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# VISION OR HALLUCINATION: A GLIDEPATH TO EXCELLENCE FOR THE CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE

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**ABSTRACT**

Many mission statements talk about centres of excellence. They make aspirational reading. Some are written with the sole purpose of uniting the workforce towards greater ambition, others are genuine statements of intent mapped out with clear goals and offer a roadmap or glide path to achieve that status. The Canadian Forces College has centre of excellence at the core of its mission and vision statements. This paper asserts that the Canadian Forces College is not a centre of excellence and examines those areas where it falls short. It does not dismiss the aspiration but offers recommendations that offer a glide path to excellence status.

The paper examines what a centre of excellence actually means and tries to identify the purpose of the key programmes within the college. It contrasts those purposes with the ambitions of Government and the wider Department, and benchmarks them against other institutions both military and civilian. The paper then examines the current curricula and the delivery mechanisms to determine where the college is delivering sub-optimal education and presents examples of how current educational theory is being used to optimise the learning experience. It suggests ways in which to improve the current college models.

The paper argues that resourcing the requirement is an equally challenging obstacle that requires force generators, senior commanders, academics, and directing staff working together to deliver optimised education. The paper examines selection criteria for students, and questions whether the current selection model is conducive to the aims and intent of the various programmes. It also looks at the force generation of the directing staff and other college staff. The paper examines the current assessment strategy at the college and argues that it is largely superfluous with significant unintended consequences.

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

My gratitude goes out first and foremost to my wife and children who for the second time in two years found themselves caught up in the chaos of academic research and had to put up with my obsession for challenging the status quo. My wife's willingness to edit and correct my hopeless attempts to master the Chicago Manual of Style citation format was also noteworthy!

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Finally to the students of the Joint Command and Staff Programme; their comments are always enlightening and entertaining in equal measure. They are the reason for writing this paper. It is a pleasure to serve them and I wish them well for their future careers; it is an honourable profession.

Animo et fide

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# CHAPTER 1

# INTRODUCTION

## Context

> *Three things convinced me that a new system of officer development was needed: the lack of co-ordination between the educational, training and career management aspects of officer development, inherited from all three pre-unification services; the loss of too many expensively educated and highly trained young officers before their normal retirement age; and the implications of unification on an officer's education and training in the future.*
>
> – General J V Allard, Chief of the Defence Staff 1960

Commander Canadian Defence Academy, Major General Eric Tremblay, described the Canadian Forces College as a centre of excellence for military education.[1] When challenged, he revised his statement to reflect that the intent was for the Canadian Forces College to become a centre of excellence and a flagship for Canadian Defence. This aspiration is reflected in the college's vision statement. It chimes with other international military institutions, notably the Royal Military College Shrivenham in the UK, which delivers all staff and command education for UK officers and is a recognised centre of excellence for other government departments involved in the wider security environment. Shrivenham was acknowledged as a centre of excellence by General Tremblay[2] and is also recognised as an institutional leader by a large number of nations that contribute students or are trying to replicate the Shrivenham model.[3] Equally, Australia's Command and Staff College and France's *L'ecole du guerre* also enjoy similar reputations for excellence.

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[1]Canadian Defence Academy Town Hall Meeting at Canadian Forces College held on 6 May 2015.

[2]*Ibid.*

[3]Currently 70 NATO, Commonwealth and other countries annually send students to attend the Advanced Command and Staff Course. The ACSC model is being replicated in at least 14 of those countries.

**Defining Excellence**

The ambition to be a Centre of Excellence is not unique but tying it down to a measurable output can be more challenging. It may be used in visionary statements as an aspirational objective rather than a planned goal. Determining what it means to the Canadian Forces College is equally challenging. The college provides the subject matter training for the Operational Planning Process and education in the practice of operational art and war fighting at the operational level. These are areas in which it could be expected to provide excellence. The college also delivers national security education to both Defence and other Government departments, which could be an area for focused expertise. Equally, excellence can be measured in the approach to education and its delivery whilst at the college. Apart from the vision statement, there is no mandate placed upon the college, nor are there key performance indicators, benchmarked against other institutions, set by the Canadian Forces or specifically the Defence Academy, that directly link to the vision statement.[4]

Excellence in education has become a prominent goal for many higher education institutions. This has raised questions, notably from those charged with quality assurance, as to what defines excellence, whether it can be measured in absolute or relative terms, and what are the goals of the institutions craving designation? The European Foundation for Quality Management, a body which many UK Defence training institutions have sought accreditation from sets out a model for excellence using five key enablers: Leadership, Policy and Strategy, People Management, Partnerships and Resources, and Processes, Products and Services.[5] These are explained by the European Association for Quality Assurance:[6]

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[4]CANFORGEN 106/08 CMP042/08 Revisions to CF Officer Developmental Period 3 Program dated 6 Jun 08; CANFORGEN 064/08 CMP 026/08 Officer PD DP4 - New National security Programme dated 3 Apr 08. Neither the CDA Management Plan, CANFORGENs related to the College, JCSP or NSP refer to establishing a Centre of Excellence.

[5]European Foundation for Quality Management, "EFQM Model in Action," last accessed 25 April 2016, http://www.efqm.org/efqm-model/efqm-model-in-action-0.

- **Leadership**: excellent leaders develop and facilitate the achievement of the mission and vision. They develop organisational values and systems required for sustainable success and implement these via their actions and behaviours.

- **Policy and strategy**: excellent organisations implement their mission and vision by developing a stakeholder-focused strategy that takes account of the market and sector in which it operates. Policies, plans, objectives and processes are developed and deployed to deliver the strategy.

- **People management**: excellent organisations manage, develop and release the full potential of their people at an individual, team-based and organisational level. They promote fairness and equality and involve and empower their people. They care for, communicate, reward and recognise in a way that motivates staff and builds commitment to using their skills and knowledge for the benefit of the organisation.

- **Partnerships and resources**: excellent organisations plan and manage external partnerships, suppliers and internal resources in order to support policy and strategy and the effective operation of processes. During planning and whilst managing partnerships and resources they balance the current and future needs of the organisation, the community and the environment.

- **Process management**: excellent organisations design, manage and improve processes in order to fully satisfy and generate increasing value for customers and other stakeholders.

EFQM also determines that "[in] order to achieve Excellence, your organisation will have to change. What is more, you will need to establish a culture that accepts and welcomes change. The Baldrige Model, another assessment model used widely within the US, also identifies the requirement to understand all stakeholders' (customers') needs and in defining excellence identifies three key components:

- a well-conceived and well-executed assessment strategy;

- year-to-year improvement in key measures and indicators of performance, especially student learning; and

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[6]European Association for Quality Assurance, *The Concept of Excellence in Higher Education*. Occasional Papers 20. (Brussels: ENQA, 2014), 9-10.

- a demonstrated leadership in performance and performance improvement relative to comparable organisations and appropriate benchmarks.[7]

Three key themes come out of these models: the need for visionary leadership, a culture of continuous improvement, and a requirement to measure against established standards in other institutions. Excellence is an ongoing pursuit that can only be validated at singular points in time. For the purposes of this paper, excellence of the Canadian Forces College will be assessed by benchmarking against the UK and other Staff Colleges, and by analysing the effectiveness and efficiency of its current programme structure against the enablers of the European Foundation for Quality Management's model.

**Background to Canadian Command and Staff Training**

Canadian military historian, Howard Coombs, chronicles the commencement of command and staff training in Canada during the Second World War as a response to the shortages on UK courses and the ever-increasing requirement to "educate officers in the knowledge needed to function as staff and leaders in an expanding military organisation."[8] Prior to 1940, a handful of officers were sent to their UK Service equivalents in Greenwich, Camberley and Bracknell, where the genesis of the Canadian programmes came from. The purpose of the UK colleges, formed at the beginning of the 19th century, was to train commanders and staff officers for war.[9] Canadian Command and staff training was delivered by the individual Services in Kingston and Toronto, in the case of the Army and Air Force respectively; the Navy focused education solely upon junior officer training in Canada, with a small number of officers sent to the UK and Toronto for command and staff training. The Canadian Forces College has been responsible for delivering joint command and staff

[7]*Ibid*., 10.

[8]Howard Coombs, "In Search of Minerva's Owl: Canada's Army and Staff Education (1946-1995)," (Doctor of Philosophy thesis, Queen's University, 2010), 10.

[9]Forces War Records, last accessed 15 February 2016, https://www.forces-war-records.co.uk/units/2382/staff-college-camberley/.

training for Canadian Forces Officers since 1966, single-Services having ceded responsibility for this aspect of training twenty-four months prior to unification. Since the end of the Second World War, the Canadian Forces has gradually shifted from its alliance and synergy with the UK military, and specifically its education programmes, towards its natural neighbour, the US. Much of its doctrine and training has been adopted or adapted from US equivalents. Nevertheless, until 2013, the Joint Command and Staff Programme broadly mirrored the UK's Advanced Command and Staff Course and the college still enjoys a close working relationship with Shrivenham.

Whilst some institutions have thrived on the elitist nature of their programmes (Royal Military College Shrivenham, L'ecole du guerre Paris, Australian Defence College Canberra), others have become a catch all generalist education programme for the majority (Command and General Staff School Leavenworth, *Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr* Hamburg). Neither trajectory is better, but they are different, meeting different needs and, in the cases of Shrivenham and Leavenworth, required a substantial uplift in resources in order to meet their full business needs. In Shrivenham's case, the creation of a substantial Intermediate Command and Staff Course for all officers on promotion to major, and single-Service equivalent ranks, was introduced to cater for increasing educational needs of all officers.[10] This allows the Advanced Command and Staff Course the licence to take the officers identified with potential for senior command and staff appointments and improve intellectual stretch capacity. Leavenworth, having chosen the opposite route and electing to provide a command and staff programme for all had to introduce the Advanced Military Studies Program at the School of Advanced Military Studies in order to stretch the very best

[10]UK Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, "Joint Services Command and Staff College. Army Division," last accessed 27 April 2016. http://www.da.mod.uk/Colleges-Business-Units/Joint-Services-Command-and-Staff-College/Army-Division. Both ICSC(L) and ICSC(LR) are designed to develop the professional knowledge and understanding of students, their analysis and decision making and their communications ability.

of the US Army and prepare them intellectually for the rigours of senior command and staff.[11]

**The Challenge**

The Canadian Forces College has historically been ranked amongst the top tier of international staff colleges.[12] As a result it has benefitted from international contributions, including highly qualified and experienced Directing Staff and Students.[13] This contribution is not guaranteed; the US Army's Command and General Staff Course, delivered at Fort Leavenworth, is no longer recognised by the UK or Canada as delivering an education programme meriting the award of 'Post Command and Staff (Joint).[14] As a result, the UK can no longer send its best students without significant career management. In order to gain the critical qualification of Post Command and Staff Course (Joint), UK students have to attend both the Command and General Staff course and the Advanced Military Studies Program, having already completed the UK Intermediate Command and Staff Course on promotion to Major. Thus far, the Canadian Forces has not determined which path it is on; it speaks of an elite programme catering to the very best officers but operates a course loading construct forced to cater to the vast majority of middle ranking officers, some with neither the intellectual capability nor capacity to reach those higher positions.[15]

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[11]United States Army Combined Arms Center, School of Advanced Military Studies, "Advanced Military Studies Program," last accessed 1 March 2016, http://usacac.army.mil/organizations/cace/cgsc/sams.

[12] Air Commodore A Byford, Deputy Commandant UK Defence Academy, telephone conversation with author, 10 May 2016. Based upon UK Training and Evaluation assessment of international Staff and War Colleges. Each college is assessed for curriculum and academic rigour. Those who meet the highest standards can grant the qualification of PSC(J). Canada currently retains that status.

[13]Since 1990, 8 UK students attending the CFC JCSP have reached General ranking, including the current VCDS, the current and two former DCDS(Mil Strat Ops), and a former Comdt of RMAS.

[14]Air Commodore A Byford, Deputy Commandant UK Defence Academy, telephone conversation with author, 10 May 2016. US Command and General Staff Course is no longer accredited with PSC(J). It attracts the lesser accreditation of PSC(Country).

[15]Only 23 officers have reached Cdr or Colonel out of 116 officers attending JCSP 36 (12 produced by the RCN).

Arguably the greatest challenge to any professional education programme is staying current to the operating environment. As the US Department of Labor report on achieving necessary skills for businesses states:

> [we] believe, after examining the findings of cognitive science, that the most effective way of teaching skills is in context. Placing learning objectives within real environments is better than insisting that students first learn in the abstract what they will then be expected to apply.[16]

This requires an understanding of the students, the environment in which they are expected to operate and emerging trends in educational delivery. The Canadian Forces has previously demonstrated its willingness to choose its own educational path, moving away from both UK and US models. In 1950, the Canadian Army Staff College demonstrated its own unique approach, based upon Canadian values, when amending its mission statement to preparing officers for "…war and peace."[17] The emphasis of the programme shifted away from command to staff officer training, reflecting Canada's support for international missions in support of the United Nations. More recently, it has become the first Western command and staff programme to award a Master level degree through course based assessment without the need for a dissertation.[18] These changes reflect a willingness to explore new subjects and new methods of delivery.

Notwithstanding those changes outlined above, subject context and training delivery have changed little. In 1967 the mission given to the Canadian Forces College was "... to prepare officers for senior staff appointments in the Canadian Forces."[19] Topics were framed in four fields: Service knowledge, warfare, geopolitics and military executive knowledge.

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[16]United States Department of Labor, The Secretary's Commission on Achieving Necessary Skills, *What work requires of schools: A SCANS report for America 2000* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1991), viii.

[17]Colonel W.W. Culp, "Resident Courses of Instruction," *Military Review* 36, no. 2 (May 1956): 15.

[18]Maj Gen P.J. Forgues, *Joint Command and Staff Programme – Syllabus Approval* (Canadian Forces College: file 4639-1 (SO ODP 3-5), 7 June 2013.

[19]Canadian Forces Staff College. "Canadian Forces Staff College Syllabus" (Course I (2nd Edition), 1967).

Despite the nature of war changing and the wider security landscape that Canada finds itself in, there has been little impact in terms of the overall objectives. In 2016, the mission to the Canadian Forces College is to establish an education programme that prepares "selected senior Canadian Armed Forces officers, international military, public service and private sector leaders, for joint command and staff appointments or future strategic responsibilities within a complex global security environment."[20] Whilst this is a clear directive, ambiguity in terms of course content, key deliverables and performance measures allow changes to take place, which has resulted in significant divergence between similar international institutions and a change in the delivery of the Joint Command and Staff Programme at the Canadian Forces College.

Worryingly there are faint signs of discontent with Toronto; a notification of intent to withdraw US Marine Corps students from the Joint Command and Staff Programme in 2016, a lack of US Navy student in 2015, a notification by the French to 'gap' their Directing Staff exchange officer in 2015 (since rescinded), and withdrawal of the German students from the National Security Programme all suggest Toronto's reputation as a leading command and staff college may be waning. Other factors, including a highly inflexible Master level degree entrance policy, which led to the highest graded student of the 2014 Joint Command and Staff Programme not being permitted to pursue a Master degree, and a perception that other institutions offer more beneficial Master degree programmes (Shrivenham awards King's College, London, Master in War Studies and provides a very simple segue to a Cranfield Business School MBA, conversely the Royal Military College's 'professional' Master in Defence Studies and Master in Public Administration degrees have no professional body

[20]Canadian Forces College, "Mission and Vision of the Canadian Forces College," last modified 15 May 2014, http://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/263-eng.html.

endorsement),[21] undermine the validity of an ambition towards centre of excellence status. This is a problem also acknowledged by the US Army, which has initiated the Army University programme aimed at improving the status and relevance of its degree programmes.[22]

The most recent accusation from Canadian Joint Operation Command suggested the college may have lost its war fighting edge;[23] whilst the initial reason behind this accusation may be flawed, it did demonstrate a significant disconnect behind what the customer expects and what is actually delivered. Likewise senior Canadian Forces College academic and training advisor to both the Canadian government and United Nations, Dr Walter Dorn, in collaboration with University of Ottawa doctoral candidate, Joshua Libben, are critical of the Canadian Forces readiness for the Government's shift towards peacekeeping roles for its forces, identifying a lack of focused training and education towards the Government's new strategy.[24] They conclude that '[this] will necessitate improved training within Canada."[25]

Toronto's standing has increasingly been jeopardised by the impact of austerity measures and a lack of commitment in terms of resourcing. Criticisms from the most senior Canadian military officers and senior international alumni have reinforced a perception that the college may not be delivering the anticipated level of staff training.[26] A removal of key

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[21] Only 1 of the 15 Canadian military students on the current National Security Programme elected to complete the accredited Master in Public Administration programme.

[22]Rick Maze. Army. The Magazine of the Association of the United States Army, "Army University: Will Education System Earn Prestige With Improvements and a New Name," last accessed 24 February 2016, http://www.armymagazine.org/2016/02/16/army-university-will-education-system-earn-prestige-with-improvements-and-a-new-name/.

[23]Maj-Gen J.G.E. Tremblay, *Joint Exercise 15 – Training Concerns* (Military Personnel Generation: file 4500-1 (SO ODP DP 3&4), 19 April 2016).

[24]Walter Dorn and Joshua Libben, "Unprepared for Peace? The Decline of Canadian Peacekeeping Training (and What to Do About It)", *Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives | Rideau Institute on International Affairs*, (February 2016): 19.

[25]*Ibid*., 37.

[26]CDS address to JCSP 41 on 27 May 15, Comd RCN address to JCSP 41 on 14 May 15, and DComd RCAF address to JCSP 41 on 30 Sep 14 all specifically criticised the removal of the experiential learning visits

experiential visits as cost saving measures has impacted upon the ability to educate in key areas and places the College in an inferior position to it peer institutions.[27] Nevertheless, the relative advantage that the college's smaller size brings in terms of agility and flexibility to re-establish itself suggest that an aspiration for national and international recognition for excellence is not beyond reach but it requires an aligned intent and commitment at all levels.

The purpose of this research is to identify where, in those key areas of vision – intent and resourcing – execution is sub-optimal and demonstrate where future energy should be targeted in order to put the college on a glide path to centre of excellence status. Furthermore, it will show that aligning delivery with such ambition will also synchronise with the Government's White paper for Defence, which charges the Department with "providing world-class technical training and advanced education… to address the full range of defence and security challenges facing Canada… and projecting leadership abroad in support of international security."[28] Likewise, the intent of this research is to show that some of the perceived weaknesses can be addressed quickly, simply, and efficiently to the advantage of the college. Both the Joint Command and Staff Programme and the National Security Programme can work in harmony, benefitting from far greater synergy and a unity of purpose.

Interestingly, and somewhat frustratingly, the areas of focus for this paper are not new. General Allard's quote in 1960 about the raison d'être, General Roger Rowley's officer development study in 1965,[29] the Honourable Douglas Young's report on leadership and

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to the Arctic and Europe. UK's VCDS, General Gordon Messenger RM, an alumni of the CFC, criticised the removal of the trips with both the Comdt CFC and CDS (Des) on 18 Feb 15.

[27]In addition to the visits to component commands, MOD and PJHQ, JSCSC conducts experiential visits to the US and Europe including NATO Headquarters, and a Battlefield Tour to facilitate operational planning.

[28]Department of National Defence, "2008 White Paper: Canada First Defence Strategy," last modified 27 July 2013, http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about/canada-first-defence-strategy.page.

[29]Canadian Army Staff College Journal, *The Snowy Owl.* Vol IV, no. 3 (1969).

management in 1997, [30] various reports following the Somalia affair and more recently the Officer 2020 study,[31] amongst others, have all highlighted potential failings in officer education manifesting today and made comprehensive recommendations for addressing these issues. Many of those recommendations have been abandoned or only partially addressed and have been surpassed by a number of internal reviews, including the End to End Review of Officer Professional Development in 2003,[32] and the Joint Command and Staff Programme review in 2010,[33] which do not explain why previous recommendations have failed to be delivered. As military historian and former CEO of the Canadian War Museum, Jack Granatstein, noted about the Canadian Army in general in his paper to the Canadian Defence Academy Institute in 1999,

> … from the Diefenbaker period onward, the slide downhill was inexorable. There were constant cuts in budget, ageing equipment turned obsolescent and then obsolete, good officers left for other lines of work. … For four decades, the Army fought a rearguard action against these things – and it lost.

Granatstein concludes, rather sombrely, "We also have an officer corps which is significantly less well educated than those of our friends. In effect, I think we might argue that we have reverted to the 1914 or 1939 situation once more." [34]

Whilst Granatstein would have benefitted from post-Afghanistan hindsight, which saw Canadian officers and their forces in general perform at the highest levels, the same broad

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[30]D.M. Young, *Report to the Prime minister on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1997).

[31]Department of National Defence, *Canadian Officership in the 21st Century (Officership 2020)*: Strategic *Guidance for the Canadian Forces Officer Corps and the Officer Professional Development System* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2001).

[32]Canadian Defence Academy. Briefing Note. *The End To End Review of Officer Professional Development,* 17 November 2003.

[33]Brigadier General David G. Hilton, *The Evolution of the Joint Command and Staff Programme* (Canadian Forces College: file 4640-1(Cmdt), 2 June 2012.

[34]Dr J. L. Granatstein. *The Development of the Profession of Arms in Canada: Past, Present and Future* (n.p., 1999).

comparisons can be made with the Canadian Forces College; the delivery of course material has remained broadly similar to its original concepts some forty years ago against a backdrop of increasing cuts to the programme and an underinvestment in infrastructure, but has largely failed to adapt to changes in the contemporary learning environment. This lack of change ignores the changes in learning behaviours, and the potential that new technology and educational study offers. Underfunding in terms of infrastructure and equipment and a lack of commitment by the Canadian Forces institution in manning the establishment has also impacted negatively on the College's ability to adapt the course constructs.[35] Put simply, whilst the college may not have significantly changed, the students and education have. This asks the fundamental question, how relevant are the courses currently? This should be viewed as an opportunity rather than a threat. A contemporisation of the current programmes may offer greater utility and will be more attractive to a wider audience than its current target audiences.

This research paper takes a holistic analysis of the Canadian Forces College, primarily using the Joint Command and Staff Programme as a case study and also the other key programmes where appropriate. In Chapter Two it defines the need for the college's senior education programmes, exploring the differing requirements or perceptions among the college, Services, commands, and wider government. It also explores the challenges in adopting multiple purposes for courses and addresses growing ambition from Government for the Canadian Forces College to take a more forthright stance. It contextualises the contemporary operating environment in order to determine whether courses need to reflect emerging challenges. Chapter Three focuses upon optimising the learning environment within the institution. It assesses whether depth of education is being sacrificed for breadth and whether the focus of the programmes is solely upon mass education, resulting in a

[35]The CFC budget has seen a reduction of approximately $3 million since 2011 with no decrease in student output.

levelling of the playing field rather than stretch of intellectual capacity and preparation for those with the potential for demanding command and staff appointments. Analysis also seeks to align current practices with best educational practice.

Chapter Four examines how the Canadian Forces resources the college from both a financial and material perspective, and a human resources dimension. It studies the entry requirements for all stakeholders within the institution and identifies the unintended consequences of the current resourcing policy. Having determined the purpose of the college and optimised delivery through educational improvement and appropriate resourcing, Chapter Five analyses how the outputs are assessed and suggests how they should be in the future. It also identifies the impact of the current assessment strategies on the learning environment and on the wider stakeholder community. Although recommendations for changes are identified and signposted throughout the chapters, Chapter Six provides a comprehensive summary of the recommendations and conclusions on the appropriateness of the Defence Academy's ambitions for the college.

*Vision without execution is just hallucination*

– Thomas Edison

This paper seeks to determine the most appropriate glide path to centre of excellence status for the Canadian Forces College. At the heart of the current syllabi of the two senior education programmes is the understanding of leadership and command. Canadian Forces doctrine embraces both the concepts of transformational leadership and transformation change.[36] Above all this paper is designed to provide empirical evidence to support transformational change and leadership. Using an operational design construct, if the operational end state is a centre of excellence for Defence studies, the centre of gravity will

[36] Department of National Defence, A-PA-005-000/AP-006, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces Leading the Institution*. (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2007), 81-98.

be the college's reputation, both domestic and international. This paper highlights the decisive conditions and supporting effects needed to protect the centre of gravity and to achieve the end state.

# CHAPTER 2

# DEFINING THE NEED

> *Be daring, be different, be impractical, be anything that will assert integrity of purpose and imaginative vision against the play-it-safers, the creatures of the commonplace, the slaves of the ordinary.*
>
> - Cecil Beaton

## Identifying the Purpose of the Programmes

Unlike a number of other countries, the Department of National Defence does not provide a conceptual framework of what should be delivered at the Canadian Forces College, relying upon syllabus derivation from the Officer Qualification Standard and professional development milestones (Developmental Periods) for officers and non-commissioned members. These standards are largely competency based and task orientated without defining the output standards required.[37] As Canadian Forces College senior academic and retired officer, Dr Alan Okros, and serving Lieutenant Colonel Colin Magee identify, in the area of professional military education for officers serving at the operational and strategic level, "virtually all the curriculum must be developed to a higher standard than found in the Qualification Standard."[38] The two pre-eminent programmes run at the Canadian Forces College are the National Security Programme and the Joint Command and Staff Programme. The National Security Programme aims to "…prepare selected military, public service, international and private-sector leaders for future responsibilities within a complex and ambiguous global security environment"[39] and is similar to its junior programme, which aims to "…prepare selected senior officers of the Defence Team for command and staff

[37]National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. *Canadian Armed Forces Professional Development* last modified 11 March 2016, http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/training-prof-dev/index.page.

[38]Lt Col Colin Magee and Dr Alan Okros, "Canadian Perspectives on Growing 21st Century Strategic Artists. Canadian Forces College Paper," last accessed 2 May 2016, http://www.military.ie/fileadmin/user_upload/documents/academic_conference/Canadian_Perspectives_on_Growing_21st_Century_Strategic_Artists_Magee__Okros.pdf.

[39]Canadian Forces College, "National Security Programme," last accessed 25 April 2016, http://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/242-eng.html.

appointments in the contemporary operating environment across the continuum of operations in national and international settings."[40]

Whilst these aims set out a broad purpose for each course, they do little to clarify the requirement. Moreover, these courses are not the only deliverables of the college. Similarly broad aims exist for the Executive Leaders' Programme, which seeks to provide understanding of executive leadership across an eclectic student population ranging from civilian Executive Officer and Brigadier General to newly promoted Warrant Officer, and a Canadian Security Studies Programme, which seeks to improve the understanding of national security issues. The latter two courses are one week and two weeks duration respectively and serve to highlight the challenges of such far-reaching aims. The executive programme takes a broad student range from senior officers, all of whom will hold a post graduate degree, to the junior Chief Warrant Officer, the majority of whom will not hold any form of graduate qualification, and seeks to produce the same outcome to all students alike. Likewise the security studies programme sets out to improve understanding of Canada's security issues for a wide ranging audience of military, public servants and interested private sector employees in a nine day programme; in reality it sets out an approach to analyse the major topics and provides perceptions or updates of the issues from various government departments. Having such broad aims with no real definition of the required output undoubtedly gives the education provider freedom to develop the curriculum. However, without needs analysis and regular stakeholder engagement, it creates high impact and likelihood of risk that the product will diverge from the customer's requirements.

**Are there specific education and training needs beyond an ability to critically analyse and communicate effectively?**

[40]Canadian Forces College, "Joint Command and Staff Programme," last accessed 25 April 2016, http://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/226-eng.html.

General Vance, Chief of Defence and former directing staff at the college expressed the aim of the college was to produce critical thinkers.[41] Similar outputs were expressed by Admiral Norman and General Blondin during question and answer sessions with the students of the college in 2015. This is a common competency requirement across western staff colleges.[42] It can be achieved in a number of ways, from broad academic study to the Socratic outcome based workshops as favoured by most Business Schools and many Staff Colleges. General Vance and many of his senior commanders have had the benefit of overseas staff training; Vance attended the US School of Advanced Military Studies, Blondin and Hood both attended USAF Air War College, and Norman attended the US National Defense University. These institutions set clear objectives and outputs; the former focussing heavily on joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational approaches to warfare with a clear emphasis on problem analysis and solving. The US approach is top down; a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction is issued, which sets out the policies, procedures, objectives, and responsibilities for officer professional military education and joint professional military education.[43] It addresses policy for attendance, including selection criteria, the education review process, learning areas and objectives to be achieved. A typical example, emphasising the detail is set out below.

Learning Area 2 – Building the Joint/Combined Force

> 1. Evaluate specific enablers such as the decision cycle, information/knowledge management, targeting methodologies, and battle rhythm flexibility that support the commander's decision cycle.

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[41]CDS address to JCSP 41, 27 May 2015.

[42]The requirement for critical thinking or critical analysis is listed as a learning outcome at the US ACAC http://usacac.army.mil/organizations/cace/cgsc/mission, an aim at the UK JSCSC http://www.da.mod.uk/Colleges-Business-Units/JSCSC, and in the course objectives for the Australian Command and Staff Course (Joint) http://www.defence.gov.au/ADC/ACSC/Course/.

[43]Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy*. CJCSI 1800.01E (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 29 May 2015.)

2. Apply transformational concepts to traditional planning, organization, and manning options to develop alternative solutions to joint task force creation.

3. Evaluate contributions of the joint functions (command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection and sustainment) throughout the phases of planning.

4. Synthesize the need to create a command climate and staffing processes based on trust, empowerment and common understanding that permit subordinate operations based on commander's intent and guidance.

5. Evaluate the effects contracting and contracted support have on the operational environment.[44]

These requirements set the context and the outcome expected by the Services and is similarly laid out for each US military education institution and the Service components providing the students and directing staff to those institutions. The outputs have a clear intent, to prepare the student for the complexities of command and staff support at the operational level. The US and UK military education model also uses key language from Bloom's taxonomy to convey the depth of learning expected.[45] The focus is not upon knowledge and understanding, which are the foundations and therefore feature across all elements of training and earlier education but on the higher elements of analysis, evaluation, synthesis and creation. Significant changes require stakeholder engagement and authority by a Chairman's instruction. This holds the delivery organisation and the end user accountable to the institution for delivery and review. The European Foundation for Quality Management emphasise the importance of leadership as a key enabler and stipulates that institutions must have leaders "…who shape the future and make it happen…" and "…implement their Mission and Vision by developing a stakeholder focused strategy."[46] The UK adopts a similar approach with a clearly defined reasoning, "Excellence in command and staff work

[44]*Ibid*., Appendix M, Enclosure E.

[45]Dr Benjamin Bloom, *Taxonomy of Educational Objectives*, (London: Longmans, Green and Co Ltd, 1956).

[46]European Foundation for Quality Management, "Enablers: What An Organisation Does And How It Does It," last accessed 26 April 2016, http://www.efqm.org/efqm-model/criteria/enablers.

has been a decisive factor in success on the battlefield throughout history… preparing for the complexity and uncertainty of future operations will place greater demands on education and training."[47] In planning terms, you cannot advocate or exercise mission command if you don't clearly articulate intent at the highest levels.

The Canadian Forces has in the past established a similar top down directive approach to education of its officers. The Rowley report on professional officer development specifically included the subjects required at each stage of an officer's development and the criteria for selection.[48] The 1998 interim report from the Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change in the Department of National Defence explicitly stated the Minister's direction for the delivery of ethics training to those selected for command and senior leadership positions.[49] Interestingly, this module was arbitrarily removed from the command and staff programme in 2013 but is under pressure to be reintroduced as a result of top down direction on Operation HONOUR and Government support for UN Security Resolution 1325 on gender security. The final report of the Monitoring Committee was more forthright. It directed that the officer professional development programme would be improved and that senior officer professionalism would be strengthened as a result of review, revision and expansion of the curriculum at the college.[50] The report set out the areas for revision and directed the outputs to be achieved. Since those reports in 1998 and 1999, arguably resulting from the Government's involvement in the aftermath of Somalia, subsequent reports have

[47]Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, "Joint Services Command and Staff College," last accessed 26 April 2016, http://www.da.mod.uk/Colleges-Business-Units/JSCSC.

[48]R. Rowley, *The Report of the Officer Development Board. Maj-Gen Roger Rowley and the Education of the Canadian Forces*, edited by Randall Wakelam and Howard Coombs (Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 2010.)

[49]Department of National Defence, Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces. Interim Report, *Education and Training* (Ottawa, 1998), 35.

[50]Department of National Defence, Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces. Final Report, *Leadership issues* (Ottawa, 1999), 35.

tended to make recommendations and request further reviews without providing clear direction.

> *Initial reports are encouraging. At the end of the day, it's going to be deeds, not words that matter.*
>
> Stephen Hadley

Since Rowley's report on officer development in 1967 there have been a plethora of reports on officer development and course delivery at the Canadian Forces College. Between 2001 and 2008 there were at least four separate commissioned reports produced, including Strategic Guidance for Officership 2020, an Exploratory Validation of the Officer Professional Military Education Programme (2 volumes), the Developmental Period 3 Initiative and the college's own Transformation Campaign Plan. They culminated in a one page CANFORGEN, which confirmed that there were three core themes, which remain relevant: Command and Leadership, Security and International Themes, and Military Planning and Operations, all of which have been present within the curriculum since the 1990s, and had little tangible impact upon delivery.[51]

Officership 2020 sets out eight strategic objectives, which provide a useful starting point for determining the output or *Ends* of the college; each objective sets out key initiatives, which establish the *means* for achieving them.[52] Currently, these objectives and initiatives are not reflected in the outputs of either the Canadian Forces College or Military Personnel Generation. The intent of the guidance, set out by VCDS, Vice Admiral Garnett, was to "align current and future activities against the vision's overall philosophy"[53] and was to be overseen by the Professional Development Oversight Committee. The Defence Academy's

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[51]Department of National Defence, CANFORGEN 106/08 CMP 042/08, *Revisions to Canadian Forces Officer Development Period 3 Programme*, 6 June 2008.

[52]Department of National Defence, *Canadian Officership in the 21st Century (Officership 2020): Strategic Guidance for the CF Officer Corps and the Officer Professional Development System* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2001), I-22 – I-34.

[53]*Ibid*., Foreword.

Development Programme 3 initiative canvassed Canadian General and Flag officers' opinions. They raised concerns over the restrictive nature of the curriculum on the command and staff programme and argued that the college focused too heavily on command and not enough on staff skills required for future employment. Again the emphasis of its findings remained on the core themes but added staff skills as a separate outcome to be achieved.[54]

The Canadian Forces College outcomes as currently listed are broad and stipulated in the programme syllabi, owned by the Canadian Defence Academy but drafted and established by the college itself. Learning outcomes focus on broad competencies: research and problem solving to defend a position, lead an element of an Operational Planning Group etc. These are ambitious outcomes, which are only achievable with all stakeholders committed to achieving them. The requirement to lead an element of an operational planning group emphasises this. On the most recent Joint Command and Staff Programme, JCSP 42, 41% of the students had no previous experience of the operational planning process and only 47% had been associated in any form with a Joint Operational Planning Group.[55] Given programme constraints, it is impossible to meet the output competency of leading an element in three weeks. The activities have to be based upon learning the process rather than expanding analysis, evaluation and synthesis, and generating expertise in leading.

This example highlights the challenge in getting alignment between force generators, force employers and the education institute without full stakeholder engagement and overarching direction. As an immediate improvement, the Canadian Forces would benefit from having a singular authoritative lead on professional delivery that aligns course *Ends* set by policy and end users, with *Means* dictated by Military Personnel Generation and *Ways* executed by the institution, similar in approach to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

[54]Canadian Defence Academy. *Briefing Note For ADM HR (MIL) – The DP3 Initiative*. 6 June 2005.

[55]Canadian Forces College. OPP Experience – JCSP 42. Email Torrance / McVicar, 31 August 2015.

instructions favoured by the United States military. This would help ensure leadership of both the institution and all stakeholders remained aligned with intent. Like Officership 2020, the US articulated its Desired Leader Attributes for Joint Force 2020. The six attributes are set out by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in his instructions and flow into the desired outcomes of the various education organisations.[56]

**Elitist Approach or Mass Education?**

There are two aspects to educational excellence, what we deliver and to whom. They are not mutually exclusive; the capacity to educate will vary based upon the student entry selection. Currently there are no academic or experience entry criteria set for the key programmes at the college. The Canadian Forces articulates that the programmes at the College are to "provide high-quality professional military education for selected Canadian and international officers…"[57] Selection criteria is as important as output goals. The 2008 CANFORGEN also introduced a requirement for increased student participation on the Joint Command and Staff Programme and the introduction of a Distance Learning programme to increase numbers further. The current selection criteria has one explicit caveat, that students must be functionally bilingual, and that students must have potential to reach Colonel and Captain (Navy) rank, which implicitly requires students to hold a Baccalaureate Degree.

Of the current residential and distance learning Joint Command and Staff Programmes, less than 70% of the Army students have the language functionality and only 23% of those on distance learning have the academic qualifications to reach Lieutenant Colonel rank. Less than 60% of Navy students have language functionality for promotion. In 2016, approximately 220 officers will graduate from the Joint Command and Staff

[56]Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum, *Desired Leader Attributes for Joint Force 2020* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 28 June 2013.)

[57]Canadian Forces College, "Transformation Campaign Plan. A Blueprint for the Future," Version 2. (Toronto: Canadian Forces College, 2007.).

Programme; based on the current commissioning targets from the Strategic Intake Plan, this represents approximately 30% of the annual inflow of officers to the Canadian Forces, which are currently inflated due to under manning, and, given current wastage rates of 5.3% per annum, equates to approximately 60-70% of officers on an annual basis.[58] The age of the current cohort ranges from 32 to 54.9, similar to 2014, and only 19 officers have been pre-selected for promotion.[59] These statistics demonstrate fundamental differences between components and branches in their selection criteria and the intent to 'select' officers for command and senior staff positions.

A review of the officers who graduated in 2010, also suggest that the purpose of the college is not solely to educate officers for command and senior staff appointments.[60] Of the 116 Canadian officers who graduated, 30 retired within five years and only 23 have moved beyond lieutenant colonel or commander. Of significance the Royal Canadian Navy selected 23 officers to attend and account for 12 of those who have reached the rank of naval captain. This may suggest a different selection process being applied by the components.

Excellence, and the reputation for it, is not absolute. It can be built upon both quality and exclusivity. This is highlighted by the European Association for Quality Assurance in Higher Education who asserts that quality "implies exclusivity, for example, the supposed high quality of an Oxbridge education. Quality… is based on an assumption that the distinctiveness and inaccessibility of an Oxbridge education is of itself 'quality'." This is borne out by the Royal Military College at Shrivenham and the British military approach to advanced command and staff training. Selection to attend the Advanced Command and Staff

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[58]Lt Gen D.B. Millar, *Strategic Intake Plan – Fiscal Year 15/16*, (Chief of Military Personnel: file 5000-1 (DGPR), 20 April 2015).

[59]Canadian Forces College, "Joint Command and Staff Programme 42. Course profile," last accessed 28 April 2016, http://barker.cfcacad.net/Admin/JCSP42/Admin/profile42.pdf.

[60]Canadian Forces College, "Joint Command and Staff Programme 36. Course profile," last accessed 28 April 2016, http://barker.cfcacad.net/Admin/JCSP36/Admin/jcsp36_e.html.

Course in itself represents status. Not all lieutenant colonels and Service equivalents are selected to attend, only those with genuine potential for senior command (Regiment and above) and senior staff appointments are invited. Selection criteria beginning with pre-selection for Lieutenant Colonel ensures the experience range of the students attending is fairly narrow.[61] Countries wishing to attend the course are mindful of the status and the output standards expected as a result of this approach to selection. The US Army School of Advanced Military Studies adopts the same approach to its Advanced Military Studies Program, selecting only the top 10% of the General Command and Staff Course students. This means that the content and outputs of these courses look very different from their intermediate feeder courses, which cater for training and education needs of the masses. Whilst the National Security Programme appears to be selective, it is difficult given the age range and promotion potential of many of the students to see any meaningful selection criteria being exerted on the Joint Command and Staff Programme. Again clear direction on who should attend each programme and why is needed in order to align curriculum with intent.

There are other areas to align in terms of intent. Both the Joint Command and Staff Programme and, to a lesser degree, the National Security Programme, walk a fine line between academic education and professional military education. It compounds the issues facing selection. Whilst there are very real drivers for professional accreditation to both military education and training, there is no extant mandate for Canadian Forces College to deliver a Master degree as a formal output measure. Notwithstanding this, promotion policy to lieutenant colonel and commander incentivises the attainment of a Master degree, and consequently the offer of a Master degree in both of the key programmes has become, for

[61]Promotion to Lieutenant Colonel requires a minimum of two reports at sub-unit command and two separate tours at staff. The window for promotion to and attendance at staff college is effectively 6 years from promotion to Major to 12 years from promotion to Major.

many students, and their career managers, a raison d'être for selection. Again, professional military education and academic accreditation are not mutually exclusive but it is important that the output requirements are stipulated transparently. A degree accredited to professional military education suggests primacy in military education.

A review of the Royal Military College, Shrivenham's Defence Studies Department, a "unique academic-military partnership with King's College London," emphasises this; "[the] mission of the Defence Studies Department (DSD) of King's College London is to provide world-class professional military education to the UK Armed Services at the JSCSC."[62] Both the Joint Services Command and Staff College and the King's College Defence Studies Department work together to provide professional military education and in doing so award a Master in War Studies. However, if a requirement to educate all Canadian Forces Majors and Lieutenant Commanders to Master degree level at the Canadian Forces College exists, this impacts on the *Ways* in which military education is delivered and what professional military education *Ends* can be achieved.

Similar to the requirement for direction on academic accreditation, there is ambiguity in terms of the intent towards military competencies that must be achieved. The current Joint Command and Staff Programme is unclear on whether the college is 'certifying' the graduate to serve as a commander and operational planner or simply providing the tools and broad intellectual foundation that will ensure success across tactical unit command, operational planning and strategic staff roles. The curriculum refers frequently to confirmatory activities but, as Dr Alan Okros, senior academic advisor at the Canadian Forces College, advisor to the Department of National Defence, and former naval officer highlights "[the] drawback with this approach is the phenomena of the 'search for the DS solution' with students

[62]Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, "Defence Studies Department. King's College London at the JSCSC," last accessed 26 April 2016, http://www.da.mod.uk/Colleges-Business-Units/Joint-Services-Command-and-Staff-College/Defence-Studies-Department.

becoming 'mirrors' simply reflecting back to assessors what they believe the assessors are looking for."[63] This produces a substantially different output than if the intent is to deepen understanding and ability to command and plan through exploratory learning. Understanding the clear intent from the force employers on what constitutes the *Ends* will shape the *Ways* and whether the college operates a confirmatory or exploratory pedagogical philosophy. Ultimately the Canadian Forces must determine its requirements to allow the college to develop the best methods of achieving those goals.

**Wider Considerations**

Jill Sinclair, Executive Director for External Engagement and Partnerships at the Canadian Defence Academy and former Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy), is charged with leading "the institutionalization of national and international partnerships in support of a Whole of Government approach in matters related to excellence in the profession of arms and in the development of expertise in defence and international security issues."[64] At the core of this mandate is the delivery of institutional excellence, which in turn enables expertise in Defence and International Security Studies, supports excellence in the Profession of Arms, and leverages engagement opportunities. This ambition suggests positioning the Canadian Forces College, and the Canadian Defence Academy, at the centre of a Defence and Security nexus, providing expertise, research facilities and education for those who need it.

This intent mirrors the UK's ambition. It sets out in its Defence People and Training Strategy:

> As the political, social and legislative context for training and education shifts, Defence must be able to demonstrate that it remains able to deliver its outcomes in a way that accords with these needs. It should develop tools, techniques, evidence and guidance to assist the Department in positioning itself as an expansive learning

[63]Alan Okros. Functional Discussion Note: *Pedagogical Philosophy*, 18 October 2015.

[64]Jill Sinclair, "CDS and DM Mandate for External Engagement and Partnerships," Presentation, October 2015, with permission.

> organisation that promotes continual improvement. The MOD should also seek to provide a greater influence across Government to increase the supply of skills which are critical for Defence. In doing so, Defence must be able to exploit modern learning methodologies (including new technologies) to optimise the ways in which we deliver effective education and training, ultimately bringing this together for effective force generation at the Joint and Collective levels.[65]

As General Andrew Gregory, the UK's Chief of Defence Personnel, summarises "across Defence, the greater prominence of the Whole Force in delivering the right mix of capable people to ensure optimised Human Capability means it should play a more pivotal role in wider Departmental capability, planning and decision-making." An optimised Canadian Forces College could and should enable Canadian Whole of Government task forces to achieve similar effect. Such ambition expressed in the Ministry of Defence has ensured that the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom is well resourced to meet that commitment and to be regarded as the centre of excellence for UK Defence studies.

**Conveying Intent**

Establishing Ends, Means and Ways aligns all facets of the institution but does not optimise the chances for success unless that intent is conveyed authoritatively to the students, embraced by the organisation, and espoused by all stakeholders. Currently we have students advised by their Career Managers that they simply "must pass the course and gain a Master degree," others informed that they must "achieve a certain level of assessment," and, in some cases, told to "enjoy the course and use it to build their CV."[66] Compounding the issue, the college Learning Output Guides and introductory briefings focus upon what the students will do, rather than what we expect them to achieve in terms of deep learning, improved ability to command and plan, and improved ability to problem solve within a complex environment. Maryellen Weimer, Professor Emerita at Penn State Berks and author for Faculty Focus,

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[65]Ministry of Defence, *The Defence People and Training Strategy*, (2014). 8

[66]JCSP 41 Discussion Group, "Perceptions of JCSP," April 2016.

points out the importance of establishing the right conditions from the outset "Catalog(sic) descriptions of courses may be accurate, but they aren't all that good at conveying why the content is important, relevant, and useful."[67] The college and wider institution must convey the intent and vision for each aspect of officer professional development. Students should be motivated by the intent and vision for the programmes.

**Summary**

This chapter explored the requirement for clear intent to be established by the Canadian Forces and conveyed to the Canadian Forces College and the wider institution. Without clear intent, it is impossible to exercise mission command, moreover without all stakeholders complying with the intent, mission command becomes a fruitless task. The paper identified the first requirement as establishing the purpose of the programmes being delivered at the Canadian Forces College. It also contrasted the approach taken in the US, and the clear direction and ownership exercised by the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff. The chapter explored the level of detail given in the US and UK by senior commanders on the delivery of professional military education and demonstrated that Canada has historically taken a similar approach but has drifted towards ambiguous broad direction in recent years. It also demonstrated the inconsistency between defined output learning objectives and entry standards. The merits of an elitist approach versus education for the masses were discussed before examining wider considerations, including the Government and the Canadian Defence Academy's ambition for the College. The next chapter considers how best to optimise the learning environment once intent and purpose have been defined.

[67]Maryellen Weimer, *The First Day of Class: A Once-a-Semester Opportunity. Faculty Focus*, (19 August 2015.)

# CHAPTER 3

## OPTIMISING THE LEARNING ENVIRONMENT

> *People inhabit a complex world of emergence, uncertainty and continuous change. Corporate life is improvising and learning together. It is an ongoing continuous exploration, a movement that is open-ended and always incomplete.*
>
> – Esko Kilpi

One of the obstacles for achieving investment from the students is a lack of broad tangible objectives and targets that explain the purpose of the college. A suggestion that the purpose of the programme will become clear sometime in future appointments, whilst possibly true, lacks incentive. Those who cannot see this, perhaps because their future career path does not obviously suggest roles where critical analysis and unbounded problem analysis forms part of their daily diet, will understandably remain sceptical. Until the epiphany occurs, many will squander the learning opportunity. As Canadian Forces College Foundation Board member and Director of Sonar Investments Ltd, Covell Brown, suggests' "… viewed from the other side, that means I failed to incite enough curiosity in the early phases to elicit full voluntary interest… learning is our objective, not research and teaching."[68] Put simply, it is not enough to merely set an education agenda, to optimise it, we must garner personal investment from the students. Undoubtedly, force generators have a role in selecting those who genuinely need to be on the programme and who will benefit from it, but there is a requirement by the institution to ignite the ambition and vision within the student. This would be enabled from the outset by clearly defined goals, both for short term completion of the programme and longer term employment expectation. Those goals must be owned by the institution and conveyed with purpose by the organisation.

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[68]Covell Brown, Email to Commandant Canadian Forces College, *Capturing the students' interest.* 30 November 2015.

The aim of any higher educational organisation must be to produce deep learning. Whilst training in its purest form will teach students to replicate skill sets, it is the process of deep learning and the consequent ability to critically analyse that sets education apart. Dr Adam Chapnick, a senior academic professor at the Canadian Forces College, argues the benefits of a liberal arts degree. He asserts that those who pursue and achieve a genuine liberal arts education, rather than merely achieving minimum grades will, through their "critical thinking, reading and writing abilities, make them indispensable."[69] He is right but the output of a command and staff college has to be more focused than simply having a generalist ability to critically analyse.

A staff college has to differentiate between the traditional university and business school. Paul Danos, Dean of Dartmouth College's Tuck School of Business in America, reinforces this point; "you need the right kind of probing mindset when you attack problems of such complexity because no-one could have ever seen the combination of factors before."[70] This has led to the creation of small scale deep courses that force students to adopt a healthy sceptical mind-set that questions the foundation of theories and analyses their appropriateness for any given analysis. By adopting the Business School approach of using current issues to analyse, underpinned with historical analysis of past scenarios, the Canadian Forces College can harness the intellectual capability of its students to provide real analysis and evaluation of problems likely to be faced by the institution.

In some areas, the Canadian Forces College has adopted this approach. The stream elective Institutional Policy Studies is given, by the Strategic Joint Staff, a number of

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[69]Adam Chapnick, "Arts Advantage. Why Enrolling in the Liberal Arts is Smarter Than You Think," *Literary Review of Canada*, no. 4 (May 2015). Last accessed 29 April 2016, http://reviewcanada.ca/magazine/2015/05/arts-advantage-2/.

[70]Paul Danos, "The Role of the Business School. Deans Debate. How do business schools remain relevant in today's changing world?" *The Economist*. 1 December 2009. Last accessed 28 April 2016, http://www.economist.com/node/15006681.

problems with which the institution is grappling with. Students work in groups to analyse the problems, challenge policy and offer avenues of approach. In other areas, the college falls back to the traditional education methodology of teach, discuss, confirm. The college and institution would benefit greatly from a wide-scale adoption of the deep thought and critical analysis model. A practical example is in the command and leadership courses of the Joint Command and Staff Programme. The current modus operandi uses case studies and theory to explain doctrine with students reverse engineering models to fit historical analysis. The confirmatory activities require students to repeat the process by writing a persuasive essay using existing models, analysing historic situations. Adopting the Tuck School approach, students should be asked to examine current issues and evaluate the utility of current doctrine to meet those challenges. This would force the students to critically think about what they've been taught. The same argument applies to operational planning courses, using scenarios based upon historic conflicts is of limited value for future commanders and planners. Scenarios based on current complex scenarios force students to analyse the appropriateness of current planning tools and doctrine, and to critically recommend areas for change or further study.

**Are we acknowledging the changing / changed learning environment?**

Little has changed in the pedagogical practices of professional military education since the inception of the Joint Command and Staff Programme in 1967. Students on all courses are given readings, listen to lectures and then discuss what they have read or heard. This fails to acknowledge the changes in the learning environment. Author and social theorist, Jeremy Rifkin's, economy of abundance predictions are already taking shape. We can share ideas on an inter-connected web of electronic devices.[71] Rather like crowd-sourced

[71]Jeremy Rifkin, *The Zero Marginal Cost Society. The Internet of Things, The Collaborative Commons, and the Eclipse of Capitalism*, (New York: St Martin's Press, 2014), 225-254.

research, the potential for students themselves to discover and analyse material is limitless. Setting students problems to analyse and teaching frameworks for analysis rather than telling them what to analyse will create deeper thinking and understanding.

Creating better understanding would also underpin purpose. A student of the 2014 Joint Command and Staff Programme remarked in his initial interview that he didn't know why he had been sent to the college, he didn't want to be at the college, and saw no benefit in being at the college. Whilst this was an extreme view, it is by no means unique and represents in lesser degrees many of the students' observations on arrival. Founding member of the Senior College of the University of Toronto and educational psychologist, Suzanne Hidi, and K Ann Renninger, Research Professor and Department Chair for Educational Studies at Swathmore College, draw the important link between interest and learning in their Four Phase Model of Interest Development.[72] They argue that many educators do not understand their role in generating interest in learning. Interest is a psychological state created by the individual and the situation.[73] Hidi and Renninger advocate a four-phase model for developing interest: triggered situational interest; maintained situational interest; emerging individual interest; and finally, well-developed individual interest.

Triggered situational interest requires environmental features or character identification. Instructional conditions involving group work, problem solving or puzzles, and computers are often triggers most associated with situational interest. Use of technology, including TED Talks, smart boards, and simulation, and a stimulating environment are key enablers.[74] The college classrooms are woefully inadequate in terms of stimulation;

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[72]Suzanne Hidi and K.Ann Renninger, "The Four-Phase Model of Interest Development," *Educational Psychologist*, 41(2), (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2006), 111-127.

[73]H. Schiefele, A. Krapp, M. Prenzel, A. Heiland, and H. Kasten, "Principles of an Educational Theory of Interest" last accessed 28 April 2016, https://www.unibw.de/sowi1_1/personen/krapp/interesse/pdf/gr6-1983.

[74]Suzanne Hidi and K.Ann Renninger, "The Four-Phase Model of Interest Development" . . ., 114.

classrooms are small, use outdated technology and course material is almost universally limited to textbooks and papers. However, the approach taken during the final exercise phases of the elective streams offers glimpses of an improved approach; students work in small teams to analyse problems and provide solutions. With modest investment to the syndicate room infrastructure, imaginative decor and smaller syndicate sizes, and greater emphasis on group work and problem solving, greater situational interest can be triggered.

Maintained situational awareness requires the student to believe they are partaking in meaningful tasks.[75] Again, project work and realistic scenarios for exercises, along with demonstrable purpose for deliverables, and focused areas for analysis during discussion, contribute to this. JCSP 41 students in the Institutional Policy Studies elective were required "to conduct a detailed Case Study of a current or potential joint military or strategic defence capability or capability deficiency and present the results to a principal decision-maker in the capability development process at NDHQ."[76] This required students to analyse the background to Operation HONOUR and frame the problem. It culminated with a brief to the General and Flag Officers in Ottawa. Compare this to the Defence and Security Studies stream, which asked students to assume they were 'representatives' of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, Public Safety and other Government departments to come up with ideas for Canadian initiatives in support of the Arctic and La Francophonie.[77] The tasking neither utilised skills and experience of the students nor provided any obvious destination for the students' outputs.

Relevance of the deliverable is important. Dorn and Libben's assessment of the Canadian Forces' readiness to support the Government's aspiration towards peacekeeping

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[75]*Ibid*.

[76]Canadian Forces College, "Course Outline: DS557 - Institutional Policy Analysis," last accessed 2 May 2016, http://barker.cfcacad.net/Admin/JCSP41/LOGs/logpr-783_e.html.

[77]Canadian Forces College, "Course Outline: DS567 - Global Power and Institutions," last accessed 2 May 2016, http://barker.cfcacad.net/Admin/JCSP41/LOGs/logpr-785_e.html.

operations, in support of the United Nations, offers opportunity. Students should be thinking about problems they will likely face following Government policy. This provides an opportunity to add relevance and realism to operational planning scenarios and allows comprehensive studies of current areas in which the United Nations is likely to operate in, and evaluation of recent Canadian forays into peacekeeping operations to determine how things could be improved. As Dorn and Libben correctly assert, general combat training is insufficient to prepare troops for peacekeeping deployments.[78] Moreover, general command and operational planning training is insufficient if Canada wishes to play a major role in future peacekeeping operations. The Canadian Forces College can contribute significantly to this capacity and help meet the aspiration of Dorn and Libben's fourth major recommendation, "integrate preparation for peace operations into the institutional culture of the Canadian Armed Forces."[79] This would also allow the National Security Programme to focus more on the strategic challenges of operating in those areas and developing comprehensive approaches to their analysis, leveraging the wider Governmental and international experience of that student cohort.

The UK's Royal College of Defence Studies, a similar programme to the National Security Programme, adopts a similar model. Its output aspiration is that "[the] RCDS graduate understands the international strategic context, is skilled in analysis and able to work intuitively across national, cultural and ideological boundaries to lead or contribute to developing strategy at the highest level."[80] Students also enrol in a King's College London MA in International Security and Strategy. As part of the course, students elect to go to various areas of the world and conduct a thorough analysis of the security and strategic

[78]Dorn and Libben. "Unprepared for Peace . . . ", 31.

[79]*Ibid*., 36.

[80]Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, "Royal College of Defence Studies," last accessed 30 April 2016, http://www.da.mod.uk/Colleges-Business-Units/RCDS.

factors affecting that area. Students submit that analysis as part of their academic deliverables. The dissertations are widely circulated across Government and within the Ministry of Defence and help departments in their own analysis.

Having generated and maintained situational interest, Hidi and Renninger's model requires emerging individual interest.[81] This is where the individual's willingness to write effectively and to set ambitious goals must be ignited. Dr Adam Chapnick observes "A combination of well-organized, well-trained, subject matter expert professors, and engaged, inspired, and dedicated students are most likely to produce meaningful learning experiences." [82] In his article for the Canadian Military Journal, he explains the concept of the flipped classroom. The flipped classroom is a concept that is gaining popularity across educational organisations.[83] It requires a fundamental shift in approach; as Chapnick humorously describes "it transforms the professor from 'sage on the stage' to 'guide on the side' to better facilitate a deeper student learning experience. It requires students to watch lectures and read material prior to attending discussions and seminars, where clarity and understanding should be achieved. Evidence suggests it works but only when it is constructed properly. Academics and Directing Staff must do their preparation and must play a full part in the process.

In some aspects, the Canadian Forces model already adopts a similar model; students are provided with readings, attend subject matter expert lectures and then move into the classroom to discuss. Results however, are hit or miss. Many of the Directing Staff, and some academics, struggle to understand the role of mentor, focussing on assessment of

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[81]Hidi and Renninger, "The Four Phase Model . . .", 114

[82]Adam Chapnick, "The Flipped Classroom and Professional Military Education: A Preliminary Assessment of the Possibilities," *Canadian Military Journal* Vol 14 No 4 (Autumn 2014).

[83]Carl Straumsheim, "Still in Favor of the Flip," *Inside Higher Ed*, 30 October 2013, last accessed 30 April 2016, https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/10/30/despite-new-studies-flipping-classroom-still-enjoys-widespread-support.

students and administration, in the case of the Directing Staff, or failing to provide military context and relevance by some of the academics. The degree of difference between Directing Staff, and between academics is a source of constant frustration. All staff must understand, and be equipped for, the role they play in achieving deep learning and igniting individual interest.

Both the UK and US utilise teaching teams with both academic and military mentors involved in discussions and seminars, and with the course development staff in producing the syllabus material.[84] This system is partially mirrored by the National Security Programme with senior mentors and academics working collaboratively to enhance student understanding and analysis. Notwithstanding resource constraints, covered later, it should be adopted for the Joint Command and Staff Programme. It is not just about working together: the UK's Defence Academy has a fundamental ethos, which is easily identifiable, when discussing the professional military education programmes. All personnel, Directing Staff and academics alike, are focused on achieving the military outputs. The same synergy is not obvious across all elements of the Canadian Forces College; this also needs to be addressed with greater integration and a shared unity of purpose. Building teaching teams would be an aid to achieving this.[85]

One other element found to support individual interest is the element of student choice in the learning outcome.[86] This approach has been adopted in both the Joint Command and Staff Programme and the National Security Programme. Student electives

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[84]Air Commodore A Byford, Deputy Commandant UK Defence Academy, telephone conversation with author, 10 May 2016.

[85]L.K. Michaelsen and R.H. Black, "Building Learning Teams: The Key To Harnessing The Power Of Small Groups In Higher Education." In *Collaborative Learning: A Sourcebook for Higher Education*, Vol 2., ed. S. Kadel, & J. Keehner (State College, PA: National Center for Teaching, Learning and Assessment, 1994.)

[86]K.A. Renninger and S. Hidi, "Student interest and achievement: Developmental issues raised by a case study." In *Development of Achievement Motivation*, ed. A. Wigfield & J. S. Eccles, (New York: Academic, 2002), 173-195.

receive positive feedback and, in the case of the junior programme, those choices are often the initiators for final academic deliverables. Conversely, the most prescriptive deliverables with the most limited scope for individual research, the command and leadership papers, both attract significantly more criticism. Wherever choice is a viable option, it should be incorporated into the activity. Renninger and Hidi conclude their learning model with the well-developed individual interest stage, characterised by positive feelings within the student, retained knowledge and value gained from the experience.[87] This also links to combining interest with purpose. Students need to visualise the correlation between professional military education and career impact. Reiterating Covell Brown's message, it is not enough to say that one day the student will see the value of their attendance at the Canadian Forces College, the value needs to be articulated at the outset and each activity should provide the student with instantaneous feedback and understanding of how that value is being created.

**Jack of All Trades, Master of None?**

Staff Colleges tend to remain generalist in nature. For the majority of senior officer appointments, individuals perform general operations officer type roles and are involved in leading the institution. This model has limitations and is difficult to change due to the small size of most forces and relatively small throughput of their officers. Only the US offers fully streamed educational profiles for its senior officers (Lieutenant Colonel, and Service equivalents, and above). Newport, Carlisle and Maxwell provide advanced operational and strategic war fighting education, [88] various single Service and Joint schools and universities provide more specific staff training. The Eisenhower School, at the National Defense University, delivers Master degree level accredited professional military education in

[87]Hidi and Renninger, "The Four Phase Model . . . ", 115.

[88]Mission statements for the US War Colleges last accessed 1 May 2016, https://usnwc.edu/, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/, and http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/.

Acquisition, Technology and Logistics.[89] The Joint Forces Staff College – also at the National Defence University – and civilian universities offer training for joint operational planners, National Security Advisors and those employed at the strategic political military interface.[90]

Clearly few militaries have the capacity or requirement for the variety of joint and single Service universities enjoyed by the US. Neither should the US model be necessarily held up as the natural benchmark; the US professional military education system has plenty of critics, particularly as it seeks to balance education with training. Dr Joseph Fischer recently criticised the educational standards being delivered at the US Command and General Staff College arguing that the drive towards training within the US had subordinated the requirement for education.[91] The UK does not have the same capacity but differentiates between strategic staff training, delivered at the Royal College of Defence Studies, and command and institutional leadership delivered at the Higher Command and Staff College, both at the Defence Academy. In addition, the UK utilises short courses at the NATO Defence College and civilian universities for specialist education, including Special Forces education.

The Canadian Forces College faces two hurdles; it attempts to cover a wide curriculum of operational and strategic level issues, whilst covering operational and institutional command and leadership; second, it places responsibility for ensuring fundamental educational building blocks have been assimilated by the students to the force generators. Selection criteria are based upon promotion potential, which should cover linguistic and intellectual capabilities, but in reality has no tangibles to assess preparedness

[89]The Eisenhower School, last accessed 1 May 2016, http://es.ndu.edu/.

[90]Joint Forces Staff College, last accessed 1 May 2016, http://jfsc.ndu.edu/.

[91]Joseph R Fischer, "A Recent Faculty Members Thoughts On The Persistent Problems Of The Army's Command and General Staff College," The Foreign Policy Group. Last accessed 1 May 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/16/a-recent-faculty-members-thoughts-on-the-persistent-problems-of-the-armys-cgsc/.

for graduate level studies. The college does not have the capacity to match either the US single Service and National Defense Universities or the UK's Defence Academy but it can utilise some best practice in order to optimise delivery. Entry criteria for all programmes should be detailed and specific with the onus on force generators and the Canadian Defence Academy to deliver before arrival at the Canadian Forces College. Two obvious examples would be: directing that all Joint Command and Staff Programme students attend and pass either AOC or the Joint Operational Planning Course prior to arrival at the college; and pre-approval to enter the Master in Defence Studies programme, thus confirming the ability to study at the graduate level. Other examples would include ensuring students have a basic education in Canadian Governmental organisation and process either through pre-reading material or previous Development Period training. This would allow more depth of analysis of issues rather than delivering foundational education. The curriculum itself should support this aspiration; discussing the operational security issues of Asia including the Indian Sub-Continent, the Middle East and Africa in three 3-hour periods is at best superficial, and at worst of negative value.

The 2015 Arctic Symposium ran by the college offered an alternative delivery mechanism; students attended three to four days of lectures, seminars and panel debates to explore the issues and develop a deeper understanding. This is a model used by the NATO Defence College, Rome, which also takes a modular approach to delivery.[92] By adopting a modular approach it aims to provide deeper understanding of the issues and allows other military and civilian students to attend study areas of importance when full attendance on the senior course would be impractical. The modules, which are part of the senior courses allow "participants the opportunity to improve their knowledge and develop their understanding of some of the key political, economic, socio-cultural, defence and security related issues which

[92]NATO Defense College, "Modular Short Courses," last modified 1 April 2016, http://www.ndc.nato.int/education/courses.php?icode=13.

may have worldwide implications for global and Alliance security."[93] This would be a potential revenue stream to the College and support the recruitment of leading speakers in those particular fields.

Whilst the Canadian Forces is unlikely to adopt a streamed approach to careers, it is feasible to provide specific groups of officers with learning that is tailored to their particular area of future employment. The streams on the Joint Command and Staff Programme offer such a vehicle although force generators need to be consistent in their approach. Some, specifically the Royal Canadian Navy, targets certain individuals for certain streams based upon potential future employment. A modular and elective based programme, would encourage wider participation at commensurate levels with other Government departments thus providing greater collaboration, networking and deeper learning through shared experience.

**The Case For Transformation**

> *Innovation is a feature of education. New program ideas are developed, new technologies taken up and both researchers and social entrepreneurs offer new opportunities for schools. But such innovations can be too narrow in scope or too small in scale to create a systemic impact for all students.*
>
> – Canadian Education Association 2016

The Canadian Education Association advocates that the case for transformation is strong. "Teaching practices exist that enable students to achieve at high levels; [and] certain educational practices and learning processes engage students in deeper and more sustained learning."[94] This applies equally to professional military education. Okros argues that the Canadian Forces College needs to shift from confirmatory learning to exploratory learning.

[93]NATO Defense College, "Education," last modified 3 June 2015, http://www.ndc.nato.int/education/courses.php?icode=0.

[94]Canadian Education Association, "A Case For Transformation," *Shifting the purposes of schooling and current designs for learning*, last accessed 1 May 2016 http://www.cea-ace.ca/transforming-education/case-for-transformation.

He argues that the focus has been on course updates rather than "the need to shift the underlying learning philosophy and, in particular, to address the gap between the 'certification' model incorporated in CFITES [Canadian Forces Individual Training and Education System] vs the 'inquiry' approach of graduate learning."[95] He also reinforces the benefits of a shift towards a learner centric model through increased choice. The European Association for Quality Assurance in Higher Education identify the need for excellence in management, research, teaching, and student performance in order to meet a holistic definition of centre of excellence.[96]

This is not an advocacy for transformational change simply for education's sake. Retired Lieutenant General, Michael Jeffrey, was asked to define the scope and propose a concept for the delivery of Canadian Forces executive development.[97] He determined that whilst senior officers "…may possess the ability to perform effectively as strategic leaders, they often lack the understanding of the environment."[98] Jeffery added that "the cognitive capacities of strategic leaders must facilitate the creation of knowledge" going beyond "the analytic, creative and judgement capacities needed to adapt the profession to the external environment."[99] Six years later a study by the Canadian Defence Academy found that those gaps in education and competency still exists.[100] Renowned organisation and leadership theorist, and Professor of Organization Studies at the University of Warwick Business School, Haridimos Tsoukas, argues that the world's problems can no longer be assumed to be an

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[95]Alan Okros. *Pedagogical Philosophy* . . .

[96]European Association for Quality Assurance, *The Concept of Excellence Higher Education* Occasional Papers 20, (Brussels: ENQA, 2014), 9-14.

[97]Lt Gen (Ret'd) Michael K. Jeffery, *The CF Executive Development Programme. A Concept for Development Period 5: The CF Officer Professional Development System*, 15 July 2008.

[98]*Ibid*., 9.

[99]*Ibid*., 9.

[100]Canadian Forces College, *Officer Development Period 4/5: Project Strategic Leader*, 16 June 2014.

extension or repeat of the past and concludes that "an open-world ontology is required to deal with a future full of possibilities."[101] This future requires military commanders and planners to develop new skill sets that focus on 'what if' contingency planning and to practice scenario based organisational learning. This will require more agility and adaptability underpinned by a need for critical thinking and analysis. Okros and Magee reinforce the point

> Such views demand an examination of PME beyond the normal curriculum review of what topics need to be included to the fundamental pedagogical underpinnings of how PME is viewed, conceived, designed and implemented. The current move from doing to thinking, and the emphasis in problem framing and design moves the profession from a scientific cause and effect mindset, to that of an artist; thereby setting the conditions necessary to meet the needs of the profession and the nation into the 21st century.[102]

The argument for improving deep learning has never been stronger.

**Summary**

Chapter 3 examined how the learning environment can be optimised. It looked at the effect that well defined, meaningful objectives and outcomes, conveyed from the outset, can have on the students' learning experience. The chapter looked at how student interest is developed and nourished and argued for the Canadian Forces College to adopt a Business School attitude towards its education programmes. Contemporary approaches to education delivery including the need for relevance and realism were discussed and that, at least in two of the Joint Command and Staff Programme's current elective streams, a more contemporary approach was being delivered and was achieving positive results. This chapter also compared the approaches taken by the US and UK in terms of delivering a variety of courses to meet different career paths, to the generalist approach of the Canadian Forces College. The

[101]Tsoukas and Haridimos, "What is Organizational Foresight and How Can it be Developed?", in *Complex Knowledge: Studies in Organizational Epistemology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 263-279.

[102]Magee and Okros, "Canadian Perspectives . . .", 23-24.

NATO Defense College was also highlighted for its use of a modular approach to education, which offered the opportunity to gain attendance from members of the wider security nexus. Lastly, Chapter 3 argues for the Canadian Forces College to pursue transformational change, amending its pedagogical approach, its structure and its course content in order to meet the needs of the Canadian Forces in the 21st century. Chapter 4 will next look at how the Canadian Forces College is resourced to meet its obligations to the Canadian Forces.

# CHAPTER 4

# RESOURCING THE REQUIREMENT

## Financial Constraints

> *Risk management is the identification, assessment, and prioritization of risks followed by coordinated and economical application of resources to minimize, monitor, and control the probability and/or impact of unfortunate events or to maximize the realization of opportunities.*
>
> – Flavia Zappa

In 1997, Assistant Deputy Minister (Personnel), Commander Force Recruiting Education and Training Services and Deputy Chief of Staff Education met with the Acting Chief of Defence staff to discuss the findings recommended by the Officer Professional Development Committee, following on from the Ministerial Report to the Prime Minister on the Canadian Forces. The clear recommendation for Developmental Period 4 was a 10-month residential course. Despite a strong recommendation backed by the impetus for greater officer education in the Ministerial report, General Caines, the Commander Force Recruiting Education and Training Services advised that the approach was unaffordable.[103] Interestingly the direction to the Commandant of the Canadian Forces College did not specify where risk should be taken by rejecting the recommendation. This is a recurring theme; in 2012 the Armed Forces Council similarly directed that the Canadian Forces College should continue to deliver the "current officer professional development structure… and supports a baseline of $14.5m."[104] The cost of delivering the structure at the Canadian Forces College at that time was $17.1m.

Savings were achieved by further reductions in experiential learning visits; the European visit had been removed 12 months earlier, and in limiting the use of external presenters amongst other savings measures. Again no mention was made of risk tolerance,

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[103]Canadian Forces Recruiting Education and Training Services, *Guidance Arising From OPDS Briefing To A/CDS*, 13 January 1997.

[104]Armed Forces Council Meeting 11 April 2012. Record of Decision dated 7 May 2012.

nor was the impact on education and learning outputs factored into the decision. In reality the College was asked to deliver the same outputs with less money. Until 2015, analysis of financial resourcing for officer professional development was virtually impossible with costs aggregated up across the college. Activity based costing leads to activity based management, which based on activity driver analysis, increases efficiency, lowers costs and improves resource utilisation.[105] A move to activity based costing by programme is long overdue. In conjunction with this, a clear understanding of the learning outcomes for each activity needs to be documented.

The removal of the experiential learning visits has impacted upon the learning outputs. The Joint Command and Staff Programme attempts to develop deep understanding of operational planning without demonstrating time and space considerations over real ground. It attempts a similar outcome for the Arctic without providing situational awareness of the Arctic. Similarly, the National Security Programme attempts to achieve the same levels of understanding of a region in two weeks that Royal College Defence Studies students acquire over eight weeks. Decisions to cut exercises and visits or change locations are taken arbitrarily without any examination of the long-term risks to the institution. Only once activity based costing per individual activity has been achieved can decisions on how to improve the current course be taken. Officership 2020 highlighted the need for an appropriate balance between experience, training, education and self-development and identified a critical gap in resource; "lack of resources: more flexibility in terms of numbers of personnel, commitments in terms of time and funding."[106] The Canadian Forces College must articulate the cost and benefits of its activities to ensure informed decisions are made.

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[105]Chartered Institute of Management Accountants, "Activity based costing. Topic Gateway Series No. 1," last modified November 2008, http://www.cimaglobal.com/Documents/ImportedDocuments/cid_tg_activity_based_costing_nov08.pdf.pdf.

**The Role of the Directing Staff**

> *Research shows that there is only half as much variation in student achievement between schools as there is among classrooms in the same school. If you want your child to get the best education possible, it is actually more important to get him assigned to a great teacher than to a great school.*
> – Bill Gates

The Directing Staff title does injustice to the role of the military advisors. It is steeped in a military culture based upon training and administration. Like their National Security Programme counterparts, the primary roles of the senior military staff on the Joint Command and Staff Programme are to mentor, advise, and where necessary, teach. The current college functional review being conducted by the Strategic Management Cell asserts in its loose terms of reference that "the focus of the DS has changed over the years from learning facilitators to student assessors."[107] This is a somewhat misplaced assertion based upon narrow data collection and does not reflect best practice at the college. Nevertheless the role and staffing of those mentors does merit review.

The European Association for Quality Assurance in Higher Education determined that excellence is achieved through various factors including "inspirational lecturers, organisation of presentations, interaction with students, and how well the information meets the learning objectives."[108] It is the latter two areas that solidify the role of the mentor. As discussed in the previous chapter, deep learning will only be achieved through gaining student interest, which requires the student to glean purpose and value from the experience. Undoubtedly the academic has a role to play in developing knowledge and critical thinking, but they are not equipped to establish the purpose and value. Command, senior Headquarter staff duties, and operational planning experience allow the mentor to provide context to all aspects of the curriculum, which is critical to developing interest and deep learning.

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[106]Department of National Defence. *Canadian Officership in the 21st Century*. . ., 1-21.

[107]Canadian Forces College, *Functional Review – Focus Areas and Issues*, 16 February 2016.

[108]European Association for Quality Assurance, *The Concept of Excellence* . . ., 12-13.

New Zealand Defence College faculty member, Murray Simmons, has attended the Australian Advanced Command and Staff Course, taught on the New Zealand Command and Staff Course, and has visited all major international staff colleges over a 20 year career teaching and observing education in the military. In his doctoral thesis on holistic professional military education, he observes that "tacit learning of the academic game was achieved when civilian university lecturers presented whereas learning the profession was more often acquired when military presenters were presenting."[109] Frequently, presenters both internal and external, fail to address the higher level learning objectives or fail to establish the conditions so that the students can make the contextual connection as to why they should be interested in the topic.[110] This is crucial if the education is to have any operational value to the Canadian Forces.

In order to be an effective mentor, a relationship built upon trust must be established. The student must have confidence in the mentor and trust that they are being led or coached in a particular direction for a reason. Dr Joanne Robinson, Director of Professional Learning for the Ontario Principals Council, conducted a qualitative study of adaptive expertise on mentors who had undertaken a mentor and coaching programme. She observed that the "mentors shifted from traditional mentor and 'problem solver' to coach and guide, using active listening and thought provoking questions."[111] In order to make this transition however, mentors need the experience and expertise.

The Canadian Forces takes an unusual approach to its assignments at the Canadian Forces College. Most Canadians are posted there having expressed an interest to be in the

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[109]Murray Simons. "Holistic Professional Military Development: Growing Strategic Artists." (Doctor of Education Thesis, Massey University, New Zealand, 2009), 147.

[110]Canadian Forces College, "Recordex," last accessed 8 May 2016, http://barker.cfcacad.net/Admin/JCSP42/Admin/jcsp-activities-eng.html.

[111]Dr Joanne Robinson, "Mentoring and Coaching School Leaders," *The OPC Register*, Vol 13, no 2., last accessed 2 May 2016, http://www.katesharpe.ca/assets/mentoring-and-coaching-school-leaders---joanne-robinson---opc-register,-vol.-13-no.-2.pdf.

Toronto or Southern Ontario region. Few are posted as a result of their experience and expertise. Students, having completed the course, are routinely posted into the College immediately as staff. Many of the Directing Staff have not commanded at unit level or filled a senior staff appointment at the Department of National Defence and it is not unusual for none of the Directing Staff to have any operational planning experience.[112] Conversely the UK lists Unit Command and senior Staff Headquarters experience as essential competencies for posting to its Defence Academy with recent operational experience listed as highly desirable.[113] This is further reinforced by the joint prioritisation system that puts the Defence Academy and other major educational establishments as Priority 1 for manning.[114] The UK Military Secretary goes further directing that the best and brightest officers should be assigned to those establishments and that this should be reflected at Promotion Boards.[115]

The Canadian Forces College has benefitted from the UK's policy; exchange officers assigned to Toronto meet the same criteria and must have been recommended for a Directing Staff assignment to the UK Defence Academy. Likewise other countries such as Australia and France have taken a similar approach, to their selection both domestically and for their exchange officers at Toronto. Unfortunately, the college compounds its experience problem by allowing the German exchange student to then become the German exchange Directing Staff officer on completion of the Joint Command and Staff Programme. Given its own assignment criteria, it would be impossible for the Canadian Forces to challenge the German approach. Using recent graduates does not reflect on individual capabilities (the individual officers are of the highest calibre) but limits the ability to mentor. It also places doubt in the

[112]The 2014 JCSP Directing Staff comprised of 6 Canadians and 6 internationals. Only two Canadians had commanded at unit level. Only one Canadian had operational planning experience (during the Bosnia campaign) and two had previous Headquarter experience in Ottawa (as Majors).

[113]Major J Twycross, Career Manager Army Personnel Centre Glasgow, email to author, 10 May 2016.

[114]*Ibid*. Priority 1 = 100% manned at all times.

[115]*Ibid*. Director Manning (Army)'s directive Manning the Training Margin 2016.

students mind as to the competence of the mentor because they are unable to contextualise the syllabus, having been unable to consolidate their learning experience in senior command and staff appointments. Students have challenged the capability of the Directing Staff during the 2014 and 2015 Joint Command and Staff Programme.

If Bill Gates's assertion that it is the quality of the teacher that makes the most impact in the student learning experience is correct,[116] it is clear that the Canadian Forces needs to demonstrate its commitment to the Canadian Forces College by increasing its selection rigour for key mentor appointments. A start would be an insistence of unit command (Lieutenant Colonel / Commander of a major unit) and senior staff experience at an operational or strategic Headquarters (CJOC, DND). Ironically, the approach taken with the National Security Programme exemplifies the approach of ensuring the mentors have sufficient expertise and experience. It uses recently retired senior general and flag officers as mentors.[117] Those individuals have served in and commanded the organisations and institutions that the students are being developed to fill. This allows the mentors to contextualise subjects, give experience-based advice, and bring military clarity to academic discourse. Once assigned to the College a period of shadowing an experienced mentor and attendance on a coaching and mentoring course should be compulsory.

**Generating Excellence Through Guest Lecturers and Subject Matter Experts**

> *Experts often possess more data than judgment.*
>
> – Colin Powell 1996

The use and quality of external speakers has deteriorated on the Joint Command and Staff Programme, although the National Security Programme offers a series of lectures by

[116]Bill Gates, "2009 Annual Letter from Bill Gates: U.S. Education," *The Atlantic Philanthropies*, last accessed 2 May 2016 http://www.atlanticphilanthropies.org/news/2009-annual-letter-bill-gates-us-education.

[117]The current senior mentors include former CEFCOM Commander, Lieutenant General Marc Lessard, former Comd RCN, Vice Admiral Dean McFadden and former Comd RCAF and VCDS, Lieutenant General Fred Sutherland.

pre-eminent leaders in particular fields. Research Professor and founding director of the Center for International Higher Education in the Lynch School of Education at Boston College listed the characteristics of the leading international universities.[118] Second only to excellence in research was 'top quality' professors. Maj Andrew Graham, a US Marine Corps officer attending the 2013 Joint Command and Staff Programme, noted "JCSP-40 suffered in the calibre of academic instruction. Several of the academic professors on the permanent faculty lacked in-depth knowledge of the subjects they taught."[119] He questioned the inability to attract senior Canadian officers from Ottawa and quality guest speakers given the proximity to Toronto's leading universities. The criticism has some validity; a review of student activity validation comments over the last two years shows that academics come in for considerable criticism when they are used to deliver lectures better suited to force development and doctrinal development departments.[120] Likewise, the Joint Command and Staff Programme sits like a frustrated bridesmaid in the wings whilst previous Canadian commanders of the latest NATO campaigns and Ambassadors linked to regions being studied visit the college to brief the National Security Programme but are not leveraged to deliver key components of the Joint Command and Staff Programme. The elective stream teaching model mirrors the National Security Programme and the UK and some other international staff college models, having an academic and military mentor in syndicate for all activities. With collaborative planning knowledge and military context can be integrated in order to create the conditions for deep learning through student interest.

Despite the college's close proximity to the Royal Canadian Military Institute, there is a noticeable lack of synergy. This again manifests in the best military speakers being in

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[118]Philip G. Altbach, "The Costs and Benefits of World-Class Universities," *Academe Online*, vol. 90, no. 1, 2004, last accessed 2 May 2016, http://bcct.unam.mx/adriana/bibliografia%20parte%202/ALTBACH,%20P..pdf.

[119]Maj A.J. Graham, JCSP-40 After Action Report, Canadian Forces College, 27 June 2014.

[120]Canadian Forces College, "Recordex."

Toronto but not being leveraged by the Canadian Forces College.[121] Opportunities do arrive; two standout lectures were delivered in 2015 by General Gordon Messenger, a former Joint Command and Staff Programme alumni and the current UK Vice Chief of Defence, at the request of a UK exchange Directing Staff officer. Lectures were given on military strategic collaboration across Government to the National Security Programme and commanding at the operational level to the Joint Command and Staff Programme. A similar opportunity has arisen via the French exchange Directing Staff officer for the final rotation of the latest Joint Command and Staff Programme. These examples demonstrate the utility of coordinated programming between the various programmes within the college to leverage guest speakers and the utility of contacting former alumni who are now in positions of senior command to gauge the likelihood of visits to Toronto.

Maj Brad Hardy, a recent US Army graduate of the US Command and General Staff College, observed "[the] guest speaker program [at Leavenworth] is world class — don't waste the opportunity."[122] It is not a lame accolade; the course boasted guest lectures from eight current and retired US general officers, senior generals from the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, Bangladesh, and Slovenia and top civilian leaders including Wolfowitz, Sinek, Chapman, Snider, Tisdale, Cobb, Brafman, and Hyrum Smith.[123] The Canadian Forces College can provide similar guest speakers providing it synchronises its programmes and leverages its relationships with premier institutions across Toronto and with former alumni.

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[121]Royal Canadian Military Institute, Speakers Dinner. Decisive Leadership for Coalition Operations in a Complex World with Gen Daniel B Allyn, Vice Chief of Staff of the US Army on 20 April 2016, last accessed 2 May 2016 http://www.rcmi.org/Programmes-Events-(1)/Security-Studies_(2).aspx.

[122]Brad Hardy, "5 Takeaways From A Recent Command And General Staff College Graduate," *Task and Purpose,* 22 June 2015, http://taskandpurpose.com/5-takeaways-from-a-recent-command-and-general-staff-college-graduate/.

[123]*Ibid*.

Attracting the best speakers is only half of the battle. Ensuring that the presentation hits key learning objectives can be problematic. Whilst a Commandant's Hour general lecture offers freedom for the speaker, attracting speakers who meet the learning objectives requires careful management. Directing Staff are occasionally left to bring out learning points ignored by the presenter. Copies of the Learning Output Guides enclosed with an invitation and the current templated appreciation notes, which have been used by the college with minimal change for the last seven years, do little to harness the speaker to meet the students' needs. Letters of invitation should be very clear in plain English on what the college is expecting to gain from the presentation. Following the presentation speakers should be thanked and given feedback on where presentations might be enhanced, critical for those invited to return on a regular basis. The UK's Joint Services Command and Staff College and School of Infantry, which delivers command programmes to Army officers, employs such a strategy to positive effect.

**Resourcing A Comprehensive Approach to Education**

> *In current operations (e.g., Afghanistan and Haiti), the Canadian Forces (CF) are expected to work more closely than in the past with a number of diverse civilian ("public") organizations, including Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), International Organizations (IOs), Other Governmental Departments (OGDs), local populations, and the media.*
>
> – Michael H. Thomson

One area where there is universal agreement across programmes and within the Canadian Forces College, is the requirement for greater whole of Government, multi-national and inter-agency awareness, particularly when planning for operations. Whilst both of the major residential programmes cover the topic extensively, only the senior National Security Programme ensures maximum learning through shared experience. Its syllabus includes briefings from other Government departments and agencies, and benefits from an eclectic student population that is equally split between Canadian military, international military, and

public servants from across Canadian Government. The Joint Command and Staff Programme no longer enjoys the patronage of a Royal Canadian Mounted Police officer or Department of National Defence public servant. The programme has also reduced the number of guest lecturers from other Government departments and agencies, which would improve situational awareness.

As identified in Chapter 3, modularising the programme would make it a more viable option for wider Government student participation at commensurate levels. As highlighted by Michael Thomson, a senior consultant and researcher with Human Systems Incorporated, in a report for Defence Research and Development Canada,

> Knowledge of potential collaboration counterparts was the core recommendation for future training and education to support civil military collaboration in a comprehensive operating context, including the public domain, and this training and education needs to be fully integrated.[124]

Thomson in a separate study concluded, "a number of conditions for effective collaboration were not consistently being met in operations."[125] Addressing this requires future operational planners to study alongside their Government and international counterparts, and to receive appropriate lectures from those departments and agencies. The Canadian Forces College should prioritise this as a learning outcome of all its programmes.

**Achieving Unity of Purpose**

> *The Destiny of Man is to unite, not to divide. If you keep on dividing you end up as a collection of monkeys throwing nuts at each other out of separate trees.*
>
> –T.H. White

Generating excellence in an educational organisation requires unity of purpose. Individual or department expertise does not necessarily lead to a centre of excellence unless it

[124]M. H. Thomson, B.D. Adams, C.D. Hall, A.L. Brown, and C. Flear, *Collaboration Between the Canadian Forces and the Public in Operations* (DRDC Toronto, CR 2011-073, March 2011), i.

[125]M.H. Thomson, B.D. Adams, C.D. Hall, A.L. Brown, and C. Flear, *Collaboration within the JIMP (Joint, Interagency, Multinational, Public) Environment* (DRDC Toronto, CR 2010-136, 2010), i.

operates towards an overarching intent and is in synergy with the aims of the organisation. Arthur Blank, co-founder of The Home Depot makes the point "[passion] and standing up for things can help create a sense of unity. But you still have to act a certain way."[126] The "act a certain way" requires unity of purpose and understanding of the intent. Again the analogy of the Business School versus the traditional university highlights the issue. The traditional university educates for educations sake. A law degree does not make you a lawyer, an arts degree does not make you an artist. The Business School does not have that luxury; its raison d'être is to improve the individual in order to improve the business. Examining the Judge Business School at Cambridge University's purpose statement gives a clear intent to all staff and departments of what is to be achieved.

> Cambridge Judge Business School is in the business of transformation - of individuals, of organisations and society.
>
> What does that mean in practice? It means we work with every student and organisation at a deep level, identifying important problems and questions, challenging and coaching people to find answers, and creating new knowledge.
>
> It means we bring forward the latest thinking from academia and professional practice, and apply our combined knowledge to specific business situations to turn it into action.
>
> It means we believe in encouraging and supporting people to create new products and businesses, pursuing goals for intellectual gain, and contributing to social enterprise.
>
> It means we achieve excellence in the quality of our research insights and our educational engagement. We develop knowledge both for its own sake and to help others make a difference.
>
> It means we train students and clients from all over the world, reward performance in our own staff and enable performance in our students and clients.
>
> It means we contribute to society by building sustainability into the heart of our business education and research.

[126]Arthur Blank in Vernon Hill with Bob Andelman, *Fans Not customers How to Create Growth in a No Growth World* (London: Profile Books, 2012), 79.

> This combination of the latest thinking from academia and professional practice, in turn, enables us to develop greater knowledge and better methods in order to have an impact on the world in which we live and work.[127]

The Canadian Forces College does not currently express such purpose. Its vision statement establishes the broad intent but with nothing underpinning it in terms of what it actually means to each department. Within the Academic department, there is a significant difference between those academics who focus on professional military education and development and those who deliver academic subjects to fulfil Master degree syllabus requirements. There is no formal induction plan that explains what the purpose of the college is, how its outputs (the students) are used by the business (the Canadian Forces). As a result many of the academic activities lack context to the student and rely upon the Directing Staff to draw linkage to future employment and military impact. Likewise support staffs are continually expected to improve performance but, with no overarching framework and limited understanding of the College purpose, focus is understandably on efficiency rather than increased effectiveness. Linked to the earlier observation, military staffs in general lack currency due to the underlying basis for assignment to Toronto; there is a tendency for staff to stay for long periods with some in excess of six years. Curriculum development, programming and syllabus delivery needs currency for effectiveness and reputation. Curriculum that is not cognisant of current Canadian Forces and international military modus operandi is quickly dismissed by the students. Learning Output Guides, which set questions that fail to encourage deep learning, and mentors and academics who do not have the competencies to facilitate deep learning, also lead to sub-optimal output and loss of reputation.

The Joint Services Command and Staff College at Shrivenham has a clear plan to maintain currency and effectiveness in curriculum development. Course planning cells are

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[127]University of Cambridge, Judge Business School, *Why CJBS? We leverage the power of academia for real world impact*, last accessed 4 May 2016, https://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/aboutus/the-school/.

made up of educational design specialists, subject matter experts and Directing Staff who spend their third year of a three-year assignment in Course Design. Where continuity is required, posts are civilianised. The Canadian Forces College should introduce educational design specialists into Course Development and utilise existing Directing Staff for their final year to provide curriculum delivery expertise. Subject matter experts with current experience should fill the remainder of the department. This also requires specific rather than generalist job specifications for individual positions, and an acceptance that posts can be filled by both military and civilian staff.

**Establishing Entry Standards**

> *As a general tendency, more and more attention will be given to the differences in the student population and the student experience. The concept of equality appears to be losing ground with students and staff. Numerous initiatives have been taken to promote excellent tracks, honours degrees and more challenging educational environments for students who are willing and who are capable of achieving higher levels of attainment.*
>
> – Karl Dittrich

The Developmental Period 3 options study in 2001 identified serious problems with the delivery of individual training and education for officers.[128] It highlighted two fundamental questions that remain unresolved: who should Developmental Period 3 education be given to; and should Developmental Period 3 be a single course or split into two, delivered at different stages within the Major to Lieutenant Colonel career stage?[129] These issues were also raised in a report on officer development in 1992 and were validated by students in 2003. Those students questioned the timing of their education, some believing they were too junior for the programme "and could not the see the importance of the education relative to the military profession, while others found some courses redundant

[128]Department of National Defence, Report of the DP3 Delivery Options Study Group, 20 June 2001.

[129]*Ibid*., 15.

because they had previously acquired the knowledge."[130] The questions remain germane to the challenges faced by the college today. Linked to Chapter 2's requirement to define the intent is the requirement to establish who should attend the Canadian Forces College, and, more importantly, why. As reported by the Minister's Monitoring Committee, selection boards are convened to consider officers for command and other key appointments.[131] In theory those selection boards should also therefore determine the requirement to attend the Canadian Forces College.

From a brief analysis of recent course profiles, selection boards are not identifying who needs to attend the Canadian Forces College and force generators, in general, pay scant regard to the development of the individuals for optimised attendance on those programmes. Since 2006, the average age of the Joint Command and Staff Programme student has steadily fallen but the age span has increased, culminating this year in a 22 year spread.[132] Many students do not have the residual service to move past their current rank, the academic qualifications to promote,[133] or the functional language profile.[134] This may suggest a lack of rigour in the selection process or a symptom of saturation. Either way, adopting entry standards for each programme establishing prior skills to be attained, and experience necessary, would enable each programme to optimise the learning output. If the desire is to provide an inclusive Developmental Period 3 course for all Majors and Lieutenant Colonels, then streaming should be considered in order to narrow student capability range and ensure

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[130]Canadian Defence Academy. *Validation of the Officer Professional Military Education Programme. 1 Apr 2002 to 1 Oct 2003*, Final Report Volume 1, 12 January 2005.

[131]Department of National Defence. Minister's Monitoring Committee Final Report …, 28.

[132]Canadian Forces College, "Archive of Courses and Programmes at the CFC," last accessed 8 May 2016, http://barker.cfcacad.net/archives-eng.html.

[133]Despite no formal requirement for a Master degree, promotion boards now award points for attaining a Master Degree, which is often the determining factor at promotion boards.

[134]Canadian Forces College, "Archive of Courses . . ."

that those with maximum potential are truly prepared for senior command and staff appointments.

The college, and Canada, also benefits from international participation on its primary programmes. Although interaction and diversity of experience and perspectives enhance the learning experience, there are some negative impacts. Despite stringent language requirements for entry upon the graduate degree programmes, no such emphasis is placed upon officers completing the professional military education element. This makes no sense given that all programmes are delivered at the graduate standard. As a result, the students who routinely finish in the bottom 5% of both the Joint Command and Staff Programme and National Security Programme are those who have limited or no functional language capability in English.[135] In recent Joint Command and Staff Programmes, students have been permitted to write in their own language with a bilingual professor hired to assess the output or to present their written deliverables verbally in order to assess understanding. Gradings are awarded arbitrarily for diplomacy. These issues would be removed by insisting that all students demonstrate functional competency in verbal, reading and comprehension, as required for graduate enrolment. It is the system used by universities throughout Canada and avoids the challenges of having international officers who are, at best, unable to be assessed properly, or worse, given a 'diplomatic pass.'

**Summary**

Chapter 4 examined how professional military education is resourced at the Canadian Forces College and briefly looked at some of the financial decisions taken on professional military education over the last twenty years. It looked at the role and selection of Directing Staff and the impact of those decisions. The chapter also looked at the role of guest speakers and subject matter experts and offered recommendations on how to leverage these assets for

[135] Joint Command and Staff Programme Assessment Grades. Accessed 1 May 16 (Restricted Access).

greater effect. Resourcing the college for a comprehensive approach was discussed in order to determine how other Government departments could be engaged, and the unity, or lack thereof, of purpose within the various departments of the Canadian Forces College was highlighted. Finally the need to establish rigorous entry standards for staff and students was identified. The next chapter examines how the outputs of the Canadian Forces College are assessed and how continuous improvement towards excellence can be achieved.

# CHAPTER 5 – ASSESSING THE OUTPUT

## Quality Assurance and Continuous Improvement

> *JSP 822 is the authoritative policy and guidance on the Defence Systems Approach to Training (DSAT) which ensures that all of our training is appropriate, efficient, effective and, most importantly, safe. It is the system that must be used by those who are involved in the analysis, design, delivery, assurance, management and governance of training across Defence.*
> – Maj Gen Andrew Gregory, Chief of Defence People 2016

Joint Service Policy 822 provides the UK's direction and guidance on the design and delivery of training for the UK Armed Forces.[136] For the purposes of the policy, "…'training' encompasses any training, education, learning or development."[137] It mandates the Defence Systems Approach to training across four areas: analysis, design, delivery and assurance. It establishes procedure and governance to "ensure that the training of our personnel contributes directly to Defence outputs and to mitigate the risk that it may fail to do so."[138] The Canadian Forces adopts a similar approach to its training through the Canadian Forces Individual Training and Education System but, crucially, does not adopt or adhere to this policy at the Canadian Forces College. The Defence Systems Approach adopts a four-element cycle, shown at Figure 1. The key component common to all phases is the requirement for assessment and assurance. Delivering excellence in education requires quality assurance. It is a philosophy that is found in most learning institutions. The Scottish Government Curriculum for Excellence paper summarises the approach; "Learning and teaching, curriculum and assessment are seen … as a single set of activities. These range

[136]Ministry of Defence, *Joint Service Policy 822. Defence Systems Approach to Training – Direction and Guidance for Individual and Collective Training. Part 1: Directive*, V2, March 2016.

[137]*Ibid*., 1.

[138]*Ibid*.

across planning, learning, teaching and assessment engaging all learners to ensure the best possible outcomes for all."[139]




Figure 1. The 4 Elements of DSAT. Reproduced from JSP 822.

The Canadian Forces College assurance strategy is confined to student feedback on individual activities and Course and Module Reviews, which in theory lead to a programme review board with external stakeholders and a Post Programme Report.[140] In reality, external stakeholders rarely attend and boards are frequently cancelled.[141] External validation is the responsibility of Military Personnel Generation, which undertakes a survey every 3-5 years. The results are not widely published or incorporated into the internal curriculum review meetings and there is no management information system for trend analysis. There is no assurance conducted on curriculum development or course delivery. Given the lack of any

[139]The Scottish Government. *Curriculum for Excellence, Building the Curriculum 5: A Framework for Assessment, Quality Assurance and Moderation* (Edinburgh: APS Group, February 2011), 2.

[140]Canadian Forces College. "Canadian Forces College Policy Document – The Continuous Improvement Continuum," (Toronto: Canadian Forces College, 19 November 2010), 1/26.

[141]Canadian Forces College. *Functional Review . . .*, 5

formal qualifications or training requirement for those involved in both of these areas, a lack of quality assurance carries risk of sub-optimal delivery and to compound the issue, means there is no obvious mechanism for continuous improvement.

**Internal Validation**

Internal validation through the student 'Recordex' system is inadequate for process evaluation. The students are able to comment on individual activities but not on the course or programme as a whole. The only holistic student feedback comes from letters from various students, universally international students, often in the form of a report to their force employer or generator. The Recordex process, whilst computerised needs enhancement. As a minimum, it should allow voluntary individual comments on individual activities, courses and the overall programme, and mandatory syndicate comments. The content of the Recordex needs to enable trend analysis with more targeted questions that provide both quantitative and qualitative data; should the activity be retained / revised / removed; if revised or removed, why; is the activity material relevant / appropriate / current; if not, why etc. At the end of each course students should be asked to comment on relevance, method of delivery and sequence. A simple set of binary questions, a requirement to provide an overall score and areas to explain sub-optimal areas for improvement, would provide timely feedback on all aspects of the curriculum.

In addition to the Recordex, students are supposed to be given the opportunity to attend an After Action Review, which should allow the students "to discuss with their colleagues and staff what they achieved in terms of the learning objectives" and how they can improve.[142] These should happen on the direction of the Director of Programmes and on completion of each exercise. There has not been an After Action Review in the last three

[142]Canadian Forces College. "Canadian Forces College Policy Document . . ., 2/26.

years. Likewise students should complete an End of Programme Survey on completion of the programme, which would provide a measure of learning and satisfaction, with the results promulgated.[143] Again, these surveys are delivered ad hoc and not promulgated for discussion and evaluation by course developers, academics and directing staff.

**External Validation**

Although it is Military Personnel Generation's responsibility to conduct external validation, it is the Canadian Forces College that requires it and benefits from it. Like internal validation, it needs to be consistent and timely in order to be useful. Again, trend analysis is key if continuous improvement is to be a goal. This should be an annual validation sent to student and force employer 12 months after completion of the course. Some learning organisations advocate repeating the exercise at a later period (2-5 years) after the student completes the programme in order to validate the findings. "Engagement in this reflective and collaborative process enable the school to review its improvement journey and build capacity for ongoing improvement in the future."[144] External validation is not simply about confirming the findings of internal validation or the relevance of the programme to the business needs; it should be used to evaluate all aspects of the programme from entry standards to assessment strategies and report writing.

If there is to be confidence in the assessments of the students attending the Canadian Forces College and utility in the reports and recommendations on those students, they must be externally validated with a view to developing supporting empirical evidence. As Dr. Samuel J. Messick, a leader in educational testing at the Educational Testing Service at Princeton states, "[validity] is an integrated evaluative judgment of the degree to which

[143]*Ibid*., 4/26.

[144]Catholic Education South Australia, "External Validation Workshop 2016," last accessed 7 May 2016, http://registrationcentre.cesa.catholic.edu.au/events.

empirical evidence and theoretical rationales support the adequacy and appropriateness of inferences and actions..."[145] Without external validation, changes to educational programmes may be made based upon limited and incomplete data. An evaluation of professional military education at the college in 2010 concluded that both the major programmes had been altered significantly but "it would seem that there is a tendency for many staff to jump on the 'good ideas bus, overly often."[146] Arguably, this trait is inevitable given the lack of validation, and performance measurements, which is discussed later. The report also argues that a lack of comprehensive, periodic and reliable validated information is problematic.[147]

**Assessing the Student**

The assessment strategy for the Joint Command and Staff Programme is built upon two competing requirements: the need to evaluate student performance in a professional military education context, and the confirmation required for the Master Degree awarded by the Royal Military College of Canada. It has led to an extraordinary policy and standards that do not stand up to close scrutiny. The course marking rubrics are geared to an average score falling within a 10 point spread (70-79); a B-grade uses terms such as "essay draws from and acceptable variety of sources and perspectives" and "presentation of the evidence demonstrates a clear understanding of its themes, both specific and general."[148] These rubric criteria place approximately 70% of the students selected for the Joint command and Staff

[145]Messick, S., "Validity," In *Educational measurement,* 3rd ed., ed. R.L. Linn (New York, NY: American Council on Education and Macmillan, 1989), 13-103.

[146]Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis, *An Evaluation of Pedagogical Practices in Professional Military Education at the Canadian Forces College*. (Ottawa, July 2010), 31.

[147]*Ibid*., 31.

[148]Department of National Defence, CFC 300, *Canadian Forces College. Joint Command and Staff Programme Syllabus Version 15*.(Ottawa: Military Personnel Generation, 2015), 2-15/48.

programme within the B bracket with a further 25% awarded an A-. Less than 4% score lower than the Master degree pass level of 70%.[149]

The assessment strategy is also hampered by the need to limit the number of students awarded a Superior or Outstanding grade, which was linked to marking grades.[150] The average academic student scores for traditional Master study are placed in the 21-point spread (80-100). As a result, the vast majority of Canadian military students are placed in an artificially condensed grade spread of around 12 points. This is compounded further by decision to set the professional military education pass mark 10 points below the Master degree pass level. Conceptually this is a ludicrous proposition. At the UK, US and AUS staff colleges, the differentiation between those awarded a Master degree and those who only pass the professional military education is the number of electives and the amount of written deliverables.[151]

There are strong arguments for including academic education, particularly the liberal arts, in professional military education for officers selected for senior command and staff appointments, confirmed by the Defence Science Advisory Board in its study of the role and value of education in the intellectual development of the Canadian Forces.[152] Tamir Libel, a professor at the Centre for War Studies, University College Dublin, argues that the adoption of academic standards, linked to Master level study, was a counter to the low standards of

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[149]Joint Command and Staff Programme Assessment Grades. . .

[150]The linkage between scores and overall grading has been relaxed with greater emphasis on position rather than score being the determinant for the latest Joint Command and Staff Programme.

[151]Air Commodore A Byford, Deputy Commandant UK Defence Academy, telephone conversation with author, 10 May 2016. ACSC Assessment Strategy.

[152]Defence Science Advisory Board, *DSAB Report 1304. The Role and Value of Education in the Intellectual Development of the Canadian Armed Forces' Officers and Non-Commissioned Members*. (Ottawa, May 2013).

professional military education that characterised the Cold War, and specifically the 1990s.[153] The Canadian Forces College suggests a lower standard required for professional military education. A student who achieves a grade of 60% is characterised in the marking rubric as someone who consistently "[has] limited interaction with peers," and "arrives noticeably less than entirely prepared"; this is apparently good enough for the rigours of senior command and staff appointments.[154] The loading policy encourages this perception; approximately 10% of students sent to the college do not have the academic pre-requisites to study at the graduate level. Despite their lack of academic credentials all pass the professional military education elements of the programme. It is almost impossible to defend different academic and professional military education standards, if using the same rubric and completing the same activities. If the curriculum dictates education at the graduate level, allowing a non-graduate pass makes no sense. This anomaly should be addressed quickly, which would also compel force generators to ensure students have the academic pre-requisites for full contribution on the course.

Aligning assessment criteria is only part of the strategy. The Canadian Forces College also adopts a 'grade everything' policy resulting in each student being awarded an individual grade for every single activity.[155] This is problematic for a number of reasons. Linked to an assessment strategy that determines only those who consistently grade outstanding over the entire course (typically scoring an average in excess of 80%) can be awarded an overall grade of outstanding, this fails to acknowledge peaks and troughs, different styles of learning, and those who take slightly longer to assimilate knowledge before making an active contribution. It also forces students to contribute in order to meet the rubric

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[153]Tamir Libel, *European Military Culture and Security Governance: Soldiers, Scholars and National Defence Universities*. (London: Routledge, 2016).

[154]Department of National Defence, CFC 300 . . ., 2-13/48.

[155]Canadian Forces College, "Archive of Courses . . ."

requirements rather than simply to add value. As Okros argues, "the current assessment policy encourages students to 'play the game' rather than develop deep learning.[156] It is fundamentally flawed in that it does not provide a safe learning environment. Students have different pedagogical approaches to learning. The syndicate room must acknowledge the requirement to reflect and understand, encourage self-reflection and encourage self-efficacy.[157] Furthermore the rankings do not necessarily reflect the overall potential for future senior command and staff appointments.

There are two elements to assessment: the requirement to confirm students have attained the necessary academic levels to pass the programme (both graduate and professional military education); and to confirm the level of potential for future senior command and staff appointments. The former could be achieved by individual assessments of written deliverables, examinations and periodic progress review assessments, a system utilised by the UK's Joint Services Command and Staff College (and US, German and Australian Staff Colleges, and most civilian universities).[158] A large number of universities base results solely on written deliverables and do not assess classroom participation. Potential needs to be realistic in its assessment; the current assessment criteria, which awards over 60% of the students with a superior or outstanding grading has become meaningless. Moreover, there is plenty of anecdotal evidence to suggest that force generators in career management ignore Staff College gradings. In part this is because of the issues regarding intent covered in Chapter 2. The institution needs to define what it wants the Canadian Forces College to do in terms of assessment.

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[156]Canadian Forces College, *Functional Review . . .*, 2

[157]Information Resources Management Association (USA), *Adult and Continuing Education: Concepts, Methodologies, Tools, and Applications* (Hershey: Information Science Reference, 2014), 636.

[158]Air Commodore A Byford, Deputy Commandant UK Defence Academy, telephone conversation with author, 10 May 2016.

The UK model of assessment employed for the Advanced Command and Staff College is an agreed policy between the Joint Services Command and Staff College and the force generators who provide the career management. They have agreed to a general principle that positioning on the course determines future potential. Notwithstanding academic grades for the award of the Master degree, students are placed in order and identified as top 10%, and top, middle and lower third, with numbers being evenly divided. Student position equates to future potential and is described thus:

- Top 10% = 'on intellectual grounds clear reach to 1*.'
- Top 1/3 = 'on intellectual grounds good reach to 1*.'
- Middle 1/3 = 'on intellectual grounds clear reach to OF5.'
- Bottom 1/3 = 'on intellectual grounds good reach to OF5.'[159]

Reports are written in free text as per a traditional personnel evaluation report, describing performance and potential with the position third and its descriptor included. Those who finish in the top ten or who receive academic awards are also acknowledged separately. Alan Okros highlights the prominence in developing, assessing and advancing individuals' leadership but explains the challenges of getting a consistent approach in the joint environment.[160] He also notes the need to understand command, leadership and management and to determine the key elements. The criteria set out by Okros could also be used as a basis for the assessment rubric.[161]

Learning objectives, assessment rubrics, strategy and reports are inextricably linked. The US military colleges favour the use of Bloom's taxonomy in developing their objectives and assessment rubrics; this provides consistency of approach. The UK uses competencies

[159]Joint Services Command and Staff College, *Advanced Command and Staff Course – Report Writing Guide*, (Shrivenham: JSCSC, 20 September 2014), Appendix 4 to Annex C.

[160]Dr Alan Okros, *Leadership in the Canadian Military Context*, CFLI Monograph 2010-01 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, November 2010), 1.

[161]*Ibid*., 9.

derived from its officer competencies, which form the basis for learning objectives, assessment rubrics, and assignment specifications. The key factor is consistency and relevance between the gradings, report and future potential. The Officer Developmental Period 4/5 report suggests such an approach would be welcomed by the Canadian Forces. It seeks greater emphasis on performance in the elective streams be included to "ensure they appropriately inform the performance assessment and career planning element of CAF personnel management."[162] There is merit in the Canadian Forces College reviewing its own assessment strategy with the wider institution in order to deliver similar levels of consistency. It is also worth reviewing the current policy of taking wider officer qualities, based upon extra-curricular activities, into consideration. It is not used in assessment in the US, UK, Australian, French or German Staff Colleges and, given that there is no formal assessment activities at the Canadian Forces College, is an entirely subjective and unmeasured quantity. The core qualities are a mandated quality for attendance not an alternative measurement of command and staff potential.

**Establishing Key Performance Questions and Key Performance Indicators**

Quality assurance in development and delivery, validation of the course and coherent assessment strategies are the vital components to delivering excellence and achieving Centre of Excellence status. Key to achieving it though is effective measurement of performance across all aspects. This requires the establishment of key performance questions and determining the key performance indicators that demonstrate success and areas for further improvement. Questions and measurements should be set across all aspects of the college business plan and include student progression post study.

Further strategies that assist in benchmarking and developing performance measurements are with greater affiliation and accreditation. The Master in Defence Studies

[162]Canadian Defence Academy. *Report of the Officer Developmental Period 4/5: Project Strategic Leader*. (Ottawa: CDA, 2015).

and the Master in Public Administration are professional degrees. The rise in popularity of professional degrees connected to business and education has been widely reported[163] but professional bodies, such as the Law Society or Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development, accredit the majority of them. There is merit in improving the value of the degrees being offered at the Canadian Forces College through accreditation for relevance but by doing so, commits the college academic programmes to professional review, as well as academic review.

**External Advice**

Another source of measurement is in the development of linkages "with sister colleges and universities for benchmarking best practice, a mandated action for the Canadian Forces College."[164] The UK Defence Academy has also forged wider links with institutions and has formed an Academy Advisory Board with the aim of "[capturing] senior level advice, [with] the involvement of academics, senior business leaders, and public sector participants."[165] Membership is drawn from a wide spectrum of military and civilian institutions and leverages the experience of key individuals. The current board comprises:

> Vice Admiral Duncan Potts CB (Chair) - Director General Joint Force Development and Defence Academy.
> Mark Alexander - Operations Director Defence Academy
> Sir Tom Phillips KCMG - Commandant Royal College of Defence Studies
> Major General J R Free CBE -Commandant Joint Services Command and Staff College
> Sir Paul Lever KCMG - Vice-President of the Royal United Services Institute Council
> Sir Ian Andrews – Former Chairman, Serious Organised Crime Agency
> Dr Frances Saunders - Trustee of the Engineering Development Trust and Fellow of the Royal Academy of Engineering.

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[163]Graduate Management Admission Council, *Disrupt or Be Disrupted: A Blueprint for Change in Management Education* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2013).

[164]Canadian Forces College, "Transformation Campaign Plan…", 20.

[165]Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, "Advisory Board Role Membership & Biographies," last accessed 8 May 2016, http://www.da.mod.uk/About-Us/Advisory-Board.

Professor Sir Hew Strachan - Professor of International Relations at the University of St Andrews
Dr Andrew Tyler FRAeS FREng CBE - Chief Executive, Europe, Northrop Grumman Corporation
Mr Paul Collard - Partner, Deloitte

This array of expertise offers the Commandant of the Academy and his College Commandants with the opportunity to test ideas, seek external advice and to identify best practice across education and business. In addition, the Defence Academy has established a number of Customer Executive Boards, which provide a "holding to account mechanism for stakeholders to develop the scale and content of Training and Education to match the operational/business requirement within the available budget, and in accordance with relevant Defence and single Service policies."[166] Although operating on a different scale – the UK Defence Academy has 12 operating units: the Royal College of Defence Studies, the Joint Services Command and Staff College, the Shrivenham Leadership Centre, the Armed Forces Chaplaincy Centre, Nuclear Department, Defence Centre of Training Support, the Technology School, Business Skills College, the Defence 6th Form College, Defence Technical Undergraduate Scheme, Defence Technical Officer and Engineer Entry Scheme, and Defence Engagement - there is significant merit in adopting a similar construct at the Canadian Forces College. An Advisory Board drawing from the expertise of institutions like the University of Toronto, the Royal Canadian Military Institute, the Monk School etc and leaders or ex-leaders from Business and other Government departments would offer a more diverse range of experience and advice to the Canadian Forces College.

**Summary**

This chapter looked at how the outputs of the Canadian Forces College are assessed and identified areas where policy and direction need to be robustly enforced. It looked at the need for quality assurance across all aspects of development and delivery, benchmarking the

[166]Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, "Customer Executive Boards," last accessed 7 May 2016, http://www.da.mod.uk/About-Us/Customer-Boards.

Canadian Forces College approach to the UK's Defence Systems Approach to Training. It examined the need for both internal and external validation and emphasised the importance of timely and useful feedback. The chapter also looked at how students are assessed and highlighted some of the unintended consequences of the current strategy. It identified the importance of clearly defined performance management questions and measurable key performance indicators in order to establish continuous improvement towards excellence. Finally, the use of external advisors in the UK's Defence Academy was examined to demonstrate how such an approach can positively impact the decision making process of the Command Board.

# CHAPTER 6

# SUMMARY OF KEY RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

*In the choice between changing one's mind and proving there's no need to do so, most people get busy on the proof.*

– JK Galbraith

## Summary of Key Recommendations

Throughout this paper observations have been made on best practise and, where appropriate, areas for improvement have been identified. The key recommendations that fall out of those observations are summarised:

### *Ends*

- A clear vision and statement of requirement must be established for the Canadian Forces College and its education programmes aligning the course *Ends* set by policy and end users, with *Means* dictated by Military Personnel Generation and *Ways* executed by the institution. Chapters 1, 2 and 3.
- In order achieve a comprehensive buy-in from all stakeholders, the intent must be owned and delivered by the Chief of Defence Staff and the Armed Forces Council, and policed by force employment and force generation commanders, Commander Military Personnel and Commander Military Personnel Generation. Chapter 2.
- Clear direction should be issued on who should attend each of the programmes and why in order to align resourcing with intent. Chapters 2 and 4.
- Previous recommendations from the Rowley Report onwards should be examined and, if still relevant, actioned. Chapter 1.
- The vision of the college needs to be aligned with Government intent on the institutionalisation of national and international partnerships in support of a Whole of Government approach. Chapter 3.

- Detailed learning outputs should be derived from Officer 2020 or its successor. Chapter 2.

***Ways***

- The college and wider institution must convey the intent and vision for each aspect of officer professional development and ensure the students understand it. Chapter 3.
- Transformation should be adopted in order to modernise the pedagogical approach, curriculum development and staff expertise. Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5.
- The curriculum must be relevant. Students should examine current issues and evaluate the utility of current doctrine to meet those challenges. Chapter 3.
- Where practicable, student choice should be offered in order to encourage deep learning. Chapter 3.
- Programme curriculum needs to reflect Government policy on future employment of the Canadian Forces. Chapter 2.
- Written deliverables need to be relevant and used in wider Defence research. Chapter 3.
- Greater synergy between key programmes needs to be generated in order to leverage guest speakers.
- The assessment strategy needs to be reviewed to include the alignment of marking rubrics with Bloom's taxonomy or other officer cognitive qualities, and alignment of grading with other Graduate institutions. Student position and future potential assessments should be aligned. Chapter 5.
- Course reports should be aligned to end user requirements. Chapter 5.
- A modular approach to course delivery should be considered to facilitate wider Government and Department student participation for specific elements. Chapter 3.

- The Canadian Forces College should establish an Advisory Board to leverage wider Government, Department, Education and Business experience. Chapter 5.
- Detailed job specifications should be produced for all Canadian Forces College curriculum development and directing staffs need to be established and rigorously enforced by force generators and Military Personnel Command. Chapter 5.
- Robust entry criteria must be established for all student programmes and rigorously enforced by force generators and Military Personnel Command. Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5.

***Means***

- Activity Based Costing needs to be adopted and aligned to learning outputs so that full impact and risk assessment can be carried out for curriculum changes.
- A comprehensive induction programme to ensure all members of the faculty and support staff understand the desired outcomes and purpose of the programmes should be introduced. Chapter 5.
- A robust quality assurance programme and continuous improvement programme must be introduced. Chapter 5.
- Internal and external validation must be improved and carried out in accordance with extant policy. Chapter 5.
- Key performance measurements should be developed and bench marking with similar institutions implemented. Chapter 5.

**Conclusion**

> *Joint military education across the ADF is growing in importance. Defence must ensure that our Defence colleges and educational institutions are best equipped to develop the future leaders of the ADF.*
>
> – Marise Payne. Minister for Defence. 2016 Australian Defence White Paper.

The ambition to be a centre of excellence is not simply an aspirational vision parachuted in to corporate missions to inspire the workforce, it is a target that all command and staff colleges should continuously strive to achieve. The purpose of a command and staff college is to prepare the selected future leaders of the military institution for command and institution staff appointments. Such a responsibility can only be delivered through a commitment to excellence in the delivery of education. This paper has examined the concept of excellence in education and taken a holistic evaluation across the areas of leadership, policy and strategy, people management, partnerships and resources, and process management. The Canadian Forces College is not yet a centre of excellence, and in some areas falls some way short of such an accolade but it is by no means an aspiration that is out of its reach.

Unfortunately, achieving excellence requires substantial effort and support from all stakeholders, many of whom fall outside of the college's command. It will only be achieved if the institution achieves unity of purpose in its delivery of professional military education. Becoming a centre of excellence requires the backing of the whole institution, driven from the very top of the command structure. It requires the establishment of clear intent and purpose, underpinned by a detailed statement of requirement. Once the *ends* have been established it requires commitment from all stakeholders to meet those requirements and the College needs to optimise the *ways* through its delivery processes. All of this has to be resourced, so that the Canadian Forces College is provided with the *means* to achieve excellence.

The paper has shown that the Canadian Forces College does not have a detailed statement of requirement nor is the broad intent expressed by senior commanders resourced properly in terms of budget, student selection and staff assignments. It does however enjoy synergy in its ambition with both Government and senior commanders as demonstrated in Jill

Sinclair's direction from the Chief of the Defence Staff. It should also be comforted that the problems it faces are not unique; the US educational system also faces internal criticism. Moreover, the UK Defence Academy, despite its general acclaim, only achieved its centre of excellence status in a relatively short time period after establishing a joint approach at Shrivenham. What is clear from the research is that in order for the Canadian Forces College to become a centre of excellence, it will need to embrace transformational change. Curriculum and pedagogical approaches must be contemporised to meet the changing needs of the student and to better achieve the intent of deep learning.

Fundamental to achieving excellence is the need for continuous improvement through quality assurance, validation, benchmarking and performance management. Again, this is not an area that the Canadian Forces College currently excels in. Assurance in itself can be resource intensive but, if the organisation and institution is serious about achieving excellence, then it is an area that it must invest heavily in. Adopting best practices from other institutions, establishing an advisory board and developing partnerships offer ways to leverage expertise and experience in the quest for excellence. The recommendations in this paper are substantial and cannot be implemented overnight. Nevertheless, they offer a glide path, which if embarked upon, could enable the Canadian Forces College to become a centre of excellence.

**Area for Further Study**

This paper has focused solely upon courses delivered within the Canadian Forces College. It has not examined alternative strategies for delivering elements of Developmental Period 3, particularly the need for staff and operational planning training for those employed at the rank of Major. It is worthy of further study; currently all Developmental Period 3 training is delivered on the Joint Command and Staff Programme but there is clearly an educational need for a wider education package. The paper also purposely avoided a discussion on the merits or otherwise of trying to deliver identical outputs and certification for the Distance Learning programme, except where it impinged upon reputation and output. Any fundamental change to curriculum and pedagogical practices at the college should trigger a comprehensive review of any Distance Learning programmes.

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