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THE CANADIAN MILITARY INSTITUTION AND ADMINISTRATIVE ACCOUNTABILITY: NOT A NATURAL MATCH

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Exercise Solo Flight

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INTRODUCTION

The Canadian Forces have always been an anomaly within the Government of Canada in that we're employees of the government but we're not part of the Public Service of Canada.¹

- General Rick Hillier, Chief of the Defence Staff of the Canadian Armed Forces from 2005-2008

The foundation of public policies and programs is grounded in the core values of society. For Canada, those include good government, as referred to in the Canadian Constitution Act of 1867, the rule of law, and the protection of human rights. Although professions, such as the profession of arms, are by definition largely self-governed, it is critical that they remain aligned with society in order to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the public it serves.²

The so called “Somalia Affair” of 1993 has become a seminal case study on the consequences of such disconnect between Canadian societal and military values. The “Rambo-like” attitude permeating throughout the Canadian Airborne Regiment which resulted in a series of incidents and culminated with the unjustified killing of Somali citizens shocked Canadians. The investigations that followed, including the Somalia Commission of Inquiry as well as a series of advisory groups instigated by the Honourable Douglas Young, appointed as Minister of National Defence in 1996, effectively suspended the self-governing condition of the profession of arms in Canada. It is only through broad reforms and re-education programs that the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) re-established its legitimacy as a military institution in the eyes of Canadians during the decade that followed.³

¹Rick Hillier, *A Soldier First: Bullets, Bureaucrats and the Politics of War* (Toronto: Harper Collins), 422.

²David J Bercuson, "Up from the Ashes: The Re-Professionalization of the Canadian Forces after the Somalia Affair," *Canadian Military Journal* 9, no. 3 (2009): 35.

³*Ibid.*, 39.

On the matter of financial administration and stewardship of public resources, multiple incidents continue to cultivate a climate of mistrust within the bureaucratic apparatus of the government, and more importantly, within the Canadian public.⁴ In its review of the yearly financial statements of the Department of National Defence (DND), the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) repeatedly criticized the department and the CAF during the last 10 years for being very poor caretakers of the \$6.5 billion inventory entrusted in them.⁵ It also scolded National Defence for “not exercising due diligence in managing the process to replace the CF-18 jets,”⁶ and declared the acquisition of the medium- to heavy-lift helicopter to be “not fair, open, and transparent.”⁷ While parallels can be drawn between the suspension of the profession of arms referred to in the previous paragraph and the creation of an independent office to oversee the replacement of the CF18,⁸ major internal reforms have yet to be initiated to deal with the military’s public administration shortfalls.

This paper will demonstrate that institutional factors such as beliefs, values, and organizational structures, impede the ability of the CAF to meet the expectations of its nation with regards to financial and materiel accountability. The research will look into potential explanations for the procedural gaps, discuss consequences and offer recommendations.

⁴Aaron Plamondon, “Amnesia in Acquisition: The Parallels of the F-35 Procurement and the Sea King Replacement Projects,” *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 17, no. 3 (2011): 265.

⁵Government of Canada, *Public Account of Canada: Volume 1 Summary Report and Consolidated Financial Statements* (Ottawa: Government of Canada Publications, 2014), 2-41.

⁶Office of the Auditor General, *Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons* (Ottawa: Government of Canada Publications, Spring 2012), 31.

⁷Office of the Auditor General, *Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons* (Ottawa: Government of Canada Publications, Fall 2010), 21.

⁸Public Works and Government Services Canada, “National Fighter Procurement Secretariat (NFPS),” last modified 10 December 2014, <http://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/app-acq/stamgp-lamsmp/snac-nfps-eng.html>.

The first section will introduce an analytical model that will guide the study of relevant aspects of the administrative functions conducted by the CAF. It will explain the three pillars of institutions proposed by W. Richard Scott, an American sociologist, and Emeritus Professor at Stanford University, specialized in institutional theory and organization science; those being regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive pillars. The paper will then proceed with the analysis, looking into each pillar in turn, and include a discussion on the consequences of the lack of cohesion between societal and military values and culture. Recommendations will also be offered to generate discussion towards improvements.

THE THREE PILLARS OF INSTITUTIONS

Regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive paradigms have long been use by social scientists to explain the functioning of institutions. W. Richard Scott suggests, however, that theoretical precepts from all three systems often define different elements and features of institutions.⁹ This research will assess how well these three pillars support and legitimize the Canadian military institution, specifically as it relates to administrative accountability.

The first viewpoint to be evaluated will be the regulative pillar. It consists in the set of rules, regulations and directives to which the institution is subjected. It also considers the capacity to monitor and sanction activities, as well as whenever necessary, the ability to manipulate rewards and punishments. It is worth noting that, according to Dr. Scott, rules which are rather controversial or ambiguous may be “better conceived as an occasion for sense-making

⁹W. Richard Scott, *Institutions and Organizations: Ideas, Interests, and Identities*, 4th ed. (Los Angeles: Sage), 70.

and collective interpretation, relying more on cognitive and normative than coercive elements for its effects.”¹⁰

The next part will assess the normative pillar. This component of the model focusses on both the values and norms of the institution, defined as follows:

- “Values are conceptions of the preferred or the desirable together with the construction of standards to which existing structures or behaviors can be compared and assessed,” and
- “Norms specify how things should be done; they define legitimate means to pursue valued ends. Normative systems define goals and objectives but also designate appropriate ways to pursue them.”¹¹

Although some values and norms may be applicable to all members of a given organization; others apply only to selected groups or positions.¹² An institution as large and complex as the military comprises many such sub-groups. The comment made above about the importance for regulative systems to be aligned across the organization equally applies in the context of the values and norms.

Lastly, the cultural-cognitive pillar considers that “what a creature does is, in large part, a function of the creature’s internal representation of its environment.”¹³ Furthermore, the author of the model used for the analysis undertaken here states that: “rather than stressing the force of mutually reinforcing obligations, cultural-cognitive theorists point to the power of templates for

¹⁰*Ibid.*, 62.

¹¹*Ibid.*, 64.

¹²*Ibid.*

¹³Roy G. D’Andrade, “Cultural meaning systems,” in *Culture Theory: Essays on Mind, Self, and Emotion*, ed. Richard A. Shweder and Robert A. LeVine, 88-119 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

particular types of actors and scripts for actions.”¹⁴ Having set a proper academic framework, the study will now proceed with the review of financial and materiel accountability functions within the Canadian military institution.

THE REGULATIVE PILLAR

The National Defence Act establishes that the Minister of National Defence is ultimately responsible and accountable to parliament for the “management and direction of the Canadian Forces and of all matters relating to national defence.”¹⁵ Although the document is silent on the specific duties and responsibilities of Deputy Minister (DM), other statutes clarify his role. In relations to the subject of this paper, the Financial Administration Act (FAA) states that the incumbent is the departmental Accounting Officer. As such the DM is accountable for “the measures taken to organize the resources of the department to deliver departmental programs in compliance with government policies and procedures.”¹⁶

The CDS, who also reports directly to the Minister, is conversely “charged with the control and administration of the Canadian Forces.”¹⁷ While this implies responsibilities for financial and materiel resources, as the senior military advisor to the Government of Canada, this officer is primarily concerned with military capabilities, operational readiness, and military decisions related to the defence of Canada.¹⁸ The CDS exercises his administrative responsibilities mainly through delegation of authorities based on positions and roles, as well as

¹⁴Scott, *Institutions and Organizations: Ideas, Interests, and Identities*, 68.

¹⁵National Defence Act, R.S.C., c. N-5, s. 4 (1985).

¹⁶Financial Administration Act, R.S.C., c. F-11, s. 16.4 (1985).

¹⁷National Defence Act, R.S.C., c. N-5, s. 18 (1985).

¹⁸Government of Canada, “National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces: Chief of the Defence Staff,” last modified 17 April 2014, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-org-structure/chief-of-defence-staff.page>.

through the military chain of command. Rules and regulations such as the Queen's Regulations and Orders (QR&Os) and Departmental Administrative Orders and Directives (DAODs) in turn provide the framework for the implementation of administrative procedures by civilian employees and military members in order for the CDS to meet his obligations.

Using the example of DAOD 3000-0 entitled "Materiel Acquisition and Support," it becomes clear, however, that this formal structure is insufficient to regulate the implementation of intricate administrative requirements. In this case, among a number of policy statements, the directive states that the CAF must carry out all acquisition and support activities in a manner that both "ensures the pre-eminence of Canadian Forces operational requirements" and "contributes to the development and maintenance of a competitive domestic defence industrial capability."¹⁹ While these objectives can, at least on occasions, be at odds, the document does not deal with the deconfliction. Instead, it is a series of complementary procedures and instructions from designated functional authorities that guides employees and military members in the conduct of administrative tasks. Notwithstanding the complexity of the operating environment which justifies this approach, technical guidance is generally provided outside the purview of the chain of command. Seventy-six managerial functions have been specifically designated where "explicit and binding" direction is provided directly to DND employees and CAF members in this manner.²⁰ In the case of the example provided, the primary source of instructions on acquisition is the Procurement Administration Manual (PAM) published under the authority of the Assistant

¹⁹Government of Canada, "National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces: DAOD 3000-0, Materiel Acquisition and Support," last modified 13 November 2013, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-policies-standards-defence-admin-orders-directives-3000/3000-0.page>.

²⁰Government of Canada, "National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces: DAOD 1000-0, Corporate Administrative Direction," last modified 26 August 2014, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-policies-standards-defence-admin-orders-directives-1000/1000-0.page>.

Deputy Minister (Materiel) (ADM(Mat)).²¹ This role taken on by functional authorities to guide the actions of practitioners across the Department is, despite being justified, in direct conflict with the principles of unity of command, and administrative accountability. It is this characteristic of the military regulative framework that General Rick Hiller referred to in frustration when he said in a CTV interview: “Civilian control of the armed forces is not civil service control of the armed forces.”²² On the one hand, this usurpation of the authority of the military leadership is inappropriate, but on the other hand, due to the complexity of the environment, it is required. It would simply not be possible for senior managers to competently direct every aspect of public administration delegated to them without assistance from those Subject Matter Experts (SMEs).

The existence of extensive series of instructions produced by functional authorities leads, however, to confusion which further challenges those entrusted with administrative responsibilities. For instance, on the subject of Controlled Goods, defined as goods designed or modified for a military or strategic purpose, general policy statements are found in a DAOD,²³ but are complemented by hundreds of pages available on the Department’s intranet prescribing detailed procedures for the management of the designated commodities from cradle-to-grave. The technical guide, entitled “Controlled Technology and Transfer (CTAT) Manual,” deals with issues such as procurement and stocktaking which have their own SMEs publishing instructions independently. Such directives are released in formal publications, through Canadian Forces General Orders (CANFORGENs) as well as in various other forms of correspondence on an

²¹Department of National Defence, A-PP-005-000/AG-002, *Procurement Administration Manual (PAM)* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2005), 15.

²²Daniel Gosselin, “Unelected, Unarmed Servants of the State: The Changing Role of Senior Civil Servants inside Canada’s National Defence,” *Canadian Military Journal* 14, no. 3 (2014): 38.

²³Government of Canada, “National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces: DAOD 3003-0, Controlled Goods,” last modified 13 November 2013, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-policies-standards-defence-admin-orders-directives-3000/3003-0.page>.

ongoing basis. The holistic approach required to ensure the good management of defence matters remains, despite the best intent of all managers, an elusive goal. The multiple layers of policies, directives, procedures, and guidance, often highly technical in nature, leave the military institution in a situation where its leaders have to rely on technical advisors within their staff while balancing priorities and obligations. This reality limits senior officers' ability to manage and control these functions, and therefore, dilutes their accountability.

Furthermore, the department's internal auditor, the Chief Review Services (CRS), indicated after a recent audit that managerial controls in place to satisfy the requirements of the FAA were not meeting expectations and had the potential to have an adverse effect on the military's ability to manage resources properly. The report stated that: "The current financial management M&O [Monitoring and Oversight] activities are not effective and are potentially creating a false sense of security in terms of being effective risk-mitigation tools."²⁴ The audit points to weaknesses in the organizational structure, the lack of resources, and the inconsistent reporting and follow up activities to explain the difficulties.²⁵

In summary, challenges in relations to the regulative aspects of administrative accountability appear to originate mainly from the DM/CDS diarchy, the integrated DND/CAF organizational structure, and the complex web of rules, regulations, and guidance from functional authorities. In a typology of problem situations proposed by Ronald Heifetz, a graduate of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, this heavily regulated and bureaucratized environment within the government makes the job of military

²⁴Chief of Review Services, *Review of the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Monitoring and Oversight Processes* (Ottawa: DND Canada, August 2013), 3.

²⁵*Ibid.*, iii.

leaders attempting to manage federal administrative programs very complex.²⁶ Despite criticism sometimes heard of the current size of headquarters staff, and the low tooth-to-tail ratio within the CAF,²⁷ it is important that commanders at all level be supported by SMEs which can help them navigate the complex environment while considering all aspects of their multifaceted problems. Without this robust support, as pointed out by the CRS, commanders are unable to assess the risks associated with their decisions appropriately.

THE NORMATIVE PILLAR

Institutions are, above all, governed by “a code of ethics that establishes standards of conducts while defining and regulating their work.”²⁸ For the profession of arms in Canada, the focus of its code of ethics is a well-defined set of core values and beliefs. Unlimited liability, fighting spirit, discipline, teamwork and physical fitness are important aspects of military service which are deep-rooted throughout the development of military members, both in formal programs, and in the socialisation process. Along with the military values of duty, loyalty, integrity, and courage, these are the most fundamental and defining elements of the Canadian military profession.²⁹ In the CAF’s cornerstone document on professional development, this ethos is coined as “the heart of Canadian military professionalism.”³⁰ When adhered to

²⁶Ronald Heifetz, *Leadership Without Easy Answers* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 76.

²⁷Andrew Leslie, *Report on Transformation 2011*, (National Defence Headquarters: 6 July 2011), 32.

²⁸Department of National Defence, A-PA-005-000/AP-001, *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2009), 6.

²⁹*Ibid.*, 32.

³⁰*Ibid.*, 36.

consistently, it provides the military institution high moral grounds for the fulfillment of its social obligation.

As an organization embedded within the structures of government, the CAF must, however, aspire to the live by the values of its Public Service as well. Under the leadership of the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat (TBCS), those ideals have been defined as respect for democracy, respect for people, integrity, stewardship and excellence.³¹ Looking beyond some of the concepts that overlap, even though the values of the Public Service are not fundamentally incompatible with the military ethos, they provide a different focus; a focus which, for military members, is secondary. Furthermore, in the mind of many soldiers, the two different sets of standards are accommodated by the Department's organizational structure itself, through the diarchy of command responsibilities entrusted in the CDS and fiscal accountability assigned to the DM.³² As explained under the regulative pillar, however, many financial and materiel management responsibilities, or aspects of the "stewardship" of public resources, to use the term chosen by the TBCS, are passed on to the military. Consequently, while the ethical code of the Public Service may be secondary for the military establishment, it must still be reflected in its practices to ensure the legitimacy of the organization.

Affiliations to many other professional groups also influence the behaviour of serving members. Among them, military accountants, supply chain, and procurement professionals have significant relevance when considering administrative accountability. These generate complementary sets of values that are integrated within the fibre of the institution. Educational pursuits in these fields force members to reconcile potentially conflicting values and find ways to deal with the complexities of the public policy domain while satisfying military imperatives.

³¹Government of Canada, "Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat: Values and Ethics Code for the Public Sector," last modified 15 December 2011, <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=25049>.

³²Leslie, *Report on Transformation 2011*, xi.

The stocktaking process, for instance, can be viewed as a control mechanism used to ensure the accuracy of financial statements, which arguably have limited impact on warfighting capabilities. It can also be considered, conversely, as a way of confirming the availability of assets critically needed in the conduct of operations. Furthermore, negative results can be leveraged by commanders as an opportunity to educate soldiers on the vital importance of their equipment, thereby relating the stewardship of resources, a core value of the public service, to the concept of discipline, a foundation of military life and a condition of survivability.

Procurement and contracting, on the other hand, exemplify a functional area where the benefits of professional excellence are not fully exploited within the Canadian military. Despite the definite requirement for this skillset, as highlighted by the OAG reports quoted earlier, the CAF has yet to invest in the development of specialised professionals. The scope of courses such as Basic Procurement and Contracting, Contract Direct with Trade, and Green Procurement, taken by those with delegated authority, is limited to the explanation of rules, regulations and procedures.³³ There is effectively no career stream for those who have an affinity for this field of employment and, as made clear in an internal newsletter from the Logistics Branch (June 2003), no professional accreditation rewarded towards advancement. In this context, there is very little hope that the military institution can live up to the statement of integrity enunciated by Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC) and consistently carry out a procurement process that is “open, fair, and honest.”³⁴ Furthermore, without proper consideration and reflection on complex procurement situations only possible through higher education, guiding

³³Department of National Defence, A-PP-005-000/AG-002, *Procurement Administration Manual (PAM)*, 35.

³⁴Government of Canada, “Public Works and Government Services Canada Buyandsell.ca: 1.10. PWGSC Procurement Process,” last modified 8 October 2014, <https://buyandsell.gc.ca/policy-and-guidelines/supply-manual/section/1/10>.

principles such as prudence, probity, and transparency, may also be unattainable.³⁵ While the lack of specialisation in the procurement field may be an unavoidable reality given the limited size of the Canadian officer corps, the effect is nevertheless negative and substantial.

The challenging function of logisticians which aims to ensure that regulatory risks are well understood and that appropriate consideration is given to different aspects of complex problems also suffers from the narrowly defined set of military values and norms. In an environment where there is a great emphasis on duty, loyalty, and teamwork and no champion for prudence, probity and transparency, the risk that important administrative factors be overlooked in an abundance of detailed procedures and instructions cannot be understated. Furthermore, as pointed out by the CRS, monitoring and oversight activities are generally assigned to military personnel who must prioritize this role with other responsibilities that they have towards the operational support of their unit or formation.³⁶ This organizational structure is a mitigating force on the normative effect of competing values; it may help explain the inconsistencies in reporting and the lack of follow up.

THE COGNITIVE-CULTURAL PILLAR

The Canadian military institution was molded by its participation in the major wars of first half of the 20th century. Up to the Cold War, it was regularly engaged in major armed conflicts which gave it clear focus. While matters of public accountability were always important to the profession, history has not judged favourably those who over-emphasized managerial responsibilities at the expense of warfighting capabilities. The accounts of Major-General Andrew McNaughton's career provide a good example of a military officer who found himself

³⁵*Ibid.*

³⁶Chief of Review Services, *Review of the Efficiency and Effectiveness...*, 3.

on the wrong side of this balancing act. As Commander of the First Canadian Infantry Division from 1939 to 1943, he gave great importance to the education and the morale of his troops, as well as their equipment and supplies. He was considered, however, to have been unprepared to lead them in battle. In the eyes of at least some historians, he was categorized as an inferior general.³⁷ In the early days of Canada's military, the institution viewed its soldiers and officers as war fighters first and foremost.

A shift in military culture gradually occurred in the following generations. As expressed by Lieutenant-General Mike Jeffrey, Commander of the Canadian Army from 2000 until 2003: "...after the 1950s, war fighting increasingly ceased to be the central organizing principle of the Canadian Military."³⁸ The Management Review Group created by the Trudeau government in 1971 may have initiated this chain of events. Their report highlighted major concerns in the areas of management, planning, procurement, financial services, personnel administration, and defence research. Its call for "greater civil servant involvement in the administrative and management construct of DND" resulted in the unification of the Canadian Forces Headquarters (CFHQ) and Department Headquarters, and the creation of the National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ). While the main purpose of the restructure was to improve oversight of the military, the change also blurred the lines of responsibility and accountability between the two groups and increased the bureaucratization of defence.³⁹

Over time, the military effectively lost its heading. As evidenced by advertising campaigns of the early 1970s which depicted officers wearing dress uniforms and carrying

³⁷Bill Rawling, "The Generalship of Andrew McNaughton: A Study in Failure," in *Warrior Chiefs*, ed. Lieutenant-Colonel Bernd Horn and Stephen Harris, 73-90 (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2001), 88.

³⁸Bercuson, *Up from the Ashes...*, 34.

³⁹Gosselin, *Unelected, Unarmed Servants of the State...*, 43.

briefcases, the officer corps started to see itself as managers and bureaucrats. The shift in military culture climaxed in the 1990s in what would later be referred to as “the decade of darkness.”⁴⁰ The change in identity prompted by the excessive use of managerial methods and careerist attitudes was recognized as one of the main factors leading to the Somalia crisis which sent the guardians of the Canadian military institution back to the drawing board.⁴¹ As top soldier from 2005 to 2008, General Rick Hillier made it his project to repair the damage. His transformation initiative changed the perception that military members had of themselves, as well as their image in the eye of the Canadian public.

The stated intent of General Hillier’s project was for the CAF to “become more effective, relevant, and responsive” and to improve its credibility and its ability to “provide leadership at home and abroad.”⁴² Effectively, the new command structures recreated, to an extent, the defunct CFHQ within the unified headquarters; it was designed to protect military planners from undue influence of civil servants, and to ensure that uniformed members were clearly focussed on their primary role as war fighters.⁴³ The jury is still out on the changes implemented through this initiative. Some of the organizational structures have already collapsed under intensive manning pressures, but the reinvigoration of the military ethos and the pride to serve returned to “soldiers, sailors, airmen, and airwoman,” as General Hillier likes to refer to serving members, will have a lasting impact. This may be this soldier’s true legacy.⁴⁴

⁴⁰Hillier, *A Soldier First: Bullets, Bureaucrats and the Politics of War*, 107.

⁴¹Gosselin, *Unelected, Unarmed Servants of the State...*, 44.

⁴²General Rick Hillier, *CDS Planning Guidanc CF Transformation* (National Defence Headquarters: 10 November 2005)

⁴³Gosselin, *Unelected, Unarmed Servants of the State...*, 48.

⁴⁴Philippe Legacé, “A Mixed Legacy: General Rick Hillier and Canadian Defence, 2005-08,” *International Journal* 64, no. 3 (2009): 612.

In retrospective, the legitimacy of the Canadian military institution appears to have been at most risk when the organization wavered during a period that saw a high degree of civilianization and bureaucratization of military affairs. It is consequently difficult to imagine more emphasis being placed on administrative accountability in the foreseeable future. Given the regulative and normative environments described earlier, the pressures on the military to live up to the high standards of financial and materiel accountability will, nonetheless, persist. This reveals an attribute of so-called “wicked problems:” depending on who considers the issue, the problem is radically different.⁴⁵ For those entrusted with the stewardship of public resources, compliance is an imperative in the provision of all government services. But as explained by Peter H. Wilson, a well-published historian from the University of Hull, “armies are different from other institutions in that their primary mission entails a readiness to take lives and destroy property.”⁴⁶ This affects their relationship with the state. Militaries see themselves as solutions of last resort. They cannot fail in the defence of their nation, and they must therefore remain operationally effective forces at all costs. In a context of strained resources and competing priorities, “good enough” performance of its administrative duties may be all that is within reach for the CAF at this time.

In the military, as in any other cultures, there are internal pressures for individuals to embrace their group’s values and beliefs.⁴⁷ For soldiers, who accept the principle of unlimited liability, these norms are critical. If the institution develops monolithic and dogmatic tendencies, however, it will be at great risk of becoming disconnected from its people. Some say that, for

⁴⁵S. Bateman, “Solving the ‘Wicked Problems’ of Maritime Security: Are Regional Forums up to the Task?,” *Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International & Strategic Affairs* 33, no. 1 (2011): 2.

⁴⁶Peter H. Wilson, “Defining Military Culture,” *The Journal of Military History* 72, no. 1 (2008): 22.

⁴⁷Scott, *Institutions and Organizations: Ideas, Interests, and Identities*, 58.

Canadians, the Somalia incident provided an example of that.⁴⁸ For a profession that must accept civilian control and be representative of its society, finding a way to resolve the dichotomy between operational effectiveness and fiscal responsibility is vital to the maintenance of its long term survival.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Dr. Alan Okros, a specialist in Industrial and Organizational Psychology who's done extensive research on the Canadian military, describes a domain which he calls the "Business of Defence" where "political direction, bureaucratic controls and professional requirements are integrated to set the conditions for success in operations." He goes further to suggest that a number of General officers and expert staff should be developed to have the necessary skills and expertise to interact with the political milieu and the machinery of government as effectively as possible in order to contribute to Force Generation (FG) and Force Employment (FE) activities.⁴⁹ Following the concepts advanced by Dr. Okros, officers would follow a common career path up to the rank of Major or Lieutenant-Colonel where they would come to a decision point. Having developed into capable military officers and bona fide members of the profession of arms, they would either go on with their core military functions, or adopt a "breadth domain" based on their intellectual capacities and personal preferences.⁵⁰

⁴⁸Bercuson, *Up from the Ashes...*, 34.

⁴⁹Alan Okros, *Developing Fully Effective General/Flag Officers and their Staff* (Toronto: Canadian Force College, April 2004), 5.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, 10.

Some could argue that the approach advocated here goes against the principle of Universality of Service espoused to by the Canadian military,⁵¹ but that may be a narrow view. The reality is that not all senior officers are destined for command in operations.⁵² This system would simply formalize the process of selection and ensure that those opting out are developed and employed purposefully into alternative fields where expertise is badly needed. It would effectively create a two-tier system while ensuring that core education and training is maintained for all members. Only a selected group would be developed to become commanders, but all officers would be valued members of the profession of arms. Although this recommendation deals specifically with the officer corps, there may be great benefit to extending a similar system to Senior Non-Commissioned Members (NCMs). Additional research could be undertaken to evaluate this option.

Either combined with the new developmental streams or as a stand-alone opportunity with its own merits, it is also recommended that the organizational structure of administrative functions within the CAF be reconsidered. The transformation initiative from 2005 erected a small military structure within NDHQ to plan and conduct operations in isolation from civilian influence; conversely, the creation of an administrative chain of command within the CAF could help foster a subculture of probity and fiscal responsibility and somewhat bridge the divide between the military and its public servants.

The idea of having a separate organizational structure that oversees the support of Canadian military units is not new. Ever since the Canadian Forces Reorganization Act of 1968

⁵¹Government of Canada, “National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces: DAOD 5023-0, Universality of Service,” last modified 13 November 2013, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-policies-standards-defence-admin-orders-directives-5000/5023-0.page>.

⁵²Alan Okros, *Developing Fully Effective General/Flag Officers and their Staff*, 11.

that forced the deactivation of the Army, Navy and Air Forces' administrative corps and the integration of those functions into the current Logistics Branch,⁵³ there has been internal pressures within the affected community towards the reestablishment of a Support Command in some form. The Canadian Operational Support Command (CANOSCOM) stood-up during General Hillier's transformation, though strictly focussed on operational support, may have been a first step in this direction. It, however, suffered the same fate as the other "dot-coms", the term of endearment used by military personnel to refer to the series of operational headquarters formed in 2006; it did not survive the latest round of rationalizations.

The latest credible voice to propose the establishment of a Support Command was Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie. His report on transformation highlighted that commanders often reallocate resources to other FG functions at the expense of support elements, resulting in varying degrees of administrative and logistical capacities across the CAF.⁵⁴ To rectify what he views as "the CF's [CAF's] most decentralized and borderline incoherent set of organizations and processes" he suggested that:

...a single L1 [Level 1 organizations are organizations such as the Navy, Army and Air Force Commands that report directly to the CDS] Force Support authority could be structured so as to provide a wide range of garrison support services, to oversee recruiting and education, and to consolidate and integrate the control, oversight, and employment of certain key joint and common support capabilities.⁵⁵

Although General Leslie's report has been criticized for advocating massive reductions in the bureaucratic apparatus which could paralyze the Department, and suggesting important shifts from "tooth" to "tail" within military establishments which could "cause serious damage,

⁵³Department of National Defence, A-LM-031-000/AG-000, *A Handbook on the Canadian Forces Logistics Branch* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1983), 3-36.

⁵⁴Leslie, *Report on Transformation 2011*, 57.

⁵⁵*Ibid.*

perhaps even “destroy” Canada’s armed forces,” the creation of a support command is a recommendation that is worth further consideration.⁵⁶

CONCLUSION

The examination of the military institution presented here paints a rather bleak picture of the potential for the CAF, in its current form, to excel in its administrative functions. It demonstrates how the beliefs, values, and organizational structures of the profession of arms in Canada impede the CAF’s ability to attain the high standards of accountability imposed on it. In accordance with institutional theory, attempts to impose a new “world order” in the current circumstances would be met with resistance.⁵⁷ If the “decade of darkness” and the Somalia affair have taught the Canadian military one thing, it is that the very survival of the profession of arms relies on soldiers being laser focussed on a war fighter identity. While financial and materiel management tasks will continue to be completed professionally, as will peacekeeping missions, the officers and soldiers of the CAF will not want to be defined by those activities. General Hillier expressed that clearly when he said: “We are not the public service of Canada. We are not just another department. We are the Canadian Forces and our job is to be able to kill people.”⁵⁸

Considering the analytical model employed in this research, each of the three pillars uncovered its own set of challenges for this institution. The regulative pillar revealed how lines of reporting are intermixed with lines of responsibilities to form an intricate web of rules, regulations and procedures. The complexity makes it very hard to remain in compliance, or

⁵⁶Martin Shadwick, “The Report on Transformation 2011,” *Canadian Military Journal* 12, no. 1 (2011): 70.

⁵⁷Scott, *Institutions and Organizations: Ideas, Interests, and Identities*, 62.

⁵⁸CTV News, “Rick Hillier reconnected Canadians with Forces,” last accessed 10 May 2015, <http://www.ctvnews.ca/rick-hillier-reconnected-canadians-with-forces-1.305402>.

sometimes, to simply determine what is right. The normative pillar, in turn, showed that while the CAF, as any other institution, is subjected to several competing, although sometimes compatible sets of beliefs and values, their integration is difficult. Furthermore, the affiliation with other professional groups is regrettably not always encouraged. The assessment of the cognitive-cultural pillar did not result in much more positive outcomes. The “soldier first” dictum often heard amongst serving members and veterans has very deep significance for the military profession. As exemplified by the title chosen for General Rick Hiller’s autobiography, this is how they view themselves.⁵⁹ And there is a good explanation for that; the experience of the Canadian military has demonstrated that attempts to dilute this grounding principle by introducing other cultures are not wise. Business and managerial principles have proven to be particularly dangerous for this warfighting organization.

Despite this somber outlook, a number of measures could be taken to improve Canadian military’s performance concerning administrative accountability. Those changes are, however, transformative in nature. There is no quick-fix for this dilemma. Two recommendations were brought forward in this paper. The first dealt with the professional development of General officers and expert staff in alternative career streams to act as buffers between bureaucrats and soldiers, and the second advocated for a Support Command that would address what General Leslie qualified as weak, on the verge of being incoherent, governance of administrative functions.

Before any solutions can succeed, however, a sense of urgency will be needed. Institutions don’t like change. Until it is forced to resolve this matter, it should not be expected that the CAF will engage in this transformation.⁶⁰ But if the observations received by the

⁵⁹Hillier, *A Soldier First: Bullets, Bureaucrats and the Politics of War*.

⁶⁰Scott, *Institutions and Organizations: Ideas, Interests, and Identities*, 57.

Department from the OAG are any indication, the momentum may be building. The inability for the CAF to fix its administrative processes will only invite more scrutiny and increase the pressure.

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