

Archived Content

Information identified as archived on the Web is for reference, research or record-keeping purposes. It has not been altered or updated after the date of archiving. Web pages that are archived on the Web are not subject to the Government of Canada Web Standards.

As per the [Communications Policy of the Government of Canada](#), you can request alternate formats on the "[Contact Us](#)" page.

Information archivée dans le Web

Information archivée dans le Web à des fins de consultation, de recherche ou de tenue de documents. Cette dernière n'a aucunement été modifiée ni mise à jour depuis sa date de mise en archive. Les pages archivées dans le Web ne sont pas assujetties aux normes qui s'appliquent aux sites Web du gouvernement du Canada.

Conformément à la [Politique de communication du gouvernement du Canada](#), vous pouvez demander de recevoir cette information dans tout autre format de rechange à la page « [Contactez-nous](#) ».

CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES

CSC 30 / CCEM 30

EXERCISE / EXERCICE NEW HORIZONS

21st CENTURY OFFICER SELECTION
IN THE CANADIAN FORCES

By / par LCol T.M. Datchko

Term One, Syndicate 8

30 April 2004

This paper was written by a student attending the Canadian Forces College in fulfilment of one of the requirements of the Course of Studies. The paper is a scholastic document, and thus contains facts and opinions which the author alone considered appropriate and correct for the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of any agency, including the Government of Canada and the Canadian Department of National Defence. This paper may not be released, quoted or copied except with the express permission of the Canadian Department of National Defence.

La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale.

Abstract:

The Canadian Forces officer corps has continually transformed itself to meet new demands placed on it by an ever-changing geo-political climate, and has adapted its education and training programmes accordingly. Most recently, Canadian Forces officer education requirements were changed following a Minister of National Defence study commissioned to investigate lapses in officer judgement after the much-publicized Somalia incident. A key recommendation resulting from this study was the requirement that by 2020, all existing officers would possess a university degree. This change was supposed to improve the intellectual capacity and professionalism of the officer corps. However, the study never broached the fundamental building block of the officer corps, that being the existing officer selection methods and training.

The purpose of this paper is to propose a solution to ensure that candidates chosen for training as officers within the Canadian Forces are the best natural leaders who, after successfully proving their leadership abilities to their direct superiors, are selected to attend basic officer training and complete initial military service prior to being afforded the opportunity to obtain their degree. Selection and training programmes in effect within the German and Israeli armies are examined, with the advantages of both systems incorporated into a proposed solution for the Canadian Forces. The result is a system that guarantees Canadian officers possess the requisite leadership skills, professionalism and experience prior to investing in their education.

In a scene reminiscent of that which repeats itself annually within the Canadian Forces (CF), newly commissioned officers fresh off their final military occupation (MOC) training arrive at their assigned units eager to assume their role as junior officers. The trouble is that they are virtually an unproven entity, especially with respect to those that they have been chosen to lead. As a consequence, the cohesiveness and integrity of a varying degree of sub-sub units is affected by their arrival, as the incumbent officers are now forced to relinquish their tenure in command to the newcomers while assuming new assignments within the unit. At this point, the CF has invested vast sums of money to provide these officers with a bachelor's degree and a basic level of training that qualifies them to assume command within their assigned element. What it has not necessarily ensured is that these officers possess the requisite leadership skills and attributes that will become vital to their success in the immediate future. These officers have only essentially proven that they have an academic capacity to learn, and quite often in a field of academia that has no direct bearing on their selected occupation. Inherent leadership skills have only been proven to the limited extent required for them to successfully pass their officer MOC training. This is not solely their fault, for the current system of CF officer selection continues to permit this credulous cycle to continue, thereby ensuring that the officers that lead our Canadian (and other nation's) soldiers are not necessarily the best qualified leadership candidates, but instead are selected largely on speculation that they can be educated first and then moulded into leaders at a later date. It is not the intent of this paper to argue against the requirement for advanced education for the officer, for these benefits are well demonstrated and not the subject of this paper. However, the placement of the period of post-secondary education within the Regular

Force Combat Arms officer's development system will be questioned. This paper will also not address the selection and training of CF Reserve Officers nor specialty officers due to the inherent complexities associated with these current programmes.

This paper will argue that CF Regular Force Combat Arms officer candidates should be selected for training from within the ranks of non-commissioned members after having proven their leadership abilities and aptitude. Current CF initiatives that have recently been implemented with the aim of reinvigorating officer training and education will be outlined, and their inherent weaknesses highlighted. An examination of successful programmes utilized by both the German and Israeli military will follow with the intent of illustrating the benefits of these officer candidate selection and training programmes. Finally, a proposal will be offered whereby the CF could potentially revise existing officer candidate selection procedures, thereby ensuring officers are selected from amongst proven leadership candidates prior to investing both the public's money and trust in their education as future commanders of our military.

Officer education and training has been extensively studied by a multitude of militaries over the course of history. It is a subject that continues to evolve and remains a constant concern to both serving military members and the public that they serve. The Canadian officer corps has continually transformed itself to meet new demands placed on it by an ever-changing geo-political climate, and has adapted its education and training programmes accordingly. The most significant impact occurred over the last decade after the ill-fated Somalia peacekeeping mission that resulted in the death by torture of Somali

teenager Shidane Arone. As a result, the Canadian officer corps was subjected to intense scrutiny in order to determine how such lapses in judgement could occur, and a study commissioned by the Minister of National Defence (MND), the honourable Doug Young, was conducted. Its aim was to determine what measures to implement in order to ensure that these shortcomings wouldn't repeat themselves. One of the recommendations was that all officers, with the exception of those commissioned from the ranks, must possess a university degree prior to commissioning¹. The premise behind this recommendation was that officers with a university degree would function at a higher intellectual level, with a higher degree of professionalism, and an appropriate ethos that would prevent the recurrence of such disciplinary breakdown.² This has since been further translated into the formal requirement that by 2020, all officers must possess an undergraduate degree as a minimum.³ Although this prestigious report identified shortcomings, the fundamental selection and education process for CF officers has continued unaltered and continues to form the cornerstone for the majority of officer selection and training today.

The fundamental weakness in the requirements outlined in the above study is that they automatically assume that those who graduate academic institutions with an undergraduate degree, be they military or civilian, will possess the requisite maturity, competence and leadership skills to qualify them to lead soldiers effectively and make the appropriate decisions even though these decisions may not be remotely relevant to their

¹ M. Douglas Young, *Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces*, Report to the Prime Minister (Ottawa: DND, 1997), 15.

² *Ibid*, 15.

³ *Canadian Officership in the 21st century: OPD 2020 statement of operational requirement* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2000), 40.


specific field of education or expertise. As will be outlined shortly, Martin van Creveld expresses the concern that various military organizations “would surely question any system by which aspiring officers receive the bulk of their training in a special institution, separated from the enlisted men whom they will ultimately command.”⁴ Surprisingly enough, there are critical opinions surfacing within the civilian community that these officer candidates are only attending military training not so that they can proudly serve their country or have the honour of leading soldiers in operations, but “for a cheap education and guaranteed job on graduation.”⁵ Being an effective leader may not even be a true part of their aspirations or ethos. The tables portrayed below clearly depict a consistently greater attrition rate for Combat Arms Regular Officer Training Plan (ROTP) officers in comparison to non-ROTP officers. The survival rate based on years of commissioned service is also comparatively lower for ROTP officers than non-ROTP officers.⁶

⁴ Martin van Creveld, *The Training of Officers: From Military Professionalism to Irrelevance*. (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 3.


⁵ Charles C. Moskos, Jr. “*From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organization*”, in *War, Morality and the Military Profession*, 219-229. As cited by Captain Eric T. Reynolds, *Ethical Competence and The Profession of Arms: A Contemporary Challenge to Military Institutions*, (Defence Quarterly, Vol 23, No 2 (December 1993), footnote 17.

⁶ Information related to attrition and survival rates was provided by Mr. Paul Bender, National Defence Headquarters Director Strategic Human Resources 3 - Modelling & Analysis.

Attrition Rate by YCS - CBT Arms



Survivor Rate by YCS - CBT Arms



The empirical evidence depicted in these two preceding graphs are in clear contradiction to ex-Chief of Defence Staff General Maurice Baril's contention that "our officers must have a clear, well articulated sense of military purpose based on the concept of unlimited liability that puts service to the nation before self."⁷ General Baril's beliefs are further supported by Colonel Malham Wakin's assertion that "self-sacrifice rather than self-interest is an essential ingredient both of military leadership and of military service in general."⁸ Martin Van Creveld offers a more pessimistic observation when he debates the effectiveness of academic education in relation to the military's ability to fight a war: "war fighting demands a certain kind of hardheaded know-how, skill, and what the Germans call *Konnen*, or competence...that cannot be acquired by sitting behind a university desk."⁹ Surprisingly enough, the 1960 Report of the Officer Development Board, commonly referred to as the Rowley Report, contradicted the more recent MND study, in that it stated "the need for intellectual capacity is lowest at the junior officer ranks and does not begin to increase substantially until after the rank of major."¹⁰ "Furthermore, the needs for branch and specialty skills are very high at the junior level. These skills are typically taught through military training, and experience at military establishments outside the civilian universities or even military academies. This observation by Rowley could be used to argue that greater development of intellectual

⁷ Bernd Horn and Stephen J. Harris. *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral: Perspectives on Canadian Senior Military Leadership*. (St. Catherines: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2001), 139.

⁸ Colonel Malham M. Wakin, "Ethics Of Leadership," *Military Leadership*, 1981, 4/16.

⁹ Martin van Creveld, *The Training of Officers...*, 77.

¹⁰ *Report of the Officer Development Board, Vol 1*, Maj-Gen R. Rowley, chairman (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1969), 39-41.

capacity should be delayed until an officer is firmly established in his career path, and has fully developed his occupation's specific military skills"¹¹ To summarize, it is difficult to argue that the current system of officer selection and training has, for the most part, been relatively successful in producing capable officers. However, when one closely analyzes the empirical evidence of attrition rates presented earlier, and reflects on the concerns expressed previously with respect to motivation for attendance at military institutions, it becomes apparent that perhaps a more effective method of selecting and training our officers is necessary in order to produce and retain the services of these officers in order to dispel these concerns.

Perhaps there is a more effective system of officer selection that is not based on a system that places emphasis on educating largely unproven leadership candidates to the post-secondary level prior to their experiencing military service in their chosen occupation. Are there systems in place today that create more capable officers simply by altering the selection and training methodology? Van Creveld is quick to dismiss any method of officer selection and enrolment that operates in a similar manner to that currently utilized by the CF. In a comparative comment on the US Reserve Officers' Training Corps, he is critical of any system in which a candidate, regardless of their background or prior military experience and training, is designated as an officer at the time of their enrolment. His criticism is based on the fact that this type of system does

¹¹ Major L.A. Paziuk, "The Need to Balance Academic Education Within The Overall Officer Development Program." (Toronto: Canadian Forces College Masters in Defence Studies Research Project, 2002) 22-23.

not depend on any actual proven performance that would indicate a candidate's suitability to lead, but "the decision as to who will be allowed to enter officer training rests with examiners and interviewers rather than with people who know the candidate and are familiar with his or her character."¹² To the contrary, the German and Israeli armed forces have addressed van Creveld's concerns by developing unique systems for officer enrolment quite different from the current Canadian system. An examination of both the German and Israeli military system of officer selection will offer insight into plausible solutions to this question.

The German system of officer candidate selection begins prior to actual commissioning. The system has two central pillars. "The first pillar is the enlisted/junior officer skills training the cadet officer receives. The second pillar is the officer aspirant's civilian and military general education."¹³ Officer candidates undertake a series of basic training courses and initial leadership roles for a period of two years before finally being commissioned as a 2nd lieutenant. Upon receiving their commission, the new officer completes a tour of duty as a junior leader for a period of five months, and then proceeds to a civilian university to complete his/her undergraduate degree. Approximately half way through the university education portion, the officer is then promoted to 1st lieutenant. From this point onwards, training continues in a manner similar to the CF

¹² Martin van Creveld, *The Training of Officers....*, 2.

¹³ Luke G. Grossman, *Command and General Staff Officer Education for the 21st Century: Examining the German Model* (Ft Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, 2002), 13.

development process, with the officer attending various additional officer career qualification courses, and command and staff officer schools.¹⁴ A depiction of this progression follows in the table below.¹⁵




Figure 2⁴²

This German military officer development model aids in reinforcing the belief that one of the primary roles of the officer, and particularly those employed in operational classifications such as the combat arms is, above all, to be militarily competent at leading troops into battle. By the time the German officer candidates are commissioned, they have already received preliminary training in the skills expected in war fighting, and have developed a degree of experience, dedication and self-identification with the military and potentially the soldiers that they will personally lead. This candidate is clearly not simply a naïve youth looking for a subsidized education. Another advantage to this system is

¹⁴ Bernd A. Goetze, *Military Professionalism: The Canadian Officer Corps*. (Kingston: Queen's University, 1976.) 41.

¹⁵ Luke G. Grossman, *Command and General Staff Officer Education for the 21st Century: Examining the German Model...*, 14.

that the newly promoted 2nd lieutenant is fully capable of actively contributing to the operational success of his unit, whereas with the current Canadian system, a new 2nd lieutenant possesses limited practical military or leadership experience, and begins his tour of duty with only a rudimentary level of experience gained from his classification training. This is seen as inherently backward when compared to the German system. Therefore, as will soon be emphasized, the German method of officer selection and training provides interesting alternatives for the CF to consider, as advanced education is still emphasized, but only after the development of essential military skills. This system retains the belief in advancing an officer's education, but maintains the strident belief that the candidates must first experience the military before an investment will be made in their further education and leadership training.

A further refinement and intriguing alternative to officer selection is that conducted by the Israeli military. The "Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) was founded in the crucible of a war... This has made it, from its first moment, a fighting army."¹⁶ Additionally, it has, since its foundation, been a conscript army. However, service in the Israeli military is seen as an honourable duty and the motivation for Israelis to serve their country is instilled in the Israeli youth from a very early age. To become an officer in the IDF is voluntary, "but volunteering to become an officer in the IDF is something else."¹⁷ Besides the requirement for officers to serve additional service after commissioning, "Being commissioned as an officer, for the majority of Israelis, means to exert one's

¹⁶ Reuven Gal, *A Portrait of the Israeli Soldier*. (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1986), 30.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, 67.

abilities and skills—as well as one’s capability to contribute to one’s society—to their utmost.”¹⁸ In a remarkably similar circumstance to that experienced by the CF, “The manpower needs of the Israeli Defence Forces can best be characterized as requiring both maximum quantity and maximum quality. Given the small population of Israel and the immense defense requirements, the optimal utilization of available manpower is an absolute necessity.”¹⁹ In order to determine the best candidates for potential service as officers, the IDF institutes a special screening process for all conscripts when they enter the Service. The final product results in what is referred to as “*The Kaba System*”, comprising four components: an intelligence evaluation, level of formal education, command of the Hebrew language, and a motivation to serve index.²⁰ What is concluded from the Kaba score is “the higher the conscript’s quality, the greater the probability that he will end up serving in a command position, either as an officer or an NCO.”²¹ Gal has also determined that empirically, the Kaba scores indicate that, with the exception of one percent, the entire officers’ corps comes from the high-quality category, with the preponderance of NCOs achieving high to moderate scores.

Once conscripts are assigned their applicable occupation, the next endeavour is to ascertain which candidates should be selected to become future IDF officers. “All Israeli field officers come from the ranks. They serve for a while as regular soldiers, then are

¹⁸ *Ibid*, 68.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, 76.

²⁰ Gal provides a detailed explanation of this system and its importance in candidate occupational classification as well as potential for leadership training. 78-81.

²¹ *Ibid*, 81.

selected for junior command courses and, consequently, serve as NCOs in positions such as squad leaders or tank commanders. Only then are they selected for officer's training."²² Gal provides further justification for this method of officer selection when he compares the attrition rates of both the CF and US military: "In the United States Army and in the Canadian armed forces [*sic*], which are both all-volunteer forces whose members receive adequate monetary compensation, an attrition rate of 30 to 40 percent during the first year of service has been reported. By comparison, in the IDF, which is compulsory service with minimal monetary compensation, the attrition rate during the three-year service period averages less than 10 percent."²³ Gal credits much of the success of this system to the strong military leadership developed within the IDF, as well as the soldier's combat motivation and willingness to serve his country. Through this system of selection based on Kaba, and tailored training, "the best soldier on the team will become the team leader, and the best among the team leaders will become an officer."²⁴ In stark contrast to current western militaries:

the IDF does not have officer academies or academic prerequisites for its officers and certainly not the requirement that they come from the "*right*" social class...Instead of an officers' model which is predominated by lateral entry (common among Western militaries) the Israeli model is characterized by vertical progression from the bottom up. Furthermore, since any combat officer has already served as both a soldier and an NCO, he is spared the tutorship of his NCOs on his first assignments. If anything, the opposite is the case. Hence, this latent function of the typical Western NCO is completely absent in the Israeli system.²⁵

²² *Ibid*, 91.

²³ *Ibid*, 94.

²⁴ *Ibid*, 116.

²⁵ *Ibid*, 116.

A brief encapsulation of the Israeli officer training programme is necessary to both understand the process, but as well to comprehend the inherent advantages this system of selection and training offers. Conscripts (in this case combat arms conscripts will be addressed) commence service in the IDF with a basic training period lasting a maximum of five months. Upon completion, they are assigned to their respective units and begin their terms of service. For those who had high Kaba scores, and upon the recommendation of their commanding officer, they are offered further leadership training on a junior command course where training emphasizes both technical and leadership training. Upon graduation, after approximately four months, they return to their respective units for a period of six to ten months, where they are exposed to the daily challenges of leadership and caring for their troops. Once again, their initial Kaba scores are re-examined, along with their commanding officer's recommendation, psychological screening, and the implementation of a peer rating system to determine the best possible candidates for officer candidate training.

From this point Israeli officer candidates undergo essentially the same kind of training found in most officer training programmes.

However, unlike the typical junior Western military officer, the Israeli counterpart already has almost two years of experience as a regular soldier and NCO prior to becoming an officer candidate. Consequently, the training in the officer course does not focus on technical or basic combat skills. Rather, the emphasis is on cultivating the young officer's cognitive ability to solve tactical as well as human problems and on his leadership ability to implement and pursue appropriate solutions.²⁶

²⁶ *Ibid*, 119.

Those candidates who successfully complete their courses return to their original units commissioned as 2nd lieutenants and assume their roles as junior officers at the platoon level of command. What has been produced is a junior officer who has already earned the respect of his soldiers as he has proven himself capable of becoming a prestigious officer in the IDF, and fundamentally these officers have nothing to prove to their soldiers. The officer is their role model and their source of motivation, because they already know that the officer is the proven product of the Israeli military who has already experienced military life and who knows intimately those to whom he has been assigned to lead. There is no prolonged period of integration into an unfamiliar unit, no awkward requirement for mentorship or being “*taken under the wing*” of a more experienced NCO who has much more to teach this inexperienced officer. No, that is the paradoxical system of the western armed forces. The IDF officer is a proven entity and is completely prepared for the rigours of leadership at the junior command level when he is commissioned.

However, it must be noted that the IDF has begun to place more emphasis on officer education than was traditionally the case. Yael Enoch and Abraham Yogev note that in contrast to the past, wherein retired military officers were practically guaranteed employment selection in high-level civilian management positions based solely on their military credentials, “while senior officer’s rank is still considered an asset on a job applicant’s curriculum vitae, a bachelor’s degree is now a common requirement for the kind of position of interest to retiring IDF officers.”²⁷ Slowly but surely the IDF “no

²⁷ Yael Enoch and Abraham Yogev, “Military-University Encounters and the Educational Plans of Israeli Officers,” *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 15 No. 3 (Spring 1989), 450.

longer conceives of the university as a rival competing for its officers but rather as an ally in the task of producing an officer who possesses professional and/or managerial skills.²⁸

In summation, the German system of officer candidate selection has, as a final product, officers who have previous military experience and have proven themselves as capable NCOs prior to selection and attendance at officer training. Upon commissioning they return to assigned units fully prepared for the challenges ahead. They possess the skills of warfighting referred to by Von Creveld, and have a high degree of dedication and self-identification with those soldiers whom they are fortunate to lead. They are capable of contributing more effectively immediately upon assignment in comparison to their western military counterparts. Once this period of practical military service is complete, they are then afforded the opportunity for advanced education, the benefits of which they can then apply to their future employment as officers in the German military.

As illustrated, the Israelis take a slightly different approach. They rely on selecting officer candidates from those who have empirically proven capabilities from an intellectual, psychological and subjective perspective. The selection of candidates is conducted by end users (i.e. those officers and NCOs who they will eventually serve with) to select candidates vice recruiting centers utilizing relatively minor and informal assessment techniques. Once they have gained military experience and technical skills training, the officer training system then places less emphasis on technical training and

²⁸ *Ibid*, 450.

focuses on the requisite leadership training that is specific to the officer. Graduates return to their units inspired by the fact that they have achieved a coveted accomplishment in their military, and are extremely motivated to serve. As indicated, officers are revered, thus devotion and respect of soldiers easily obtained. One also sees the necessity for NCO mentorship to be eliminated for the reasons indicated. This can only contribute to faster integration and acceptance into the unit by all personnel.

By examining the benefits of the German and Israeli models, it is readily apparent that the CF could incorporate certain aspects into the current system of officer selection to both improve the quality of the candidates entering officer training, while at the same time ensuring that those eventually commissioned as officers possess the requisite leadership skills and attributes necessary to successfully command in today's fast paced and complex military environment. Given the constraints of this paper, the proposal that follows will introduce a macro level programme to be considered for incorporation by the CF to exploit advantageous aspects of both the German and Israeli systems.

To understand the context of this proposal, it is imperative to first provide a brief overview of the existing officer development stages with a view to providing a clearer comprehension of the proposed changes to the target audience (CF officer candidates). As of 1995, the CF instituted a new professional development model based along seven core themes running throughout an officer's career: leadership, communications, ethics, ethos, history, management and technology. From this, the Officer Professional Development system was developed with these core themes using four pillars: education,

training, operational and command experience, and self-development. This education was to be gained through four Development Periods (DP) during an officer's career: Basic (DP 1) – Officer Cadet and Second Lieutenant; Junior (DP 2) – Lieutenant and Captain; Advanced (DP 3) – Major and Lieutenant-Colonel; and Senior (DP 4) – Colonels and General Officers.²⁹ Clearly, the object of this proposal is directed at those officers who are situated in the early stages of DP 1 and 2.

Currently, officers enter into the CF through a limited variety of entry programmes, primarily the ROTP and the Direct Entry Officer plan. There is an alternate plan that allows officers to enter directly without post-secondary education in the form of the Continuing Education Officer Training Plan. However, this is a restricted entry plan only permissible when shortfalls via the other two programmes occur and contingent upon the officer obtaining a bachelor degree within a specified period.³⁰ In the existing system, officer candidates aged 18-21 years of age are enrolled, complete four or five years of post-secondary education upon which they obtain a bachelors degree and are granted commissions as officers. Military occupation training is conducted during MOC specific phase training during prolonged academic breaks during summer periods. Upon successful completion of their final phase of training, commissioned officers are assigned to their first operational unit. From age 22 to 24, the junior officers expect to command

²⁹ As cited in Caravaggio, A.N. "Educating the Officer of 2020: Officership Education at the Canadian Forces College: Utilizing the Military Leader Competency Model." Toronto: Canadian Forces College Command and Staff Course Masters in Defence Studies Research Project, 2003, 5.

³⁰ DND Recruiting Website; available from http://www.recruiting.forces.gc.ca/html/army/careers/career_profiles/armo.html; Internet; accessed 4 February 2004.

at the platoon/troop level. However, it is highly likely that their actual exposure to command at this level will be limited to perhaps one year, as unit staff positions are required to be filled. Therefore, it is feasible that the only direct leadership experience that the officer receives is during his first year or second year at the most. During this brief period, they spend a large portion of time under the mentorship of their NCOs, and a limited amount of time performing in their role as the platoon/troop leader. After a maximum of three years in an operational unit, the officer is then assigned to Extra-Regimental Employment, and remarkably enough, may even be assigned to instructor roles within the above-mentioned MOC training establishment possessing minimal leadership experience. This is at complete variance when compared to the advantages outlined by both the German and Israeli systems. Unfortunately, this system has not been challenged or revised over the course of time. It has simply become ingrained in our military institution from an historical perspective, having been accepted as correct and not in need of any revision by those who have successfully completed the programme and are now in advanced leadership positions themselves. Hence, these leaders may therefore be hesitant to implement any changes to the current traditional programme out of concern for the inevitable backlash of criticism from potentially uncompromising alumni who hold deep-rooted apprehension towards institutional reform. However, these concerns can be allayed by the fact that the proposed solution does not suggest that the Royal Military College (RMC) is not a credible and worthwhile institution. What it addresses, quite simply, is that the leadership ability of the officer cadets attending RMC is proven prior to selection and attendance at this fine educational institution. The outcome of this proposal sees everyone concerned evolving as winners. The CF ensures itself that officer

cadets in training are indeed the best candidates via a rigorous leadership selection process, while at the same time continuing the time-honoured tradition of maintaining a military style academy dedicated solely to the education of military officers. Details of this proposal will now be outlined.

The proposed solution would implement a combination of advantages found in the German and Israeli systems. To begin a potential career as an officer in the CF, one would be required to enroll as a Private and begin MOC training along with all other future NCMs and officers. Enrolment numbers would not be affected in any manner whatsoever. Those candidates that aspire to be officers will have every opportunity to prove themselves to the military leadership, and will emerge as officers on completion of the programme. However, simply wanting to be an officer for sheer status or following family tradition, and actually possessing the wherewithal to become an officer, is where

acquired at least one, if not more, primary combat functions (PCF) and have been employed specifically in this role. The apparent advantage of this is that it would alleviate the necessity to conduct this aspect of training during their officer-training course. The cost savings alone would be numerous. There is apparent potential for savings in manpower requirements at existing training institutions from an instructor and maintenance personnel perspective, as well as the operational and maintenance savings realized by not being required to conduct basic PCF courses for the officer candidates. Additionally, the retention rate of potential successful officer candidates could increase in comparison to the empirically evidenced attrition rates presented previously as these officers are more aware of the requirements of their occupation, and thus are possibly more prepared for the challenges that await them on commissioning. (This hypothesis cannot be empirically validated until such time that a programme similar to this proposal has been implemented in order to acquire sufficient data in support of this assertion.) Candidates would then be selected for officer training at approximately 21 years of age, and as indicated, would attend a condensed version of officer training that, similar to the Israelis, would place more emphasis on leadership attributes and tactical skills applicable to the junior officer vice a combination of leadership and technical skills presently performed on current courses. For example, an examination of existing Royal Canadian Armoured Corps training syllabuses indicates that there currently exists approximately 30

working days of instruction specifically allocated to technical training on related equipment that could be dropped from the courses, thereby reducing the actual amount of time the officer spends during their MOC specific officer training.³¹ Prior to attending, and especially upon completion of their training, the candidates would possess a higher degree of maturity based on their advanced age during this stage, and also on their military experience that could potentially have exposed them to more challenges than the average Canadian of the same age attending either a civilian or military academic institution. Upon successful completion of their officer training, candidates would receive their commissions and be returned to their original unit for employment. In a situation reminiscent of the Israeli and German officers, having been previously exposed to the unit regimen and already possessing a familiarity with the majority of the unit soldiers, equipment and responsibility of their roles as subalterns (from having previously witnessed junior officers in the conduct of their duties) the newly commissioned officers arrives ready to assume their duties without the present mentorship period that currently exists. After serving for a minimum of two years, those junior officers that are identified as having a certain degree of potential should be selected for post secondary education training in order to obtain their bachelors degree. As previously indicated, this could be completed within a minimal amount of time in comparison to the current four to five year programme as there is no requirement for MOC training during the spring and summer timeframes. Theoretically, RMC would be required to modify its current academic

³¹ An examination of RCAC Phase 3 and 4 optimum timetables indicates that a minimum of 30 days of technical training on armoured skills could potentially be eliminated from existing courses if, as suggested, candidates possessed these skills prior to attendance. This translates into a savings of approximately 27% of allocated training time on a combined 111-day syllabus incorporating both Phase 3 and 4 calendars.

programme to accommodate this requirement. Given academic credits for completion of military Officer Professional Military Exams and experience, officers could graduate within a maximum of three years, or 26 years of age. They would then simply be assigned to appropriate roles within the normal DP cycle in accordance with service requirements. (A comparison between existing and proposed selection and training models is summarized in the table provided at Annex A)

There are a multitude of advantages associated with this proposed system of officer selection and training. Of prime importance is that the end-user has a direct role in the selection of candidates that have proven leadership abilities prior to the CF investing in their military and academic training as officers. When compared to the existing ROTP programme, this proposal results in junior officers who, upon commissioning, are potentially more mature soldier, experienced in their chosen MOC, and immediately prepared to assume the role and responsibilities of an officer the moment they arrive at their unit. This affords them the maximum opportunity to experience the responsibilities of officership while developing their personal professional development. Attendance at a post-secondary educational institution then occurs after having proven themselves capable as junior officers, and when they are at a slightly more mature age and level of experience. This permits the officer to be more objective and receptive to advanced education and able to contribute fully to the challenges afforded at these institutions. The investment in the officer is only detrimental to the extent that the age of the officer is slightly advanced in comparison to the existing DP structure, but as can be seen in the attached table, this would only be by a matter of a few years. The

advantages of having a proven, more experienced and mature leader at the junior officer level is difficult to measure from a quantitative perspective. The esoteric benefits of the CF implementing such a system are readily apparent as demonstrated by the success of the German and Israeli military.

Initiatives such as Officership 2020 are well intentioned and extremely beneficial for improving the level of officer education and training in comparison to only a decade or so earlier. These initiatives are to be applauded as they strive to improve the overall performance of officers through the acquisition of advanced academic and military knowledge. However, they completely overlook the fundamental building block of the officer: the natural leadership abilities that are inherent in our soldiers. The opportunity to lead should not be assigned randomly to those candidates that meet a general prerequisite, complete a degree in a field of education largely unrelated to their chosen MOC, nor ever having practically proven their leadership ability except to examiners who have no direct relation to the recruit. Direct involvement by the CF in the selection of officer candidates from within the ranks of proven leaders will be most beneficial to ensuring that our officers are first and foremost true leaders who are motivated to become officers, and have experienced in the rigours of military life so as to be completely prepared for their future responsibilities as officers within their chosen MOC. The adoption of such a system will require current leaders to rid themselves of institutionalized and parochial beliefs with respect to the suitability of the existing system of officer selection and training. As with any suggestion that proposes to alter or does not conform to the norm, there will be a natural reluctance to adopt change for fear of

ridicule, the potential for failure, or simply being creatures of habit and set in our ways. This proposal, albeit macro in nature, is predicated upon the integration of the beneficial aspects of successful German and Israeli officer selection programmes. It is worthy of serious consideration for adoption by the CF in order to fully refine our officer selection, training and development in the not so distant future.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Baril, Maurice, Gen. "Officership: A personal Reflection." *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral*. Edited by Bernd Horn and Stephen J. Harris. St. Catherines, Ontario: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2001.

Canadian Officership in the 21st Century: OPD 2020 Statement of Operational Requirement. Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2000.

Caravaggio, A.N. "Educating the Officer of 2020: Officership Education at the Canadian Forces College: Utilizing the Military Leader Competency Model." Toronto: Canadian Forces College Command and Staff Course Masters in Defence Studies Research Project, 2003.

Canada, Department of National Defence, B-GL-300-000/FP-000 *Canada's Army: We Stand On Guard For Thee*, Ottawa: DND Canada, 1 April 1998.

Canada, Department of National Defence, *Canadian Officership in the 21st Century: Detailed Analysis and Strategy for Launching and Implementation (Officership 2020)*. Ottawa: DND Canada, 8 March 2001.

Canada, Department of National Defence, *Report of the Officer Development Board*, Vol 1. Major-General R. Rowley, Chairman. Ottawa: DND Canada, 1969.

Enoch, Yael, and Yogev, Abraham. "Military-University Encounters And the Educational Plans of Israeli Officers." *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 15 No. 3 (Spring 1989)

Gal, Reuven. *A Portrait of the Israeli Soldier*. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1986.

Goetze, Bernd A. *Military Professionalism: The Canadian Officer Corps*. Kingston: Queen's University, 1976.

Grossman, Luke G. *Command and General Staff Officer Education for the 21st Century: Examining the German Model*. Ft Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, 2002.

Horn, Bernd and Stephen J. Harris. *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral: Perspectives on Canadian Senior Military Leadership*. St. Catherines: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2001.

Paziuk, Major L.A. "The Need to Balance Academic Education Within The Overall Officer Development Program." Toronto: Canadian Forces College Masters in Defence Studies Research Project, 2002.

Van Creveld, Martin. *The Training of Officers: From Military Professionalism to Irrelevance*. New York: The Free Press, 1990.

Wakelam, Colonel R.T. "So What's In A Degree?" *Canadian Military Journal*, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Summer 2003).

Wakin, Colonel Malham M. "Ethics Of Leadership," *Military Leadership*, 1981.

Wenek, Karol W.J. "Looking Ahead: Contexts of Canadian Forces Leadership Today and Tomorrow." Canadian Forces Leadership Institute Course Paper, July 2002.

Young, M. Douglas, MND. *Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces*. Report to the Prime Minister. Ottawa: DND Canada, 1997.

CF OFFICER SELECTION AND TRAINING

Existing Officer Selection System (All ages are approximate)			
18-21yrs	22-24yrs	25 + yrs	
Enrolment, RMC trg and MOC specific trg until commissioning and assignment to first unit.	Sub-sub unit officer command position at assigned unit. Note: Officer may potentially only serve one year in command position due to unit requirements for junior level staff officers	ERE posting outside of unit. Potential to be employed at MOC training establishments after only having experienced limited leadership experience.	
Proposed Solution			
18-20yrs	21yrs	22-24yrs	24-26yrs
Enrolment as Pte, PCF trg on MOC related eqpt. Attendance at Basic level Leadership trg (JLC) with identification as potential for further trg as an officer. Return to unit and prepared for Officer selection trg	Officer MOC trg This would be a condensed version of existing MOC officer trg. Candidates already have experience on eqpt, therefore emphasis will be on officer skills and tactical deployment of specific MOC sub-sub units	Commissioned and return to unit for sub-sub unit level command (Potential to reduce to maximum 2 yrs) Depending on assignment, additional PCF trg will be conducted at unit. (Unit driven trg on specialist eqpt if necessary)	After having proven leadership skills and ability to command, officers then attend further education to develop intellectual skills. Programmes/syllabuses offered at RMC would be required to be modified to ensure opportunity for successful completion of a Bachelor level degree within 3 yrs. Officers then re-enter the career mgt system and follow normal DP cycle. Intellectual skills developed, therefore officers better suited for either MOC or staff related assignments.