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AFRICA: WHY CHINESE STRATEGY TRUMPS CANADIAN TACTICS

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Exercise Solo Flight

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AFRICA: WHY CHINESE STRATEGY TRUMPS CANADIAN TACTICS

Canada continues to tout its place in the world as a peacekeeping and philanthropic nation; however, in Africa this seems to be more talk than action. In contrast, China has taken a different approach to Africa. Despite protests from other major powers, China continues to expand. From their military base in Djibouti through the “Belt and Road” initiative to their infrastructure investments, China’s strategic goals to expand their economic and military power continue to be fueled by no real resistance to their efforts. As Africa’s largest trading partner, the PRC has relative freedom of movement in the country, even though there is a significant trade deficit. The United States has taken a firm stand against the PRC expansion, and their influence in the region, but continue to take little tangible action against them. Ultimately, with much of their strategy, China is focusing on the long game, and showing little reaction to international criticism on their expansion on the continent. Canada has remained relatively silent on the subject but has a complicated history with Africa. With two failed United Nation missions on the continent, specifically Rwanda and Somalia, Canada remains hesitant to commit to large scale contributions to missions in the region. What Canada does contribute, is limited and usually the “safest” option, which means the least possibility of Canadian casualties. Ultimately, what Canada has recently contributed, is small numbered special force operatives and this supports the China narrative to Africa that they are the only ones who will look after the Region once the Western countries lose interest. As Western nations continue to provide reactionary, small scale and tactical efforts in Africa, China is developing long term strategic goals and capitalizing on the limited vision of its enemies. This paper will analyze how tactical engagements of Canada fail and why they contribute to China’s strategic vision of expansion in Africa through

ineffective stability operations through aid or peacekeeping, using Canadian Forces assets ineffectively and employing misguided policies.

In order to understand why the scale and composition of missions in Africa is important, we must first understand the terms which will be used to analyze them. When discussing efforts on a tactical level this generally means smaller, compact missions. Technically when discussing these terms with NATO partners, due to Canada's relatively small military, our scale is also smaller. Within NATO a tactical contribution would be a Brigade, or fifteen hundred personnel.¹ Canada has had no efforts to that scale other than Afghanistan in recent history, and given the current political climate, nor will there be in the near future. Post-Afghan war has seen a significant shrinking in the size of the Canadian military, both in personnel and equipment. But the difference between tactical and strategic is more than just numbers of deployed personnel. A comprehensive plan from the government which incorporates long-term strategy for a country's involvement is key to success with any mission. In particular, this is where Canada has been lacking. A strategic engagement is one which requires commitment and possibly years of involvement with a certain country. Due to Canada's place in the world as a "contributory" military, meaning it offers contributions to already existing missions (usually on a small scale), Canadian government analysis or planning is usually limited to the already existing framework.² This has seen Canadian contributions be less than impactful, whereas a military and government the size of China is able to provide tangible and effective contributions where it desires. Canada desires a "seat at the table" within the United Nations and NATO and the future of Africa will be a contributing factor in many decisions moving forward. However, Canada's tactical

¹ NATO, Joint Allied Doctrine- Capstone Document, February 2017, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/602225/doctrine_nato_allied_joint_doctrine_ajp_01.pdf

² Yves Engler, *Canada in Africa*, (Vancouver: Fernwood, 2017), 137

engagements in Africa continue to be mis-aligned with the strategic goals of the nation to be seen as the great peace-keepers. This is in stark contrast to the ruthless nature of China who do little to hide their national interests in Africa, but are willing to provide funding, personnel and resources to the tasks.

The first way in which Canada's tactical engagements have contributed to the Chinese strategic narrative is the failure to provide effective stability in the continent. One of the more obvious examples of this is the aide provided to the country of Mali. Canada has contributed more than one billion dollars of aid to Mali in the last decade, but it has seen little improvement.³ We must also keep in mind that although this seems like a large sum for a country like Canada, it is small change for what is required to assist the country.

Between the years 2013 and 2025 China will have provided one trillion USD in financing to Africa as a whole.⁴ Where China succeeds is that it contributes specifically to the agricultural, economic, education and transportation elements of the country. Many African leaders have recently begun look to Chinese investment as more effective than Western aid: "...when relations became problematic with international financial institutions, we turned to China."⁵ These are areas where, as the African nations improve, it specifically contributes to the success of the Chinese military and economic stature in the country it is helping. China looks to improve itself through the aid it gives to any nation.⁶ This is strategic thinking at its best and is an excellent example of how China's long-term planning benefits both elements. Conversely, Canada's aid regularly seems to benefit neither Canada nor the African nations it tries to help.

³ Yves Engler, *Canada in Africa*, (Vancouver: Fernwood, 2017), 137.

⁴ Paul Nantulya. The Africa Centre, "Pursuing the China Dream through Five Key Elements," 6 April 2017, <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/china-dream-five-elements-china-africa-strategy>.

⁵ Firoze Manji, *African Perspectives on China in Africa*, (Cape Town: Fahamu), 74.

⁶ *IBID*, 88.

Without a strategic plan for how the aid is to be used, or understanding why we are assisting these nations, these continue to be tactical efforts.

Canada has attempted to make some change to their ineffective policies, but these changes regarding aid were short-lived. In 2012 the Canadian government ceased aid to Mali due to internal coups and the understanding that aid could not be distributed properly.⁷ However, this stance was quickly rescinded in 2013 and without any real change in the Mali government or stability, Canada once again provided aid. Canada has now committed to sending approximately 250 soldiers to the country on a peacekeeping mission. Again, this is a tactical level commitment with the most robust element being Griffon helicopters. The helicopters will do more to protect the UN peacekeepers from attack on the ground than they will to assist in rebuilding the country. With mission success being stability in the country, the broad non-specific nature of the mission shows once again that the tactical efforts being contributed do not align with the strategic goals. With a corrupt government, failing military and rampant poverty and violence there must be a whole of government approach to tangible improvements in the country.⁸ There will likely be a lot of pressure on the forces considering this will be Canada's first real contribution to peacekeeping in Africa since the publicly failed mission in Rwanda.

Canada's contribution to the UN mission in Rwanda, led by the battle-weary Lieutenant-General (LGen) Romeo Dallaire was another example of the tactical situation on the ground being mis-aligned with the strategic goals of the mission.⁹ Soldiers were sent to Rwanda with a mandate to observe, report and provide stability. LGen Dallaire warned the UN Headquarters

⁷ Edward Ansah Akuffo, *Canadian Foreign Policy in Africa: Regional Approaches to Peace Security and Development* (New York: Routledge, 2016), 96.

⁸ CBC News. "Canadian Special Forces Hand over Niger Mission," 9 Mar 2017, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/military-training-niger-1.4016277>

⁹ Romeo Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil* (Toronto: Randomhouse, 2004), 112.

many times that their small contingent would require back-up to prevent the violence he predicted was coming.¹⁰ Only thirteen Canadians were involved in this mission, but they were left unsupported by the United Nations and Canada to fight a losing battle. They were unable to protect the population, prevent the political overturn or protect themselves. Ten peacekeepers lost their lives due to the inability of western nations to provide realistic assistance and a strategic plan for the mission.¹¹

The instability of the region, and the failed attempts of Canada, the UN and other western nations to cause any real assistance, is where China frequently criticizes West. Chinese efforts in peacekeeping in Africa has increased from four hundred in the nineties to over twenty-two thousand today, and this number continues to grow.¹² China's contribution in peacekeeping to Africa is one of five steps in which China plans to expand what they call "China Dream" in the region. Every contribution that China makes to Africa is linked to this over-arching strategic mission. This includes economic, military, UN peacekeeping, political party training and soft-power influence "China has not left any stone un-turned regarding diplomacy, economy, development, tourism, training...."¹³ Having a defined strategic goal for the area allows for them to exploit opportunities for success when they see it. The ultimate goal is to have influence over the Africa which China will use for its own benefit in many ways. One of these ways is to use the twenty-two seats held by African nations to swing votes at the United Nations.¹⁴ And as one of the key financial and aid contributors, it is unlikely that many African nations would find it amenable to decline these favours.

¹⁰Dallaire, *Shake Hands...* 74.

¹¹ Dallaire, *Shake Hands...*, 342.

¹² Nuntulya, *Pursuing the China...*

¹³ Kachinga, *China in Africa...* 195.

¹⁴ Deborah Brautigam, *The Dragon's Gift* (Oxford: University Press, 2013), 162.

China sees the benefit in continuing to contribute to peacekeeping in Africa. With their articulated vision, it is to be expected that they would be more welcomed in Africa than western countries. China contributes more in man-power than the five other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council combined.¹⁵ Whatever their motivations are, it is easy to understand why they have been so welcomed by many African nations. As the Chinese influence increases in the area and the strategic goals for each become more intertwined, it will only become more difficult to separate Chinese influence from African goals should there be large scale conflict in the area. There is little that western nations can do now to interfere with the growing ties between resource-rich Africa and expansionist China.

We have seen time and again how Canada's tactical, almost reactionary contributions to African stability have been ineffective and how China succeeds with their strategic vision. It is easy to predict that the upcoming mission in Mali will also have little impact given the scale and nature of the mission. It seems that Canada is destined to continue with the same mistakes, sending its soldiers into conflict zones without the ability to make real change and without a strategic vision.¹⁶ It is not enough simply to send a few helicopters under the umbrella of the UN and expect that it will foster real stability within a failing African country. This resource rich continent it is a true dichotomy of riches against extreme poverty, violence and corruption and it will be those who are able to contribute to true stability who will benefit from these riches.

These resources are exactly why China has put so much effort into peacekeeping and governmental training in the continent, and why it is part of their strategic plan for the country: "Chinese foreign aid was conceived holistically and tends to focus on countries whose resources

¹⁵ *IBID*, 222.

¹⁶ Akuffo, *Canada...*, 202.

are important to China.”¹⁷ They understand if they are to benefit from the economic opportunities within Africa, that they must play a key part in assisting with stabilization to gain trust and maintain an environment from which they can extract the resources.¹⁸ China is also able to put some much effort into the peacekeeping missions in Africa because of their large military forces, which dwarfs the resources available to Canada and many other UN contributory nations.

Since 1956 Canada has attempted to develop a reputation as a “peacekeeping” nation. This has been what Canada was known for until the war in Afghanistan saw Canadian soldiers in a combat role. Previously, Canada’s contribution to peacekeeping was most notably in Bosnia. Contrary to the peacekeeping missions in Africa, 1,600 soldiers were deployed to Bosnia.¹⁹ This is a significantly larger contribution to this mission than any that have been seen in any peacekeeping mission since. In fact, despite its desire to be known as a peacekeeping nation, Canada currently has less than fifty personnel deployed on UN peacekeeping missions. The UN has consistently requested a more robust contribution from Canada, not only in Africa, but also internationally. These requests have fallen on deaf ears. Many expected that with the incoming Liberal government there would be significant increases to the contributions Canada has made to peacekeeping, instead the military has seen historically low deployments on any missions. This sets a dangerous precedent in a world which is becoming ever-more unpredictable and volatile. Canada must do everything it can to try to project some of its power for good or face the reality that its military is not able to project power internationally.

It is no wonder that China is able to provide stability to the continent while Canada and the West continues to fail. Canada’s strategic narrative does not in any way match the tactical

¹⁷ Jean Kachiga, *China in Africa...*, 188.

¹⁸ Firoze, *African perspectives...*, 120.

¹⁹ Engler, *Canada...*, 47.

efforts they have made thus far in Africa.²⁰ When analyzing Canada's failure thus far, it is the theories of German military historian Hans Delbruck who best articulated the importance between political strategy and military action.²¹ Although he was speaking of the German Army in World War One, it echoes true today. Canada wishes to be seen as a humanitarian nation who helps those most in need, but the financial aid and military contributions we have offered in Africa have not reflected the intent. With these two realities misaligned, it is impossible to achieve the success of providing stability to Western Africa.

Despite the good it may want to achieve the size of Canada's military continues to be a limiting factor when considering how much influence it can have internationally. The small force is made exponentially more noticeable by the piece meal approach to deployments the government has taken in recent years. Rather than take a focused, strategic approach to international intervention, Canada's foreign military policy is schizophrenic. This type of deployment frustrates those involved, fosters little assistance for the country involved and wears out those involved more quickly. Tactical, small and short-lived engagements which make little to no influence in a particular region are favoured over larger, long term engagements which can make a real difference.²² When speaking about Africa, the reason Canada has not been more engaged militarily is threefold; the risk of casualties, reliance on special forces in the region and lack of interest.

Canada's military approach to Africa since the Somalia incident in 1993 and Rwanda in 1994 has been an almost universal reliance on Special Operations Forces (SOF), as stated by Engler "If decision-makers in Ottawa have their way, Canadian special forces are likely to

²⁰ Edward Ansah Akuffo, *Canadian Foreign Policy in Africa: Regional Approaches to Peace Security and Development* (New York: Routledge, 2016), 64.

²¹ Antulio J. Echevarria, *Clausewitz and Contemporary War* (Oxford: University Press, 2007), 133.

²² Engler, *Canada...*, 232.

increase their operations on the continent.”²³ Although this strategy is not unfounded, it is a band-aid solution for a long-term problem. Historically, SOF is known as the tactical tool for a strategic engagement.²⁴ However, as previously stated, there is little strategic guidance when it comes to Canada’s relationship with Africa, and specifically the most recently utilized Mali. The Canadian government had an embarrassing and dangerous information leak in 2013 when it became public that they had deployed SOF to the disintegrating country.²⁵ Although they were quick to state that SOF were only there to protect the embassy, there is wide spread speculation that more had been going on with the military forces.

Canada has also had an ongoing training mission with Mali’s neighbour, Niger under the name Operation NABERIUS. Not much attention has been paid to this mission but within the military it raised many questions regarding why SOF was used and not conventional forces.²⁶ Canada’s elite special forces being monopolized for conventional training missions not only isn’t an effective use of their skill sets: “...a closer look at military doctrine suggest broader strategic and geopolitical motivations (other than training).”²⁷ Because of the simplicity of deploying the special forces, it can be the easy answer for the government to keep their particular contribution under the radar and rapid. Rather than demand more from their conventional forces, the Canadian government relies on SOF to carry the burden for the regular military.

Although Canada may find itself in good company, the United States have equally been relying on their SOF to fill the gaps they can’t fill with their regular forces in Africa. This created particular issue for the government when they took casualties and the government was

²³ *IBID*, 234.

²⁴ William McRaven, *Spec Ops* (New York: Randomhouse, 1996), 21.

²⁵ CTV News. “A Glimpse into Canadian Special Forces,” August 2014, <https://www.ctvnews.ca/w5/behind-the-secret-world-of-canada-s-covert-commandos-1.1761614>.

²⁶ CBC News. “Canadian Special Forces Hand over Niger Mission,” 9 Mar 2017, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/military-training-niger-1.4016277>

²⁷ Engler, *Canada...*, 231.

forced to explain what their SOF were doing in Nigeria. Despite what may seem like the lowest risk element to use, without strategic government vision and communication when things go wrong. Although the United States is more transparent in their strategic vision for the continent, with military bases throughout the country, and AFRICOM (Africa Command) specifically designed to maintain command and control over military operations in the region they too struggle with the balance between tactical and strategic relations in Africa.²⁸

For the Canadian military, Africa could be a beacon of hope if it was linked to the proper strategy. Canada Since the end of Afghanistan, the regular Canadian Armed Forces have been twisting in the wind attempting to find new direction and new and interesting deployments. Canada, as a contributory military, has now found itself spread across a series of small scale missions and “unlike US or France Canada is not a leading military force on the continent.”²⁹ If the Canadian government was able to develop a strategic, long term plan for the African countries it was trying to help, it would not only be of greater assistance to the region, but it would give the military a more robust mission to motivate soldiers. To avoid what was called the “dark days” of the 1990s, where the military struggled to find a unifying purpose the Canadian government must develop a strategic plan to keep Canada’s military relevant. This could very well be with a focus, well-manned, properly timed deployment in the world’s most needy continent.

China is perfectly happy to have Western nations chasing their tails to attempt to develop concise strategy for their military involvement in Africa. Because China has developed and maintained a strategic vision for the country they have been able to take strides in the region that

²⁸ US AFRICA COMMAND Official site, 12 April 2018, www.africom.mil.

²⁹ Enler, *Canada...*, 231.

would be previously considered impossible.³⁰ China has taken uncharacteristically bold steps in Africa, especially East Africa to assert their dominance. Further, unlike Western nations, China is not bound by the ideal that they must justify their actions on the continent. China uses thinly veiled excuses about “logistical hubs” to build bases like the one in Djibouti.³¹ This base caused immediate reaction by other countries, specifically the United States, due to its proximity to the US base across the port and visibility of US movements. However, because China had spent the appropriate amount of time planning and apportioned the proper resources to their planning, they had developed deep relations with the countries within the Horn of Africa and would not soon be ousted by the Americans.

The Djibouti port is significant not only because it signifies the planning, resources and commitment that China has made to the continent, but also the growth of the Chinese expansion.³² As the first overseas military base for China, it rivals the size of the American base and was widely welcomed by the African people. As part of the “One Belt, One Road” initiative the Djibouti base is the true pinnacle of Chinese strategic success in the country. And it signals what will undoubtedly be a continuing trend of Chinese expansion on the continent. It also significantly increases Chinese naval power projection. While improving the economy, transportation routes and overall welfare people while they expand, it is easy to understand why they see little resistance on the continent.

Although their military efforts on the continent are often questioned by the West, and undoubtedly with reason, there are many benefits to the strategic actions of China in Africa.³³ The establishment of their base in Djibouti has been coupled with increased peacekeeping

³⁰ LC Guo. *The Belt and Road: Official Documents*, (Beijing: Intercultural Press, 2017), 93.

³¹ Guo, *Belt and...*, 41.

³² *IBID*, 45.

³³ Kachiga, *China in...*, 218.

missions, anti-piracy and humanitarian operations. Although Canada makes little public criticism of the Chinese expansion, our closest ally, the United States rarely mentions the improvements being achieved by China. The long and complicated relationship between the two superpowers means that it will unlikely be any time soon before they are agreeing on China's right to expand internationally, whether they are doing good or not.

Ultimately, Canada's tactical engagements in Africa cause more burden on the Canadian military than they do help the African people. The United Nations "grows tiresome" waiting for our contributions to match what has been promised.³⁴ And while Canada is wearing out the SOF soldiers and burdening the over-worked Griffon, China is making real progress militarily. China's strategic planning and resource commitment has seen them achieve their goals of expansion and help the local population. Ultimately, it is their patient, long term vision that will pay off on in the long run. This is not only through their humanitarian involvement and military deployment, but the political realm as well.

Where Canada and the US have historically stumbled in countries where whole of government approaches are required, is to assume that the Western policy is the best and to attempt to apply that to whatever country they are dealing with. This is highlighted by the failure to make real change in Afghanistan.³⁵ Rather than try to find a workable solution which will respect the culture, westerners expect those we are helping to adopt the western way of life. This mindset will certainly not aid in success for Canada in Africa. Despite the self-image Canada has

³⁴ Norman Hiller and Philippe Lagasse, *Justin Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto: Palgrave Macmillan 2019), 189.

³⁵ Brautigam, *Dragon's Gift...* 153.

created for itself, or likes to believe it has, there have been significant issues with cultural relations in Africa both militarily and in the private sector.³⁶

Militarily, the Somalia affair speaks volumes about the racist undertone that continued, and possibly still continues, in the Canadian military today. The Canadian military has stumbled through the development of a new, multi-cultural world. The top brass hope initiatives like “the Journey” will attract a more diverse corps and force change internally regarding how the military views other cultures.³⁷ The “strategic corporal” will continue to reflect the Canadian governments’ lack of focus in cultural sensitivity- that is to say, every soldier on the ground represents Canada, and if they are not properly trained to work in a cultural diverse area then it will be poorly reflected strategically on the government.³⁸

For Canada to have successful relations in Africa Canada needs to develop a strategic policy which will assist in creating stability and economic improvement; because they too would financially benefit from a more stable Africa. A more stable environment would not only assist Canadian private companies, it would also ensure better oversight of development within Africa to preserve their natural resources. Canadian mining companies have been quietly ravaging the African countryside with violence on the land and the people.³⁹ Chemicals from the mining are poisoning the country and the Canadian government is quick to turn a blind eye. This again shows how the actions from one tactical entity can lead to a strategic failure, and the mining companies are offering examples by the hundreds. Canada is also the biggest donor to African mining initiatives- an extremely strategic move which benefits only the Canadian mining

³⁶ Engler, *Canada...* 173.

³⁷ SSE Executive Summary, June 2017, <http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/canada-defence-policy/docs/summary.pdf>

³⁸ Engler, *Canada in Africa...*, 235.

³⁹ *IBID*, 169.

industry. If the Canadian government were able to align their public persona with their economic desires, they could help significantly more humanitarian projects in Africa. Instead, Canada's actions are misaligned with our public strategy and fewer are able to benefit from it.

In extreme contrast to Canada's difficult history in Africa, China has been extremely successful in developing a relationship with the African governments. This begins with a straight-forward, easy to understand policy which states that "mutual trust" and "cooperative relations" are the most important to the future of their relationship with Africa. Although there have been some missteps, specifically in the allegations of "bugging" the African Union, this strategy has been successful.⁴⁰ China uses their history to remind Africa that they have the same struggle: "The Chinese President was not shy in drawing attention to the common anti-imperialist struggles of China and Africa."⁴¹ China wants to continue to develop their political relationships to increase their soft power in the region.⁴² The reason why they are successful is because what they say publicly and show in their policies, is also reflected in their actions. From the tactical soldier on the ground to their highest envoy, the strategic vision is acted out as planned.

Despite everything seeming as though it is sunshine and friendship for the China-Africa relations, there do still remain some ominous undertones. China's aggressive expansionism into Africa has created international concern and drawing many critical eyes on Africa.⁴³ Although China is one of the highest contributors of aid, for nations that are heavily reliant on humanitarian aid for survival, they may not be keen to draw such scrutiny. Then of course,

⁴⁰ The Council on Foreign Affairs. "China Cyber Espionage causes Strategic Shifts" <https://www.cfr.org/blog/african-union-bugged-china-cyber-espionage-evidence-strategic-shifts>, 7 Mar 2018.

⁴¹ Frizoze, *African Perspectives*....129.

⁴² United States. Hearing Before the Sub-Committee on African Affairs. "China in Africa: Implications for U.S. Policy." In Committee on Foreign Relations: United States Senate, Second Session, June 4, 2008. Washington: US Government Printing Office, 2008.

⁴³ Kachinga, *China in...*, 258.

remains the motive of China. Although China continues to insist that it has no stake in the sovereignty of any African country, the fact remains that most are not keen to replace one tyrant (Great Britain in most cases) for another. China remains steadfast that they have no wish to reenact the atrocities of the West.⁴⁴ Whether Africa continues to believe this or not will be dependent on the future steps taken by China now that they have a foothold.

As their relationship continues to grow and China's expansionist railroad barrels through East Africa, strategic trust will remain the key to success. And although China has been successful in achieving it as of late, there have been signs that China should not overstep their bounds. The "bugging" scandal of the African Union, where officials claim China deliberately placed listening devices in gifts donated for the opening of the new headquarters in Ethiopia.⁴⁵ Although it seems as though relations have survived between the two, it is not without tension and the ever-present consideration that China may take more than Africa bargained for. Until then, the relationship will continue to flourish under China's strategic vision.

Ultimately, China is succeeding in Africa where other countries have failed. When other countries have tactical failures in Africa, China is steadfast in its strategic vision for the continent. China began the development in the country slowly and quietly.⁴⁶ It has not been without its road blocks but China has been able to weather criticism and international outcry because of their ability to look past the current battle and plan for the strategic victories. The future for China in Africa is only limited by the interference of the international community and the continued benefit for both nations.

⁴⁴ *IBID*, 266.

⁴⁵ Council on Foreign Affairs, "Strategic Shift due to China Espionage," 7 Mar 2018, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/african-union-bugged-china-cyber-espionage-evidence-strategic-shifts>.

⁴⁶ Kachiga, *China in...*, 257.

Canada's foreign policy on Africa remains rooted in self-serving policies that benefit very few, and risk adverse deployment of assets to foster real change. Until Canada is prepared to allocate time, manpower, and resources to a long term and coherent plan regarding its involvement in Africa it will continue to be a band-aid solution. While Canada is scrambling to provide a few helicopters and a handful of peacekeepers, China will continue make tangible contributions to the betterment of their country. Given the significant mining industry within Africa, Canada will soon have to face the economic truth that more needs to be done. Canada must stop its focusing on short term, tactical solutions. Understanding how the tactical engagements of Canada and its Allies and how they contribute to China's strategic vision of expansion in Africa by failing to provide effective stability through aid or peacekeeping, using Canadian Forces assets ineffectively and misguided policies is the key to understanding the future in Africa. Perhaps China will be the future for Africa and it will succeed where every other country has failed. It may also be a signal to Canada to look to a new model for foreign relations, specifically in regions where we have had little success. Not only would a more robust and strategic engagement in Africa bring economic security to the Canadian mining and other industries, it would give the Canadian Armed Forces the focused deployment required to keep soldiers motivated and provide much needed stability to a state in need. As long as Canada develops a plan where a strategic vision is developed with a properly resourced, coherent policy, then it could make more significant contributions in Africa, despite its size.

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