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HOW THE FALKLANDS WAR AFFECTED BRITISH NATIONAL POWER

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Exercise Solo Flight

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EXERCISE *SOLO FLIGHT* – EXERCICE *SOLO FLIGHT*

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Power resides where men believe it resides. No more and no less.

– George R.R. Martin

HOW THE FALKLANDS WAR AFFECTED BRITISH NATIONAL POWER

The Falkland Islands, a group of small barren islands lie off the Eastern tip of South America. These islands were home to just under 2000 people and in 1982, these islands became the centre of a battle for power and national identity that had been escalating over centuries of dispute.¹

The dispute goes back to the late eighteenth century, when control of the islands passed between Britain and Spain. In 1771 Britain reoccupied West Falkland (having been thrown off by Spain the year before) and it is claimed that Spain then recognized British sovereignty. However, a few years later Spain was back, following a British withdrawal. When Spanish rule in Latin America came to an end, Spain abandoned the Falklands (in 1811)...[Argentina] officially claimed in 1829. Britain which had never renounced its own claim, protested and at the start of 1833 expelled Argentine forces. Since then Britain has maintained a presence.²

The dispute finally ended during what is known today as the Falklands War, the United Kingdom's (UK) OPERATION CORPORATE, where a British Task Force was sent 16000km to retake the islands and re-establish the UK's sovereignty.³

¹ Worldometers, "Falkland Islands Population," Accessed 04 May 2018, <http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/falkland-islands-malvinas-population/>

² Lawrence Freedman, "The War of the Falkland Islands, 1982," *Foreign Affairs* 61, no. 1 (Fall 1982): 197.

³ James Corum, "Argentine Airpower in the Falklands War: An Operational View," *Air and Space Power Journal*; (Fall 2002): 60.

The quest for national power was the principle currency that was on the line during the conflict. When Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands, it was about to significantly increase its national power; it was a lightweight challenging a heavyweight champion for the championship title. Going to war with Argentina was not an easy decision for Britain. When Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher asked Admiral Leach why Britain should consider going to war over the Falklands, Leach exclaimed, “Because if we do not, or if we pussyfoot in our actions and do not achieve complete success, in another few months we shall be living in a different country whose word counts for little.”⁴ What he was saying is that, by not going to war, Britain will have failed in keeping its word and defending those who wanted to remain in the empire; and if Britain were to lose sovereignty so easily to a lesser power, then the power that Britain possessed globally would diminish significantly. Britain had already relinquished most of its empire in the last half century.⁵ In addition:

The military intervention at Egypt’s Suez Canal in 1956 was the moment Britain’s ambition to remain an imperial power floundered. The humiliating climb-down forced upon the British government by economic weakness and international disapproval showed it could no longer carry out a foreign policy independent of the United States.⁶

With diminished power after the Suez crisis, Britain’s national power stood to fade into obscurity. Britain had to act.

⁴ The Telegraph, “Admiral of the Fleet Sir Henry Leach,” Accessed 05 May 2018, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/military-obituaries/naval-obituaries/8474861/Admiral-of-the-Fleet-Sir-Henry-Leach.html>

⁵ Paul Sharp, *Thatcher's Diplomacy: The Revival of British Foreign Policy*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997, 52.

⁶ Grant, R.G., et al, *History of Britain and Ireland*, Dorling Kindersley: New York, New York, 2011, 367.

This paper will demonstrate that the Falklands War increased the UK's national power through the increase of its hard power, soft power, and the UK's own perception of itself as a nation, which led the UK to remain a global power. A brief background will set some of the initial historical perspectives of the conflict. Hard and soft power will then be defined, followed by the metrics that will be used to assess the UK's national power. The UK's hard power leading up to the war and its increase after the war will be examined, followed by the UK's soft power.

Power and Metrics

Famous power writer, Joseph Nye has written many books on power and coined the term "soft power." He defines power as "the ability to influence the behaviour of others to get the outcomes one wants."⁷ He then goes on to narrow down the definition of soft power to "the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion and payments."⁸ Nye refines this further, saying: "Soft power uses a different type of currency (not force, not money) to engender cooperation – an attraction to shared values and the justness and duty of contributing to the achievement of those values."⁹ What Nye is essentially saying is that soft power is the power to attract and draw others to your culture, beliefs, or to yourself for business purposes. It is a type of power that greatly influences immigration, such as the "American Dream" does for the United States. Soft power is not directly linked or proportional to hard power. Nye uses the following example to illustrate it: "Soviet soft power declined even as its hard economic and military resources continued to grow. Because of its brutal policies, the Soviet Union's hard

⁷ Joseph Nye Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. United States: Public Affairs, 2004, 2.

⁸ *Ibid.*, x.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 7.

power actually undercut its soft power.”¹⁰ For the UK, a country that appeared to be in slow decline since its days as a great empire, the Falklands War had the potential to erode the UK’s soft power if its actions were seen as too aggressive, while also increasing its soft power with the image of a nation that fights for all of its people.

Hard power is the more recognized and understood source of a nation’s power. It can be defined as “the capacity to coerce including both the threat of and resort to armed force, economic pressure including fiscal and commercial sanctions, subversive techniques, and various other forms of intimidation.”¹¹ At the time of the Falklands War, the UK was wielding its power through its military power, diplomatic power, and economic power, as well as its soft power – despite it not being labelled as such at the time.¹² According to Nye, some of the key methods of employing hard power are through payments, bribes, sanctions, diplomatic coercion and the use of force.¹³ Colonel Greg Smith, a student in the National Securities Program at the Canadian Forces College conducted an analysis of hard and soft power before applying it to Canada. He stated the most effective metrics of a nation’s hard military power is through an analysis of how much it spends on defence, as well as what capabilities it is able to project, but the most important factor that affects these measures is the nation’s will to project and use its military power.¹⁴ A nation’s gross domestic product (GDP) and ability to trade with other nations is an effective metric of a nation’s economic power.¹⁵ A nation’s effective use of diplomacy is also a

¹⁰ Ibid., 9.

¹¹ Boone Bartholomees, *The US Army War College Guide to National Security Issues Volume 1: Theory of War and Strategy*, (Carlisle, PA, 2010), 142.

¹² Joseph Nye Jr., *Soft Power...*, 31.

¹³ Ibid., 8.

¹⁴ G.R. Smith, “True North Strong and Free: A Study of Canadian National Power” (National Securities Program MPA Course Paper, Canadian Forces College, 2014), 38.

¹⁵ Ibid., 38.

measure of its power, and its number of embassies and diplomats is an effective measurement of its hard diplomatic power.¹⁶

To assess the UK's hard power, several metrics will be used. GDP and trade will be used to measure its economic power. Military spending and military capabilities will be used to measure its military power. Each will be assessed as to how they changed after the war. Measuring soft power is more complex; to measure soft power, immigration is the primary measure that will be used, as no soft power reports existed at the time of the war.

Various indicators and markers of power will be examined to define the UK's power and how the Falklands war affected it. With regard to the Falkland's War, power trends and indicators leading up to the Falklands War will be examined, as well as how these trends were affected in the period following the war. Trends will not be examined beyond 1991, since the end of the Cold War occurred at that time and any data after that is likely affected by the end of the Cold War and not the Falklands War.

Hard Power

If soft power is like the apple pie that draws visitors, then hard power is a big club that ensures they behave. In the years leading up to the Falklands War, British hard power was in an overall decline. However, by going to war over the Falkland Islands, the UK re-asserted its power and demonstrated that it still had the will to use its power when challenged. A stronger British economy and increased military power led to an overall increase in British hard power as

¹⁶ Ibid., 38.

a result of the war. This set the conditions to ensure the UK remained a major power player on the international stage.

Economic Power

In the years leading up to the war, the UK was facing difficult economic times. In 1960, the UK had the second largest GDP in the world, but it had decreased to the fifth largest economy in the world by the end of the 1970s.¹⁷ The UK's GDP was stagnant around \$1.2 trillion and was merely fluctuated from the late 1970s into the early 1980s, with no major increases.¹⁸

Domestically, the World Bank reported that the unemployment rate within the UK was increasing significantly, "from 1 million in 1979 to over 3 million by 1983, peaking at a rate of 12 percent of the labour force in 1982."¹⁹ The country's imports and exports did increase slightly from the late 1970s until 1981; however, at that point they saw a steep decline until a 1983 low.²⁰ It was a time of recession in the UK and the Falklands War would contribute to re-invigorating the economy.

Following the Falklands War, despite a few continued challenges economically, the UK's economy did rebound. The UK's GDP increased rapidly from its pre-war \$1.2T to \$1.64T in 1990.²¹ In addition, from 1983 to 1990, exports increased steadily from \$91.6 billion to \$185.0 billion while imports increased from \$118.9 billion to \$267.0 billion.²² These were significant increases in trade for the UK, increases that greatly contributed to its economic rebound. This

¹⁷ World Bank. "UK GDP (Current US\$)," Accessed 04 May 2018, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=GB>

¹⁸ World Bank. "UK GDP (constant 2010 US\$)," Accessed 04 May 2018, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD?end=1999&locations=GB&start=1974>

¹⁹ Alastair Blair, *Britain and the World since 1945*, New York; Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2015, 94.

²⁰ World Bank Data, "Imports/exports of goods and services (current US\$)," Accessed 04 May 2018, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.IMP.GNFS.CD?end=1997&locations=GB&start=1975>

²¹ World Bank. "UK GDP (constant 2010 US\$)," Accessed 04 May 2018, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD?end=1999&locations=GB&start=1974>

²² World Bank Data, "Imports/exports of goods and services (current US\$)," Accessed 04 May 2018, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.IMP.GNFS.CD?end=1997&locations=GB&start=1975>

increase in the economy signifies an increase in the UK's national power relative to what it was prior.

It could be argued that since the UK's GDP and economy remained the fifth largest in the world from 1980-1989 that the Falkland's War, in fact, did not benefit the economy.²³ Although the UK's economy increased significantly during this time period, the economies of France, Germany, and Japan continued to increase just as rapidly as the UK's economic recovery post war.²⁴ The Falkland's War was the only major event that contributed to this increase in economic strength. In addition, the UK's two major trading partners, France and Germany, also benefited economically through increased trade with the UK, despite the sanctions they had imposed on Argentina.²⁵ As the UK's GDP increased, France's and Germany's GDP's also increased.²⁶ As British power increased, so did the national power of its closest European allies.

Concurrently to the economic increase, the UK's population increased by over a million people from 1982 to 1991, more than ten times the increase it had in the decade leading up to the war.²⁷ This increase in attraction to the UK signifies an increase in UK soft power, which further contributed to the UK's hard economic rebound.²⁸ This correlation between the increase in population and the economic increase indicates that the UK's national power in the wake of the Falklands War also increased.

²³ International Monetary Fund, World Economic and Financial Surveys (Current US\$), Accessed 04 May 2018, <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/02/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x>

²⁴ World Bank. "UK GDP (Current US\$)," Accessed 04 May 2018, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=GB>

²⁵ Stelios Stavridis, and Christopher Hill, *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy: West European Reactions to the Falklands Conflict*, Oxford [England]; Washington, D.C: Berg, 1996, 60, 72.

²⁶ World Bank. "UK GDP (constant 2010 US\$)," Accessed 04 May 2018, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD?end=1999&locations=GB&start=1974>

²⁷ World Bank Data, UK Population, Accessed 04 May 2018, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?end=2016&locations=GB&start=1969&view=chart>

²⁸ Schmitt, John and Jonathan Wadsworth. "Changes in the Relative Economic Performance of Immigrants to Great Britain and the United States, 1980–2000." *British Journal of Industrial Relations* 45, no. 4 (2007): 662.

The only other factor that could have contributed to the economic changes was the *British Nationality Act 1981*, “the Act” appears to have contributed to the increase in immigration in the UK. The Act granted “the right to abode” to previous colonials living permanently in the UK and to the colonies of the *Isle of Man* and the *Channel Islands*.²⁹ It also modernised wording to allow mothers of children the ability to pass on citizenship, as well as granting citizenship to those that originally came from the colonies and were permanent residents, but due to previous technicalities had been unable to receive citizenship.³⁰ Therefore, the Act likely increased immigration, but since it was focused on those already in the UK, it was not a major event that affected the economy. The Falklands War was the only major event during that time period. Therefore, the Falklands War was the inciting incident that triggered an increase in the UK’s economy and, therefore, its economic hard power. Additionally, this increase positively affected France and Germany’s economies, increasing their economic power, and due to the close relationship between the nations economically and militarily, this further increased the perception of British national power.

Military Power

When measuring national power, it has been said that “the ultimate yardstick of national power is military capability.”³¹ Military allow a nation to act or threaten another nation into doing what that nation would not ordinarily do. Professor Ashley J. Tellis, Counselor to the National Bureau of Asian Research and a Senior Fellow at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, breaks down military capability into strategic resources, conversion

²⁹ The National Archives. “British Nationality Act 1981,” Accessed 05 May 2018, <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1981/61>

³⁰ The National Archives. “British Nationality Act 1981,” Accessed 05 May 2018, <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1981/61>

³¹ Ashley Tellis, Janice Bially, Christopher Layne, and Melissa McPherson, *Measuring National Power in the Postindustrial Age*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2000, 133.

capability and combat proficiency such that it can be assessed.³² He defines strategic resources and states that they can be assessed through their defence budgets, manpower, and military inventory.³³ Conversion capability he defines as the ability of the nation to convert its doctrine and the military it currently has to the one needed in the conflict.³⁴ While he states that combat proficiency can be defined and assessed as the measure of a nation to progress from basic combined arms forces to full combined arms, and eventually to joint and adaptive warfare, he also states that it is the most difficult to assess.³⁵ The UK's hard military power was relatively strong during the war, which led to it being able to win the Falklands War. The UK's strategic resources, conversion capability and combat proficiency increased following the war, resulting in a net UK power increase.

In the years leading up to the Falklands War, the defence policy, *UK Defence Program 1981*, was written. This policy planned cuts to the military, which included: 20,000 service members; the retirement of the full size aircraft carrier *Hermes*; the phasing out of the amphibious ships *Intrepid* and *Fearless*; and the strategic bomber – the Avro Vulcan.³⁶ The policy noted the retention of the Royal Marine Commandos; an increase in the number of submarines; an increase in Tornado Fighter jets with an expanded role; and an increase in army capabilities in mainland Europe.³⁷ Professor Eric Grove, a defence analyst and historian at multiple UK universities, states that the Thatcher government's intent with these cuts was to focus defense around the European theatre, cutting elsewhere in an attempt to balance the budget

³² Ibid., 29.

³³ Ibid., 29.

³⁴ Ibid., 33.

³⁵ Ibid., 43.

³⁶ United Kingdom, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, *United Kingdom Defence Program: The Way Forward*, Cmnd 8288, London, UK: Secretary of State for Defence, 1981, 4-8.

³⁷ Ibid., 4-8.

and, hence the economy.³⁸ Fortunately for the UK government, the Falklands War occurred before all the strategic asset retirements because, as Freedman states, the UK would not have otherwise had the capabilities to conduct the war as they did.³⁹ Defence journalists, Sir Max Hastings and Sir Simon Jenkins, state in their book, *The Battle for the Falklands*, that “it would have become entirely impossible [to win the Falklands War] within a few years when the carrier and amphibious assault groups had been phased out.”⁴⁰ Therefore, the overall state of the UK’s military was in decline, with further decline planned in the following years, which would equate to a decrease in hard power.

Strategic resources

As previously outlined, defence budgets are an important part of hard military power. Based on the World Bank data from the late 1970s up to 1982, it is clear that the UK was increasing its spending on its military. In 1979, the UK’s military spending was \$8.7 billion to \$14.2 billion in 1982.⁴¹ As a percent GDP, there were more fluctuations. In 1975, the UK spent 4.78 percent GDP on military, which then decreased to a low of 4.19 in 1979, followed by a sharp increase to 4.81 in 1982.⁴² Following the Falklands War, the UK’s defense budget increased between 1982 and 1991, nearly doubling from \$14.2 billion to a \$23.9 billion.⁴³ Following the Falklands War the Thatcher government adjusted its defence spending after a new review that contained several changes, “the defense budget was to be increased beyond the

³⁸ Eric Grove, “The Falklands War and British Defense Policy,” *Defense & Security Analysis* 18, no. 4 (2002): 307.

³⁹ Lawrence Freedman, “The War of the Falkland Islands, 1982,” *Foreign Affairs* 61, no. 1 (Fall 1982): 199.

⁴⁰ Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, *The Battle for the Falklands*, London, 1983, 62.

⁴¹ World Bank data, “UK Military spending Local Currency Unit (LCU),” Accessed 05 May 2018, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.CN?end=1997&locations=GB-AR&start=1979>

⁴² World Bank Data, “UK Military expenditure (% GDP),” Accessed 05 May 2018, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?end=1997&start=1978>

⁴³ World Bank data, “UK Military spending Local Currency Unit (LCU),” Accessed 05 May 2018, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.CN?end=1997&locations=GB-AR&start=1979>

planned three percent until 1985–6 to pay for the costs of replacements ... This allowed significant force enhancements.”⁴⁴ As a percent GDP, the defence budget decreased from 4.78% GDP in 1982 to 3.68% GDP in 1991.⁴⁵ However, in this case the percent GDP decrease actually indicates the wealth distribution within the yearly budget.⁴⁶ This indicates the Thatcher government’s attempt to end the economic slump, by investing large sections of the budget in areas that would re-invigorate the economy.⁴⁷ The fact is that the Falklands War resulted in a defence review that changed the policy at the time and increased the defence budget. This increase resulted in a post Falklands increase in hard military power.

Military manpower is a source of national power that is primarily projected by the army, but it is also projected by the other services. At the national level, the *UK Defence Program 1981* stated that it was reducing the UK’s military by 20,000 service members.⁴⁸ Following the review of the Falklands War, the British government wrote the supplementary White Paper, *The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons (Cmnd 8758)*, which changed a few of the planned cuts.⁴⁹ First the paper announced planned replacements for the ships lost, as reconstituting these was important to meet national commitments.⁵⁰ The paper went on to state that due to the continued Russian threat the focus of defence would remain mainland Europe, and the planned personnel cuts would continue.⁵¹ This would decrease the UK’s overall power; however, there was also to be more investment in “Out-of-Area” commitments, such as naval patrols to areas rarely

⁴⁴ Eric Grove, “The Falklands War and ... 309.

⁴⁵ World Bank Data, “UK Military expenditure (% GDP),” Accessed 05 May 2018, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?end=1997&start=1978>

⁴⁶ Economics help, “UK Government spending – Real and as % GDP,” Accessed 05 May 2018, <https://www.economicshelp.org/blog/5326/economics/government-spending/>

⁴⁷ A. Dorman, “John Nott and the Royal Navy: The 1981 Defence Review Revisited,” *Contemporary British History* 15, no. 2 (2001): 99.

⁴⁸ United Kingdom, Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, *United Kingdom Defence Program...* 4-8.

⁴⁹ Eric Grove, “The Falklands War and ... 308.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 310.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 308.

patrolled by the UK's navy.⁵² This would act as a reminder of British power to these areas. In the Falklands, military manpower was increased significantly by “a sizeable garrison of land, sea and air forces was to be deployed to the Falklands and its surroundings.”⁵³ This garrison saw an increase in soldiers, ships, air defence, and fighter jets.⁵⁴ This military hard power ensured that the Falklands was never again attacked or invaded, leaving a stark reminder of British hard power in the South Atlantic, and potentially around the world.

As Professor Tellis and Greg Smith both outline, military capabilities are a very important aspect of national hard power. Where defence budgets and military manpower are threatening, indicating the size of the club that will enforce hard power, military inventory is the club's ability to be swung and actually hit something. Within a military, these capabilities are the key assets that will win an operation. During the Falklands War, the UK employed several of these assets to win the war, demonstrating the UK's hard military power in action. The main assets used during the war were the UK's air power and naval power.

The UK's air power during the Falklands War consisted primarily of the Harrier fighter jets and the Avro Vulcan. Each can be identified as a source of power. The Sea Harrier jets were capable of vertical takeoff and landing, and were capable of being launched by the aircraft carriers and the large cargo vessel *Atlantic Conveyor*.⁵⁵ This allowed the Sea Harriers to be deployed anywhere in the world. These fighter jets conducted strikes against Argentine forces on the Falkland Islands, while also maintaining a combat air patrol over the carrier group – the

⁵² Ibid., 308.

⁵³ Ibid., 309.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 309.

⁵⁵ James Corum, “Argentine Airpower in the Falklands War: An Operational View,” *Air and Space Power Journal*, (Fall 2002): 60.

British operational centre of gravity.⁵⁶ This was a key factor that enabled the British to win the war and secure its place as a national power asset. Following the Falklands War, the lost Sea Harriers were replaced, as they were seen as a “production of a national intervention capability.”⁵⁷ Although this appeared to have a neutral effect on national power, it actually increased it. The Sea Harrier had demonstrated its capability and could now be labelled as combat proven; it had been used to defeat an enemy while being significantly outnumbered. This demonstration of combat proficiency is an increase in hard power.

The Avro Vulcans were initially designed as strategic nuclear bombers that would fly deep into an enemy’s territory and unleash nuclear weapons on that nation.⁵⁸ Though they were not used in the nuclear role during the Falklands War, they are a symbol of national power, their ability to fly deep into another country and release a nuclear arsenal is a strategic threat to an enemy. During the Falklands War they were flown from Ascension Island to strike the Falklands, giving the nation power image of “a nation mad enough to fly 4,000 miles to hole a runway might send Vulcans to bomb Buenos Aires.”⁵⁹ After their use, the Argentinians “pulled back [their fighters] to protect Buenos Aires from Vulcan raids.”⁶⁰ This demonstration of national power illustrates the importance of this type of strategic asset. Unfortunately, after the Falklands War, this bomber was retired from service due to its age and was never replaced, resulting in a major power decrease for the UK in the wake of the Falklands War. This national power gap was mitigated in two ways. First, among the coalition, the United States had the bulk of the strategic bombers to challenge Russia; and since the UK was procuring more ballistic submarines they

⁵⁶ Department of the Navy, *Lessons of the Falklands Summary Report February 1983*, Washington D.C. 1983, 33.

⁵⁷ Eric Grove, “The Falklands War and ... 309.

⁵⁸ Rowland White, *Vulcan 607: The Epic Story of the Most Remarkable British Air Attack Since WWII*, Corgi: United Kingdom, 2006, 198.

⁵⁹ Carl Posey, “Air War in the Falklands,” *Air and Space Magazine*, (September 2002), 9.

⁶⁰ Carl Posey, “Air War in the Falklands,” *Air and Space Magazine*... 9.

were not losing their nuclear launch capability, it was instead transferred to the navy.⁶¹ Also, the UK was in the process of procuring the Tornado fighter, which when combined with the Victor long range Air-to-air refuelers would allow conventional munitions to be delivered deep within enemy territory. Therefore, although the power symbol of the Vulcan was lost forever, the national power effects it delivered remained present, resulting in static power status.

The UK's naval power during the Falklands War can be organized into its aircraft carrier group and its attack submarine group. Aircraft carriers are, to this day, a symbol of national power. Countries that can afford aircraft carriers get the prestige and power projection that comes with them, along with the price tag. The UK deployed two carriers in the Falklands War. These carriers were crucial in projecting power over the islands and protecting the vital systems of the fleet such as the amphibious ships.⁶² One of these carriers was to be decommissioned before the start of the war; however, the value of its projection of power ensured that the government decided to retain it.⁶³ Therefore, the Falklands War ensured that the power of the aircraft carrier was not diminished.

Submarines are one of the power strategic power projection assets that a nation can have – the power they project should never be underestimated. During the Falklands War, the flagship of the Argentine navy, the *General Belgrano*, which had ship-mounted Exocets missiles, was manoeuvring toward the UK's carriers. However, the Argentine navy had not considered the threat of the submarines seriously enough.⁶⁴ The British government, seeing the threat of the Exocets, ordered the submarine, *HMS Conqueror*, to sink the *General Belgrano* on May 2nd,

⁶¹ Eric Grove, "The Falklands War and ... 309.

⁶² Finlan, Alastair. *The Royal Navy in the Falklands Conflict and the Gulf War: Culture and Strategy*. London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2004, 66.

⁶³ Eric Grove, "The Falklands War and ... 309.

⁶⁴ The National Archives. "Falklands: Background Briefing." Last modified 03 May 2010, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100503141944/http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/FactSheets/Falklands25BackgroundBriefing.htm>

1982.⁶⁵ With the sinking of their flagship, and the killing of 321 of its sailors, the “Argentine decision makers would not consider any further naval sorties, and the Argentine navy's one carrier remained in port.”⁶⁶ This one action by a submarine ensured British naval dominance over the South Atlantic during the war, and was consequently a national embarrassment for the Argentine government. The UK government now recognized the power of the submarines, and after the Falklands War they ordered additional submarines.⁶⁷ Therefore the Falklands War had the effect of demonstrating military hard power, leading to the procurement of more submarines, and increase British power.

During the Falklands War, the UK demonstrated its military power for the world to see. Since the British had been training for war against Russia on the plains of Eastern Europe, it demonstrated a high conversion capability in adapting its land forces to the conflict it actually faced. The adapted role of the Avro Vulcan is also example of this – its change from a strategic nuclear bomber to a conventional bomber.⁶⁸ In addition, British forces were “outnumbered and thousands of miles from a British air base, Britain was able to support a vast Task Force of over 100 ships, provide air defence, anti-submarine operations, ground support, and a myriad of other duties in a war which many thought was impossible.”⁶⁹ Therefore, British conversion capability and combat proficiency were evidently high entering the war, and with not major policy changes, remained high after the war. The only significant change was the UK recognizing that it needed a

⁶⁵ The National Archives. “Falklands: Background Briefing.” Last modified 03 May 2010, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100503141944/http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/FactSheets/Falklands25BackgroundBriefing.htm>

⁶⁶ James Corum, “Argentine Airpower in the Falklands War... 69.

⁶⁷ Eric Grove, “The Falklands War and ... 309.

⁶⁸ Rowland White, *Vulcan 607: The Epic Story of the Most Remarkable British Air Attack Since WWII*, Corgi: United Kingdom, 2006, 201.

⁶⁹ Stephen Badsey, R. P. W. Havers, and Mark J. Grove, “The Falklands Conflict Twenty Years on: Lessons for the Future,” Routledge, 2004, 265.

Joint Operational Headquarters, which it funded and built after the war.⁷⁰ In addition, recognizing the need for a higher level of combined training, the UK started conducting more combined exercises with its allies in Europe.⁷¹ The ability to continually adapt, and conduct more complex warfare at the multinational joint level run by a Joint Headquarters, allows a military to confront more complex and challenging problems, increasing its overall military power.

Not all of the academic world agrees that the Falklands War resulted in positive policy changes. Sir Roger Jackling, who served as the first Director General of the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, and professor Eric Grove both disagree with the assessment that the Falkland's War had a positive effect on defence. Professor Grove states:

In fact, there is a good case to be made that, although the war did have some marginal effects on policy, the basic direction of *The Way Forward* mapped out in 1981 was not greatly altered by the war and that the general trajectory of British defense policy remained as Mr Nott had planned.⁷²

He states that the slow reduction of frigates and destroyers from fifty-five to fifty ships, and then down to forty-eight, was just what Nott had noted in his original defence White Paper.⁷³

However, he also states that a change in procurement of the type of submarine also allowed the British to retain the amphibious ships, which would “enable us to maintain our capability to conduct amphibious operations not only on NATO's flank but also out of area.”⁷⁴ He then states

⁷⁰ Eric Grove, “The Falklands War and ... 309.

⁷¹ Stephen Badsey, R. P. W. Havers, and Mark J. Grove, “The Falklands Conflict Twenty...285.

⁷² Eric Grove, “The Falklands War and ... 307.

⁷³ Eric Grove, “The Falklands War and ... 311.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 307.

that the “main gain was the extra carrier.”⁷⁵ This indicates a misunderstanding of military power. Trading a couple of aging frigates and destroyers for an extra aircraft carrier, two amphibious ships, and a couple of extra submarines is a huge gain. These are all national strategic assets that allowed the UK to project military power globally in the following year, such as during the Gulf War. Overall, the Falklands War led to an increase in economic power, defence spending, and military capabilities, which led to an overall increase in British hard power following the Falklands War.

Soft Power

Soft power is the attraction effect and the driving force behind immigration. As a war is about to be initiated, a nation uses soft power to gain support from its allies, both from the governmental and general public. An example of this is Australia’s illegal immigration. Australia is a land of safety, security, and a country that values human rights. The fact that it is in a neighborhood full of insecurity and human rights violations creates an attraction, drawing immigrants to it, specifically illegal immigrants, because in Australia they may have a future. Unfortunately, soft power is very difficult to measure. At the time of the Falklands War, the concept of soft power had not been established and so there are no soft power reports that can be used to confirm the desired metrics to be used. Therefore, simple metrics that are more tangible will be employed to measure the UK’s soft power. When examining the UK’s immigration, the image it projected, and its trade economy, it is clear that the UK’s soft power increased after the Falklands War.

Immigration

⁷⁵ Ibid., 311.

Both immigration and illegal immigration are excellent measures of a nation's soft power, since it measures that attractive power of the nation towards the other people of the world. For examples the American Dream, which has had such a draw on the peoples of the world illustrates American soft power. The population of the UK in 1974 was 56,229,974 people, which increased to 56,313,641 in 1982, and to 57,424,897 by 1991.⁷⁶ This demonstrates no direct correlation in the years following the Falklands War. The UK's immigration data also suggests that the Falklands War had little effect; the British population graphs show a steeper immigration increase after the fall of the Berlin wall.⁷⁷ Therefore, this does not demonstrate a soft power change due to immigration, since the increases are proportionally insignificant.

When focusing on a more regional level, the data indicates different results. The population of the Falkland Islands was decreasing leading up to the war. In 1974, the islands had a population of 1,935, which had decreased by 1982 to 1,843 people.⁷⁸ Then after the war the population increased to 2,063 people as of 1991, and then continued to increase to 2,954 people by 2004.⁷⁹ At first glance, this increase appears to occur too long after the war to have been impacted by the war. However, it is actually a direct result of the Falklands War.

The Falklands War increased security to the Falklands in the form of sovereignty and stability within the empire. This was primarily due to the fact that the UK granted full British

⁷⁶ World Bank Data, UK Population, Accessed 04 May 2018, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?end=2016&locations=GB&start=1969&view=chart>

⁷⁷ Office for National Statistics, "Explore 50 years of international migration to and from the UK," Last modified: 01 Dec 2016, <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/articles/explore50yearsofinternationalmigrationtoandfromtheuk/2016-12-01>

⁷⁸ Worldometers, "Falkland Islands Population," Accessed 04 May 2018, <http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/falkland-islands-malvinas-population/>

⁷⁹ Worldometers, "Falkland Islands Population," Accessed 04 May 2018, <http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/falkland-islands-malvinas-population/>

citizenship to the Falkland Islanders.⁸⁰ This led to an influx of workers into “jobs like sheep-shearing and nursing are now filled by Chileans, while mixed-race people from the island of St. Helena [another British territory], which lies some 2,500 miles to the northeast, take service jobs as waiters and store clerks.”⁸¹ These workers helped fill jobs that the aging Falkland population was having issues filling. What precipitated this influx of workers was the “result of Britain’s decision to allow the Falklands government to declare a 200-mile economic zone that gives islanders jurisdiction over the icy but fish-rich waters around them.”⁸² The Falkland Island economic study that was conducted in 1976 had stated that the Falklands economy was “in grave danger of collapsing in the next five years or so without continued support and/or development.”⁸³ This was due to the fact that the economy lacked diversification.⁸⁴ However, the economic report outlined the potential fishing economy, and how the adoption of the 200-mile economic zone surrounding the Falkland Islands was theorized to spark the economy.⁸⁵ These changes in economic policies then began attracting foreign businesses, such as “Korean, Taiwanese, Russian and Spanish ships with Indonesian, Filipino and Bangladeshi crews [which] scoop up tons of squids, which have replaced wool and mutton as the territory’s principal export.”⁸⁶ Victory in the Falklands War led the UK to declare economic zone, which led to greater cashflow on the islands.⁸⁷ This increased economy combined with a sense of security, as well as the potential of becoming a British citizen, drew in workers from the region while also attracting business globally. This increase in attraction was a result of the Falklands War.

⁸⁰ Larry Rohter, “25 Years After War, Wealth Changes Falklands,” *New York Times*, Last modified: 01 April 2007, <https://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/01/world/americas/01falklands.html>

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁸² *Ibid.*

⁸³ Edward Shackleton, et al, *Falkland Islands Economic Study*, 1982. Vol. 8653. London: H.M.S.O, 1982.6.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁸⁶ Larry Rohter, “25 Years After War, Wealth Changes Falklands...”

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

Conclusion

The Falklands War can be attributed to the Argentinians assessing British power as declining, while perceiving theirs as ascending. Their misjudgement and poor assessment of British power led to them starting the war, but Britain's superior hard power ensured their own victory in the war. The Falklands War precipitated increased military hard power in the form of strategic resources, conversion capability and combat proficiency, and a stronger British economy which indicate a net increase in the UK's hard power. The war also resulted in an increase in British soft power, which was observed through an increase in immigration to the UK, as well as an increase in immigration to the Falkland Islands. The UK learned some valuable lessons about power during the war. A country goes to war with only the military power it has at the time, and so reducing military hard power is a national risk. A country must continuously foster its relationships with its allies. The US's and the European community's support during the war was crucial; it provided support for the UK at the UN, as well as imposing economic sanctions and an arms embargo on Argentina immediately and unanimously at the outset of the war.⁸⁸ In the end, Britain kept its word to its citizens, kept its honour, and showed the world that it would not step down from the world stage. The United Kingdom would remain a major global power, even if it was no longer the biggest.

⁸⁸ Stelios Stavridis, and Christopher Hill, *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy: West European Reactions to the Falklands Conflict*, Oxford [England]; Washington, D.C: Berg, 1996, 41.

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