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MEETING THE CHALLENGE:

THE CANADIAN NAVY IN THE NEW STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

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Meeting the Challenge:
The Canadian Navy in the New Strategic Environment

Abstract

The Canadian Navy has excelled in interoperability, vastly improved capability and has proven itself in operations throughout the globe to clearly meet the demands of the new and dynamic strategic security environment. Naval interoperability has proven itself as an inextricable link for the success of the Canadian Navy in the past, the present and into the future. The doctrine of interoperability is the cornerstone of naval policy that has enabled the Canadian Navy to meet the challenge of the new strategic environment. Interoperability is not without its advantages and disadvantages for policy makers. Critical issues such as sovereignty, autonomy and national command and control are at the forefront of this debate. In adapting to the new security environment, the Canadian Navy has undergone three distinct stages of development in the post-Cold War era: transition, stability and transformation. The Canadian Navy's participation and growth in the 1990s is considered a time of transition from the Cold War. The Canadian Navy today, with its broad array of capabilities and proven operational relevance, is enjoying a time of relative stability in an unstable world. The future will present significant challenges and will be a period of transformation for the Canadian Navy during which naval policy will have both a domestic and expeditionary component. Throughout these stages, interoperability has been, and will continue to be, a vital component of naval policy.

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Introduction

> *When I was a student on the CCO course, the instructors were given ten pounds of clay to mould into Naval Cold Warriors…now; I am given five pounds of mud…*[1]

How so very wrong this statement was. Gathered together for the first day of a year long operations course in the winter of 1998 were a new breed of Naval Warriors breaking free from the stigma of the Cold War. They were young students, who had conducted real deployments, participated in real operations in real theatres; from the Persian Gulf; the Adriatic Sea; and off of the coasts of Somalia and Haiti. The manifest change in the global strategic environment was clear to the new breed of young officers, but the Cold War glory days of anti-submarine patrols and exercises in the North Atlantic was still fresh in the minds of the old guard.

The pervasive close-minded attitudes of the Cold War shrouded the Canadian Navy's judgment and vision for over forty years. Complacent with conducting routine Cold War exercises and training, the Navy became stagnant in mindset and vision. The Canadian Navy at the end of the Cold War was forty years of tradition unimpeded by progress. Mired in fighting the last great-war, and preparing for the next big one, the Canadian Navy made little forward progress in the areas of tactics, logistics, allied integration, capability and save a few short deployments to Korea, any real combat operations. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the anticipated peace dividend for Western nations did not materialize. Since the end of the Cold War, the global security situation has steadily eroded and the operational pressures on the Canadian Armed Forces

[1] Introductory remarks to ORO 9801.

and the Canadian Navy have steadily increased. A Foreign Affairs assessment from 1995 confirm this hypothesis and states:

> The international community must increasingly navigate in uncharted waters. The peaceful triumph of democracy destroyed the Soviet bloc and with it the bipolar world…this is therefore a time of great uncertainty, but also great opportunity.[2]

Throughout this post-Cold War evolution to a new strategic environment, naval interoperability has proven itself as an inextricable link for the success of the Canadian Navy. Canadian Navy interoperability may appear as a relatively new issue for Canada. This statement, as history proves, could not be farther from the truth. Throughout the turbulent twentieth century Canada, and its navy, has always operated militarily in coalitions with others. In modern times of war and peace, Canadian "defence arrangements and commitments have been institutionalized in lockstep with the Americans in particular."[3] Middlemiss and Stairs highlight this Canadian involvement and show that for the past century Canada has been an interoperable force. Integrating with Great Britain and to a lesser extent the United States during the two world wars, Canadian interoperability has steadily migrated south of the border and taken on a distinct American flavour in the past half century.[4] Key defence arrangements such as NORAD and the looming National Missile Defence Program highlight the level of interoperability on a national scale. From a strictly naval perspective, Rich Gimblett argues that interoperability imperatives with the United States were the drivers of both

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[2] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada in the World* (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 1995), 1.
[3] Danford W. Middlemiss and Denis Stairs, "The Canadian Forces and the Doctrine of Interoperability: The Issues," in *The Canadian Forces and Interoperability: Panacea or Perdition?* ed. Ann L. Griffiths (Halifax: The Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 2002), 9.
[4] Middlemiss and Stairs, "The Canadian Forces and the Doctrine of Interoperability: The Issues"…,14-19.

equipment upgrades and naval planning over the past thirty years.[5] Clearly, interoperability is not a new issue, but why has the degree of naval interoperability between Canada and the United States garnered so much attention as late? The answer may lie in the change in the nature of sea power post-Cold War that has forced navies out of the blue water and into the littorals where interoperability is key. As noted by Sokolsky:

> Since 1990, the political and strategic nature of multilateral sea power has changed, shifting from a focus on securing the seas to that of the projection of power ashore.[6]

In the past fifteen years, academics and naval professionals have tried to redefine the nature of sea power. During that time, one thing has been clear, navies have moved out of the oceans and into the littorals where navies are able to exert influence and support from the sea onto land. In an operational renaissance, navies today are conducting similar operations that they conducted during World War II, supporting armies ashore from the sea. However, moving inshore comes with a price. Indication and warning times are reduced, radar coverage is poor, traffic density is increased and overall situational awareness is negatively impacted. Coupled with these challenges of the littoral environment has been the dramatic increasing trend of multinational coalition operations. The cumulative result is that many nations are operating warships in a dangerous, confined and confusing environment in the missile age. Interoperability is one solution to this new sea power dilemma. As Sokolsky has noted, "the new era did

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[5] Richard H. Gimblett, "Canada-US Interoperability: Towards a Home Port Division of the United States Navy?" in *The Canadian Forces and Interoperability: Panacea or Perdition?* ed. Ann L. Griffiths (Halifax: The Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 2002), 102-103.

[6] Joel J. Sokolsky, "Sailing in Concert: The Politics and Strategy of Canada-US Naval Interoperability," *Choices*, Vol. 8, no. 2 (April 2002), 3. Journal on-line; available from http://www.irpp.org; Internet; accessed 18 January 2004.

not mean the disappearance of the need for maritime forces," but there is a need to redefine how forces operate.[7] With close allied interoperability, however, come advantages and disadvantages for governments and policy makers.

Interoperability has become an important element in contemporary maritime strategy for Canada.[8] But at what cost politically and operationally? Interoperability with close allies can been seen as a "two-edged sword," according to Middlemiss and Stairs.[9] One the one hand, interoperability with a powerful nation can allow a middle power with a modest military to make an effective contribution to a coalition; Canada can be seen to be contributing. On the other hand, aligning so closely to a more powerful ally can be seen as losing some autonomy in decision-making, as evident by the Canadian Navy reaction to the Cuban Missile Crisis, or even reducing national sovereignty altogether.[10]

These times are interesting for defence in Canada, especially in regard to defining the threat, determining the force structure required to counter the threat, and providing the required resources to support the overall strategy.[11] The present national security situation has become more complex, albeit arguably safer than the potential consequences of the Cold War, and in deference to Arnold Wolfers, more ambiguous.[12] This situation has been further exacerbated by the fact that the government has called upon the armed forces more often than any time since the end of the Second World War, but at the same time cutting the defence budget significantly in terms of real dollars. Some would argue

[7] Ibid, 6.
[8] Ibid, 7.
[9] Middlemiss and Stairs, "The Canadian Forces and the Doctrine of Interoperability: The Issues"…,12.
[10] Ibid, 12-13.
[11] Mike Martin, "Command Briefing: Regional Headquarters Allied Forces North Europe." Lecture to Canadian Forces Command and Staff Course 30. Brunsum, Netherlands, 19 February 2004.
[12] Arnold Wolfers, "National Security' as an Ambiguous Symbol", Political Science Quarterly, Vol 67, No 4 (December 1952), 481.

that the government is finally getting its money's worth out of the armed forces. But as Joseph Jockel has noted, it should be no surprise that with the two trends of falling budgets and increased deployments, problems have arose with more on the horizon.[13] The challenge facing the Canadian Armed Forces in the past decade, and remaining true today, is the ability to adapt accordingly to the dynamic nature of the global security environment within the fiscal restraints imposed by government. The ability to translate resources into relevant capabilities and to act on behalf of the Canadian Government's policies and decisions will continue to challenge the Canadian Forces for the foreseeable future.

Following the end of the Cold War there was a paradigm shift in the nature of conflict. The years of large-scale force on force preparation for war ended. The nineties were characterized as a decade of failed states, asymmetric challenges, global instability and a more complex security environment. Military operations were generally no longer undertaken by superpowers alone, but gradually became a combined effort of many like-minded nations bound together to achieve a common limited objective. The Canadian Military engaged in this global policing under both United Nations auspices and like-minded coalitions. In response to the changing nature of the strategic environment, the Canadian Forces adopted a forward deployment strategy for international security in order that Canada remains relatively safe and undisturbed in an uncertain and dangerous new world. The Canadian Navy followed this theme by moving out of the North Atlantic to focus on the entire world, a traditional role of power projection navies, but one medium powers are more frequently adapting to.

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[13] Joseph T. Jockel, *The Canadian Forces: Hard Choices, Soft Power* (Toronto: The Canadian Institute for Strategic Studies, 1999), 9-11.

What is clear is that the mission spectrum for the Canadian Forces and by default, the navy, has broadened considerably. Canada must now be able to move along the traditional conflict spectrum from peace, through crisis and into conflict, with perhaps more intermediate stages and perhaps employed in more than one role at a time. The traditional linear spectrum, with peace and conflict at opposite ends, and crisis somewhere in the middle, probably no longer conveys the changed nature of political-military and civil-military activity. In these dynamic times, the difference between war-fighting and traditional crisis response has become even more blurred.[14] It has become increasingly difficult to determine when "soldiering" and "sailoring" ends and global policing begins. As a result, the Canadian Armed Forces and the Canadian Navy must be capable of integrating land, air and maritime forces drawn from coalition nations at any point along this spectrum. The government recognizes this fact and was clear in stating the requirement for a multi purpose, flexible and combat capable force in the 1994 Defence White Paper:

> …the maintenance of multi-purpose, combat capable forces is in the national interest. It is only through the maintenance of such forces that Canada will be able to retain the necessary degree of flexibility and freedom of action when it comes to the defence of its interests and the projection of its values abroad.[15]

Although dated, and in desperate need of re-writing, this theme of multi-purpose and combat capable from the Canadian Defence White Paper of 1994 remains valid in the complex world of today. The ability to conduct operations across a broad range of the conflict spectrum in cooperation with our allies is the cornerstone for the Canadian

[14] Mike Martin, "Command Briefing: Regional Headquarters Allied Forces North Europe." Lecture to Canadian Forces Command and Staff Course 30. Brunsum, Netherlands, 19 February 2004.
[15] Department of National Defence, *1994 Defence White Paper* (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 1994), 13.

Military. The challenge has been, and will continue to be, integration with our key allies, the United States in particular, when called upon by the Canadian Government to act as the military arm of Canada's national policy. The key to successful coalition integration and cooperation, as will be demonstrated in this paper, is interoperability.

Where does the Canadian Navy stand in the new Global Strategic Environment? The 1994 White Paper states that Canadians are "internationalists and not isolationists by nature…[with a] proud heritage of service abroad."[16] As a result, the Canadian Military was forced to adapt quickly to this shift in the global security environment if it was to remain relevant on the world stage. Fortunately, Canada, and in particular, the Canadian Navy, was in a unique position to react to the dynamic nature of the new security environment and contribute throughout the globe. The Canadian Navy's ability to react immediately, work effectively with each other, and more importantly, integrate and lead within a coalition force environment was key to the success during the past decade and will remain a vital component of Canada's National Security Policy in the future. Since the end of the Cold War, the Canadian Navy has excelled in interoperability, vastly improved capability and has proven itself in operations throughout the globe to clearly meet the demands of the new and dynamic strategic security environment.

As a direct result of the level of interoperability with our Allies and its ability to react quickly to dynamic security situations, the Canadian Navy has been, and will continue to be, a vital component of Canada's foreign and defence policy. The Navy has clearly met the challenge of the new strategic environment.

The Canadian Navy's rapid development and adaptation to the new strategic environment post Cold War are a direct result of the level of interoperability with our key

[16] Department of National Defence, *1994 Defence White Paper…,* 27.

allies. Aside from all of the negative issues surrounding the military over the past decade including downsizing, rust-out and scandal, there has been one consistent bright light for the Canadian Navy, namely interoperability. Interoperability with our allies, particularly the United States Navy, has been the cornerstone of naval development and has paved the way for Canadian participation and leadership within international coalitions. Interoperability with "High-End Allies" has been, and will continue to be, the focus for the Canadian Navy for some time to come.[17] Close allied interoperability has many pros and cons that come with tying the navy's future so closely with other nations.

The distinct stages of the Canadian Navy in the past decade and into the future are; transition, stability and transformation. The Canadian Navy's participation and growth in the 1990s can be considered a time of transition from the Cold War era to the new strategic environment. The Canadian Navy was well placed by the procurement of the Canadian Patrol Frigates in the 1980s to make the transition from static, Cold War Navy to a globally deployable force given the long legs of the frigates. As a result, the transition to a globally deployable force was relatively painless for the navy. This transition was made better by some key naval management decisions to pursue close interoperability with the USN as much as possible, particularly in the field of communications. The navy's development throughout the 1990s translated directly into capabilities allowing the navy to participate in and lead many coalition operations.

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[17] K. Gause, C. Lea, D. Whiteneck and E. Thompson. "U.S. Navy Interoperability with its High-End Allies." Paper written for the Center for Strategic Studies, Center for Naval Analyses, Arlington, VA, 2001. Article on-line; available from http://www.dodccrp.org/2000ICCRTS/cd/papers/Track3/080.pdf; Internet; accessed 18 January 2004.
High end allies as defined by Gause et al., refers to those navies that will not only provide political support in a future coalition, but can be counted on to complement U.S. Navy capabilities, supplement U.S. ships and aircraft, provide additional numbers, or be able to respond more quickly than U.S. forces. Canada is clearly in that realm.

The roles and capabilities of the Canadian Navy today, a time of stability in the Navy, but instability throughout the globe has justified the foresight and decisions of the 1980s and 1990s. *Operation Apollo*, Canada's contribution to the Global War on Terrorism, will be used as a backdrop to tout the successes of the Canadian Navy in the present security environment. Once again, it will be shown that interoperability with key allies, was key to the navy's ability to deploy, operate, and lead a maritime coalition. Referred to as the "Golden Age" by Richard Gimblett in his Manuscript for the Chief of Maritime Staff, the success of *Operation Apollo* will prove that the efforts in the past decades paid off in preparing the Canadian Navy for the present security environment.[18]

The future holds a period of transformation for the Canadian Forces and the Canadian Navy. What will the global security situation evolve into? What will be the future of Naval Warfare? And finally, what maritime strategy and maritime capabilities will be required to meet that future? Certainly, interoperable forces will be a key component if the Canadian Navy wishes to remain relevant on the global stage.

Naval interoperability has proven itself as an inextricable link for the success of the Canadian Navy in the past, present and future. Moreover, interoperability is the cornerstone of naval policy that has enabled the Canadian Navy to meet the challenge of the new strategic environment.

[18] Richard H. Gimblett, *Operation Apollo: The Golden Age of the Canadian Navy in the War Against Terrorism.* Draft Manuscript for the Chief of Maritime Staff (Ottawa, January 2004), 13/74.

Section 1 - Doctrine of Interoperability: Challenges and Rewards

> …let's consider interoperability. Combined ops are the way of the future. Today, we are unlikely to operate internationally outside a coalition. The ongoing anti-terrorism campaign is a case in point…Interoperability will remain crucial in the future, so we must continue to improve in this area.
>
> General Henault, Chief of Defence Staff, January 2002[19]

The Canadian Forces have traditionally operated within allied coalitions and will likely continue this trend as noted by the Chief of Defence Staff. As a result, the Canadian Forces must be compatible and interoperable if they are to make a meaningful contribution to coalition operations. Interoperability with allied navies is also the reason the Canadian Navy has garnered so much success over the past decade and as such, the many issues surrounding interoperable forces must be addressed. The doctrine of interoperability is the cornerstone of current Canadian Naval Policy and with it comes many advantages and disadvantages for policy makers. Critical issues such as sovereignty, autonomy and national command and control are at the forefront of this debate. But what exactly is interoperability?

Interoperability as defined by NATO is " the ability of systems, units and forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together."[20] While this definition may seem to focus on the technical aspect of force integration, NATO has

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[19] Chief of Defence Staff. Speaking Notes for the National Security Studies Course. Delivered 08 January 2002. Article on-line; available from http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/pubs/speeches; Internet; accessed 17 January 2004.

[20] K. Gause, C. Lea, D. Whiteneck and E. Thompson. "U.S. Navy Interoperability with its High-End Allies," Paper written for the Center for Strategic Studies, Center for Naval Analyses (Arlington, VA, 2001), 2. Article on-line; available from http://www.dodccrp.org/2000ICCRTS/cd/papers/Track3/080.pdf; Internet; accessed 18 January 2004.

further refined the term "operational interoperability" to include situational awareness, coalition collaboration, communications and command to emphasize the commonality of not only technical aspects but the doctrine, training and command of coalition forces.[21] Clearly, at the heart of interoperability is the technical means of coalition forces to exchange information. Once the technological gap has been crossed, however, interoperability in Command and Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) allows a multinational coalition to operate as if it were a national force.[22] This ability to operate closely will in turn have a synergistic, or multiplying, effect on the capability of a multinational force to conduct maritime operations in a theatre of operation. Reducing national inefficiencies and duplication of effort amongst coalition partners in even the smallest terms such as communications broadcasting saves time and promotes task force efficiency. Taken a step further, the combined effect of reducing all inefficiencies will significantly improve the capability of the coalition task force. In the ideal interoperable maritime coalition, individual national units will contribute directly to the multinational "common operating picture" and thereby provide increased situational awareness for the commander. Through interoperable communications and data link architecture, individual nations are able to transmit their sensor and intelligence information to the entire task force. When properly linked together, the combined interoperable force can be linked in all warfare areas producing a synergistic effect on the capability of maritime forces.[23] A clear, coherent tactical picture will be available to the commander and to all coalition units leaving no one in the dark. Of course, with this high

[21] Gause et al., "U.S. Navy Interoperability with its High-End Allies"…, 2.
[22] Sokolsky, "Sailing in Concert: The Politics and Strategy of Canada-US Naval Interoperability"…, 9
[23] Ibid, 9.

level of interoperability, issues such as sovereignty and political autonomy come to the fore.

> Some believe that if you become too involved with the Americans, you lose your sovereignty. But the opposite is also true: If you don't become involved with the Americans, there goes your sovereignty.
>
> Commodore Eric Lehre, January 2004[24]

The negative impacts of interoperability on sovereignty, political autonomy and command and control usually overshadow the immense political and operational benefits gained by having interoperable forces. The perceived "loss of capacity for independent action and hence sovereignty itself" usually gathers the most attention in the interoperability debate.[25] Middlemiss and Stairs have argued that preoccupation with national prestige and perceived national interest has created a view that close interoperability with the United States will go hand-in-hand with political dependency and a reduced capacity for acting independently.[26] "Peacemaker or Powder Monkey" as argued by Mitchell, is the concern that may face a seamlessly integrated Canadian Navy.[27] The fear from a sovereignty perspective is that it will be very difficult for Ottawa to refuse a request, if a request is even made, to contribute to American-led operations. Conversely, it may be equally difficult for Canada to participate in an operation without the Americans. Reliance on American foreign policy dictating Canadian military operations is worthy of caution, and as a result, "the political dimension of military interoperability with the United States may now warrant more

[24] Kelly Toughill, "Our ships, but U.S. hands on the weapons." *Toronto Star*, 10 January 2004, F04. Cited by Commodore Eric Lehre in the Toughill article.
[25] Gimblett, "Canada-US Interoperability: Towards a Home Port Division of the United States Navy?"…, 101.
[26] Middlemiss and Stairs, "The Canadian Forces and the Doctrine of Interoperability: The Issues"…,13.
[27] Paul T. Mitchell, Lecture to Canadian Forces Command and Staff Course 30, October 2003.

attention than they have tended in the past to receive."[28] Whereby interoperability was deemed a military necessity in the past, there is now a significant political aspect to the issue today. While it has been shown that politics is a significant contributor to the disadvantages of interoperability, so to is politics a significant contributor to the advantages of interoperability.

As argued by Sokolsky, the counter-argument to the sovereignty debate rests in the political realm:

> …the fact that the Canadian Navy plans and postures itself to be able to achieve interoperability with the USN does not necessarily bind the government to dispatch forces when Washington decides to deploy the fleet.[29]

Clearly, the decision rests with the government, and that was proven in the recent operations in Iraq when the Canadian government chose not to support the U.S. coalition. Although Canadian units were integrated within the theatre, Canadian sovereignty was exercised in the tasking and missions of the Canadian Navy. Canadian foreign policy and international goals remained distinct while still operating under overall U.S. command.[30] As argued by Peter Haydon, "integration into naval formations does not undermine Canadian sovereignty because each mission is a function of choice."[31] There is an argument to be made that says interoperability enhances sovereignty because it gives nations the ability to choose which operations they will support. Quite simply, the ability to choose exerts sovereignty. The price of not being interoperable in the current strategic environment can be even higher as noted by Gimblett:

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[28] Middlemiss and Stairs, "The Canadian Forces and the Doctrine of Interoperability: The Issues"…,13.
[29] Sokolsky, "Sailing in Concert: The Politics and Strategy of Canada-US Naval Interoperability"…, 14.
[30] Kelly Toughill, "Our ships, but U.S. hands on the weapons." *Toronto Star*, 10 January 2004, F04. Cited by Commodore Eric Lehre in the Toughill article.
[31] Peter Haydon, "What Naval Capabilities Does Canada Need?" *In Maritime Security in the Twenty-First Century,* Maritime Security Occasional Paper No.11, ed. Edward L. Tummers (Halifax: The Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 2002), 153.

> The price of failure to maintain functional interoperability with American forces at the task group level will be the loss of opportunities for independent action to demonstrate Canadian military sovereignty.[32]

Without the ability to integrate into a coalition operation, smaller nations would be left on the sidelines and be unable to exert any form of sovereignty on the world stage. Loss of autonomy of command and control and "implied operational subordination" is the other key argument against close interoperability.[33] The overlying fear is that with such close integration and the advances in technology, smaller interoperable nations in a large coalition, such as the Canadian Navy, will be left out of the decision loop when it comes to critical command issues or even weapons release authority. These fears have been raised in the media as recently as January with the headline, "Our ships, but U.S. hands on the weapons."[34] The crux of this argument stems from technological advances in area weaponry that can theoretically provide an Anti-Air Warfare umbrella over a task force using the combined weaponry of the task force through a Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) network. Although still in the developmental stages, theatre or sea-based Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) would be the eventual result.[35] Unfortunately when the CEC concept is parlayed in the media it becomes, "American fingers on the trigger of Canadian missiles."[36] Once again, there are two sides to this debate. Michael Byers from Duke University, will argue that the CEC network "goes beyond interoperability from a policy perspective" as U.S. Commanders would have a level of

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[32] Gimblett, "Canada-US Interoperability: Towards a Home Port Division of the United States Navy?"…, 106.
[33] Middlemiss and Stairs, "The Canadian Forces and the Doctrine of Interoperability: The Issues"…,3.
[34] Kelly Toughill, "Our ships, but U.S. hands on the weapons." *Toronto Star*, 10 January 2004, F04.
[35] Christopher R. Bullock, "Canadian Ballistic Missile Defence from the Sea: Interoperability and Sea-Based BMD," *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* (Spring-Summer 2003), 3-6. Journal on-line; available from http://www.jmss.org/2003/spring-summer/article4.html; Internet; accessed 18 Jan 2004.
[36] Toughill, "Our ships, but U.S. hands on the weapons."

control over Canadian Missiles."[37] To some extent this is true but from an operational perspective, more protection is better in the evolving littoral environment. Nations would certainly be more apt to become involved in an area if there were a level of risk mitigation and the overall level of force protection could be guaranteed. Cooperative protection of coalition assets will go a long way to reduce the risk in the dynamic and fast paced littorals. Commodore Eric Lehre argues for the CEC network as he states, "the CEC capability may be the only way to defend ships in the future."[38] In the rapidly evolving field of anti-ship weaponry, CEC may present the best alternative for force protection in the future. The jury, however, is still out in the CEC debate.

This debate is likely to continue for some time as the CEC concept is still in the developmental stages. There will be ample debate prior to the Canadian Navy devolving weapons release authority to any nation, regardless how interoperable it may be, for fear of the negative consequences that could result from a Canadian Missile striking an unintended target. The Canadian political climate and populace in general could not stomach a *USS Vincennes* accident. Loss of sovereignty and decreased command and control autonomy are solid arguments against maintaining an interoperable navy from a political perspective. But what about the enormous benefits of interoperability?

Global engagement is the overwhelming positive outcome of interoperability. Without the ability to integrate and operate with our high-end allies, Canada will be "relegated to the sidelines, undertaking the most menial of tasks, encouraged to stay out of the way-or stay at home."[39] Global engagement is the foundation of the Canadian

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[37] Ibid.
[38] Ibid.
[39]Paul T. Mitchell, "Small Navies and Network-Centric Warfare: Is There a Role?" *Naval War College Review,* Vol LVI, No 2 (Spring 2003), 83.

Navy's interest in interoperability with the USN. It is not only the navy that feels this way, a broad consensus of Canadians agree that Canada must remain globally engaged.[40] And in the present global security environment, global engagement equals interoperability with the United States. David Pratt, chair of SCONDVA, and now Minister of National Defence, previously stated:

> …in pursuing international peace and security, the world will need Canada. What is also clear to me is that Canada will need modern, well-trained, interoperable, multipurpose combat capable forces.
>
> David Pratt, M.P. February 2002[41]

Obviously, the influence and success of interoperability at the political level has not gone unnoticed. Close interoperability allows Canada the "inside view" of the intentions of its large neighbour to the south.[42] Interoperability and integration of forces also sends an "unambiguous signal to Washington" that Canada is on side with her closest ally.[43] Clearly, the advantages of interoperability earn political dividends from Canadians at home and from coalition partners abroad.[44] The ability to act on the global stage, as well as be seen to be acting on the global stage, is an irrefutable argument in favour of interoperability. For Canada to assume its place in the world, Canada must contribute to international peace and security. In order to contribute, Canadian Forces must be interoperable.

But what do the Americans think about allied interoperability? As our closest ally, and the nation to which Canada strives to become the most interoperable, it is

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[40] Sokolsky, "Sailing in Concert: The Politics and Strategy of Canada-US Naval Interoperability"…, 11.
[41] David Pratt, M.P. Speaking Notes for the Annual Seminar of the Conference of Defence Associations. Delivered 21 February 2002. Article on-line; available from http://www.cda-cdai.ca/seminars/2002/gimblett.htm; Internet; accessed 17 January 2004.
[42] Middlemiss and Stairs, "The Canadian Forces and the Doctrine of Interoperability: The Issues"…,19.
[43] Stephen Clarkson, "Uncle Sam and Canada After September 11th." In *The Canadian Forces and Interoperability: Panacea or Perdition?* ed. Ann L. Griffiths (Halifax: The Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 2002), 80.
[44] Middlemiss and Stairs, "The Canadian Forces and the Doctrine of Interoperability: The Issues"…,13.

necessary to look at interoperability from an American perspective. Without question, the United States defence capability and technological advances are unmatched and likely to remain that way for some time to come. As a result, the United States has the military capability to act unilaterally in any area of the world, but by policy does not do so. Of course, unilateral military action comes with a large political price tag, and not one that Americans are willing to pay unless absolutely necessary. According to Gauss et al., "whenever possible, U.S. forces will seek to respond to requirements for military force in concert with other countries."[45] Although the U.S. has recently demonstrated a willingness to act unilaterally or with a reduced coalition, multinational or coalition operations provide much more political legitimacy. As noted by Sokolsky, "interoperability is a means to an end" for the American military and for U.S. foreign policy.[46] This policy has been clear and well exercised since the end of the Cold War.

Clearly, politics and not operational necessity has been the driver behind U.S. interoperability with its allies. The need to garner foreign support, the ability to shape foreign navies and adherence to stated policy are all political requirements and not indicative of any real defence need.[47] Recent indications from the U.S. government show that the U.S. is not likely to change its policy in the near future and will continue its attempt to garner international support for operations. The onus will then fall upon Canada and other close allies to keep up in the interoperability game if they wish to continue to participate. This fact is not being lost on Canadian politicians. Defence

[45] Gause et al., "U.S. Navy Interoperability with its High-End Allies"…, 1.
[46] Sokolsky, "Sailing in Concert: The Politics and Strategy of Canada-US Naval Interoperability"…, 10.
[47] Gause et al., "U.S. Navy Interoperability with its High-End Allies"…, 3.

Minister Pratt has clearly stated that any "capabilities brought to the table must be completely interoperable and combat capable."[48]

[48] Pratt, Speaking Notes…, 4.

Section 2 - Canadian Navy in the 1990s: Transition

The end of the Cold War brought to a close over forty years of painstaking preparations, planning, and exercises focused at a known threat, in a known theatre and utilizing known capabilities. The dawn of the "New World Order" brought a "rapid onset of new, diverse and demanding" operations that "generated a rapid and often chaotic change" in the way navies prepared for and executed their missions.[49] Fortunately, Canada was very well placed in order to adapt and contribute in the dynamic security environment of the 1990s. This response was no accident. Throughout the lean years of the late 1980s, the Navy had wisely invested its limited budget in maintaining communications connectivity with the USN.[50] As a direct result of this forethought, Canada was given a key command role of the protection and escort force in the 1990-1991 war against Iraq due to an ability to communicate with a broad spectrum of allies.[51] Utilizing this initial success during operations against Iraq, the Canadian Navy leapt forward, headlong into the rapidly changing security environment of the 1990s.

The transition of the Canadian Navy throughout the 1990s laid the foundation for success, which the navy enjoys today. As a result of the close interoperability with allies, the navy was able to shed its Cold War heritage and adapt to the dynamic security environment that demanded rapid change in roles and capabilities of maritime forces. The roles of the Canadian Navy during the Cold War were in sharp contrast to the change

[49] Conference of Defence Associations, *Caught in the Middle: An Assessment of the Operational Readiness of the Canadian Forces* (Ottawa: The Conference of Defence Associations Institute, 2001), 4.
[50] Richard H. Gimblett, *Operation Apollo: The Golden Age of the Canadian Navy in the War Against Terrorism,* Draft Manuscript for the Chief of Maritime Staff (Ottawa, January 2004), 8/74.
[51] Duncan (Dusty) E. Miller and Sharon Hobson, *The Persian Excursion: The Canadian Navy in the Gulf War* (Mississauga: Arthurs-Jones Lithographing Ltd., 1995), 227.

in the nature of sea power in the 1990s. The capabilities demanded by the "New World Order" are not the traditional Anti-Submarine roles associated with the Cold War. Humanitarian Assistance and Sanction Monitoring and Enforcement (Maritime Interdiction) are two distinct new roles and capabilities that the Canadian Navy developed and excelled in during the 1990s. Examples of operational experience and missions throughout the 1990s will show that the navy successfully made the transition from the Cold War toent (90 1a

control of the seas.[54] Of course, the fall of the Berlin Wall and subsequent end of the Cold War left allied navies in search of a new role. Preparations, plans, doctrine and exercises that had been rehearsed for over forty years were now as good as useless.

Change was not too long in the offing. As noted by Gimblett, when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait a new chapter in the history of maritime security was launched. There was a sudden and rapid change from ASW in the North Atlantic to sanctions enforcement in the Persian Gulf.[55] Canadian Foreign Policy demanded engagement, and the navy was first to commit. Throughout the conflict Canada "sought and contributed to those roles and tasks which would be most beneficial to the allied cause overall."[56] Due to her high level of interoperability with the USN and other allies, the Canadian Navy was able to make a significant contribution to the war effort in the maritime environment. The Canadian Navy's role in the Persian Gulf War was an impetus for change in the development of capabilities and roles for the navy in the 1990s. The first Gulf War mirrored a change in the global security environment. In order to stay relevant, navies needed to respond to the change. Peter Haydon expands on this change in roles of navies in the 21st Century in his paper on Medium Powers.

As argued by Haydon, "the basic purpose of navies is to act as instruments of state policy on, over and under the oceans."[57] When state policy changes the instruments of policy must change as well. This change is exactly what occurred throughout the

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[54] Laura J. Higgins, "Examining the "Adjusted Course" of the Canadian Navy in the 'New World Order'," (master's thesis, Dalhousie University, 2000), 20.
[55] Gimblett, *Operation Apollo: The Golden Age*…, 7/74.
[56] K.J. Summers, "Canadian Operations in the Gulf Crisis and War." in *The Canadian Navy in Peace and War in the 1990s*, The Niobe Papers, Vol. 3, ed F.W. Crickard (Halifax: The Naval Officers' Association of Canada, 1991), 55.
[57] Peter T. Haydon, *Sea Power and Maritime Strategy in the 21st Century: A "Medium" Power Perspective,* Maritime Security Occasional Paper No.10 (Halifax: The Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 2000), 37.

1990s. Changes in the international system decreased the immediate importance of collective security and thereby decreased the need of the navy to focus on its Cold War mission. As East-West tensions diminished, new missions were derived for the forces that were directed to localized global instabilities.[58] Throughout the 1990s, the Canadian Navy migrated from its traditional alliance based operations and broadened its horizons across the globe. Engagement and presence in all corners of the globe in regional hotspots was a substantial shift away from traditional North Atlantic duties. With an underlying doctrine of interoperability and joint operations, the spectrum of naval operations post-Cold War broadened considerably.[59] The inherent flexibility that naval forces provided, allowed the Canadian Navy to react to this change and meet the demands of a changing security environment.[60]

Canadian naval roles and capability requirements in the 1990s were diversifying. Collective defence and security capability was still a significant requirement in order to maintain a seat at the NATO table, but more often, the navy was deploying overseas in operations that involved an ever-broadening range of maritime activities.[61] Peter Haydon has masterfully encapsulated the emerging roles and capabilities required by Maritime Forces.[62] Two roles and capabilities that the Canadian Navy has excelled in during the 1990s were Humanitarian Assistance and Sanction Monitoring and Enforcement. Humanitarian Assistance missions were a unique fit for the ideals and interests of Canadians. The use of military forces seen to be conducting humanitarian missions was directly in line with national policy as noted by Higgins:

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[58] Higgins, "Examining the "Adjusted Course" of the Canadian Navy…, 22.
[59] Conference of Defence Associations, *Caught in the Middle*…, 20.
[60] Haydon, *Sea Power and Maritime Strategy in the 21st Century*…, 38.
[61] Higgins, "Examining the "Adjusted Course" of the Canadian Navy…, 64-65.
[62] Haydon, *Sea Power and Maritime Strategy in the 21st Century*…, 43-70.

> The use of the military's expertise in humanitarian aid missions has proven to be advantageous in many situations where military technology, capabilities, training and equipment allow them to deal effectively with crisis situations.[63]

Humanitarian Assistance operations became a cottage industry for the Canadian Navy during the 1990s. Requiring virtually no additional equipment or training, the inherent flexibility of naval forces was utilized throughout the globe.[64] The reason for an increase in naval missions was mainly due to increased public global awareness and the political desire for Canada to be seen to contributing on the world stage. The term humanitarian assistance is traditionally associated with responses to natural disasters; however, current patterns in international situations have extended this definition to famines, civil wars, social and endemic disasters as well.[65] The range of activities associated with Humanitarian Assistance missions includes medical support, aid delivery, refugee monitoring, transportation, and evacuation of non-combatants. Any warship, particularly a large one with a helicopter, is well suited to a wide range of these tasks both at sea and ashore.[66] A warship also provided the staying power to loiter off shore for an extended time in international waters without the complication of basing or status of forces agreements associated with armies or air forces. These non-combative activities, dovetail nicely into the "soft" ideals and foreign policy that Canada has pursued for several decades. Consequently the navy was called upon to assist on many instances in the 1990s. Humanitarian assistance is not new to the Canadian Navy, as it has been involved in similar missions during the Suez Crisis and in the Caribbean, in

[63] Higgins, "Examining the "Adjusted Course" of the Canadian Navy…, 22.
[64] Haydon, *Sea Power and Maritime Strategy in the 21st Century*…, 58.
[65] Higgins, *Canadian Naval Operations in the 1990s*…, 49.
[66] Haydon, *Sea Power and Maritime Strategy in the 21st Century*…, 58,66.

particular Haiti, throughout the 60's, 70's and 80's as noted by Sean Maloney.[67] Whether it was *HMCS BONAVENTURE* in the Suez or *HMCS PRESERVER* off of Somalia, the navy has traditionally utilized its large ship to provide the most flexibility for humanitarian missions.

The Canadian Navy, more specifically the Canadian AORs *HMCS PRESERVER* and *HMCS PROTECTEUR*, participated in several humanitarian taskings throughout the 1990s in every corner of the world. Stretching from the Horn of Africa (*Operation Deliverance*), through the Indonesia Archipelago (*Operation Toucan*), the Bahamas and the State of Florida, the Canadian Navy responded to the global need for humanitarian assistance. Throughout all these deployments, there have been some common themes that have developed including "jointness" and flexibility. Inherent in all humanitarian mission in the 1990s were the participation of all three services of the Canadian Forces and a developing appreciation for joint operations. In different corners of the world and in response to differing situations, ground forces were being supported from the sea by both naval and air forces.[68] Among the key enablers to this joint and combined approach to operations was the degree of connectivity and interoperability that the Canadian Navy had developed and enjoyed throughout the decade. This connectivity, however, was not focused on working with the other arms of the Canadian Forces. There were major difficulties experienced with the different environments working together, specifically the army. One of the key lessons learned for the Canadian Navy in the 1990s was its inability to establish connectivity with the other arms of the Canadian Forces. This

[67] Sean M. Maloney, "Maple Leaf Over the Caribbean: Gunboat Diplomacy Canadian Style?" in *Canadian Gunboat Diplomacy: The Canadian Navy and Foreign Policy*, ed. Ann L. Griffith, Peter T. Haydon and Richard H. Gimblett (Halifax: The Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 2000), 147-183.
[68] Higgins, *Canadian Naval Operations in the 1990s*…, 49.

lesson is still being learned today as the Canadian Forces moves forward in developing its joint doctrine. Connectivity and interoperability are key to the success of joint development.

Flexibility is the key to sea power, especially in humanitarian operations. Because of the unforeseen nature of humanitarian operations, prior planning gives way to the necessity of rapid reaction. As a result, units deploy as soon as possible and often without a clear objective or mission in mind. As highlighted by Laura Higgins, both *Operation Deliverance* and *Operation Toucan* deployments had to deal with rapidly changing circumstances and a complete change of mission once the ships arrived.[69] This degree of flexibility is inherent in naval forces and one reason that the Canadian Navy was ideally suited to meet the challenge in the 1990s. Flexibility allowed the navy to handle the change in missions very well, the same cannot be said of the army, which struggled throughout the 1990s to react to the new security environment.

If humanitarian assistance missions were a cottage industry for the Navy in the 1990s, then Sanction Monitoring and Enforcement was the economic staple. Moving away from the doctrine of maintaining crucial SLOCs in the large expanses of the Atlantic Ocean during the Cold War, the Canadian Navy in the past decade became experts in local, littoral sea control and maritime interdiction through almost continual involvement in Sanction Monitoring and Enforcement while participating in UN and multilateral operations. From as far away as the Arabian Gulf, the Adriatic Sea and off the Coast of Haiti, the Canadian Navy played a key role in international sanction monitoring and enforcement. The driver, once again, was interoperability with key allies and relevance to the United Nations.

[69] Ibid, 49-64.

The close relationship and training that routinely occurred between Canadian East and West Coast Fleets and their respective USN 2nd and 3rd Fleets allowed the Canadian Navy to integrate seamlessly into multinational U.S.-led coalitions throughout the 1990s as part of task forces and groups.[70] Experience with modern interoperable communications, tactics and the inside track as a member of a select club, Canada enjoyed special access to advanced C4I concepts developed by the USN which placed it ahead of other allies. Throughout these integrated operations, Canadian navy ships were essentially treated as "USN" ships. As a result, the Canadian Navy was able to develop unique skills in the littoral theatre and in interdiction operations: roles and capabilities not generally practiced during the Cold War.[71] The Canadian Navy adapted well to this new challenge of sanction monitoring and enforcement as noted by Higgins.[72]

In particular, the Canadian Navy played a key role in the enforcement of sanctions against Iraq throughout the 1990s as an integral part of the multinational naval force in the northern Arabian Gulf monitoring and preventing illegal export of oil from Iraq.[73] Far from the North Atlantic, the navy adapted once again to the requirements of the new security environment as argued by Gimblett:

> Southwest Asia would not seem a natural operating area for the Canadian Navy. Since the Gulf War…it has replaced the North Atlantic as a 'home away from home'…[74]

The Canadian Navy deployed no less than ten times to the Arabian Gulf during the past decade. Noteworthy is that the *HALIFAX*-class frigates deployed have been fully

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[70] Higgins, "Examining the "Adjusted Course" of the Canadian Navy…, 70.
[71] Mitchell, "Small Navies and Network-Centric Warfare: Is There a Role?"…, 93.
[72] Higgins, *Canadian Naval Operations in the 1990*

integrated units of American Aircraft Carrier Battle Groups (CVBG) which is testament to their level of interoperability with USN Warships.

> The term integrated is significant: warships of other navies often also deploy with USN battle groups as 'extras', but only Canada's meet the stringent communications and other technical compatibility requirements to be interchangeable one-for-one with American warships.[75]

Both the Canadian Navy and the USN benefit significantly from this integration. Canada enjoys the operational experience and inside track on technical development, while the USN was able to provide the same force structure with one less USN ship. Even the USN is stretched for resources, and they welcome an integrated Canadian warship that can take the place of an overworked USN asset. The integration process did not develop overnight as highlighted by Mitchell. The integration of Canadian ships into CVBGs was an evolutionary process over many years and many long deployments. Canadian ships initially deployed to the Gulf as members of the Maritime Interdiction Force (MIF) and gradually moved into actual Battle Group integration as familiarity improved.[76] Nor was the integration without its difficulties. Even though Canada and the U.S. share a special defence relationship, trust and information sharing only go so far. Among the key difficulties was release of operational manuals and access to U.S. classified materials. Inflexible security policy and not technical difficulties were the root cause of this problem.[77]

The strategic effect of integration and interoperability cannot be overlooked. What started as an "operational initiative" of the Commander of the Maritime Forces Pacific, eventually gained "strategic stature" when it became DND policy to improve

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[75] Gimblett, *Operation Apollo: The Golden Age*…, 10-11/74.
Cited from Lieutenant Commander Michael Crockett and Captain Jim Stavridis, USNI *Proceedings*.
[76] Mitchell, "Small Navies and Network-Centric Warfare: Is There a Role?"…, 92.
[77] Ibid, 95.

interoperability with its allies, purely as a result of the success of CVBG integration.[78] The effects of this integration and interoperability developed throughout the 1990s are a mainstay of current naval policy and direction today. The success of the navy in integrating with the USN also became the benchmark for integration and interoperability with the Canadian Forces. As a direct result, efforts are being undertaken within all arms of the Canadian Forces to become more interoperable with key allies.

Canada continues to benefit in many ways from this high degree of USN interoperability. It not only gains access to USN joint training and exercises but it forces the Canadian Navy to keep pace with technological and defence related advances. In addition to these tangible benefits, "by demonstrating its ability to work with the USN, the Canadian Navy establishes that it can work with anyone" which enables it to become engaged anywhere the government deems necessary.[79] So what specific roles and capabilities were developed in Sanction Monitoring and Enforcement? As noted by Haydon, evolving roles include: establishing and enforcing Maritime Exclusion Zones (MEZ) and quarantine areas; conducting surveillance and monitoring of shipping; intercepting, searching, seizing and diverting vessels and monitoring the airspace.[80] These roles are the crux of Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO), which Canada was to participate in and eventually become the standard bearer for medium power navies on the world stage. Today, the Royal Australian Navy and even the USN attempt to mirror Canadian MIO procedures.

While large navies such as the USN and RN have specialized forces to conduct MIO and more specifically the visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS) of vessels, Canada

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[78] Ibid, 92.
[79] Higgins, *Canadian Naval Operations in the 1990s*…, 77.
[80] Haydon, *Sea Power and Maritime Strategy in the 21st Century*…, 66.

and other medium power navies "must resort to multi-tasking of its sailors."[81] The Canadian Navy dove headlong into this role. Throughout the 1990s, Canada was able to develop a world class MIO organization and contributed ship's boarding parties that had capabilities unequalled by their peers. And these were just ordinary sailors. The benefits derived from these capabilities were two fold. Respect and admiration amongst allies was one, but more importantly, the capability and expertise that made Canada a leader in the field of MIO, now made them a desirable partner when forming a coalition. Canadian ships were seen as a "force multiplier when it came to operations in the Gulf" and therefore, Canadian presence would be desired in any future MIO mission in the littorals.[82] The ability to efficiently conduct the more mundane escort, visit, search and seizure allowed Canada to continue its presence in the region and allowed the Canadian Navy to continue to develop capabilities and skill sets.

MIO and VBSS are impressive capabilities, but they are also indicative of the larger Canadian Navy transition of the 1990s. As a result of the capability developments and missions of the 1990s, the Canadian Navy was essentially rebuilt into a flexible, joint, interoperable force multiplier able to conduct operations throughout the globe. Higgins supports this argument and stated:

> …the post-Cold War demands on the Canadian navy have required that the fleet, which was designed for Cold War functions, adapt to the complex circumstances of the 'New World Order.'[83]

The end of the Cold War created a need for middle power navies to broaden their roles and capabilities to meet the challenges of the new strategic environment. In order to stay relevant, navies need to react and respond with new roles and capabilities not

[81] Gimblett, *Operation Apollo: The Golden Age*…, 11/74.
[82] Higgins, *Canadian Naval Operations in the 1990s*…, 76.
[83] Higgins, "Examining the "Adjusted Course" of the Canadian Navy…, 118.

traditionally exercised during the Cold War. The Canadian Navy was up to that challenge and throughout the 1990s developed new roles and capabilities demanded by its changing foreign policy. Humanitarian assistance brought about the need for flexible, joint forces deployable throughout the globe. Sanction Monitoring and Enforcement demanded close interoperability with the USN and spawned a new capability for which Canada has become the middle power standard bearer and a desired partner of any coalition. Flexible, joint, interoperable and capable was what the Canadian Navy delivered.

The Canadian Navy shed its Cold War garb and successfully transitioned through the1990s to become a modern, globally engaged middle power navy, significantly contributing to peace and stability across a broad spectrum of maritime roles and capabilities. The Canadian Navy made the transition from a stagnant Cold War ASW Fleet and became an active, engaged navy relevant to national and international interests. The extent of development and transition is highlighted by a quote from Captain(Navy) Ron Lloyd just prior to *HMCS CHARLOTTETOWN's* deployment as an integrated member of the *USS Harry S. Truman* CVBG in January 2001:

> *We're ready…We're probably one of the few non-U.S. ships in the world that are ready now to do so.*[84]

[84] Department of National Defence, "Canadian Navy Teams Up with U.S. Carrier Battle Groups," Article for DND Website. Article on-line; available from http://www.dnd.ca/site/focus/canada-us/backgrounder_e.asp; Internet; accessed 17 January 2004.

Section 3 - Canadian Navy Today: Stability

> Canada's Navy is a symbol of the state itself…It offers nothing less than a medium global force protection navy that will serve Canada as a multipurpose, interoperable force, capable of joint and combined operations worldwide.[85]
>
> *Leadmark*, June 2001

Released only three months prior to the tragic events of September 11th, 2001, *Leadmark* offered a vision of the Canadian Navy for the 21st Century. It purported a navy that was well trained, modern, interoperable and combat capable with a broad range of capabilities able to react and operate in all corners of the globe to meet the challenges of the new strategic environment. Little did the navy know that it would be called upon within three months to deliver that promise, and deliver it did. The first arm of the Canadian Forces to respond, the navy was ready as soon as the government called upon it as noted by Admiral Buck, Chief of Maritime Staff:

> …within 30 minutes of the political decision being made our first ship was enroute to the Persian Gulf, followed by a complete task group 10 days later.[86]

The events of September 11th, 2001 culminated the change to a new strategic environment that had been occurring throughout the 1990s. Superpower dominance had given away to failed-state crisis that had now given way to non-state actors influencing the world stage. The Canadian Navy was able to react immediately to this new form of crisis facing Western Powers because it have developed new roles and capabilities

[85] Chief of Maritime Staff, *Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy for 2020* (Ottawa: Directorate of Maritime Strategy, NDHQ/Chief of Maritime Staff, 2001), 170.
[86] Ronald D. Buck, "The Canadian Navy: In the Vanguard of Canadian Foreign and Defence Policy," Address to Canadian Defence Associations Institute (Ottawa, 26 February 2004), 4/6.

throughout the 1990s and entered the new millennium proud, confident, and stable.[87] It is ironic that navy was now in a position of stability and confidence when instability and fear spread throughout the globe.

The Canadian Navy in today's strategic environment has achieved a degree of stability in an unstable world. The Task Group concept, the backbone of naval policy, enabled the navy to meet the requirements imposed by the 1994 White Paper in response to the War on Terrorism. *Operation Apollo*, the Canadian contribution to the global war on Terrorism, and specifically at the Canadian Navy's contribution epitomizes the level of readiness and capabilities that the navy possesses today. The navy was able to deploy without delay, make a significant contribution and assume a leadership role. Although stable and capable, today's dynamic and demanding security environment does pose problems for the navy, specifically sustainment. The stable position of the navy at the outset of the new millennium allowed it to respond and contribute when called upon by Canadian Government.

In order to respond to the evolving nature of asymmetric conflict, flexibility remains key. The Task Group concept, refined throughout the 1990s, is a key enabler for the Canadian Navy in terms of this flexibility. Composed of a "trinity of critical elements," which includes command and control, operational depth and integral sustainment, the combined effectiveness is "greater than the sum of their parts."[88] When integrated into a coalition environment, it has a synergistic effect on capability. Admiral Buck, Chief of Maritime Staff, stressed the importance of jointness from a maritime perspective:

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[87] Gimblett, *Operation Apollo: The Golden Age*…, 9/74.
[88] Ibid, 8-9/74.

> It provides the Coalition Commander with a Flag Officer and Battle Staff, a wide area Command and Control capability and area air defence. It also offers a flexible, multi-purpose and sustainable force of mutually supporting ships and maritime aircraft capable of carrying out a wide variety of mission.[89]

It should be noted that this capability, while impressive, is also required. In accordance with the 1994 Defence White Paper, the Canadian Navy is required to deploy a naval task group within three months as a 'Main Contingency Force' and a single 'Vanguard' unit within three weeks.[90] This capability is considerably faster and more robust than a comparable land formation, which is why the navy has consistently been the lead arm of the Canadian Forces in responding to global crisis. As noted by Gimblett, in response to the Canadian Government's contribution pledge to the global war on Terrorism, "*HALIFAX* achieved her vanguard re-tasking literally on a days notice, and the full task group got under way in a similar fraction of time."[91] In real terms, the main contingency force was underway in "less than half the time stipulated for the deployment of vanguard forces."[92] This feat was impressive and clearly demonstrates the capability and confidence of the Canadian Navy. The Chief of Maritime Staff echoes this enthusiasm.

"Operation Apollo illustrates how Canada engages and intervenes on the international stage."[93] When called upon to respond as the main effort of the Canadian contribution to the War on Terrorism, the Canadian Navy was ready and was able to pitch

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[89] Wolfgang Legien, "Canadian Naval Task Group Concept Translates into Readiness," *NATO's NATIONS and Partners for Peace*, Vol. 48, Issue 2, 2003: 161.
Admiral Ronald D. Buck cited in interview.
[90] Department of National Defence, *1994 Defence White Paper*…, 38-39.
[91] Gimblett, *Operation Apollo: The Golden Age*…, 6/74.
[92] Legien, "Canadian Naval Task Group Concept Translates into Readiness"…158.
Admiral Ronald D. Buck cited in interview.
[93] Ronald D. Buck, "Intervention and Engagement: A View from the Bridge." in *Intervention and Engagement: A Maritime Perspective*, ed. Robert H. Edwards and Ann L. Griffiths (Halifax: The Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 2003), 51.

in "with the largest fighting flotilla it has sent to sea since the Korean War."[94] Relevancy was also a key issue. The navy was able to rise to the occasion when called upon by fielding operationally credible forces in a timely manner. Unfortunately for pundits of the Canadian Army and Air Force, "the navy was the only arm of the Canadian Forces capable of taking the fight to the enemy" in a timely, relevant manner.[95]

Operation Apollo clearly highlighted the fact that the navy was able to deploy without delay, make a significant contribution and assume a leadership role within a coalition environment. Unlike the early 1990s when a massive engineering effort was required to cobble together a few ships for *Operation Friction*, the Canadian Navy was ready and able to deploy as soon as tasked in the Fall of 2001. These demands and operations have now become routine for the navy as opposed to an exceptional occurrence that *Operation Friction* was in the early 1990s. Among coalition nations, Canada was first to the fight and provided the "first coalition Task Group to arrive in the CENTCOM AOR."[96] The contribution was also significant. According to Admiral Buck:

> Our contribution…is not window dressing. It is real, it is credible and we are one of the few countries which are doing the heavy lifting. We have the equipment, the doctrine, the connectivity and procedures that make us key, integral players…[97]

The Canadian commitment was credible, relevant and timely which allowed the navy to further its leadership position within the coalition. *Operation Apollo* highlighted the emerging role of Canada as a leader in maritime coalitions. Consistent with

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[94] J. Geddes, J. Demont, J. Beltrame and K. Macqueen. "Canada Goes to War." *Macleans's Magazine*, 22 October 2001: 26.
[95] Gimblett, *Operation Apollo: The Golden Age*…, 5/74.
[96] Department of Defense, Article for CENTCOM Website. Article on-line; available from http://www.centcom.mil/Operations/Coalition/Coalition_pages/canada.htm; Internet; accessed 17 January 2004.
[97] Buck, "Intervention and Engagement: A View from the Bridge"…,50

developments and policy throughout the 1990s, the Canadian Navy established a level of interoperability with the USN that has allowed it to assume a leadership role in U.S.-led multinational coalitions. The high level of technical and operational interoperability of the Canadian Navy resulted in American commanders opting to delegate command assignments to Canadians whom they were familiar with and trusted.[98] *Operation Apollo* Maritime Commanders bore the fruits of this decade old policy.

The degree of trust allotted to the Canadian Navy is worth noting and testifies to the degree of readiness and capability that a Canadian Task Group offers. Immediately upon entering the theatre of operations in November 2001, the Canadian Commander, Commodore Drew Robertson, was assigned responsibility for protection of the American Amphibious Forces in preparation for moving marines into Afghanistan.[99] Over the period of *Operation Apollo*, the area under Canadian Command within the theatre steadily grew. Initially concentrating in the Gulf of Oman, by Summer of 2002, the Canadian Commander, Commodore Eric Lehre, had "firmly taken charge" and was now responsible for coalition operations in the Gulf of Oman, the Straits of Hormuz and Southern Arabian Gulf.[100] The degree of command responsibility culminated in February 2003, when Canadian Commodore Roger Girouard assumed command of Multinational Task Force 151, exerting broad sea control over vast expanses of the Arabian Sea and into the Arabian Gulf.[101] Clearly, this endorsement by the coalition leadership is testament to the degree of trust in the Canadian Naval leadership, both in terms of

[98] Gimblett, "Canada-US Interoperability: Towards a Home Port Division of the USN?"…, 103.
[99] Gimblett, *Operation Apollo: The Golden Age*…, 15/74.
[100] Ibid, 24/74.
[101] Legien, "Canadian Naval Task Group Concept Translates into Readiness"…159.
Admiral Ronald D. Buck cited in interview.

capability and interoperability. Canada was providing relevant naval forces and making a relevant coalition contribution.

Apart from a significant leadership role within the coalition, Canadian warships were extremely busy throughout *Operation Apollo*, contributing in a wide-range of relevant and important duties. Specific task group roles ranged from "protecting logistic and amphibious forces, to surveillance and interdiction operations, to logistics re-supply."[102] What is particularly impressive is that individual ships often conducted this full range of tasks throughout their deployments, which highlights the capability and professionalism of the Canadian Navy. These ships garnered good operational experience that puts the Canadian Navy in good stead as an operationally relevant and useful force to Canada's closest allies. *HMCS HALIFAX* exhibited the degree of flexibility and broad range of capability that Canadian Warships offer a multinational coalition. Throughout her tour in theatre, *HALIFAX* conducted the full range of naval tasks and missions assigned to the coalition.

Upon arrival in theatre, *HALIFAX* first conducted escort missions through the busy Strait of Hormuz, protecting the valuable allied replenishment shipping entering and exiting the Arabian Gulf. Coalition Commanders then planned to utilize *HALIFAX* within the *USS Theodore Roosevelt* CVBG, but prior to taking up her duties, was re-assigned to conduct Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) of a particularly critical area outside the territorial waters of the United Arab Emirates port of Fujairah. Utilizing her onboard sensors and employing her organic Sea King helicopter, *HALIFAX* was able to generate a cohesive Recognized Maritime Picture (RMP) of that area for the

[102] J.Y.Forcier, "Expeditionary Operations and the International Campaign Against Terrorism: Operation Apollo," in *Intervention and Engagement: A Maritime Perspective*, ed. Robert H. Edwards and Ann L. Griffiths (Halifax: The Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 2003), 351.

Coalition Forces. Soon after, *HALIFAX* found herself in the Gulf of Oman conducting Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) aimed at deterring and if possible capturing fleeing Al-Qaeda leadership. These operations, later dubbed Leadership Interdiction Operations (LIO), became the mainstay of the Canadian Task Group for the duration of *Operation Apollo*.[103] *HALIFAX* was the first to commit to these operations and led the way for future coalition members to follow.

As tensions grew between India and Pakistan in early 2002, Coalition forces were wary of the presence of surface and subsurface forces from both countries. *HALIFAX* was re-tasked at the beginning of 2002 to conduct ISR of both Pakistani and Indian forces that were operating close to the Coalition amphibious forces. ISR quickly turned into Anti-Submarine operations when a subsurface contact was detected operating near Coalition Forces. *HALIFAX*, being the most capable ASW platform, was tasked with her helicopter to investigate and deter the subsurface threat. Utilizing ship's sensors and its Sea King helicopter, *HALIFAX* was able to localize and shepherd a Pakistani Diesel Submarine away from the Coalition Amphibious Forces.[104] Although Pakistan was an ally of the coalition, it was deemed necessary to keep the waters sanitized from any subsurface threat as the Amphibious Group conducted operations.

What *HALIFAX* accomplished was not unique unto itself. All Canadian ships participating in *Operation Apollo* offered the same degree of flexibility and broad range of capabilities that *HALIFAX* had displayed. Effective across the spectrum of maritime tasks, the Canadian Navy was a force-multiplier in theatre. From escort and protection of High Value Units, ISR and RMP development of coastal areas, Interdiction Operations

[103] Gimblett, *Operation Apollo: The Golden Age*…, 16-17/74.
[104] Ibid, 17-18/74.

(both MIO or LIO) and when called upon, ASW operations in support of Coalition Forces, the Canadian Navy was up to the task. The Canadian Navy provided relevant combat forces to the coalition.

Operation Apollo was a significant test for the Canadian Navy. The more than two-year operation consumed the valuable resources of the navy in terms of platforms, spares, aircraft and more importantly, personnel. However, in the end, operational relevance was gained. Equipment, resources and personnel can be replenished, but the esteem and experience garnered by an active navy rather than a "garrison" force provided return on investment for the Canadian taxpayer. Sixteen out of the eighteen major surface combatants deployed to theatre, along with more than 4500 out of a total of just 9000 Regular force sailors.[105] What is clear is that navy requires additional support to continue to do what the country expects in the rapidly changing security environment. As argued by Gimblett, the issue of sustainability was at the forefront from the beginning of *Operation Apollo*.[106]

As a result of the level of effort put into *Operation Apollo*, the Canadian Navy is facing some difficult but manageable problems today. The biggest problem is in terms of personnel, which has been a festering issue over the past decade due to some very shortsighted decisions in the mid-1990s. Current demographics of the entire Canadian Forces are unsustainable in the current security environment. Deploying virtually every sailor in a sea going billet, combined with pre-existing shortfalls in some key technical trade, resulted in an empty barrel of sailors from which to choose from. Personnel training, career coursing and measurable quality of life concerns were impacting on the

[105] Legien, "Canadian Naval Task Group Concept Translates into Readiness"…159.
Admiral Ronald D. Buck cited in interview.
[106] Gimblett, *Operation Apollo: The Golden Age*…, 20/74.

ability to deploy ships. The personnel tempo was simply too much to maintain over a long period. The personnel shortage was not limited to the Navy either. The Sea King community, which is integral to the capability of surface units, was also facing personnel crisis in terms of pilots and technicians.[107] But the cost of deployment has to be weighed against the benefits. The bottom line is that the experience gained by *Operation Apollo* is well worth the cost in terms of personnel and resources. Real operations are far better than any training exercise regardless of the perceived erosion of war fighting skills. Real "sailoring" is what navies are good for in defending Canadian national interests and adding value and relevance in today's world.

Personnel and resources were not the only items to be stretched during *Operation Apollo*. Ships themselves were feeling the pressure of prolonged deployments. WINNIPEG, CHARLOTTETOWN, IROQUOIS and TORONTO had all deployed to the Arabian Gulf theatre twice within a two-year period. 'Rode hard and put away wet' is a common phrase bantered about the fleet these days. The maintenance and upkeep bill could not be sustained for such a high tempo of operations. Not only was it demanding on the ship's technical staffs, the shore maintenance facilities were increasingly unable to keep pace with the workload associated with continual deployments. Dockyard capacity of the coastal Fleet Maintenance Facilities (FMFs) had been reduced by cutbacks in the 1990s and as a result they did not possess the capacity for throughput that they once had.[108] The deployment surges of late 2001 into 2002 and 2003 left the yards struggling to keep pace and often resulted in scheduled maintenance windows being delayed in lieu of critical pre-deployment work.

[107] Ibid, 20-21/74.
[108] Ibid, 21/74.

Spares and ammunition were also becoming a critical factor for the Navy after two years deployed. The supply bins for critical spares were becoming exhausted at an ever-increasing rate. 'Robbing Peter to pay Paul' in terms of technical spares became the norm near the end of *Operation Apollo*. Was the price too high? Over time the maintenance and spares issues will be forgotten and the important legacy will remain. The Canadian Navy was able to deploy when called upon and made a significant contribution to the coalition effort.

Although continued sustainment over a two-year period became a critical issue, the bottom line is that the Canadian Navy was able to deploy for that period of time and meet its obligation on behalf of the Canadian Government. Gimblett argues this point in stating:

> Perhaps only a half-dozen countries anywhere can assemble a national task group on just a few days' notice and sail it independently to the other side of the globe.[109]

The modern, multi-purpose Canadian Navy was able to make a significant, credible contribution to the global war on Terrorism. Confident in its capability and leadership, the Canadian Navy proved it was able to integrate effectively and lead a multinational coalition in a dynamic and challenging littoral environment. In doing so, the navy gave the government exactly what it was looking for:

> …[the] fluid nature of sea power actually afforded the government a great deal of flexibility...its fleet allowed the Canadian government to demonstrate precisely the degree of resolve it desired.[110]

The challenge is not over for the Canadian Navy. After a period of growth and development throughout the 1990s, the navy is in an enviable, stable operating position at

[109] Ibid, 9/74.
[110] Ibid, 47/74.

the turn of the millennium. It has shown that it is more than capable to react to the rapidly changing global security environment, but it must not rest on its laurels. The future will hold many more demanding challenges for the navy, but the navy and its leadership are up to that challenge as evident by the development and fostering of a future Canadian maritime strategy within the Maritime Staff. The Canadian Navy is looking forward to transform itself to meet future challenges at home and abroad:

> After being the first internationally deployed Canadian military response…the Canadian Navy continues to answer the call to deter and eliminate acts of terrorism before they reach Canada.[111]

[111] Chief of Maritime Staff, "Canadian Navy Frigate Sets Sail for the Arabian Gulf in the Campaign Against Terrorism," News Release CMS 04.001, 09 January 2004. Article on-line; available from http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view-news-e.asp?id=1288; Internet; accessed 17 January 2004.

Section 4 - Canadian Navy in the Future: Transformation

...whoever runs Canada needs a Navy.[112]
Sir Wilfred Laurier, 1910

What Laurier observed nearly a century ago remains true today. While the nature of conflict and the actors involved may have changed, future Canadian foreign and domestic policy requirements will demand a significant, capable maritime force. In an uncertain future, one thing is certain, namely armed forces will continue to be used as an instrument of government policy.[113] So where will the Canadian Navy find itself operating in the future? If history is any indication, the navy will find itself operating where it has been since its inception: "operating far from home in concert with its principal allies as part of multilateral maritime coalitions."[114] The nature of warfare and the world today will continue to change and evolve as well.

As noted by Admiral Buck, "changing friends, new opponents, new issues and new forms of conflict" will be defining features of this new security environment.[115] As a result of this dramatic change in the nature of conflict, there has been a "fundamental transformation in which the traditional boundaries associated with security and defence have blurred – in fact in many ways they have now merged."[116] The demands imposed by this evolving strategic environment will place a heavy burden upon the Canadian

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[112] Marc Milner, *Canada's Navy: The First Century* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 310.
[113] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War.* trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 87.
[114] Sokolsky, "Sailing in Concert: The Politics and Strategy of Canada-US Naval Interoperability"…, 2.
[115] Ronald D. Buck, "The Canadian Navy: In the Vanguard of Canadian Foreign and Defence Policy," Address to Canadian Defence Associations Institute (Ottawa, 26 February 2004), 2/6.
[116] Buck, "The Canadian Navy: In the Vanguard…, 1/6.

Navy, a burden that will force it to react and change continually to meet new threats and new situations. The Canadian Navy must transform to meet the challenge.

The role of the Canadian Navy in the future strategic environment will continue to be one of an expeditionary force deployed in support of multinational coalitions. The need for a domestic presence, however, will also increase given the uncertain nature of asymmetric threats. The broader perspective of the future strategic environment throughout the globe and at home, might offer some insight as to where the Canadian Navy will be required to act. The future will not be without challenges. Some of the challenges that will face the Canadian Navy are warfare related and others will have no warfare component at all. The littoral environment and modern weaponry will challenge the navy from a war fighting perspective, while limited resources and an ever-increasing technology gap between the U.S. and the rest of the world will challenge the Canadian Navy on another level. After considering the future strategic environment, the roles of sea power and some trends and challenges, it will become abundantly clear that a cohesive maritime strategy will require both a domestic and expeditionary component. Expeditionary to meet our foreign policy commitments to international peace and security, and domestic to meet security concerns at home. Whatever shape the new strategic environment may take, transformation of the Canadian Navy will be continuous and challenging. Haydon summed up the challenge:

> …while the emerging international system remains laden with uncertainty, some things are beginning to crystallize. One of these is the utility of naval forces in international crisis management operations within the broader realm of maritime security.[117]

[117] Haydon, *Sea Power and Maritime Strategy in the 21st Century*…, 4.

According to Peter Haydon, navies have a busy future. This is understandable, in part due to the broadening spectrum of naval operations and tasks that naval forces can perform. Able to reach into virtually any part of the world with military power, navies have the ability to perform a multitude of tasks. Ranging from military operations, through diplomatic missions and even executing a purely constabulary role, navies provide the flexibility for governments in executing both foreign and domestic policy.[118] Of course, with a broadening span of tasks and roles there will come a broadening degree of control. While the basic tenets of sea power, "the ability…to exercise control over the seas and to project power ashore," have not changed, there has been, and will continue to be, a significant increase in political control over the conduct of naval operations.[119] This trend is understandable, as naval forces "do the bidding of the government," and the government will want oversight in the bidding process.[120] Governments and politicians will desire a very tight rein on naval forces involved in politically sensitive areas of the world. Scenarios similar to Iraq, where the Canadian Navy was operating in theatre as part of the overall coalition, but not involved in the combat operations due to the political position of the government, will likely continue in the future. This is understandable given the navy's role as an instrument of state policy.

As noted by Haydon, "on, over and under the ocean," the Canadian Navy will continue to provide the government "the inherent flexibility of naval forces…well suited for a wide range of missions and tasks."[121] In an ever-shrinking world where political

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[118] Ibid, 37.
[119] Ibid, 37.
[120] John Dewar, "The New Naval Vision and Instruments of Foreign Policy," in *Canadian Gunboat Diplomacy: The Canadian Navy and Foreign Policy*, ed. Ann L. Griffith, Peter T. Haydon and Richard H. Gimblett (Halifax: The Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 2000), 370.
[121] Haydon, *Sea Power and Maritime Strategy in the 21st Century*…, 37-38.

sensitivity often overrides policy, naval forces will continue to emerge as the arm of choice for the Canadian Government given this flexibility.[122]

It is said that only fools and charlatans attempt to predict the future.[123]

While this may be true, it is still necessary to analyze recent trends and hotspots to determine where the Canadian Navy is likely to operate and what type of action it may be involved in. While predicting the future strategic environment has occupied countless academics and military studies, the exercise has some merit in considering what the Canadian Navy might face in the future. What will become clear is that the Canadian Navy will be required to operate as an expeditionary force integrated within a multi-national coalition. Interoperability will remain the key issue for this expeditionary integration.

The change in nature of conflict involving non-state actors and asymmetric threats combined with an ever increasing amount of regional conflict will challenge naval forces in the future. In all regions of the world, navies will be called upon to act on behalf of their governments. Even close to home in the Caribbean, widespread poverty, political instability, and pervasive presence of narcotics trafficking threaten the stability of smaller states. Given its proximity to North America and close ties with Canada, any

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[122] Haydon, *Sea Power and Maritime Strategy in the 21st Century*…, 38.
Peter Haydon outlines four key reasons why naval forces are employed in politically sensitive crisis management operations and why navies are most desirable arms to employ.

intervention scenario could demand Canadian participation. This participation would likely have a largely maritime support component.[124]

Intra-state conflict in Africa will also demand Canadian presence. As a large contributor to the immigration stream of Canada, increased public awareness and pressure will force the government to address African issues. There is no naval threat in the region, but like the Caribbean, a significant maritime component will be required to provide supporting logistic and command and control to intervening ground forces.[125]

North East and South East Asia concerns will also continue to develop over the foreseeable future. Next to the U.S., Asia is Canada's most important trading partner and one of Canada's largest sources of recent immigration. Therefore, Asia will continue to represent a real strategic interest for Canada. Economies within the region are heavily dependent upon sea-borne trade and any conflict in the region would impact on this. With a viable strategic interest at stake, any Canadian contribution to a regional conflict would likely involve a significant maritime component.[126] As noted by Barry Gough:

> Canada is not a bystander in Pacific affairs. The ocean may be large, but those who live by the "Rim of Fire" will have requirements, needs and expectations that will oblige us to make responses…as the circumstances require, to fulfill what Canada holds dear.[127]

Clearly, there will be a place for Canada. And finally the Middle East. This region of the world is expected to remain the most unstable region in the world for at least the next decade. Although not directlyp

these reserves. Canada would not be immune to the effects of conflict on world oil prices and the global economy. As a result, Canada will continue to be engaged in maintaining stability in the region, as instability would indirectly impact Canada.[128] The bottom line is that the international security environment will be a volatile and frequently unstable.

Although the potential for major interstate conflict remains remote, the likelihood of limited conflict in many regions of the world is ever increasing. In order for Canada to continue to contribute to international peace and security, Canada will require interoperable maritime forces to work within coalitions throughout the globe. This environment will most likely involve multi-national maritime forces operating in the littorals conducting the sea-land interface. An expeditionary, interoperable, multi-purpose combat capable force will be required to conduct these missions in support of Canadian foreign policy.

But what about closer to home? Reacting to failed states abroad has become a somewhat traditional role over the past decade but the proliferation of non-state actors and evolving trends in asymmetric warfare demand a future role for the Canadian Navy at home as well. "Providing for the Defence of Canada and Canadian Sovereignty" has taken on a whole new meaning than was originally intended in the 1994 Defence White Paper.[129] As highlighted by Minister Pratt in referring to the attack of September 11th 2001, "it was not outside the parameters of what had been described for years as asymmetrical warfare."[130] In order to combat new asymmetric threats that have the potential to impact Canadian safety and prosperity at home, it will become necessary to implement a significant domestic maritime security policy that will incorporate the

[128] Williams, DMARSTRAT, "Future Security Environment."
[129] Department of National Defence, *1994 Defence White Paper*…, 15.
[130] Pratt, Speaking Notes…, 1/7.

domestic use of Canadian Navy expertise.[131] Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), whether done in foreign waters or domestically requires the same capabilities and skill sets. The current expertise in maintaining an accurate Recognized Maritime Picture (RMP) can easily be translated into a domestic role. Currently the Maritime Staff is working towards this goal with the Interdepartmental Maritime Security Working Group for a more comprehensive and cohesive approach to maritime security. One again, interoperability of the Canadian Navy will be a key component. In the future, however, the navy will also have to become interoperable with other domestic arms of the government and not solely other navies.

There is a significant role for the Canadian Navy in the future strategic environment, both at home and abroad. There will, however, be significant challenges for the navy both from an operational perspective and of a non-warfare variety. The littoral environment and evolving asymmetric threats will challenge the navy from an operational perspective and politics, fiscal constraints and even the limited technological capability to keep pace will present a significant non-warfare challenge. Unconventional methods of warfare such as suicide bombing and the complete disregard for the Laws of Armed Conflict create huge challenges for maritime forces.[132] The littoral warfare zone only enhances this problem. The proximity of land and enemy forces, the complication of determining friend from foe, the density of shipping: all of these factors contribute to make picture complication a real challenge. As a result, warning time and manoeuverability are reduced creating a significant problem for navies in the littorals.[133]

[131] Buck, "The Canadian Navy: In the Vanguard…, 1/6.
[132] Ibid, 2/6.
[133] Williams, DMARSTRAT, "Future Security Environment."

After considering the future strategic environment, the roles of sea power and some trends and challenges, it has become clear that a cohesive maritime strategy will require both a domestic and expeditionary component. Translating these "broad concepts into actual policies, programs and equipment takes us into the realm of maritime strategy."[134] The Canadian Navy is heading in this direction. Led by Admiral Buck, the vision of the Canadian Navy and a future maritime security policy is clear and will have at its heart two distinct mission areas:

> First, we must defend and protect our people, our nation and our society. Implicit in this task is the control of our frontiers including our ocean frontiers. We must be able to deal with this threat in order to ensure the safety of Canada's citizens and to also ensure Canada is not a staging area for international violence. This latter aspect will have a significant impact on the stability and harmony of our relationship with the US.
>
> Second, we must work to protect the stability of the global world order to provide stability to ensure the free flow of goods and services on the global stage to assure global prosperity. Contributions to collective defence is a key way to pay our way and be seen to pay our way on the world stage. [135]

Domestic and expeditionary capabilities are the key to transformation of the Canadian Navy. While "geography has made Canadian military forces expeditionary," the demands imposed by the new strategic environment will make it domestic as well.[136] At the heart of these capabilities will be interoperability with allies' abroad and other arms of the government at home. As the boundaries between security and defence continue to merge, Canada will have to respond with a new level of flexibility and agility. No single service or government agency "possesses all of the knowledge and capability

[134] Haydon, *Sea Power and Maritime Strategy in the 21st Century*…, 31.
[135] Buck, "The Canadian Navy: In the Vanguard…, 3/6.
[136] Buck, "Intervention and Engagement: A View from the Bridge…, 56.

to operate independently within this new [domestic] environment."[137] As a result, Canada will have to embrace the new "joint interagency models" to satisfy Canadian domestic security concerns.[138] At the same time, Canada will continue to play an important role on the world stage and will demand maritime forces up to that challenge. Expeditionary, domestic, interoperable, multi-purpose and combat capable will become the moniker of the Canadian Navy. As argued by the Chief of Maritime Staff:

> To implement these two enduring but in the future much broader defence missions, I believe we must embrace the widest base of policy options possible and secure the capabilities to implement them.[139]

So what will these capabilities likely look like? In determining in broad terms that a future Canadian maritime strategy will possess both an expeditionary and domestic component, it is necessary to offer some insight as the specific capabilities that they must possess. Captain(Navy) John Dewar, succinctly addresses these capability requirements.

> …first, to be a credible instrument of policy we must have the capacity and expertise to command our forces at sea. Second, that capacity in turn requires a high degree of self-sufficiency.[140]

Applicable both in a domestic and expeditionary capacity, the ability to command and sustain our maritime forces is at the heart of any future naval capability. Interoperability with key allies and other government departments will also remain a vital component of any future capability. If Canada wants to remain part of the "first team" it will have to maintain and further develop its current level of interoperability with its allies.[141] Improved Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) will also be required of Canadian naval forces in both a foreign and domestic role. Coordinating the

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[137] Buck, "The Canadian Navy: In the Vanguard…, 1/6.
[138] Ibid, 1/6.
[139] Ibid, 3/6.
[140] Dewar, "The New Naval Vision and Instruments of Foreign Policy…,370.
[141] Haydon, *Sea Power and Maritime Strategy in the 21st Century*…, 112.

surveillance at home and contributing to the RMP abroad are key roles and capabilities that the navy must possess.[142] Finally, defence of forces at sea and ashore from forces on, above and under the sea will continue to be a core capability requirement. Layered, long-range near-land and over-land air defence umbrella "may well constitute a viable contribution" to both domestic and international operations.[143] But what will it all cost?

Sustainable, interoperable, defendable maritime forces that possess key ISR capabilities and a high degree of autonomous Canadian command is a tall order, but one that is demanded by Canadians in order to react and meet the challenge of the future security environment. The navy will require resources to meet this mandate, but Admiral Buck sums up the benefits from this investment:

> Maritime forces offer a broad set of mission options because of their unique mobility to act as sovereign units on the world's oceans and the capability that they provide across the entire spectrum of activity from constabulary through diplomatic to conflict.[144]

The inherent flexibility that naval forces provide the government will translate into an ever-increasing role for the navy in Canadian foreign and domestic policy. The requirement to react and change to meet the needs of the new strategic environment both at home and abroad will require the navy to transform to meet this challenge. There will no doubt be significant challenges ahead for the navy in terms of political will, fiscal constraints and the capacity of Canadian industry to provide assets. At the same time there will be significant challenges in the evolving asymmetric threat and the littoral environment. To adapt to these challenges, Canada will need to develop a cohesive maritime security policy with both a domestic and expeditionary flavour. An

[142] Buck, "The Canadian Navy: In the Vanguard…, 5/6.
[143] Ibid, 5/6.
[144] Ibid, 3/6.

interoperable maritime force with both a domestic and expeditionary component will be at the heart of the transformation of the Canadian Navy. In order to execute the evolving maritime security mission, the navy will require significant capabilities. A requirement for a modern, high readiness, flexible, self-sustaining fleet with a firm base of combat capabilities will remain an imperative for the Canadian Navy in meeting the challenge of the future strategic environment.[145]

[145] Williams, DMARSTRAT, "Future Security Environment."

Conclusion

The global strategic environment is rapidly changing. Conflict itself is changing, becoming more complex and dangerous.[146] The migration away from state conflict to one that involves non-state actors and asymmetric threats has been, and will continue to present, a particularly daunting challenge for military forces. The Canadian Navy has been meeting the challenge of this new, dynamic security environment. With an underlying doctrine of interoperability, the Canadian Navy has successfully transitioned from its static Cold War footing, dedicated to Anti-Submarine Patrols in the North Atlantic, to become a globally deployable, relevant naval force. Interoperability, particularly with the USN, has e th tenabynai

Canadian Navy today, is a proven, operationally relevant and credible naval force that can deploy throughout the globe in support of Canada and its allies. The challenge, however, is far from over. The future strategic environment will present new challenges and opportunities for the navy as it expands it role to include both an expeditionary and domestic component in support of Canadian national policy. Interoperability across not only foreign navies but also other national government departments will provide significant challenges.

Clearly, since the end of the Cold War, the Canadian Navy has excelled in interoperability, vastly improved capability and has proven itself in operations throughout the globe to clearly meet the demands of the new and dynamic strategic security environment. The navy has proven its relevance in the world today and will continue to do so in the future. As a direct result of the level of interoperability with our Allies and its ability to react quickly to dynamic security situations, the Canadian Navy has been, and will continue to be, a vital and relevant component of Canada's foreign and defence policy. The Canadian Navy has met the challenge of the new strategic environment.

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