


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BECAUSE IT IS 2017: CANADA AND THE WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY AGENDA

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JCSP 43

Master of Defence Studies

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MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES – MAÎTRISE EN ÉTUDES DE LA DÉFENSE

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SECURITY AGENDA**

Maj C.M.F. Niquette

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ABSTRACT

The objective of this research project was to define how the women, peace and security agenda is related to Canada's role on the international stage and in what areas of the agenda the country can make a difference and play a leading role. Through the analysis of the origin and content of the women, peace and security agenda and its links with the concepts of human security and cultural intelligence, it was established that Canada is in a unique position to leverage its reputation and expertise to face the various challenges associated with the global implementation of the agenda. These challenges were identified through a review of the approach currently taken by the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and other regional and sub-regional actors. They were found to include the under-representation of women in senior positions and in deployed military and police units, financial and human resourcing issues, a low level of engagement with civil society, a lack of gender-related training and education and the militarization of the agenda. This research project also looked at the current women, peace and security implementation strategy adopted by Canada and the Canadian Armed Forces, inferring that Canada possesses the foundation to become a world leader and role-model in this field, but that it lacks an overarching and coordinated national strategy. It was concluded that through the implementation of a truly comprehensive approach, articulated in a new Canadian National Action Plan and supported by the Canadian Armed Forces, Canada could address many of the global challenges associated with the women, peace and security agenda.

CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

Among the worst personal threats are those to women. In no society are women secure or treated equally to men. Personal insecurity shadows them from cradle to grave. In the household, they are the last to eat. At school, they are the last to be educated. At work, they are the last to be hired and the first to be fired. And from childhood through adulthood, they are abused because of their gender.

- United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1994*

It has now been more than 20 years since the publication of the *Human Development Report 1994* by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

Introducing the concept of human security, this report proposed a new way of thinking about global security. Highlighting, amongst other issues, the threats to vulnerable populations such as women, the report opened the door to a series of landmark documents including Resolution 1325 which was unanimously adopted by the United Nations (UN) Security Council on 31 October 2000.¹ The resolution marked a significant milestone for the inclusion of women's perspectives as an integral part of the global security agenda. It was, in fact, the first time that the UN Security Council formally acknowledged the unique role of women in armed conflict not only as victims, but also as important actors in the prevention, resolution and peace-building processes.

Since then, a series of other resolutions have been adopted in order to build on the successes and to address the challenges of Resolution 1325. Resolutions 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013), 2122 (2013), 2242 (2015) and 2272 (2016) aimed at bolstering the implementation of Resolution 1325 notably by addressing the issue of gender-based violence in armed conflict and by increasing the participation

¹ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1325* (New York: UN, 2000).

of women in post-conflict decision-making.² Together, these resolutions form the basis of what is known as the women, peace and security agenda of the UN.

The drafting and adoption of these resolutions is the result of the work of a large and varied body of civil society organizations, academia and governmental organizations from all over the world who have advocated that women are disproportionately affected by conflict and that their participation in peace processes is critical to the achievement of long lasting peace. As a member of the UN Security Council at the time of the adoption of Resolution 1325, Canada has always been amongst the countries which played an active role in the advancement of the women, peace and security agenda.³ Although its commitment has taken different forms throughout the years, Canada has generally been perceived as an important actor in the field. However, other countries have become increasingly involved and are looking at the women, peace and security file as a way to influence the global security agenda.⁴ Meanwhile, developing countries are looking for leadership and support in the implementation of the different aspects of the resolutions within their own borders.⁵ This is therefore an interesting time for Canada as it stands at a crossroads and has the opportunity, as noted by the Canadian House of Commons

² United Nations Security Council, "Security Council Resolutions," last accessed 22 November 2016, <http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/>.

³ United Nations Security Council, *Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace – A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325* (New York: UN, 2015), 326.

⁴ Countries such as the Netherlands and Norway have included in their foreign policy the support to organizations and institutions promoting gender equality. The Honourable Robert D. Nault, Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, *An Opportunity for Global Leadership: Canada and the Women, Peace and Security Agenda* (October 2016), 42-46; Nordic countries (Sweden, Norway, Iceland, Finland and Denmark) are also playing an increasingly important role and have established the Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations (NCGM) in 2012. The NCGM is "the leading international centre on gender in military operations." Swedish Armed Forces, "Nordic Center for Gender in Military Operations," last accessed 22 December 2016, <http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/siteassets/english/swedint/engelska/swedint/nordic-centre-for-gender-in-military-operations/ncgm-folder-2015-04-16.pdf>.

⁵ United Nations Security Council, *A Global Study ...*, 250.

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, to “articulate a bold and ambitious global role for Canada.”⁶

The domestic political situation also seems to be conducive to a renewed leadership role for Canada on the women, peace and security agenda. In October 2015, Canadians elected a Liberal government which advocates for a more active role for Canada within the United Nations and has put significant emphasis on women’s rights. The new Prime Minister has also pledged to “restore constructive Canadian leadership in the world ... to support the deeply held Canadian desire to make a real and valuable contribution to a more peaceful and prosperous world.”⁷ It is under this fresh leadership that Canada is also preparing its new National Action Plan for the implementation of Resolution 1325 which will replace the first version, *Building Peace and Security for all: Canada’s Action Plan for the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security*, published in 2010.⁸

Given the current global and national situations, it is an opportune time for Canada to reflect on the significance of the women, peace and security agenda, how it is related to its role on the international stage and in what areas the country can make a difference and play a leading role. Meanwhile, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), as a major instrument of foreign policy and international influence, also needs to ask itself how it can contribute to this national objective. This reflection has already started within

⁶ Nault, *An Opportunity for Global Leadership: Canada and the Women, Peace and Security Agenda*, 1.

⁷ Justin Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada, “Minister of Foreign Affairs Mandate Letter,” last accessed 22 December 2016, <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/minister-foreign-affairs-mandate-letter>.

⁸ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Building Peace and Security for all: Canada’s Action Plan for the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security* (2010).

the institution with the release in January 2016 of the *Chief of Defence Staff Directive for Integrating UNSCR 1325 and Related Resolutions into CAF Planning and Operations*.⁹

This research project will demonstrate that Canada is indeed well positioned to play a leading role on the women, peace and security agenda, and that it should do so through the implementation of a comprehensive and integrated approach in which the CAF would play a supporting role. To demonstrate this, the research project will be split into three major sections. Chapter two will first provide an overview of the origin and content of the women, peace and security resolutions and interpret them through the lens of human security and multiculturalism. From there, the link between the role of Canada on the international stage and the women, peace and security agenda will be established. Chapter three will elaborate upon the current approach to women, peace and security by different global, regional and sub-regional organizations, with an important focus on the UN and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) of which Canada is a member. This chapter will permit the identification of existing leadership and implementation gaps that Canada and the CAF could address. Finally, chapter four will describe where Canada currently stands and, more specifically, what role the CAF is currently playing within the national women, peace and security strategy. This will lead to the conclusion that Canada is in a position to become a global role-model and leader through the adoption of a renewed comprehensive approach to the challenges of the women, peace and security agenda.

⁹ Department of National Defence, *Chief of Defence Staff Directive for Integrating UNSCR 1325 and Related Resolutions into CAF Planning and Operations* (2016).

CHAPTER 2 – THE WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY AGENDA, HUMAN SECURITY AND CANADA

We can never talk meaningfully about human security without discussing gender equality first. For human security is not a concern with weapons. It is a concern about human dignity ... it is a concern for people and their welfare. And no society can ever prosper half-liberated and half-chained. Women's security is a pre-condition for human security.

- Khadija Haq, *Human Security for Women*

Introduction

In order to identify where Canada and the CAF can influence and play a leading role in the women, peace and security global agenda, it is important to understand the agenda itself, its origin and how it has been historically linked to Canada's interests and priorities. This chapter will provide an overview of the evolution of the women, peace and security agenda and demonstrate its importance for the achievement of long lasting peace. It will then examine the agenda from a human security perspective, establishing the link between the women, peace and security agenda and Canada's historical approach to foreign policy. Finally, this chapter will take a look at Canada's unique approach to multiculturalism and explain how it provides the country with an exceptional ability to understand and promote diversity allowing it to be a credible advocate of the women, peace and security agenda.

What is the women, peace and security agenda?

UN Security Council Resolution 1325, the corner stone of the women, peace and security agenda, is the result of the slow but constant progression throughout the 20th century of the idea of mainstreaming gender perspectives when dealing with conflict prevention, management and resolution. It can be argued that this process started with the adoption of the UN Charter in 1945 which included in its preamble a resolve to "reaffirm

faith in fundamental human rights, in dignity and worth of the human person, in the *equal rights of men and women* [emphasis added] and of nations large and small.”¹⁰ However, the origin of the UN gender mainstreaming approach is usually traced back to the first world conference on women which took place in 1975 in Mexico City to mark the International Women’s Year. Three more world conferences organized by the UN followed in Copenhagen in 1980, in Nairobi in 1985 and in Beijing in 1995.¹¹ The latter resulted in the adoption of a key policy document which is now considered to be one of the most important milestones in the advancement and empowerment of women: the *Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action*.¹² The document, adopted unanimously, presented the idea that

women’s empowerment and their full participation on the basis of equality in all spheres of society, including participation in the decision-making process and access to power, are fundamental for the achievement of equality, development and peace.¹³

It marked an important change in the way the UN and its member-states approached gender equality (notably by moving the focus from women to gender) and it established a series of strategic objectives in 12 “critical areas of concerns”.¹⁴ The commitments made

¹⁰ United Nations, “Charter of the United Nations,” last accessed 22 December 2016, <http://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/>.

¹¹ UN Women, “World Conferences on Women,” last accessed 22 December 2016, <http://www.unwomen.org/en/how-we-work/intergovernmental-support/world-conferences-on-women>.

¹² United Nations, The Fourth World Conference on Women, *Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action*, 1995.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.* These areas of concern are Women and poverty, Education and training of women, Women and health, Violence against women, Women and armed conflict, Women and the economy, Women in power and decision-making, Institutional mechanism for the advancement of women, Human rights of women, Women and the media, Women and the environment and The girl-child.

in the document served as the basis for the work that led, five years later, to the drafting and adoption of Resolution 1325.¹⁵

Resolution 1325 is also based on the pledge made by the UN General Assembly during the *Women 2000: Gender Equality, Development and Peace for the Twenty-First Century* Special Session which assessed the achievements and obstacles encountered since the adoption of the *Beijing Declaration*.¹⁶ It also builds on the recommendations presented in the *Windhoek Declaration* and the *Namibia Plan of Action* which addressed the role of women in peace support operations.¹⁷ More importantly, Resolution 1325 is the result of the relentless work of civil society organizations from all over the world which ensured that the women's rights and gender equality agendas remained part of UN considerations when discussing global security issues. Their work ultimately led to the adoption of the "first resolution ever passed by the Security Council that specifically addresses the impact of war on women, and women's contributions to conflict resolution and sustainable peace."¹⁸

Resolution 1325 therefore represents a watershed in the women, peace and security agenda. Recognizing that women and children are vulnerable populations during armed conflict, it highlights the disproportionate negative effects that wars have on them. As such, it reaffirms the UN resolve to ensure the proper implementation of human rights laws to guarantee their protection. However, it does not only focus on the role of women as victims of armed conflicts. It also puts the emphasis on the key role of women at all

¹⁵ Rosalind Boyd, *The Search for Lasting Peace* (Surrey, England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2014), 9.

¹⁶ United Nations General Assembly, *S-23/3 Further Actions and Initiatives to Implement the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action* (New York: UN, 2000).

¹⁷ Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women, "Windhoek Declaration," last accessed 22 December 2016, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/wps/windhoek_declaration.pdf.

¹⁸ Boyd, *The Search for Lasting Peace*, 9.

stages of the peace process, stressing the importance of involving them in the decision-making process. The resolution therefore urges member-states to increase the representation and participation of women in conflict prevention and resolution processes and to take into account the unique needs of women and girls during and after armed conflicts, notably to protect them from gender-based violence. It also demands that gender awareness training be provided to personnel deploying to peacekeeping missions.¹⁹

Resolution 1325 was followed by Resolutions 1820 and 1888 in 2008 and 2009, respectively. These two resolutions focus on the use of sexual violence as a tactic of war and express the resolve of the Security Council to “adopt appropriate steps to address widespread or systematic sexual violence.”²⁰ These resolutions clearly identify gender-based violence as a threat to global peace. Subsequent resolutions on women, peace and security (1889 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013), 2122 (2013), 2242 (2015) and 2272 (2016)) essentially recognize the slow progress of the agenda, re-affirm the commitment of the member-states to Resolution 1325 and advocate for greater empowerment of women in all stages of the peace-building process and for a firm condemnation of sexual violence in conflict situation.²¹ The content of these nine resolutions, adopted over the last 16 years, represents the core of the women, peace and security agenda.

Why women?

Considering the emphasis put by the UN on the women, peace and security agenda in the past two decades, one may ask how and why women are considered such a

¹⁹ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1325*.

²⁰ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1820* (New York: UN, 2008).

²¹ United Nations Security Council, “Security Council Resolutions.”

key element of the peace process. According to Marie O'Reilly, lead researcher at the *Institute for Inclusive Security* which provides expert advice on women's participation in peace-building, women are essential to the process for three reasons.²² First, their inclusion is instrumental to conflict prevention. It has been demonstrated quantitatively that the best indicator for peace in a country is gender equality. In fact, through the analysis of the status of women in various countries of the world, it has been proven that "the very best predictor of a state's peacefulness is not its level of wealth, its level of democracy, or its ethno-religious identity; the best predictor of a state's peacefulness is how well its women are treated."²³ As just one example, it has been shown by various studies that an increased level of participation of women in parliament is associated with a strong decrease in the likelihood of violence of a state inside and outside its borders.²⁴

Second, women are the key to a successful peacemaking process. Their contribution to peace agreement negotiations have been shown to be critical to the reaching of a satisfactory solution. In fact, empirical data indicates that when women's groups are not at the table, the prospect of reaching an agreement is strongly reduced.²⁵ In addition, once an agreement has been reached through mediation, it is significantly more likely to last if women were included in the peace process. A study of 182 signed peace agreements shows that "an agreement is 35 percent more likely to last for fifteen years if

²² Marie O'Reilly, *Why Women? Inclusive Security and Peaceful Societies*, The Institute for Inclusive Security (2015), 2.

²³ Valerie M. Hudson, "What Sex Means for World Peace," *Foreign Policy*, last modified 24 April 2012, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/04/24/what-sex-means-for-world-peace/>.

²⁴ Erik Melander, "Political Gender Equality and State Human Rights Abuse," *Journal of Peace Research* 42, no. 2 (2005), 149-166; Mary Caprioli and Mark Boyer, "Gender, Violence, and International Crisis," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45, no. 4 (2001): 503-518.

²⁵ Marie O'Reilly, Andrea O Suilleabhain, and Thania Paffenhol, *Reimagining Peacemaking: Women's Roles in Peace Processes*, The International Peace Institute (2015), 11.

women participate in its creation.”²⁶ According to Marie O’Reilly, the reasons why women’s inclusion has such a big impact include the facts that:

- a. Women promote dialogue and build trust;
- b. Women bridge divides and mobilize coalitions;
- c. Women raise issues that are vital for peace; and
- d. Women prioritize gender equality.²⁷

Lastly, women are also critical to the rebuilding process and the conservation of peace after a conflict. A thorough statistical analysis of 78 peace periods in 58 states between 1980 and 2003 has shown that the inclusion of women in social and political society improves the prospect of long lasting peace.²⁸ According to some studies, this could be explained by “women’s inclusive approach to governance ... and the perception of trust associated with them.”²⁹ These elements are indeed critical to building confidence in newly established institutions in a country recovering from war.

As demonstrated above, there is an increasing body of empirical data proving that the inclusion of women in peace processes is instrumental to the prevention of conflicts, the reaching of peace agreements and the sustainment of security in post-conflict settings. This explains the importance and relevance of the women, peace and security agenda, and should be a motivation for nations to invest in its implementation.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 12.

²⁷ O’Reilly, *Why Women? Inclusive Security and Peaceful Societies*, 5-8.

²⁸ Jacqueline H.R. Demeritt and Angela D. Nichols, “Female Participation and Civil War Relapse,” *Civil Wars* 16, no. 3 (2014): 346-368.

²⁹ O’Reilly, *Why Women? Inclusive Security and Peaceful Societies*, 9.

Resolution 1325 and Human Security

Considering that women's participation in peace processes is essential to the achievement of long lasting peace, it is not surprising that Resolution 1325 was adopted at a time when the international discourse on global security was greatly influenced by the concept of "human security". Human security can be summarized as a shift of focus from a state-centered to an individual-centered approach to security. Although the broad notions behind the concept were not new, the term was coined for the first time in the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) *Human Development Report 1994*.³⁰ The report recognized that the classical definition of security, based on the geo-political context of the Cold War, was too narrow and did not take into account "the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives."³¹ The report defined two components of human security: "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want".³² It also established seven main categories: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security.³³ The intent of the report was to bring states to address the challenges of the contemporary security environment by moving resources from the protection of their national territory to the promotion of the global human development agenda.

³⁰ United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1994* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).

³¹ *Ibid.*, 22.

³² *Ibid.*, 24.

³³ *Ibid.*, 24-25.

The human security approach was fully embraced by the UN around 1999 as the organization was aiming to reinvent itself to face the challenge of the new millennium.³⁴

That year, Kofi Annan, then Secretary-General of the UN, wrote:

Peace means much more than the absence of war. Human security can no longer be understood in purely military terms. Rather, it must encompass economic development, social justice, environmental protection, democratization, disarmament, and respect for human rights and the rule of law.³⁵

It is therefore not surprising that Resolution 1325 was adopted in October 2000 as there is a strong link between human security and the women, peace and security agenda. The classical, state-centered approach to security is strongly gendered with men over-represented in state security systems (governments, police forces and military forces).³⁶ By opposition, the human security approach is focused on the individual, the family and the community, bringing women to the center of the question.³⁷ In essence, human security is all about protecting and empowering individuals. This aligns nicely with the objectives of Resolution 1325 which, as stated previously, focus on protecting women as vulnerable population and empowering them as key actors in the peace process. Since human security puts forward a broader definition of security threats which include aspects such as health, environmental, social and economic, it is much more inclined to

³⁴ Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh and Anuradha M. Chenoy, *Human Security: Concepts and Implications* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 24.

³⁵ Kofi Annan, "Towards a Culture of Peace," in *Letters to Future Generations*, ed. Frederico Mayor (Paris: UNESCO Publishing, 1999), 13.

³⁶ Vivienne Taylor, "From State Security to Human Security and Gender Justice," *Agenda* 18, Issue 59 (2004): 67.

³⁷ A.C. Okros, "Rethinking "Diversity" and "Security"," *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 47, no. 4 (November 2009): 352.

consider women's security needs specifically.³⁸ In addition, as human security is “about preventing violent conflict and reducing the multiple deprivations and social inequalities experienced by people,”³⁹ it is poised to involve women as active participants of the peace process since, as demonstrated above, they are instrumental to the prevention of conflicts and the peace-building process.

Canada, Human Security and the Women, Peace and Security Agenda

Having established the importance and relevance of the women, peace and security agenda, notably as part of a human security approach to peace, it is now interesting to look at the role Canada can play in its implementation. First of all, the concept of human security was embraced by Canada very shortly after its formalization in the UNDP *Human Development Report 1994*. Lloyd Axworthy, Foreign Minister from 1996 to 2000, developed his foreign policy around the concept and explained it “as an alternative way of seeing the world, taking people as its point of reference, rather than focusing exclusively on the security of territory or governments.”⁴⁰ The human security approach to external affairs was seen as a great way for Canada, and other middle-power such as Norway or Japan, to augment their influence on the international stage and to achieve a certain level of autonomy from the United States.⁴¹ The Axworthy human security foreign policy agenda was based on five priorities: public safety, protection of

³⁸ Anuradha M. Chenoy, “The Gender and Human Security Debate,” *IDS Bulletin* 40, no. 2 (March 2009): 44.

³⁹ Taylor, “From State Security to Human Security and Gender Justice,” 66.

⁴⁰ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing World,” last modified April 1999, <http://www.summit-americas.org/Canada/HumanSecurity-english.htm>.

⁴¹ Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, *Human Security: Concepts and Implications*, 28-29.

civilians, conflict prevention, governance and accountability, and peace support operations.⁴²

Driven by these priorities and the idea of bringing to people the “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want”, Canada played a leading role on a number of international initiatives. For example, in 1997, through the Ottawa Process, Canada was instrumental in the adoption of the Anti-personnel Landmines Treaty.⁴³ It also played, in 1998, a critical role in the negotiations that led to the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC).⁴⁴ The same year, Minister Axworthy, along with his Norwegian counterpart, created the Human Security Network which brought together 13 countries with the objective of “promoting human security strategies in foreign policy.”⁴⁵ Most significantly, Canada was at the forefront of the development of the principle of the “Responsibility to Protect”. In 2000, Canada established the independent International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) which had the mandate to “build a broader understanding of the problem of reconciling intervention for human protection purposes and sovereignty.”⁴⁶ The resulting landmark document, very much influenced by the precepts of human security, introduced the principle of “Responsibility to Protect” which promoted “the idea that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect

⁴² *Ibid.*, 31.

⁴³ John English, “The Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel Landmines,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy*, ed. Andrew F. Cooper, Jorge Heine, and Ramesh Thakur (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 797-809.

⁴⁴ Benjamin N. Schiff, “Diplomacy and the International Criminal Court,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy*, ed. Andrew F. Cooper, Jorge Heine, and Ramesh Thakur (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 745-762.

⁴⁵ Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health, Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, “Human Security Network,” last accessed 4 May 2017, <http://www.hpcrresearch.org/research/human-security-network>.

⁴⁶ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect* (December 2001), 2.

their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe ... but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states.”⁴⁷

In this context it is not surprising that Canada was also actively involved in the adoption and efforts to implement Resolution 1325. Of the five Canadian foreign policy priorities mentioned above, it is easy to link at least two to the women, peace and security agenda: “protection of civilians” and “conflict prevention”. It could also be argued that the elements of “governance and accountability” and “peace support operations” have a strong potential to include a women, peace and security dimension. As such, Canada had a great interest in the adoption of Resolution 1325 and played an active role as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council at the time.⁴⁸ But Canada was not only involved in the adoption of the resolution, it also led a number of initiatives advocating for its implementation. For example, it was responsible for the creation of a committee called the Group of Friends of Women, Peace and Security which includes UN member-states, UN agencies and civil society organizations and actively promotes the women, peace and security agenda.⁴⁹ Established in 2001, the group is still active, and Canada, as the chair, continues to organize meetings to ensure the promotion of different aspects of the agenda.⁵⁰

Canada also took steps domestically to ensure the successful implementation of Resolution 1325. It created, in 2001, the Canadian Committee on Women, Peace and Security which served as “a national coalition of parliamentarians, government officials

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, VIII.

⁴⁸ United Nations Security Council, *A Global Study ...*, 326.

⁴⁹ Originally called Friends of 1325.

⁵⁰ Nault, *An Opportunity for Global Leadership: Canada and the Women, Peace and Security Agenda*, 48.

and representatives of civil society and academia.”⁵¹ Within the government, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT)⁵² was given the mandate to implement the resolution and to create an interdepartmental working group involving the Department of National Defence (DND), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Citizen and Immigration Canada, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the International Development Research Center.⁵³

Canada was therefore an active supporter of the women, peace and security agenda right from the beginning as it aligned nicely with its human security foreign policy. Over the years, its commitment has fluctuated and taken different forms, notably due to the change of government in 2005 which saw a Conservative government take the lead of the country. This Conservative government, which banned the use of the term “human security”⁵⁴ and imposed a change of language from “gender equality” to “equality between women and men”⁵⁵ within its institutions, somewhat distanced itself from Canada’s previous approach to human rights. Nonetheless, Canada remained a credible contributor to the women, peace and security agenda maintaining its expertise in police and military training, integration of gender analysis into development projects as well as prosecution of gender-based violence.⁵⁶ However, as noted by the Canadian House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International

⁵¹ Boyd, *The Search for Lasting Peace*, 39.

⁵² Now merged with the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and known as Global Affairs Canada.

⁵³ Boyd, *The Search for Lasting Peace*, 39.

⁵⁴ Emily Paddon and Jennifer M. Welsh, “Protecting Civilians in Conflict: A Constructive Role for Canada”, in *The World Won’t Wait: Why Canada Needs to Rethink its International Policies* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016), 134.

⁵⁵ Rebecca Tiessen and Krystal Carrier, “The erasure of “gender” in Canadian foreign policy under the Harper Conservatives: the significance of the discursive shift from “gender equality” to “equality between women and men”,” *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 21, no. 2 (2015): 95.

⁵⁶ Nault, *An Opportunity for Global Leadership: Canada and the Women, Peace and Security Agenda*, 49.

Development, “the role played by Canada in recent years is one of a collection of activities that have been developed by different departments and agencies [without] an overarching and strategic vision.”⁵⁷

As stated in the introduction, the return to power of a Liberal government in Canada could be an opportunity for the country to focus more attention and resources on the women, peace and security agenda. In fact, the Liberal party was elected based on an electoral platform which included provisions for the eradication of discrimination based on gender identity, a greater emphasis on gender impacts of public policies, a commitment to gender parity in cabinet, and a strategy to address gender violence.⁵⁸ In this new political context, Canada could certainly leverage its reputation as a proponent of human security, its historical links to Resolution 1325 and its expertise in various aspects of gender equality to play a leading role on women, peace and security issues.

Canada, Multiculturalism and Women, Peace and Security

In addition its reputation, its history and its expertise, Canada is also unique in the way it approaches multiculturalism within its own borders. Although the link with the women, peace and security agenda is not as obvious, the cultural openness of Canada provides the country with a unique understanding of the value of diversity.

It is widely accepted that Canada is “the founder of multiculturalism as a formal government policy.”⁵⁹ As early as 1971, the country adopted a policy to address diversity

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ Liberal Party of Canada, “Real Change,” last accessed 22 December 2016, <https://www.liberal.ca/realchange/>.

⁵⁹ Jeffrey G. Reitz *et al*, *Multiculturalism and Social Cohesion: Potentials and Challenges of Diversity* (London: Springer, 2009), 1.

seeking to facilitate the inclusion and participation of the immigrant populations rather than their assimilation. Multiculturalism was then further formalized as a fundamental part of the Canadian identity through the inclusion of its principles in the Constitution Act (1982), the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1985) and the Multiculturalism Act (1988).⁶⁰ To this day, “no other Western country has gone as far as Canada in adopting multiculturalism not only as a policy toward minorities but also as a basic feature of shared identity.”⁶¹

This unique ability for Canada to embrace multiculturalism and diversity is a demonstration of what experts call cultural intelligence. Cultural intelligence (CQ) is “the ability to recognize the shared beliefs, values, attitudes and behaviors of a group of people and, most importantly, to effectively apply this knowledge toward a specific goal.”⁶² Researchers suggest that a multicultural environment is a fertile ground to foster cultural intelligence.⁶³ In turn, a high level of cultural intelligence is essential to a proper implementation of the women, peace and security agenda. For one thing, cultural intelligence is an “important tool for understanding ... the potential for gender and diversity to enhance the overall capacity of organizations.”⁶⁴ In addition, cultural intelligence provides the tool to “address the complexity that gender and sex can represent within social and cultural contexts.”⁶⁵ As such, Canada, through its unique

⁶⁰ David Este, “Multiculturalism (Canada),” in *Encyclopedia of Social Welfare History in North America*.

⁶¹ Rainer Baubock, “If You Say Multiculturalism Is the Wrong Answer, Then What Was the Question You Asked,” *Canadian Diversity/Diversite canadienne* 4, no. 1 (2005): 93.

⁶² Karen D. Davis and Justin C. Wright, “Culture and Cultural Intelligence,” in *Cultural Intelligence & Leadership – An Introduction for Canadian Forces Leaders* (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2009), 9.

⁶³ David C. Thomas and Kerr Inkson, *Cultural Intelligence: People Skills for Global Business* (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2003), 125.

⁶⁴ Karen D. Davis, “Sex, Gender and Cultural Intelligence in the Canadian Forces.” *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 47, no. 4 (November 2009): 435.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 437.

approach to multiculturalism has developed a set of competencies related to cultural intelligence that places it in a position to better understand the value of integrating and considering women, and to do so in a culturally-sensitive way depending on the context.

It is also interesting to note that while Canada is embracing multiculturalism, many countries are backing away from it. In Europe, but also in Australia and the United States, the rhetoric is shifting from multiculturalism to assimilation.⁶⁶ This provides Canada with an opportunity to play a unique role in the promotion of the women, peace and security agenda based on its unique ability to understand and leverage diversity.

Conclusion

The current women, peace and security agenda is the result of 40 years of work by the UN to mainstream gender perspectives in the global security discourse. It started in 1975 at the first world conference on women in Mexico City and reached a milestone in 1995 with the adoption of the *Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action*. The *Beijing Declaration* then became the foundation for the drafting and adoption of landmark Resolution 1325 in 2000. Resolution 1325 and the subsequent nine related resolutions address the impact of conflict on women and the issue of gender-based violence, but also recognize the essential contribution of women to the achievement of sustainable peace. As explained in this chapter, it has in fact been proven that women are instrumental to the prevention of conflicts, the reaching of peace agreements and the sustainment of security in post-conflict settings.

⁶⁶ Elke Winter, "Rethinking Multiculturalism After its "Retreat": Lessons From Canada," *American Behavioral Scientist* 59, Issue 6 (2015): 638.

This chapter also illustrated the link between the women, peace and security agenda and the “human security” concept. Human security, which promotes an individual-centered approach to security, was adopted by the UN at the turn of the century. It considers global security from the perspective of the individual, the family and the community. As such, the objectives of the women, peace and security agenda and the human security concept align nicely as they both focus on the protection and empowerment of individuals as a way to achieve a more stable and peaceful world.

These objectives are also aligned with Canada’s historical approach to global security. Canada was in fact one of the first countries to embrace human security and make it an integral part of its foreign policy. As such, Canada was actively involved in the adoption and implementation, domestically and abroad, of Resolution 1325. Although its commitment to the women, peace and security agenda fluctuated over the last 20 years, notably due to the changes in government, Canada maintains an enviable reputation in the field.

This chapter also illustrated that Canada’s unique approach to multiculturalism provides the country with a distinctive understanding of the value of diversity. Through its openness to multiculturalism, Canada has achieved a degree of cultural intelligence which allows for a better appreciation of the importance of integrating women and considering their unique needs.

Canada is therefore in an exceptional position to leverage its reputation as a proponent of human security, multiculturalism and gender equality in order to play a leading role in the women, peace and security agenda. The next chapter will attempt to

identify what are the current implementation gaps at the global and regional levels with a view to defining areas where leadership is needed.

CHAPTER 3 – GLOBAL AND REGIONAL APPROACHES TO THE WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY AGENDA

I am personally committed to implementing these resolutions. I have highlighted women's leadership in peacebuilding as a priority and appointed an unprecedented number of women leaders in the United Nations. It is essential to ensure that the UN is fit for purpose when it comes to women, peace and security, and that we become a model for all actors to emulate.

- UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, *A Global Study*

Introduction

Celebrating 15 years since the adoption of landmark Resolution 1325, the UN prepared in 2015 a detailed study reviewing the successes and the challenges associated with the implementation of the women, peace and security agenda. *Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing Peace – A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325* takes a critical look at the progress and the status of the agenda around the world. Although it identifies a number of positive developments, it also highlights the “crippling gap between the ambition of [the] commitments and actual political and financial support.”⁶⁷ This chapter will endeavor to better define this gap with a view to identifying opportunities for Canada to play a leading role in filling the existing void.

In order to do so, the chapter will examine the approach taken by the various actors of the women, peace and security agenda at the global and regional levels. First, it will describe the UN approach, looking at its implementation framework including the national action plans and the organizational structure put in place to address the issue. It will then highlight the challenges faced by the organization when it comes to transforming policies into actions. Issues such as women's representation, funding and

⁶⁷ United Nations Security Council, *A Global Study* ..., 5.

civil society's involvement will be discussed. The chapter will also examine the approach taken by regional and sub-regional security organizations identifying the generic successes and challenges associated with their implementation of Resolution 1325. It will then focus more specifically on NATO's approach and look at the organization's application of gender mainstreaming through planning and execution of operations as well as education and training. This review should lead to the identification of clear implementation gaps associated with the execution of the women, peace and security agenda at the global and regional levels.

The UN Approach – The Implementation Framework

Since the adoption of Resolution 1325, the UN has generally approached the women, peace and security agenda from the perspective of four key issue areas: prevention, participation, protection and peacebuilding and recovery.⁶⁸ These pillars reflect the objectives stated in the various resolutions and reiterated in the latest *UN Strategic Results Framework on Women, Peace and Security*.⁶⁹ They put the emphasis on the *prevention* of conflict and violence against women and girls, the equal *participation* of women in peace and security decision-making processes, the *protection* of women's and girls' rights, and the consideration of women as recipients and agents of *relief and recovery* aid in post-conflict situations.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 13.

⁶⁹ UN Women Watch, "UN Strategic Results on Women, Peace and Security: 2011-2020," last accessed 2 March 2017, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ianwge/taskforces/wps/Strategic_Framework_2011-2020.pdf.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

National Action Plans

In order to address these key issue areas, the UN has mandated its member states to produce national action plans (NAPs). These action plans represent an instrument for nations to “identify priorities, determine responsibilities, allocate resources, and initiate strategic actions within a defined timeframe.”⁷¹ As of January 2017, 63 countries had adopted a NAP (see Figure 3.1), and an additional eight had committed to publish one within a year.⁷² In addition to these national documents, a number of regional action plans have also been produced by organizations such as NATO and the European Union (EU).

The content, the quality and the impact of these NAPs vary greatly from nation to nation. Some countries, such as Denmark, have already released their third generation NAP and have built on the lessons learned through the years to come up with a strong, balanced and applicable document.⁷³ On the other hand, some member states, including permanent members of the Security Council China and Russia, have yet to publish their first NAP.⁷⁴ Finally, a number of countries, including Canada, are currently working off expired NAPs. These older or expired documents, although representative of a certain level of commitment, generally contain numerous deficiencies such as “the absence of a clear division between comprehensive goals, strategic objectives and actions, lack of

⁷¹ United Nations Security Council, *A Global Study ...*, 240.

⁷² Peace Women, “Who Implements – Member States,” last accessed 5 March 2017, <http://www.peacewomen.org/member-states>. Algeria, Angola, Brazil, Czech Republic, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Thailand and the United Republic of Tanzania have committed to adopt a NAP in 2017.

⁷³ United Nations Security Council, *A Global Study ...*, 241.

⁷⁴ Paul Kirby and Laura J. Shepherd, “The Future Past of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda,” *International Affairs* 92, no. 2 (2016): 378.

clear lines of responsibilities, budget and timelines, and of coordinating and oversight mechanisms.”⁷⁵



Figure 3.1 – Countries having adopted a NAP as of January 2017

Source: Peace Women, <http://www.peacewomen.org/member-states>.

Organizational Structure

In addition to the requirement for the production of NAPs, the UN attempts to implement of the women, peace and security agenda through its organizational structure. Although all UN bodies have a responsibility to ensure the implementation of Resolution 1325, UN Women is the leading entity when it comes to making sure that the agenda

⁷⁵ United Nations Security Council, *A Global Study ...*, 240.

remains at the center of UN's preoccupations. As the "global champion for gender equality", UN Women chairs the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee on Women, Peace and Security.⁷⁶ The Standing Committee brings together UN entities, member states, regional organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) on a quarterly, or needs-based, basis in order to exchange information, provide advice for strategic policy development and support monitoring and reporting mechanisms.⁷⁷

The UN also strives to incorporate dedicated gender expertise throughout its organization, starting with the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), which are the main agents responsible for the Security Council's peace and security mandate. Both DPKO and DPA have established gender units within their headquarters and have deployed gender advisors and/or gender focal points to their missions.⁷⁸ Although progress has been noted in recent years, there remains a number of challenges associated with the staffing, the funding and the resourcing of these advisor positions. These challenges will be discussed in greater detail in the next section.

In summary, the UN delivers the women, peace and security agenda through four pillars: prevention, protection, participation and peacebuilding and recovery. The main instruments used by the UN to monitor the implementation of this agenda are the NAPs which each member state should use to define the priorities, responsibilities and resources associated with its commitment. As an organization, the UN has built a certain level of gender expertise which principally resides within the UN Women entity. It is also

⁷⁶ UN Women, "About Us," last accessed 5 March 2017, <http://www.unwomen.org/en/about-us>.

⁷⁷ UN Women Watch, "IANWGE Standing Committee on Women, Peace and Security," last accessed 5 March 2017, <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ianwge/taskforces/tfwpssecurity.htm>.

⁷⁸ United Nations Security Council, *A Global Study ...*, 277-279.

in the process of expanding this expertise throughout its various departments and deployed missions. However, as will be shown below, the UN still faces numerous challenges when it comes to transforming policies and commitments into concrete actions and results.

The UN Approach – The Challenges

Some of the most commonly cited leading indicators of the progression of the women, peace and security agenda are the level of participation of women in peace processes and the level of consideration given to gender-related issues in these processes. Although there has been clear progress since the adoption of Resolution 1325, these levels remain disappointingly low. A study by UN Women reviewing 31 major peace processes between 1992 and 2011 showed that women represented only “4 percent of signatories, 2.4 percent of chief mediators, 3.7 percent of witnesses and 9 percent of negotiators.”⁷⁹ In addition, only 27 percent of peace agreements signed since the adoption of Resolution 1325 included references to women in the text.⁸⁰ When looking at more recent statistics from 2014 it may be encouraging to note that 88 percent of peace processes involving the UN included consultations with women’s groups. However, it appears that “these meetings [were] sometimes symbolic affairs lacking thorough preparation, representativeness, and follow-up.”⁸¹ Considering these results, it is clear that the UN is still far from achieving the level of women’s participation promoted in the various women, peace and security resolutions.

⁷⁹ UN Women, *Women’s Participation in Peace Negotiations: Connections between Presence and Influence* (New York: UN, 2012).

⁸⁰ United Nations Security Council, *A Global Study ...*, 44. This is nonetheless a significant improvement from the percentage obtained when looking at the 1990-2000 period during which only 11 percent of peace agreements contained references to women.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 45.

This slow progress can be explained by a number of challenges related to the implementation of the agenda. Of these many challenges, or implementation gaps, four appear to have the greatest impact and will be discussed in further details in the next sections:

- a. The under-representation of women in senior positions within the UN;
- b. The under-representation of women in peacekeeping operations;
- c. The limited funding and resourcing allocated to the implementation of the agenda; and
- d. The low level of engagement with civil society.

Women in Senior Positions

The first challenge is the under-representation of women in senior positions within the UN. According to experts, women in decision-making positions have a unique ability to promote gender mainstreaming and gender equality.⁸² Recognizing this fact, the UN made an ambitious (and unrealistic) commitment in 1996 to reach gender parity in managerial and decision-making positions by 2000. However, more than 20 years later, this target is far from being achieved.⁸³ When looking at data from 2011 to 2015, the proportion of women in leadership or managerial positions within peacekeeping and special political missions has generally fluctuated between 15 percent and 30 percent.⁸⁴

⁸² United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women, *Equal Participation of Women and Men in Decision-Making Processes* (New York: UN, 2005), 23.

⁸³ United Nations General Assembly, *Resolution 50/164 – Improvement of the Status of Women in the Secretariat* (New York: UN, 1996).

⁸⁴ United Nations Security Council, *A Global Study ...*, 270-273. For example, 15 to 25 percent of peacekeeping and special political missions have been headed by women, and 15 to 24 percent have been sub-headed by women. These missions have also employed women in managerial positions at a rate of 18 to 33 percent.

As with other UN entities working in conflict and post-conflict locations, the representation of women is concentrated in lower professional positions.⁸⁵

This situation, although improving since the adoption of Resolution 1325, represents an important capability and credibility gap for the UN as it endeavors to lead by example. This is exacerbated by the fact that the UN Secretariat “underperforms NATO, the World Bank, the European Union, and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in the overall percentage of women working in conflict and post-conflict locations.”⁸⁶ The organization now has a plan to “make the UN system 50-50 by 2030.”⁸⁷ It will be interesting to see if this objective can realistically be achieved and, more importantly, if the progress will be reflected in senior positions and in field missions where women can have the biggest impact.

Women in Peacekeeping Operations

The second challenge is the under-representation of women in peacekeeping operations. Again, the UN is far from meeting the objectives it has set for itself. In 2009, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon put in motion a campaign to reach a ratio of 10 percent female peacekeepers in military units and 20 percent in police units by 2014.⁸⁸ According to the *Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325*, as of 2015, UN missions employed only 3 percent of female military peacekeepers and 10 percent of female police officers.⁸⁹ There is no indication that these figures will

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 271.

⁸⁶ United Nations Security Council, *A Global Study ...*, 271.

⁸⁷ UN Women, *Beijing +20: Past, Present and Future – The Representation of Women and the United Nations System* (New York: UN, 2015), 5.

⁸⁸ Sabrina Karim and Kyle Beardsley, “Female Peacekeepers and Gender Balancing: Token Gestures or Informed Policymaking,” *International Interactions* 39, no. 4 (2013): 466.

⁸⁹ United Nations Security Council, *A Global Study ...*, 139, 160.

improve as no real augmentation has been noted in the last five years despite repeated calls to troop contributing nations to increase the number of women deployed to UN missions.⁹⁰

The importance of deploying uniformed female peacekeepers is indisputable. It is generally accepted that women's presence results in "more "civilized" behavior among the mission staff", increased operational effectiveness, added legitimacy and improved prevention and response to gender-based violence.⁹¹ The participation of female peacekeepers is therefore critical to all UN missions, but especially in situation of violent conflicts where gender expertise is most needed. Unfortunately, it appears that "women are much more likely to be deployed to observer or political missions than to situations of significant conflict."⁹² Women peacekeepers also need to assume visible roles on the ground in order to have a tangible impact. This is currently not the case as the majority of female military peacekeepers are currently employed in support staff positions, therefore limiting the effect of their presence.⁹³

Unsurprisingly, the low percentage of women deployed to peacekeeping operations and the role they play in these operations are a reflection of the composition of the troop contributing countries' armed forces.⁹⁴ With the top five contributing countries in 2015 having between one and seven percent of women representation in their national armed forces, it is difficult to imagine that the UN could reach its target of 10 percent.⁹⁵

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 139.

⁹¹ Lesley J. Pruitt, *The Women in Blue Helmets* (Oakland, California: University of California Press, 2016), 100-101.

⁹² Kirby and Shepherd, "The Future Past of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda," 376.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 139.

⁹⁴ Karim and Beardsley, "Female Peacekeepers and Gender Balancing," 467-468.

⁹⁵ United Nations Security Council, *A Global Study ...*, 139.

For this reason, the *Report of the High-level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (2015)* recommended that the UN “develop a gender-sensitive force and police generation strategy to address the recruitment, retention and advancement of female uniformed personnel, including by exploring such incentives as reimbursement premiums.”⁹⁶ Although increasingly discussed, such a strategy remains to be put in place nor deliver results.

Funding and Resourcing

The third challenge is the failure to properly fund and resource the women, peace and security agenda. The issue is twofold. First, the issue resides within the UN structure itself. According to Louise Allen, executive coordinator for the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, gender expertise across the UN is at best inconsistent, notably within DPA and DPKO.⁹⁷ This is consistent with findings from an internal review conducted by the UN itself which concluded that “staff members with gender-related responsibilities are under-ranked, under-staffed and under-resourced, and often relegated to the most junior staff.”⁹⁸ Peacekeeping missions are striking examples of this situation. Although DPKO has committed to have a senior gender advisor for all of its multidimensional peacekeeping missions, only nine of the 16 missions active at the end of 2014 had a senior gender advisor post. Of those nine posts, seven were vacant, thus resulting in only two senior gender advisors being deployed.⁹⁹ The situation is similar in DPA’s Special Political Missions with only six of 12 missions having a dedicated gender

⁹⁶ United Nations, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on Uniting our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People* (New York: UN, 2015), 67.

⁹⁷ Nault, *An Opportunity for Global Leadership: Canada and the Women, Peace and Security Agenda*, 17.

⁹⁸ United Nations Security Council, *A Global Study ...*, 277.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 279.

advisor position.¹⁰⁰ Resourcing at headquarters level for gender expertise within DPKO and DPA faces similar challenges.

One of the proposed ways to make up for this lack of resources is to develop a better cooperation and coordination framework between DPA, DPKO and UN Women. This would “capitalize on existing and limited resources for the implementation of Resolution 1325 within the UN system, maximize the UN’s existing gender expertise and leverage UN Women’s comparative advantages.”¹⁰¹ However, this collaboration and resource-sharing scheme is a challenge in a context in which UN Women “is known to be under-resourced, particularly in terms of women, peace and security.”¹⁰² In addition, UN Women is under-represented in conflict-affected countries making it difficult for UN field missions to leverage their expertise where it is most needed.

The second aspect of the funding issue is reflected in the programming delivered by the UN and its member states. The UN has recognized that “the failure to allocate sufficient resources and funds has been perhaps the most serious and unrelenting obstacle to implementation of women, peace and security commitments over the past 15 years.”¹⁰³ The UN currently aims at having 15 percent of peacebuilding funds allocated to projects having a focus on gender equality and addressing women’s needs.¹⁰⁴ Although there has been a significant increase since the adoption of this target, the latest data shows that only

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 280.

¹⁰² Nault, *An Opportunity for Global Leadership: Canada and the Women, Peace and Security Agenda*, 17.

¹⁰³ United Nations Security Council, *A Global Study ...*, 372.

¹⁰⁴ UN Women Watch, “UN Strategic Results on Women, Peace and Security: 2011-2020.”

6 percent of all aid actually have a focus on gender issues, and the number goes down to 2 percent when considering peace- and security-specific aid.¹⁰⁵

This is symptomatic of a greater problem at the global level where there is a strong tendency to “pour resources into short-term militarized responses rather than investing in conflict prevention, social justice and inclusion.”¹⁰⁶ This reality is reflected in the funding available for local women’s organizations working in fragile contexts. Although their contribution to the establishment of a durable peace is undisputable, they do not have access to sufficient and predictable funding. In 2012-13, women’s civil society organizations received only USD 130 million (0.4 percent) of the USD 31.8 billion of total aid to fragile states and economies.¹⁰⁷ According the *Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325*, the level of targeted funding should be raised to at least 15 percent to meet current requirements.¹⁰⁸

Civil Society Engagement

This leads to the fourth and last challenge: the low level of engagement with civil society. Although civil society organizations laid the ground work for the adoption of Resolution 1325, the implementation of the women, peace and security agenda has evolved into a largely state-centered topic. In placing the NAPs at the core of the implementation framework, the UN has put the onus on state actors to coordinate and implement the agenda. According to many experts, this does not leave enough room for

¹⁰⁵ OECD, “Financing UN Security Council Resolution 1325: Aid in Support of Gender Equality and Women’s Rights in Fragile Contexts,” last accessed 13 March 2017, <http://www.oecd.org/dac/gender-development/Financing%20UN%20Security%20Council%20resolution%201325%20FINAL.pdf>.

¹⁰⁶ United Nations Security Council, *A Global Study ...*, 372.

¹⁰⁷ OECD, “Financing UN Security Council Resolution 1325....”

¹⁰⁸ United Nations Security Council, *A Global Study ...*, 90.

women's civil society organizations to provide input and influence the agenda.¹⁰⁹ In fact, as of 2014, only a third of published NAPs (including Canada's) specifically mentioned and described the participation of civil society in the planning and drafting of their plan.¹¹⁰ As a result, most NAPs lack the "grounded understanding of community needs related to [women, peace and security] provisions" and can be perceived by the population as "elitist" or "irrelevant".¹¹¹

The UN itself recognizes that the level of involvement of civil society is insufficient. Acknowledging the importance of their knowledge and experience, especially those working at the grassroots level, the UN recognizes the need to "institutionalize the participation and consultation of civil society [...] in local, national and global decision-making processes, including the development, implementation and monitoring of national action plans."¹¹² Of note, a similar observation was made after an independent review of Canada's implementation of its NAP, highlighting the requirement to "consult more regularly and predictably with civil society."¹¹³ In both the UN and the Canadian cases, meaningful steps in that direction remain to be reported.

To summarize, the UN faces various challenges when it comes to implementing the women, peace and security agenda. Some of these challenges reside within the organization itself such as the appointment of women in senior positions, the adequate funding of gender expertise within the UN, and the collaboration with civil society. For

¹⁰⁹ Kirby and Shepherd, "The Future Past of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda," 383.

¹¹⁰ Barbara Miller, Milad Pournik, and Aisling Swain, *Women in Peace and Security through United Nations Security Resolution 1325: Literature Review, Content Analysis of National Action Plans, and Implementation*, Institute for Global and International Studies Working Paper 13 (Washington: George Washington University, 2014), 29.

¹¹¹ Kirby and Shepherd, "The Future Past of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda," 384.

¹¹² United Nations Security Council, *A Global Study ...*, 310.

¹¹³ Inclusive Security, *Assessment of Canada's Action Plan for the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security 2010-2016* (2014), 4.

other issues, the UN has to rely on its member states to make progress. Nations are responsible for the production and implementation of meaningful NAPs, the provision of gender-balanced peacekeeping forces and the proper funding of aid programs focused on gender issues. In all cases, the UN has the responsibility to put in place realistic objectives and timeframes supported by proper monitoring mechanisms and incentives. Unfortunately, there is a blatant lack of leadership within the UN organization on this question. Without this leadership, there is little hope that priority will be given to allocate the level of effort, resources and time required to significantly advance the women, peace and security agenda. Rich and developed countries such as Canada therefore have a responsibility to find ways to fill the implementation gaps presented above despite the lack of global leadership.

The Regional Approach – Successes and Challenges

The UN is not the only multilateral organization responsible for global security. Many states have in fact decided to work together to address the challenges associated with today's increasingly complex security environment. They do so through various regional and sub-regional security organizations, many of which have decided to integrate the women, peace and security agenda into their work. The implementation frameworks and commitments of these organizations take different forms, but all have the same objectives: allow their member states to share limited resources such as funding, research and technical expertise as well as build on respective lessons learned and best practices.

Some of these organizations have formalized their commitment through the publication of regional action plans (RAPs). This is the case of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the EU, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the League of Arab States, NATO, and the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF).¹¹⁴ Others, such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the African Union (AU), have integrated the principles of Resolution 1325 within existing policies, conventions and regional programmes.¹¹⁵ Regardless, the level of success of these approaches depends on similar factors such as political commitment, involvement of civil society, adequate financial, human and technical resources as well as coordinated implementation, monitoring and evaluation.¹¹⁶ It is fair to say that most of these organizations have shown progress since the adoption of the women, peace and security agenda, but they also face a number of challenges when it comes to implementation.

One of the successes associated with the regional approach is the increase in related NAPs. It has been noted that regional organizations promoting the women, peace and security agenda have seen an increase in the production of NAPs by their member states. A good example of this can be seen in West Africa where 13 out of 15 member states have adopted NAPs following the production of the ECOWAS RAP.¹¹⁷ The preparation and adoption of NAPs is obviously not an end in itself as there must be

¹¹⁴ Peace Women, “Who Implements – Member States”; UN Women, “Arab League Presents Regional Action Plan for Women, Peace and Security,” last accessed 14 March 2017, <http://arabstates.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2015/10/arab-league-presents-regional-action-plan>.

¹¹⁵ Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, *Teaching Gender in the Military – A Handbook* (Geneva: DCAF and PfPC, 2016), 45-46, 50.

¹¹⁶ United Nations Security Council, *A Global Study ...*, 257.

¹¹⁷ African Union, *Implementation of the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda in Africa* (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Office of the Special Envoy on Women, Peace and Security of the Chairperson of the AUC, 2016), 14.

political will and dedicated resources associated with them. However, it is a step in the right direction which regional and sub-regional organizations can influence and support.

The adoption of the women, peace and security agenda by regional entities has also led to a slight increase in the representation of women in senior positions within these organizations. However, as is the case with the UN, women are still significantly under-represented.¹¹⁸ One notable exception is the AU Commission which has achieved parity at the executive leadership level. Unfortunately, other key positions within the AU such as Special Representatives, Envoys and Heads of Missions remain almost exclusively occupied by men.¹¹⁹

Another positive result is the creation of gender expertise within regional organizations. This expertise can be represented by gender units, gender focal points or gender advisors and can be found at all levels of the organizations, from headquarters to field missions. The EU is particularly successful in this respect with gender expertise in various sections of its headquarters, an informal Task Force on Resolution 1325 and gender advisors or focal points in all of its 16 deployed missions.¹²⁰ NATO is also a leader in this area, notably through the appointment of the first Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security in 2012 which paved the way for other regional organizations to create similar high-level posts.¹²¹

Although commendable, the progress described above remains modest, and there are still many challenges to address at the regional level. Similar to the UN, regional

¹¹⁸ United Nations Security Council, *A Global Study ...*, 258.

¹¹⁹ African Union, *Implementation of the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda in Africa*, 16.

¹²⁰ United Nations Security Council, *A Global Study ...*, 260.

¹²¹ Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, *Teaching Gender in the Military ...*, 44.

organizations face significant funding issues. According to the 2016 report on the *Implementation of the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda in Africa* by the African Union Commission, “the most referred to challenge is the issue of sustainable and adequate funding for implementation.”¹²² Another important problem is the lack of appropriate monitoring and reporting systems often resulting in the inability to produce or access statistical data, especially gender disaggregated data.¹²³ This makes it very difficult for regional organizations to evaluate progress, address problematic areas and share best practices. Finally, as with the UN, “more must be done to formally engage and partner with women peace leaders, women’s human right defenders and other civil society organizations in the work of regional organizations.”¹²⁴ The input of these important stakeholders is critical to the development of women, peace and security action plans, policies and programmes that are relevant and accepted by communities.

The adoption of the principles of Resolution 1325 by regional and sub-regional security organizations is a very positive indicator that the women, peace and security agenda is progressing globally. Be it through the publication of RAPs or through the integration of gender mainstreaming principles within policies and programmes, regional organizations are increasingly promoting the agenda. However, success remains dependent on actual political and financial commitment by member states. Although a number of encouraging developments have been noted, these organizations still face major challenges such as funding, monitoring, reporting and civil society involvement.

¹²² African Union, *Implementation of the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda in Africa*, 37.

¹²³ United Nations Security Council, *A Global Study ...*, 260-263.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 262.

Again, leadership from senior representatives of these organizations is required to dedicate the proper resources to address these issues.

The NATO Approach – The Implementation Framework

Having covered the generic successes and challenges faced by regional security organizations in the implementation of Resolution 1325, it is now relevant to focus more closely on NATO, of which Canada is a member. A deeper look at the organization's implementation strategy and associated challenges will allow for an appropriate definition of existing implementation gaps that could represent unique and realistic leadership opportunities for Canada.

NATO formally adopted a gender mainstreaming policy for the first time in 2007 when it released the *Committee on Women in the NATO Forces (CWINF) Guidance for NATO Gender Mainstreaming*.¹²⁵ After consultations, analysis and reviews, the document evolved and resulted in the adoption, in 2014, of the *NATO/EAPC [Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council] Policy for the Implementation of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and Related Resolutions*.¹²⁶ The Policy was supplemented by an Action Plan which was signed by 55 nations including NATO allies, EAPC partners and six global partners.¹²⁷ The aim of the Policy and associated Action Plan is to “ensure that a gender perspective is mainstreamed into policies, activities and efforts to prevent and resolve

¹²⁵ North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, *Committee on Women in the NATO Forces (CWINF) Guidance for NATO Gender Mainstreaming* (2007).

¹²⁶ North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, *NATO/EAPC Policy for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and related resolutions* (2014).

¹²⁷ Marriet Schuurman, “NATO and the Women, Peace and Security Agenda: Time to Bring it Home,” *Connections The Quarterly Journal* XIV, no. 3 (2015): 2.

conflicts.”¹²⁸ The policy also identifies human resources policies, public diplomacy as well as education, training and exercises as the three main implementation enablers.

In addition to these political documents, NATO’s two Strategic Commands also took steps to integrate the women, peace and security agenda into their operations. This was done through the issue of the *Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1* in 2009, which was updated in 2012 to include new UN Resolutions and policies as well as recent lessons learned. The directive’s aim is to ensure the “integration of gender perspective in military organizations and forces in the NATO Command Structure (NCS) and NATO Force Structure (NFS) of the Alliance and within NATO-led operations.”¹²⁹ Emphasis is put on education and training as well as operational planning and execution.

In order to implement these policies and directives, NATO relies on a network of Gender Advisors (GENADs) and Gender Focal Points (GFPs) employed at all levels of the command structure. They have the mandate to “ensure that a gender perspective is integrated in the day-to-day work of all branches.”¹³⁰ Their efforts are supported at the highest level by the Women, Peace and Security Task Force which is headed by the NATO Secretary General’s Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security, a position that was created in 2012 to ensure a complete institutionalization of the agenda.¹³¹ At the military level, the International Military Staff Office of the Gender Advisor (IMS GENAD) and the NATO Committee on Gender Perspective (NCGP) are responsible for the provision of “information and advice on gender issues, including the

¹²⁸ North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, *NATO/EAPC Policy for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 ...*

¹²⁹ North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, *Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1 – Integrating UNSCR 1325 and Gender Perspective into the NATO Command Structure* (2012).

¹³⁰ Schuurman, “NATO and the Women, Peace and Security Agenda: Time to Bring it Home,” 3.

¹³¹ Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, *Teaching Gender in the Military ...*, 44.

effective implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 and related Resolutions” to NATO leadership and member states.¹³²

When looking at the policies, directives and organizational structure, the implementation of the women, peace and security agenda by NATO can be summarized by two main focus areas: planning and execution of operations as well as education and training. Within these two focus areas, NATO has made some interesting progress but is also facing various challenges that will be explored in the next section.

The NATO Approach –Successes and Challenges

Planning and Execution of Operations

NATO’s approach to the women, peace and security agenda includes an important focus on the integration of the agenda at all stages of planning and execution of an operation or mission. The organization clearly identifies gender mainstreaming as a “tool to increase operational effectiveness.”¹³³ It sees the integration of a gender perspective as a way to better understand and positively influence the operational environment.

As such, it puts a lot of emphasis on gender balance within its forces. The *CWINF Guidance for NATO Gender Mainstreaming* and the *Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1* both highlight the importance of leveraging the experiences and skills of both male and female personnel especially “in light of the increasing complexity of civil-military interaction, public relations and intelligence gathering.”¹³⁴ It therefore sees a gender balanced force as a way to increase operational effectiveness through the use of

¹³² North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Gender Perspective in NATO Armed Forces,” last modified 14 June 2016, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_101372.htm.

¹³³ North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, *Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1* ..., 3.

¹³⁴ North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, *CWINF Guidance for NATO Gender Mainstreaming*, 11.

complementary skills brought to the table by men and women. It also increasingly considers women in its forces as an important asset for intelligence gathering as they can facilitate engagement with the entire population.

The improvement of gender balance in NATO-led operations is therefore stated as one of the desired outcome of the *NATO/EAPC Action Plan*, however there remains a lot of progress to be done. As of 2015, the average of active duty women in the armed forces of NATO's member states was just under 11 percent. Although this represents a positive improvement from the 7 percent representation of 1999, NATO is still far from having the resources to deploy a gender balanced force in operations. In fact, the percentage of women deployed to NATO operations in 2015 was just above 6 percent.¹³⁵ This number is obviously extremely low, but still represents a much better record than the 3% female military members deployed on UN peacekeeping missions. This slight advantage could be explained by the fact that all 28 NATO countries currently have in place specific policies to address women's participation in their armed forces.¹³⁶

As mentioned earlier, in addition to gender balance, NATO also strives to incorporate gender perspective to planning and operations through the use of GENADs (which serve at the strategic and operational level, in peacetime HQ), Gender Field Advisors (GFAs) (which are deployed in operational and tactical contexts) and GFPs (which are dual-hatted positions integrated within the chain of command).¹³⁷ While NATO aims to have all commanders and staff sufficiently skilled to integrate gender perspectives, they recognize that this not yet the case and therefore rely on GENADs and

¹³⁵ North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, *Summary of the National Reports of NATO Member and Partner Nations to the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives 2015* (2017), 9, 30.

¹³⁶ United Nations Security Council, *A Global Study ...*, 137.

¹³⁷ North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, *Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1 ...*, 14.

GFAs to ensure that gender issues are considered throughout the planning and execution phases of all operations. In addition to supporting different staff functions, they are also responsible for coordinating and sharing information on gender issues with international organizations and civil society actors in theatre.¹³⁸ This construct was successfully exercised in the planning for NATO Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan during which gender perspective was integrated in the “entire planning cycle, from political decision-making to development of the Operational Plan and generation of forces.”¹³⁹

One of the criticisms of NATO’s approach to integrating gender perspective in operations is its focus on using gender as a military intelligence resource and uniformed women as enablers for information gathering.¹⁴⁰ An oft-cited example of this is the use by the US military of Female Engagement Teams (FETs) in Afghanistan, which used all-female teams to engage with Afghan women in order to gather intelligence and information.¹⁴¹ Such an approach is seen as a militarization of the women, peace and security agenda in which its implementation is seen as “being about fitting women into current peace and security paradigm and system; rather than about assessing and redefining peace and security through a gender lens.”¹⁴² NATO is therefore perceived as denaturing the women, peace and security agenda by shifting the focus from women’s protection and empowerment to the exploitation of gender for military operational

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, A-1-A-2.

¹³⁹ United Nations Security Council, *A Global Study ...*, 258.

¹⁴⁰ Kirby and Shepherd, “The Future Past of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda,” 389-390.

¹⁴¹ Synne Laastad Dyvik, “Women as ‘Practitioners’ and ‘Targets’: Gender and Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan,” *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 16, no. 3 (2014).

¹⁴² Isabella Geuskens, “Engendering Peace? The Militarized Implementation of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda,” *Sustainable Security*, 30 July 2014, <https://sustainablesecurity.org/2014/07/30/reflections-on-militarized-women-peace-and-security/>.

effectiveness purposes. Such militarization of the agenda is seen as a break from the original human security roots of Resolution 1325.

Education and Training

To support the integration of gender perspective in all stages of the planning and execution of operations, NATO puts significant emphasis on the importance of training and education. In fact, the *Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1* states that “the greatest effect is gained if gender perspective is included in the earliest forms of training and education and mainstreamed throughout courses at different levels to achieve lifelong learning.”¹⁴³

The development, implementation and institutionalization of such a training and education program has however been somewhat challenging for NATO. For example, a review of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) between 2010 and early 2013 indicated a low level of gender training amongst military personnel deployed.¹⁴⁴ In addition, workshops held by the *Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes* in 2012 have highlighted “the need for more materials and resources” on the delivery of gender content as part of military education.¹⁴⁵ Aware of this capability gap, NATO has since taken steps to improve the situation.

The most important step was the designation, in 2013, of the Swedish Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations (NCGM) as the department head for gender

¹⁴³ North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, *Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1* ..., 8.

¹⁴⁴ Helené Lackenbauer and Richard Langlais, *Review of the Practical Implications of UNSCR 1325 for the Conduct of NATO-led Operations and Missions* (2013), 69.

¹⁴⁵ Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, *Teaching Gender in the Military* ..., I.

education and training.¹⁴⁶ The NCGM is now responsible for the design and delivery of courses as well as the establishment of standards for gender-related training. It offers specialized courses and seminars for GENADs, GFAs, Commanding Officers, key leaders and gender trainers.¹⁴⁷ It also supports the NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in the development of gender courses accessible through its distributed learning platform. Basic and advanced courses are therefore available online to all NATO personnel and partners.¹⁴⁸ The ACT and the NCGM have also developed the *Gender Education and Training Package for Nations* which is composed of a series of presentations and notes and “offers best practice examples and guidance from different nations on the institutionalization of gender perspective.”¹⁴⁹

NATO remains however largely dependent on the effort and will of its member states and partners when it comes to education and training. Since troop contributing countries are responsible for the delivery of pre-deployment training, NATO can only “strongly encourage [national programs] to incorporate NATO pre-deployment gender training objectives.”¹⁵⁰ NATO can certainly provide input on the gender dimension of specific areas of operation, offer courses and training packages and facilitate lessons learned sharing. However, beyond that, it is the responsibility of contributing nations to adequately prepare its military members for deployment.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 65.

¹⁴⁷ Swedish Armed Forces, “Courses and Seminars at SWEDINT/NCGM,” last accessed 26 March 2017, <http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/en/swedint/courses-at-swedint-and-how-to-apply/>.

¹⁴⁸ Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, *Teaching Gender in the Military ...*, 65.

¹⁴⁹ NATO Allied Command Transformation, “HQ SACT Office of the Gender Advisor,” last accessed 26 March 2017, <http://www.act.nato.int/gender>.

¹⁵⁰ North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, *Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1 ...*, 6.

The challenge also goes beyond pre-deployment training as it is known that “for the best possible results, training on gender should be included in basic training, integrated throughout all education, [and] given as early as possible.”¹⁵¹ It is also recognized that gender training should be mainstreamed which means that it should not be treated as a separate subject but rather included in existing courses and programs.¹⁵² As such, women, peace and security education becomes a career-long endeavour that, although potentially supported by NATO, is mainly a national responsibility.

In summary, NATO has overall taken a very focussed and militarized approach to the women, peace and security agenda with a well-defined objective to increase operational effectiveness. This approach is reflected clearly in strategic and operational policies and directives. NATO’s focus on integrating gender perspective in the planning and execution of operations led to the identification of a requirement for a more gender-balanced force and the development of a strong network of GENADs and GFPs. NATO also puts a lot of emphasis on education and training. Leveraging the expertise of the Swedish NCGM, it has put in place a number of learning tools and established common training standards. It however remains greatly reliant on member states for the actual enforcement of those standards. NATO’s implementation of the women, peace and security agenda has attracted a number of criticisms due to its very traditional military approach which is seen as a departure from the original human security objectives of the agenda.

¹⁵¹ Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, *Teaching Gender in the Military ...*, 66.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*

Conclusion

The implementation of Resolution 1325 by global, regional and sub-regional organizations has led to the progression of the women, peace and security agenda in the world over the last 17 years. This progress has been observed, with different levels of success, in all four pillars of prevention, participation, protection and peacebuilding and recovery. To get to that point, organizations have integrated the principles of the women, peace and security resolutions in their policies and programs. They have also encouraged their member states to do the same thing through the production of NAPs. These multilateral organizations have incorporated gender expertise within their structure either by creating stand-alone gender equality entities or by integrating GENADs and GFPs throughout the organization. They have also set targets to increase gender balance at senior levels and in deployed staff and troops. In addition, they put a greater emphasis on gender training and education in order to ensure a thorough institutionalization of the women, peace and security agenda.

This chapter has however shown that a lot of progress remains to be made to truly achieve the objectives set by the women, peace and security resolutions. In order to transform policies into actions, each organization faces important challenges. The *representation of women*, although slowly increasing in some cases, is a major impediment to the advancement of the agenda. At the UN and regional levels, women are desperately under-represented in senior positions, especially in conflict and post-conflict locations. In the field, the extremely low number of female peacekeepers and NATO troops continues to have a negative impact on gender mainstreaming, sexual exploitation prevention and overall operational effectiveness.

The *resourcing issue* is also a great obstacle to the implementation of the agenda. Within the UN itself, gender expertise is under-staffed and under-resourced in headquarters and field missions. In addition, programming delivered by UN agencies and member-states does not properly target gender equality and women's needs and is insufficient to adequately support local women's organizations. Regional and sub-regional organizations also suffer from similar funding challenges which are an impediment to the implementation of proper monitoring and reporting mechanisms.

Another important hindrance to the full execution of the women, peace and security agenda is the insufficient *level of engagement with civil society* by multilateral security organizations and individual nations. By leaving aside this important pool of knowledge and experience, countries and organizations run the risk of implementing programs that are irrelevant and conducting operations without a full understanding of the operational environment.

The deployment of *properly educated and trained forces* is another challenge for security organizations. Although an increasing body of training tools and standards is being made available, many countries still struggle to integrate the women, peace and security agenda within their professional development system in a way that would truly mainstream gender perspective throughout a member's career.

Finally, the approach taken by certain security organizations, such as NATO, to integrate gender perspectives in their operations is being criticized for its *overly militarized* aspect. There indeed seems to be a tendency to leverage the women, peace

and security principles primarily for operational effectiveness purposes rather than for altruistic reasons.

The challenges mentioned above are indicative of the lack of leadership on the women, peace and security agenda within these multilateral organizations. This situation represents a great opportunity for Canada to fill the existing leadership void and play a key role in the global implementation of the agenda. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, Canada does, indeed, possess the right reputation and expertise to play such a leading role. The next chapter will explore what Canada and the CAF are currently doing and, based on the findings of chapters two and three, propose an approach that would build on their strengths to address the global challenges of the women, peace and security agenda.

CHAPTER 4 – A RENEWED AND UNIQUE CANADIAN COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO THE WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY AGENDA

Greater and more consistent leadership is needed from Canada in relation to women, peace and security. The renewal of the Government of Canada's national action plan on that agenda presents the opportunity to articulate a bold and ambitious role for Canada.

- Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs
and International Development, 2016

Introduction

On International Women's Day in March 2016, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of International Development and La Francophonie and the Minister of International Trade announced in a joint statement that Canada was going to renew its NAP on women, peace and security.¹⁵³ They reiterated Canada's commitment to the empowerment of women throughout the world and to the promotion and protection of their rights. Hopes are high within Canadian civil society, and in some government departments, that this new NAP will reposition Canada as a leader in this field. This chapter will examine how this could be achieved through the adoption of an approach that would allow Canada to leverage its strengths, interests and expertise to address the global challenges of the women, peace and security agenda.

The chapter will first describe the Canadian approach since the publication of the first Canadian National Action Plan (C-NAP) in 2010. It will examine the content of the C-NAP and how it has been implemented through advocacy, foreign aid programming, international training and participation in international missions. It will also look more specifically at how the CAF has thus far contributed to the Canadian women, peace and security strategy. It will then describe how Canada could improve this strategy by

¹⁵³ Government of Canada, "Joint statement by ministers Dion, Freeland and Bibeau on International Women's Day," last modified 8 March 2016, <http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=1038889>.

adopting a truly comprehensive action plan. Based on the current political context and Canada's expertise, this chapter will demonstrate that a renewed Canadian comprehensive approach to the women, peace and security agenda will address many of the challenges faced globally, thereby positioning Canada as a role-model and leader in the field.

Canada's Approach to the Women, Peace and Security Agenda

As explained in chapter two, Canada was at the forefront of the development, adoption and promotion of UN Resolution 1325. As a member of the UN Security Council at the time and as chair of the international Group of Friends of Resolution 1325, Canada was seen as a world leader for the agenda. However, in 2004, when the UN Secretary-General called for all member states to prepare NAPs for the implementation of Resolution 1325, the women, peace and security community was surprised and disappointed to see Canada delay the publication of its national document until 2010.¹⁵⁴ Once published and put into action, the C-NAP received praise and criticism. This section will look at how Canada has articulated its commitment to the women, peace and security agenda since 2010 through the C-NAP and through its actions on the international stage.

The Canadian National Action Plan (C-NAP)

The C-NAP was developed around the four pillars adopted by the UN: Prevention, Participation, Protection and Relief and Recovery. It is intended to provide a

¹⁵⁴ Women, Peace and Security Network – Canada, *Looking Back, Looking Forward: Reflections on Canada's National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security* (2015), 3.

“framework for a cohesive whole-of-government approach” through actions on multiple fronts, including:

- a. Advancing international norms and standards;
- b. Conducting sustained advocacy on a bilateral and multilateral basis;
- c. Seeking mechanisms for accountability and implementation;
- d. Engaging Canadian, international and local civil society organizations; and
- e. Building knowledge and skills for practitioners.¹⁵⁵

It explicitly designates DFATD’s Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Forces (START) as the agency responsible for the implementation of the Action Plan with CIDA, DND, RCMP and Public Safety also identified as key departments.¹⁵⁶ Finally, it highlights and welcomes the active participation of Canadian civil society in all aspects of the plan.

The C-NAP is supported by a series of indicators that provide a monitoring framework for its implementation. These indicators have facilitated the preparation and publication of annual progress reports. Although not perfect, Canada was lauded for putting in place such a monitoring and evaluation framework which is one of the few that exists in the world.¹⁵⁷ Canada also mandated the conduct of a mid-term review from external evaluators to assess the progress made and identify areas for improvement. Only Ireland and the Netherlands conducted such thorough reviews, and only Ireland had it done through an external auditor.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁵ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Building Peace and Security for all: Canada’s Action Plan* ...

¹⁵⁶ CIDA has since been merged with DFAIT to become DFATD, and now Global Affairs Canada (GAC); START has also been rebranded as the Peace and Stabilization Operations Program (PSOP).

¹⁵⁷ Inclusive Security, *Assessment of Canada’s Action Plan* ..., 3.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 9-10.

However, this monitoring and evaluation framework has its flaws. Experts complain that the publication of annual progress reports is always greatly delayed (the first “annual” report was publicized in January 2014, almost four years after the publication of the C-NAP).¹⁵⁹ This inconsistency in reporting is seen as an impediment to the government’s commitment to have a plan that is “dynamic in nature and respond[s] to changing needs and lessons.”¹⁶⁰ In addition, the monitoring framework lacks clear baselines and targets, year-by-year comparisons and detailed statistical analysis.¹⁶¹ Without this data, it has proven difficult for the departments and civil society to track progress and articulate lessons learned. In its most recent progress report, the government of Canada has acknowledged these issues and committed to streamline the annual reporting process in order to make it more “accessible” and “meaningful”.¹⁶²

Canada’s Implementation of the C-NAP

Although progress has not always been easy to track, there are areas where Canada has clearly successfully applied the principles promoted in the C-NAP since 2010. One of them is the advocacy role it has pledged to play on the international stage. Through various multilateral summits and meetings, Canada has brought the women, peace and security agenda to the global discussion table. It did so as the host of the G8 Summit in 2010, as a participant of the NATO Chicago Summit in 2012, as a signatory of the UN Declaration of Commitment to End Sexual Violence at a UN General Assembly

¹⁵⁹ Women, Peace and Security Network – Canada, *Looking Back, Looking Forward ...*, 25.

¹⁶⁰ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Building Peace and Security for all: Canada’s Action Plan ...*

¹⁶¹ Inclusive Security, *Assessment of Canada’s Action Plan ...*, 15-16.

¹⁶² Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, *2014-2015 Progress Report – Canada’s Action Plan for the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security* (2016).

event and as a participant of the UK-hosted Girl Summit in 2014.¹⁶³ In 2015, Canada also acted as one of the co-chairs for the Group of Friends of the Global Study on Women, Peace and Security, and continued in its his role as the chair of the Group of Friends of Women, Peace and Security.¹⁶⁴

Canada reinforced its advocacy work through its foreign assistance programming. In this field, Canada is recognized as a strong example to follow. Its Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF), which provides aid to fragile states and economies, is cited as one of the best national funding mechanisms that support the promotion of gender equality.¹⁶⁵ In the first three years following the adoption of the C-NAP, the proportion of projects addressing the “different needs of women, men, boys and girls” went from 12 to 85 percent, and the proportion of projects targeting “gender equality as a principal objective” reached 43 percent.¹⁶⁶ Canada also uses the Canada Fund for Local Initiatives (CFLI), which primarily funds local non-governmental organizations in developing countries, to promote the women, peace and security agenda. The CFLI specifically prioritizes projects that address issues such as “increasing the role of women in decision-making and promoting the human rights of women and girls.”¹⁶⁷ For example, the CFLI has funded the development of NAPs in developing countries such as South Sudan.¹⁶⁸

However, representatives from civil society have criticized the current funding mechanism used by the Canadian government. Built on a project-based funding model,

¹⁶³ Inclusive Security, *Assessment of Canada's Action Plan ...*, 14.

¹⁶⁴ Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, *2014-2015 Progress Report ...*, 2016.

¹⁶⁵ United Nations Security Council, *A Global Study ...*, 373.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.* Data from the 2012-2013 C-NAP Progress Report.

¹⁶⁷ High Commission of Canada in Kenya, “Canada Fund for Local Initiatives,” last modified 20 February 2017, <http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/kenya/development-developpement/cfli-fcil.aspx?lang=eng>.

¹⁶⁸ Inclusive Security, *Assessment of Canada's Action Plan ...*, 14.

Canadian programming is considered by many as unpredictable and unresponsive. Financial commitments are short-term rather than multi-year which prevents civil society organizations from implementing long-term, durable plans.¹⁶⁹ In addition, the current framework requires applicants to put in place “sophisticated operational and monitoring systems” which is often impossible for smaller, grassroots level organizations.¹⁷⁰ As such, Canadian programming, despite putting significant emphasis on gender equality and women’s empowerment, is seen as favoring large international organizations rather than small and agile local organizations.

In addition to advocacy and programming, Canada also focusses on delivering and improving women, peace and security training internationally. Canada’s expertise in this field dates back to the early implementation of Resolution 1325 when it notably developed, in collaboration with the UK, the Gender Training Initiative (GTI) for personnel participating in peace support operations.¹⁷¹ Canada is also involved in the training of security forces of various countries where it focuses on improving their capacity to promote and protect women and girls’ rights. This is done in countries such as Haiti and Afghanistan through the RCMP International Policing Development (IPD) Program.¹⁷² Furthermore, Canada participates in the UN’s all-female pre-selection assistance and assessment team (SAAT) training project in which Canadian police

¹⁶⁹ Nault, *An Opportunity for Global Leadership: Canada and the Women, Peace and Security Agenda*, 45.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁷¹ *Inclusive Security, Assessment of Canada’s Action Plan ...*, 5.

¹⁷² Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, *2013-2014 Progress Report – Canada’s Action Plan for the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security* (2015).

officers assist in the development and delivery of a two-week pre-SAAT training course.¹⁷³

On the military side, the CAF uses the Military Training and Cooperation Program (MTCP) to integrate women, peace and security topics to courses and seminars delivered to international participants. These include the United Nations Staff Officer Course, the Caribbean Junior Command and Staff Course, the Peace Support Operations Course and mission-specific pre-deployment training.¹⁷⁴ The CAF is also continuously updating the content of its professional military education programs which target a domestic and international audience. The most recent iterations of the Joint Command and Staff Program, the National Security Program and the Canadian Security Studies Program have dedicated portions of their curriculum to the women, peace and security agenda.¹⁷⁵ In addition, the CAF is involved in the development and implementation of the NATO Education and Training Plan for Gender in Military Operations.¹⁷⁶

The final aspect of Canada's implementation of the C-NAP is with respect to participation in international missions. The two main conduits for this are currently the RCMP and the CAF. As identified in chapter three, there is a critical need for more uniformed women in peacekeeping operations. The RCMP has taken this call for more deployed female police officers very seriously and implemented specific actions and policies to address it. As of April 2016, women represented approximately 25 percent of

¹⁷³ Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, *2014-2015 Progress Report*

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁵ In accordance with the latest update to the Canadian Armed Forces Officer General Specification. Department of National Defence, A-PD-055-002/PP-003, *Canadian Armed Forces Officer General Specification (OGS)* (Ottawa: DND Canada, DRAFT July 2016).

¹⁷⁶ NATO Allied Command Transformation, "HQ SACT Office of the Gender Advisor."

all Canadian police deployed to peace support missions.¹⁷⁷ This represents a significant increase from the 10 percent originally reported when the C-NAP was first released and surpasses the UN and IPD goal of 20 percent.¹⁷⁸ Of note, female Canadian police officers also occupied high-level positions on international deployments including Afghanistan, Haiti and the West Bank as well as within the UN organization itself.¹⁷⁹

As for the CAF, they reported an average of 10.7 percent women deployed to operations in 2015.¹⁸⁰ When looking specifically at peace and humanitarian operations, which represent only a fraction of total deployments, 67 of 301 (22.3 percent) CAF members deployed were women.¹⁸¹ Although these figures are low, they are well above the UN (3 percent) and NATO (6 percent) averages. The CAF's contribution to the women, peace and security agenda however goes beyond the deployment of female military members. The next section will take a closer look at the other aspects of the approach taken by the CAF in recent years.

CAF Implementation of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda

As one of the first national armed forces to allow women to serve in all occupations, including combat units and submarines, the CAF has an enviable reputation when it comes to the integration of women. With 15 percent of all active duty military personnel being women, the CAF also ranks in the top 10 within NATO and partner nations for the percentage of women serving in armed forces.¹⁸² As such, it represents a

¹⁷⁷ Nault, *An Opportunity for Global Leadership: Canada and the Women, Peace and Security Agenda*, 19.

¹⁷⁸ Inclusive Security, *Assessment of Canada's Action Plan ...*, 10.

¹⁷⁹ Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, *2014-2015 Progress Report ...*; Inclusive Security, *Assessment of Canada's Action Plan ...*, 11.

¹⁸⁰ North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, *Summary of the National Reports (2017)*, 57.

¹⁸¹ Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, *2014-2015 Progress Report ...*.

¹⁸² North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, *Summary of the National Reports*, 10.

unique instrument for the Canadian government to promote the women, peace and security agenda abroad.

Although it has gained a lot of momentum recently, the CAF was concerned with gender mainstreaming prior to the adoption of the C-NAP. As mentioned above, as early as 2002, the CAF was involved in the development of gender training with the UN GTI. The principles of Resolution 1325 were also integrated in Canadian military pre-deployment training prior to the release of the C-NAP, through instruction delivered by the Peace Support Training Center (PSTC).¹⁸³ As a member of NATO, the CAF has been an active participant in the NATO Committee on Gender Perspective (NCGP) for a number of years and has served as chair and deputy chair several times.¹⁸⁴ However, the integration of gender perspectives has truly been brought to the forefront in January 2016 with the release of the *Chief of Defence Staff Directive for Integrating UNSCR 1325 and Related Resolutions into CAF Planning and Operations*.¹⁸⁵

The preparation and publication of the directive is a direct result of the increased emphasis put by NATO on gender mainstreaming. When appointed Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) in July 2015, General Jonathan Vance had recently spent time in NATO headquarters and in Afghanistan where he directly witnessed the operational requirement for a gender-sensitive approach to military operations.¹⁸⁶ Meanwhile, CAF training and education establishments had been gradually including modules on gender perspective in pre-deployment training and as part of junior and senior officer professional development

¹⁸³ Inclusive Security, *Assessment of Canada's Action Plan ...*, 12.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁵ Department of National Defence, *Chief of Defence Staff Directive for Integrating UNSCR 1325 and Related Resolutions into CAF Planning and Operations*.

¹⁸⁶ James Cudmore, "Military to Hire Gender Specialists for Operational Advice Overseas," *CBC News*, 30 October 2015.

programs.¹⁸⁷ It was therefore a natural progression for the institution to formalize the CAF commitment to the women, peace and security agenda through the release of a CDS Directive.

The CDS sees the implementation of his directive as a means to achieve three main objectives:

- a. Meet Canada's moral obligations and commitment to protect populations at risk;
- b. Align the CAF with NATO and UN policy and doctrine; and
- c. Improve CAF operational effectiveness.¹⁸⁸

As with NATO, the Canadian approach places significant emphasis on the operational effectiveness benefits of gender mainstreaming. Although this has the potential to be perceived as an overly militarized way of thinking about the women, peace and security agenda, a number of steps have already been taken within the CAF to incorporate gender perspective in planning and operations.

The first step was the appointment of Gender Advisors (GENAD) within the CAF structure. Three positions were created in the summer of 2016 to directly support the CDS, the commander of the Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) and the commander of the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM). Their initial mandate is to integrate “the requirements of CNAP, UNSCR 1325, and related resolutions in line with Government of Canada and NATO direction ... into the

¹⁸⁷ Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, *2014-2015 Progress Report ...*

¹⁸⁸ Department of National Defence, *Canadian Armed Forces Gender Aide-Memoire – Integrating Gender as a Force Multiplier* (2017), 5.

design and delivery of operational effect.”¹⁸⁹ They are also required to put in place and support a Resolution 1325 Implementation Working Group which will ensure the integration of the Government of Canada Gender-Based Analysis (GBA+) approach into “CAF operational and institutional culture.”¹⁹⁰

It is interesting to note here that the CAF has decided to leverage the Government of Canada GBA+ framework to implement the women, peace and security agenda. The GBA+ approach was adopted by the government in 1995 as a way to meet its obligations associated with the ratification of the Beijing Platform for Action. GBA+ is an “analytical tool used to assess the potential impacts of policies, programs, services, and other initiatives on diverse groups of women and men, taking into account gender and other identity factors.”¹⁹¹ Within the Government of Canada, the implementation of GBA+ is overseen by Status of Women Canada, while GAC has the lead for the implementation of the C-NAP on women, peace and security. While there is an obvious relationship between both initiatives, they are currently being implemented in isolation in most departments. Their integration by the CAF represents an interesting and innovative way to approach gender issues.

The CAF is also currently evaluating the requirements to further integrate the women, peace and security agenda into training and education. The Military Personnel Generation (MILPERSGEN) formation is conducting a complete needs analysis to

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 12.

¹⁹⁰ Department of National Defence, *Chief of Defence Staff Directive for Integrating UNSCR 1325 and Related Resolutions into CAF Planning and Operations*, 15.

¹⁹¹ Status of Women Canada, “Gender-Based Analysis Plus,” last modified 13 May 2016, <http://www.swc-cfc.gc.ca/gba-acis/index-en.html>. Of note, “the “plus” in the name highlights that GBA+ goes beyond gender, and includes the examination of a range of other intersecting identity factors (such as age, education, language, geography, culture and income).”

determine the most appropriate ways to integrate gender perspective into professional military education and training programs, as well as the most efficient way to train current and future GENADs and staff planners.¹⁹² As part of this effort, the CAF Gender Aide-Memoire was released in 2017 as a tool to help planning staff integrate gender considerations into the operational planning process.¹⁹³ While MILPERSGEN is developing the training and education framework, CAF organizations are mandated to leverage existing NATO training aids, NCGM courses and Status of Women GBA+ material.

Outside the parameters of the CDS Directive, but closely related, other initiatives have been put in place to address the issues and challenges associated with gender mainstreaming within the CAF. One of the challenges that the institution is currently facing is the recruitment and retention of women. The causes and potential solutions for this problem are complex and beyond the scope of this research project. However, it is important to note that the issue has been acknowledged by the leadership of the CAF which is currently devoting extensive resources to address the problem. Research is being funded to identify attrition and retention patterns, evaluate the impact of deployments on women and better understand work-life balance challenges, notably for single parents.¹⁹⁴ Recruitment efforts focused on women are also being deployed to reach the target set by

¹⁹² Military Personnel Command, *MILPERSCOM Directive on Gender-Based Analysis (GBA) for CAF Planning and Operations* (2016).

¹⁹³ Department of National Defence, *Canadian Armed Forces Gender Aide-Memoire – Integrating Gender as a Force Multiplier*.

¹⁹⁴ Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, *2014-2015 Progress Report ...*

the CDS, who has ordered the armed forces “to increase the percentage of women within [the] ranks by 1 percent per year until [they] reach [the] target of 25 percent.”¹⁹⁵

This renewed emphasis on attracting and retaining women is partly the result of the release of a condemning report by former Supreme Court justice Marie Deschamps, who pointed to an “underlying sexualized culture” to explain the prevalence of sexual harassment and assaults in the CAF.¹⁹⁶ The report emphasizes the need for a complete cultural change supported by policy changes and driven by strong leadership. It also highlights the necessity to “[increase] representation of women in the CAF, including in the highest positions of senior leadership” in order to achieve this cultural change.¹⁹⁷ The conclusions of the report have been taken very seriously by the CDS which has committed, through the release of Operation HONOUR, “to eliminate harmful and inappropriate sexual behavior within the CAF” in order to maintain “operational readiness” and “retain the trust and confidence of Canadians.”¹⁹⁸

The female recruitment and retention drive is also in line with the broader approach taken by the CAF towards diversity. With the publication of the *CAF Diversity Strategy 2016*, the institution recognizes that “maximizing the potential of a diverse workforce is not only a social imperative, but is also an operational advantage.”¹⁹⁹ The

¹⁹⁵ House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, no. 8, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 19 April 2016.

¹⁹⁶ Marie Deschamps, “External Review into Sexual Misconduct and Sexual Harassment in the Canadian Armed Forces,” 27 March 2015, i.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, vii.

¹⁹⁸ Department of National Defence, *Chief of Defence Op Order – Op HONOUR* (2015).

¹⁹⁹ Department of National Defence, *Canadian Armed Forces Diversity Strategy 2016* (2016), 1.

Strategy goes beyond the “compliance-based” model dictated by the Employment Equity Act and moves to a more ambitious and aspirational “value-based” model.²⁰⁰

The commitment of the CAF to implement Resolution 1325 and related resolutions on operations and within the institution is aligned with the broader Government of Canada’s approach to the women, peace and security agenda. Canada has committed to promote the agenda internationally through advocacy. In order to remain credible, the country must be seen as living up to the standards it promotes. Operation HONOUR and the *CAF Diversity Strategy 2016* are ways to demonstrate this commitment. Canada also aspires to deploy gender-sensitive forces to missions abroad. The CAF is now committed to do more in this field. Through the recruitment and retention of women, the CAF hopes to be able to deploy more uniformed female in theatre. It also aims at deploying troops that are better equipped to implement the principles of the women, peace and security agenda through improved training and education while ensuring that gender perspectives are taken into account early in the planning process through the establishment of GENAD positions at different levels of the organization. Canada and the CAF obviously have work left to do to truly reach the objectives they have set for themselves and to play a leading role in the women, peace and security global agenda. The next and final section will suggest an approach to reach those objectives, address some of the global issues previously identified and reaffirm Canada’s role as a global leader.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 4.

Canada as a Global Leader on the Comprehensive Approach

As demonstrated in chapter two of this research project, Canada has a long-standing reputation as an advocate of human security and gender equality. Internationally, Canada is perceived as having the potential to play an important role in the women, peace and security agenda due to its historical approach to global security challenges and its unique openness to multiculturalism and diversity. This section will argue that the best way for Canada to play this leadership role is to embrace this reputation and become a role-model through the development of a truly comprehensive approach to the women, peace and security challenges.

Canada and the Comprehensive Approach

The concept of a comprehensive approach to security issues is not new to Canada. Globally, the idea emerged from the challenges of the post-Cold War era when conflicts appeared to become more complex and problems increasingly interconnected. This situation led to the deployment of multilateral missions in which it was recognized that security forces, foreign ministries, development agencies, non-governmental organizations, private sector and even the media had a role to play in those operations where “the line between war-fighting and post-conflict peace support operations [was becoming] increasingly blurred.”²⁰¹ With the involvement of all these different participants came the realization that there was a need for “concurrent, complementary and coordinated actions” to implement long-term “integrated security solutions.”²⁰²

²⁰¹ Kim Richard Nossal, “Introduction: Security Operations and the Comprehensive Approach,” in *Security Operations in the 21st Century: Canadian Perspectives on the Comprehensive Approach*, ed. Michael Rostek and Peter Gizewski (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2011), 1.

²⁰² Okros, “Rethinking “Diversity” and “Security”,” 351.

From this reflection emerged the now well-known concept of “comprehensive approach” to security operations.

In Canada, the comprehensive approach is the result of the evolution of an initial “3D” (Diplomacy, Development and Defence) approach and of the subsequent “whole-of-government” approach.²⁰³ The former was introduced by the Liberal government of Prime Minister Paul Martin in the 2005 *Canada’s International Policy Statement*. The Policy Statement highlighted the need for “an integrated approach to international crises” in which “Canada’s diplomatic, defence and developmental (“3D”) efforts” would be instrumental to fostering human security around the world.²⁰⁴ The government of the time made a commitment to use this new approach to “increase Canada’s profile and influence on key international peace and security issues.”²⁰⁵ To put this commitment into action, the government stood up the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) to coordinate Canada’s response to international crises across government departments.²⁰⁶ Elected in 2006, the Conservative government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper adopted the concept and rebranded it “1C” (One Canada), and then the “whole-of-government” approach, promoting a unique and coordinated “Canadian” approach to foreign policy.²⁰⁷

²⁰³ Eric Dion, “Canada’s Comprehensive Approach in Afghanistan: A Critical Review of Literature, 2001-2011,” *Defence Studies* 14, no. 2 (2014), 196.

²⁰⁴ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada’s International Policy Statement* (2005), 10.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁶ START Secretariat, “Comprehensive Approach: Toward a Strategic Doctrine,” in *Security Operations in the 21st Century: Canadian Perspectives on the Comprehensive Approach*, ed. Michael Rostek and Peter Gizewski (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2011), 89. As noted earlier in this research project, START has recently morphed into the Peace and Stabilization Operations Program (PSOP).

²⁰⁷ Michel-Henri St-Louis, “The Strategic Advisory Team in Afghanistan – Part of the Canadian Comprehensive Approach to Stability Operations,” *Canadian Military Journal* 9, no. 3 (2009), 58; Women, Peace and Security Network – Canada, *Looking Back, Looking Forward ...*, 26.

Since the formal adoption of this approach, Canada has applied it in different contexts with various levels of success. The most elaborate deployment of Canada's whole-of-government approach was obviously in the Afghanistan mission where elements of DFAIT, CIDA, CAF, Public Safety, Correction Services and Canadian Border Services were involved. Through the establishment and evolution of the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), Canada deepened its comprehensive approach expertise.²⁰⁸ Canada also exercised this approach in a humanitarian assistance context through its response to the earthquake that struck Haiti in 2010, as well as in a capacity-building setting through its support to the African Union's mission in Darfur, Sudan.²⁰⁹ Canada's current involvement in Ukraine and in Syria, where Canadian military operations are complemented by development, financial and humanitarian assistance, embodies the present-day model for the Canadian comprehensive approach.²¹⁰

Throughout its evolution, the Canadian comprehensive approach to security operations has faced challenges. The Conservative government's implementation of the whole-of-government approach has often been criticized for putting too much emphasis on the "defence" side of the "3D" triangle, notably in the Afghanistan mission.²¹¹ This can be explained in part by the ideological Conservative vision of "Canada as a military

²⁰⁸ Richard Roy, "Military Considerations in Assisting Fragile States," in *Security Operations in the 21st Century: Canadian Perspectives on the Comprehensive Approach*, ed. Michael Rostek and Peter Gizewski (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2011), 130.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 128-129.

²¹⁰ Government of Canada, "Canada renews its military commitment to Ukraine," last modified 7 March 2017, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2017/03/canada_renews_itsmilitarycommitmenttoukraine.html; Global Affairs Canada, "Canada's Response to the Conflict in Syria," last modified 11 April 2017, http://www.international.gc.ca/development-developpement/humanitarian_response-situations_crisis/syria-syrie.aspx?lang=eng.

²¹¹ Dion, "Canada's Comprehensive Approach in Afghanistan ...," 196-197.

strength”²¹², but also, in the case of Afghanistan, by the technical challenges of deploying civilians into hostile environments.²¹³ Another criticism of the Harper government’s whole-of-government approach was the difficulty for civil society organizations to engage with the government and meaningfully contribute to the process.²¹⁴

The return of a Liberal government in power in 2015 is seen by many as an opportunity to redefine the Canadian comprehensive approach. Days after being elected, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau stated: “Many of you have worried that Canada has lost its compassionate and constructive voice in the world over the past 10 years. Well, I have a simple message for you: on behalf of 35 million Canadians, we’re back.”²¹⁵ The Liberal government has since been promoting a more balanced approach to global security challenges. For example, it has modified Canada’s commitment to addressing the crises in Iraq and Syria by refocusing the military response and putting the emphasis on other aspects of Canada’s contribution. This new policy is intended to rely on “a whole of government approach that enlists several federal departments to work closely together to enhance security and stability.”²¹⁶

This new political context, combined with Canada’s experiences over the past 10 years, opens the door to the implementation of a renewed, uniquely Canadian, comprehensive approach to security challenges. It appears that Canada is currently in a good position to play a more prominent role on the international stage and demonstrate

²¹² Women, Peace and Security Network – Canada, *Looking Back, Looking Forward ...*, 27.

²¹³ START Secretariat, “Comprehensive Approach: Toward a Strategic Doctrine,” 93.

²¹⁴ Women, Peace and Security Network – Canada, *Looking Back, Looking Forward ...*, 26.

²¹⁵ Jim Bronskill, “We’re Back, Justin Trudeau Says in Message to Canada’s Allies Abroad,” *National Post*, 20 October 2015.

²¹⁶ Prime Minister of Canada, “Prime Minister sets new course to address crises in Iraq and Syria and impacts on the region,” last accessed 18 April 2017, <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2016/02/08/prime-minister-sets-new-course-address-crises-iraq-and-syria-and-impacts-region>.

the power of a truly comprehensive strategy to global security issues. The women, peace and security agenda would be an excellent place to start as the issues associated with its implementation require the contribution of the entire spectrum of governmental and non-governmental actors. With limited resources available to implement the agenda, it would greatly benefit from a comprehensive approach which would multiply the effects of those resources and allow for optimized sharing of lessons learned and best practices. In addition, Canada has already committed, through its C-NAP, to implement a “cohesive whole-of-government approach” to address the women, peace and security agenda.²¹⁷ The next section will demonstrate that if Canada could live up to this commitment, it could address many of the implementation gaps identified in chapter three and therefore become a role model on the international stage.

The Comprehensive Approach as a Solution

The comprehensive approach in the Canadian context can be defined as the adoption of an

integrated, cooperative, and coordinated orientation to both policy and campaign planning that [draws] upon a range of diplomatic, defence, development, and commercial resources as well as a range of players (both official and private) in efforts to address the key security issues of the day.²¹⁸

It therefore involves all concerned government departments and agencies, but also civil society organizations, international organizations and commercial interests. Beyond the

²¹⁷ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. *Building Peace and Security for all: Canada's Action Plan*

²¹⁸ Peter Gizewski, “Discovering the Comprehensive Approach,” in *Security Operations in the 21st Century: Canadian Perspectives on the Comprehensive Approach*, ed. Michael Rostek and Peter Gizewski (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2011), 13.

obvious benefits of the comprehensive approach such as greater awareness, greater collaboration and more coherent and effective responses, one of the great advantages of such an approach is the achievement of a “greater level of legitimacy.”²¹⁹ The involvement and buy-in of such a large array of contributors to security solutions will undoubtedly lead to more legitimate and relevant actions. In the case of the women, peace and security agenda, the comprehensive approach represents an excellent answer to the question of the militarization of the agenda. Identified as one of the challenges for NATO and the CAF, the overly militarized use of gender mainstreaming, centered on operational effectiveness rather than human security, could be overcome by ensuring that the use of military forces is only one small, but important, aspect of the overall solution. The proposed renewed Canadian comprehensive approach to the women, peace and security agenda should therefore ensure that any contribution of the CAF is in support of other instruments in order to demilitarize the issue and seek greater legitimacy.

By definition, the comprehensive approach also addresses the issue of the low level of engagement with civil society organizations. Problematic for the UN and most regional and sub-regional organizations, and also identified as a challenge for the implementation of the C-NAP, the contribution of civil society to the development and implementation of a women, peace and security strategy could be greatly enhanced through the establishment of formal and regular engagement processes.²²⁰ As a starting point, Canada would greatly benefit from following the example of the Netherlands, which launched its third NAP in 2016. The Dutch NAP was developed and co-signed by the government and “over 50 Dutch civil society organizations and knowledge

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 15.

²²⁰ Inclusive Security, *Assessment of Canada's Action Plan ...*, 21.

institutions.”²²¹ It clearly states that the implementation of the action plan is a shared responsibility, but also that the government has a political duty to oversee and coordinate the overall strategy.²²² As such, it is consistent with the Canadian definition of a truly comprehensive approach.

A similar level of collaboration with civil society needs to be achieved in Canada where there is an opportunity to leverage seasoned practitioners and academics to develop gender-sensitive policies and security solutions.²²³ Experiences such as the collaboration between the Women, Peace and Security Network – Canada (WPSN-C) and the RCMP on the development and delivery of pre-deployment training should be built upon and become the norm.²²⁴ It also needs to be applied abroad through the engagement of local civil society organizations focused on gender equality and women’s empowerment. In order to do so, Canada must however modernize its funding mechanisms in order to make it more accessible to those grassroots organizations. Through a renewed comprehensive approach, Canada could therefore ensure a more meaningful contribution of domestic, international and local civil society organizations to the national women, peace and security strategy.

As mentioned above, Canada can count on a large pool of qualified experts on different aspects of the women, peace and security agenda. Some are involved with civil society organizations; others are parts of the academic community; some work for

²²¹ Dutch NAP Partnership, *The Netherlands National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2016-2019* (2016), 4.

²²² *Ibid.*, 6.

²²³ Women, Peace and Security Network – Canada, “Who We Are,” last accessed 21 April 2017, <https://wpsn-canada.org/who-we-are/>. The Women, Peace and Security Network – Canada counts over 70 Canadian non-governmental organizations and individuals involved in the promotion of women, peace and security agenda across Canada.

²²⁴ Women, Peace and Security Network – Canada, *Looking Back, Looking Forward ...*, 23.

governmental departments and agencies as civilian employees; and others are now being trained in the CAF as members of the regular and reserve forces. All these Canadians could play a significant role in addressing the human resourcing issues associated with the implementation of the women, peace and security agenda at the global and regional levels. As it is unlikely that Canada will increase its financial commitment, it could instead increase its human commitment by deploying more gender-related expertise to UN, NATO and other security organizations headquarters and deployed missions. Canada could also put in place specific mechanisms to increase the amount of qualified women nominated to the most senior positions of these organizations thus also addressing the issue of the under-representation of women in managerial and decision-making positions. However, in order to have a significant and coherent impact, this needs to be done through a comprehensive strategy where the government would oversee a nation-wide recruitment and nomination campaign.

With the upcoming publication of the new C-NAP, Canada has an exceptional opportunity to define and implement the new comprehensive approach proposed above. In order to do so, this new C-NAP needs to have aspirational and value-based objectives rather than being restricted by a compliance-based approach solely centered on the guidelines established by UN Resolution 1325 and associated resolutions. Canada needs to aspire to play a greater role and become a model for a new and unique way to implement the women, peace and security agenda. The new C-NAP should embody this aspiration through the definition of a clear overarching strategy based on a comprehensive approach in which the government not only designates the different

agencies and organizations responsible for the implementation, but also defines how and why they will work together.

In order to truly make a difference on the international stage, this new comprehensive strategy should focus on areas where improvements are greatly needed and where Canada can make a difference, including the demilitarization of the agenda, the engagement of civil society domestically and abroad as well as the provision of gender expertise and the nomination of women to security organizations and operations. Through the implementation of a successful comprehensive approach to the women, peace and security agenda, Canada will also greatly enhance its credibility when it comes to the advocacy role it strives to play. The new C-NAP must however be supported by a genuine intent within Canadian leadership to embrace this renewed comprehensive approach. Without leadership at the highest levels, the plan will never meet expectations.

The Role of the CAF

As highlighted in the previous section, the implementation of a truly comprehensive approach means that the CAF becomes only one of many instruments to implement the Canadian women, peace and security strategy. This is critical if Canada wants to be perceived as deploying an action plan focused on human security issues rather than on militarized solutions. As such, the CAF needs to be prepared to primarily play a supporting role. As stated by the current CDS, in a comprehensive approach, military forces should simply bring a “stabilizing influence ... while the important social, political and economic work [addresses] the nature of the conflict.”²²⁵ This is even more

²²⁵ The Honourable Daniel Lang, Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *UN Deployment: Prioritizing Commitments at Home and Abroad* (November 2016), 26.

true when it comes to women, peace and security issues for which solutions lay in the social and political realms.

This supporting role needs to be driven by the overarching strategy proposed by the government in its new C-NAP. The CAF therefore must be prepared to align its women, peace and security objectives, within the institution and on operations, with the orientations of the Government of Canada. As mentioned earlier, the integration of the GBA+ framework as part of the CAF women, peace and security approach is an excellent demonstration of how it can effectively work with multiple government departments on gender issues. Building on this positive example, and on the whole-of-government experience and doctrine developed during the Afghanistan campaign, the CAF needs to institutionalize the mechanisms to coordinate its women, peace and security strategy with all governmental stakeholders.

The CAF will also need to enhance its ability to work with civil society organizations in order to move beyond cooperation and towards collaboration and integration, which is essential to implement a fully comprehensive approach. The current effort of the CAF to increase the diversity of the organization through the publication of the *CAF Diversity Strategy 2016* is a good way to enhance this ability. According to research, diversity is a “key enabler of success” when it comes to the capacity of “multiple organizations in the security sector to work together effectively.”²²⁶ As such, a more diverse CAF will be a better contributor to a renewed Canadian comprehensive approach to the women, peace and security agenda.

²²⁶ Okros, “Rethinking “Diversity” and “Security”,” 351.

Diversity, however, will not be sufficient. To achieve true collaboration, a significant amount of effort and expertise will be required, especially when employed abroad where additional stakeholders must be taken into account, including the UN, NATO, international organizations and local civil society organizations. The current effort to train GENADs is a step in the right direction as they have a specific mandate to collaborate with non-governmental organizations. However, more attention will need to be given to this issue to ensure that a true culture of collaboration with civil society is ingrained in the institution.

The CAF should also build on its current strengths to become a meaningful contributor to the Canadian comprehensive approach to the women, peace and security agenda. The CAF, through its recent missions in Afghanistan, Ukraine and Syria, is currently developing a unique expertise in security forces capacity building. The current CDS already stated that one of the ways that the CAF can support the implementation of Resolution 1325 is through the provision of “extensive training and support” and “mentorship” of troop-contributing nations to UN missions.²²⁷ This is a role that the CAF can do well and that would most likely fit nicely in a renewed Canadian women, peace and security overarching strategy.

The CAF should also leverage the relatively high percentage of women in its military forces. As one of the rare armed forces to employ women in all occupations, the CAF is in a good position to deploy more women in more meaningful roles to security operations abroad. The current recruiting and retention efforts show a desire to do more on this front, but additional efforts need to be done to encourage and support the

²²⁷ Nault, *An Opportunity for Global Leadership: Canada and the Women, Peace and Security Agenda*, 23.

deployment of women, especially on missions where the presence of female uniformed members will have the greatest impact. The CAF is also in a position to support the effort to appoint more women to senior positions. With a growing pool of qualified and skilled female senior officers and non-commissioned officers, the CAF should seize all opportunities to nominate them to high-profile positions in UN and NATO headquarters and missions. The recent appointment of Lieutenant-General Christine Whitecross to the position of Commander of the NATO Defense College is an excellent example of the kind of contribution the CAF can make.²²⁸ The deployment and appointment of women, if supported by other aspects of a Canadian contribution, could certainly represent an excellent way for the CAF to participate to a renewed comprehensive approach to the women, peace and security agenda.

Conclusion

With the announcement of the renewal of the C-NAP on women, peace and security, Canada has a unique opportunity to redefine its commitment to the agenda. The previous C-NAP, which proposed a whole-of-government approach focused mainly on advocacy, but also strongly supported by foreign assistance programming as well as participation in international security and training missions by the RCMP and the CAF, is a good starting point. However, the new C-NAP needs to clearly define an overarching strategy centered on a comprehensive approach which would put the emphasis on integrated and coordinated actions of all Canadian stakeholders, from government departments and agencies to civil society organizations.

²²⁸ Government of Canada, "Lieutenant-General Christine Whitecross assumes command of NATO Defense College," last modified 29 November 2016, <http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=1162409>.

Canada is well positioned to develop such a strategy owing to its expertise with the comprehensive approach, dating back to 2005 and including experiences in Afghanistan, Haiti, Sudan, Ukraine and Syria. The arrival in power of a Liberal government favoring a more balanced approach to global security challenges and strongly promoting gender equality represents an opportunity for Canada to redefine this comprehensive approach and apply it to the women, peace and security agenda.

A comprehensive solution to the agenda, led by the government but leveraging multiple sources of expertise, would address many of the global challenges identified in this research project. First, the participation of stakeholders from all horizons would provide legitimacy to the action plan and ensure that it does not become overly militarized. Second, it would ensure the systematic involvement of civil society, domestically and abroad. Third, it would address the important human resourcing challenges such as overall gender expertise and representation of women in senior positions within international, regional and national headquarters and missions. More importantly, by adopting a strong comprehensive approach to the women, peace and security agenda, Canada would fill the current leadership void on the international stage. Through role-modeling, Canada could become the reference on the subject and live up to its reputation.

The CAF would obviously have a role to play in this comprehensive approach. Building on the recent efforts to implement Resolution 1325 and to foster a more diverse, inclusive and open culture, the CAF must be prepared to play a supporting role in the Canadian women, peace and security strategy. This implies that the CAF will be required to enhance its ability to work with other government departments, civil society

organizations and international organizations. The implementation of the *Diversity Strategy*, the appointment of GENADS and the adoption of the GBA+ framework will contribute to this ability. However, the CAF will need to find new innovative ways to ensure that a culture of collaboration and integration with civil society becomes institutionalized. Another way for the CAF to enhance its contribution will be to focus on its current strengths. For example, the CAF has the opportunity to leverage its expertise in security forces capacity building as well as its pool of qualified women to contribute to the national and global women, peace and security strategy.

In summary, the current Canadian and CAF approach to the women, peace and security agenda, which is very much focused on compliance with the UN and NATO policies, needs to be revitalized. A renewed comprehensive approach will allow Canada to go beyond this compliance-based model and propose a unique aspirational way to tackle the agenda. This will reposition Canada as a role-model and leader in the field.

CHAPTER 5 – CONCLUSION

In October 2015, the UN celebrated the 15th anniversary of the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1325. Considered a significant milestone in the history of women's rights and gender equality, Resolution 1325 represents the first document adopted by the Security Council to formally acknowledge the unique role of women in armed conflict not only as victims, but also as important actors in the prevention and resolution of conflicts. Throughout the years, Resolution 1325 was reinforced by a series of eight other resolutions advocating for greater empowerment of women in all stages of the peace-building process and for a firm condemnation of sexual violence. Together, these resolutions form the basis of the women, peace and security agenda of the UN.

Although the 15th anniversary was a great opportunity to celebrate the successes of the agenda, it was also an occasion to reflect on the challenges associated with its implementation and to recognize that there is still much to be done. Looking at the progress made since the adoption of Resolution 1325, it is clear that the UN has struggled to translate ideas and policies into actions and that it is still looking for nations to emerge as real leaders on the agenda. For a middle-power such as Canada, looking for ways to increase its status on the international stage, the women, peace and security agenda represents an opportunity to step up and play a leading role. This research project has demonstrated that Canada possesses the reputation and the expertise to play such a leading role, but that it must revitalize its commitment to the agenda by adopting a truly comprehensive approach that would see the government leverage multiple sources of expertise in a collaborative and integrated way.

The women, peace and security agenda is based on the knowledge that the inclusion of women in peace processes is instrumental to the prevention of conflicts, the attainment of peace agreements and the sustainment of security in post-conflict settings. The objectives of the agenda align nicely with those of the concept of human security as they all focus on the protection and empowerment of individuals as a way to achieve a more stable and peaceful world. The early commitment of Canada to human security and to Resolution 1325 is responsible for the enduring positive reputation of the country when it comes to women's rights and gender equality. In addition, the unique Canadian approach to multiculturalism, which is an indicator of a high level of cultural intelligence, represents an enabler for the proper implementation of the women, peace and security agenda. Combined together, Canada's status as a proponent of human security, its reputation as an advocate for gender equality and its unique approach to multiculturalism place the country in an exceptional position to play a leading role in the implementation of the women, peace and security agenda.

Looking at the approach taken by the various actors of the women, peace and security agenda, it is possible to identify where Canada could leverage these unique attributes to truly make a difference on the global scene. Although progress has been made over the last 17 years, many challenges remain for global and regional organizations such as the UN and NATO. First, the under-representation of women in senior positions, but also in deployed military and police units, is a major impediment to the advancement of the agenda. Second, resourcing issues, both financial and human, represent a significant obstacle. Third, the level of involvement of international and local civil society organizations remains too low to have a positive impact on the

implementation of the agenda. Fourth, gender-related training and education of deployed forces is an enduring challenge for security organizations. Finally, the overly militarized approach of some organizations, such as NATO, threatens the original human security roots of the agenda. These various challenges are largely due to a lack of leadership on the women, peace and security agenda at the global and regional levels, thus opening the door for Canada to fill the void and play a leading role.

Since the adoption of its first NAP in 2010, Canada has put forward a women, peace and security strategy based on advocacy, foreign aid programming, delivery of international training and participation in international missions. As a component of this national strategy, the CAF has recently taken various steps to contribute to the agenda, including the appointment of GENADs, the adoption of the GBA+ framework and the reevaluation of gender-related training and education. Other CAF initiatives such as Operation HONOUR and the *CAF Diversity Strategy 2016* also represent enablers to the implementation of the agenda. Canada therefore possesses the foundation to become a world leader and role-model on the women, peace and security agenda, although it needs to adopt a truly comprehensive approach to achieve this status. Such a renewed comprehensive approach has the potential to address numerous previously identified global challenges associated with the implementation of the women, peace and security agenda, including the militarization of the agenda, the involvement of civil society and the human resourcing issues. This approach needs to be clearly articulated in the new C-NAP and supported by a genuine intent amongst Canadian leadership to implement its principles. The role of the CAF in this new approach would be a supporting one, which implies an improved ability to work with other government departments, civil society

organizations and international organizations. The CAF also has the opportunity to build on its expertise with respect to security forces capacity building and on its access to a pool of qualified women to further contribute to the national and global women, peace and security agenda.

As mentioned in the introduction of this research project, Canada now stands at a crossroads. As it prepares its new NAP, it must reflect on the significance of the women, peace and security agenda, how it is related to its role on the international stage and in what areas the country can make a difference and play a leading role. This is even more important in a context where Canada is looking at ways to reaffirm its commitment to the UN in order to secure a seat on the Security Council.

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