TARGETING DOES NOT REQUIRE A MOSID

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Word Count: 2362
AIM

1. The aim of this service paper is to dissuade the development of a specific Military Occupation Structure Identification Code (MOSID) for targeting in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). Due to the relative small size of the CAF, it is necessary for its personnel to possess a number of specialized qualifications within each branch. Instead of looking to develop a specific MOSID for such a small community, the CAF should investigate present models currently in practice by branches to manage individuals with similar specialized training and qualifications.

INTRODUCTION

2. Targeting within the CAF has made advanced considerably in the past two decades. In the 1990s, the CAF did not possess a center of excellence or doctrine on the subject. At that time, there was not a huge requirement for individuals within the CAF to possess this special qualification. Those that were identified as requiring this skill set were sent to the NATO school of targeting in Oberammergau Germany in order to receive training.\(^1\) This trend continued throughout the 1990s until elements of the CAF deployed to Afghanistan.

3. In the complex operating environment of Afghanistan, targeting personnel used the latest coalition technology and demonstrated the full range of effects that modern targeting could provide field commanders. It was through their success that Senior CAF commanders at the operational and strategic level recognized the importance this capability brought to the modern battlefield. As such, the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) in Contingency Plan Jupiter, directed Commander Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) to develop an operational level targeting capability that would be housed within CJOC. This targeting capability needed to be able to conduct a full spectrum approach to targeting. Commander CJOC’s solution to this problem is the impending Joint Targeting and Intelligence Center (JTIC) which is scheduled to commence operations in 2019. Although the final manning for this organization has yet to be approved, the draft manning brick proposes that a number of specialists from the intelligence, influence activities, intelligence surveillance target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR), legal, signal intelligence, cyber, and targeting communities comprise the bulk of the staff for this organization. It was during the development of the JTIC that discussions began to surface regarding the requirement for a specific MOSID for targeting personnel.

4. It is important to note that there is a difference between targeting and a targeteer. Current Canadian military doctrine defines targeting as the “process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking into account operational requirements and capabilities.” The targeting process also includes the selection of the means, whether kinetic or

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3 JTIC finalized manning brick has not been approved yet for release.
non-kinetic in nature, that will be used to achieve the commander’s or nation’s effect. Although there is no doctrinal definition for a Canadian targeteer, the Land Targeting publication refers to these individuals as “qualified targeting personnel who are able to plan, coordinate, employ and synchronize joint targeting procedures and assess effects in support of land operations at the unit, formation and national level.”

This service paper will first discuss how the Artillery Corp has been able to successfully manage two specialized qualifications found within its branch without the requirement to introduce two new MOSIDs into the CAF. Next, this service paper will briefly discuss the benefits and potential impediments that a specific MOSID for targeting would cause the CAF. Finally, this paper will discuss the personnel management approaches that members of the five eye community have taken in regards to their targeting qualified personnel.

**DISCUSSION**

5. In the late 2000s, there was a similar debate regarding developing a MOSID for Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTACs). This was due in large part to the level of specialized training which a JTAC required in order to maintain their qualifications. There was a belief at that time that the units at the tactical level did not have the capability to properly organize, log, and monitor training as well as complete all the necessary administration requirements for these individuals. This issue was resolved through the appointment of the Joint Terminal Attack Controller Evaluator (JTAC-E) at the tactical level. The JTAC-E is responsible to organize access and track the training completed by the JTACs under their supervision. This individual conducts this action on behalf of the unit commanding officer (CO) who is overall responsible to

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ensure he or she has the number of qualified JTACs needed to meet the Management Readiness Plan requirements. The JTAC-E provides currency information to the Air Land Integration Cell (ALIC) located in Kingston Ontario. The ALIC is responsible to keep track of the total number of current and qualified JTACs and JTAC–Es in the CAF, as well as ensures the training being conducted by the JTAC-Es meets CAF approved standards. All of the administration generated by JTACs is completed by the unit with whom the JTAC is affiliated with eliminating the need to provide separate dedicated support to these individuals.

6. The Artillery Corp has an additional group of specialized soldiers which it is responsible to force generate. These individuals are the personnel who are employed in the Surveillance Target Acquisition Batteries (STA Btys) across the field force units. Their specialized training is recognized as a stream within the Artillery MOSID. Similar to JTAC training, the force center of excellence for STA training is the Royal Canadian Artillery School (RCAS). The RCAS only oversees the training of the command and control courses such as the STA Troop Commander Course. Unit COs are responsible to oversee and force generate three specialized operators in order to operate unmanned aerial vehicles, light weight counter mortar radars, and the acoustic weapon locating systems. Unlike JTACs which can come from any element across the CAF, the individuals who work and operate the CAF’s STA equipment are also cross trained to operate the M777 howitzer. This is the primary weapon system for the Artillery Corp. These soldiers have been used to augment manning in the M777 Btys when required. This cross training has added much needed depth in regular force Artillery Regiments across Canada.
7. In comparison to JTAC and STA training requirements, the training required to produce a qualified targeting personnel is straightforward. The current Land Target Course (LTC) can be completed in three weeks at the Land Targeting School (LTS) in Kingston Ontario. Following the completion of the three week program, successful course candidates are qualified to plan, coordinate, employ and synchronize joint targeting procedures and assess effects in support of land operations at the unit, formation and national level. Similar to qualified JTAC personnel, targeting personnel must maintain currency in the field. Unlike a JTAC who requires a number of assessed training runs both in a live and simulated environment, the targeting personnel are required to complete an on line self-study package which is unassessed and returned to the LTS for tracking purposes. Once completed the member is recertified as a qualified targeting personnel for a period of one year from the date of the completed package. At the tactical level it is the unit CO who is responsible to ensure that they have a qualified targeting officer to fill the various positions within the tactical level headquarters. Those individuals who are currently filling targeting positions at the operational or strategic level have been selected by the branch director. The onus is on these individuals to maintain their own currency. In all three examples, the current systems established for force generation, training and tracking currencies have been successful in meeting the needs of the CAF. More importantly, these steps have not required any additional support to be generated from the CAF. The administrative support as well as career management is provided by individuals and organizations which already exist and already provides support to the unit.

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8. The most obvious benefit for targeting to have its own MOSID is in the force generation and development of targeting personnel. In the manning model currently being used by CAF career managers, there are preassigned targeting positions which organizations are required to fill. These are referred to as hard targeting positions. There also are joint targeting positions which any organization having qualified personnel of the appropriate rank can fill. These are often the positions in a headquarters which go unfilled as organizations are not obligated to fill them with personnel. If targeting was granted its own MOSID, it could be tasked as the force generator for these joint positions. This would ensure that all targeting billets would be filled across the CAF.

9. However, the negative aspect of developing this MOSID would be the overhead required to manage it. In this particular case, the targeting personnel would need a unit in which they could train and be force generated from. The CAF would be required to draw from the targeting community in order to fill key positions such as CO, RSM, sub unit commanders and principle staff. This would initially remove expertise from targeting organization across the CAF. This unit would also require the normal equipment and support personnel to maintain the equipment and process the administration generated by the personnel posted to the unit. A career progression model would need to be developed for both the officers and non-commissioned personnel who would be posted to the organization. Given the current shortages in equipment and personnel the CAF is presently facing, it would be extremely difficult to properly man and equip this new capability without taking away from other CAF organizations.
10. The targeting unit would also require specialized infrastructure in order to operate and train due to the sensitivity of the material it would be handling. The availability of these facilities is extremely limited. A current example of this issue can be found in Kingston where the LTS is sharing infrastructure with the Canadian Forces School of Military Intelligence (CFSMI). The LTS does not have a dedicated facility in which it can conduct its targeting courses. It currently uses classroom space provided by (CFSMI) which is in an emission security facility. CFSMI has the only Department of National Defense (DND) facility in Kingston which meets the security requirements for the material being delivered on the LTC. These types of facilities are limited in DND and the ones that do exist are currently occupied by organizations who have the same security requirements as the LTS. It would take time to either build a new facility to house this unit or renovate existing CAF infrastructure to the required standards. Both options would require a significant investment of DND funding.

11. The CAF is not the only military to treat targeting as a specialized qualification. The countries of Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, the United States Army, and United States Marine Corp follow a similar model to that of the CAF. Targeting is treated as a specialized qualification and not a distinct MOSID. Individuals are selected and force generated by their respective units or branches to fill key targeting positions at the tactical, operational and strategic levels of operation. Career management of these individuals is conducted by the branch to which the member is affiliated with.

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12. However, the United States Airforce (USAF) does not follow this model. The USAF centralized its targeting capability within the 480th Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance Wing in Langley Virginia. The 480th specializes in “the geospatial intelligence production, target system analysis, weaponeering, threat recognition and precision engagement.” As such, the course package which is delivered to their targeting students is a seven week course package vice the three week package which is offered by the LTS. Individuals posted to this unit are identified as and hold the MOSID of targeteers in the USAF. The USAF decided to centralize this capability within one unit due to the Greybeard report which was published in 2008. The Greybeard report highlighted the fact that the USAF was slowly losing its ability to effectively employ precision munitions due to loss of specific targeting skill sets.

13. In response to the Greybeard report, the USAF developed a force management plan and education and training system in order to prevent the loss of these key capabilities in their targeteers. The core function of the 480th is to serve as a reach back organization to satisfy the needs of combatant command’s deliberate and dynamic targeting requirements. The 480th is considered a small specialized unit of 6000 service personnel by the USAF. To put this in a Canadian context, the 480th is approximately the size of one of Canada’s regular force mechanized Brigade groups. The USAF needs a targeting MOSID based on the size of the

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13 Ibid., 7
targeting community it has to manage. In the CAF’s case, our targeting community will never need a MOSID because of its small size.

CONCLUSION

14. Due to the relative small size of the CAF, it is unavoidable that its soldiers must possess a number of specialized skill sets within their trade or occupation. If the CAF was to develop a MOSID for every specialized course it required its soldiers to have, it would fail to function. Currently, units at the tactical level have been able to meet the force generation requirements of the CAF while in many cases, managing multiple specialized qualifications found within the unit. This has not required the CAF to commit any additional resources in manning or large scale infrastructure projects to do so. Furthermore, the small size of the JTIC as well as the number of targeting positions in the CAF does not require a MOSID to be developed. If the CAF possessed a targeting capability similar to that of the USAF then it would make sense to have a MOSID for targeting.
RECOMMENDATION

15. Despite the small size of the CAF targeting community, it is important that all designated targeting positions are filled with qualified personnel. Under the current manning management system, branches or elements of the CAF only required to fill the targeting positions assigned to their organization. The Chief of Military Personnel working in conjunction with the various directors and career managers, should eliminate redundant targeting positions. Those that remain should be assigned to the various organizations which provide targeting personnel. This will allow branch directors and career managers to properly forecast requirements and communicate their needs down to the tactical level for force generation.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


