteidigung als Leitmotive.", (Deutschland, Berlin: SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Deutsches Institut fuer internationale Politik und Sicherheit, SWP Aktuell Vol. 31, April 2015)

³⁰ Cantwell, Douglas, "Hybrid Warfare: Aggression and Coercion in the Gray Zone", (USA, Washington D.C., American Society of International Law, Volume 21, Issue 14, 29.November 2017), accessed 21.04.2018 at <https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/21/issue/14/hybrid-warfare-aggression-and-coercion-gray-zone>

The likelihood of military conflict between NATO and other actors sank to a minimum after the fall of the "Iron Curtain". Most of the Western Nations were using this to minimize their military capabilities and to pocket the so-called "peace dividend".³¹ After the incidents in Ukraine and Syria, the increased likelihood of a new confrontation is omnipresent. Thus, "territorial integrity" is a vulnerability of Western nations, whose tension is again clearly evident in the Baltics in particular.³² The reason is the military weakness of NATO, which has itself found that it is not sufficiently prepared for a major inter-state conflict.³³ Other actors could use this weakness to enforce their interests.

The recent events in Ukraine, as well as in Syria³⁴, have made it clear that a common strategy and a united approach towards Russia (e.g. international economical sanctions, joint military actions) can at least have some influence. At the same time, these events have highlighted another vulnerability. Due to different interests, it is understandable that the approach against Russia is assessed from different perspectives. Outwardly, this does not indicate "political unity" among the Western nations and offers scope for methods of hybrid

³¹ Richter, Andrew, "Sharing the burden? U.S. allies, defense spending, and the future of NATO." (U.K. London: Journal Comparative Strategy, Volume 35, 2016, Issue 6, 02.11.2016) p. 298 – 314, accessed 21.04.2018 at <https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2016.1222843>

³² Luik, Juri and Praks Henrik, "Boosting the Deterrent Effect of Allied Enhanced Forward Presence", (Estonia, Eesti, ICDS – International Center for Defence and Security, Policy Paper, May 2017), assessed 20.04.2018 at <https://www.icds.ee/publications/article/boosting-the-deterrent-effect-of-allied-enhanced-forward-presence/>

³³ Stoltenberg, Jens (NATO Secretary General). Speech at the Munich Security Conference at 18 Feb. 2017, accessed 21.04.2018 at https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/opinions_141632.htm

³⁴ Eisenstadt, Michael, "Military Strikes on Syria: Critical Considerations." (USA, Washington D.C., The Washington Institute, 10.4.2018), accessed 21.04.2018 at <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/military-strikes-on-syria-critical-considerations>

warfare.³⁵ Not least because there are doubts about the originator of various hybrid activities and this uncertainty offers room for further hybrid maneuvers.

It can be assumed with some certainty that a potential aggression would probably not start with the deployment of an armored division at present. The lesson learned from the analysis of the annexation of Crimea is that the destabilization of the society of a country by hybrid methods tends to take place from inside (e.g. by mobilizing minority populations).³⁶ For example, the Baltic States fear that their Russian minorities will be mobilized.³⁷ Point of attack is the "inner vulnerability of open societies", well-directed social spaces and social media are attacked, minorities are exploited and people are radicalized and radical parties are supported in order to destabilize the existing political and social order.³⁸

In order to safeguard social peace and order and prosperity, the Western nations are dependent on the freedom of international trade. Both raw materials, energy and international infrastructures play a crucial role here. In the context of globalization and technology, internet communication is an international factor. On the one hand, Western nations benefit from these

³⁵ Major, Claudia und Chrtsian Moelling, "Eine hybride Sicherheitspolitik fuer Europa. Resilienz, Abschreckung und Verteidigung als Leit motive.", (Deutschland, Berlin: SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Deutsches Institut fuer internationale Politik und Sicherheit, SWP Aktuell Vol. 31, April 2015)

³⁶ Degg, Anton and Michael Schurian, "Vernetzte Unsicherheit – Hybride Bedrohungen im 21. Jahrhundert." (Austria, Wien, Bundesheer, Schriftenreihe der Landesverteidigungsakademie, Juli 2015), p. 23, accessed 21.04.2018 at

http://www.bundesheer.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/lvak_sr_15_2015_hybride_bedrohung_degg_schurian.pdf

³⁷ Richter, Wolfgang, "Rueckversicherung und Stabilitaet. Die NATO entscheidet ueber die Truppenstationierung im Osten." (Deutschland, Berlin: SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Deutsches Institut fuer internationale Politik und Sicherheit, SWP Aktuell Vol. 41, Juli 2016)

³⁸ Major, Claudia und Chrtsian Moelling, "Eine hybride Sicherheitspolitik fuer Europa. Resilienz, Abschreckung und Verteidigung als Leit motive.", (Deutschland, Berlin: SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Deutsches Institut fuer internationale Politik und Sicherheit, SWP Aktuell Vol. 31, April 2015)

"international dependencies", on the other hand, they are increasingly threatened and susceptible to disruption.³⁹

In order to counter these vulnerabilities, the existing civilian and military instruments of security policy and risk prevention must be better and more actively networked with one another, in the sense of a "networked security policy". The civilian and military departments must be better coordinated in the context of resilience, deterrence and defense. NATO has already decided to strengthen resilience as one of many measures as a countermeasure to hybrid threats.⁴⁰ Seven "baseline-requirements" were defined.

Based on an assessment of threats and vulnerabilities, allied defense ministers agreed on a set of minimum standards for national resilience, so-called "baseline requirements," in seven areas that were deemed most critical to NATO's collective defense tasks:

1. Continuity of Government– maintaining at all times the ability to make decisions, communicate them, and enforce them, and to provide essential government services to the population.
2. Resilient Energy Supplies– ensuring that energy supply, including national power grids, are secure and that nations maintain the necessary prioritization arrangements and redundancy.

³⁹ NATO. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. Topics, "Economic analysis at NATO" (Belgium, Mons, Topics, 03.December 2015), accessed 21.04.2018 at https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/topics_76400.htm

⁴⁰ Hartmann, Uwe, "The Evolution of Hybrid Threat, and Resilience as a Countermeasure", (Italy, Rom, NATO, Research Paper, Research Division – NATO Defence College, No. 139, September 2017)

3. Resilient Civil Communications Services– ensuring that telecommunications and cyber networks remain functional even in demanding conditions and under attacks.
4. Resilient Food and Water Supply– ensuring sufficient supplies are available to both civilians and the military, and safe from disruption of sabotage.
5. Ability to Deal with Large Scale Population Movements and to be able to de-conflict such movements from potential national or Alliance military deployments and other requirements.
6. Ability to Deal with Mass Casualties– ensuring that health systems can cope even in very demanding situations when there might be simultaneous pressure on civilian and military health care capabilities.
7. Resilient Civilian Transportation Systems– ensuring that NATO forces can move across Alliance territory rapidly and that civilian transportation networks remain functional and effective to support civil and military requirements even when challenged or attacked.⁴¹

Since a rather narrow, defense-oriented view of resilience is pursued here, it must be understood that the basis for resilience lies not only in the infrastructure, planning and preparation, but above all in the common commitment and understanding of the Western nations to and from common values. Therefore, moreover, the "unity of societies" should be

⁴¹ Meyer-Minnemann, Lorenz, "Resilience and Alliance Security: The Warsaw Commitment to Enhance Resilience" (USA, Washington D.C., John Hopkins, School of Advanced International Studies, Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2016), accessed 21.04.2018 at <http://transatlanticrelations.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/resilience-forward-book-meyer-minnemann-final.pdf>

strengthened. This refers to measures of strengthening of diversity and the support of minorities to maintain social cohesion⁴², flanked by educational, social and economic policy measures, which at best are coordinated on an international level. Networking and openness are equally the greatest strengths and weaknesses of Western societies. Their ability to handle this situation has to be increased. They should be empowered to recover quickly from any attacks on the values or functioning of living together, as these attacks will not be prevent in the future. This requires no "counter-hybrid strategy", but only a better coordination and allocation of existing means and measures across country borders and department boundaries.

In conclusion, none of the applied instruments is new. The changed quality lies rather in their combination and the orchestration of the use of the means. Unusual is the professionalization in the application of information operations as well as the growing importance of civil measures as a "weapon", such as cyber-attacks and energy-political measures. But despite all change in appearance and its reactions, the fundamental nature of war remains the same. War is politically motivated and does not follow any independent logic. The purpose of a war is a situation in which one's own interests are permanently secured. The aim of the war is to force the opponent to fulfill his own will through organized force.⁴³ Warfare is the order and conduct of the fight, as different as it may look in detail. Hybrid warfare is not a new phenomenon, nor have the fundamental rules of war changed. Nevertheless, the Western nations have so far little to oppose this form of warfare successfully. As there is currently no apparent political will to bring hybrid actors such as Russia to their knees either with lethal or non-lethal

⁴² Major, Claudia und Chrtsian Moelling, "Eine hybride Sicherheitspolitik fuer Europa. Resilienz, Abschreckung und Verteidigung als Leitmotive.", (Deutschland, Berlin: SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Deutsches Institut fuer internationale Politik und Sicherheit, SWP Aktuell Vol. 31, April 2015)

⁴³ Clausewitz, Carl von, "On War", Indexed Edition, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (USA, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984) p. 90 - 99

means, it should remain a stated goal to return to a stable and cooperative security order worldwide. The shared values and the common understanding of freedom and security could play a key role in the establishing process of an “networked security policy”. A precondition to achieve better results is to subordinate own interest to a common political objective, which is shared among the Western community as a base for coordinated actions and measures against future hybrid threats.

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