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THE EMERGENCE OF POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA: HYPE OR FACT?

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Exercise Solo Flight

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EXERCISE *SOLO FLIGHT* – EXERCICE *SOLO FLIGHT*

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THE EMERGENCE OF POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA: HYPE OR FACT?

INTRODUCTION

Since the end of apartheid in the early 1990s, South Africa has been ‘marked’ for continental leadership.¹ Two (soon to be three) tours on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC),² its induction into BRICS and G20 as the only African voice in the groups, and its hosting of various international events such as the FIFA World Cup, UN summits on AIDS, climate change, and racism, all lend credence to South Africa’s emergence as the regional power representing Africa.³ However, the euphoria of the end of racial segregation and the birth of democracy in South Africa has since faded. With South Africa’s slow rate of economic growth and domestic problems such as a 27% unemployment rate, it is no longer the largest economy in Africa and lags behind other emerging powers.⁴ Further, its inclusion and influence in the global

¹ Chris Alden and Garth Le Pere, “South Africa in Africa: Bound to Lead?” *Politikon* 36, no. 1 (2009): 165.

² Peter Fabricius, “SA Returns to the UN Security Council with a New Leader,” Institute for Security Studies, last modified 22 February 2018, <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/sa-returns-to-the-un-security-council-with-a-new-leader>.

³ Olusola Ogunnubi and Olumuyiwa Babatunde Amao, “South Africa’s Emerging “Soft Power” Influence in Africa and Its Impending Limitations: Will the Giant Be Able to Weather the Storm?” *African Security* 9, no. 4 (2016): 299-300, 305-306, <https://doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2016.1242978>; Brand South Africa, “South Africa’s Expanding Global Influence,” last modified 11 March 2014, <https://www.brandsouthafrica.com/investments-immigration/international-news/south-africas-expanding-global-influence>.

⁴ Peter S. Goodman, “South Africa Sees Fresh Start for Economy, with the Same Challenges,” *The New York Times*, last modified 15 February 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/15/business/south-africa-economy-ramaphosa.html>; Jakkie Cilliers, Julia Schünemann, and Jonathan D. Moyer, “Power and influence in Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Africa,” *ISS African Futures Paper* 14 (March 2015): 8, <https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/AfricanFuturesNo14-V2.pdf>; Daniel Trachsler, “South Africa: A Hamstrung Regional Power,” *CSS Analysis in Security Policy* no. 102 (October 2011): 3, <http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSS-Analysis-102-EN.pdf>.

arenas such as BRICS and G20 are increasingly debated.⁵ Is South Africa's status as a regional leader and emerging global power justified or is it a hype?

This essay examines South Africa's regional and global influence since the democratic election in 1994 in order to explore the extent to which it can be considered a continental leader and a global emerging power. For this purpose, this essay will first discuss some theoretical considerations on power and hegemony in international relations. Next, this essay will analyze South Africa's regional influence in the economic, security and diplomatic domains both in Southern Africa as well as the rest of the continent. Subsequently, its influence in the global arena since the fall of the apartheid regime will be explored. This essay will then examine the future of South Africa's regional and global leadership. This essay finds that South Africa is a sub-regional hegemon in Southern Africa. However, elsewhere in Africa, its continental leadership is hindered by its own domestic limitations, the lack of regional acceptance, and the emergence of other African powers. In the global stage, South Africa is better accepted as the representative of Africa. However, this recognition is largely symbolic and based on an unrealistic expectation of what South Africa can do with the small size of its national power.

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS ON POWER AND HEGEMONY

In the context of international relations, a state's power can be defined as the capacity to pursue its strategic goals.⁶ This capacity can be described in terms of national resources and capabilities, primarily in the military, economic and diplomatic domains. Elements of national

⁵ Oluwaseun Tella, "South Africa in BRICS: The Regional Power's Soft Power and Soft Balancing," *Politikon* 44, no. 3 (2017): 388, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02589346.2017.1295620>.

⁶ Ashley J. Tellis et al, *Measuring National Power in the Postindustrial Age: Analyst's Handbook* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2000), 4, https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1110z1.html.

power within each of these domains can be used in a coercive manner (hard power), co-optive manner (soft power) or a combination of coercion and cooption (smart power).⁷ When a state's power is disproportionately superior to those of other states, it is considered as a hegemon that has the capacity to exert a considerable influence over other states.⁸ This influence is often formalized in the form of institutions that advance the hegemon's values and policies. Alden further states that a stable hegemonic system must be based on the general acceptance of the legitimacy of the hegemony by other states in the international political system.⁹ A hegemon can obtain this acceptance through the provision and/or promise of stability, prosperity and other public goods. The next section will examine South Africa's power within the context of these considerations.

SOUTH AFRICA'S REGIONAL INFLUENCE

In 1994, the African National Congress (ANC) inherited a South African economy that was weakened by years of economic sanctions against the apartheid government. During the apartheid years, South Africa's influence was limited to its neighbouring states that comprised the South African Customs Union (SACU). However, the international sanctions restricting imports, exports and monetary flows also led to a strong manufacturing sector in order to locally produce goods that could not have been imported and a highly mature banking system in the country.¹⁰ After the sanctions had ended, the ANC government brought a closer economic integration and cooperation with the rest of the continent in the form of South Africa's ascension

⁷ Joseph S. Nye Jr., "Get Smart," *Foreign Affairs* 88, no. 4 (2009): 160-163.

⁸ Ogunnubi and Amao, "South Africa's Emerging "Soft Power" Influence . . . , 307.

⁹ Alden and Le Pere, "South Africa in Africa . . . , 146.

¹⁰ South African Market Insights, "South Africa's Market History," last modified 16 February 2018, <https://www.southafricanmi.com/south-africas-economic-history.html>.

into the South African Development Community (SADC) as well as 40 bilateral mechanisms with other African states.¹¹ Within the SACU and SADC regions, South Africa became an economic powerhouse: it was the most technologically advanced and industrialized country; it had the greatest material and human resources; and by 2010 its economy was twice that of the rest of Southern Africa.¹² South Africa's comparative advantages made it a hub for headquarters, logistics and sourcing; while its banking sector expanded across the continent.¹³ Meanwhile, the spillover effects of South Africa's growth to other African countries included more than direct import-export trade but also technological transfers, investments and remittances.¹⁴

It is also evident that the effect of South Africa's economy is not even across the continent. It has a disproportionately large effect in the Southern Africa region such as within SACU and the Common Monetary Area (CMA) states where South Africa's banking sector dominates and its currency is utilized.¹⁵ In order to reduce local resentments of its economic domination, South Africa practises a degree of 'benevolent' hegemonic behaviour by revising the SACU revenue-sharing formula for the benefit of other states.¹⁶ In the rest of the continent, South Africa's economy has a much smaller effect. Only 25-35% of the external trade in other Southern African states and 5-16% of that in Central/Eastern African states are with South Africa

¹¹ Brand South Africa, "South Africa's Expanding . . . , n.p; Alden and Le Pere, "South Africa in Africa . . . , 152. The predecessor of SADC is the South African Development Coordination Conference, which was created in order to isolate the apartheid South Africa.

¹² Ogunnubi and Amao, "South Africa's Emerging "Soft Power" Influence . . . , 307.

¹³ Teresa Almeida Cravo *et al*, "African emerging powers," *NOREF Report* (Oslo: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, July 2014), 2, http://www.ces.uc.pt/myces/UserFiles/livros/1097_4efe8a9991f3aa4f0cf563f62937aab8.pdf; Vivek Arora and Athanasios Vamvakidis, "South Africa in the African Economy: Growth Spillovers," *Global Journal of Emerging Market Economies* 2, no. 2 (2010): 156-157. The market share of South African banks in Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland is up to 82%.

¹⁴ Arora and Vamvakidis, "South Africa in the African Economy . . . , 154.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 159; Alden and Le Pere, "South Africa in Africa . . . , 152. The use of South African currency ensures a degree of dependence of these states on South Africa's monetary policy.

¹⁶ Alden and Le Pere, "South Africa in Africa . . . , 151. The benefits include compensation to other SACU states for trade benefits that flow to South Africa and a development fund from its customs revenue for other states to use.

(as opposed to 73-90% of that in SACU states).¹⁷ This variation of South Africa's influence across the continent is due to the relatively small size of its resources and the geographical factor. With 57 million people, South Africa is only the 6th most populous country in Africa.¹⁸ In terms of economic influence, size matters: Nigeria—with its 196 million people—has overtaken South Africa as the largest economy in Africa since 2014.¹⁹ The rise of Nigeria has further weakened South Africa's influence, especially in the West Africa region.

In the military domain, South Africa has the most powerful and advanced military in sub-Saharan Africa, with Nigeria and Angola not too far behind.²⁰ Despite having this capability, South Africa's government and general public are averse to using military intervention due to the legacy of the apartheid's use of the military to quell internal dissents as well as its external interventions in Zimbabwe, Angola and Mozambique.²¹ The ANC government's use of the military was largely limited to contributing to peacekeeping and to the African Standby Force of the African Union (AU).²² In March 2018, South Africa was the 17th largest contributor of UN peacekeepers with 1,217 troops—well below the contributions of other African states such as Ethiopia, Egypt and Tanzania.²³ Nevertheless, South Africa's peacekeeping deployments—all in Africa to date—have contributed to its obtaining the UNSC seat three times since 1994, and have

¹⁷ Arora and Vamvakidis, "South Africa in the African Economy . . .", 159.

¹⁸ Worldometers, "Africa," last accessed 17 May 2018, <http://www.worldometers.info/geography/7-continent/africa/>.

¹⁹ Cilliers, Schünemann, and Moyer, "Power and influence in Africa . . .", 8; Central Intelligence Agency, "Country Comparison: GDP (Purchasing Power Parity)," The World Factbook, last accessed 17 May 2018, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html>.

²⁰ Trachsler, "South Africa . . .", 2; Global Fire Power, "2018 Military Strength Ranking," last accessed 17 May 2018, <https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp>. South Africa's military is the third in the continent behind Algeria and the much more powerful Egypt.

²¹ Ogunnubi and Amao, "South Africa's Emerging "Soft Power" Influence . . .", 305-306; Cravo *et al*, "African emerging powers," 2; Chiara Carter, "Apartheid Army's Deadly Secrets," *IOL*, last modified 30 April 2006, <https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/apartheid-armys-deadly-secrets-275899>.

²² Trachsler, "South Africa . . .", 3.

²³ United Nations, "Monthly Summary of Military and Policy Contribution to United Nation Operations," United Nations Peacekeeping, last accessed 17 May 2018, https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/msr_31_mar_2018.pdf.

further strengthened its demand for a permanent seat.²⁴ While being generally averse to military intervention, South Africa deployed its troops to the Central African Republic as part of the bilateral agreement to (unsuccessfully) defend the Bozizé regime from the Seleka rebels.²⁵ This deployment as well as that in a similar role in Burundi²⁶ are examples of the inconsistencies in South Africa's foreign policy that could lead to an increased suspicion among African states of South Africa's true intentions.

Despite being the most powerful military in sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa's military—similar in size as Canada's military—is too small to be able to enforce South Africa's interests throughout the turbulent continent that necessitates seven of the current fourteen UN peacekeeping missions.²⁷ The overstretching of South Africa's military forced the government to backtrack on promised contributions of peacekeepers due to the inability to generate the troops and funding.²⁸ Lotze estimates that South Africa's annual contribution of 2,500-3,000 peacekeepers appears to be its ceiling.²⁹

The legacy of the apartheid rule shaped the ANC government's approach in international relations towards the use of soft power. For example, Nelson Mandela advocated a foreign policy that promoted the principles of anti-imperialism, human rights, peace, democracy, and

²⁴ Walter Lotze, Cedric de Koning and Theo Neethling, "Peacekeeping Contributor Profile: South Africa," Providing For Peacekeeping, last modified September 2015, <http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/2014/04/03/contributor-profile-south-africa/>.

²⁵ Ahana Banerjee, "Perspectives on Crisis in Central African Republic," The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, last modified April 2013, <https://idsa.in/africatrends/perspectives-on-crisis-in-central-african-republic#abanerjee>.

²⁶ Sia Kambou, "South Africa's Involvement in the Central African Republic," Stratfor Worldview, last modified 29 March 2013. <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/south-africas-involvement-central-african-republic#/>.

²⁷ Trachsler, "South Africa . . . , 3; United Nations, "Where We Operate," United Nations Peacekeeping, last accessed 17 May 2018, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/where-we-operate>.

²⁸ Alden and Le Pere, "South Africa in Africa . . . , 161.

²⁹ Lotze, de Koning and Neethling, "Peacekeeping Contributor Profile . . . , n.p.

development.³⁰ The emphasis on soft power diplomacy was reflected in South Africa's active role in mediating conflicts throughout the continent such as in Madagascar and Sudan,³¹ and in its crucial role in the establishment of regional structures such as the New Partnership for Africa's Development and the AU.³² At the same time, the failures of South Africa's mediation attempts in Angola, Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of the Congo highlight the limit of soft power diplomacy and the resistance of some African countries to South Africa's leadership.³³ This resistance was in part due to the regional competition for leadership and the prevalence of authoritarian regimes in Africa which naturally opposed South Africa's liberal democratic ideals.³⁴ In particular, Nigeria, Angola and Zimbabwe were particularly sensitive to South Africa's claim of leadership.³⁵

The effectiveness of South Africa's diplomacy in the region was further hampered by the inconsistencies in its foreign policy. South Africa's support to Zimbabwe's Mugabe and its opposition to the International Criminal Court's arrest warrant against the Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir highlight the contradictions that further undermine its leadership and fuel suspicions on its motives.³⁶ Mandela's successor Thebo Mbeki's 'African Renaissance' idea is another example of South Africa's ambiguous foreign policy. The 'African Renaissance' is a vision of democratizing Africa, appreciating African uniqueness and pursuing African-own solutions to African problems.³⁷ It is not a complete policy in that it lacks substantive policy

³⁰ Trachsler, "South Africa . . . , 2.

³¹ Brand South Africa, "South Africa's Expanding . . . , n.p.

³² Trachsler, "South Africa . . . , 3.

³³ Alden and Le Pere, "South Africa in Africa . . . , 156.

³⁴ Ogunnubi and Amao, "South Africa's Emerging "Soft Power" Influence . . . , 308.

³⁵ Trachsler, "South Africa . . . , 3; Cilliers, Schünemann, and Moyer, "Power and influence in Africa . . . ,

³⁶ Ogunnubi and Amao, "South Africa's Emerging "Soft Power" Influence . . . , 312.

³⁷ Tella, "South Africa in BRICS . . . , 395.

content.³⁸ As a consequence, this vision had a very limited acceptance among the elites and was virtually unrecognized among ordinary Africans.³⁹ Naidu states that the contradictions in South Africa's foreign policy stem from an unsettled identity crisis and the dilemma between values and national interests.⁴⁰ The preceding analysis of South Africa's influence in the African continent indicates that it only exerts a hegemonic influence within its immediate surroundings in Southern Africa. Elsewhere in the continent, it is a significant power but it lacks the (hard and soft power) capabilities and acceptance to dominate the continent.

SOUTH AFRICA IN THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT

In the global economy, South Africa ranks 34th in (nominal) GDP in 2018 and shares only 0.4% of the global wealth.⁴¹ In BRICS, South Africa is regarded as a 'junior' partner due to the size of its economy, which is only 22% the size of the next smallest member (Russia) or 2.6% the size of the largest member (China).⁴² South Africa's memberships in BRICS and G20 are often debated in the context of its limited size and capabilities, with some suggesting that South Africa's inclusion is a symbolic geographical representation.⁴³ However, the importance of South Africa to other international actors is not necessarily due to the size of its economy. Rather, its excellent infrastructure and sophisticated financial networks lower the entrance cost

³⁸ Adekeye Adebajo, "Mbeki's Dream of Africa's Renaissance Belied South Africa's Schizophrenia," *The Conversation*, last modified 24 April 2016, <https://theconversation.com/mbekis-dream-of-africas-renaissance-belied-south-africas-schizophrenia-58311>.

³⁹ Alden and Le Pere, "South Africa in Africa . . .", 149, 151.

⁴⁰ Sanusha Naidu, "South Africa's foreign policy has been at sixes and sevens – here's why," *The Conversation*, last modified 9 January 2017, <https://theconversation.com/south-africas-foreign-policy-has-been-at-sixes-and-sevens-heres-why-70089>.

⁴¹ Statistics Times, "List of Countries by Projected GDP," last modified 6 May 2018, <http://statisticstimes.com/economy/countries-by-projected-gdp.php>. Ranking using PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) GDP results in a slightly different ranking at 30th of 192 countries.

⁴² *Ibid*; Cravo *et al*, "African emerging powers," 2.

⁴³ Tella, "South Africa in BRICS . . .", 388.

for foreign companies and their investments to flow into the rest of Africa. Nevertheless, South Africa's *individual* influence in the global economic governance appears to be very limited. For example, its voting share in the IMF of 0.6% reflects the size of its economy.⁴⁴ In this respect, South Africa's influence depends on its soft power to establish, participate and to a lesser degree set the agenda in an alliance or coalition. This is exemplified by the tendency of the BRICS states to speak with one voice in the UN and other international fora in order to advocate global economic and political reforms.⁴⁵

Even though South Africa's individual influence in the global economic governance is very limited, its embrace of neoliberalism—embodied in its Growth, Employment and Redistribution Programme (GEAR) macroeconomic strategy of reducing government expenditure, privatizing, and liberalizing trade⁴⁶—also made it vulnerable to external shocks. The financial crisis of 2008 reduced the global commodity demand, resulting in a loss of one million jobs in South Africa.⁴⁷ While trade liberalization allowed South Africa to operate in other parts of the world, it also opened South Africa to foreign competitors. For example, its textile and manufacturing sectors were devastated by cheap Chinese exports.⁴⁸ Poor management and

⁴⁴ International Monetary Fund, "IMF Members' Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Board of Governors," last modified 17 May 2018, <https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.aspx>.

⁴⁵ Peter Ferdinand, "Rising powers at the UN: an analysis of the voting behaviour of BRICS in the General Assembly," *Third World Quarterly* 35, no. 3 (2014): 380, 383.

⁴⁶ Alden and Le Pere, "South Africa in Africa . . .", 159.

⁴⁷ Peter S. Goodman, "End of Apartheid in South Africa? Not in Economic Terms," *The New York Times*, last modified 24 October 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/24/business/south-africa-economy-apartheid.html>.

⁴⁸ Ian Taylor, "The South Will Rise Again? New Alliances and Global Governance: The India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum," *Politikon* 36, no. 1 (2009): 54.

underinvestment contributed to the further stagnation of South Africa's economy,⁴⁹ resulting in the downgrading of South Africa's credit rating to below investment level.⁵⁰

In the diplomatic domain, the transition to liberal democracy after a half century of apartheid rule provided South Africa with a degree of moral authority especially in the area of conflict resolution and mediation.⁵¹ This moral authority, combined with South Africa's preference for soft power, liberal democratic values and willingness to collaborate in tackling global issues, resulted in the international recognition of South Africa as a regional power and a global actor.⁵² This recognition gave South Africa a significant voice in international relations, such as three tours on the UNSC, the European Union's only global strategic partner in Africa,⁵³ and the opportunity to host a number of important UN summits on AIDS, climate change and racism. However, what has South Africa accomplished with these opportunities?

As an advocate for a new rule-based international order, South Africa pushes for a reform to the existing US-dominated Western liberal order. South Africa's strategy is to conduct soft balancing through an 'entangling diplomacy' strategy, especially against the US.⁵⁴ With this strategy, South Africa utilizes its membership in multilateral and supra-national organizations such as the UN, WTO and G20 to pursue its policy of non-interference, multilateralism and non-

⁴⁹ Cilliers, Schünemann, and Moyer, "Power and influence in Africa . . .", 8.

⁵⁰ Sven Grimm and Christine Hackenesch, "The EU–South Africa Strategic Partnership: Waning affection, persisting economic interests," *South African Journal of International Affairs* 24, no. 2 (2017): 160, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10220461.2017.1334585>.

⁵¹ Adetiba, Toyin. "South Africa's Military and Peacekeeping Efforts: A new paradigm shift in its foreign policy since 1994," *Journal of Economics and Behavioral Studies* 9, no. 5 (October 2017): 157, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320552588_South_Africa's_Military_and_Peacekeeping_Efforts_A_new_paradigm_shift_in_its_foreign_policy_since_1994.

⁵² Ogunnubi and Amao, "South Africa's Emerging "Soft Power" Influence . . .", 306.

⁵³ Grimm and Hackenesch, "The EU–South Africa Strategic Partnership . . .", 159.

⁵⁴ Tella, "South Africa in BRICS . . .", 397, 399; Justin Elliott, "Reagan's Embrace of Apartheid South Africa," *Salon*, last modified 5 February 2011, https://www.salon.com/2011/02/05/ronald_reagan_apartheid_south_africa/. The balancing against the US is perhaps a natural tendency considering the history of Reagan's support for the apartheid regime and the US State Department's inclusion of ANC in the terrorist list.

alignment. This is highlighted by its opposition to the 1998 US bombing of Iraq, 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, 2003 Iraq invasion, and 2011 NATO bombing of Libya.⁵⁵ The analysis of South Africa's two tenures on the UNSC shows a mixed result. On one hand, South Africa had displayed an inconsistent foreign policy that resulted in widespread criticism, exemplified by South Africa's opposition against the resolution to condemn Myanmar for its human right abuses.⁵⁶ On the other hand, South Africa achieved some limited successes in promoting a closer cooperation between regional organizations and the global security architecture, specifically the empowerment of the AU under the formal auspices of the UNSC.⁵⁷

The analysis of South Africa's interaction in the global economic and diplomatic environment indicates that the international community (outside Africa) recognizes South Africa as a leader and representative of Africa. However, this recognition is due to South Africa's history and values, the weakness of other African states,⁵⁸ and perhaps the expectation of South Africa's potential to transform the region. This 'bequeathed' leadership is not based on a realistic assessment of South Africa's capabilities and/or actual results of South Africa's international engagements.

THE FUTURE OF SOUTH AFRICA'S LEADERSHIP

South Africa is facing significant domestic challenges. The government programs aimed at improving the lives of black South Africans have succeeded in doubling the size of the black

⁵⁵ Tella, "South Africa in BRICS . . . , 399.

⁵⁶ Tom Wheeler, "South Africa's Second Term in the United Nations Security Council," SAIIA, last modified 10 January 2011, <http://www.saiia.org.za/opinion-analysis/south-africas-second-term-in-the-united-nations-security-council>.

⁵⁷ Chris Alden, "South African Foreign Policy . . . , 5.

⁵⁸ Trachsler, "South Africa . . . , 3.

middle class.⁵⁹ However, they were mostly the ones with ties to the government—ordinary South Africans, even those who were highly educated, were not able to participate in the programs due to the inability to pay bribes.⁶⁰ For many of these ordinary people, the result of a quarter century of liberation from apartheid could be summarized as “I’ve gone from a shack to a shack.”⁶¹ To date, half of the country lives in poverty while unemployment was at 27% in 2017.⁶² South Africa’s economic growth is projected at 1.1% in 2018 and constitutes one of the weakest growths on earth—below the projected growth for the world economy at 3.1%, sub-Saharan Africa at 3.2% and well below other ‘emerging powers’ such as China at 6.4% and India at 7.3%.⁶³ By 2023, South Africa’s ranking in the global economy is forecasted to drop from 34th to 39th, while Nigeria’s is expected to rise from 31st to 20th.⁶⁴ Without a significant course correction, all of these serious domestic issues create a ‘time bomb,’ that will further distract South Africa from regional and global leadership.

In Southern Africa especially the states within SACU and CMA, South Africa’s problems are likely to bring serious consequences to these states due to their high level of dependency to South Africa. South Africa’s downfall will result in a significant downturn of their respective economies as well. If this happens, the inability to provide stability and prosperity will mark the end of South Africa’s hegemony in the Southern Africa region. Elsewhere in Africa, South Africa’s leadership will be further degraded due to the superior economic and population

⁵⁹ Goodman, “End of Apartheid in South Africa? . . . , n.p.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² Goodman, “South Africa Sees Fresh Start . . . , n.p.

⁶³ Peter S. Goodman, “Every One of the World’s Big Economies Is Now Growing,” *The New York Times*, last modified 27 January 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/27/business/its-not-a-roar-but-the-global-economy-is-finally-making-noise.html>; World Bank, “Global Economy to Edge Up to 3.1 percent in 2018 but Future Potential Growth a Concern,” Press Release, last modified 9 January 2018, <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2018/01/09/global-economy-to-edge-up-to-3-1-percent-in-2018-but-future-potential-growth-a-concern>.

⁶⁴ Statistics Times, “List of Countries by Projected GDP,” n.p.

growths in other African countries. Even if South Africa is able to stabilize its domestic issues, it cannot prevent the rise of other African states that compete for continental leadership. Nigeria—already the largest economy in Africa—has the potential for hegemony in Africa although it has its own serious problems such as the Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies.⁶⁵ In East Africa, Ethiopia, Kenya and Tanzania all have an economic growth above 5%.⁶⁶ The increased wealth in these countries will undoubtedly result in increased expenditures for their military capabilities. By 2040, the power distribution in Africa is projected to be West Africa, East Africa, South Africa, North Africa, followed by Central Africa.⁶⁷ While some of the emerging powers in Africa have a long way to match South Africa's level of sophistication in its infrastructure, economy and military, it is likely that over the next 25 years South Africa's influence the continent will stagnate or even decline.⁶⁸ By 2040, the power structure representing Africa will likely be multipolar.⁶⁹ The power structure and dynamics in Africa matter for Canada or other Western nations which intend to contribute to peace operations, economic relations and/or human development activities in the continent. For example, it is unlikely that a peace support operation can bring a long-term stability if opposed by the (sub) regional hegemon.

In the short term, South Africa's standing in the global arena and memberships in the G20, BRICS and EU Strategic Partnership are likely to remain due to the weaknesses of other

⁶⁵ Cilliers, Schünemann, and Moyer, "Power and influence in Africa . . .", 25; Cyril Obi, "Recalibrating South Africa's Role in Global Economic Governance: A Nigerian Perspective on Some Strategic Challenges," *SAIIA Policy Insights* no. 11 (March 2015): 8, <https://www.saiia.org.za/policy-insights/801-recalibrating-south-africa-s-role-in-global-economic-governance-a-nigerian-perspective-on-some-strategic-challenges/file>.

⁶⁶ Gerard Kambou, "Sub-Saharan Africa," in *Global Economic Prospects* (Washington DC: The World Bank, 2018): 143, <http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/575011512062621151/Global-Economic-Prospects-Jan-2018-Sub-Saharan-Africa-analysis.pdf>.

⁶⁷ Cilliers, Schünemann, and Moyer, "Power and influence in Africa . . .", 5.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 1.

⁶⁹ North Africa is customarily grouped in the Middle East region vice Africa proper. Therefore, discussions on Africa often eliminate powers such as Egypt. Even with this consideration, sub-Saharan Africa is arguably already multipolar now considering the weakness of South Africa's influence outside Southern Africa. However, in the international arena, it is still treated as a unipolar region under the leadership of South Africa.

African states. Over the next 25 years, it is unlikely that South Africa will remain as the only African voice in these groups. Despite the rise of emerging powers in the continent, Africa is likely to stay at the margins of global power debates until at least 2040 when the total combined power of 55 African states is likely to surpass that of the EU and US, but less than that of China.⁷⁰

CONCLUSION

The political liberation from the apartheid rule had brought a new set of opportunities for South Africa. The end of economic sanctions imposed by the international community expanded South Africa's economic sectors to become the most dominant economy in the continent by the first decade of the 21st century, especially in the Southern Africa region. Its excellent infrastructure, manufacturing and banking also made South Africa the ideal gateway for foreign investments into the African continent. In the diplomatic domain, South Africa's moral authority, prestige and preference for soft power also influenced its obtaining the UNSC seats and memberships in G20 and BRICS. In effect, South Africa has become a de facto hegemon in the Southern Africa region and the voice of Africa in the international arena.

However, soft power alone is not enough to achieve a hegemony throughout Africa. South Africa's hard power, both military and economy, is too small to significantly influence more than the Southern Africa region. The inability to provide stability and prosperity elsewhere in Africa, combined with the suspicions over the inconsistencies of its foreign policy, means that its continental leadership is not uniformly accepted by African countries.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 4.

The subsequent stagnation of South Africa's economy, caused by the global economic meltdown, inequality, corruption, underinvestment, and poor management, have exposed South Africa to serious domestic challenges that will reduce its capacities and capabilities for continental and global leadership. These domestic factors, combined with South Africa's foreign policy inconsistencies and the rise of other African powers, will reduce South Africa's influence over the next 25 years. By 2040, the international community will see multiple African powers in global power debates.

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