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DOMESTIC OPERATIONS READINESS: EVOLVING TO MATCH PREPAREDNESS TO THREATS

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Exercise Solo Flight

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EXERCISE *SOLO FLIGHT* – EXERCICE *SOLO FLIGHT*

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Maj Garrett Hallman

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DOMESTIC OPERATIONS READINESS: EVOLVING TO MATCH PREPAREDNESS TO THREATS

While Domestic Operations (Dom Ops) within sovereign Canadian territory is unquestionably within the mandate of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), the CAF is known officially as “the force of last resort” within Canada.¹ The role of the CAF within Canada is to serve as the last line of defence, only getting involved when civilian capabilities at the municipal, provincial and federal level are overwhelmed. The CAF is only the force of first resort in the defence of Canada from foreign threats, when these threats don’t fall into the categories of criminal actions that require investigation, and judicial proceedings. This essentially limits the CAF’s primary mission in the Defence of Canada to conventional military threats from adversary countries.

The problem with this concept of the CAF being “the force of last resort” is that the decision to employ the CAF within Canada is a political decision with requests emanating from the municipal and provincial political levels, or other federal departments, to the federal political level for decisions and direction. While CAF doctrine, plans, processes and preparations are generally structured based on requests emanating from the bottom up in a bureaucratic fashion, this is rarely the way that Requests for Assistance (RFAs) occur and any true requirements for the CAF to launch an operation as the “force of last resort” will not follow the laborious official RFA process.

¹ National Defence. "National Defence | Canadian Armed Forces | Article | The Force of Last Resort: How the CAF Respond to Natural Disasters across Canada." DND CAF. June 23, 2014. Accessed May 08, 2018. <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/news/article.page?doc=the-force-of-last-resort-how-the-caf-respond-to-natural-disasters-across-canada/hwrv2eb>.

There is provision in CAF regulations for CAF Regional Joint Task Force (RJTF) Commanders to launch rapid response operations (RRO) in the case of a disaster to save lives or alleviate human suffering that would otherwise occur by formally seeking the authority needed to respond. But other than elements of units belonging to the Canadian Special Operations Command (CANSOFCOM), CAF units tasked with high readiness for domestic operations are not trained and prepared to respond on a RRO timeline. The forces the CAF has assigned to Dom Ops high readiness are not emergency services, but there is an expectation amongst many elected officials and much of the Canadian population that they are. The CAF needs to update their approach to Dom Ops high readiness to ensure expectations can be met during contingency and RRO Dom Ops.

The CAF faces a problem when it comes to Dom Ops. Enshrined within the Canada First Defence Policy (CFDP) published in 2008 was a theme that Dom Ops have primacy over international operations for the CAF. An updated defence policy, *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy (SSE)*, reiterates this primacy while also reiterating that Canadian national security relies upon North American continental security.² While the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), and the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) are intrinsic components of continental defence through NORAD and NATO commitments, the Canadian Army (CA) is the primary force for disaster response within Canada. The culture of the CA is to prepare for and prioritize warfighting on international operations over domestic operations. In military parlance, this is the most dangerous course of action (COA). But the history of the CAF demonstrates repeated domestic deployments, making this the most likely COA. To properly meet their requirements for Dom Ops, the CAF must take actions to prioritize forces assigned to Dom Ops high readiness

² National Defence. "Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy." National Defence | Canadian Armed Forces. April 12, 2018. Accessed May 08, 2018. <http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/canada-defence-policy/index.asp>. 60

over other taskings, must acquire specific Dom Ops equipment so it is immediately available for use and must standardize the Dom Ops training and Operational Readiness (OPRED) Declaration process. This is all required to satisfy the standard set in SSE.

The CAF must be prepared to deploy high readiness forces on a RRO timeline across Canada to adequately respond to the worst case scenarios these forces could face. Greater capabilities to respond to worst case scenario domestic crises and natural disasters is in the CAF's broader interest. Improvements to Dom Ops capabilities are an easier sell to the electorate and politicians, and any Dom Ops improvements will also bolster international operations capabilities.

While Canada does not routinely suffer from frequent large scale disasters, the threat is always present and smaller scale disasters are very frequent. A state's preparedness is often reactive and based on past events, attempting to patch holes and fill gaps once they are found. Canada and the CAF should look to disasters experienced in other countries when preparing for future events due to the effects of climate change and likely exacerbation of the disasters already experienced routinely within Canada.

Global climate change will continue to have an impact on Canadian national security and safety, both from the direct threat of the effects on our ecosystems and secondary effects due to the impact on other nations we depend on economically for imports and exports. The climate change debate is essentially settled with 97% of climate scientists agreeing that climate change is occurring due to carbon pollution warming the earth. Carbon levels and temperatures have risen

hand in hand since the industrial revolution and there is now enough scientific evidence to make it irrefutable.³

The earth experiences natural warming and cooling cycles, but scientists believe the current warming trend is unprecedented in the last 1300 years.⁴ While there have been significant decreases in carbon pollution in some areas, significant increases in the developing world have led to current carbon pollution from the fossil fuel industry being the highest ever.⁵ Many scientists believe that carbon levels must start to decline in 2020 to prevent catastrophic consequences.⁶

Slightly warmer temperatures cause significant changes to the environment leading to droughts, floods, wildfires and superstorms. It has been recorded that the Earth's temperature has raised one degree Celsius since 1880 and it is projected to rise a total of four degrees by the end of the century. These numbers seem insignificant, but the impacts are disproportionate with global sea levels rising 20cm since 1901.⁷ Some studies indicate another one to four foot rise in sea levels by 2100 due to melting ice with the Arctic Ocean ice free during summer months by mid-century.⁸ Higher sea levels will cause greater erosion in coastal areas while warmer waters will impact fisheries.

³ "Climate 101." Climate Reality. Accessed May 08, 2018. <https://www.climaterealityproject.org/climate-101>.

⁴ "Climate Change Evidence: How Do We Know?" NASA. April 04, 2018. Accessed May 08, 2018. <https://climate.nasa.gov/evidence/>.

⁵ Carrington, Damian. "Fossil Fuel Burning Set to Hit Record High in 2017, Scientists Warn." The Guardian. November 13, 2017. Accessed May 08, 2018. <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/nov/13/fossil-fuel-burning-set-to-hit-record-high-in-2017-scientists-warn>.

⁶ "Three Years to Safeguard Our Climate." Nature News. Accessed May 08, 2018. <https://www.nature.com/news/three-years-to-safeguard-our-climate-1.22201>.

⁷ "Climate 101." Climate Reality. Accessed May 08, 2018. <https://www.climaterealityproject.org/climate-101>.

⁸ "Global Climate Change: Effects." NASA. February 27, 2018. Accessed May 08, 2018. <https://climate.nasa.gov/effects/>.

Floods are the most frequent natural hazard in Canada. Higher temperatures cause greater evaporation which causes more precipitation, and not necessarily in the region where the evaporation occurred. Every one degree Fahrenheit increase in temperature allows the atmosphere to hold four percent more water vapour, leading to heavier precipitation. Flooding due to heavy rains and rapid spring melting of thick snow pack will increase due to climate change, with the impact potentially already being felt.⁹

The oceans' temperatures have increased 1-3 degrees Fahrenheit over the last one hundred years, directly fuelling hurricanes.¹⁰ One study suggests that hurricanes are intensifying much quicker, with the greatest reduction in time being in the North Atlantic.¹¹ Along with intensity, frequency and duration of North Atlantic hurricanes, including the strongest category hurricanes, have all increased since the early 1980's.¹² The previously mentioned sea level increase magnifies the destructive power of hurricanes by intensifying the storm surge.

While some areas receive heavy rains causing flooding, other areas will see soil moisture (drought) decrease causing a threat to food supplies. Drought will have a less of an impact on Canada than other countries located closer to the equator, but countries that we rely on for food imports will be impacted to a much greater extent. More than flooding and sea level rise,

⁹ "Floods." Get Prepared / Préparez-vous. February 27, 2018. Accessed May 08, 2018. <https://www.getprepared.gc.ca/cnt/hzd/flds-en.aspx>.

¹⁰ "Warmer Air Means More Evaporation and Precipitation." Climate Central. September 06, 2017. Accessed May 08, 2018. <http://www.climatecentral.org/gallery/graphics/warmer-air-means-more-evaporation-and-precipitation>.

¹¹ Kishtawal, C. M., Neeru Jaiswal, Randhir Singh, and D. Niyogi. "Tropical Cyclone Intensification Trends during Satellite Era (1986–2010)." *Journal of Geophysical Research: Atmospheres*. May 26, 2012. Accessed May 08, 2018. <https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1029/2012GL051700>.

¹² "Global Climate Change: Effects." NASA. February 27, 2018. Accessed May 08, 2018. <https://climate.nasa.gov/effects/>.

prolonged drought could have serious consequences causing large scale migrations of millions of people away from the equator, potentially into Canada.¹³

Drought will also set the conditions for more frequent wildfires of greater intensity, causing more damage to root systems and soil. Wildfires are a threat throughout most of Canada, and as evidenced by the Fort McMurray can cause rapid large scale destruction to urban areas. The continuous battle against wildfires in California serve as a good example to regions further north of what may come due to climate change. The 2017 wildfire season was the costliest ever in California's history with \$9 billion USD in damage.¹⁴ This cost was essentially the same as the Fort McMurray fire, and is not something that can be afforded on a routine basis.¹⁵

Numerous locations in Canada are assessed as having a high risk of earthquakes which would be of sufficient intensity to damage manmade infrastructure. Earthquakes occur on a routine basis without causing damage to infrastructure. But in the past, very significant earthquakes have occurred off the coast of Newfoundland, in the Arctic in the vicinity of Baffin Bay, and multiple earthquakes have occurred along the Pacific Coast.¹⁶ Two populated areas of Canada are at a particular risk, the Lower British Columbia Mainland and the Charlevoix Seismic Zone near Quebec City. It is estimated that a 9.0 magnitude earthquake in BC would

¹³ "Megadroughts in U.S. West Projected to Be Worst of the Millennium." NASA. Accessed May 08, 2018. <https://svs.gsfc.nasa.gov/cgi-bin/details.cgi?aid=4270>.

¹⁴ Kasler, Dale. "Wine Country Wildfire Costs Now Top \$9 Billion, Costliest in California History." Sacbee. Accessed May 08, 2018. <http://www.sacbee.com/news/state/california/fires/article188377854.html>.

¹⁵ Weber, Bob. "Fort McMurray Wildfire Financial Impact Reaches Almost \$10B, Study Says." Thestar.com. January 17, 2017. Accessed May 08, 2018. <https://www.thestar.com/business/2017/01/17/fort-mcmurray-wildfire-financial-impact-reaches-almost-10b-study-says.html>.

¹⁶ Natural Resources Canada, Earthquakes Canada. "Important Canadian Earthquakes." Government of Canada, Natural Resources Canada, Earthquakes Canada. Accessed May 08, 2018. <http://www.seismescanada.rncan.gc.ca/historic-historique/map-carte-en.php>.

cost almost \$75 billion and a 7.1 magnitude earthquake near Quebec City would cost approximately \$61 billion.¹⁷

While tsunami waves can be caused by undersea earthquakes, they can also be caused by other rapid, large scale disturbances of water such as volcanic eruptions, landslides and meteor impacts. This makes all coastal areas of Canada susceptible to tsunamis, but coastal BC has been struck multiple times by tsunamis in the past and 27 people were killed in Newfoundland in 1929 from a tsunami that was a result of an earthquake 250 kilometres away.¹⁸ Residents of coastal BC live in constant threat of devastating earthquakes and tsunamis.

The Canadian population has largely been lulled into a false sense of security due to the relative calm during the period following the end of the Cold War and the lack of large scale terrorist attacks in Canada following the September 11th Attacks (9/11). It is not that Canada is a comparably unsafe country, but it is not the "...fireproof house, far from inflammable materials..." that Senator Dandurand claimed it to be in 1924.¹⁹ Standing next to the United States, it is easy for Canada to look innocent when compared against a country with such a history of extreme violence. But the tensions which have ignited periodically throughout Canadian history remain today while other tensions have been imported via diaspora populations and Canadian foreign policies.

Public Safety Canada's report, 2017 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada, lists groups inspired by violent Islamist ideology as the main terrorist threat to Canada while

¹⁷ Natural Resources Canada, Earthquakes Canada. "Earthquake Hazard." Government of Canada, Natural Resources Canada, Earthquakes Canada. Accessed May 08, 2018. <http://www.seismescanada.rncan.gc.ca/hazard-alea/>.

¹⁸ Natural Resources Canada, Earthquakes Canada. "Information on Tsunamis." Government of Canada, Natural Resources Canada, Earthquakes Canada. Accessed May 08, 2018. <http://www.seismescanada.rncan.gc.ca/info-gen/tsunami-en.php>.

¹⁹ Bothwell, Robert. "The Canadian Isolationist Tradition." *International Journal* 54, no. 1 (1998): 76. doi:10.2307/40203356.

acknowledging that Right-Wing extremism is a growing concern. The report states that at the time of publishing, there were 190 persons with a nexus to Canada suspected of engaging in terrorist related activities outside of Canada. The Government acknowledged that an additional 60 had returned to Canada.²⁰ The acts committed by organized and self-radicalized terrorists in countries outside of Canada serve as a clear warning of what could occur in Canada. The ideologically motivated violent attacks that have occurred in Canada appear to be due to self-radicalization and this self-radicalization isn't limited to violent Islamism.

Despite the relationships built between the CAF and many aboriginal communities, there are still many communities that are not overly receptive to the CAF or other federal agencies. The conditions for tensions to flare up into violent confrontations still remain. Poverty, substance abuse and violence plagues many aboriginal communities, essentially the same conditions that exist in many locations in the world where Western military forces have deployed to conduct counter insurgency operations. While the Oka Crisis of 1990 serves as an example of a worst case scenario example, that situation was essentially a chain of events leading to a perfect storm.²¹ Still, other incidents have happened in Canada between Aboriginal communities and law enforcement agencies that could require CAF assistance or a CAF operation if they were to escalate beyond the capabilities of law enforcement.

One very recent example is the Muskrat Falls Project protests. The construction of a hydroelectric dam west of Happy Valley-Goose Bay, Labrador on the Churchill River by Nalcor Energy, a corporation of the Newfoundland and Labrador (NL) Provincial government, led to a

²⁰ "2017 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada." Public Safety Canada / Sécurité Publique Canada. December 21, 2017. Accessed May 08, 2018. <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrscs/pblctns/pblc-rprt-trrst-thrt-cnd-2017/index-en.aspx>.

²¹ Maloney, Sean M. "Domestic Operations: The Canadian Approach." SeanMMaloney.Com. Autumn 1997. Accessed May 7, 2018. <http://www.seanmmaloney.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/PARAMETERS-US-Army-War-College-Quarterly-Autumn-1997.pdf>. 7

series of protests by Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal groups. In Fall 2016, the protests turned heated with the protestors breaching the Nalcor fence into the construction site and making threats against Nalcor employees amongst others in the region supporting the construction project and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) response. The RCMP surged large numbers of personnel into the region to quell the protests and get the construction project restarted. The RCMP received limited support from the CAF, mostly secure accommodations at Canadian Forces Base (CFB) Goose Bay.²²

It is public knowledge in Labrador that many protestors and some leaders of the protest were CRPG members, who are members of the CA Primary Reserves. Direction from the NL government, again the owners of the project, to the RCMP empowered them to deploy police officers into the region “to the extent necessary...to maintain law and order”.²³ There is no interest in the senior leadership of the CAF to get involved in an armed confrontation with Aboriginal communities. The CA COIN manual was even amended to remove references to past Aboriginal insurgencies to ensure that there was no provocation of tensions.²⁴

Quebec Nationalism has morphed since the Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) insurgency which lasted from 1963 to 1970. It should be noted that this violent insurgency, which transformed into a failed political separatist campaign, met some of its objectives with 600,000 Anglophone Canadians departing Quebec.²⁵ The Marxist-Leninist ideology of the FLQ

²² Roberts, Terry. "How the Military Quietly Provided Behind-the-scenes Support amid Threatened Muskrat Falls Protests | CBC News." CBCnews. February 01, 2018. Accessed May 08, 2018. <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/newfoundland-labrador/labrador-canadian-forces-muskrat-1.4508634>.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ "Forces' Terror Manual Lists Natives with Hezbollah." The Globe and Mail. April 25, 2018. Accessed May 08, 2018. <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/forces-terror-manual-lists-natives-with-hezbollah/article17994390/>.

²⁵ Bryan-Baynes, Elysia. "'Quebec My Country Mon Pays' Tackles Anglophone Exodus from Quebec." Global News. November 16, 2016. Accessed May 08, 2018. <https://globalnews.ca/news/3069385/quebec-my-country-mon-pays-tackles-anglophone-exodus-from-quebec/>.

and separatist agenda have given way to far-right nationalist ideology seeking to protect Quebec culture from immigrant influence.

Groups such as Justiciers du peuple, PEGIDA Quebec, Soldats d'Odin and La Meute have been created in recent years, generally sharing intolerant attitudes especially towards Muslims. While there are no public indications that the groups have a violent agenda, such as the FLQ, hate crimes have increased in Quebec.²⁶ These groups are active in online forums where they can spread their messages, something not available during the FLQ insurgency causing FLQ terrorists to set off bombs and kidnap officials for publicity. The internet and television 24/7 news channels provide a substitute for attracting attention to spread messages. The threat of violence from far-right groups is a reality and the presence of former members of the CAF with combat experience in Afghanistan makes these groups a threat to be taken very seriously.²⁷

National security threats to Canada by state actors exists, but are not publicized in Canada in the way that they are in other countries. Occasionally, threats do make the headlines but they often do not last. This is likely due to the fact that there is less motivation to politicize national security threats in Canada. While Canada's geographic location surrounded by three oceans and the US provides great protection, Canadians also inherit many of the threats that face the US due to proximity. Due to modern technology, a war between the US and near-peer adversaries could have severe effects inside Canadian territory.

While the current Liberal government has worked very closely with China to build a better trade relationship, under the former Progressive Conservative government a former

²⁶ Montpetit, Jonathan. "Where Do Quebec's Extremist Groups Fit in the Global Far-right Movement? | CBC News." CBCnews. January 22, 2017. Accessed May 08, 2018. <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/quebec-far-right-how-worried-should-we-be-1.3947183>.

²⁷ Ibid.

Canadian CSIS director accused China in 2010 of infiltrating Canadian politics up to the provincial cabinet level.²⁸ Concurrent to Canada's diplomatic efforts to form tighter bonds with China, the United States have been more openly accusatory that Chinese actions and influence in the United States is a clear national security threat. Assuming that US accusations are well founded, it is rational to assume that the same Chinese actions in Canada also constituted a national security threat.

Recently, Confucius Institutes have come under scrutiny in the United States. These organizations are Chinese state funded educational institutes that teach Chinese language, culture and history, but even the Chinese government has acknowledged their true intent. In a speech by a government official, these institutes were described as making "... an important contribution toward improving our soft power...Using the excuse of teaching Chinese language, everything looks reasonable and logical."²⁹ Confucius Institutes represent a global state sponsored influence campaign, with approximately 500 locations and \$10 billion USD in annual funding.³⁰

The Chinese government has openly declared that these locations are an important part of their propaganda efforts against "...Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan, human rights and Falun Gong"³¹ With these institutes generally located on or in close proximity to universities and colleges, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) accusations that many Chinese students are covertly spying for the Chinese state make these institutes potential offices of Chinese

²⁸ News, CBC. "Some politicians under foreign sway: CSIS." CBCnews. June 23, 2010. Accessed February 20, 2018. <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/some-politicians-under-foreign-sway-csis-1.909345>.

²⁹ Epstein, Ethan, Timothy Bella, Jack Shafer, and Ronan Farrow. "How China Infiltrated U.S. Classrooms." Politico. January 17, 2018. Accessed May 08, 2018. <https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/01/16/how-china-infiltrated-us-classrooms-216327>.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

foreign intelligence organizations.³² In Canada, the Confucius Institutes website lists 12 institutes and 36 classrooms. These locations are mostly collocated with Canadian universities, colleges and high schools.³³

The US has also recently accused Chinese state owner telecommunications companies of producing technology built with the capability for Chinese intelligence organisations to spy on users. Huawei and ZTE cellphones have been banned from sale on US military installations.³⁴ Retailer Best Buy has stopped selling Huawei cellphones, laptops and smartwatches while US telecommunications companies AT&T and Verizon have refused to sell them due to pressure from the US government.³⁵ Against the advice of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) Department of National Defence (DND), the current Liberal government have approved the sale of Canadian technology companies to Chinese buyers.³⁶

While Chinese investment in Canada is important, it also places Canada in a difficult position with the US as a NORAD and NATO partner and member of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance. China has also declared itself a “Near Arctic State” with the 2018 release of its first Arctic policy. They have openly declared interest in opening Arctic shipping lanes, participating

³²Arciga, Betsy Woodruff Julia. "FBI Director's Shock Claim: Chinese Students Are a Potential Threat." The Daily Beast. February 14, 2018. Accessed May 08, 2018. <https://www.thedailybeast.com/fbi-directors-shock-claim-chinese-students-are-a-potential-threat>.

³³"Confucius Institute/Classroom in Canada." Confucius Institute/Classroom. Accessed May 7, 2018. http://english.hanban.org/node_10971.htm.

³⁴Connolly, Amanda. "Huawei, ZTE Phones Banned by Pentagon over Spying Fears Neither Sold nor Banned by Canadian Military." Global News. May 03, 2018. Accessed May 08, 2018. <https://globalnews.ca/news/4184104/pentagon-ban-huawei-zte-military-bases-canada/>.

³⁵Gartenberg, Chaim. "Best Buy Won't Sell Huawei Phones, Laptops, or Smartwatches Anymore." The Verge. March 22, 2018. Accessed May 08, 2018. <https://www.theverge.com/2018/3/22/17151186/best-buy-huawei-smartphone-china>.

³⁶"Ottawa Accused of Appeasing China with Second Review of Takeover Deal." The Globe and Mail. April 13, 2017. Accessed May 08, 2018. <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/ottawa-accused-of-appeasing-china-with-second-review-of-takeover-deal/article33713720/>.

in Arctic fossil fuel and mineral exploration, Arctic fisheries and tourism.³⁷ Canada needs to remember that Canadian values conflict greatly with Chinese state values. It is not difficult to find reminders of this with examples like the recent Chinese government explosive demolition of a Christian church, as Christianity is seen as a national security threat in China.³⁸

The debut of Russia's re-organized military and synchronization of their instruments of national power to conduct what they have labelled as New Generation Warfare, but fitting the US model of hybrid warfare, is a clear warning to Canada and other Western states that they must enhance their defences against Russian aggression. Russia's use of non-state actors, such as private military company (PMC) contractors, insurgents, criminal gangs and hackers, alongside uniformed and non-uniformed Russian military members and other state actors, all in a unified campaign to achieve their objectives was predicted in the West before its employment in Ukraine.³⁹

Russian aggression, and success, in Ukraine coincided with the start of their campaign to influence the US election. Russia hired a private company known as the Internet Research Agency (IRA) to conduct deniable influence operations with the objective, in Putin's words, of implementing Russian national interests without direct state involvement.⁴⁰ The IRA, labelled as a "Troll Farm" or "Troll Factory" is connected to the Wagner Group PMC, which has operated in Ukraine and Syria, through its owner Yevgeny Prigozhin who has close ties to

³⁷ Gao, Charlotte. "China Issues Its Arctic Policy." *The Diplomat*. January 27, 2018. Accessed May 08, 2018. <https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/china-issues-its-arctic-policy/>.

³⁸ Goldman, Russell. "Chinese Police Dynamite Christian Megachurch." *The New York Times*. January 12, 2018. Accessed May 08, 2018. <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/12/world/asia/china-church-dynamite.html>.

³⁹ Wilkie, Robert. "Hybrid Warfare Something Old, Not Something New." *Air & Space Power Journal*, Winter 2009. Accessed April 21, 2018.

⁴⁰ Lee, Dave. "The tactics of a Russian troll farm." *BBC News*. February 16, 2018. Accessed February 20, 2018. <http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-43093390>.

Putin.⁴¹ Pigozhin and members of the IRA have been indicted by the US for interfering in and influencing the 2016 US Presidential elections. This was done through an extensive campaign of masquerading as US citizens to ferment discord amongst Americans by exploiting social media.⁴² IRA influence activities appear to be targeted more at ensuring Hillary Clinton lost the election than in ensuring that Donald Trump won the election.⁴³ IRA actions were not limited to the 2016 election, as they also targeted the controversial topics of immigration, ethnic minority group rights (eg. Black Lives Matter), religion, and geographic regional interests to sow discord amongst the US population.⁴⁴ It is also believed that Russia influenced the BREXIT vote in the UK in favour of leaving to weaken the European Union and that elections in Germany, France, the Netherlands and the Czech Republic have been targeted by Russian operations.^{45 46}

Relations between Russia and Canada are at a low point, and as a liberal democracy Canada is vulnerable to Russian influence. Russia has actively tried to undermine Canada's deployment to Latvia as part of the NATO Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) in the Baltic states.⁴⁷ Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia Freeland is banned from travelling to

⁴¹ "Russias shadowy world of military contractors: independent mercenaries, or working for the Kremlin?" Los Angeles Times. Accessed February 20, 2018. <http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-russia-mercenaries-20180218-story.html>.

⁴² Lee, Dave. "The tactics of a Russian troll farm." BBC News. February 16, 2018. Accessed February 20, 2018. <http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-43093390>.

⁴³ Hosking, Priscilla Alvarez and Taylor. "The Full Text of Mueller's Indictment of 13 Russians." The Atlantic. February 16, 2018. Accessed February 20, 2018. <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/02/rosenstein-mueller-indictment-russia/553601/>.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ PUTIN'S ASYMMETRIC ASSAULT ON DEMOCRACY IN RUSSIA AND EUROPE: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY." COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE. January 10, 2018. Accessed February 20, 2018. <https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FinalRR.pdf>.

⁴⁶ Blanchfield, Mike. "NATO Researcher Warns of Russian Interference in 2019 Canadian Election | CBC News." CBCnews. February 27, 2018. Accessed May 08, 2018. <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/nato-researcher-russian-interference-election-1.4553572>.

⁴⁷ Blackwell, Tom. "Russian Fake-news Campaign against Canadian Troops in Latvia Includes Propaganda about Litter, Luxury Apartments." National Post. November 20, 2017. Accessed May 08, 2018. <http://nationalpost.com/news/canada/russian-fake-news-campaign-against-canadian-troops-in-latvia-includes-propaganda-about-litter-luxury-apartments>.

Russia due to their previous criticism of Russia as a journalist.⁴⁸ Janis Sarts, the director of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, stated recently that Canada should assume that Russia will try to interfere with our 2019 election since Canada is a member of NATO and we are active in countering Russian aggression.⁴⁹ It is a logical deduction to also assume that Russia has, could, or will use the same techniques employed in the US to sow discord amongst the Canadian population by exploiting divisions in Canadian society.

In more conventional terms, Russia has significantly outpaced the West in the Arctic, "...Russia unveiled a new Arctic command, four new Arctic brigade combat teams, 14 new operational airfields, 16 deep-water ports, and 40 icebreakers with an additional 11 in development."⁵⁰ Russian submarine activity has spiked considerably in recent years, with concerning activity around undersea cables and under the Arctic ice.^{51 52}

Canada, while comparatively safer than many other countries, faces a range of national security threats. These threats range from potential conventional military threats that could materialize within Canadian sovereign territory, unconventional threats which could undermine our democracy and/or society, and the direct threat of violence from foreign and "homegrown" terrorists. While these threats are "on the radar", nothing significant has really changed in the CAF's training or posture of Dom Ops high readiness forces.

⁴⁸ Blanchfield, Mike. "NATO Researcher Warns of Russian Interference in 2019 Canadian Election | CBC News." CBCnews. February 27, 2018. Accessed May 08, 2018. <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/nato-researcher-russian-interference-election-1.4553572>.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Gramer, Robbie. "Here's What Russia's Military Build-Up in the Arctic Looks Like." Foreign Policy. January 25, 2017. Accessed May 08, 2018. <http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/25/heres-what-russias-military-build-up-in-the-arctic-looks-like-trump-oil-military-high-north-infographic-map/>.

⁵¹ Birnbaum, Michael. "Russian Submarines Are Prowling around Vital Undersea Cables. It's Making NATO Nervous." The Washington Post. December 22, 2017. Accessed May 08, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/russian-submarines-are-prowling-around-vital-undersea-cables-its-making-nato-nervous/2017/12/22/d4c1f3da-e5d0-11e7-927a-e72eac1e73b6_story.html?utm_term=.5a337b7701ad.

⁵² Pillar, Paul R., Gary Samore, William Tobey, Cui Tiankai, and Asia Times. "Russian Submarine in Arctic Tracked 'Enemy' Sub Undetected for Days." The National Interest. Accessed May 08, 2018. <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/russian-submarine-arctic-tracked-enemy-sub-undetected-days-24979>.

The CAF maintains a range of high readiness forces across four components; land, maritime, air and SOF.⁵³ These high readiness forces look good on paper, but only the SOF component maintains true high readiness and rapid deployability. Other than SAR, Air component readiness states refer to the readiness of the aircraft, while air crew availability could be less than that of the aircraft. The maritime component maintains a Ready Duty Ship (RDS) at all times on each coast, capable of deploying within eight hours but there is no guaranteed redundancy built into this capability.⁵⁴ The land component maintains four Immediate Reaction Units (IRUs), one per CA division, at CA bases in Gagetown, Valcartier, Petawawa and Edmonton with additional forces in Shilo due to the extensive distances in Western Canada. Due to the nature of the army, IRUs represent the bulk of CAF Dom Ops capabilities and they maintain redundancy but their readiness is often compromised by manning difficulties in combat arms units, a multitude of competing tasks, ageing vehicle fleets and parts shortages.

All high readiness forces belong to their respective service commanders, who are force generators to Commander CJOC, the force employer. Deployment of these high readiness forces for routine (planned/scheduled) and contingency (based on contingency plans held at each RJTF) operations requires a Tasking Order from the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and Force Generation Orders from the CA, RCN and RCAF. While this sounds laborious, in practice these orders can be delivered by email with formal signed orders following at a later time. For rapid response operations (RROs), Regional Joint Task Force commanders can assign tasks to units and formations in their regions without a CDS Tasking Order and Force Generation Order. The deployment of forces for an RRO is very serious and is not taken lightly. A true crisis must be

⁵³ National Defence. "Operations." DND CAF. March 13, 2018. Accessed May 08, 2018. <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations.page>.

⁵⁴ National Defence. "National Defence | Canadian Armed Forces | Article | Yukon Count on the Immediate Reaction Unit." DND CAF. December 16, 2013. Accessed May 08, 2018. <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/news/article.page?doc=yukon-count-on-the-immediate-reaction-unit/hkfnhjuy>.

occurring and CAF members will not be deployed on an RRO for armed assistance to law enforcement agencies (ALEA) duties without the approval of the CDS.

While a plethora of contingency plans (CONPLAN) exist for a range of potential domestic operations to meet the threats which have been listed in this paper, these operations would require specific capabilities which are not necessarily maintained by the high readiness forces.⁵⁵ There are no specific training standards or specialized equipment assigned by CJOC to Dom Ops high readiness forces to ensure that they can deploy rapidly to conduct contingency operations and RROs. Previous CA references to Dom Ops individual battle task standards (IBTS) referred to archived documents from Canada Command, which was amalgamated into CJOC. These archived documents were incomplete and did not contain specific IBTS or collective battle task standards (BTS).

CJOC and the CA take a very methodical and detailed approach to preparing high readiness forces for international operations such as the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) and Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), which both fall under CJOC's high readiness formation headquarters 1st Canadian Division Headquarters for employment. They also take the same approach for each task force being deployed to locations like Iraq, Ukraine, Latvia and Mali.

Between CJOC and the CA, training objectives are established and extensive force generation orders listing all required individual and collective training objectives are published. Training is conducted to formal standards, supervised by leadership, recorded and validation exercises are conducted. Commanders then formally sign operational readiness (OPRED) declarations, sometimes with caveats. Caveats can establish that a training standard was not

⁵⁵ "Standing Operations Order Domestic Operations." Staff Officer Handbook. Accessed May 7, 2018. http://armyapp.forces.gc.ca/SOH/SOH_content/CJOC SOODO - OOPON CCOI.docx.

achieved for a specific reason, like specific ammunition for a weapon was unavailable for specific equipment was unavailable. These caveats must be accepted by each higher commander or they could order that the training be completed while allocating the missing ammunition or equipment.

This process is not followed in the same fashion for Dom Ops, but each division may impose their own training standards independent of any guidance from CJOC. To prepare high readiness forces for employment across the spectrum of the most likely and most dangerous situations they could face on Dom Ops on a RRO deployment timeline, CJOC must impose more detailed training requirements to ensure that the CAF is able to perform to the standard expected by the Canadian people. At this time, great risk is assumed by commanders and assumptions are made that for any deployment there will be time for mission specific training before employment, in the worst case scenarios that CAF members could face this is not the case.

As high readiness forces are geographically assigned and each area of the country has its own character, training priorities are different from location to location. There will be resistance to more mandatory training and synchronizing unit and formation calendars around meeting more training gateways, but enhanced training requirements for Dom Ops will help make the CAF more operationally focused, will justify expenses to the Canadian people and will make the CAF more prepared for international operations.

As CAF high readiness units will generally augment an overwhelmed civilian capability, CAF Dom Ops training does not have to prepare members to fully replace these capabilities. It would be severely burdensome to train personnel to this standard in a range of capacities. To maintain simplicity, the common IBTS and BTS items that are assigned to task forces training for international operation high readiness should also be assigned to those preparing for Dom

Ops high readiness. This would have a significant impact on maintaining skillsets but also maintaining a culture of preparedness in the CAF.

High readiness units should be mandated to conduct much of the Dom Ops specific training to ensure the safety of CAF members before they are declared OPRED and enter high readiness. In the case of deployments in response to natural disasters, captured under Operation LENTUS, training should focus on safely operating in areas that are flooded, have downed powerlines, have damage to manmade structures that must be entered, and around wildfires. Training should be conducted on the range of equipment that could be employed on these operations such as small boats and associated equipment, chainsaws, urban and rural search and rescue equipment and firefighting equipment. Personal protective equipment (PPE) for the range of potential hazardous equipment should be procured and stockpiled across Canada.

Operations in an environment effected by Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) contaminants are captured under CONPLAN RUBICON.⁵⁶ The employment of CAF personnel under this CONPLAN could happen in an accidental situation or due to hostile act. The recent deployment of the British Army after the nerve agent poisoning of a former Russian spy in the United Kingdom serves as an example that the use of CBRN weapons is realistic.⁵⁷ The CBRN capabilities of the CAF, other than those contained in CANSOFCOM, fell significantly after the end of the Cold War and are being improved. Training and equipment should be stockpiled and prioritized for Dom Ops high readiness forces across the country.

⁵⁶ Erhardt, Lorne, Dr., and David Waller, Dr. "Radiological Nuclear Defence R&D Priorities: Proposal for a Long Range Plan for DRDC." June 2017. Accessed May 7, 2018. http://cradpdf.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/PDFS/unc277/p805477_A1b.pdf.

⁵⁷ Said-Moorhouse, Lauren. "Russian Spy Attack: British Troops Deployed to Assist Probe." CNN. March 09, 2018. Accessed May 08, 2018. <https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/09/europe/russian-spy-nerve-agent-british-troops-intl/index.html>.

Ensuring that CAF Dom Ops personnel are trained to the same high readiness IBTS standards as those entering high readiness for international operations would go a long ways towards preparing them to operate in Canada on Dom Ops in an environment with a threat from VNSAs and VEOs. This includes auxiliary forces maintained on bases/wings across Canada for security forces. These duties are maintained by non-combat arms personnel, assigned security duties on top of their normal duties. Security of DND/CAF establishments are generally referred to as Force Protection operations but the increase and decrease of Force Protection Levels (FPL) and the associated Measures (FPM) is not operationalized in a CJOC CONPLAN. Any increase in FPL creates a severe burden on base/wing military police (MPs) and base/wing security forces (BASF/WASF). While IBTS for BASF/WASF should meet high readiness standards, collective training standards can be lower than the combat arms units assigned duties off DND/CAF establishments, amongst the civilian population.

For those operating amongst the civilian population, the current CAF escalation of force training is insufficient. CAF Dom Ops high readiness forces should be trained to the same continuum of force standard as MPs and civilian police officers. While both systems start at the lowest level of force and work towards lethal force, the continuum of force system includes de-escalation techniques and equipment (such as Tasers, batons, less than lethal munitions and pepper spray). This is missing from CAF training, and in Afghanistan led to the use of lethal force when other methods could have resolved the situation.

The Russian Active Measures campaign of influence operations in the US, amongst other countries, presents an interesting opportunity for the domestic use of CAF Influence Activities capabilities. The CAF currently maintains an Influence Activities Task Force (IATF) in Kingston, Ontario and each division maintains PRes IA companies. These forces, already

containing members with operational experience on international operations, should prepare to conduct counter-IA within Canada. These IA capabilities should also be employed to assist with Op LENTUS deployments to enhance messaging to civilian populations.

One CAF routine Dom Op that is conducted 24/7 is Operation LIMPID. It is conducted to detect threats to national security as early as possible through air, maritime, land, space and cyber domain awareness. While surveillance of the air, maritime, space and cyber domains are straight forward, land domain awareness is complex as it occurs amongst the Canadian population. Land domain awareness is generally restricted to the Canadian sub-Arctic and Arctic regions due to the sparse population and requirement to maintain sovereignty. In the more populated areas of Canada, there are significant legal restraints on the CAF conducting any surveillance that actively or passively includes Canadian citizens. But to assist with countering threats from VNSAs, VEOs and hostile state actors, all CAF members should receive counter surveillance and counter intelligence training. Personnel on Dom Ops high readiness, Reg Force and PRes, should receive enhanced training in these fields.⁵⁸

Since the creation of Canada Command in 2006 and subsequent amalgamation into CJOC in 2012, much of the work done to further Dom Ops in Canada was done by creating RJTF headquarters and the creation of CONPLANs and other documents. The overall approach to high readiness forces did not significantly change. The Canadian climate is changing and with those changes brings the threat of more severe weather. Concurrently, the threats from VNSAs, VEOs and state actors have risen. The CAF has deployed to directly confront terrorists in Afghanistan and Iraq while confronting Russian aggression in Europe. The approach to Dom

⁵⁸ National Defence. "Operation LIMPID." DND CAF. March 20, 2018. Accessed May 08, 2018. <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-canada-north-america/op-limpid.page>.

Ops high readiness forces must evolve with the environment, and this means an increase in training standards and capabilities.

The CAF should also be championing a change in civilian culture and policy towards a more proactive Federal response. The current system captured in the 2007 Emergency Management Act⁵⁹, Federal Emergency Response Plan (FERP)⁶⁰ and Federal Emergency Response System (FERS)⁶¹ relies on provinces to admit that they lack a capability or are overwhelmed before receiving federal assistance. For Provincial ALEA requests, and many Federal requests if not captured in Memorandums of Understanding (MOU), CAF support is only to be provided when it is in the “national interest”.⁶² Definition of the “national interest” is vague. For all potential CAF Dom Ops, set lists of “triggers” should be established and agreed upon to remove politicization and other human elements from the decision making process. In the end, we all stand to gain from an enhanced CAF Dom Ops approach and the benefits are not as nebulous as many international deployments.

⁵⁹ Legislative Services Branch. "Consolidated Federal Laws of Canada, Emergency Management Act." *Loi Sur Les Sports Nationaux Du Canada*. May 04, 2018. Accessed May 08, 2018. <http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/E-4.56/page-1.html#docCont>.

⁶⁰ "Federal Emergency Response Plan January 2011." Public Safety Canada / Sécurité Publique Canada. January 31, 2018. Accessed May 08, 2018. <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrscs/pblctns/mrgnc-rspns-pln/index-en.aspx>.

⁶¹ "National Emergency Response System." Public Safety Canada / Sécurité Publique Canada. January 31, 2018. Accessed May 08, 2018. <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrscs/pblctns/ntnl-rspns-sstm/index-en.aspx>.

⁶² "Dom Ops Playbook." Staff Officer Handbook. Accessed May 7, 2018. http://armyapp.forces.gc.ca/SOH/SOH_content/CJOC_DomOps_Playbook_ODG.pdf.

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