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## “Canada’s Back”: Canadian Contribution to the UN?

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**JCSP 44**

### ***Exercise Solo Flight***

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Maj D.G. Bourque

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## **“Canada’s Back”: Canadian contribution to the UN???**

### **INTRODUCTION**

If asked most Canadians would say that Canada has rich history as a member of the United Nations (UN), after all Lester B Pearson received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957 for proposing a UN peacekeeping force be used in the Suez Crisis. Canada has also held a seat on the UN Security Council 6 times since the creation of the UN in 1945.<sup>1</sup> During Canada’s last federal elections, in 2015, Prime Minister (PM) Justin Trudeau announced that Canada would be running for a seat on the UN Security Council in 2021. He justified this decision by stating that Canada would be “playing a positive and constructive role in the world, and [that he was] determined to revitalize Canada’s historic role as a key contributor to the UN peacekeeping.”<sup>2</sup> Canada’s contribution to peacekeeping missions in the past decade has been at an all time low since the creation of the UN. PM Justin Trudeau set aspirational goals during the election year in 2015, one of which was to send 600 peacekeeping troops to Africa.<sup>3</sup> Three years have passed and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) have just received the warning order to deploy two Chinook helicopters and four Griffon helicopters to replace German helicopters which are due to leave this Summer from Mali. In November 2017 during a UN conference in Vancouver, the Prime Minister announced “Canada is promoting the ‘Smart Pledge’” approach when

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<sup>1</sup> C. McCullough and R. Teigrob, *Canada and the United Nations: Legacies, Limits, Prospects*. (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2016), 142.

<sup>2</sup> Aaron Wherry, PM invokes Canada’s peacekeeping past in seeking UN Security Council seat. (CBC, 17 March 2016) <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/trudeau-united-nations-wherry-1.3494541>

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

contributing to peace support operations in order to provide the UN with the predictability it needs to more effectively plan its operations and training.”<sup>4</sup>

As Dr. Adam Chapnick, expert in the history of the UN and professor at the Canadian Forces College, said,

I suspect and I hope that part of the reason for this initiative is that the government has concluded after a detailed analysis that we can truly help here. Yes, it will help our council bid. Yes, it will help our reputation, but it’s my hope that we can truly have an effect on creating a more stable, peaceful world.<sup>5</sup>

The CAF and advisors to the Liberal Government have conducted several analyses and during the last two years have made very little progress towards fulfilling PM Justin Trudeau’s statement that “Canada is Back” and willing to support UN peacekeeping missions.

Although UN peacekeeping missions are a tangible way to contribute to the UN, Canada continues to contribute to the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) in Iraq, with 5 million CAD dollars over the next 4 years.<sup>6</sup> The Head of Cooperation at the Embassy of Canada in Iraq stated that this is a major priority for Canada, “to support the Government of Iraq and Iraqi civil society as the best possible way of ensuring long-term sustainability of quality reproductive health service delivery. Canada is very happy to work with UNFPA on this most important of

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<sup>4</sup> Justin Trudeau. *Canadian contributions to UN peace support*. (PM Office, 15 November 2017) <https://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2017/11/15/canadian-contributions-united-nations-peace-support-operations>

<sup>5</sup> J. Vomiero, “Trudeau pushing 'Canada is back' narrative with Mali UN peacekeeping mission: experts”. (Global news, 17 March 2018)

<sup>6</sup>Salwa Moussa. Canada Commits to four more years of support to UNFPA in Iraq. 16 Apr 2018. (United Nations Population Fund, 16 April 2018) <https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/canada-commits-four-more-years-support-unfpa-iraq-enar>

Canadian international assistance priorities.”<sup>7</sup> In addition, PM Trudeau has also stated that Canada is playing a major role in the Elsie Initiative, which focuses on having higher numbers of female leadership and females on UN peacekeeping missions.<sup>8</sup>

This essay will demonstrate that although the Liberal government has made a claim that Canada is running for a seat on the UN Security Council in 2021, the CAF and peacekeeping advisors have swayed the government to minimizing its troop contribution to win the vote. The use of deploying CAF personnel on UN peacekeeping missions is not in Canada’s best interest to secure the support of the UN to get voted onto the Security Council in 2021. This will be broken down into two main arguments, firstly that CAF have had several negative experiences on past UN missions. Secondly, the nature of what was considered peacekeeping when Lester B. Pearson proposed the idea is greatly different from what the UN is currently doing in Peacekeeping missions and comes with much greater risk.

## **ARGUMENT 1- BIASED MILITARY HISTORY WITH THE UN**

Canada has deployed on numerous UN peacekeeping missions the past 70 years, however Canada has had negative experiences in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia. The following argument will be explained using Richard Scott’s institutional analysis, explaining how institutional theorists look at the legitimacy of the institution whether there is external or internal legitimacy issue and then the different layers within the institution, Normative and Regulatory.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>8</sup> Justin Trudeau. *Canadian contributions to UN peace support*. (PM Office, 15 November 2017) operations <https://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2017/11/15/canadian-contributions-united-nations-peace-support-operations>

<sup>9</sup> Richard Scott, *Institutions and Organizations: Ideas, Interests and Identities* (London, SAGE, 2014), 55-74.

The main focus for this Argument will be derived from the normative layer and why the Canadian Armed Forces would have a very difficult time accepting deploying Canadian troops to a UN peacekeeping mission. This model gives a direct correlation of the CAF attitude toward peacekeeping missions and the reasons the Government should look through different avenues to influence the vote for the seat on the UN Security Council.

### **Richard Scott Institutional Analysis**

The CAF is like any other institution, and the theories that apply to institutions also apply to the CAF. When considering Richard Scott's model of institutional analysis, he explains that changes on an institution are due to internal or external legitimacy, in this case the Canadian Government is facing external legitimacy issues on the world stage with respect to the UN. Therefore the decision to send troops on UN peacekeeping missions would help show Canadian legitimacy to the international community. However, as the CAF is currently at an all time low in UN peacekeeping deployments, this type of change has a great effect on the CAF as an institution.<sup>10</sup> Scott's model predicts that the decision to send CAF troops on a peacekeeping mission creates a certain response from the CAF institution.

In Richard Scott's model the institution has three pillars. The Normative pillar which represents the norms and values of the institution. The Cognitive pillar which is mostly derived from the institutions close history and using examples taken from similar events and metaphors. The final pillar is the Regulative pillar, which rules and regulations both written and not govern the institution. With these three pillars it is possible to see where changes made to the institution

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<sup>10</sup> Walter Dorn and Joshua Libben. Unprepared for Peace: The Decline of Canadian Peacekeeping Training. (Toronto, Rideau Institute, 2016.) 11.

may have support of the three pillars or may have conflicts when the three pillars do not align. These pillars could be put together like a triangle with layers, the bottom of the triangle being the Normative pillar, the bottom layer of the triangle, the Cognitive as the next layer and the top of the triangle, the regulatory layer. In the case of the CAF when dealing with the UN, the Normative layer, it is the bottom layer and thickest layer, the following examples will prove how the CAF Normative and Cognitive pillar are not aligned with the current government climate to send troops on peacekeeping mission. The following three case studies have all had deep seeded impacts on the CAF during Canada's past UN peacekeeping deployments.

### **The Somalia Affair**

Although the peacekeeping mission in Somalia was a short duration, it has had an eternal impact on the CAF. The results of this peacekeeping mission, although not due to the UN but due to the CAF itself, have completely changed the CAF since the board of inquiry of the Somalia Affair. The Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR) was deployed to the peacekeeping mission in Somalia, United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNSOM I) in 1993. During the deployment, a civilian was detained, tortured, and beaten to death. "In the 1990s and early 2000s, especially following the Somalia debacle and inquiry, the Department of National Defense recognized the need for specialized training to prepare for such difficult and unique environments."<sup>11</sup> The results of a board of inquiry that had been conducted after the mission, resulted in the disbanding of the CAR. Along with the disbanding of the Unit and cultural changes to the way that leadership should be implemented. One of the major changes that

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<sup>11</sup> Ibid.,. 11.

resulted from this ordeal is a current professional development for senior officers. Joint Command and Staff Program academics provides insight on the issues that were brought to light during the Somalia Affair and ensure the CAF officer core is better educated than previous generations. However this stain on the Canadian peacekeeping troops is often discussed, and for good reason in the CAF learning institutions. That being said, this continues to entrench deep feelings for this event, especially considering the CAF still have members within the ranks that were once part of the CAR.

“In 1995 the UN withdrew all peacekeeping troops. It was described at the time by one UN official as the greatest failure of the UN in our lifetime.”<sup>12</sup> The fact that the CAF, who was not ready for the mission, had been deployed to a theater that the UN knew could not accomplish the mission and withdrew after only being deployed for two years. This once again engrains itself in the Normative layer of the CAF, not only were CAF troops not prepared, but the UN mission itself was doomed for failure.

According to Richard Scott’s model for an institution to have as much change as the CAF went through in late 1990’s is due to the fact of external or internal legitimacy issues, which in the case of the Somalia Affair the CAF was facing extreme external legitimacy issues in face of the Canadian Government and the UN. The Somalia Affair is often considered a great stain on Canada reputation,<sup>13</sup> over 25 years have passed since the CAR deployed to Somalia and the CAF is has still not forgotten the events that have caused massive institutional changes as a result of the Somalian Peacekeeping mission.

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<sup>12</sup>Richard Spencer, UN at 70: Five greatest successes and Failures. (Telegraph, 15 September 2015) <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/switzerland/11700969/UN-at-70-Five-greatest-successes-and-failures.htm>

<sup>13</sup> Anonymous. Good Intentions Turned to Shame, *The Economist*; London Vol. 344, Iss. 8024, (Jul 5, 1997): 48-49.

The fact that exacerbates the scenario and an even greater link to today's issues with sending troops to a peacekeeping mission in Africa is that the CAF recommended not to be part of the peacekeeping force in Somalia.<sup>14</sup> This fact would be considered to be part of the Scott's model under the Cognitive pillar that in the CAF history this is not the first time the CAF recommend not sending troops on a peacekeeping mission. In the case of Somalia both the normative and cognitive pillar according to Scott's model are aligned for the CAF not to support sending peacekeeping forces to Africa.

## **Genocide in Rwanda**

Canadian troops undertook a peacekeeping mission to Rwanda in 1993, a conflict between the Hutus and the Tutsis, as part of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNIMAR). The most notable role was that of then MGen Romeo Dallaire as the force commander. The results of this peacekeeping mission can only be discussed as shameful. The UN could not stop the massacre of hundreds of thousands of Tutsis and was constrained by its limited mandate.<sup>15</sup> The result, what is now known as the Rwanda genocide, will never be forgotten. Romeo Dallaire and his troops remain marked to this day on the events they witnessed and were powerless to stop.<sup>16</sup> As stated by General Dallaire in his book *Shaking Hands with the Devil*, "I know there is a God because in Rwanda I shook hands with the devil. I have seen him, I have smelled him and I have touched him. I know the devil exists and therefore I know there is a

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<sup>14</sup> Grant Dawson, *Here is Hell: Canada's engagement in Somalia* (Toronto, UBC press, 2007), 179.

<sup>15</sup> Veterans Affairs Canada, *The Canadian Armed Forces in Rwanda*, date modified 2017/11/27. [www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/history/canadian-armed-forces/rwanda](http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/history/canadian-armed-forces/rwanda)

<sup>16</sup> Romeo Dallaire, *Shaking Hands with the Devil*. (Toronto, Vintage Canada, 2004) 510.

God.”<sup>17</sup> This quote only echoes the values and religious beliefs that normatively effect CAF personnel, and the fact that UNIMAR was unable to take action is burnt into the CAF psyche.

Using the normative pillar in Scotts model, having this happen under a UN peacekeeping mission does not align with the CAF values and norms to protect all those in need. Although the UN has now endorsed the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in 2005<sup>18</sup>, which in theory would ensure that a UN peacekeeping force would no longer be hamstrung by their mandate and would be able to act, this does not change the scars that have been created due to this peacekeeping mission. The normative pillar is the deepest and most dominant pillar, when your values and norms are not upheld it is not easily forgotten. “UN soldiers did not return to Rwanda until June, by which time hundreds of thousands of people were dead. The UN was accused of leaving Rwanda to its fate”.<sup>19</sup> The fact that the UN could stand by and let the events transpire leads one to believe that future unforeseen events may cause a similar inaction by the UN as was the case of UNIMAR.

In the case of UNIMAR, cognitively the CAF will never forget that Canadian troops were unable to prevent a genocide from occurring and that UN peacekeeping missions have often had instances where the troops on the ground were unable or unwilling to prevent egregious events to occur. According to The Telegraph when the UN turned 70 years, the Rwandan Genocide is one of the top 5 failures in its history.<sup>20</sup> Had this event taking place under the lead of another contributing nation the facts may remain under the cognitive pillar, whoever the fact that this

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 461.

<sup>18</sup> Karen Mingst and Margaret Karns. *The United Nations in the 21st Century*. 4<sup>th</sup> ed. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2012), 135-136.

<sup>19</sup> Richard Spencer, UN at 70: Five greatest successes and Failures. (Telegraph, 15 September 2015) <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/switzerland/11700969/UN-at-70-Five-greatest-successes-and-failures.htm>

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

happened under a Canadian Force Commanders further aggravates the memory of this peacekeeping mission.

### **Failure in Bosnia**

UN peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), was deployed in 1992 during the Yugoslav wars. Canadian troops made up a significant proportion of UNPROFOR, with over 40 000 Canadian troops deployed to the Balkans since 1992. The UNPROFOR mandate was from 1992 to 1995, which was then transferred to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The main failing of the UN was on 12 July 1995 when the force failed to deter the Bosnian Serb attack on Srebrenica. This was because they were not able to sufficiently reinforce the UN battalion, which led to the city being overrun. All the UN forces that were in the city could do was evacuate the women and children. What followed the attack was the Serbs holding the Muslim men and massacring them by the thousands. Once again the UN was unable to stop another genocide. The fact that a genocide could occur two years after the UN encounter with the Rwanda Genocide is a major scar on the UN's reputation. Canadian troops were put into a conflict where their mandate did not allow them from acting. The additional stress in the case of Bosnia was that even if the mandate would not have stopped them, they did not have the required equipment to respond. According to The Telegraph when the UN turned 70 years, the Bosnian mission is also one of the top 5 failures in its history.

All these factors continued contributing to the friction between the UN and the CAF's institutional norms and values, which permeated through the ranks throughout the years. Not

only was this a UN failure, the fact that the CAF was transitioning internally only exacerbated the already complicated UN mission. During the peacekeeping missions to Bosnia, units and sub-units within the Canadian Army were being rerolled into a peacekeeping force which only put more tension on the Normative pillar. This thought of losing combat capabilities, ie transitioning of Artillery units to regular infantry peacekeepers conflicted with the norms and values of the CAF and it was not until Canadian troops deployed to Afghanistan that the CAF realized it needed artillery to effectively conduct their mission. Within the CAF as an institution these factors play everlasting roles in the way the CAF makes decisions and provides advice to the Government of Canada.

Although the three UN peacekeeping missions discussed above are examples of UN failures, there are several successful UN peacekeeping missions. The UN Stabilization mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) is one success of the UN.<sup>21</sup> Canadians throughout the years have played key roles in contributing to this mission and its success. This can also be said for the UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), a successful mission which had CAF personnel working for the UN.

Using Richard Scott's model, the normative pillar is the most difficult to change, when the right condition are met and the appropriate incentives in place, whether that is due to internal or external legitimacy, it is possible to force the institution to change. "Peacekeeping's becoming interwoven with a Canadian national identity also represented a modification of a long-standing association between the nation and its military."<sup>22</sup> The initial response of the CAF when explained it would participate in peacekeeping mission, the CAF advised the government

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<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> C. McCullough and R. Teigrob, *Canada and the United Nations: Legacies, Limits, Prospects*. (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2016), 140.

that it did not recommend participating. The CAF however was told it would deploy on peacekeeping mission and the sentiments and Normative pillar evolved over the following 40 years of peacekeeping missions, and UN peacekeeping missions accepted within the CAF.<sup>23</sup>

As laid out in the UN Charter, the norms and values of the institution align with those upheld by the CAF, with events like Bosnia and Rwanda, CAF norms and values would not have troops stand by idly while innocent victims are being killed. The CAF's Normative pillar does not align with the UN and cognitively the CAF has seen the UN history of being unable to provide protection to a certain population when needed. These UN missions have fundamentally changed the composition of the CAF, the norms and values of the institution have had many changes over the years due to its history. However the fact that the CAF is not currently under real legitimacy pressure, it would be very difficult to enforce change on the institution. The fact that when advice was initially requested by the government on what would be the best way to support a UN peacekeeping mission, the CAF continually pushed back that peacekeeping mission are no longer what Canadians consider as peacekeeping as was laid out by Lester B Pearson back in 1957.<sup>24</sup> In conclusion, as discussed in Richard Scotts model, the Normative layer often in the thickest and most difficult to change, often this Normative layer is able to influence an institution to make non-rational decisions, like not willing to support UN peacekeeping missions and exert pressure on the Government to look at alternative means to prove to the UN that the Canadian Government is willing to contribute to the UN to get the voted in the UN Security Council seat.

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<sup>23</sup> Ibid., 141.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., 208.

## **ARGUMENT TWO- PEACEKEEPING**

This section of the essay will focus on explaining how the nature of peacekeeping has evolved from conventional peacekeeping proposed by Lester B Pearson, to what is now generally accepted as peacebuilding. With this evolution of peacekeeping the argument will also demonstrate how the risk to UN peacekeeping forces is much higher today than what it was initially, and how this has influenced the advice that the CAF has been giving the Canadian Government in making decisions for Canada's future contributions to the UN.

### **Conventional Peacekeeping**

As was stated at the start of this paper, Canadians hold dearly to what is considered peacekeeping, after all the initial notion of peacekeeping was proposed by a Canadian, Lester B Pearson, who received the Nobel peace prize. The notion of peacekeeping started mostly with UN temporary military force, military observers at first, into the world's regional hotspots. These military observers main goal would be impartial mediators and would watch the movements of opposing armies, supervising ceasefires, monitoring demilitarized zones and protecting local civilians. This often took the form of enforcement of a peace treaty between two states. The first peacekeeping mission where authorized between the disputed region of Kashmir between Pakistan and India. Several similar peacekeeping missions were undertaken, one that the Canadians played a substantial role was when the UN intervened to separate the Greeks and Turks in Cyprus which remained one of the CAF main commitments for several decades. In 1988 the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the UN for peacekeeping work it had done over the decades, this was a shared sentiment for Canadians seeing its involvement in the creation of

peacekeeping and the fact that 80 000 personnel had contributed to UN peacekeeping mission over that period which was roughly 10 percent of the UN missions.<sup>25</sup>

The peacekeeping missions continued into the 1990's which as a result, discussed earlier in the essay CAF, underwent significant difficulty in three of its UN peacekeeping mission, Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia, "where there was little or no peace to keep."<sup>26</sup> With the issues of peacekeeping in the 1990's and Canadian foreign policy focused on the war in Afghanistan from 2001-2014, as well as most NATO allies focused in the middle east, there was a shift in peacekeeping between two states to state peacebuilding.

## **Peacebuilding**

The thought that conventional peacekeeping is something of the past is a subject that has had much discussion over the past year in Canada. "Over the past sixty years, United Nations peacekeeping has evolved into one of the main tools used by the international community to manage complex crises that pose a threat to international peace and security."<sup>27</sup> The fact that almost all peacekeeping missions deployed at this time are not observers or forces monitoring ceasefires between two states but are in positions trying to ensure protection of civilians from often non state actors.<sup>28</sup> Peacebuilding is defined as "external interventions that are intended to reduce the risk that a state will erupt into or return to war."<sup>29</sup> This peacebuilding has been

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<sup>25</sup> <http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/peacekeeping/>

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>27</sup> Jean-Marie Guehenon, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*. (New York, UN Best practices section, 2008)

<sup>28</sup> Karen Mingst and Margaret Karns. *The United Nations in the 21st Century*. 4<sup>th</sup> ed. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2012), 113-119.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., 118.

conducted in places such as Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), or fighting Bocco Haram in the UN mission in Mali. These conflicts are not new, but the fact that UN peacekeeping forces are no longer overseeing peace treaties between two states but are trying to enforce security and aide to humanitarian assistance within volatile states, which creates an environment that is much more risky. One attack last year killed 12 UN peacekeepers in the DRC, one of the largest incidents in the UN history, shows just how risky current UN mission can be. Often UN peacekeeping missions are fighting counter insurgencies, making it difficult to differentiate insurgents from local population. This is exacerbated by the fact that often Rules of Engagement in a UN mission do not allow for the contributing nations to act properly to accomplish their mission. This was true in the Canadian experience in Rwanda and Bosnia, the UN had troops deployed during both missions and were unable to stop genocides from occurring.

Although counter insurgencies are dangerous and risky missions, the CAF have a very recent experience with over 10 years of combat operations in Afghanistan. “Today, Canada’s military is the most operationally experienced we have had in this country in over half a century.”<sup>30</sup> This experience lends itself specifically toward the current United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (UNMISMA). The Canadian Army had been engaged in combat operations in Afghanistan for over a decade and the lessons learned from the theater of operations would be invaluable in another theater of operation fighting against an insurgency. This not only applies to the Canadian Army but to the helicopter pilots of Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), who are already designated to deploy to UNMISMA.

Not only have UN peacekeeping missions evolved in the way they have been conducted, but the demographics of the UN peacekeeping force have also evolved. Initial peacekeeping

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<sup>30</sup> Eugene Lang, What Canada Gained (and Lost) in Afghanistan. (The Star, March 25 2014.)  
[https://www.thestar.com/opinion/commentary/2014/03/25/what\\_canada\\_gained\\_and\\_lost\\_in\\_afghanistan.html](https://www.thestar.com/opinion/commentary/2014/03/25/what_canada_gained_and_lost_in_afghanistan.html)

missions were primarily made up of western first world countries but over the past seven decades this has evolved, with the majority of the troops coming from nations such as Bangladesh, Pakistan, India.<sup>31</sup> This leave more place for Canada's specific niches capabilities like air transport, communication, intelligence, SOF, etc., and mostly highly qualified staff officers. With the announcement of helicopters supporting the UNMISMA, the Canadian Government has also said it will be sending air transport to support UN activities in Entebbe, Uganda, the major logistical hub for the UN in Africa. This once again demonstrates why the Government should focus its efforts not only militarily means of influencing the UN vote for the security council seat.

The belief that the Liberal government misunderstood a commitment that it was making during its electoral campaign, that Canada would be sending peacekeepers to Africa. "But the Liberals' ill-defined promise before the 2015 election that, if elected, they would return Canadian soldiers to peacekeeping missions around the world, needed fulfilment."<sup>32</sup> This was all based on a premise that current peacekeeping missions were conventional peacekeeping. This premise was fundamentally flawed and the CAF advised the Canadian Government of the evolution of peacekeeping missions and the risk that would follow a possible deployment to a peacekeeping mission in Africa. "Like electoral reform, the promise should have been left on the side of the road as an indication of mature decision-making."<sup>33</sup>

Even looking through Canada's defense policy, "Strong, Secured, Engaged" which was published in June 2017, it is clear that the Canadian Government had a firm commitment to

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<sup>31</sup> Karen Mingst and Margaret Karns. *The United Nations in the 21st Century*. 4<sup>th</sup> ed. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2012), 135-136.

<sup>32</sup> Gar Pardy, Peacekeeping in Mali is but a mirage for Canada. Ottawa Citizen, April 17 2018. <http://ottawacitizen.com/opinion/columnists/pardy-peacekeeping-in-mali-is-but-a-mirage-for-canada>

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

increasing its support to UN peacekeeping operations.<sup>34</sup> The Defense policy continued to explain that Canada would play a key role in contributions in Africa, “notably by contributing to peace and security through re-engaging in UN peace operations, providing training, supporting development and empowering woman and girls.”<sup>35</sup> The document also illustrates that the Canadian Government wants to bolster its connection with the African Union and specifically with the like minded states, like those of the *Francophonie*. Although this document was published in June 2017 it was a work in progress for nearly a year before being published, yet the CAF still hesitated and still advising against sending peacekeeping troops to the mission in Mali.

## CONCLUSION

In such circumstances (internal/external misalignment), institutional theory posits that pressures to preserve external legitimacy usually wins the day<sup>36</sup>, even if there is a clear rational case for supporting the internal views. In the case of Canada trying to be voted into the 2021 UNSC, the government is pressuring the military for deployment to assist in this goal, this however the military has advised against any deployment and the government accept several of the UN’s request for Canada to support UN peacekeeping operations.<sup>37</sup> Richard Gowan a professor Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs, March 15 2018 stated, "To be honest with you, the UN has given up waiting for these guys,"<sup>38</sup> According to Gowan Canada has made positive policy contributions such as the Elsie Initiative and that the government has been making the right rhetorical noises. However Canada’s inability to deliver

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<sup>34</sup> Strong, Secured, Engaged: Canada Defense Policy. (June 2017.) 84.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., 91.

<sup>36</sup> Richard Scott, *Institutions and Organizations: Ideas, Interests and Identities* (London, SAGE, 2014), 55-74.

<sup>37</sup> Murray Brewster, Number of Canadians soldiers on UN peacekeeping missions hits new low. CBC 15 March 2018. <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/peacekeeping-canadian-soldiers-missions-1.4576721>

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

on all the UN request are “overshadowing” all these positive aspects. This feeling is shared by a number of civil servants at Global Affairs Canada (GAC), namely that such mission will not be nearly enough for Canada to be back on the UNSC. The relative importance of Canada on the international scene has greatly diminished since the 1990s, and to truly restore it, Canada would need to really invest massively, for many years, on all kinds of initiatives. Yet, there is no real appetite for doing that in Ottawa. The days of getting lots of glory on the cheap are long gone.

Yet, the government will proceed no matter what. This, will in turn cause further deligitimization internally, and military institutional leaders then have to use more “coercive power” (a “do as your told” approach) to align the institution internally with the externally-oriented posture. The normative and cognitive pillars as seen in argument one are aligned to push against sending CAF personnel on UN peacekeeping missions. Although three decades have passed since some of the biggest UN peacekeeping failures have occurred, the CAF has been traumatized by its experiences it has incurred due to UN peacekeeping missions. “The disasters associated with peacekeeping are now more than manifest and successes are faint memories. It is time for new thinking. If half of the cost of the UN mission to Mali were dedicated to a political solution, then there might be some hope that a more peaceful future could be achieved.”<sup>39</sup> The Canadian Government has made grand gestures to the UN and is been unable to hold up to its bargain due to an internal struggle between the CAF and the Government.

“Lester Pearson’s leadership in the 1956 Suez Crisis and Canada’s role in the UN Emergency Force he helped create, Canadians have sometimes considered peacekeeping part of

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<sup>39</sup> Gar Parady, Peacekeeping in Mali is but a mirage for Canada. (Ottawa Citizen, April 17 2018) <http://ottawacitizen.com/opinion/columnists/pardy-peacekeeping-in-mali-is-but-a-mirage-for-canada>

the country's identity.”<sup>40</sup> In conclusion, although it very much is in Canadian national interest to have a seat on the UN Security Council, the means to influence the 2021 vote should not be focused on defense, number of troops but through diplomacy, development and humanitarianism. The Whole of Government approach would bring the biggest benefit to securing the UN Security Council seat, the question remains whether its too late to get UN support for this position, after having almost two years of little to no activity to show Canada's commitment of “being Back” as Prime Minister Trudeau stated in 2015. The multiple request that UN had made for support during that period may not easily be undone, times have changed and although Canadians feel that being peacekeepers are part of the Canadian identity may have changed after fighting a war in Afghanistan and knowing that the nature of peacekeeping is no longer the same as the Canadian legacy in peacekeeping missions.

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<sup>40</sup>The Canadian Encyclopedia. Peacekeeping. (Historica Canada, last updated 29 April 2016)  
<http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/peacekeeping/>

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