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MAKING THE TRUE NORTH STRONG: AN ANALYSIS OF THE HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL CONSISTENCY OF STRONG, SECURE, ENGAGED IN RELATION TO ARCTIC POLICY

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Exercise Solo Flight

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EXERCISE *SOLO FLIGHT* – EXERCICE *SOLO FLIGHT*

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**MAKING THE TRUE NORTH STRONG:
An Analysis of the Horizontal and Vertical Consistency of
Strong, Secure, Engaged in Relation to Arctic Policy**

Introduction

Strong, Secure, Engaged (SSE) released in June of 2017 is the Liberal government's commitment to being Strong in Canada, Secure in North America, and Engaged in the rest of the World. As a fundamental task set out in SSE, being Strong in Canada is easier said than done. This statement is no truer than in Canada's North where an austere environment, coupled with an expansive landmass, makes even the most simple of tasks extremely difficult. This paper will conduct an in-depth look at the elements of SSE to determine if the commitments made in writing throughout the document will be able to achieve the overall intent of being Strong in Canada's North, and if those initiatives are in alignment with other Governmental policies. Furthermore, by looking at what commitments are new, and which are hold-overs from previous administrations, one can draw a conclusion as to where the current Government views the actual priorities. This analysis will help support the overall thesis that despite appearing disjointed in some areas, when viewed through the lens of other government initiatives, the commitments made in SSE begin to make more sense, not just from a defence stand point, but one of a whole of government effort.

To illustrate the above thesis, the overall roadmap will analyze SSE in the form of its ability to anticipate, adapt and act with respects to issues related to the North. In order to assess each of these three functional areas, they will be broken down into both their vertical as well as horizontal policy linkages. In order to assess vertical consistency, government efforts will be analyzed to determine if departmental initiatives in one field contradict other departmental

efforts in another.¹ To aid in drawing these linkages, governmental documents from other departments, as well as statements from the federal budget, will be utilized to determine pan-government consistency or inconsistencies. On the vertical axis, an analysis will be conducted to determine if programs and activities undertaken within the Department of National Defence (DND) are logically related from the strategic down to the operational level.² By reviewing documents such as ministerial mandate letters, speeches from the throne, and other political initiatives filtered through SSE, these initiatives should be in line with the Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) plan for the North if true vertical consistency is to be achieved. With no over-arching National Security Policy to align with, the authors of SSE were faced with a daunting task, one of attempting to align defence efforts to meet the whole of government approach, without a capstone document to reference. As SSE remains a relatively new document within the policy world, little academic work exists on the analysis of the linkages of government initiatives announced in the publication. Although this paper will be limited to a view on the Arctic, the novel method of analyzing anticipate, adapt, act versus horizontal and vertical consistency will provide future researchers with a framework to conduct further analysis in other areas.

Background and Context

In a message from the Minister of National Defence found in the pre-amble to SSE, Minister Sajjan outlines a new framework for how the future vision of defence will be accomplished. “Anticipate, Adapt, and Act, sets out a way of operating that addresses the

¹ Leslie A. Pal, “Policy Analysis: Concepts and Practice.” *Beyond Policy Analysis: Public Issue Management in Turbulent Times*, (Toronto: Nelson, 2010), 14.
<http://bishop.cfcacad.net/CFCL/Readings/DS557/pal-eng.pdf>

² *Ibid.*, 13.

challenges we face today, and the ones that will emerge tomorrow.”³ It therefore stands to reason that these same three categories will be valuable in analyzing current Government initiatives to identify priority areas and gaps across a vertical and horizontal spectrum of policies. In order to put the preceding arguments into context, a general understanding of this new approach to viewing defence is required. The ability to anticipate focuses on the development of a better understanding of potential threats to Canada “so as to identify, prevent or prepare for, and respond to a wide range of contingencies.”⁴ Adapt focuses on being proactive and ensuring that the Canadian military is “agile, flexible and responsive in meeting the challenges and capturing opportunities of our rapidly evolving world”.⁵ Finally, Act calls for “a decisive military capability across the spectrum of operations to defend Canada, protect Canadian interests and values, and contribute to global stability.”⁶

It is through the lens of the above three pillars of SSE that horizontal and vertical policy can be filtered through to determine consistency or any lack thereof. In an effort to be strong at home, SSE notes: “the Government has no higher obligation than the safety and security of the Canadian people.”⁷ Understanding that this task will be the most challenging in the austere environment of the North, it is likely no accident that the drafters of SSE chose to put a photo of a Canadian Ranger aiding a Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) member under the Strong at home title.⁸ Furthermore, SSE calls for “improved mobility and reach in Canada’s northernmost territories, and pursue a greater presence in the Arctic over the longer-term.”⁹ With an emphasis

³ Department of National Defence. *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy*. (June 7, 2017), 6, accessed April 28, 2018, http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2017/mdn-dnd/D2-386-2017-eng.pdf.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 63.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 67.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 63.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 60.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 60.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 60.

on the Arctic engrained throughout SSE, it is vital that this document be consistent with the whole of government initiative if it is to be successfully implemented.

Anticipate - Horizontal consistency

SSE highlights that Canada's arrangements with its allies is a crucial element of mission success in preparing for and anticipating challenges to domestic security.¹⁰ This commitment to international cooperation in anticipating challenges can be seen consistently across government lines, particularly in the North. Recognizing that anticipating tomorrow's challenges will require close relations with our neighbours in the Arctic, Canada became a founding member and first chair of the Arctic Council in 1996.¹¹ Through the Arctic council, the Canadian Government has been active in cooperating with the eight Arctic states consisting of Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States in anticipating and advancing shared interests. In particular, such initiatives have included trade and transportation, environmental protection, natural resource development, the role of indigenous peoples, oceans management, climate change adaptation and scientific cooperation.¹²

The government's commitment to working closely with partner nations on issues outside of defence, to resolve mutual problems, is consistent with SSEs commitments of doing the same on the security front. While an argument can be made that the statement within SSE regarding the criticality of working closely with allies was not specific to the Arctic, SSE does note: "while

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 65.

¹¹ Arctic Council, *Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council: Joint Communique of the Governments of the Arctic Countries on the Establishment of the Arctic Council*, (September 19, 1996), 4, accessed April 28, 2017, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/85/EDOCS-1752-v2-ACMMCA00_Ottawa_1996_Founding_Declaration.PDF?sequence=5&isAllowed=y.

¹² Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, *Canada's Arctic Policy Framework: Discussion Guide*, (November 28, 2017), accessed April 29, 2018, <https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1503687877293/1503687975269#intro>.

operating in Canada's North, we often work in close partnership with other federal, territorial, and local partners. As such we will leverage our new capabilities to help build the capacity of whole-of-government partners."¹³ Therefore, while not explicitly mentioning working with other Arctic nations, SSE appears to capture the fact that the Arctic will be a complex environment, with many actors who need to work in concert to solve complex problems.

Further horizontal consistencies can be viewed in the field of Research and Development (R&D). SSE calls for a bolstering of academic outreach in order to benefit from Canada's "rich academic and analytic community."¹⁴ This commitment to increasing collaboration with academia is consistent with the overall government efforts of investing in academia to assist in anticipating future challenges. Specifically for the North, Budget 2018 makes a commitment to invest 20.6 million dollars over four years starting in 2019, with 5.1 million per year ongoing to aid POLAR Knowledge Canada in an effort to support the Canadian High Arctic Research Station (CHARS), and enable world class cutting-edge research in polar science and technology.¹⁵ Additionally, the federal budget highlights that these investments will be coordinated across the spectrum of government departments in order to ensure greater collaboration. According to the CHARS Act, its purpose is to "advance knowledge of the Canadian Arctic in order to improve economic opportunities, environmental stewardship and the quality of life of its residents and all other Canadians."¹⁶ In addition, CHARS intendeds to "strengthen Canada's leadership on Arctic issues."¹⁷ Aligning this government initiative on

¹³ Department of National Defence. *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy*. (June 7, 2017), 80, accessed April 28, 2018, http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2017/mdn-dnd/D2-386-2017-eng.pdf.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 67.

¹⁵ Department of Finance, *2018 Federal Budget: Equality Growth, A Strong Middle Class*, (February 27, 2018), 99, accessed April 28, 2018, <https://www.budget.gc.ca/2018/docs/plan/budget-2018-en.pdf>.

¹⁶ Department of Justice, Canadian High Arctic Research Station Act, (December 14, 2014), accessed April 28, 2018, <http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-17.8/page-1.html>.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

Arctic research to SSE shows the horizontal policy consistency in becoming Strong at home, particularly in the North. A review of the Canadian Northern Economic Development Agency (CanNor) Report on Plans and Priorities reveals that this alignment is by no mere accident. CanNor's program on Policy and Alignment is specifically geared towards ensuring that programming and policy choices are developed to promote horizontal strategies to support northern interests both inside and outside of the federal government.¹⁸ This pan governmental approach to increasing initiatives across the spectrum of government interests provides for a consistent message that Canada will be strong at home, in all areas, including the Arctic.

While SSE predominately deals with the vertical aspect of anticipating threats and challenges, as seen through other government investments such as CHARS, and CanNor's commitment to addressing economic development challenges and opportunities in the North, the Canadian government has demonstrated a vision that supports SSEs goal of enhancing Arctic presence.¹⁹ This horizontal effort highlights that being strong is not merely about arming the North. In a joint statement with President Obama, Prime Minister Trudeau announced "a new partnership to embrace opportunities and confront challenges in the changing Arctic, with Indigenous and Northern partnerships, and responsible, science-based leadership."²⁰ While not directly linked to the provision of national defence, the commitment of the federal government to invest in understanding the challenges of the Arctic point towards a whole of government approach in anticipating future potential issues. This whole of government approach in pursuing

¹⁸ Canadian Northern Economic Development Agency, *2016–17 Report on Plans and Priorities*, (2016), 20, Accessed April 28, 2018. http://www.cannor.gc.ca/DAM/DAM-CANNOR-CANNOR/STAGING/texte-text/cannor_rpp-2016-17_1456759517060_eng.pdf.

¹⁹ Department of National Defence. *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy*. (June 7, 2017), 60, accessed April 28, 2018, http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2017/mdn-dnd/D2-386-2017-eng.pdf.

²⁰ Government of Canada, Prime Minister, *United States-Canada Joint Arctic Leaders' Statement*, (December 20, 2016), accessed April 28, 2018, <https://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2016/12/20/united-states-canada-joint-arctic-leaders-statement>.

a greater understanding of the Arctic region over the long term, in order to anticipate challenges both environmentally, economically, as well as physically all contribute to the overall goal of strengthening our northern border.

Anticipate - Vertical Consistency

In an effort to increase situational awareness, to better anticipate events happening in the Arctic, CJOC's plan for the North highlights the ability to conduct Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) as essential to CAF activity.²¹ Although written prior to SSE's release, CJOC's plan remains consistent with the overall Government vision in SSE which calls for the CAF to acquire "next generation surveillance aircraft, remotely piloted systems, and space based surveillance assets to significantly expand its joint ISR capacity."²² Further demonstrating the vertical alignment within DND as a whole, is the Government investment of \$133M to support an Assistant Deputy Minister Science & Technology (ADM S&T) initiative known as All Domain Situational Awareness (ADSA).²³ The intent of this initiative is to "support the development of options for enhanced domain awareness of air, maritime surface and sub-surface approaches to Canada, and in particular those in the Arctic."²⁴

The above investment in ISR for the Arctic may initially seem at odds with departmental views, particularly when compared to the words of Vice-Admiral McFadden, former Commander of the Navy, who stated "let me be clear. Canada does not see a conventional

²¹ Canadian Joint Operations Command, *CJOC Plan for the North*, (February 25, 2015), 8.

²² Department of National Defence. *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy*, (June 7, 2017), 15, accessed April 28, 2018, http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2017/mdn-dnd/D2-386-2017-eng.pdf.

²³ Defence Research and Development Canada, *All Domain Situational Awareness S&T Program*, (2016), accessed April 28, 2018. http://www.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/assets/DRDC_Internet/docs/en/adsa-cstd-info-en.pdf.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

military threat in the Arctic in the foreseeable future.”²⁵ However, in accordance with the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and Deputy Minister’s Directive for the North issued in 2011, two of the key strategic objectives to be achieved were supporting other government departments such as the RCMP, CCG, and CBSA, as well as maintaining a 24/7 Search and Rescue capability. So while there may be no conventional threat, ISR remains an important aspect, captured in SSE, to support these capabilities demanded through the CDS and Deputy Minister’s directive.

While it is encouraging to note that SSE, CJOCs plan for the North, and ADM S&T are aligned with the need to increase ISR capabilities in order to anticipate, one area that has not been discussed in any of the documents is Canada’s participation in the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS). Canada is a participant in IUSS, supplying approximately 30 Canadian operators to work alongside the USN on Whidbey Island, Washington, in an effort to provide acoustic cueing, and conducting maritime surveillance of the Pacific for domestic security.²⁶ However, Canada does not have the same bi-national arrangements for the Atlantic, and therefore is not able to exploit this same access to increasing maritime surveillance as it does on the west coast. While SSE does discuss increasing ties with allies, and a need to increase ISR, it fails not only to identify the opportunities available through IUSS, it also fails to discuss any potential of expanding this capability to cover the Arctic. Although initially designed specifically to track Soviet submarines during the Cold War, IUSS is capable of providing much more such as tracking vessels of interest and providing cueing to other government departments.²⁷ While it is encouraging to see much of DND aligned with SSE’s vision of “anticipate”, the omission of a

²⁵ Vice Admiral Dean McFadden, speaking notes, “The Evolution of Arctic Security and Defence Policies: Cooperative or Confrontational?” Center for Strategic and International Studies conference, Washington, DC, 28 April 2010.

²⁶ U.S. Navy, Integrated Undersea Surveillance System. *Naval Ocean Processing Facility Whidbey Island*, accessed April 28, 2018, <http://www.public.navy.mil/subfor/cus/Pages/NOPFWI.aspx>.

²⁷ Dawn M. Maskell, *The Navy’s Best-Kept Secret: Is IUSS Becoming a Lost Art?* (April 12, 2001), 32, accessed April 28, 2018, <http://dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a401150.pdf>.

valuable asset such as IUSS demonstrates a missed opportunity to further exploit and align this capability under the ISR umbrella.

Adapt - Horizontal Consistency

As climate change leads to a more accessible Arctic, the region is becoming more and more relevant to the international community.²⁸ With issues ranging from potential economic benefits, to environmental impacts, it is clear that Canada needs to be ready to adapt across all government lines, not just within defence. As noted by Mary Simon, “The simple fact is that Arctic strategies throughout my lifetime have rarely matched or addressed the magnitude of the basic gaps between what exists in the Arctic and what other Canadians take for granted.”²⁹ While Mary Simon was speaking in reference to conservation and not SSE, her observations hold true in that we cannot take things for granted in the Arctic, and must be ready to adapt to reality. It should therefore come as no surprise that SSE, despite being a defence policy, emphasizes the need to expand and deepen relationships with northern communities, particularly through the Canadian Rangers and Junior Rangers.³⁰ In particular, SSE calls for the requirement to “enhance and expand the training and effectiveness of the Canadian Rangers to improve their functional capabilities within the CAF.”³¹

Consistent with other government initiatives, such as the above comments from Mary Simon, SSE captures the necessity of engaging the local experts who better understand the environment such that Canada as a whole can better understand the environment and adapt

²⁸ Department of National Defence. *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy*. (June 7, 2017), 79, accessed April 28, 2018, http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2017/mdn-dnd/D2-386-2017-eng.pdf.

²⁹ Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, *Interim Report on the Shared Arctic Leadership Model*. (October 31, 2016), accessed April 29, 2018, <http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1481656672979/1485800424490>.

³⁰ Department of National Defence. *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy*. (June 7, 2017), 80, accessed April 28, 2018, http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2017/mdn-dnd/D2-386-2017-eng.pdf.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 113.

accordingly. However, with regards to the Canadian Rangers, an argument can be made that SSE falls short of the pan-governmental initiative of strengthening ties in the Arctic. While SSE directs an increase in the size of the CAF reserve force by enhancing their role and capabilities,³² there is no mention of expanding the actual size of the Canadian Rangers, rather it solely focuses on improving their training as mentioned above.

Aside from strengthening ties with the northern communities, in order to adapt to emerging challenges, SSE highlights the necessity of “harnessing new technologies, fostering a resilient workforce, and leveraging innovation, knowledge and new ways of doing business.”³³ This message, particularly the need to leverage innovation, is consistent horizontally along government lines as reflected in the 2017 Federal Budget which notes: “Innovation is the key that unlocks possibilities and opportunities-it’s what allows Canadian to adapt to change and prepare for the future.”³⁴ In order to adapt to future challenges and harness opportunities provided through innovation, the CAF must be able to procure items in a timely manner. This sentiment is even more pronounced in the North where Canada must be ready to tackle the challenges posed by climate change. SSE’s captures this challenge by committing to reduce project development and approval time in the Department by at least 50 percent, while incentivizing Canadian research and development in important and emerging technological areas.³⁵ Perhaps even more so than the ability to anticipate, the CAF must be ready to adapt to a rapidly changing environment in the Arctic. As new issues emerge as a result of climate change, if the CAF is unable to adapt, it will not be able to keep pace in the North. SSE’s

³² *Ibid.*, 69.

³³ *Ibid.*, 63.

³⁴ Canadian Department of Finance, *2017 Federal Budget: Building A Strong Middle Class*, (February 27, 2018), 231, accessed April 28, 2018. <https://www.budget.gc.ca/2017/docs/plan/budget-2017-en.pdf>.

³⁵ Department of National Defence. *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy*. (June 7, 2017), 75, accessed April 28, 2018, http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2017/mdn-dnd/D2-386-2017-eng.pdf.

acknowledgement of increasing adaptability, supported across government lines as illustrated in the federal budget, is a positive sign that this challenge has been acknowledged and is being addressed.

Adapt - Vertical Consistency

The vertical alignment in the ability to adapt can be traced all the way up to the ultimate capstone document that guides policy within Canada. In the 2015 Speech from the Throne, the Governor General highlights the need for “a leaner, more agile, better- equipped military.”³⁶ This statement is echoed in the opening of SSE’s Adapt section, which states “Canada’s military must be agile, flexible and responsive in meeting the challenges and capturing the opportunities of our rapidly evolving world.”³⁷

As previously discussed and further highlighted in CJOC’s plan for the North, the CAF is uniquely postured to support other governmental departments in the North, and must be ready to react “quickly and effectively when called upon to assist when it is beyond the capacities of our partners to respond.”³⁸ As the response that will be required from the CAF will be varied, and often required on short notice, the highlighting of the requirement to be flexible and agile in SSE, and the Speech from the Throne, show that policies are aligned to face this challenge from the strategic level down to the operational. Furthermore, CJOC’s plan for the North articulates the need to find “unique solutions and approaches in order to achieve desired effects in a timely

³⁶ Governor General of Canada, *Speech From the Throne: Making Real Change Happen*, (December 4, 2015), 9, accessed April 28, 2018, https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/pco-bcp/documents/pm/speech_from_the_throne.pdf.

³⁷ Department of National Defence. *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy*. (June 7, 2017), 67, accessed April 28, 2018, http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2017/mdn-dnd/D2-386-2017-eng.pdf.

³⁸ Canadian Joint Operations Command, *CJOC Plan for the North*, (February 25, 2015), 6.

manner.”³⁹ This requirement is captured throughout SSE with investments earmarked to increase space and cyber capabilities, remotely piloted systems, and the creation of defence innovation clusters to conduct R&D into areas critical for future defence needs.⁴⁰ These investments found in SSE further illustrate the linkage between the government’s strategic objectives and CJOC’s operational plan.

In addition to technological and physical means of adapting to change, SSE states that in order to adapt to the rapid change in today’s environment, the way people are managed and employed needs to be transformed.⁴¹ However, this initiative set out by SSE is complicated by the fact that there is no overarching National Strategic Security policy to vertically align and transform the efforts of the various actors in the North. As noted by CJOC, the list of governmental actors in the region are numerous and varied ranging from other government departments such as Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada (AANDC), Global Affairs Canada (GAC), Public Safety, Canadian Coast Guard (CCG), Public Health, Natural Resources Canada (NRCAN), Environment Canada, Transport Canada, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) to name a few.⁴² With competing mandates of all of these various departments, and no overarching security policy to effect change, attempting to transform organizational structures to be more agile and responsive will remain an elusive task.

³⁹ Ibid., 3.

⁴⁰ Department of National Defence. *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy*. (June 7, 2017), 110-113, accessed April 28, 2018, http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2017/mdn-dnd/D2-386-2017-eng.pdf.

⁴¹ Ibid., 15.

⁴² Canadian Joint Operations Command, *CJOC Plan for the North*, (February 25, 2015), 20-24.

Act – Horizontal Consistency

The prominent military strategist Carl Von Clausewitz once opined that “War is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.”⁴³ It is therefore vital that when analyzing SSE’s commitment in the ability to act that it be aligned horizontally amongst other government initiatives. To address how SSE is aligned, two contrasting views will be analyzed. First, a look at Canada’s closest ally, the United States, will highlight how the Arctic provides for a continued commitment towards strengthening our ties with our neighbours to the south. Secondly, a closer look at the pan-governmental initiatives towards Russia will illustrate one area where alignment may be disjointed in the North.

Under the heading for security and opportunity, the 2015 Speech from the Throne directed that “the Government will strengthen its relationship with allies, especially with our closest friend and partner, the United States.”⁴⁴ SSE supports this government initiative by highlighting the necessity to work closely with the United States and modernize elements of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), namely the North Warning System (NWS) and sufficient mission-ready fighters.⁴⁵ While an investment in a capability to defend against a conventional threat may seem ill advised considering the previously noted comments of no conventional threats, when viewed alongside other government objectives things become more clear. With a shared interest in the North, Canada has a unique opportunity to strengthen its ties with the world’s military hegemon. For decades, Canada has refused to sign on to NORAD’s

⁴³ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. and e. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New York: Everyman’s Library, 1993), 98-99.

⁴⁴ Governor General of Canada, *Speech From the Throne: Making Real Change Happen*, (December 4, 2015), 7, accessed April 28, 2018, https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/pco-bcp/documents/pm/speech_from_the_throne.pdf.

⁴⁵ Department of National Defence. *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy*. (June 7, 2017), 79, accessed April 28, 2018, http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2017/mdn-dnd/D2-386-2017-eng.pdf.

Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD), despite already having Canadian's working in the Command at Colorado Springs.⁴⁶ While there has been no indication of Canada being pushed out of NORAD, as systems become more integrated to BMD, Canada will need to find a way to maintain a viable contribution to its participation in the bi-national command, outside of BMD. So while there may be no perceived conventional threat, the commitments made in SSE in modernizing the NWS, and investments in the fighter program, demonstrate an act capability that reaches beyond traditional military lines and supports the horizontal government initiatives of strengthening ties with our most important ally.

Despite being somewhat convoluted, the previous linkage with the US is fairly easy to follow; however, Canada's policy with regard to Russia appears more disjointed. The Canadian Arctic Foreign policy, released by the former conservative government, notes that Canada is working with Russia, amongst various countries, to advance shared interests such as trade, transportation, environmental protection, natural resource development, indigenous people, ocean management, and climate change.⁴⁷ While the Liberal government has yet to release an updated policy, Foreign Affairs Minister Stéphane Dion stated it was time to "start working with Russia when we have common interests."⁴⁸ Further, Minister Dion poses the question, by not talking with Russia, "in what way is this helping our interests in the Arctic?"⁴⁹ Despite these commitments to working closer with Russia on solving Arctic challenges, SSE makes clear that Russia's annexation of the Crimea was illegal, and proves their willingness to test the

⁴⁶ Canadian Global Affair Institute, *Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence*, (March, 2014), accessed April 28, 2018. https://www.cgai.ca/canada_ballistic_missile_defence.

⁴⁷ Global Affairs Canada. *Statement on Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy: Exercising Sovereignty and Promoting Canada's Northern Strategy Abroad*, (2010), 23, accessed April 29, 2018, http://international.gc.ca/world-monde/assets/pdfs/canada_arctic_foreign_policy-eng.pdf

⁴⁸ Peter Zimonjic, "Stéphane Dion Signals Willingness to Re-engage with Russia," *CBC News*, January 26, 2016, accessed April 28, 2018, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/russia-canada-relations-diplomacy-dion-lavrov-1.3420781>.

⁴⁹ *Ibid*

international security environment.⁵⁰ In addition, SSE highlights a commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in “its attention to Russia’s ability to project force from its Arctic territory into the North Atlantic, and its potential to challenge NATO’s collective defence posture.”⁵¹ While the rest of the government may be focused on increasing dialogue and cooperation with Russia in regards to the Arctic, SSE only makes note of Canada’s commitment to “be ready to deter and defend against any potential threats.”⁵² While an argument could be made that an open dialogue and cooperation with Russia on Arctic issues can aide in easing tension, the previously noted lack of a National Strategic Security framework does not allow for individual departments to coordinate efforts under one umbrella. SSE’s misalignment on dealing with Russia is a clear example of why such a policy is needed.

Act – Vertical Consistency

There has been little to no additional investment from SSE in the ability to “act” in the North, short of continuing with the Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ship (AOPS) program, new vehicles for the army, and modernizing the aurora, which will need to be replaced anyways, based on age. It can therefore safely be assumed that the words of the former CDS, General Walt Natynczyk, remain true today; “if a country invades the Canadian Arctic, my first challenge is

⁵⁰ Department of National Defence. *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy*. (June 7, 2017), 50, accessed April 28, 2018, http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2017/mdn-dnd/D2-386-2017-eng.pdf.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 79.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 79.

search and rescue to help them out.”⁵³ It therefore stands to reason that SSE places the section on enhancing Arctic capability squarely in the Adapt portion of the document prior to Act.⁵⁴

Although the government’s continued investment in AOPS is by no means a small investment, it can be argued that providing this capability to the RCN is not solely about providing a capability to act in the North against future threats. As highlighted by the Government Senate committee, there are serious concerns within government about the capabilities of the AOPS, chiefly that AOPS will “Not be able to operate in ice more than one meter thick, are slower than a BC Ferry, can only operate in the Arctic from June to October and will require a coast guard escort when in northern water.”⁵⁵ Despite the statement on a requirement for a coast guard escort being false, the RCN Arctic Operations Manual does not mandate for this, the remainder of the concerns remain valid in the limited operating area and duration.⁵⁶ Why then, despite these concerns by the Senate committee, does the government continue to invest in a capability that will not give them a robust means to “act”? While it is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze the influence of domestic economic benefits on SSE, it is important to note that AOPS was promised under the 2010 National Shipbuilding Program that promised to “restore our shipyards, rebuild our marine industry and create sustainable jobs in Canada.”⁵⁷ Therefore, while the addition of AOPS to the RCN fleet may initially be seen as a

⁵³ Senate of Canada, Standing Committee on National Security and Defence, *Issue No. 5 Canada’s National Security and Defence Policy*, (June 7, 2010), 71-72, accessed April 28, 2018, <https://sencanada.ca/en/Content/SEN/Committee/403/defe/05evb-e>.

⁵⁴ Department of National Defence. *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada’s Defence Policy*. (June 7, 2017), 83, accessed April 28, 2018, http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2017/mdn-dnd/D2-386-2017-eng.pdf.

⁵⁵ Senate of Canada, Standing Committee on National Security and Defence, *Reinvesting in the Canadian Armed Forces: A Plan for the Future*, (June 7, 2010), vii, accessed April 28, 2018, https://sencanada.ca/content/sen/committee/421/SECD/Reports/SECDDPRReport_FINAL_e.pdf

⁵⁶ Royal Canadian Navy, *Arctic Operations Manual North*, August 11, 2017.

⁵⁷ Public Services and Procurement Canada, *National Shipbuilding Strategy*, (June 11, 2017), accessed April 28, 2018, <https://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/app-acq/amd-dp/mer-sea/sncn-nss/apropos-about-eng.html?wbdisable=true>.

step towards militarizing the ability to “act” in the North, vertically aligned with CJOCs plan to provide a presence, this section on AOPS could just as easily have been articulated in and aligned across the horizontal level supporting other government initiative such as promoting economic growth within Canada. Furthermore, the Senate Committee erroneously called AOPS the Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship, when in fact the actual name is Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ship. While this error in naming may seem minor, the official name eludes to the fact that this vessel will be used for more than just Arctic Patrols. According to the AOPS Concept of Use manual, AOPS “will also possess sea-keeping qualities to allow for operations in the open ocean, thereby contributing to the support provided to OGDs off Canada’s east and west coasts.”⁵⁸ This seemingly minor misunderstanding of the vessels name leads to a major misunderstanding that it is not just being built for acting in the Arctic, but also supporting other government initiatives. CJOC’s plan for the North clarifies that there remains no immediate conventional threat to Canada in the Arctic.⁵⁹ So while SSE may seem light on investing in the kinetic ability to respond militarily in the North, it remains in line with the CAF’s view on the perceived threat, or lack thereof.

Conclusion

Due to the vastness and complex environment of the North, sovereignty is truly a whole of government initiative, with security being but one, although important, aspect. While the commitments made in SSE generally align with the Government of Canada approach to strengthening Canada’s protection of the Arctic, there are still some areas that remain disjointed.

⁵⁸ Royal Canadian Navy, *Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ship Concept of Employment*, (January 12, 2011), 9.

⁵⁹ Canadian Joint Operations Command, *CJOC Plan for the North*, (February 25, 2015), 5.

SSE's philosophy of anticipate, adapt, and act should not be considered in isolation when attempting to solve the sovereignty issues in the North. Initiatives such as the construction of AOPS, updating of the NWS, and investments into R&D, while found under the Arctic section of SSE for defending the North, feed into the bigger whole of government approach. Making the True North Strong is definitely not free, or easy, and a balance of limited resources needs to be struck in order to effectively navigate this challenging sovereignty task. The numerous stakeholders involved in Canada's commitment to the Arctic makes for a wicked problem, one where various departments, operating under varying mandates, with varying views of an ideal end state, need to align without an overall National Security Policy.

By definition, there is no right or wrong solution to a wicked problem. However, by diversifying commitments across numerous government initiatives, and not solely attempting to solve the sovereignty issue with the hammer of the Canadian Forces, the chances for success are increased. As Canada strives to develop closer relations with Arctic neighbours to solve mutual issues, the size and scope of military efforts needs to be carefully balanced. As the Arctic continues to become more accessible, Canada must first be able to anticipate the challenges to invest in the right areas in order to be ready to adapt to emergent issues, and ultimately act to resolve them. By continuing to focus the whole of government initiative in these three pillars, Canada stands a better chance of maintaining sovereignty in the Arctic in an uncertain future in an austere environment.

One large caveat must be added to the conclusions that have been drawn out through this paper, and that is the fact that the documents used have all pre-dated the release of SSE. The Trudeau government has yet to release their new Arctic Policy despite announcing in 2016 that it would begin developing a new strategy to replace Canada's Northern Strategy of 2009 and the

Statement on Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy of 2010.⁶⁰ It would stand to reason that since the Liberal government signed off on SSE, that the new Arctic policy would remain in alignment, yet that assumption will need to be validated once the policy is actually released. Further complicating the matter will be the federal election in 2019, which may or may not see a shift in political priorities. All of these factors serve to conclude that the Arctic sovereignty issue remains a complex problem with numerous actors that need to work together in close cooperation. While making the True North strong comes at a large price, by focusing on a leaner, more agile force that is better situated to anticipate, adapt, and then act, SSE sets the CAF in the right direction to be able to meet the challenges of a rapidly changing environment in the Arctic.

⁶⁰ Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, *Towards a New Arctic Policy Framework*, accessed April 29, 2018. <https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1499951681722/1499951703370>

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