THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES ARE NOT JOINT (YET): AN INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF CANADIAN JOINTNESS

Major Daniel Vincent

Disarmament
Opinions expressed remain those of the author and do not represent Department of National Defence or Canadian Forces policy. This paper may not be used without written permission.

© Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2019.

Avertissement
Les opinions exprimées n’engagent que leurs auteurs et ne reflètent aucunement des politiques du Ministère de la Défense nationale ou des Forces canadiennes. Ce papier ne peut être reproduit sans autorisation écrite.

© Sa Majesté la Reine du Chef du Canada, représentée par le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2019.
THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES ARE NOT JOINT (YET): AN INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF CANADIAN JOINTNESS

Major Daniel Vincent

“This paper was written by a candidate attending the Canadian Forces College in fulfilment of one of the requirements of the Course of Studies. The paper is a scholastic document, and thus contains facts and opinions, which the author alone considered appropriate and correct for the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of any agency, including the Government of Canada and the Canadian Department of National Defence. This paper may not be released, quoted or copied, except with the express permission of the Canadian Department of National Defence.”

« La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale. »
INTRODUCTION

The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) is not joint. At least not yet, and maybe that is ok. This is a bold and provocative statement given that the CAF is one of the very militaries few to undergo the transformative process of unification into one single service; at the time a revolutionary transition for any western military, meant to increase efficiencies and operational effectiveness while creating a single joint culture.\footnote{Department of National Defence. \textit{Task Force on Review of Unification of the Canadian Forces} (Ottawa: Task Force on Review of the Canadian Armed Forces, 1980): 6-9.} Although organizationally the CAF is ‘joint’, Canadian joint doctrine stipulates that in expeditionary operations Canada is limited to fighting as part of a coalition.\footnote{Department of National Defence. CFJP 1.0, \textit{Canadian Military Doctrine} (Ottawa: Joint Doctrine Branch, Canadian Forces Experimentation Center, 2009): 6-2.} The CAF simply does not have the capabilities to do joint warfare alone unless part of a coalition with the proper and complete array of joint enablers. This means that achieving true ‘jointness’ within the CAF will remain elusive. This does not mean that CAF is not a capable military force. Canada has distinguished itself on the battlefield since the First World War and continues to do so around the world. The CAF has extremely proficient forces that garner high praise from allies and enemies alike; but tactical prowess is not the subject of this paper.

Lieutenant-General Rouleau’s recent thought piece “How We Fight” implies we have not yet achieved the jointness that we desire.\footnote{LGen M. Rouleau, \textit{How We Fight} (Ottawa: Canadian Joint Operations Command, 10 February 2019)} How can this be? In the 1950s and early 1960s the Canadian military went through a torturous debate that lasted almost a decade about how best to achieve efficiencies in a changing and volatile world. The end
result was a single unified CAF meant to end service competition and create the truly joint force. And yet more than 50 years later we continue to discuss many of the same concepts and ideas that underpinned the debate during the Cold War. “How We Fight” is built on some core assumptions that have persisted in Canadian defence since the beginning of the Cold War. Those assumptions are: the joint force consisting of all environments working together is best suited to meet the security challenges of the future, that Canada will continue to conduct expeditionary operations within coalitions, and that resources and budgets will remain scarce forcing the never ending search for efficiencies.

Canada plays a balancing act with its military forces between maintaining a level of interoperability with allies and building the joint force. We simply cannot have it all. The central thesis of this paper is that there are strong institutional forces at play, which maintain this balance between interoperability and jointness, making the achievement of true jointness an elusive goal. Essentially the CAF needs to be just joint enough to be able to participate in coalition operations. These institutional forces are extremely powerful and have existed for decades resurfacing during attempts to modernize or transform, irrespective of political party in charge or the security environment surrounding the debate. Past transformation attempts have been met time and again with the same roadblocks and frustrations. This paper will begin with a brief discussion of what is meant by joint and jointness, and then transition to examining the institutional factors that hamper the quest for joint before embarking on a brief discussion the explicit and implicit factors involved in this tug of war and the implications on the “How We Fight” discussion.
WHAT IS ‘JOINTNESS’

The academic viewpoint on joint warfare is unified military activities focused on unified purpose rather than any one military actor or service.⁴ While much of the historical analysis has focused on the traditional air-land-sea battle such as the Allied landings in Normandy or the First Gulf War, the future of joint operations must include a discussion about emerging domains of warfare.

The CAF’s current keystone doctrine publication on joint operations, CFJP 3.0 Operations, defines joint as an activity conducted or executed by two or more environments or services with the objective of applying capabilities in a coordinated fashion to achieve a common objective.⁵ The conduct of joint operations from a Canadian perspective is focused rather narrowly on command and control relationships between the operational commanders responsible for the generation of forces and the operational commanders responsible for the planning and execution of operations. While the roles and responsibilities of commanders at various levels are clearly defined and laid out in the doctrine,⁶ what is lacking is a serious discussion on the joint effects that the CAF views as imperative to operating as a joint force. Although an entire chapter is dedicated to ‘Joint Operations and Activities’, the scope of ‘joint’ military actions is limited to traditional military operations such as major combat operations, counter-insurgency operations, peace support and humanitarian relief operations, as well as search

---

⁶ Ibid, 3-5 – 3-12.
and rescue activities and various stabilization activities. Although these activities remain vitally important for any modern day military to be able to execute with a high degree of proficiency, absent is recognition of the importance of cyber and space domains of modern warfare. Also absent is a discussion of the new and emerging domains of modern warfare nor is there a serious discussion on joint effects and how they may delivered by one or all of the environments within the CAF. When coupled with the assertion from CFJP 1.0, Canadian Military Doctrine, that on operations CAF tactical elements will be grouped with larger coalition forces at the theatre level, it identifies the need to understand joint but does not compel the CAF to be joint.

The US military has similarly adopted jointness and the concept of the joint force as the fundamental organizing construct. The Armed Forces of the United States understands joint to be a cross-service combination of capabilities where the end result is fully synchronized effects between two or more services to achieve the same goal. The US definition is quite similar to the Canadian one, with some key differences. JP 1 introduces the idea of ‘common’ military activities, which are described as overlapping military capabilities shared by two or more services. An example of a common capability could be fighter aircraft of the US Air Force and US Navy, both capable of conducting strikes. This difference is significant from the CAF’s concept of joint due to the CAF’s design as a joint force where each service has clearly defined areas of responsibility, such as the RCAF’s exclusive role over all aircraft including helicopters flown from naval ships. JP 1 also introduces the concept of ‘unified action’, which is used.

---

7 Ibid, 8-2 – 8-5.
8 Department of National Defence. CFJP 1.0, Canadian Military Doctrine…: 6-2.
to describe actions undertaken by governmental (military and non-military) as well as non-governmental organizations to achieve mission accomplishment. Despite some slight variances the two descriptions of joint between Canada and the US are relatively similar, which facilitates Canadian participation in US led coalition operations.

Joint functions, in US doctrine parlance, refers to capabilities, actions and effects in the conduct of joint operations to achieve the aim and are again very similar to Canada’s five operational functions (command, sense, act, shield and sustain). The seven functions of joint warfighting are: command and control (C2), information, intelligence, fires, movement and manoeuvre, protection and sustainment. What sets this doctrine apart is the inclusion of emerging domains such as cyber, space, and electronic warfare into the seven warfighting functions above. This comprehensive view of jointness paints a clearer picture of what is joint for the US military, rather than a cursory discussion about a generic air-land-sea battle.

Much like the US doctrine, NATO recognizes eight joint warfighting functions (manoeuvre, fires, C2, intelligence, information activities, sustainment, force protection and civil-military cooperation). Although the NATO version of joint is similar to the US, NATO doctrine focuses more on the nature of coalition operations, whereas Canadian doctrine focus on national command and control issues while acknowledging that joint operations will likely occur within a coalition or alliance structure, and US doctrine acknowledges that the US is likely to lead multinational coalitions.

12 Department of National Defence, CFJP 3.0, Operations…: 1-6.
13 Ibid, III-1.
Expanding beyond the idea of joint, recently the term ‘multidomain’ battle has turned up as a more inclusive description of modern warfare. Multidomain battle must first and foremost be understood to be more than simply ‘joint’ + ‘space’ + ‘cyber’. Albert Harris, a current serving USAF officer, recently writing in *Air and Space Power Journal* describes multidomain battle as follows:

Multidomain approaches at the tactical level involves the lowest warfighting echelon taking advantage of secondary domains—land, sea, air, space, or cyber—to deliver effects more effectively across their primary domain.\(^ {15}\)

Although space and cyber are often associated with multidomain battle the advent of technology has allowed for adversaries to operate in any number of domains through gaining access through space or cyber means. The once level joint playing field may be viewed as a multidomain three dimensional space which is ill defined and potentially limitless allowing trans-domain exchanges such as the response to a cyber attack coming in the form of a physical strike.

From an adversarial perspective, the US along with its traditional Western allies currently enjoys dominance over potential adversaries on the symmetrical battlefield. US military dominance has lead potential adversaries to the conclusion that to be successful against the US in the next war they must achieve three macro objectives. First, potential adversaries must prevail in A2AD operation to not allow US access to a theatre of operations thereby preventing the US from bringing overwhelming forces to bear. Next, they must be able to defeat the current western dominance within the air domain. Finally, any potential adversary must be able to fix our friendly forces within all domains, constraining manoeuvre and freedom of movement, including along the information

---

Multidomain battle as a concept aims to breakdown the silos of warfighting between the services and acknowledges that future war will exist within all domains and remain linked through the more recently discovered domains of cyber and space. In the interest of clarity, this paper will refer to multidomain as the security environment and joint as our approach to fighting multidomain battle. Now that we have established a baseline understanding of what is joint, we turn to the analysis portion of the paper.

INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS MODEL

Institutional analysis is but one of the many sociological tools that exist to explain the environmental pressures and cultural beliefs that aid decision-making. The model that will be used here is the one proposed by organizational sociologist Richard Scott.\textsuperscript{17} The model brings together the regulative, normative and cognitive aspects that together determine how an institution operates and makes decisions. The regulative pillar looks at how behaviour is determined by formalities and rules. The regulative pillar can also work through a system of rewards or sanctions. The normative pillar introduces the obligatory aspect of social life as determined by values and norms. The normative system imposes constraints on social behaviour, but can also act as an enabling function to social life by conferring rights, responsibilities, and privileges such as professional colleges within their specific domains.\textsuperscript{18} The cognitive pillar may be described as “the shared conceptions that constitute the nature of social reality and create the frames

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid, 64-65.
through which meaning is made.”19 Essentially, the cognitive is the way in which a particular collective group views the world.

Together these three pillars provide a lens through which the decisions and actions of an institution can be understood; the three pillars work together but not always equally. Scott’s model is one way of building understanding and is certainly not the only way. In the interest of clarity and brevity however, we will not explore further models. The next section of this paper will apply this model to the CAF in order to identify institutional impediments to jointness beginning with the regulative.

REGULATIVE PILLAR

The regulative pillar will explore efforts at effecting jointness through the use of such tools as position power and legislation, both relying on the regulative aspect of social order. There have been many attempts in the past at increasing the jointness of the CAF, some of which have succeeded and some of which failed to take hold. The most obvious of those being the unification policy of the 1960s, followed by the Defence Policy of the 1970s, and more recently the transformation initiative of General Hillier in the mid-2000s with the creation of operational level commands charged with the planning, execution and sustainment of operations. All of these initiatives had strong regulative aspects to them, which proved key at implementing change in an attempt to become more joint.

Through the use of regulative power, Minister Paul Hellyer was able to pass legislation, Bills C-90 and C-243 that brought unification into force. Faced with significant opposition within the military to such sweeping change, Hellyer was forced to

19 Ibid, 66.
resort to regulative measures in order to push legislation into action.\textsuperscript{20} These legislative changes brought about both the creation of the Canadian Forces Headquarters (CFHQ) as well as the abolition of the services chiefs of staff replaced by the Chief of Defence Staff with the support of a joint staff. While placing all military capabilities within the confines of a single service would seemingly have created an inherently more joint force, by forcing change through regulative means the unintended consequence was a disruption of traditional military-based power and legitimacy through the increase in power held by civilians within the department.\textsuperscript{21} The replacement of traditional sources of military legitimacy and power with civilian structures and management methods resulted in an increased focus on management rather than operational outputs.

Following unification of the CAF and the defence policy of 1971, the new Minister of Defence Donald MacDonald commissioned a Management Review Group (MRG) to evaluate the management processes of the department.\textsuperscript{22} The results of the review revealed that unification had not produced a truly efficient or optimal organizational structure for the CAF as it pertained to management practices or command and control. The result was yet another regulative change that joined the newly created CFHQ into the Department of National Defence to form National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ). Once again a change that promised more efficiency and operation output, the MRG process was criticized for subjugating military authorities to civilian management.\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid, 73.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid, 76.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.
It was not until 2005 when General Hillier as CDS conveyed his vision of CAF transformation that was guided by military necessity and operational outputs rather than civilian management techniques. Yet Hillier also faced significant resistance from senior military leaders as transformation took on a distinctly more land based focus rather than a truly joint outlook on military operations, mainly due to operations in Afghanistan being front and center.\textsuperscript{24} In order to force change Hillier was also forced to rely on his position as CDS to bring about change. Past attempts to achieve jointness have met resistance when the services perceive threats to their traditional bases of power. This would lead us to believe that jointness is something that the environments will only accept if it proposes to benefit that service. If achieving joint is something that is resisted the evolution of joint doctrine in Canada requires brief exploration.

From a doctrine perspective, the CAF have implemented many joint publications and have embraced the idea of conducting joint operations. However, the creation of CAF joint doctrine is not a unique endeavour as since the Cold War Canadian doctrine has rigidly followed the US lead in the area of joint force development and doctrine. Following the end of the Second World War, Canada’s move closer to the US politically and economically was naturally followed by the military as well, leading to what some have called an obsession with US doctrine and jointness.\textsuperscript{25} The creation of joint doctrine would appear to operate at a cross purpose to past attempts to transform and become more joint due to the tension with interoperability. While there is an overt acknowledgement that joint doctrine and aligning with the US is required for the CAF,

achieving that jointness often requires a regulative forcing function to ensure that jointness takes hold.

Through an evaluation of regulative bases of power within the CAF, we see that there are longstanding impediments towards truly achieving a joint force focused on future warfare. An examination of normative factors will reveal some of the underlying and implicit forces at play, which may explain past resistance to jointness.

NORMATIVE PILLAR

The normative dimension reveals a more complex web of values and norms that often tie individual loyalty to the services, which may have the opposite effect that unification was trying to achieve. The stated goals of unification were cost reduction, increased operational effectiveness, the creation of a common identity and a streamlined career process.26 In creating a new force that would replace the three traditional services, the thought was that this new service would create loyalty among service personnel to the newly created service and build upon pre-existing traditions and pride in unit accomplishments. While a 1980 review of unification of the CAF found that unification had in fact improved operational effectiveness in certain areas, the most controversial aspects of the policy was the desire to create a higher loyalty, other than to individual services.27 Most notable being uniform and rank changes. Although the CAF maintained its operational effectiveness through unification, the values and traditions of the services have proved to be a strong institutional force that continues today.

Highlighting the long lasting nature of these forces, the transformation initiative of General Hillier in the mid 2000s found strong resistance to perceived attacks on the

---

27 Ibid, 78-79.
independence and influence of the traditional bases of power within the navy, army and air force. The deeply entrenched idea of service identity is one that permeates Canadian defence. The finalization of unification simply pushed the debate off the front pages and deeper into psyche of the Canadian military. The implication to Canadian jointness is the underlying competition between services is one that is particularly difficult to destroy as each service sees itself as rightly positioned to be the dominant service. For example, the navy has traditionally resisted jointness due to the operational reach and required independence to conduct operations abroad. With such strong service identity it is difficult to become truly joint. However, it should be noted that this resistance to jointness is not a uniquely Canadian endeavour. The US had faced its own clash of services prior to the passing of the Goldwater-Nichols Act mandating the independent services to collaborate and develop joint doctrine.

Despite the normative hurdles and challenges faced by the CAF over the years often as a result of unification, there have been some positive outcomes. As noted by Canadian historian Allan English, unification did inculcate a culture of jointness into certain areas. Examples of improved jointness include the areas of training as well as operations, not to mention the support branches of the CAF, which provide much needed assistance to the daily functioning of all aspects of the CAF.

Taking the idea of jointness a step further, consider Lieutenant-General Rouleau’s assertion that a joint force can no longer be an attachment to core service capabilities.

---

30 Ibid, 150.
31 Ibid, 143.
32 English, Understanding Military Culture…: 109.
Rather the joint force itself must be central to the CAF’s ability to be interoperable and provide military capabilities. All of this in underwritten by “an overarching culture that is collaborative, aligned … to outcomes.”

Rouleau’s call for an overarching culture heralds back to the 1960s where the desire to create a common CAF culture and loyalty which extended beyond the traditional services was the *raison d’être* of unification. However, this desire to achieve a unified culture persists. The constraints of social order within the military have proven themselves to very powerful forces that resist changes to the established order of things. The next section will examine the cognitive pillar to demonstrate some of the more explicit forces at play, which have historically acted as roadblocks to jointness.

**COGNITIVE PILLAR**

General Hillier’s attempts to transform the CAF starting in 2005 and instil more jointness have generally been heralded as a major turning point in CAF operational capability, and been met with mixed reviews. The vision as expressed in a policy statement aimed at restructuring forces and expanding expeditionary capabilities through integration of land, sea, air and special forces. The ultimate goal was the creation of a CAF that was agile and responsive to the Government of Canada’s needs in defence of Canadian interests. The transformation initiative was broken down into two broad sets of policies. The first was the transformation of force structure to include the creation of three joint units: a special operations group, a standing contingency task force, and a mission specific task force. These new units included the acquisition of new equipment such as mobile gun systems and multirole support ships capable of conducting

---

33 Rouleau, *How We Fight…*; 2.
amphibious and littoral operations. The next set of transformation policies focused on transforming the command and control capabilities of the CAF through the replacement of the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (DCDS) by four operation level commands responsible for the command and control and support of all CAF missions domestic and expeditionary.

Despite reinvigorating interest in defence circles, Hillier’s vision for the transformation of force structure failed to fully materialize due to strong institutional factors. Perhaps strongest and most longstanding institutional factor was the resistance faced by the services (army, navy and air force). The perceived loss of influence in the planning and conduct of operations and a relegation to the sole role of force generator and the implications on force structure proved to be difficult hurdles, especially for the acquisition of the mobile gun systems by the army and the watering down of capabilities for the multirole joint support ships. While the structural changes to the command and control of CAF operations did come to fruition, it was not without criticism that the new operational commands created inefficiencies, redundancies, and overextended staffs across the defence architecture all while only slightly improving the CAF’s ability to conduct joint operations. However, any military transformation effort must be viewed as an evolutionary process rather than definitive and final.

Although this transformation period was vastly different from other transformations in that it was conceived of and led by senior military officers, the end result was a return to the status quo of Canadian civil-military relations. While Hillier entered the post of...
CDS with vigour and the freedom from restriction of civilian restrictions, a change in government saw a return to the longstanding Canadian tradition of the ‘silent soldier’ mentality of civilian control of the military and mistrust for ambitious senior military officers.\(^{39}\) Within Canada it is a seemingly very strong institutional force that keeps the military firmly under the control of civilians who naturally mistrust the military. In the case of General Hillier this mistrust and deep rooted institutional force provided a significant roadblock to improve interoperability between the services in the conduct of joint warfare.

The CAF have always been open to the idea of joint in international coalitions; the Second World War to Kosovo to Afghanistan all point to Canada’s eagerness to contribute joint forces. However the notion that the CAF does not campaign but rather contributes to coalitions demonstrates another roadblock to true jointness. In 2005, Canada’s current CDS General J.H. Vance sought to explain why Canada’s does not conduct operations at the operational level and that rather Canada conducts ‘contribution’ warfare. The logic being that as a ‘medium’ power Canada does not have the diplomatic, military or economic power to wage war alone for its own specific strategic interests, and as such Canada protects its interests by contributing to campaigns rather than campaigning. Canadian strategic interests are therefore attained through shared interests and aligning with like-minded states or coalitions. As such Canadian strategic aims may be met through physical presence not through the application of joint capabilities.\(^{40}\) By sharing strategic interests Canada is often required to align interests with those of the

\(^{39}\) Ibid, 621.

coalition, which in turn requires outcomes and achievements to be subordinate to physical presence. Through the contribution of task tailored units to coalitions Canada is able to avoid awkward conversations about joint capabilities, or a lack thereof. Furthermore, by aligning strategic interests with pre-existing coalition strategic aims there is a less of a requirement for high-end A2AD capabilities in the multidomain battle discussed previously. The requirements for Canadian jointness in contribution warfare is to be just joint enough to ‘fit in’ with the coalition club. This desire to fit in is best articulated by what has been described as the Americanization of the CAF over the years and manifests itself through the desire for interoperability with the environmental counterparts in the US, sometimes at the expense of interoperability with other CAF environments. The implication of adopting policies for purposes of interoperability is that there may be a sacrifice to be made to the ability of the CAF to be joint itself.

When looking at Canadian military interoperability with the US, there is a peculiar paradox at play. While Canada may try as it might to be as closely aligned militarily with the US, Canadian military capabilities remain insignificant to the point where they may be unhelpful to advancing jointness. As noted by David King, a former Canadian Colonel and former faculty member of US National Defence University in Washington DC, due to Canada’s small size and defence expenditures relative to the US, Canada has little to offer the US in terms of joint capability simply because of size. In essence Canada would have to increase its defence budget beyond what would be considered politically viable in order to become militarily relevant to the US. Hence why Canada traditionally only provides single service contributions to plug into coalition efforts. This

41 Ibid, 286.
42 English, Understanding Military Culture..., 128.
description of Canadian defence is no doubt highly controversial if not outright
dismissive of hard fought Canadian battles. It is however revealing to understand that the
size and scope of Canada’s military pales in comparison to the US in the joint fight,
thereby reinforcing the importance of the political capital garnered in coalition
operations. The next section will discuss how the three pillars of Scott’s institutional
analysis model work together.

DISCUSSION

The above analysis demonstrates that affecting change is difficult. Achieving true
jointness has been a desire of the Canadian military since the mid 1960s and yet there
exists a continued desire to be joint implying that the CAF never was joint in the first
place. Despite replacing uniforms and renaming the former services, the institutional
factors that underpin traditional bases of power continue to exist and play a strong role in
defining the Canadian military.

While intuitional factors seemingly have continued to stifle jointness, the CAF
remain operationally effective when conducting coalitions or domestic operations. So
long as each service understands what they bring to the joint fight and how they fit into
the bigger picture, service identity does not necessarily operate at a cross purpose to
jointness. Therefore maybe the CAF is joint enough for its purposes.

The institutional analysis model as proposed by Scott has offered insight into the
explicit and implicit forces at play in Canadian defence, explaining why jointness has
been such an elusive goal. While each of the pillars work together in building our
understanding of the factors, it is clear that not all of them are equal and sometimes they
operate at a cross purpose to each other. From a regulative perspective attempts to
become more joint have been traditionally met with resistance and have been pushed through using formal sources of social power and legislation. The normative pillar has focused on the tug of war between a universal joint culture versus that of the individual services. While cognitive arguments have placed emphasis on the need to be interoperable with key allies so that the CAF may ‘plug and play’ in expeditionary operations. The above analysis would appear to indicate that the cognitive aspect of social power to be the strongest of the forces that regulate CAF jointness balanced against the interoperability requirements of contribution warfare. However, the normative forces highlighted by the tension between joint and individual service culture must not be discounted.

These institutional forces have played a tug of war between what Carl von Clausewitz cited as the extremes of the real world and the world of abstract concepts.\(^4\) The result is the balance that has been struck between achieving jointness and maintaining interoperability. The CAF exist in a world that is socially constructed, which constrains it from gravitating to the extremes and allows it to sit comfortably in the middle.

Currently there exists a discussion regarding the gap between joint force doctrine development, joint force generation, and joint capability development; there is simply no single champion for the joint force within the CAF.\(^5\) The various iterations of unification and transformation over the years have left the business of jointness squarely

---


in the hands of the CDS alone.⁴⁶ Lieutenant-General (Retired) Beare, former commander Canadian Joint Operations Command, writing after his retirement suggested that for the CAF to achieve true jointness, military professionals working alone are not sufficient. Political enthusiasm, among other things, will be required to provide leadership over the “joint agenda – including our military’s own joint culture.”⁴⁷

CONCLUSION

The above analysis demonstrates that jointness might be out of reach to the CAF. If the forces at play are enduring, does this mean we should just give up? We need to think beyond the current threats to the next bound and beyond. The “How We Fight” discussion is an effort to not only making the CAF more joint, it is also aimed at ensuring that the discussion is properly framed around the idea of what kind of joint force the CAF needs to be into the future.

Prior to embarking on any discussion about the kind of force the CAF needs to be there must be a fulsome understanding of what the CAF is at the present. This paper has examined some of the underlying institutional factors that have traditionally been at play and resisted previous efforts towards jointness. Even “How We Fight” brings about old ideas about joint culture and the need to be more effective and efficient for a lack of resources. Without understanding some of these forces, “How We Fight” may be doomed to fail before it begins. Clearly there is a desire to be joint, but the historical institutional forces are still around.

⁴⁷ Ibid.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Griffin, Stuart, Joint Operations: A Short History, Great Britain: Joint Services Command and Staff College, 2005.


