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INVITING TERRORISM? CANADA'S IMMIGRATION POLICY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

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Exercise Solo Flight

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EXERCISE *SOLO FLIGHT* – EXERCICE *SOLO FLIGHT*

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INVITING TERRORISM? CANADA'S IMMIGRATION POLICY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

In a world darkened by ethnic conflicts that tear nations apart, Canada stands as a model of how people of different cultures can live and work together in peace, prosperity, and mutual respect.

- Bill Clinton, 1995

Canada welcomes more immigrants per capita than any other member-state in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) – with the exception of Australia, with immigrants now accounting for 20% its population.¹ Immigration quotas were significantly increased under Prime Minister Brian Mulroney in the 1990s, and the trend has only increased since that time. While immigration was increasing, the traditional countries of origin for new immigrants to Canada were changing drastically. By 2006, immigrants from Asia and the Middle East outnumbered those from European countries – comprising over 40% of foreign-born residents of Canada.² Canada's total proportion of foreign-born citizens and residents is the highest among the G8 countries.³

With the larger numbers of non-traditional immigrants arriving in Canada through economic, family and humanitarian immigration programs; Canada was forced to

¹ Citizenship and Immigration Canada, *Canada's Recent Immigrants: A Comparative Portrait Based on the 1996 Census* (Ottawa, Citizenship and Immigration, 2001), 2.

² A.E. Challinor, "Canada's Immigration Policy: a Focus on Human Capital," *Online Journal of the Migration Policy Institute*, Sept 15 2011. Last accessed 10 May 2010. <http://migrationpolicy.org/article/canadas-immigration-policy-focus-human-capital/>

³ Statistics Canada, "Immigration and Ethnocultural Diversity in Canada, National Household Survey 2011," Last accessed 10 May 2015, 6. <http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/nhs-enm/2011/as-sa/99-010-x/99-010-x2011001-eng.pdf>

consider the security implications of an open immigration system. The terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre in 2001 amplified the link between immigration and national security, and Canada consequently altered the way immigrants to Canada were screened, prioritized and settled.

Successive Governments have made the case that Canada requires immigrants to stimulate economic growth, counterbalance the low Canadian fertility rate, and to provide the revenue necessary to ensure social safety nets for the aging population are maintained.⁴ These theories are contested, and other theories that high immigration levels are linked to securing votes for the governing federal party abound. Irrespective of the rationale behind the unprecedented levels of immigration, Canada is now faced with the conundrum of permitting large numbers of “the right” immigrants into the country while safeguarding the nation from “the wrong” immigrants. This has resulted in significant changes to the immigration policy of Canada - which attempts to single-out those with the potential to contribute to the country, and anti-terrorism legislation intended to screen-out those prospective immigrants involved in terrorism.⁵ If one accepts that these objectives are mutually necessary, national security must become a more significant consideration in the development of immigration policy.

This paper posits that the changes to the immigration policies of Canada enacted since 2001 – and particularly those of 2014-2015, have the potential to increase

⁴ Arif Anwar, “Canadian Immigration Policy: Micro and Macro Issues with the Points Based Assessment System in Canadian Ethnic Studies,” *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 46, no. 1 (2014): 174.

⁵ “An activity conducted within or outside Canada, for a political, religious or ideological purpose, that is intended to intimidate the public with regard to its security... or to compel a person, government or organization... to do or refrain from doing any act, and that intentionally causes one of a number of specific forms of serious harm.”

radicalization and militancy amongst Muslim immigrants, given a disproportionate focus on the economic benefits to the country - to the detriment of immigrant integration. This paper looks at the threat of militant Islam specifically, as the Government of Canada has expressly identified “jihadist extremism” as the primary threat to national security. Canada’s pre and post 2001 immigration policies will be compared and contrasted with Dr Marc Sageman’s “trajectories to jihad” – which outlines the types of individuals and specific circumstances most likely to cause one to embrace militant Islam.

THE TERRORIST THREAT TO CANADA

Militant Islam

In the most recent Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada, Minister of Public safety, Steven Blaney, stated that “terrorism remains the leading threat to Canada’s national security.”⁶ While the report does not expressly identify militant Islam as the primary terrorist threat, it solely outlines efforts to combat that phenomenon. A report produced for the Integrated Terrorism Analysis Centre (ITAC) supports this view, and notes that the escalation of the terrorist threat in Canada has resulted from Muslim immigrants who become detached from their culture, while at the same time take offence the values apparent in the society of which they are now a part.⁷

The 2011 Statistics Canada National Household Survey indicated that Islam is the fastest growing religion in the Country, with Muslims now accounting for 3.2% - or

⁶ Public Safety Canada, *2014 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada* (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen, 2014), 2.

⁷ Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, “Terrorism in 2025: Likely Dimensions and Attributes.” *ITAC Presents 3* (2007), 9.

approximately 1 million of the national population, and are expected to double in size over the next 10 years.⁸ While Muslims in general contribute greatly to Canadian society and constitute no threat to Canada, a survey of Canadian Muslims suggests deep divisions within the community over subjects such as the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate and the role of Sharia Law.⁹ The same survey indicates that 1% of Canadian Muslims fully support the aims of Al Qaeda, while 34% partially support the organization.¹⁰ A 2007 opinion poll of Canadian Muslims found that 12% of the respondents felt that the terrorist attacks plotted by 18 Canadian Muslim youth in Toronto in 2007 – which aimed to detonate bombs in Toronto and Ottawa, were justifiable.¹¹ Considering the current Muslim Population in Canada, this poll suggests that approximately 12,000 Canadian Muslims would potentially approve of terrorist attacks targeting innocent civilians in Canada. There is no data to suggest how many of those supportive of terrorism in principle would actually engage in or facilitate an attack; however, even a conservative number of 5% of those who consider terrorism a justifiable activity would amount to 600 Canadian Muslims potentially willing to conduct terrorist attacks domestically or abroad. Several post-2001 domestic terrorist events in Canada, as well as the recent trend of the Canadian ‘extremist traveler’ suggest that the concerns of the Government are warranted.

⁸ Statistics Canada, “Immigration and Ethnocultural Diversity in Canada, National Household Survey 2011,” Last accessed 10 May 2015, 216. <http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/nhs-enm/2011/as-sa/99-010-x/99-010-x2011001-eng.pdf>

⁹ Christian Leuprecht and Conrad Winn, “What do Muslim Canadians Want? The Clash of Interpretations and Opinions Research,” n.p.: Macdonald-Laurier Institute, 2011, 3.

¹⁰ Ibid., 28.

¹¹ Daniel Stoffman, “Truths and Myths about Immigration,” In *Immigration Policy and the Terrorist Threat in Canada and the United States*, ed. Alexander Moens and Martin Collacott, 3-20. n.p.: Fraser Institute, 2008, 15.

Trajectories to Militant Islam

While most experts in the field of terrorism studies now agree that there is no single profile which serves to reliably identify potential terrorists, there are broad trajectories along which certain demographics are more likely to be drawn toward militant Islam. Previously held notions of terrorists as poor, mentally unstable, ultra-religious and ignorant have been proven wrong by experts such as Dr Marc Sageman - a former US Foreign Service Officer, forensic psychiatrist and terrorism scholar. Sageman conducted a study of biographical data on 172 individuals who embraced militant Islam and joined Al Qaeda. His research, found that the two demographic groups most likely to embrace militant Islam were Muslims from non-Western countries who traveled to the West to study, and 2nd or 3rd generation offspring of economic immigrants to Western countries.¹² Within these groups there are similarities between the types of individuals who are more likely to embrace militant Islam. Those with the greatest susceptibility are usually university educated, from middle class families and moderate religious household. These individuals are primarily radicalized within social networks they personally seek-out as a result of loneliness, alienation, marginalization, and underemployment experienced in the West.¹³ Those unable to integrate with Western society can become depressed, and seek-out other Muslims of the same age and circumstances – often finding such like-minded individuals in places Muslim immigrants usually congregate, such as Mosques, student

¹² Katharina Von Knop, “Countering Web-Based Islamist Narratives: Conceptualizing an Information War and a Counter-Propaganda Campaign,” in *Hypermedia Seduction for Terrorist Training*, ed. Boaz Ganor et al, 245-266 (Amsterdam, IOS Press, 2007), 246.

¹³ Marc Sageman, “Islam and Al Qaeda,” in *Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization of Martyrdom*, ed. Ami Pedahzur, 122-131 (New York: Routledge, 2006), 127.

associations and online chat rooms. Once a group of disaffected young Muslim male immigrants have associated, they can become more devout in their faith and the malice they hold toward the society in which they feel apart can result in radical one-upmanship – whereby individuals within the group escalate their devotion to Islam and hatred of the West. These hostile views can then turn to militancy – whether it be the desire to engage in terrorism within that country or abroad.¹⁴

Sageman’s findings on the trajectories to militant Islam are corroborated by several other studies. A 2001 study conducted by Nasra Hassan – a UN aid worker, of 250 Palestinian militants, their associates and families. She found that well-educated individuals unable to achieve a social status befitting their education in the workforce were more likely to be drawn to militancy. A separate study by the Palestinian Center for Policy polled 1356 Palestinians above the age of 18 in 2001. The respondents were grouped into occupations of students, tradesmen, housewives, professionals and the unemployed, and of those - students and professionals were most likely to support the use of terrorism to achieve political ends. The unemployed were the least likely to support terrorist attacks – particularly against civilians.¹⁵ Another study of deceased Hezbollah fighters in Lebanon - conducted by Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova in 2002, found that Hezbollah fighters were between the ages of 18 and 25 and were far more likely to have achieved a higher level of education than those of the general Lebanese

¹⁴ Katharina Von Knop, “Countering Web-Based Islamist Narratives: Conceptualizing an Information War and a Counter-Propaganda Campaign,” in *Hypermedia Seduction for Terrorist Training*, ed. Boaz Ganor et al, 245-266 (Amsterdam, IOS Press, 2007), 246.

¹⁵ Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, “Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17, no. 4 (Fall 2003): 125.

population.¹⁶ Similarly, a study of Palestinian suicide bombers from 1987 – 2002 indicated that those conducting martyrdom attacks were far more likely to have post-secondary education than the average Palestinian and were significantly better off economically than the majority of the population.¹⁷

The susceptibility of young, educated, middle-class, disaffected, single males to militancy is not only a phenomenon in the Islamic world. A 1983 study of Latin American, European, Asian and Middle Eastern terrorist groups also found that two-thirds of those involved in terrorist activities had attended university and more than two-thirds came from upper or middle class families.¹⁸

That separate research conducted on markedly different terrorist groups comes to the same conclusion, provides a solid baseline for comparative assessment of the efficacy of Canada's immigration policies against the threat of militant Islam.

IMMIGRATION: THEN & NOW

Pre-2001 Immigration Policy

Canada's immigration department introduced the 'points system,' for selecting new immigrants in 1962, replacing the previous discriminatory process which facilitated entry for those of European decent and kept others out.¹⁹ The immigration programs of

¹⁶ Ibid., 131.

¹⁷ Ibid., 135.

¹⁸ Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, "Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?" *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17, no. 4 (Fall 2003): 141.

¹⁹ Arif Anwar, "Canadian Immigration Policy: Micro and Macro Issues with the Points Based Assessment System in Canadian Ethnic Studies," *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 46, no. 1 (2014): 170.

this era were similar to those of today, in that they consisted of programs designed to facilitate the entry of economic immigrants, family-reunification, and refugees. The points system gave preference to working-age immigrants with English or French language ability, but gave equal priority to family class immigrants attempting to reunite with kin already residing in Canada.²⁰ Economic-class immigrants comprised just 38% of all immigrants to Canada in 1986, and 52% of all immigrants in 1995.²¹ The original economic class programs weighed an immigrant's potential economic and social capital out of a total of 100 points. Equal points for being 'working age' were given to all applicants under the age of 49, and formal job offer was required to secure entry. Pre-arranged employment only offered an applicant a maximum of 15 points out of 100. Additional points were awarded to those with kinship ties in Canada. Language ability accounted for a maximum of 24 out of 100 pts, and a maximum of 22 points were given for education.²² Applicants were not disadvantaged by having dependents.

New immigrants to Canada were guaranteed freedom of mobility under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and could live wherever they chose. As a result, 50% of immigrants moved to Toronto while 30% settled in Montreal and Vancouver – creating large cohesive diaspora communities and unwittingly creating the cultural mosaic for

²⁰ Ray, Brian, "Canada: Policy Changes and Integration Challenges in an Increasingly Diverse Society," *Online Journal of the Migration Policy Institute*, November 1, 2005. Last accessed 10 May 2015. <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/canada-policy-changes-and-integration-challenges-increasingly-diverse-society>

²¹ Citizenship and Immigration Canada, *Canada Facts and Figures: Immigration Overview Permanent and Temporary Residents 2010* (Ottawa, Her Majesty the Queen, 2010), 10.

²² Library of Parliament, BP-190E, *Background Paper: Canada's Immigration Program* (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 2008), 16.

which Canada has become known.²³ Further, successful applicants were offered a range of settlement and integration assistance options – ranging from language training, counselling, low-interest loans, employment search assistance, and development of social contacts within their communities.²⁴ These were well funded, and many were specifically created to assist the large numbers of refugees immigrating to Canada in the 1990s.

An influx of refugees through the 1990s and the terrorist attacks of 9/11 changed the way Canada looked at its immigration process, and the Immigration Act was replaced by the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act in 2001 to reflect a more economically driven process. The most substantial changes to the immigration policy, however, were enacted in 2014/2015.²⁵

Post-2001 Immigration Policy

Upon forming the government in 2008, the Conservative Party of Canada placed the economic resilience of Canada at the fore of many domestic and international policies. Immigration policies began to favour those immigrants most likely to bring economic benefit to Canada – which was consistent with the Conservative reprioritization of Canada’s foreign policy to focus greater diplomatic effort on the facilitation of trade, and

²³ Ibid., 31.

²⁴ Ibid., 28.

²⁵ A.E. Challinor, “Canada’s Immigration Policy: a Focus on Human Capital,” *Online Journal of the Migration Policy Institute*, Sept 15 2011. Last accessed 10 May 2010.
<http://migrationpolicy.org/article/canadas-immigration-policy-focus-human-capital/>

the tying of Canadian aid for developing countries to a tangible economic benefit to Canada.²⁶

The 2001 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act more heavily favoured educated, working-age immigrants from the economic class, while the Express Entry Program - which came into effect in January 2015, solidified Canada's prioritization of economic immigration over humanitarian and family reunification schemes, and gave Provincial Governments and employers a much more significant role in the immigration process.²⁷

The Express Entry Program is an immigration scheme intended to fast-track those immigrants holding skills for which the Canadian economy has identified an urgent need. Applicants complete an online profile, from which scores are tabulated automatically and computer-analyzed results are passed to a Citizenship and Immigration Canada employee for review. Those applicants with the highest rankings are invited to submit their profile to the Express Entry Pool and the Canadian Job Bank, from where employers and Provincial Governments can then view immigrant files and offer jobs and nominations based on need. The Express Entry Program constitutes the first time in history where employers are able to actively search pre-screened immigrants and make unsolicited job offers directly. The offer of a job by a Canadian employer or offer of nomination by a provincial government results in an automatic invitation for the applicant to apply for

²⁶ Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, *Global Markets Action Plan* (Ottawa, Her Majesty the Queen, 2013), 4.

²⁷ Canadian Citizenship and Immigration Resource Center, "Canada Priority Residence Program." Last accessed 10 May 2015. <http://www.immigration.ca/en/employment-portal/canada-priority-residence-program-cprp>

permanent residence in Canada. Those applicants not selected by a province or employer have their scores assessed by Citizenship and Immigration Canada on the basis of their potential “human capital” contribution to Canada. Those invited to apply for permanent residence are promised a selection decision within 6 months.²⁸

The way in which points are tabulated under the Express Entry Program are also markedly different from that of the pre-2001 economic immigration schemes. The new system rates an applicant out of a total of 1200 points. An applicant receives 600 points automatically if he has a job offer from a Canadian employer or is nominated through a provincial immigration program.²⁹ Up to 500 points are awarded based on age, education, language proficiency and work experience – with notable preference given to young, university educated individuals. Finally, up to 100 points are awarded for foreign work experience and recognized trade qualification certificates. Prospective economic immigrants with spouses can be significantly disadvantaged under the Express Entry Program, should the spouse have limited marketable skills, education or language ability. As of March 2015, Citizenship and Immigration Canada had not selected any applicant possessing a score below 735 points.³⁰ This indicates that no prospective economic immigrant has been accepted under the Express Entry program without a provincial

²⁸ Synergism Consulting, “A Comparison of Express Entry and Canadian Work Permits.” Last accessed 10 May 2015. <http://canadaworkpermit.com/wp/2015/01/a-comparison-of-express-entry-and-canadian-work-permits>

²⁹ Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, “Express Entry: How will Skilled Immigrants Rank?,” 3 December 2014. Last accessed 10 May 2014. <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/express-entry-how-will-skilled-immigrants-rank-1.2858150>

³⁰ Gerami Law, “Ottawa Immigration Lawyers Weigh In: Did Express Entry Change the Canadian Experience Class Category?,” Last accessed 10 May 2015. <https://www.geramilaw.com/blog/ottawa-immigration-lawyers-weigh-in-did-express-entry-change-the-canadian-experience-class-category.html>

nomination or job offer from a Canadian employer. Out of 260,000 – 285,000 expected immigrants to Canada in 2015, 66.2% of offers of permanent residency are designated for economic-class immigrants.³¹ This number is significantly higher than the average for economic immigrants at any point in Canadian history.

In comparison to the pre-2001 immigration programs, the current programs differ most significantly in the number of points associated with a formal job offer, direct employer participation in the process, automation of the file assessment process, and the increased total percentage of annual immigration intake designated for economic-class immigrations. Figure 1 shows the Express Entry Pool scores of a 27 year old university graduate with Basic English language competency and some job experience in his/her home country. Also shown are the scores for this same individual if he had applied with a spouse, or had no formal job offer.

Job Offer / No Spouse	Job Offer / With Spouse	No Job Offer / No Spouse
854 / 1200 points	838 / 1200 points	254 / 1200 points

Table 1 – Express Entry Score for 27 Year Old University Graduate with Basic English Language Competency³²

Under the post-2001 immigration policies, new immigrants retain the right of freedom of mobility; however, the employer-driven nature of the process suggests that immigrants will be forced to move to the area in which they received a job offer.

³¹ Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “Notice – Supplementary Information to the 2015 Immigration Levels Plan,” Last accessed 10 May 2015. <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/media/notices/2014-11-06.asp>

³² Canadian Immigration Law Firm, “Express Entry Comprehensive Ranking System Calculator.” Last accessed 10 May 2015. <http://www.canadavisa.com/comprehensive-ranking-score-calculator.html>

Immigrant integration programs also continue in the post-2001 era; however, despite the record levels of immigration, the operating budgets and human resource allocation for programs which facilitate immigrant integration have been reduced for the 2015 year – with further cuts forecasted over the next three years. Funding for the family and refugee classes of immigration has also been reduced for 2015. Meanwhile, funding and human resources dedicated to the international student program have increased and economic immigration programs will only experience a drop in funding related to the automation of the entry process and reduced terminated applications.³³

The International Student Program has been recognized for its economic benefit in post-2001 immigration policies, and the program was streamlined in 2014 to ensure the student population could grow beyond the 111,865 accepted into Canada the previous year.³⁴ To gain entry to Canada as a student, the applicant requires a letter of acceptance to a “designated learning institute” – which can include varying educational institutions offering everything from hairstyling to doctorates, a clean criminal record, and proof they have sufficient funds to return home following their studies.³⁵

IMPACT OF ECONOMIC IMMIGRATION ON SECURITY

³³ Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “Report on Plans and Priorities 2014-2015,” Last accessed 10 May 2015. <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/publications/rpp/2014-2015/>

³⁴ Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “2014 Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration,” Last accessed 10 May 2015. <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/publications/annual-report-2014/index.asp>

³⁵ Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “Determine Your Eligibility to Study in Canada.” Last accessed 10 May 2015. www.cic.gc.ca/english/study/study-who.asp

The success of Canada's post-2001 immigration policies in reducing backlogged applications, recognizing immigrant professional accreditations, and addressing unemployment – issues that hamper economic integration, cannot be denied; however, economic integration is but one aim of immigration. Social integration - the sense of belonging to one's community and country, must be given similar weight if immigration programs are to be successful.

The Express Entry Program will undoubtedly result in more highly educated immigrants entering Canada and correspondingly fewer burdens on social programs. So from an economic standpoint, Canada's immigration policy appears sound. It is when one views immigration from a security perspective that the Canada's policies reveal areas for concern. This paper has established that those most susceptible the trajectories to militant Islam are young, educated, single male economic immigrants who become isolated and marginalized upon moving to the West. The following sections will therefore discuss the profile of immigrants most likely to benefit from Canada's post-2001 immigration policies such as the Express Entry Program, and will determine whether the unbalanced prioritization of economic integration is detrimental to social integration – and whether that poses an increased risk of alienating new Muslim immigrants.

Education and Employment

It has been established that Muslim immigrants with higher education and social status who experience discrimination and isolation in Canada are more susceptible to the lure of militant Islam than are unskilled or poor Muslim immigrants. It has also been

demonstrated that Canada's new immigration policies strongly favour economic immigrants over family or humanitarian cases, and that Express Entry Immigration Pool scores can give preference to single immigrants over those with families. The fact that economic immigrants will account for a larger percentage of new immigrants over the coming years, coupled with a youth bulge of educated young males in Muslim countries unable to find work in their home countries, suggests that Canada will likely witness an increasing number of immigration applications from that demographic – who are more likely to achieve residency under Express Entry.

Educated economic class immigrants have 10% more success entering the workforce than refugees and 20% more success than family class immigrants.³⁶ Of those educated immigrants, however, the most educated are more likely to experience higher unemployment than Canadian-born citizens with the same education.³⁷ Immigrants to Canada are generally paid less than Canadian-born citizens with similar education and skills, and there are few measures contained in the new immigration policies which would alleviate this disparity.³⁸ The issue is compounded when the underemployment of highly skilled immigrants is factored-in, as an immigrant possessing a university degree is 29% more likely to have to accept a low-income job under the post-2001 immigration policy than would have been the case in 1993. Considering these statistics, there is an increased possibility that the new system could perpetuate the phenomenon of underemployed

³⁶ Livianna S. Tossutti, *Literature Review: Immigration Outcomes - Citizenship and Immigration Canada*. Pathways to Prosperity Initiative, Last accessed 10 May 2015, 4.
<http://p2pcanada.ca/files/2013/01/Literature-Review-Integration-Outcomes-1.pdf>

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 8.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 9.

immigrants, as employers – now able to access the pool of immigrants directly, are incentivised to favour economic immigrants they believe will accept lower salaries. Employers have exploited the Temporary Foreign Workers program in the past, and while penalties for employers abusing the process have been established, this is no guarantee against similar exploitation of the Express Entry Program.³⁹ These factors may result in a higher perception of discrimination by new immigrants – of which highly educated male visible minorities are already the most likely demographic to perceive discrimination in their day to day lives.⁴⁰

When these facts are contrasted with Sageman’s study of militancy, it can be suggested that the Express Entry Program seeks-out the same demographic which is also the most susceptible to radicalization. If not adequately socialized upon arriving in Canada. Perceived discrimination or underemployment experienced during the process may lead to the alienation of these same immigrants.

As noted earlier, the Government of Canada is also attempting to increase the number of international students studying in Canada. Along with educated professionals, students constitute the demographic of Muslim immigrants most likely to perceive discrimination, become isolated, and embrace militancy. While only the smallest fraction of these individuals are likely to become disenfranchised, radicalized and willing to undertake violence against Canadian society, weak security checks and a Government

³⁹ Employment and Social Development Canada, “Employers who have Broken the Rules from the Temporary Foreign Workers Program.” Last accessed 10 May 2015.
http://www.esdc.gc.ca/eng/jobs/foreign_workers/employers_revoked.shtml

⁴⁰ Livianna S. Tossutti, *Literature Review: Immigration Outcomes - Citizenship and Immigration Canada*. Pathways to Prosperity Initiative, Last accessed 10 May 2015, 19.
<http://p2pcanada.ca/files/2013/01/Literature-Review-Integration-Outcomes-1.pdf>

desire to accept large numbers of international students could pose a risk to national security, without adequate safeguards.

One such example of an international student radicalized in Canada is that of Chiheb Esseghaier – a 30 year old Tunisian who plotted to bomb a passenger train traveling from New York to Toronto in 2013. Esseghaier was conducting doctoral study at the University du Quebec at the time of the plot.⁴¹ He had been in Canada since 2010, and was – by all accounts, an intelligent and dedicated scientist. Before traveling to Canada in 2010 he was clean shaven, chubby, and eager to experience life in the West. He grew up in a middle-class, moderate family without any conservative religious inclinations, and many of his immediate family were employed as doctors, lawyers and engineers. It was in Canada that Esseghaier experienced isolation and began attending a mosque where the sermons delivered were more radical than those to which he had been exposed in his homeland.⁴² He let his hygiene degrade, grew a beard, started wearing traditional clothing, sought-out other young male Muslim students with similar beliefs, embraced conservative Islamic practices and began to openly admonish Canadian society. Following two trips to Iran to meet with members of Al Qaeda, he ultimately became a major player in the terrorist plot.⁴³

⁴¹ Wendy Gillis, “Was Ahmed Abassi a Via Rail Terrorist-in-Waiting, or Just a Talker?,” *Toronto Star*, 12 March 2015.

⁴² Maxime Bergeron, “Chiheb Esseghaier’s Parents in Tunisia Call Terror Allegations ‘Impossible’,” *Toronto Star*, 24 April 2013.

⁴³ Michele Mandel, “Via Terror Trial : Esseghaier and Jaser an Odd Pairing,” *Toronto Sun*, 20 March 2015. Last accessed 10 May 2015. <http://www.torontosun.com/2015/03/20/via-terror-trial-esseghaier-and-jaser-an-odd-pairing>

These are precisely the types of threats which could be presented by both Muslim economic immigrants and international students if the Government of Canada focuses solely on economic integration, but fails to select immigrants on the basis of their ability to integrate socially – and allocate the resources necessary to facilitate that social integration once immigrants arrive in Canada.

Socio-cultural Integration

A 2010 Citizenship and Immigration study revealed that the health and well-being of immigrants is significantly enhanced by the presence of network of family and friends within the individual's new society.⁴⁴ Marc Sageman's study similarly suggests that Muslim immigrants who become members of an inclusive community to which they can relate are less likely to feel isolated and marginalized – therefore, are less likely to develop anti-Western sentiments which can morph into radicalization and militancy. These findings each speak to the value of a vibrant diaspora, and as proof - immigrants have flocked to major urban centres for decades solely due to the presence of ethnic communities into which they can more easily integrate and which allow for a more gradual socialization to the larger Canadian society. The post-2001 economic immigration programs have threatened the integrity of that immigrant safety-net.

Citizenship and Immigration Canada has recognized a new trend in the flow of immigrants to non-traditional provinces without well-established diaspora communities

⁴⁴ Jun Zhao, Li Xue and Tara Gilkinson, "Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Health Status and Social Capital of Recent Immigrants to Canada: Evidence from the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada," In *Canadian Immigration: Economic Evidence for a Dynamic Policy Environment*, 311-340. n.p.: Queen's Policy Studies Series (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press), 2010, 4.

such as Alberta and Saskatchewan and resulting decreased immigration to multicultural centres like Toronto and Montreal. This change is directly linked to “economic push and pull factors.”⁴⁵ Statistics Canada has similarly determined that the types of entry programs through which new immigrants landed in Canada was almost entirely responsible for the locations immigrants settled.⁴⁶ The economic focused Express Entry Program, and the trend toward an absolute requirement for an offer of employment or provincial nomination prior to entry will likely exacerbate the resettlement of immigrants. In the short term, this may mean that new Muslim immigrants could find themselves living in a far less heterogeneous society without an ethnic or family safety-net, where they are more likely to experience discrimination and a sense of isolation. New economic immigration preferences and selection criteria are more likely to exacerbate this regional dispersion of new immigrants. As Sageman notes, those isolated and disaffected young Muslim males could seek-out like-minded individuals within the same community or look online. Lonely individuals are more likely to use the internet – with offers a host of forums in which those seeking to recruit, radicalize and fundraise lurk.

A case-study of Newfoundland offers insight on what new Muslim immigrants may face if entering Canada through the Express Entry Program. If a young, single, educated Muslim male immigrant accepted a job offer in St John’s, he would be forced to move to a community with a dispersed Muslim population of only 1020 individuals,

⁴⁵ Statistics Canada, “Study: Changes in the Regional Distribution of New Immigrants to Canada,” Last accessed 10 May 2015, 1. <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/daily-quotidien/150318/dq150318b-eng.pdf>

⁴⁶ Statistics Canada, “Study: Changes in the Regional Distribution of New Immigrants to Canada,” Last accessed 10 May 2015, 6. <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/daily-quotidien/150318/dq150318b-eng.pdf>

accounting for .002% of the total population of St John's.⁴⁷ Visible minorities in general account for just 1.9% of the population.⁴⁸ There is a Muslim community association, a Muslim student association, and one mosque serving the entirety of eastern Newfoundland, but no Government run immigration services centre.⁴⁹ Comments of one Muslim female on an immigration blog bemoaned the sense of loneliness and disappointment with life in St John's – her life there ultimately resulting in “necessary detachment [from society] required for sanity.”⁵⁰ A single male immigrant living in that environment would likely find it difficult to meet people of his age and faith, get married – a religious obligation in Islam, or start a family, and is more likely to experience racism and discrimination than Muslims residing in a heterogeneous community. These are the circumstances that have the potential to place some immigrants on a trajectory to militancy – and they are being fostered by the post-2001 immigration policies in Canada.

Contrary to the Express Entry Program, the pre-2001 immigration policies enabled far more immigrants to settle in existing diaspora communities. Within those communities there have been numerous examples of Muslim community leaders working to counter-radicalization and advising security officials of those holding extreme or militant views. One such success was the foiled “Toronto 18” terrorist plot in 2005. A

⁴⁷ Newfoundland and Labrador Statistics Agency, “Population by Religion and Sex, Newfoundland and Labrador, St John's CMA, 2011 National Household Survey.” Last accessed 10 May 2015. http://www.stats.gov.nl.ca/Statistics/Census2011/PDF/REL_Religion_2011_NHS.pdf

⁴⁸ Karolina Rous, “Living in St John's Newfoundland and Labrador,” March 29, 2011. Last accessed 10 May 2015. <http://canadianimmigrant.ca/settling-in-canada/discover-canada/living-in-st-john%E2%80%99s-newfoundland-and-labrador>

⁴⁹ Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “Immigrant Services: Newfoundland and Labrador.” Last accessed 10 May 2015. <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/newcomers/map/newlab-list.asp>

⁵⁰ Karolina Rous, “Living in St John's Newfoundland and Labrador,” March 29, 2011. Last accessed 10 May 2015. <http://canadianimmigrant.ca/settling-in-canada/discover-canada/living-in-st-john%E2%80%99s-newfoundland-and-labrador>

member of the local Muslim community, Mubin Shaikh, was solicited by the would-be terrorists to take part in the plot – yet he advised police and became actively involved in preventing an attack instead. Had a similar plot been hatched in St John’s, it is doubtful that the dispersed Muslim community would have had the same capacity to detect and prevent an attack.⁵¹ In this respect, diaspora communities serve a valuable function in establishing and enforcing norms for new Muslim immigrants – an influence likely to decrease under the new immigration system.

It was established earlier in this paper that the Express Entry Program could also favour immigrants without dependants, despite statistics which demonstrate that immigrant families adapt better to life in Canada.⁵² The benefits of close familial ties – particularly if living and working in a society lacking cultural diversity, assists in the socialization and integration process and offers a barrier to isolation and depression. The Esseghaier train derailment terrorist plot once again offers insight on how familial ties can potentially curb militancy. Two of Esseghaier’s accomplices were initially supportive of the plot, but both later attempted to withdraw. Ahmed Abassi, another Tunisian graduate student living in Quebec met with Esseghaier several times and shared anti-Western views, but Abassi would later fall in love and marry in Canada and was later

⁵¹ Charlie Gillis, “Toronto 18 Informant: ‘We Need to Get our Act Together’,” *Maclean’s*, October 23, 2014. Last accessed 10 May 2015. <http://www.macleans.ca/news/canada/toronto-18-informant-we-need-to-get-our-act-together/>

⁵² Alan B. Simmons, “Canadian Immigration Policy in the Early 1990s: A Commentary on Veugelers and Klassen’s Analysis of the Breakdown in the Unemployment-Immigration Linkage,” *Canadian Journal of Sociology* 19, no.4 (Autumn, 1994): 531.

joined by his sister.⁵³ Could these family ties have contributed to the reversal of his willingness to take part in a terrorist attack? Similarly, Raed Jaser, the son of a Canadian immigrant from the West Bank, withdrew from the terror plot. He lived within the Muslim diaspora in Toronto and evidence shows that his father and a prominent Muslim community leader worked to counter his extreme philosophies. Jaser also had a wife and children in Toronto.⁵⁴ Had it not been for Jaser's family network nearby, would he have gone through with the plot? A study of the Palestinian Liberation Organization determined that militancy among hardened fighters waned once they were married – particularly upon the birth of a son.⁵⁵ While it cannot be definitively proven that the family status of Jaser and Abassi contributed to their decision to withdraw from the terrorist plot, it is a commonality they shared which Esseghaier did not. It can therefore be suggested that an economic immigration program that favours single educated individuals and penalizes families could create difficulties with social integration that have the potential to transform into security issues over time.

Security Screening

The last element of the post-2001 immigration system to be examined, deals with the manner in which new immigrants are screened by security and immigration officials.

⁵³ Allison Jones, "Former Laval Student Once Linked to Via Terror Plot Sentenced," *Canadian Press*, July 16, 2014. Last accessed 10 May 2015. <http://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/former-laval-student-once-linked-to-alleged-via-terror-plot-sentenced-1.1917108>

⁵⁴ Naheed Mustafa, "The Jihadists of Suburbia," *Toronto Life*, n.d. Last accessed 10 May 2015. <http://www.torontolife.com/informer/features/2014/11/26/jihadists-of-suburbia/>

⁵⁵ Bradley A. Thayer and Valerie M. Hudson, "Sex and the Shaheed: Insights from the Life Sciences on Islamic Suicide Terrorism," *International Security* 23, no. 4 (Spring 2010): 56.

Currently, security screening is focused on identifying known terrorists and criminals through background checks.⁵⁶ Sageman's findings suggested that most militants are not initially overly religious, do not have a prior history of involvement with terrorist groups, nor a criminal past, and have the financial means to fund their immigration. Which of these factors would draw attention during security screening? It is exceptionally difficult to screen-out an immigrant who has not yet adopted any anti-Western views.

The automation of at least part of the economic immigration programs under Express Entry will unquestionably result in an immigrant spending less time in face-to-face interaction with the Citizenship and Immigration official. At present, many Muslim immigrants are issued visas without having to meet with visa officer face-to-face, and it is likely that the Express Entry Program would further separate security interests from economic interests in immigration.⁵⁷ The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) is responsible for immigrant security screening, but they only screen those individuals referred by Citizenship and Immigration Canada.⁵⁸

Security Intelligence officials are already overburdened with screening and terrorism investigations and it is likely that the promise to facilitate Express Entry of an approved immigrant within six months would make limit screening to little more than a cursory background check based on simple or outdated concepts of terrorism – where

⁵⁶ David Harris, "Is Canada Losing the Balance Between Liberty and Security?" In *Immigration Policy and the Terrorist Threat in Canada and the United States*, ed. Alexander Moens and Martin Collacott, 129-160. n.p: Fraser Institute, 2008, 140.

⁵⁷ Bissett, James, "Security Threats in Immigration and Refugee Policies," In *The Effects of Mass Migration on Canadian Living Standards and Society*, ed. Herbert Grubel, 75-94 (n.p.: Fraser Institute, 2009), 81.

⁵⁸ Canadian Security Intelligence Service, "Security Screening of Refugees and Immigrants", 1. Last accessed 10 May 2015. <http://www.cpj.ca/files/docs/csis.pdf>

individuals from certain listed countries are given additional attention.⁵⁹ In the most extreme cases, CSIS took over two years to complete security screening of one refugee suspected of links to the Kurdish Workers Party – a suspicion proven false.⁶⁰

If security screening of prospective immigrants is unlikely to identify those who might follow a trajectory to militancy, and economic integration alone is no guarantee against future radicalization, then it is argued that the Government must do more to support the social immigration of new immigrants.

CONCLUSION

This paper has suggested that Canada's post-2001 immigration policy – which prioritizes economic immigration under the theory that it will promote economic growth in Canada and help alleviate the challenges of an aging demographic, could have potential implications for national security. As an overabundance of young, educated Muslims unable to find work in their home countries head West looking for work, Canada's Express Entry Program will likely capitalize on this available pool of highly qualified individuals. This will result in a significant increase in Muslim immigrants to Canada in general; however, the new policies would see these new immigrants dispersed to non-traditional immigrant communities, without a diaspora or family safety-net. This combined with decreased funding and services for the integration of new immigrants could perpetuate their isolation from Canadian society. Consequently, Canada may be left

⁵⁹ Citizenship and Immigration Canada, "Immigrant Processing," US Department of State Release 200202183, 14 April 2005, 1.

⁶⁰ Canadian Security Intelligence Service, "Security Screening of Refugees and Immigrants", 1. Last accessed 10 May 2015. <http://www.cpj.ca/files/docs/csis.pdf>

with pockets of young, disaffected Muslim male immigrants – who are statistically more likely to embark on a trajectory of militancy under these circumstances.

Screening of immigrants and the acceptance of only the most highly educated will do little to counter the potential security risks resulting from the post-2001 immigration policies. To effectively counter potential radicalization and militancy, Canada must achieve a better balance between the economic integration of immigrants into the workforce and social integration – which will promote the acceptance of Canadian norms while allowing immigrants to keep and express their own culture. This could be partially accomplished by rectifying the Express Entry points disadvantage experienced by immigrants with dependents. Further, Citizenship and Immigration Canada has an obligation to increase integration and settlement services offered outside of traditional diaspora communities to reflect the new reality of immigrant dispersion to where jobs are offered instead of where members of the same ethnicity have traditionally congregated. Finally, immigration programs should embrace the common desire of immigrants to live in immigrant communities if they so choose. In essence, Canada must reaffirm its commitment to multiculturalism, realize that the value of an immigrant is measured by his ability to integrate and contribute to society - not just the economy, and begin thinking of diaspora communities as a solution to radicalization and militant Islam instead of the cause. Canada must dedicate resources to countering an increasing anti-Islamic sentiment amongst the traditionally pro-immigrant Canadian population - proportional to the resources it dedicates to countering the radicalization of Muslims, and embrace the values of freedom, equality and social justice which we have traditionally

attempted to instill in new immigrants.⁶¹ Only then can it be said that immigration policies have effectively contributed to the national security of Canada.

⁶¹ John Geddes, "Canadian Anti-Muslim Sentiment is Rising, Disturbing New Poll Reveals," *Maclean's*, October 3, 2003. Last accessed 10 May 2015. <http://www.macleans.ca/politics/land-of-intolerance/>

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