GENDER BASED ANALYSIS +: TACTICAL GUIDANCE REQUIRED

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Exercise Solo Flight

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Introduction.

The controversies regarding gender and diversity within military operations have been around as long as militaries have existed. To understand how gender is affected during military operations, the United Nations (UN) and certain member countries have adopted means to analyze gender and diversity during times of conflict. The Canadian government, in turn, has adopted an analysis tool, Gender Based Analysis Plus (GBA+), to examine and analyze the effects on gender and diversity within their planning and policy development. From a military perspective, the CDS promulgated a end state requiring that United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, related resolutions, and Canadian National Action Plan (CNAP) requirements be implemented across all Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) operations and institutions so that GBA+ is routine and common in “…all CAF activities, policies, education, professional development and programs.”1 The CAF must recognize best practices and approaches and in turn educate members at all levels to improve operational effectiveness. This CDS Directive is primarily based on the strategic and operational level, directing the administration required to implement gender analysis. Reaching the CDS directed end state will take robust education, organizational culture change, and continuous analysis of operations from a gender and diversity perspective. This paper will argue that the CDS Directive for integrating UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions into CAF planning is not sufficient to institutionalize gender analysis ‘as a routine and common element’ in CAF processes and policies at the tactical level.

Background.

The United Nations Security Council approved UNSCR 1325 in 2000 to recognize that conflicts have different impacts on men, women, boys and girls and to assist in the prevention and resolution of conflict. From a military perspective, NATO began using a gender-based analysis to improve operational effectiveness at all levels and thus implemented gender policy for its operations. The government of Canada, in accordance to UNSCR 1325 and the UN Beijing Platform for Action, implemented a National Action Plan that requires all its departments to use a gender-based analysis that would, in addition to gender, identify areas including age, education, language, culture, and income. The CDS implemented his directive in January 2016 requiring the CAF to implement the GBA+ tool into planning and operations while calling for the creation of three Gender Advisor (GENAD) positions at the strategic and operational levels, which has been implemented, the inclusion of GBA+ in the CAF Operational Planning Process, which has begun, and for planners and deployed personnel to receive training “required to put Women, Peace and Security principles in practice.” Training CAF members to consider gender and diversity in its operations will provide better understanding on how people are at risk allowing the CAF to effectively reach its mission goals.

There is a great deal of research regarding gender analysis in recent years, however, it must be recognized that methodologies such as gender-analysis frameworks are only one element

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2 CDS Directive.
5 “Thinking about gender in military planning and operations.” (25 July 2017)
to ensure that gender considerations are implemented into the development of a process.\textsuperscript{6} These frameworks in combination with other methods are required during all stages of planning, execution, and evaluation; if left out of any phase, erroneous interpretations of the direction or oversight render the process ineffective.\textsuperscript{7} Bridget Byrne, an expert on gender and conflict, states that integration of development and gender concerns requires a broader understanding of gender and “more bottom–up, participatory methods.\textsuperscript{8} To translate in military terms, having the tactical level participate heavily in gender analysis, will improve information collection, provide better intelligence collection and assist in evaluation and continual improvement. Involving the tactical level at the various stages of planning will ensure that proper gender analysis is conducted and not diluted at the lower levels. There is a requirement by the entire organization to understand that gender and diversity roles are shaped by values and norms in society and that the internal culture of the organization plays a key role.\textsuperscript{9} Militaries have traditionally been ‘owned and operated’ by men who have influenced agendas and policies.\textsuperscript{10} Now gender mainstreaming has been introduced to the military organizations to reorganize, improve, develop and evaluate the policy process.\textsuperscript{11} The CDS Directive is a transformative or agenda – setting strategy. This means politics are involved throughout the process, to broaden the development agenda, to broaden the

\begin{tabular}{l}
\textsuperscript{6} Hannah Warren, “Using gender-analysis frameworks: theoretical and practical reflections.” Gender \\
\& Development 15, no. 2 (July 2007): 187. \\
\textsuperscript{7} Ibid. 188. \\
\textsuperscript{8} Bridget Byrne, “Towards a Gendered Understanding of Conflict,” IDS Bulletin 27, no. 3 (1996): 38. \\
\textsuperscript{9} Anant Kumar, “Complementing Gender Analysis Methods,” Journal Evidence-Informed Social Work, 13 no.1. (February, 2016): 106. \\
\textsuperscript{11} Verloo, Mieke. Another Velvet Revolution? Gender mainstreaming and the politics of implementation, IWM Working Paper no. 5/2001: 2. \\
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/242539328_Another_Velvet_Revolution_Gender_Mainstreaming_and_the_Politics_of_Implementation
\end{tabular}
objectives and introduce other values. Ensuring that gender analysis becomes mainstream in its processes and policies an organization must be careful not to overlook the need to change its culture. It is easy to add terms such as gender mainstreaming and diversity integration to existing policies and training but in the end the goal of institutionalizing such requirements is important to guarantee its survival and appropriate use. Best practices, recognized by experts and other organizations to institutionalize gender analysis within an organization, involve education, planning, and analysis/evaluation. These practices will prove why the CDS Directive will not reach its end state at the tactical level.

Education.

The CDS Directive lacks the guidance on education and training at the tactical level. It does consider education and training for the strategic and operational level by directing GBA+ training. The GBA+ model is based on the Harvard Analytical Framework, that requires a hands on approach, providing information that can be used to develop a concise picture of what has been done and what is required while relying on facts. From a CAF perspective, this approach means that the organization needs to move from a compliance and business model, to a learning and effectiveness model. The CAF needs to educate its members to be aware of the needs of diverse groups, to understand the CAFs role during operations, and how it affects gender and diversity. Those who collect the data to evaluate and analyze the situation must have an

13 Ibid.
understanding of the needs of the organization and the groups it is assisting.\textsuperscript{16} In other words, the tactical level operators and planners must have a clear understanding of the needs of the operational and strategic level in order to collect the correct data and they must understand the culture in which they are working in order to provide adequate support and to guarantee change. More importantly the tactical level must understand and accept the need for gender and diversity integration within the organization and within operations. It must become part of the organizational culture.

The ways in which modern militaries operate today require cognitive and social skills and a broader understanding of the cultures involved.\textsuperscript{17} Education and training of military members can broaden and develop their knowledge to make the operation effective. In addition it can provide insight into their own bias, in turn ensuring that these bias do not slip into the planning and execution of operations.\textsuperscript{18} Foremost, all levels of the organization must have a solid understanding of gender and diversity and the goals the organization wishes to accomplish.\textsuperscript{19} Therefore when interacting with those who may hold different beliefs one must become knowledgeable about the culture, its biases and also understand ones own perception of the culture to overcome assumptions and determine how best to help in times of crisis.\textsuperscript{20} Training of all troops will ensure “a common standard of behaviour in the force.”\textsuperscript{21} This is a start but to provide training on only the tools and checklists that a tactical level operator must use is not effective. An organization, to successfully implement gender and diverse thinking in all aspects

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{16} International Labour Organization.
\item \textsuperscript{17} Scoppio. 28
\item \textsuperscript{18} Warren. 193.
\item \textsuperscript{19} Ibid. 189.
\item \textsuperscript{20} Karen Davis, “Sex, Gender and Cultural Intelligence in the Canadian Forces,” Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 47, no 4 (2009): 433.
\end{itemize}
of its operations, must combine its practical tools with a sound understanding of the values and ideology behind them.\textsuperscript{22} Research from countries such as Rwanda and Uganda found they were only ‘ticking the boxes’ and recording numbers so as to say they had implemented gender and diversity techniques within their government.\textsuperscript{23} In addition, the United Nations discovered that training must take into account on-the-ground challenges of deployed forces in order to be successful.\textsuperscript{24} The lack of education on culture and beliefs within these countries slowed understanding of how to improve the situation.\textsuperscript{25}

The CDS directive fails at the tactical level because only specific training needs of the strategic and operational levels were addressed in detail. From a tactical educational perspective members in various tactical units have completed the GBA+ online course, developed by the government agency Canadian Status of Women, as an introduction to gender and diversity. Education must be implemented throughout the organization and be participatory allowing for a consistent understanding of the “what” and “why” the organization is trying to achieve.\textsuperscript{26} Education conducted at the level of the audience and written for the specific organization to be effective with scenario and interactive based training has proven to be the most effective.\textsuperscript{27} Otherwise it may miss the requirements of the operation. A good education program at all levels will ensure, over time, a culture change and effective execution of plans.\textsuperscript{28} The GBA+ online course fails because it is not participatory and does not apply specifically to the military system.

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{22} Warren. 191.
\bibitem{23} Ibid. 195.
\bibitem{25} Warren. 195.
\bibitem{26} Ibid. 193.
\bibitem{27} UNFIL.
\bibitem{28} Warren. 193.
\end{thebibliography}
tactical level, and the author would argue that it does not do an effective job of ensuring the member is thinking about their own bias and ideas in relation to the organization and operations.

Gender perspectives training and culture awareness were outlined in the Directive to be included in pre-deployment training. The issue is that formal pre-deployment training for the tactical level is not always available in situations such as Op LENTUS, or other domestic operations that require rapid response. From the tactical perspective understanding the region one is deploying and the cultural/gender differences that will be faced is important for data collection, analysis and appropriate assistance. The CDS directive states that the appropriate deploying personnel will receive training in GBA+ in order to support the tactical level commander.\footnote{CDS Directive.} The argument is that everyone should receive a minimum amount of training regarding the region and how gender analysis will assist within the operational zone. In addition, the pre-deployment training which is conducted at the Peace Support Training Centre in Kingston, Ontario is the United Nations developed material and a NATO online course. Once again not written specifically for CAF.

The CDS Directive also points out the need for a ‘train the trainer’ package so that the CAF can have qualified trainers to train the rest of the military population. Both military and DND civilian employees, who will advise tactical level commanders, take the Gender Focal Point (GFP) course, all having various agendas to accomplish. Therefore the training is not specific to each military level or DND group. The GENADs, who advise on this course and provide guidance to GFPs after graduation complete NATO distance learning courses as well as a course from the Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations Centre in Sweden, course requirements stated in the CDS Directive. As mentioned above it is essential to have courses
written for the level of the organization and taught with specifics about the organization itself. In addition, Hannah Warren, a gender integration educator, demonstrated that there needs to be an understanding of the theories behind the analysis training not just a discussion about the use of the tool.\(^{30}\) The trainer must have a solid understanding of the theory behind gender analysis in order to help those being trained how to best use the tool, to give those a understanding of their bias with regards to gender and diversity, and to have a common grasp at all levels of how gender and diversity is integrated within all levels of military organizations\(^{31}\). Further, Warren realized that experience and further formal education on the matter would be required to overcome the complexities and limitations of being a trainer.\(^{32}\) The ‘train the trainer’ direction fails because a military member, who takes a trainer’s course, several weeks in duration, will receive a certificate but not become an expert in short order. The failing here is that once something is taught it is even more difficult to un-teach, potentially causing negative effects to organizational culture change.

Finally, the CDS Directive has tasked the Commander Military Personnel Command/Military Personnel Generation (CMPC/MPG) to ‘consider’ alternate sources for training and “…if necessary, develop a CAF specific framework…”\(^{33}\) The words “consider” and “if necessary” are not strong enough to ensure that change in the area of education is needed. As mentioned, it is important for an organization to have a course developed specifically for their needs at each level and to ensure it is participatory. The wording does not guarantee a change will take place.

\(^{30}\) Warren. 191.  
\(^{31}\) Ibid.  
\(^{32}\) Warren 192.  
\(^{33}\) CDS Directive.
It is recommended that training/education be designed for each level within the military and developed and implemented with input by the CAF using participatory type education.

*Planning.*

With regards to planning, a gender and diversity perspective can be an objective at any level and can be seen as an enabler, which if properly addressed will support the military objective.\(^{34}\) It is in the planning of a mission that a GFP from the tactical level can contribute and benefit from being a part of the strategic planning process and most definitely the operational level planning process.\(^{35}\) By inserting a tactical level GFP within higher level planning they will assist with the operational estimate process based on their experience and knowledge of tactical level execution as well as assisting in building the Force composition.\(^{36}\) Standpoint theory reveals that the knowledge taken from personnel within an organization or within a specific group normally comes from personal experience and can make important contributions to those who are standing outside looking in.\(^{37}\) This can lead to important questions about ideals that are normally taken for granted and, through knowledge, outsiders can open their eyes to understand how those unlike them live, their needs and differences.\(^{38}\) Once the higher-level planners understand how the tactical level GFP operates the mutual support between the two will improve. In turn the support that the tactical level receives will prove that the GFP is an enabler of the mission developing the unit’s understanding of the operating environment and integration.

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\(^{34}\) NATO. 3.  
\(^{35}\) Ibid. A-1, B-1.  
\(^{36}\) Ibid. 3.  
\(^{37}\) Kronsell, 288.  
\(^{38}\) Ibid. 290.
of the gender perspective within the force.\textsuperscript{39} It must be recognized that every operation is different and will require its own plan for gender integration.\textsuperscript{40} A force must build and improve on past experiences, good and bad. In addition, to tactical level presence the planning process must take into consideration the groups of people in the areas deployed.\textsuperscript{41} This requires representation of the groups during planning and by appropriate DND personnel during the execution and the analysis of information being sent back from tactical operators.\textsuperscript{42} A diverse planning team and the use of their unique skills will only make the plan better, in turn, ensuring mission success.\textsuperscript{43}

From a planning/execution perspective the CDS directs that a GFP trained in GBA+ with a GFP course be assigned to deployed tactical commanders.\textsuperscript{44} However, during routine operations at home base GFPs are, at many locations, secondary duties in an environment that is short other resources. For this reason GFP integration in higher level planning may not always be feasible due to other operational commitments. If a GFP is a secondary duty at the tactical level during routine operations many may not see gender analysis as a priority to leadership making organizational change at the tactical level difficult. It is recommended that further guidance guarantee that the GFP at the tactical level home base be an assigned position and not a secondary duty. It is further recommended that in order to change culture and identify the importance of diversity and gender perspectives, a mechanism must be added to any future

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{39} NATO. C-1
\item \textsuperscript{40} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{43} Scoppio. 29.
\item \textsuperscript{44} CDS Directive.
\end{itemize}
annual evaluations such as CFPAS to show each members ability to work with and/or lead in a diverse time.\textsuperscript{45}

\textit{Analysis and Evaluation.}

Analysis and evaluation of gender and diversity integration within operations plays a significant role in current and future missions as well in policy development and organizational improvement. Thinking both tactically and strategically to achieve gender and diversity perspectives in policy requires an ultimate analysis.\textsuperscript{46} Analysis and evaluation must be implemented in the planning, execution and aftermath of an operation to be effective and must be conducted according to the level of the organization in which it is meant to address.\textsuperscript{47} Analysis can be conducted using traditional and non-tradition methods including surveys, interviews, walking tours of the community and informal conversations.\textsuperscript{48} One important aspect that must be addressed is that tactical operators gathering the analytical information must be trained how to liaise with the local population and how to recognize and report the effects of situations on the people within the community.\textsuperscript{49} Ensuring that the tactical level understands the importance of gender and diversity perspectives and the how the analysis can adopt mission effectiveness will only improve on the quality of information brought forth. In turn these people will become force multipliers and enablers. Tactical operators must be made cognisant of the fact that when

\textsuperscript{46} Kabeer and Subrahmanian. Section 2.1
conducting analysis, institutionalized gender roles or expected modern gender roles must not avoided and only the real existing gender roles in a specific culture where work is being conducted is essential.\textsuperscript{50} This goes back to proper education at the tactical level.

Effective analysis also requires indicators of success to review progress. These indicators should include outside research and acceptance in a particular field of development and may include the agency’s indicators of how it perceives itself and measures its objectives and the beneficiary’s indicators detailing how they benefited and expressed their well-being.\textsuperscript{51} For indicators of achievement to be applied a decision must be made on whose indicators will be used and the appropriate information must be present in order to evaluate.\textsuperscript{52} The process must be analysed through causes, effects, means and ends in collaboration with those who have been traditionally excluded to acknowledge the incompleteness of the process.\textsuperscript{53} The CDS Directive does not guide the CAF on the indicators required for analysis and evaluation of the use of gender and diversity perspectives making tactical level indicators difficult to develop.

Continual analysis of the implementation, the use and the collection of data and the use of gender/diversity perspective are important for the effectiveness of current operations and improving processes for future endeavours. The Directive discusses the implementation of the UNSCR1325 Implementation Working Group (UIWG) as the only means of analysis or evaluation but nothing further that will ensure effective analysis once GBA+ is fully implemented. Currently, a means of analysis/evaluation at the tactical level is the Lessons Learned program, a program within the CAF that is not without its own challenges. Without a strong background in gender perspectives and the organizational goals regarding the topic the

\textsuperscript{50} Kumar. 106.
\textsuperscript{51} Kabeer and Subrahmanian. Section 3.6.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid. Conclusion.
military members who are Lessons Learned Officers/NCMs will have a difficult time to analyze the information coming to them and guiding decision and policy makers at the tactical level. It is recommended that direction be given so that Lessons Learned personnel receive specific training on GBA+ and understand the gender/diversity indicators to evaluate the effectiveness of gender integration within operations.

Conclusion.

GBA+ and the integration of gender and diversity perspectives is not a matter of implementing a checklist to satisfy government and international policies. It will take robust direction from our leadership to ensure members at all levels are educated, planning includes the appropriate people, and analysis and evaluation is a continuous, meaningful way of improving the process. To ensure that the processes and direction are available to guarantee the CDS end state is implemented, organizational change must occur, which will take the longest to accomplish at the tactical level. The CDS must promulgate further direction to include more robust education practices, and direct how the execution and analysis will be conducted so gender analysis can become a routine and common element at the tactical level, otherwise gender analysis will be considered extra work and rendered inefficient.
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