

Canadian
Forces
College

Collège
des
Forces
Canadiennes



A DRAGON BY THE TAIL: NORTH KOREA'S MANIPULATION OF CHINA

Maj D.R. Cronk

JCSP 44

Exercise Solo Flight

Disclaimer

Opinions expressed remain those of the author and do not represent Department of National Defence or Canadian Forces policy. This paper may not be used without written permission.

© Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2018.

PCEMI 44

Exercice Solo Flight

Avertissement

Les opinions exprimées n'engagent que leurs auteurs et ne reflètent aucunement des politiques du Ministère de la Défense nationale ou des Forces canadiennes. Ce papier ne peut être reproduit sans autorisation écrite.

© Sa Majesté la Reine du Chef du Canada, représentée par le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2018.

CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE – COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES
JCSP 44 – PCEMI 44
2017 – 2018

EXERCISE *SOLO FLIGHT* – EXERCICE *SOLO FLIGHT*

**A DRAGON BY THE TAIL:
NORTH KOREA'S MANIPULATION OF CHINA**

By Major D.R. Cronk

“This paper was written by a student attending the Canadian Forces College in fulfilment of one of the requirements of the Course of Studies. The paper is a scholastic document, and thus contains facts and opinions, which the author alone considered appropriate and correct for the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of any agency, including the Government of Canada and the Canadian Department of National Defence. This paper may not be released, quoted or copied, except with the express permission of the Canadian Department of National Defence.”

Word Count: 5170

« La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale. »

Compte de mots : 5170

A DRAGON BY THE TAIL: NORTH KOREA'S MANIPULATION OF CHINA

INTRODUCTION

North Korea's procurement of nuclear weapons continues to be one the greatest perceived threats to not only the regional security of East Asia but also to the efforts of global nuclear non-proliferation. Though isolated from and ostracized by the international community, the actions taken by North Korean leaders have had implications far outside its borders. Situated as a buffer between the world's current two great rivals, China and the United States, North Korea is uniquely situated where its actions and importance are elevated beyond those of a country its relative size and capabilities. North Korea's placement between mainland China and the heavily American aligned South Korea on the Korean peninsula places the small "hermit kingdom" in a distinctive position. It finds itself between a rapidly rising China and the United States which has been increasing its influence in East Asia.¹ For many, the proximity of China to North Korea, China's relative hegemony in the region, and the heavy reliance of North Korea on China for economic subsistence would indicate that China is well situated to influence North Korean behavior. Yet, with a complicated history, a growing divergence in their views of the socialist world and China's desire for a place on the world stage, the ability of China to quell Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions is increasingly in question.² This paper will argue that the ability of China to unilaterally influence North Korea to denuclearize is extremely limited due to the complex relationship between the two states and their shared co-dependency of domestic and regional security.

¹Robert J. Art, "The United States and the Rise of China: Implications for the Long Haul," in *China's Ascent: Power, Security and the Future of International Politics*, edited by Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 260.

²David C. Kang, "China's Rising and its Implications for North Korea's China Policy," in *New Challenges of North Korean Foreign Policy*, edited by Kyung-Ae Park, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 128.

In order to best understand the Chinese / North Korean relationship and the actual ability of China to influence the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, this essay will explore the following three aspects of the relationship between these two states. Firstly, Chinese national interests and agendas for the Korean peninsula will be examined. Secondly, North Korean national interests and the reasoning underpinning the country's tenacious development of a nuclear program will be explored. Finally, this paper will examine how the national interests and agendas of these two states intersect, where the opportunities exist for China to influence North Korean denuclearization, and what are the impediments to such influence.

CHINESE INTERESTS

As with all nations, a state's actions are rooted in what best suits its national interests. Chinese activity in East Asia is no different, and as observed by its behaviour and priorities in the region, "China has at least two main goals: prosperity and security."³ In East Asia, and on the Korean Peninsula, this translates into policies which seek to strengthen relationships with all East Asian neighbours, while also ensuring the stability and security of the Korean Peninsula, particularly the domestic stability of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).

The provocations of the Kim Regimes, particularly their nuclear ambitions, pose a significant obstruction to fostering an environment of trust and regional stability in East Asia. For its part to overcome this, China has endeavoured to build relations with its traditional East Asian rivals, notably Japan and South Korea.⁴ It has done this while simultaneously maintaining dialogue with an increasingly isolated and confrontational DPRK. This has been done with a view to encouraging a semblance of stability in the region. China's engagement with the DPRK and its emphasis on regional security is not entirely altruistic, as these activities directly support

³Denny Roy, *Return of the Dragon: Rising China and Regional Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013): 18.

⁴*Ibid.*, 21

the national interests of China in the region and particularly on the Korean peninsula. Of specific concern to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is the maintenance of regional stability, and the fostering of economic modernization and growth within the DPRK.⁵ In the Chinese view, “stability of the Korean peninsula is a prerequisite for regional stability, which is essential for China’s persistent economic growth that strengthens the CCP's legitimacy.”⁶

Additionally, a serious concern of the Chinese is the influence that the DPRK's nuclear ambition would have in triggering a nuclear arms race in East Asia and encourage South Korea, Japan and Taiwan to procure these weapons. Such insecurity would also invariably weaken those states' relationship with China, both diplomatically and economically, and further strengthen their respective alliances with the United States, China's chief global rival.⁷ Such actions are in direct opposition to China's goals for East Asia, and could see an entrenchment of the adversarial China vs the United States, and American East Asian allies, rhetoric.⁸ In efforts then to assure its East Asian neighbours, President Xi Jinping has clearly expressed China's official stance in regards to the DPRK's nuclear ambitions and has confirmed China's clear opposition to a nuclear North Korea.⁹ Though China has been outspoken in its opposition of North Korean nuclear ambitions, primarily due to their destabilizing effects on the region, it is

⁵Min-Hyung Kim, “Cracks in the Blood-Shared Alliance? Explaining Strained PRC-DPRK Relations in the Post-Cold War World,” *Pacific Focus* 32, no. 1 (2017): 115, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pafo.12087/abstract>, Suk-Hi Kim, “Reasons for a Policy of Engagement with North Korea: The Role of China,” *North Korean Review* 13, no. 1 (2017): 88.

⁶Min-Hyung Kim, “Cracks in the Blood-Shared Alliance? Explaining Strained PRC-DPRK Relations in the Post-Cold War World,” *Pacific Focus* 32, no. 1 (2017): 117, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pafo.12087/abstract>

⁷*Ibid.*, 115, Kihyun Lee and Jangho Kim, “Cooperation and Limitations of China’s Sanctions on North Korea: Perception, Interest and Institutional Environment,” *North Korean Review* 13, no. 1 (2017): 35, <https://search.proquest.com/docview/1917823086?OpenUrlRefId=info:xri/sid:summon&accountid=9867>

⁸Chu Shulong, “China’s Perception and Policy about North Korea,” *American Foreign Policy Interests* 37, no. 5-6 (2015): 273, <http://web.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=1&sid=49ff6e80-706c-41d0-ba80-92afaacfb98%40sessionmgr4006>

⁹Min-Hyung Kim, “Cracks in the Blood-Shared Alliance? Explaining Strained PRC-DPRK Relations in the Post-Cold War World,” *Pacific Focus* 32, no. 1 (2017): 115, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pafo.12087/abstract>

also committed to ensuring the domestic stability of the DPRK, as part of the greater regional security of East Asia. The benefit of a stable North Korea also serves an important geo-political role in its ability to act as a buffer state between China and heavily American aligned South Korea.

In East Asia, China increasingly finds itself ringed by states, such as Japan and South Korea, who are strongly aligned with America not just geo-politically but militarily too. Particularly, the presence of over 23,000 American troops in South Korea reaffirms the strategic importance of North Korea as a buffer state between these two rivals.¹⁰ This perspective was further reinforced with America's "Asian Pivot" under the Obama Administration, which saw a rebalancing of American forces in East Asia and a strengthening of trilateral American-Japan-South Korean cooperation, entrenching China's "strategic interest to preserve a non-hostile and viable North Korea."¹¹ Heightening Chinese concerns about the increasing presence of American forces in the region, the deployment of the American Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-ballistic missile system in South Korea intensified Chinese worries of the capabilities that the United States was deploying in the region.¹² For these reasons, it is in the best interests of the CCP to maintain the status quo and ensure that the DPRK does not collapse. Any efforts taken by China to ensure continuity and stability within the DPRK can be "seen an insurance premium to avoid paying bigger strategic, social, and economic costs than an implosion

¹⁰Jih-Un Kim, "Pseudo Change: China's Strategic Calculations and Policy toward North Korea after Pyongyang's Nuclear Test," *East Asia* 34, no. 3 (2017): 174, <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs12140-017-9276-z>

¹¹Tat Yan Kong, "China's Engagement Oriented Strategy towards North Korea: Achievements and Limitations," *The Pacific Review* 31, no. 1 (2018): 79, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09512748.2017.1316301>, Kevin Gray and Jong-Woon Lee, "The Rescaling of the Chinese State and Sino-North Korean Relations: Beyond State Centrism," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 48, no. 1 (2018): 114, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00472336.2017.1377279>

¹²Samuel S. Kim, "US-China Competition over Nuclear North Korea," *Insight Turkey* 19, no. 3 (2017): 132, <https://search.proquest.com/docview/1931511331?pq-origsite=summon>

of North Korea could inflict.”¹³ Though China is opposed to the DPRK’s nuclear ambitions and finds increasing divergence in its global perspective than that of the DPRK, the spectre of American forces in such close proximity to mainland China gives the CCP a strong incentive to ensure the stability of the DPRK to act as a buffer state. This is all in an effort to minimize American military presence and influence on its doorstep.¹⁴

The stabilization of the DPRK, in conjunction with efforts to restrain its nuclear ambitions, is a core element of Chinese national interests in East Asia.¹⁵ Though not supportive of a nuclear DPRK, China is adverse to actions against the Kim Regime that would impact the DPRK's domestic stability. Worrisome to the CCP would be any action that would see a collapse of the DPRK regime. As such a scenario could lead to instability and insecurity along its north-eastern boundary with the "hermit kingdom."¹⁶ This was demonstrated in its response to the implementation of United Nations sanctions against the DPRK, after its fourth nuclear test on 6 January 2016. Though articulating support for such international actions, China placed considerable diplomatic effort in ensuring "that sanctions should be focused on deterring North Korea’s nuclear development, and should not induce any harmful results to North Korean residents’ daily lives or normal state-relations and humanitarian aids."¹⁷ It is logical that China would pursue such efforts as any domestic unrest or chaos would invariably spill over into China, particularly along its shared border region.

¹³Jih-Un Kim, “Pseudo Change: China’s Strategic Calculations and Policy toward North Korea after Pyongyang’s Nuclear Test,” *East Asia* 34, no. 3 (2017): 174, <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs12140-017-9276-z>

¹⁴Kevin Gray and Jong-Woon Lee, “The Rescaling of the Chinese State and Sino-North Korean Relations: Beyond State Centrism,” *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 48, no. 1 (2018): 115, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00472336.2017.1377279>

¹⁵Tat Yan Kong, “China’s Engagement Oriented Strategy towards North Korea: Achievements and Limitations,” *The Pacific Review* 31, no. 1 (2018): 76, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09512748.2017.1316301>

¹⁶ Kevin Gray and Jong-Woon Lee, “The Rescaling of the Chinese State and Sino-North Korean Relations: Beyond State Centrism,” *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 48, no. 1 (2018): 115, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00472336.2017.1377279>

¹⁷Byoung-Kon Jun, “China’s Sanctions on North Korea after its Fourth Nuclear Test,” *Pacific Focus* 32, no. 2 (2017): 217, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pafo.12092/abstract>

A contributing, but less worrisome factor, in China's support for a stable DPRK is the unlikely but possible scenario were an unstable nuclear enabled DPRK could also pose a threat to China. Though the use of force by North Korea against China is generally assessed as low, a provoked and unstable DPRK could use its newly acquired weapons against the PRC.¹⁸ In light of the potential impacts that a destabilized North Korea could have on China, potential for chaos and insecurity along their shared border to the less likely use on nuclear weapons, China will invariably prioritize stability over denuclearization.¹⁹

Underpinning the aforementioned Chinese national interests in East Asia, the principal national interest guiding Chinese involvement in the DPRK is to assure the international community that China is in fact a responsible actor, not only regionally, but also within the recognized world of global governance. As China has risen in its prominence and influence in East Asia, it has had to carefully navigate its involvement and official stance in regards to the DPRK, particularly its nuclear ambitions. In one perspective, it is in its national interests to support the Kim regime for the reasons already mentioned, but conversely as North Korea continues to become more isolated and to push the boundaries of accepted state behaviour, this creates its own challenges for a China that strives to prove to the world that it is "a responsible global partner that does not associate with rogue states."²⁰ As the DPRK persists in flaunting international norms and acts as an agitator both regionally and internationally, China becomes acutely aware that support of the Kim regime has become increasingly problematic for its

¹⁸Jih-Un Kim, "Pseudo Change: China's Strategic Calculations and Policy toward North Korea after Pyongyang's Nuclear Test," *East Asia* 34, no. 3 (2017): 174, <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs12140-017-9276-z>

¹⁹Donggil Kim and Seong-Hyon Lee, "Historical Perspective on China's "Tipping Point" with North Korea," *Asian Perspective* 42, no. 1 (2018): 41, <https://search.proquest.com/docview/1992870012?pq-origsite=summon>

²⁰*Ibid.*, 113

ambitions to expand Chinese political and security influence in the region.²¹ As such, with successive North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile tests, China has become more outspoken and harsher in its condemnation of the DPRK's actions.²² Since the Six Party talks of the early 2000s China has articulated its "commitment to peaceful ends and means, namely 'denuclearisation', 'peace and stability' and 'dialogue and negotiation'" in regards to the North Korean nuclear ambitions.²³

As these diplomatic overtones have failed to influence the Kim Regime and have negatively impacted the impression of China to be an effective unilateral player in denuclearization efforts, China has increasingly aligned itself with the international community to "bolster an image as a responsible stakeholder."²⁴ This is why, though opposed to crippling sanctions for fear of creating damaging internal instability, China has supported international sanctions to greater degrees with each successive DPRK provocation. Key to this is the Chinese acknowledgement "that it was not in China's interest to deny or reject international regimes. Rather it would be more prudent to make rules and norms through active participation and further shape the agenda making process."²⁵ Second, cooperating with the international community would improve China's national image on the international stage and also further integrate it into the existing international order, giving it a greater voice within governing world

²¹Hongseo Park and Jae Jeok Park. "How not to be Abandoned by China: North Korea's Nuclear Brinkmanship Revisited." *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 29, no. 3 (2017): 372 <http://web.b.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=1&sid=a356c959-4886-4021-b571-01eae515ccfc%40sessionmgr102>

²²Byoung-Kon Jun, "China's Sanctions on North Korea after its Fourth Nuclear Test," *Pacific Focus* 32, no. 2 (2017): 210, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pafo.12092/abstract>

²³Tat Yan Kong, "China's Engagement Oriented Strategy towards North Korea: Achievements and Limitations," *The Pacific Review* 31, no. 1 (2018): 77, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09512748.2017.1316301>

²⁴Byoung-Kon Jun, "China's Sanctions on North Korea after its Fourth Nuclear Test," *Pacific Focus* 32, no. 2 (2017): 223, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pafo.12092/abstract>

²⁵Kihyun Lee and Jangho Kim, "Cooperation and Limitations of China's Sanctions on North Korea: Perception, Interest and Institutional Environment," *North Korean Review* 13, no. 1 (2017): 28-34, <https://search.proquest.com/docview/1917823086?OpenUrlRefId=info:xri/sid:summon&accountid=9867>

bodies.²⁶ In its escalating support and enforcement of international action against the DPRK, China is able to increase its status and influence by positioning itself as a responsible great power committed to nuclear non-proliferation.

NORTH KOREAN INTERESTS

Identifying China's national interests and agendas as they relate to North Korea is only one side of the coin in appreciating the security concerns on the Korean Peninsula. Clearly, the interests and agendas of North Korea also play a critical role in any discussion of stability and denuclearization in the region. Understanding the Kim regime's priorities, agendas and motivations for their nuclear ambitions are essential to deciphering the reasoning for their insistence of acquiring a nuclear arsenal, in spite of world condemnation for such action.

A dominant explanation of the DPRK's continued efforts to become a nuclear nation is its belief that securing nuclear weapons will ensure the survival of the Kim regime and strengthen its legitimacy and authority.²⁷ Since the transition of power to Kim Jong-Un, this reasoning provides a strong argument for the growing progress and advancement of the DPRK nuclear program. As a new and relatively inexperienced leader, the development of a nuclear program aided in solidifying his authority, provided justification of his appointment, and demonstrated a concrete deterrent to external threats.²⁸ Kim Jong-Un's insistence on advancement of the DPRK's militarized nuclear capabilities goes to great lengths to improve his standing amongst the North Korean military, and has silenced internal criticism based upon his

²⁶Jeffrey Legro, "Purpose Transitions: China's Rise and the American Response," In *China's Ascent: Power, Security and the Future of International Politics*. Edited by Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008): 181.

²⁷Min-Hyung Kim, "Why Provoke? The Sino-US Competition in East Asia and North Korea's Strategic Choice," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 39, no. 7 (2016): 995, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2015.1035433>

²⁸Scott A. Snyder, "Confronting the North Korean Threat: Reassessing Policy Options," *Hampton Roads International Security Quarterly* 1 (2017): 1, <https://search.proquest.com/docview/1865126804?pq-origsite=summon>

weak military credentials upon the assumption of power.²⁹ Recognition as a nuclear power underpins the policy agenda of the current Kim regime, in so much that the DPRK's constitution was revised early in Kim Jong-Un's rule to declare it a nuclear armed state and that the advancement of a nuclear weapons program shares equal importance to the pursuit of economic development in the State's official "Byungjin" strategy.³⁰

However, the desire to secure regime legitimacy does not alone explain the importance that the Kim regime places on the procurement of a nuclear capability. While the prominence the program played in aiding the inexperienced leader to quickly consolidate his power and establish his authority upon assuming the reins of power in Pyongyang was vital, it does not solely justify its elevated status in North Korean policy. The clearest explanation for the emphasis of nuclear weapons in DPRK policy is the realpolitik belief that it is a rational requirement for the national security of a North Korea encircled by political and military threats.³¹ With the exception of China, the DPRK is surrounded by regional adversaries. In the minds of the North Koreans, the presence of significant American forces in South Korea, Japan and other Asian states poses a credible security threat that necessitates the demonstration of strong military capabilities, which includes a nuclear deterrent.³² Of all states, it is the presence of American forces in East Asia that most provokes North Korea and in its view justifies the development of a nuclear deterrent. Since American involvement in the Korean Peninsula during the Korean War of the 1950s, the

²⁹Min-Hyung Kim, "Why Provoke? The Sino-US Competition in East Asia and North Korea's Strategic Choice," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 39, no. 7 (2016): 995, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2015.1035433>

³⁰Min-Hyung Kim, "Cracks in the Blood-Shared Alliance? Explaining Strained PRC-DPRK Relations in the Post-Cold War World," *Pacific Focus* 32, no. 1 (2017): 116, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pafo.12087/abstract>

³¹Mathieu Duchatel and Phillip Schell, *China's Policy on North Korea: Economic Engagement and Nuclear Disarmament*, SIPRI Policy Paper no. 40, (Solna: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2013): 41.

³²Min-Hyung Kim, "Why Provoke? The Sino-US Competition in East Asia and North Korea's Strategic Choice," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 39, no. 7 (2016): 981, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2015.1035433>

DPRK has perceived an existential threat to its existence due to American presence in the region, a threat that includes a fear of the use of nuclear weapons by the United States.³³

To the Kim regime, the threat posed by America is very real and supported by an exceptionally adversarial approach since the end of the Korean War. The distrust between the two states was highlighted during the Bush Administration of the 2000s, when in his State of the Union address on January 2002, President Bush included the DPRK as part of the “Axis of Evil, placing North Korea on par with Iraq as a menace to the global rule of law and expansion of global liberal democracy, and a threat that justified the same sort of pre-emptive action that was taken against Saddam Hussein's Iraqi regime.³⁴ Foremost in Bush’s address was North Korea’s continued work on a nuclear program as reasoning for inclusion in the Axis of Evil.³⁵ This rhetoric only fuelled distrust between the two states and reinforced the DPRK’s belief in its requirement to assure North Korean national security through nuclear means. This, in turn, entrenched American belief and fears of the Kim regime’s potential to use such weapons for offensive purposes.³⁶ These political pronouncements by the United States and subsequent nuclear advancements by the DPRK only escalated the tension in the region and the level of mistrust between these two states.

Further exacerbating DPRK distrust of not only the United States, but the global community as a whole, was the apparent hypocrisy of Washington who to the DPRK exemplified a “Do as I say, Not as I Do” mentality. The United States, along with the nuclear

³³Samuel S. Kim, “US-China Competition over Nuclear North Korea,” *Insight Turkey* 19, no. 3 (2017): 123, <https://search.proquest.com/docview/1931511331?pq-origsite=summon>

³⁴Stephen Haggard and Marcus Noland, *Hard Target: Sanctions, Inducements, and the Case of North Korea*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2017), 18.

³⁵The White House, "President Delivers State of the Union Address," last accessed 29 April 2018, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html>

³⁶Hongseo Park and Jae Jeok Park. “How not to be Abandoned by China: North Korea’s Nuclear Brinkmanship Revisited.” *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 29, no. 3 (2017): 383 <http://web.b.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=1&sid=a356c959-4886-4021-b571-01eae515ccfc%40sessionmgr102>

armed five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, have failed to meet the disarmament obligations as outlined in the United Nations Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), while simultaneously condemning North Korean efforts to develop the same weapons.³⁷ This, in conjunction with the lack of condemnation of Israel, India and Pakistan who operate nuclear arsenals outside of the NPT, demonstrated an inequitable approach between those countries which the United States, and the other permanent five of the Security Council, considered friendly and those that they did not.³⁸

The actions of the global community in both Iraq and Libya further also solidified North Korea's belief that without an adequate deterrent that, either unilaterally or as part of a United Nations sanctioned action, the United States would take action against the Kim regime and it could be vulnerable to the same regime change that occurred in Iraq in 2003 and later in Libya in 2011. The ousting of both Hussein's and Qaddafi's regimes after they had committed to ceasing their respective nuclear programs only further exemplified to the Kim regime that only a nuclear deterrent would ease its insecurity "in the face of a potential US pre-emptive strike."³⁹ Such actions by both the United States and the global community without a doubt reinforced to the Kim regime that in the absence of a viable element of deterrence, it is susceptible to the same kind of regime change that occurred in Iraq and Libya. This is the premise upon which the DPRK attempts to secure legitimacy for its nuclear program, not just domestically but internationally as well. It contends that the sole purpose and intent of becoming nuclear enabled is that its "nuclear arsenal has been built to deter the United States, (and) not for threatening

³⁷Samuel S. Kim, "US-China Competition over Nuclear North Korea," *Insight Turkey* 19, no. 3 (2017): 121, <https://search.proquest.com/docview/1931511331?pq-origsite=summon>

³⁸*Ibid.*

³⁹Min-Hyung Kim, "Why Provoke? The Sino-US Competition in East Asia and North Korea's Strategic Choice," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 39, no. 7 (2016): 994, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2015.1035433>, Mathieu Duchatel and Phillip Schell. *China's Policy on North Korea: Economic Engagement and Nuclear Disarmament*, SIPRI Policy Paper no. 40, (Solna: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2013): 41.

neighbouring states.”⁴⁰ From this realpolitik point of view, with an omnipresent military threat to its immediate south, a limited number of allies in the region, and having witnessed the actions taken against similar “rogue” states who had given up their nuclear programs it is completely logical for North Korea to continue down the path of becoming nuclear capable, as it is path onto which they have been forced.⁴¹

INTERSECTING INTERESTS: NORTH KOREAN MANIPULATION OF CHINA

The relationship between China and North Korea is complex and the intersection of PRC and DPRK interests is critical to understanding the support that China offers North Korea and the reciprocal geo-political importance of North Korea to China. The foundation of this, as in any, relationship is the shared history between these two states and how it colours their behavior towards each other. From an understanding of their shared history, it is easier to explore or discuss where the spaces in which the two countries manoeuvre against each other are and what advantages do they respectively use against each other. By exploring both shared history and the gamesmanship between North Korea and China, it is possible to understand what leverage that the PRC may have over the DPRK in finding a solution to the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, and what are the impediments to this objective.

The relationship between the PRC and the DPRK dates back to the Chinese support of North Korea during the Korean War, resulting in a relationship that up until the end of the Cold War had been described "as one of 'lips and teeth' or 'blood-cemented' brothers'."⁴² From the Korean War until the end of the Cold War, for China the DPRK was especially important due to

⁴⁰Byoung-Kon Jun, “China’s Sanctions on North Korea after its Fourth Nuclear Test,” *Pacific Focus* 32, no. 2 (2017): 214, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pafo.12092/abstract>

⁴¹Mathieu Duchatel and Phillip Schell. *China’s Policy on North Korea: Economic Engagement and Nuclear Disarmament*, SIPRI Policy Paper no. 40, (Solna: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2013): 41.

⁴²Min-Hyung Kim, “Cracks in the Blood-Shared Alliance? Explaining Strained PRC-DPRK Relations in the Post-Cold War World,” *Pacific Focus* 32, no. 1 (2017): 109, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pafo.12087/abstract>

the socialist politics of the time. Due to divergent socialist paths, the Soviet Union and China saw the advancement of the socialist cause in very different ways. In the ensuing Sino-Soviet split, China found itself on the socialist margins with the all communist bloc states, less Albania, and the majority of the world's socialist states siding with the Soviets. As a result, in the DPRK the PRC found one its few allies.⁴³ Highlighted by the 1961 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, the two states have demonstrated commitment to each other's national security. From its inception, the balance in the relationship always favoured the DPRK with China being able to offer more support than could the smaller North Korea. In turn, China continuously "provided economic aid and political support to its security-obsessed communist ally, making Beijing the most important patron of Pyongyang."⁴⁴

In the immediate post-Cold War years, the PRC maintained efforts to keep the DPRK close as China believed that a diplomatically isolated North Korea posed an imminent threat to East Asian regional security.⁴⁵ However, as China increasingly opened up internationally and adopted economic reforms, which included a normalization of relations with South Korea, the level of trust and cooperation between the PRC and the DPRK began to wane.⁴⁶ This, in conjunction with North Korea's first steps on the path to nuclear weapons, the strength of the Sino-DPRK alliance began to come into question. In recent years, there have been overtures of openness, notably demonstrated when upon Kim Jong-Un's appointment as Chairman of the

⁴³Donggil Kim and Seong-Hyon Lee, "Historical Perspective on China's "Tipping Point" with North Korea," *Asian Perspective* 42, no. 1 (2018): 39-40, <https://search.proquest.com/docview/1992870012?pq-origsite=summon>

⁴⁴Min-Hyung Kim, "Cracks in the Blood-Shared Alliance? Explaining Strained PRC-DPRK Relations in the Post-Cold War World," *Pacific Focus* 32, no. 1 (2017): 110, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pafo.12087/abstract>

⁴⁵Donggil Kim and Seong-Hyon Lee, "Historical Perspective on China's "Tipping Point" with North Korea," *Asian Perspective* 42, no. 1 (2018): 42, <https://search.proquest.com/docview/1992870012?pq-origsite=summon>

⁴⁶Min-Hyung Kim, "Cracks in the Blood-Shared Alliance? Explaining Strained PRC-DPRK Relations in the Post-Cold War World," *Pacific Focus* 32, no. 1 (2017): 112, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pafo.12087/abstract>

Korean Worker's Party (WKP), Chinese President Xi Jinping sent a congratulatory message to Kim Jong-Un. This message reaffirmed the PRC's connection and shared values with the DPRK.⁴⁷ Yet in practice, based upon the level of interaction between Xi Jinping and Kim Jong-Un, one could make a strong assumption of a strained relationship. Since his appointment as Chairman of the WKP, Kim Jong-Un had not held meetings with the Chinese leader until March 2018, whereas Xi Jinping has had numerous interactions with his South Korean counterparts in the same timeframe.⁴⁸

Already discussed, from a North Korean perspective the possession of nuclear weapons is an essential deterrent mechanism against military intervention by either America or its East Asian allies. That said the resulting cost of this nuclear goal has been significant to the DPRK. With each nuclear test, North Korea suffers further international condemnation, diplomatic isolation, and the imposition of harsher and broader international sanctions. Yet the DPRK has also used its nuclear provocations as a diplomatic tool to strengthen its Chinese alliance. In large part, the Kim regime has achieved this through carefully constructed diplomatic gamesmanship that in ways has coerced China into supporting it. In many ways, it has achieved this by providing few other options available to the PRC. These actions taken by North Korea have been described as a policy of two steps forward and one step back, in that each nuclear provocation is inherently overly aggressive and is meant to push the boundaries of accepted behaviour to its absolute limit. These provocations are constructed with the understanding that in negotiations

⁴⁷Jih-Un Kim, "Pseudo Change: China's Strategic Calculations and Policy toward North Korea after Pyongyang's Nuclear Test," *East Asia* 34, no. 3 (2017): 170, <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs12140-017-9276-z>

⁴⁸Min-Hyung Kim, "Cracks in the Blood-Shared Alliance? Explaining Strained PRC-DPRK Relations in the Post-Cold War World," *Pacific Focus* 32, no. 1 (2017): 110, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pafo.12087/abstract>

compromises will be made that still sees the DPRK ahead of their original start state.⁴⁹

Underpinning the DPRK's coercive strategy has been manipulation of China's and the United States' competition for regional influence in East Asia. Clearly understanding its geopolitical importance as a buffer state between China and its American aligned East Asian rivals, the argument can be made that the DPRK uses this advantage to ensure PRC support and assurances of Kim regime survival. Knowing that China is adverse to a destabilized Korean peninsula and regime change in North Korea that would see the Chinese aligned WKP replaced by a potentially American aligned regime, the DPRK feels comfortable to proceed with its nuclear program knowing that it only intensifies its importance as a buffer state, regardless of Chinese objections.⁵⁰ That said, China is not the lone target of North Korean nuclear gamesmanship, as the DPRK also uses each nuclear agitation as a diplomatic tool to coerce China's rival, the United States. By relying on the East Asian competition between the two rivals, North Korea is confident that as it agitates the United States with increasingly aggressive actions and charged political rhetoric that any actions taken either by the United States or by the international community will be softened or weakly enforced by China.⁵¹ This DPRK strategy further widens the gap between North Korea and China, as the PRC is keenly aware of the gamesmanship being played by the Kim regime and increasingly finds that "Pyongyang's coercive diplomacy was intolerable within the context of newly emerging Sino-U.S. cooperative relations."⁵²

Chinese opposition to North Korean nuclear ambitions represent one of the greatest

⁴⁹Mathieu Duchatel and Phillip Schell. *China's Policy on North Korea: Economic Engagement and Nuclear Disarmament*, SIPRI Policy Paper no. 40, (Solna: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2013): 43.

⁵⁰Min-Hyung Kim, "Why Provoke? The Sino-US Competition in East Asia and North Korea's Strategic Choice," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 39, no. 7 (2016): 996, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2015.1035433>

⁵¹Hongseo Park and Jae Jeok Park. "How not to be Abandoned by China: North Korea's Nuclear Brinkmanship Revisited." *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 29, no. 3 (2017): 384 <http://web.b.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=1&sid=a356c959-4886-4021-b571-01eae515ccfc%40sessionmgr102>

⁵²*Ibid.*, 380.

policy disputes between the two states. Yet given the aversion of the Chinese state to increased instability on not only the Korean peninsula but its shared border with North Korea, the PRC is forced to remain engaged with the DPRK. The desire of the Chinese to maintain engagement with North Korea manifests itself as a commitment to trade between the two states and the delivery of Chinese economic aid to North Korea. As the DPRK finds itself increasingly isolated, its reliance on Chinese trade forms a substantial portion of its economic activity and its sole respite from the economic sanctions imposed by the international community.⁵³ In addition to being the DPRK's chief trading partner, the employment of thousands of North Korean workers in China provides a significant influx of funds, which the North Korean state confiscates, into the cash strapped DPRK.⁵⁴ A by-product of China's economic engagement is that these activities in turn provide the funds required by the DPRK to finance its nuclear program.⁵⁵ This creates a situation where in the name of stability, China is faced with the conundrum of providing the resources that are directly feeding the dispute between the two states and regionally. For many outsiders, North Korea's economic dependence on China is seen as the most reliable way that the PRC could leverage the DPRK to moderate its nuclear program.⁵⁶ There is an argument to be made that China is in a strong position to place greater limits on the North Korean economic capacity to fund its nuclear program due to the economic levers that it can pull. Yet, any economic limitations continue to be overridden by China's fear of an unstable domestic situation

⁵³Suk-Hi Kim, "Reasons for a Policy of Engagement with North Korea: The Role of China," *North Korean Review* 13, no. 1 (2017):

92, <https://search.proquest.com/docview/1917823305?OpenUrlRefId=info:xri/sid:summon&accountid=9867>

⁵⁴Hongseo Park and Jae Jeok Park. "How not to be Abandoned by China: North Korea's Nuclear Brinkmanship Revisited." *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 29, no. 3 (2017): 372, <http://web.b.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=1&sid=a356c959-4886-4021-b571-01eae515ccfc%40sessionmgr102>

⁵⁵Tat Yan Kong, "China's Engagement Oriented Strategy towards North Korea: Achievements and Limitations," *The Pacific Review* 31, no. 1 (2018): 76, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09512748.2017.1316301>

⁵⁶Christina Lai, "Acting One Way and Talking Another: China's Coercive Economic Diplomacy in East Asia and Beyond," *The Pacific Review* 31, no. 2 (2018): 180, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09512748.2017.1357652>

in North Korea and the associated requirement of the DPRK to fulfill its role as a buffer state.⁵⁷

This trend is perceived to continue unless North Korea begins to pose a legitimate threat to China or North Korean provocations render it a greater strategic liability than asset in regards for China's quest for international recognition.⁵⁸

In the same vein as the potential for economic sway over North Korea, China's support for and enforcement of international sanctions is another key area where the PRC has the potential to influence the DPRK's nuclear ambitions. After each provocation by North Korea and the subsequent international condemnation and call for international sanctions, it is China that invariably is looked to first due to its unique relationship with the hermit kingdom.⁵⁹ However, in any discussions of international sanctions, the same issues of Chinese national interests for the Korean peninsula very quickly percolate to the surface. It is true that through its commitment to a policy of engagement with North Korea, it maintains one of the few open lines of diplomatic communication with the country. It is also a fact that due to the DPRK's overwhelming reliance on the PRC for economic stability that China is well placed to support or enact sanctions that would have a significant impact on the Kim regime's capability to fund its nuclear program.⁶⁰ The ability of China to take such action is, however, constrained by the geopolitical realities of East Asia. China finds itself having to balance between its goal of stability on the Korean peninsula, which includes stability of the Kim regime, and perpetuating its image as a

⁵⁷Tat Yan Kong, "China's Engagement Oriented Strategy towards North Korea: Achievements and Limitations," *The Pacific Review* 31, no. 1 (2018): 91, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09512748.2017.1316301>

⁵⁸Christina Lai, "Acting One Way and Talking Another: China's Coercive Economic Diplomacy in East Asia and Beyond," *The Pacific Review* 31, no. 2 (2018): 180, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09512748.2017.1357652>

⁵⁹Kihyun Lee and Jangho Kim, "Cooperation and Limitations of China's Sanctions on North Korea: Perception, Interest and Institutional Environment," *North Korean Review* 13, no. 1 (2017): 29, <https://search.proquest.com/docview/1917823086?OpenUrlRefId=info:xri/sid:summon&accountid=9867>

⁶⁰Jih-Un Kim, "Pseudo Change: China's Strategic Calculations and Policy toward North Korea after Pyongyang's Nuclear Test," *East Asia* 34, no. 3 (2017): 163, <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs12140-017-9276-z>

responsible regional and world player. Critical to its actions as a responsible world player include providing security reassurances to America and its East Asian allies, Japan and South Korea, to avoid increased militarization of the region.⁶¹ This balancing act has led to some action by China in support of sanctions, but in an extremely calculated manner.

With each successive nuclear test, Chinese condemnation has indeed grown as has its support for United Nations implemented sanctions. After succeeding tests, China has been forced to join international sanctions, in large part, to strengthen its image in the international community. Additionally, the Chinese Foreign Ministry has been more open in its criticism of each test.⁶² Yet China is still hesitant to pursue and is critical of calls for it to impose unilateral Chinese sanctions on North Korea. It firmly believes that any sanctions should be implemented via the United Nations, where supposedly it could mitigate any calls for exceptionally harsh sanctions, by way of its permanent seat on the Security Council, which could lead to undesired Kim regime instability.⁶³ Yet evidence does exist that in spite of increased diplomatic rhetoric against North Korea and articulated support for international sanctions that in practice, Chinese pronouncements are superseded by its interests of regime, regional and economic stability. Notably, reports indicate that in 2016, despite increased sanctions and Chinese commitments to them that trade from North Korea into China actually increased.⁶⁴ Some have suggested that the

⁶¹Christina Lai, "Acting One Way and Talking Another: China's Coercive Economic Diplomacy in East Asia and Beyond," *The Pacific Review* 31, no. 2 (2018): 176, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09512748.2017.1357652>

⁶²Jih-Un Kim, "Pseudo Change: China's Strategic Calculations and Policy toward North Korea after Pyongyang's Nuclear Test," *East Asia* 34, no. 3 (2017): 164, <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs12140-017-9276-z>

⁶³Kihyun Lee and Jangho Kim, "Cooperation and Limitations of China's Sanctions on North Korea: Perception, Interest and Institutional Environment," *North Korean Review* 13, no. 1 (2017): 32, <https://search.proquest.com/docview/1917823086?OpenUrlRefId=info:xri/sid:summon&accountid=9867>

⁶⁴Scott A. Snyder, "Confronting the North Korean Threat: Reassessing Policy Options," *Hampton Roads International Security Quarterly* 1 (2017): 6, <https://search.proquest.com/docview/1865126804?pq-origsite=summon>, Jih-Un Kim, "Pseudo Change: China's Strategic Calculations and Policy toward North Korea after Pyongyang's Nuclear Test," *East Asia* 34, no. 3 (2017): 164, <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs12140-017-9276-z>

pragmatic aspects of sanctions in consideration of the Chinese and North Korean relationship are a barrier to sanctions being a viable tool of denuclearization. As such, for as much as China needs to appear to support them on the world stage, in their practical application the need to fulfil China's superseding interest of security will render them ineffectual.⁶⁵ Harkening back to North Korea's understanding of its role and importance as a buffer state and the gamesmanship it plays within this sphere, it permeates into any application of international sanctions as the DPRK knows it can insulate itself from exceptionally hazardous effects due to its deep Chinese ties.⁶⁶

CONCLUSION

The ability of China to influence North Korea is complex and nuanced by its intricate shared history and the unique geopolitics of East Asia. From all appearances the much larger and more powerful China should have easy sway over its tiny and isolated neighbour. Reinforced by the fact that China is North Korea's sole ally in the region and that the DPRK's economy would collapse without the interventions of the Chinese, it would seem mathematical that North Korea would yield to Chinese wishes.

Yet such a scenario is not the case. Fiercely independent and having identified its importance in the region, North Korea has continued to use its relationship with China to its advantage. It is keenly aware of its importance as a buffer state between China and the pro-American states surrounding it. It is aware that its relationship with China has evolved and that their shared commitment to the socialist path is no longer as strong as it once was. In this North Korea has identified that China may not be the same committed security partner it professed to be in 1961, when it signed the 1961 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance.

⁶⁵Samuel S. Kim, "US-China Competition over Nuclear North Korea," *Insight Turkey* 19, no. 3 (2017): 134, <https://search.proquest.com/docview/1931511331?pq-origsite=summon>

⁶⁶Stephen Haggard and Marcus Noland, *Hard Target: Sanctions, Inducements, and the Case of North Korea*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2017), 228.

To this end, the DPRK strongly feels that the only security assurances it can rely upon are those that it creates for itself, resulting in the North Korean commitment to its nuclear program.

Implicit to this understanding is North Korea's political gamesmanship with China. Realizing that China favours security in East Asia, the DPRK has been able to skillfully craft its nuclear provocations so they push the boundaries of accepted behavior, still advance its nuclear program, yet provide room for negotiation and compromise with China. North Korea used its knowledge of China's desire for regional security to its benefit. The DPRK knows that regardless of the world's condemnation of its nuclear program that China would not allow conditions to be created that would disrupt the domestic security of the DPRK and in turn the Kim Regime. As such, for as much influence and power that China may be perceived to have over North Korea, it is mitigated by North Korea's skilful entrapment of China and its ability to keep the dragon on a leash.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Art, Robert J. "The United States and the Rise of China: Implications for the Long Haul." In *China's Ascent: Power, Security and the Future of International Politics*. Edited by Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng, 260-292. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008.
- Daojiong, Zha. "China-US Relations under Trump: More Continuity than Change." *Asian Perspective* 41, no. 4 (2017): 701-715.
<https://search.proquest.com/docview/1963096190?pq-origsite=summon>
- Duchatel, Mathieu and Phillip Schell. *China's Policy on North Korea: Economic Engagement and Nuclear Disarmament*. SIPRI Policy Paper no. 40. Solna: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2013.
- Gray, Kevin and Jong-Woon Lee. "The Rescaling of the Chinese State and Sino-North Korean Relations: Beyond State Centrism" *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 48, no. 1 (2018): 113-132. <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00472336.2017.1377279>
- Haggard, Stephen and Marcus Noland. *Hard Target: Sanctions, Inducements, and the Case of North Korea*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2017.
- Jun, Byoung-Kon. "China's Sanctions on North Korea after its Fourth Nuclear Test." *Pacific Focus* 32, no. 2 (2017): 208-231. <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pafo.12092/abstract>
- Kang, David C. "China's Rising and its Implications for North Korea's China Policy." In *New Challenges of North Korean Foreign Policy*. Edited by Kyung-Ae Park, 113-132. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
- Kim, Byung-Kook. "Between China, America, and North Korea: South Korea's Hedging." In *China's Ascent: Power, Security and the Future of International Politics*, edited by Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng, 191-217. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013.
- Kim, Donggil and Seong-Hyon Lee. "Historical Perspective on China's 'Tipping Point' with North Korea." *Asian Perspective* 42, no. 1 (2018): 33-60.
<https://search.proquest.com/docview/1992870012?pq-origsite=summon>
- Kim, Jih-Un. "Pseudo Change: China's Strategic Calculations and Policy toward North Korea after Pyongyang's Nuclear Test." *East Asia* 34, no. 3 (2017): 163-178.
<https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs12140-017-9276-z>
- Kim, Min-Hyung. "Cracks in the Blood-Shared Alliance? Explaining Strained PRC-DPRK Relations in the Post-Cold War World." *Pacific Focus* 32, no. 1 (2017): 109-128.
<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pafo.12087/abstract>
- Kim, Min-Hyung. "Why Provoke? The Sino-US Competition in East Asia and North Korea's Strategic Choice." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 39, no. 7 (2016): 979-998.
<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2015.1035433>

- Kim, Samuel S. "US-China Competition over Nuclear North Korea." *Insight Turkey* 19, no. 3 (2017): 121-137. <https://search.proquest.com/docview/1931511331?pq-origsite=summon>
- Kim, Suk-Hi. "Reasons for a Policy of Engagement with North Korea: The Role of China." *North Korean Review* 13, no. 1 (2017): 85-93. <https://search.proquest.com/docview/1917823305?OpenUrlReflD=info:xri/sid:summon&accountid=9867>
- Kong, Tat Yan. "China's Engagement Oriented Strategy towards North Korea: Achievements and Limitations." *The Pacific Review* 31, no. 1 (2018): 76-95. <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09512748.2017.1316301>
- Lai, Christina. "Acting One Way and Talking Another: China's Coercive Economic Diplomacy in East Asia and Beyond." *The Pacific Review* 31, no. 2 (2018): 169-187. <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09512748.2017.1357652>
- Lee, Kihyun and Jangho Kim. "Cooperation and Limitations of China's Sanctions on North Korea: Perception, Interest and Institutional Environment." *North Korean Review* 13, no. 1 (2017): 28-44. <https://search.proquest.com/docview/1917823086?OpenUrlReflD=info:xri/sid:summon&accountid=9867>
- Legro, Jeffrey. "Purpose Transitions: China's Rise and the American Response." In *China's Ascent: Power, Security and the Future of International Politics*. Edited by Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng, 163-190. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008.
- McEachern, Patrick and Jaelyn O'Brien McEachern. *North Korea, Iran, and the Challenge to International Order: A Comparative Perspective*. New York: Routledge, 2018.
- O'Neil, Andrew. "The Paradoxes of Vulnerability: Managing North Korea's Threat to Regional Security." In *Security and Conflict in East Asia*, edited by Andrew T.H. Tan, 172-180. New York: Routledge, 2015.
- Park, Hongseo and Jae Jeok Park. "How not to be Abandoned by China: North Korea's Nuclear Brinkmanship Revisited." *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 29, no. 3 (2017): 371-387. <http://web.b.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=1&sid=a356c959-4886-4021-b571-01eae515ccfc%40sessionmgr102>
- Ping, Chen. "China's (North) Korea Policy: Misperception and Reality." In *China's Foreign Policy: Who Makes it, and How is it Made*, edited by Gilbert Rozman, 251-274. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.
- Roy, Denny. *Return of the Dragon: Rising China and Regional Security*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2013.
- Shulong, Chu. "China's Perception and Policy about North Korea." *American Foreign Policy Interests* 37, no. 5-6 (2015): 273-278. <http://web.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=1&sid=49ff6e80-706c-41d0-ba80-92afaacfc98%40sessionmgr4006>

- Snyder, Scott A. "Confronting the North Korean Threat: Reassessing Policy Options." *Hampton Roads International Security Quarterly* 1 (2017): 1-7.
<https://search.proquest.com/docview/1865126804?pq-origsite=summon>
- Song, Wenzhi and Sangkeun Lee. "China's Engagement Patterns towards North Korea." *Pacific Focus* 31, no. 1 (2016): 5-30.<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pafo.12063/abstract>
- Sutter, Robert G. *Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy Since the Cold War*. New York: Rowman & Littlechild, 2008.
- The White House. "President Delivers State of the Union Address." Last accessed 29 April 2018.
<https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html>
- Theisen, Nolan. "Prospects of Conflict in Korea: The Threat of North's Korea's Continuing WMD Programme and Unreformed Economy." In *Security and Conflict in East Asia*, edited by Andrew T.H. Tan, 164-171. New York: Routledge, 2015.
- Woodward, Jude. *The US vs China: Asia's New Cold War*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017.
- Yufan, Hao. "China's Korea Policy in the Making." In *China's Foreign Policy: Who Makes it, and How is it Made*, edited by Gilbert Rozman, 275-298. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.

- Snyder, Scott A. "Confronting the North Korean Threat: Reassessing Policy Options." *Hampton Roads International Security Quarterly* 1 (2017): 1-7.
<https://search.proquest.com/docview/1865126804?pq-origsite=summon>
- Song, Wenzhi and Sangkeun Lee. "China's Engagement Patterns towards North Korea." *Pacific Focus* 31, no. 1 (2016): 5-30.<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pafo.12063/abstract>
- Sutter, Robert G. *Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy Since the Cold War*. New York: Rowman & Littlechild, 2008.
- The White House. "President Delivers State of the Union Address." Last accessed 29 April 2018.
<https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html>
- Theisen, Nolan. "Prospects of Conflict in Korea: The Threat of North's Korea's Continuing WMD Programme and Unreformed Economy." In *Security and Conflict in East Asia*, edited by Andrew T.H. Tan, 164-171. New York: Routledge, 2015.
- Woodward, Jude. *The US vs China: Asia's New Cold War*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017.
- Yufan, Hao. "China's Korea Policy in the Making." In *China's Foreign Policy: Who Makes it, and How is it Made*, edited by Gilbert Rozman, 275-298. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.