ENGAGED, SECURE, STRONG: ENABLING DOMESTIC SECURITY THROUGH GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

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**JCSP 44**

*Exercise Solo Flight*

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ENGLISH TEXT

EXERCISE SOLO FLIGHT – EXERCICE SOLO FLIGHT

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INTRODUCTION

As Minister of National Defence, your overarching goal will be to ensure that the Canadian Armed Forces are equipped and prepared, if called upon, to protect Canadian sovereignty, defend North America, provide disaster relief, conduct search and rescue, support United Nations peace operations, and contribute to the security of our allies and to allied and coalition operations abroad.

- Prime Minister Justin Trudeau

The Prime Minister’s mandate letter to the Minister of National Defence in 2015, quoted above, highlights the tremendous obligation of a government towards the protection of its citizens. In one sentence, the government commits the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) to the protection of Canadian sovereignty, continental defence, humanitarian missions, peace support operations and domestic search and rescue. With such a broad spectrum of operations, how then to decide on what capability is needed to execute all of these missions, and how will this be balanced with other government priorities?

The Trudeau government’s defence policy, “Strong, Secure, Engaged” (SSE) released in 2017 aligns with the mandate letter. The title of the document calls to attention the three themes of defence policy: the protection of Canada in ‘strong’, the protection of North America in ‘secure’, and the protection of Canadian interests abroad through ‘engaged.’ As defence priorities for Canada, these themes are consistent for every government mandate dating back to the 1960s, although earlier governments explicitly prioritized Canada’s engagement with allies abroad, to include strong participation in NATO, while the protection of national sovereignty was of less importance if wars were first won off the shores of Canada. Given the history of Canada’s military action post-World War Two (WWII), where the CAF has consistently been
involved in overseas missions, it seems as though engagement remains the government's preferred strategy despite SSE ordering. Whether this manifests itself in combat missions such as the Korean War from 1950-53, the First Gulf War in 1990, Kosovo in 1999, Afghanistan from 2002-14 or Libya in 2011, or in multiple peace support operations from Cyprus to Sinai to Bosnia to Kosovo, the fact remains that these actions require the CAF to possess robust capabilities to protect Canadian national interests.

The Trudeau government has stressed a theme that “Canada is back.” In August 2016, he pledged up to 600 CAF members for peacekeeping support operations (PSO), and in November 2017, he committed Canada to sending helicopters and 200 CAF members to Mali in support of PSOs. Canadian support to PSOs, particularly those sanctioned by the United Nations (UN), has become a signature policy for the Trudeau government even though it has yet to manifest itself more than halfway through its mandate. At the same time, this government has signalled it does not wish to participate in combat missions, first with the withdrawal of CF-18 fighter jets from Iraq in 2016 and then with the insistence that the current Iraq mission is not one of combat. Given the defence policy direction, how can Canada maintain forces capable of protecting the sovereignty of Canada, while contributing to coalition missions across the globe, particularly if the missions may, in future, involve combat operations?

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Public opinion polls in Canada have consistently shown that the general public sees the CAF in a favourable light as one of the most trusted institutions in the nation.\(^5\) Defence funding in Canada has largely ebbed and flowed given the economic situation of the day regardless of whether there was genuine need or not, and it certainly has not been consistent in delivering stated defence policy procurement.\(^6\) The answer may lie in leveraging the positive views of the CAF and Canada’s role internationally as a PSO participant combined with the current defence policy with a view to the past. This paper will argue that by utilizing the desire of Canadians to support the “Engaged” component of SSE, specifically with a focus on CAF participation in PSOs under or in support of a UN mandate rather than its engagement in coalition combat and/or NATO operations, the CAF has the ability to develop and maintain the necessary capabilities to enable both the “Strong” and “Secure” components of current defence policy, the components with the greatest priority but most neglected. First, the necessary capabilities for the CAF will be established including those that are currently absent, followed by an examination of recent PSOs to determine what is possible in today’s global context, and finally the proposed solution will be presented by establishing a plan for the CAF to achieve combat capability through continuous PSO participation.

**ESSENTIAL CAPABILITIES**

In order to protect Canadian and North American sovereignty, it is essential to review the capabilities required to comply with SSE. The text lists a core CAF mission as one required to

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\(^5\) Forum Research, “Canadian military most trusted institution,” accessed Apr 23, 2018, poll.forumresearch.com/post/36/Canadian_military_most_trusted_institution_052614/

“detect, deter and defend against threats to or attacks on”\textsuperscript{7} either Canada or North America in its entirety. This is amplified by describing what this means in terms of expected capability for the CAF in that “Canada will continue to invest in a multi-purpose, combat-ready force that is able to act decisively and deliver results across the full spectrum of operations”\textsuperscript{8} and act “with decisive military capability across 8 core missions, with modern equipment and highly trained personnel.”\textsuperscript{9} Perhaps most intriguing in examining Canadian defence policy post-9/11, is that it remains consistent with previous defence policy post-WWII in that the main protection of Canadian sovereignty and security will be “meeting threats to our security as far away from our borders as possible, wherever they may arise.”\textsuperscript{10} This would suggest that in order to be “Strong,” then the CAF must be capable of engaging all threats domestic and foreign, and the capability required for “Strong” and “Secure” is the same as that required for “Engaged.” The question can therefore be simplified to CAF capability rather than domestic capability.

As introduced above, Canadian defence policy is consistent in wanting to equip the CAF with multi-purpose, well-trained, combat-ready, full-spectrum capability. Specific capabilities are given throughout Canadian defence policies to the point where specific assets are championed as embodying a capability in some cases, but this can be argued as simply replacing like for like rather than thinking in terms of capability delivery. Current defence policy goes as far as specifying modern equipment but this too indicates little in terms of capability required or whether upgrades to existing capability is sufficient. However, with SSE as the official policy direction from government, it will be assumed that current CAF capability will be the minimum

\textsuperscript{8} Ibid., 81.
\textsuperscript{9} Ibid., 81.
required, as SSE only discusses replacing existing or acquiring new capabilities, and not
discarding any currently fielded capabilities.

SSE, like the Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS) preceding it, contains promises of
new equipment and defines new, required capability. Annex D of SSE provides a summary of
all of the intended investments the government will make in the CAF. Other than replacing or
modernizing existing equipment, the new capabilities list is not very long or more ambitious than
what most medium militaries already possess. It includes: new naval intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms, new offensive and defensive naval combat weapons
capability, vehicles for arctic operations, space-based ISR and communication capabilities,
acquire unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for ISR and attack, acquire airborne ISR platforms for
special operations forces, and ground-based air defence.11 When combined with existing
equipment, this list is then assumed to contain all of the necessary capabilities that the
government feels the CAF requires to enable SSE, but it is still useful to compare it with another
medium-sized military.

The Australian military is a good comparison because of the similarities of Australia to
Canada concerning population, economy, population-density, as well as parallels between
foreign and defence policies. The Australian comparison may only be skewed towards Australia
requiring a more robust military because of its proximity to China and other potential
adversaries, combined with its distance from its (and Canada’s) key ally, the United States.
However, as John Ravenhill notes there is tremendous similarity in terms of foreign and
domestic policy between the nations in his middle power comparison.12 Lieutenant Colonel John

12 John Ravenhill, "Cycles of Middle Power Activism: Constraint and Choice in Australian and Canadian
Blaxland makes a similar comparison with similar conclusions regarding military missions that both Canada and Australia have participated in, stating that the “requirement for expeditionary forces springs from different national interests yet which results in remarkably similar net effects.”\textsuperscript{13} This is consistent with the conclusion drawn in his paper that Canada enables domestic defence through expeditionary capability and that the capability required to do both missions is identical for these two nations. The comparison to Australia is therefore worth exploring to determine what are the differences and are they relevant in terms of military capability.

Australian John Blaxland makes the case for amphibious capability as key for independent operations and Joint effectiveness.\textsuperscript{14} This argument is shared with some in the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) who argue its merits for Joint operations, enhanced rapid deployment, and ability to project both hard and soft power.\textsuperscript{15} Australia also possesses its own airborne early warning and control aircraft, while Canada relies on Canadian aircrew aboard US aircraft (and soon on NATO aircraft once again) for this function. Additionally in the air, Australia possesses electronic warfare (EW) attack aircraft, close support attack helicopters and high-altitude long-endurance (HALE) UAVs, all of which Canada does not. These capabilities allow Australia to act more independently across all operations in the military spectrum when compared to Canada and if Canada is truly willing to be “Strong” at home, then the CAF should be considering adding some of the above to its arsenal.

\textsuperscript{13} J. C. Blaxland and Royal Military College of Canada, “Strategic Cousins: Canada, Australia and their use of Expeditionary Forces from the Boer War to the War on Terror” ProQuest Dissertations Publishing), 526.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
Academics and military professionals alike have also suggested that the existing CAF capabilities and additional proposals by the government are inadequate for the missions it is given even without comparison. As with any policy argument, the solutions are endless and therefore the attempt is made here to highlight only a few examples of major shortfalls in the current CAF inventory. The first concerns littoral naval capability, the currently equipment is inadequate to ensure the defence of domestic waters and must be replaced with something that can actually detect, deter and defend. The CAF dispensed with its air defence capabilities due to budget cuts and is now exposed domestically or reliant on other forces when deployed abroad, and this includes everything from ballistic or cruise missile threats, to UAVs and attack aircraft, specifically for land forces.

These are examples of major capabilities that would enhance the CAF to operate independently in any conflict but are all capabilities that Canada relies on others to provide in a coalition environment.

PSO CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS

As introduced in the previous section, the CAF has a range of required capabilities that are in place, a number that are desired or directed by current defence policy, and a further number that may become required to truly succeed in the domestic missions of “Strong” and “Secured.” To enable, develop and exercise an expansive list of capabilities requires a wide range of missions. An examination of PSOs will demonstrate the feasibility of a robust, multi-

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16 S. A. Kelemen and Canadian Forces College, *RCN Littoral Capability Replacements: Good enough is Not Good Enough* (Toronto, Ont.: Canadian Forces College,[2016]).
purpose, combat ready CAF by following the avenue of “Engaged”. For this purpose, PSOs include varied forms of peacekeeping such as buffers between opposing forces or those operations of a humanitarian nature that help to create global stability.

Traditional peacekeeping, especially as envisioned by Canadians who see this as the national legacy, largely no longer exists. The capability needs of peacekeepers who were invited at the request of state actors to act as a buffer between opposing forces and ensure all sides observed the terms of a peace agreement were relatively basic as only their presence between forces was generally required. Even with missions that have involved actual combat, the capabilities required from intervention forces were very traditional, as they were approached following the model that the UN developed for peacekeeping in the 1950s. For example, the UN mission to the Congo in 1960-64, and even forces in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s were meant to be simply blue berets standing between belligerent forces to keep them away from each other. Post 9/11, the situations are much more complicated as all parties to the conflict are likely not welcoming of foreign intervention, there is no clear determination of sides, there are state and non-state actors involved, and the mandate often includes elements of development work or nation-building. Notable PSOs in this era include UN missions in East Timor, Haiti, and a dozen in Africa alone, notably in Central African Republic, Ethiopia and Eretria, Sudan and Mali. Other operations such as CAF participation in the International Security Assistance

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Force (ISAF) while NATO-led, was UN sanctioned and is considered a PSO by the Government of Canada, and so will be included as part of the range of PSOs considered.

The CAF will likely continue to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HADR) in an expeditionary capacity, a virtual parity of a mission as the CAF strong at home missions are described in SSE. However, when the need for HADR exists, it is most often unpredictable and immediate, and unless a nation can self-deploy they are competing for the same leased assets as many other nations. This fact supports the argument of having added strategic airlift during Afghanistan and adding future amphibious capability to the CAF with utility at home and abroad. It also speaks to maintaining a robust Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) capability which would pay dividends in any HADR situation, but would be equally important in any combat mission where interactions with the general population are critical.

HADR capability for the CAF must remain effective and would likely be an approach to increasing capability that would be seen favourably by the public. One such example was the rapid CAF deployment and effective use of extensive assets, including all manners of fixed- and rotary-airlift along with deployable air traffic control, and a naval task force, proving instrumental to relief efforts after the Haiti earthquake in early 2010.

As US Army Colonel Christopher Barron states, PSO missions will continue to be heavy on requirements for multi-purpose air force and navy capabilities as they offer a cleaner and publicly acceptable intervention. But, there is also a strong argument to involve all manner of

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24 Von Hlatky and Breede, Going to War?: Trends in Military Interventions, 50.
land forces in order to effect true change in an intervention mission.\(^\text{26}\) Recent stabilization Missions such as ISAF in Afghanistan and MINUSMA in Mali have needed boots on the ground to hold territory and interact with the local population. The Canadian Army has shown that it can get the job done but in order to participate effectively in any mission, the army must re-acquire equipment in the likes of air defence and anti-tank capabilities.\(^\text{27}\) Canada presently contributes to PSOs in mainly handfuls of numbers since high-water marks of troops deployed during the 1990s to UN missions,\(^\text{28}\) but it is not the only nation to be grappling with determining whether it has a role in PSOs.

Europe finds itself in a similar position to Canada where there is a demand to reengage in UN peace operations. A look at various nations provides context in the many variables that differ between European nations. France provides an example whereas a military force can actively support UN missions through national, EU or NATO operations, thus ensuring that it chooses the capability required and its forces are used in a way that maximizes their effectiveness and they retain control. The downside in this approach is that there is often little control over the exit strategy as it is related to the UN-mission.\(^\text{29}\) The concern in Britain as of the early 2000s among military leadership was that deploying in UN peacekeeping missions would degrade the war-fighting capability of its armed forces and thus should be minimized, but recently there has been a change of strategy and the UK, likely bolstered by strong domestic support for increasing UK military presence in PSOs in the name of global security and stability,

\(^{26}\) Von Hlatky and Breede, *Going to War?: Trends in Military Interventions*, 70.

\(^{27}\) Ibid., 102.


is looking for niche capabilities it can offer to the UN.\textsuperscript{30} Germany has cautiously approached PSOs since its unification but now, with the UK’s pending departure from the EU, it sees these operations as a way to develop closer military integration with European partners and take a leadership role in European security.\textsuperscript{31} Thus a quick (and by no means extensive) survey of European nations wanting to reengage in UN missions shows a variety of ways that capability can be exercised. The UK will ensure it does not lose war-fighting prowess but offer niche capability, Germany will attempt to use participation to bolster domestic and regional European defence, and France will involve itself alongside the actual UN mission to retain control and leadership of its forces. Although there is no consensus across Europe the unifying theme would seem to be that the right approach is the one that best serves the nation to remain strong and secure at home.

As demonstrated by Europe’s pivot to Africa and increased participation in PSOs there, Western militaries are best equipped to provide high tech, specialized or more costly capabilities such as air power and special forces to supplement basic host nation and other PSO forces.\textsuperscript{32} Political scientists Leuprecht and Sokolsky would seem to agree that this approach is consistent with Canada’s historical involvement of deploying forces abroad to serve the national interest where “Canada has contributed extremely useful and highly regarded forces to the efforts of allies to contain global threats and lesser challenges posed by regional instability to the security and stability of the West.”\textsuperscript{33} At the same time, PSOs will continue to require basic military capabilities that are key components to any military, such as infantry and armour. This section

\textsuperscript{32} Von Hlatky and Breede, \textit{Going to War?: Trends in Military Interventions}, 170.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., 196.
has examined a small number of PSO missions and covered a broad range of capabilities that are required, and while each participating nation will have an approach that serves its own needs, the CAF can find missions for most if not all of its capabilities, as well as some that it does not yet possess but yet requires for a more robust domestic defence force.

**CANADA CAN BE BACK AND COMBAT CAPABLE**

The CAF has a capability deficiency as outlined by government, scholars and professionals above, but choosing to participate wisely in PSOs can represent an opportunity to overcome those deficiencies. The question that remains is how. As shown, the current government believes strongly in peacekeeping as a use for the CAF. Whether that desire translates into support in the form of adequate funding and resources to maintain and increase capability for the roles the CAF is given is another matter, but the present government insists that their defence policy is fully costed and funded.\(^{34}\) A survey of polls and favourable public opinion regarding Canada’s role internationally is strongly influenced by Canada’s role in PSOs throughout the latter half of the twentieth century.\(^{35}\) A recent Abacus poll supports this theory by indicating a majority support for military action or support for military action to invade Syria to remove President Assad, where there are widespread humanitarian crises, but not to confront North Korea, Russia or China.\(^{36}\) The majority of the public believe that these missions are of value and that Canada has a role to play, and specifically that PSOs and disaster relief is how the

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\(^{35}\) Lane Anker, *Peacekeeping and Public Opinion*, Vol. 6 (Ottawa: ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE OF CANADA, 2005), 23.

\(^{36}\) Bruce Anderson and David Coletto, “Tensions Rising: Canadian Views on Foreign Conflict, China, & Trudeau in an International Crisis,” last modified Apr 27, accessed Apr 16, 2018
CAF should be contributing to world peace and prosperity.\textsuperscript{37} The population of Canada therefore may be encouraged and welcoming of a more robust CAF presence in international PSOs. As of March 2018 only 92 CAF personnel were deployed on PSO missions, an all-time low for Canada, and it is felt that there is an appetite to do more.\textsuperscript{38} If Canadians are supportive of more CAF involvement in PSOs internationally, what about the CAF and its ability to handle additional mandates? Former CAF army officer and current military and security affairs historian Bob Martyn hits both the heart of this paper and present realities by outlining a case that only PSOs may be possible for a fiscally limited CAF and a war-weary, casualty adverse public. Fortunately for the CAF he concludes that PSOs are exactly the missions that the CAF can tackle with public support and perhaps enthusiasm.\textsuperscript{39} CAF equipment is aging and although it is able to respond and participate when required, the ability to deploy is much more limited than during the Afghanistan mission in the early 2000s or the peacekeeping efforts of the 1990s. For example, the Navy no longer has any destroyers and will only restore auxiliary tanker capability in summer 2018, thus relying on foreign cooperation for naval deployments. For the first time, coastal defence vessels form a significant portion of overseas deployments and are ranging farther from home than ever before as larger vessel capacity diminishes.\textsuperscript{40} The Air Force has seen fighter deployments decrease from 18 during the First Gulf War (1990) down to a standard six in Libya (2010) and Iraq (2014), and other fleets such as long-range patrol and transport, are continuously tasked both domestically and internationally.\textsuperscript{41} Experience in

\textsuperscript{38} Murray Brewster, \textit{Number of Canadian Soldiers on UN Peacekeeping Missions Hits New Low}, Mar 15, 2018.
\textsuperscript{39} Von Hlatky and Breede, \textit{Going to War?: Trends in Military Interventions}, 106-109.
\textsuperscript{40} Darlene Blakeley, "Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels Sail Beyond Expectations," last modified Jan 12, accessed May 7, 2018; Ryan Melanson, "Ships Depart for West Africa," last modified Mar 12, accessed May 7, 2018
Afghanistan showed the difficulty the CAF had in sustaining an Army Battle Group, with augmentees from the Air Force and Navy seconded to fill roles that the Army was unable to.\textsuperscript{42} Unless the CAF grows a number of smaller missions designed to exercise, perfect, improve and increase capability could prove fruitful.

With the CAF presently only capable of participation in continuous smaller engagements, a well-considered approach to procurement equipment and using limited resources is essential. Leuprecht and Sokolsky argue that “easy-riding” on the tails of larger allies with larger defence budgets will eventually cripple the CAF as it seeks to procure capability with the “just enough” approach and should rather adopt a sound policy somewhere in the middle between major and small powers, and be willing to pay “full-price” for capability that matters.\textsuperscript{43} UK international affairs scholars Curran and Williams propose that future UN peace operations may very well resemble the stability operations of NATO in Afghanistan and therefore there is little if any additional training and capability required from the military.\textsuperscript{44} Given Canada’s investments in Afghanistan and the CAF during this conflict, it is a reasonable comparison that the CAF shares the same expertise already to be offered to PSOs, and this mirrors capability required to be a war-fighting military without breaking the bank. The additional capability identified earlier of what the CAF lacks for proper domestic defence could then be procured in the publically-supportable PSO operations for use in these missions and available if needed at home.

Defence policy is explicit when describing what Canada is willing to commit in terms of numbers of troops and numbers of concurrent missions overseas. Canada would simultaneously

\textsuperscript{42} The author of this paper, serving as an Air Force aerospace structures engineer at National Defence Headquarters, was seconded to the Army as an augmentee Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Officer and deployed to Afghanistan in this role 2009-10.

\textsuperscript{43} Von Hlatky and Breede, \textit{Going to War?: Trends in Military Interventions}, 215.

\textsuperscript{44} Curran and Williams, "The United Kingdom and United Nations Peace Operations,"
deploy: 500-1500 personnel in two sustained missions, one of which as the lead nation, a one-time deployment of 500-1500 personnel for 6-9 months, two sustained missions of 100-500 personnel, and numerous other sustained deployments of handfuls of personnel.\(^{45}\) There are currently 14 UN PSO missions underway, with a range of military capabilities in use for a variety of mandates. These range from full spectrum stability operations in a contested environment such as the UN mission MINUSMA in Mali\(^ {46}\) with a parallel French mission focussing entirely on combat with terrorist organisations,\(^ {47}\) to traditional observer forces in Lebanon and Cyprus.\(^ {48}\) With the government willing to commit to up to four sustained deployments, as well as surge forces to two more temporarily, Canada can commit as many troops as it is currently capable of without any change to policy. All that is required is a selection of which force of the CAF requires experience, and then pairing with a suitable mission (as part of that mission or parallel to it). This could be executed in perpetuity for the CAF with variance between capabilities deployed, number of concurrent missions, and changing mission participation over the years. It is fair to say that if Canada wants to participate, and with the UN indicating that it would welcome a larger Canadian contribution to its missions,\(^ {49}\) that there are opportunities for any military capability the CAF can offer, and defence policy offers the means to commit equipment and personnel.


CONCLUSION

The obligation of subjects to the sovereign is understood to last as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth by which he is able to protect them.

- Thomas Hobbes

The quote written above in Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan is as true today as when it was written in 1651, even in the era of the nation-state and with democratic governments now serving at the pleasure of the people. To make a state function to the benefit of all citizens there is an obligation on the part of every citizen to contribute to the growth and prosperity of the nation, but at the same time the nation represented by its government has the obligation to ensure protection and security for all citizens. Canada has long taken an active role in global affairs to ensure the security and sovereignty of the nation since assuming control of its own foreign policy and military engagement during the First World War. Post-Second World War, successive governments made it policy to “actively address threats abroad for stability at home,”50 embodying the Western mantra of deploying military forces overseas to conflict regions to ensure global stability and the pre-eminence of a rules-based world order to ensure peace and prosperity. In doing so, Canada became a leader in engaging in peace support operations, building a domestic culture that embraced the peacekeeper role. But since the end of the 1990s, Canadian Armed Forces contributions to PSOs have gradually decreased resulting in the present situation of an all-time low in terms of personnel numbers. At the same time, the Canadian Armed Forces was going through the ‘decade of darkness,’ where funding and personnel were cut in a bit to balance government ledgers, while supporting high operational deployment tempo and dealing with negative public sentiment after several scandals within the forces. Post-

Afghanistan in 2014, the CAF is struggling to meet its domestic operational commitments, not to mention seeing a decline in the ability to deploy forces globally. The CAF would be unlikely to be able to deter or defend an incursion on Canadian sovereignty without allied help and is deficient in maintaining obligations to the defence of North America, thus leaving Canada neither strong nor secure.

With the Trudeau government proclaiming a robust return to PSO engagement, the time is now to ride a swell of public support for PSO missions to procure and restore the necessary equipment and skillsets for the CAF to keep Canada domestically capable. Through sustained commitment to peace support operations, Canada can work within the stated defence policy of ‘Engaged,’ to remain ‘Strong’ and ‘Secure’ at home. The capability Canada is lacking in the CAF for domestic defence is well-documented within current defence policy, as well as through numerous other professional and academic sources. This additional as well as the current CAF capability are well-suited to use on existing and envisioned PSOs, following the examples of a number of like-minded countries in hotspots around the world. Finally, “Strong, Secure, Engaged” provides the commitment and funding from government to deploy in support of multiple PSO missions, for sustained periods and at a pace that could be sustained indefinitely. The CAF have the required capability to engage immediately in PSOs, whether as part of a UN mission or in support of one. Defence policy supports the purchase of new capability and PSOs can be the necessary lever to gain public approval for additional procurement of the capability-shortfall discussed, such as amphibious ability. It would seem that all the required pieces are falling into place to create a dynamic, modern military force for Canada and to be engaged fully in global security affairs, but Canada has a history of promising big things and talking above its
weight, and so it remains to be seen whether this government can deliver on this, the most recent set of defence promises.
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