CAF LOGISTICS FORCE PROTECTION

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CAF LOGISTICS FORCE PROTECTION:

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Clearly, logistics is the hard part of fighting a war.¹
-- Lieutenant General E. T. Cook, USMC, November 1990

Following more than a decade of conducting operations in Afghanistan, the Canadian military has learned that asymmetric warfare has dramatically impacted the way the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) must be trained, equipped and taught to fight in order to win our Nation’s wars. Coalition operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq have identified certain vulnerabilities to our soldiers, in general, and our logistics units and lines of communications (LOCs) are becoming ever more vulnerable to attack in this environment. This has manifested a considerable impact on our Cold War doctrine of the past, which focused on mass versus mass on a linear battlefield with clearly defined boundaries. In addition, the ever increasing support demands of maneuver warfare in an asymmetric environment will continue to strain finite logistics resources.

The CAF recognizes the changing battlefield realities and clearly states its vision in the CDS document *Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020 (Strategy 2020).* This strategic vision document states “the Canadian Forces is charged to develop new task-tailored capabilities to deal with asymmetrical threats and weapons of mass destruction (WMD).”² While the CAF intent and direction is clear, with regards to operating in an asymmetric environment, the Logistic Branch (Log Br) and the Army Combat Service Support

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(CSS) communities’ ability to equip, train and operate in this environment remains a considerable challenge. It is critical that the lessons learned, from over ten years of supporting combat operations in Afghanistan, not be lost and that the CSS community press for equipment and doctrinal changes to re-define CSS units to meet future needs. This paper will discuss elements of the CAF’s logistics force protection capabilities in an asymmetric environment, through the lens of Afghanistan, as well as provide recommendations to overcome challenges and address some of the identified shortfalls.

It should be noted that it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the shortcomings of the Logistics Branch’s (Log Br) training system. It is clear that logisticians in all three environments have individual service training requirements and those are best conducted in the service member’s environment or the environment in which he/she is serving. For example, an Air Force clerk working in an Infantry Battalion can expect to conduct army training with his/her unit, in addition to any trade specific training that could be conducted at the Canadian Forces Logistics Training Centre (CFLTC) located in Borden, Ontario.

The study and analysis of the CAF’s logistic force protection capability is both relevant and timely in today’s contemporary operating environment (COE). After more than ten years in Afghanistan, and with the recent completion of the CAF military involvement in that country, it is imperative that we do not fail to capture all the lessons learned in this conflict, both from operational and sustainment perspectives. It is also critical that our ‘sustainers’ ensure that the soldiers sailors and airman get the absolute best level of support while on operations.
It may be that this \{logistics\} requires not any great strategic genius but only plain hard work and calculation. While absolutely basic, this kind of calculation does not appeal to the imagination, which may be one reason why it is so often ignored by military historians.\(^3\)

-Martin Van Creveld

This essay will focus on tactical level logistics analyzed through the lens of the COE. It is beyond the scope of this essay to focus on operational level logistics in any great depth, although it would be worthwhile to apply some intellectual rigor to the level of operational support that was provided by both CANOSCOM and CEFCOM throughout the Afghanistan campaign. In addition the discussion, analysis and recommendations will be aimed primarily at the Army logisticians, because it was predominantly the Army logisticians who conducted the Combat Logistics Patrols (CLPs) in Afghanistan, and as a result, it is the Army which will need to train and equip them to do their jobs in the future. Air Force and Navy logisticians provided significant contributions to the overall effort in Afghanistan, but they were primarily employed in static, less dangerous situations than their Army counterparts. It is not intended to imply, in any way, that this was the case for all Air Force and Navy members, because they indeed did conduct CLPs and were often ready to assume risk similar to their Army counterparts.

Initially, the asymmetric environment will be defined in order to provide the baseline framework and context for the discussions and recommendations. This will, in turn, lead to an analysis of training and equipment that currently present considerable challenge in the delivery of sustainment in the asymmetric warfare environment. Finally, some recommendations for a few minor changes which will immeasurably improve the logistics soldiers’ ability to effectively

operate in a complex and dangerous environment. Finally the essay will conclude with a brief discussion on culture and propose that a culture change is required in the Log Br.

Although the term asymmetric warfare has gained much traction and attention over the last decade, the concept is not new from a historical warfare perspective. The noted Kings College academic, Philip Wilkinson, describes asymmetric warfare as the smaller power applying its strengths against the weaknesses of the larger power. This type of warfare has been applied many times in recent history, including South America, Cuba and Chechnya, with differing levels of success. In fact it could be argued the only recent example of a leader and regime ignoring the tenets of asymmetric warfare was the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq in 2003-2004. Wilkinson is one of many providers of asymmetric warfare definitions and some are more pertinent and relevant to an analysis of the CAF’s Logistic Force Protection capability.

For example, P.F. Herman, author of Sizing the Threat, Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement, postulates that asymmetric warfare is basically a set of operational principles aimed at negating the enemies advantages and exploiting his weaknesses, which is far more preferable than engaging in a traditional attrition type of warfare. This definition is in line with the CAF’s definition of asymmetric warfare which is explained as “attempts to circumvent or undermine an opponent’s strengths while exploiting his weaknesses, using methods that differ significantly from the opponent’s usual mode of operations.”

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5 Ibid.


7 Definition adopted by Armed Forces Council, 18 April 2000.
What makes asymmetric warfare significant and timely to the CAF is the likelihood of a continued future trend towards the use of this type of warfare. From a tactical perspective, often the method of choice is the use of terror in order to either threaten the stronger military force or to gain control over the population. Terror is often spread through the use of limited wide scale attacks, suicide and improvised explosives, as well as kidnapping. It is clear that our enemies are resorting to the use of terror and getting away from targeting military objectives with military goals. This fact is critical for logisticians because the enemy is continually looking to attack us where we are apparently weakest.

Historically, this weakness could be found along the Lines of Communications (LOCs) and in the logistics units on the battlefield. It is critical that in all future conflict these units harden themselves in order to ensure that they are not targeted and if they are, they can respond, with the proper training and equipment, in order to defeat the enemy and repel the aggression. The capability to protect and thwart attacks is not something that the Log Br has been particularly good at, nor trained for, in the Cdn Army over the last half century.8

CSS soldiers have always faced risk most notably through the threat of artillery and aerial attack in the rear areas of a linear battlefield. This risk was often mitigated by commanders through the application of robust rear area security measures that often included maneuver sub-units (usually company sized units) providing security and quick reaction force capability when the rear area was threatened. In the asymmetric environment, without a clear and defined forward edge of own troops, for the first time in modern history, logistic soldiers are prone to the same types of threats that threaten combat arms (cbt arms) soldiers. In fact, the simple notion

that the enemy could attempt to expose your weaknesses may make the CSS soldier at more risk than his maneuver brethren. Although killing the enemy is not their primary focus, the CSS soldiers now face many of the same threats and challenges that the arms soldier faces.  

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) highlighted the unprecedented speed of maneuver forces as they raced from Kuwait to Baghdad, often bypassing pockets of Iraqi resistance in order to maintain the tempo and the momentum of the advance. The speed and momentum exercised by the maneuver elements outpaced the ability of the CSS soldiers to maintain the pace and the LOCs began to stretch further and further after each day. The famed US Army’s 507th Maintenance Company and one of its members, Private Jessica Lynch, is a prime example of why CSS convoys and soldiers must have the skill set, fire power and equipment in order to successfully engage the enemy in an asymmetric environment. Unable to maintain the speed of their maneuver elements, the 507th Maintenance Company became lost in Fallujah, primarily due to the fact that their vehicles did not have GPS equipment as did their supported maneuver elements. The support convoy was ambushed by Iraqi irregular forces, resulting in the death of nine U.S service members and the capture of five others. Subsequently and following analysis of the incident, it became clear that CSS soldiers must have the requisite level of training, weapons, equipment in order to deal with this type of threat. Continued reliance on maneuver elements providing security to support elements in today’s rapidly moving battlefield was proven untenable.

CSS units must have the ability to not only keep up with the maneuver forces they are supporting, but they must have the ability to effectively react to what the enemy may attempt to

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do while deployed on CLPs. The idea that combat forces will always be available to provide force protection to convoys, as well as rear area security, is no longer a viable or feasible concept in the CoE. Maneuver forces, as well as supporting arms, such as Artillery and Engineers, will always be given higher priorities and the CSS soldier and leadership must ensure they are capable of operating, often alone, in this type of environment. In order to provide logistic support in the COE, the CSS soldier must be trained for close combat.\textsuperscript{11} It is clear that current trends aim to reduce the logistics footprint in battle. However, leaders must also ensure that all CSS units become more lethal and survivable in the new COE.\textsuperscript{12}

The following section of the essay will focus on sustainment and, more specifically, how sustainment was tactically delivered by the NSE of JTF-A between the periods of 2006-2011. The section will first focus on and analyze how the NSE’s were force generated (FG), trained and then employed on the Afghanistan operation. Finally, the section will make recommendations on ways the CAF Logistics Branch and the Cdn Army CSS leadership must ensure the valuable lessons from this conflict are both learned and incorporated into the Log Br institutional and training programs.

A logistics soldier’s primary purpose is to provide support to combat forces. In the Army construct, each of our three Regular Force Brigade Groups has a large support unit, a Service Battalion, in order to support the combat and combat support units in the Brigade.\textsuperscript{13} The birth of the current ‘Service Battalion’ happened in the 1960s under the direction of the Army’s Western

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., 46.

\textsuperscript{12} Walsh, “More Tooth for Tail”…10.

Area Commander, Major-General Geoff Walsh, who conducted a series of trials in Wainwright, Alberta in an attempt to place all of the disparate support organizations into one large unit. The concept was trialed and tested in the form of the “Experimental Brigade Service Battalion, or 3ESB, with 3 Brigade at Camp Gagetown. The Svc Bn has maintained this basic construct and design for the next 65 years with no major tinkering or redesigning. This is both a blessing and a curse, because it was the first time since World War I that the Log Br received this level of command interest (which is required) and reorganization. Unfortunately, it has also been the last time that the Log Br has received this level of command influence and logistics transformation has not occurred in any meaningful way since.

The majority of changes to the Log Br have occurred as a result of trying to apply better business practices to the system. Changes, such as contracting out logistics services, force reduction cuts and the inability for a corporate minded Logistics Branch to fight for itself, resulted in ‘survival mindset’ vice a focus on developing battlefield logistics doctrine that could support our combat forces. Contracting logistics services is not necessarily a bad thing, but there is still a dirty and dangerous aspect of logistics and which is manifested in the way the Army delivers tactical replenishment on a battlefield. The Log Br and CSS communities had their mettle tested in Southern Afghanistan like no previous time in their history.

Between 2003-2005 Canada participated in the NATO Afghan mission, primarily operating in the relatively safe confines of Kabul, Afghanistan. At the time it was decided to combine the administration company (Admin Coy, the organization responsible to deal with the units immediate logistical needs) of the 3rd Battalion of the Royal Canadian Regiment Battle

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Group (3 RCR BG) with the National Support Element (NSE), or the organization that serves as the bridge between the BG and Canada for support. The NSE model worked well in Kabul, predominantly because of the relative short time and space issues within the BG’s area of operations in Kabul. Unfortunately, this construct became the model of choice for all future conflict.\(^{15}\)

NSE’s were formed and given a simple but difficult mission for their operation in Afghanistan, which was to effectively sustain a Cdn BG in combat operations. This was later followed by the NSE having to provide support to all Canadians in the theatre. However, support to the BG and later on in the deployment, support to the Operational Mentor Liaison Team (OMLT), was the focus. In either case, it often meant that the NSE was required to travel great distances through often dangerous territory in order to provide critical sustainment and act as the link between Kandahar Airfield (KAF) and the Forward Operating Bases (FOBs). It was clear throughout this mission that the NSE, and logistics forces in general, must never be a hindrance to the success of fast, agile, technologically advanced battlefield dominating combat forces.\(^{16}\)

Most NSE’s were based on a Service Battalion (Svc Bn) of the Brigade that was tasked with the Force Generation (FG) of the BG for the mission. The BG was made up of an Infantry Battalion and key sub-units from other combat arms (Armoured, Artillery and Engineers) as well as Combat Service Support (CSS) soldiers. The Svc Bn had the task to FG a Company which formed the nucleus of the NSE. Other specialist soldiers were FG from units across Canada in

\(^{15}\) Ibid., 76.

order to fill out the final slots of the unit. Needless to say, the NSEs were comprised of many
different trades which were FG’d out of Bases and Wings all across Canada.

Combat Logistic Patrols (CLPs) were the means in which the NSE moved key
sustainment from the relatively safe confines of KAF to the BG’s FOBs throughout the
countryside of Afghanistan. CLPs usually consisted of large Armoured Heavy Support Vehicle
(AHSVS, vehicles driven by Mobile Support Operators (MSE Ops, commonly called
“Truckers”), Maintenance Vehicles, as well as Force Protection (FP) vehicles. The Force
Protection vehicles were mostly crewed by Reserve Force Combat Arms soldiers.

As a former company commander in Afghanistan who was responsible for conducting
CLP’s, I can attest to many of the challenges in bringing together a unit with many different
trades and skill sets. The Supply and Transport Company of the NSE consisted of Platoons of
Transport, Supply, Ammunition, Food Services and a Force Protection (FP) Platoon, an
organization of approximately 200 soldiers. It was initially challenging trying to incorporate a
FP Cbt Arms Pl from the Reserves with their regular force CSS counterparts. However, the team
came together in confirmation exercises that took place in Texas and later in Wainwright in
2008. It was critical to focus on team building and soldier skills because it was this company
that was going to assume the majority of risk and danger in the unit while supporting the combat
forces. In addition, a large amount of effort and time was given to identifying key lessons from
the training exercises. Two glaring shortcomings were (1) not having access to the vehicles and
platforms that we would later use in Afghanistan and (2) the noticeable skill fade of CSS soldiers
performing combat drills both individually and collectively. The fact remains, that in order to
provide CSS in an asymmetric environment, the CSS soldier must be capable and prepared to
engage in combat.
Most Transport and FP Pl’s averaged approximately 100 individual CLP’s throughout a six-month tour. This was a considerable feat because the Area of Operation (AO) of Regional Command-South (the AO in which the Cdn TF worked in) was approximately 225,000 square kilometers. Many were involved in ambushes or hit improvised explosive devices (IEDs), the preferred option and tactic most employed by the enemy in Afghanistan. The result of this experience has hardened many logistics soldiers and re-enforces the moniker ‘soldier first’, which implies that regardless of trade or classification, we are soldiers and thus must be able to perform soldier skills such as shooting, moving, communicating and, at times, engaging in combat with a determined enemy.

How do the Log Br and the Cdn Army CSS communities ensure that these skill sets and lessons are not forgotten, considering that the asymmetric threat is something that the CAF will likely face again in the future? The following portion of the essay will focus on equipping and training CSS soldiers in order to ensure that we will be ready for the “next” Afghanistan.

In the asymmetric environment, it is critical that CSS soldiers have both the protection and the firepower that they require in order to survive and operate in the CoE. Unfortunately, the Cdn Army has not yet given the Svc Bns either the necessary equipment or the training required in order to prepare itself adequately for this type of environment. In order to transition from the ad hoc nature the army used to prepare CSS soldiers for the war in Afghanistan, the Cdn Army must re-invest resources so that CSS can train as they will fight, just like the combat arms soldier is afforded the opportunity to do so.

According to the Canadian Forces Joint Publication 4-0, Support, in land component sustainment activities conducted in a combat zone, sustainment units must be appropriately
equipped and manned (implied to include “trained”) in order to operate in a high threat environment. The introduction of the AHSVS in 2008 was an excellent transportation means in which the CSS soldier was provided a higher level of protection against an IED or small arms attack while maintaining the carrying capacity to move sustainment across the battlefield. In addition, the RG-31 (a South African, V shaped haul vehicle with a remote weapons system) provided the FP platoon both the blast protection and fire power to counter most threats that existed in Afghanistan at the time. The RG-31 was also used as the command and control platform for the convoy commander, in most cases, the officer or Snr NCO from the FP Pl.

Unfortunately these vehicles are not part of a Svc Bn’s Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) and the majority of soldiers who deployed to Afghanistan only received a quick introduction to the vehicles prior to deployment. In other words, the two Pl’s were not afforded the opportunity to train as they were about to fight in an extremely dangerous and complex environment. That said, when purchased, all the vehicles were immediately positioned in Afghanistan to allow the soldiers a much needed protection and firepower platform upgrades and, in this particular circumstance where there was a scarcity of resources, the equipment was positioned where it was most needed. These challenges are not new to the Cdn Army; that said, with some relatively limited resource investment, the challenges can be easily overcome and would allow our soldiers to train and operate in Canada in a similar fashion as to how they will operate in an expeditionary context.

It is recommended that the Cdn Army invest in a type of CSS vehicle that provides both protection and firepower. These vehicles should be placed in the Svc Bn’s TO&E and the CSS

soldiers can train in a FP type role during their CLP training. This is imperative because there
are no Cbt Arms (regular force or reservists) in a Svc Bn who can perform this function. It is
also a false hope to think that in all future missions that Cbt Arms soldiers will be made available
to conduct convoy escort or security type tasks. There are too few Cbt arms soldiers and their
ability to be available to participate in sustainment operations is very limited. It is time that the
Log Br and Army CSS community assume the responsibility for this task. In addition, the Army
must provide the Svc Bns with a vehicle type that will enable this critical task to be performed
without outside assistance. The US Army has employed CSS soldiers to conduct FP tasks for
CLPs throughout the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is simply a question of resource allocation
and training. The Cdn Army CSS community has the ability to assume these tasks.

In a budget constrained environment, one that the CAF is currently experiencing at the
time of this writing, it is doubtful that resources and funding will be made available for
purchasing new vehicles for a Svc Bn, or any other Army unit, for that matter. Resource
limitations are a constraint that militaries have had to deal with for centuries and an issue that the
CAF has become quite accustomed to over the past few decades, excepting the mission in
Afghanistan where funding was, virtually, never an issue. Funding for Cbt vehicles to provide a
FP role for convoys in a Svc Bn is not an onerous task for the Army and the CAF to undertake.
In fact, the Army could re-allocate some Light Armoured Vehicles- III (LAV-III) to the Svc Bn
to train with and address the problem.

Training is a key issue for all soldiers in an Army. In a budget constrained environment,
resources for training become less and less available. For the CSS soldier, resources often
become non-existent due to the fact that the limited resources must be provided to cbt forces that
are required to maintain a minimum level of capability and deployability. This notion, coupled
with the fact that a Svc Bn is often the last unit in a Bde to receive funding for training, makes it a necessity that Svc Bns get very creative in how they do training and expend resources. It is with this mindset that all future CSS leaders must approach the training issue.

Skills training for a Supply Tech or Vehicle Tech are often performed at the trades Centers of Excellence or schools. These courses are nationally funded and are programmed well in advance. Thus, one can make the assumption that the majority of CSS soldiers in a Svc Bn have had a level of training that enables them to perform their trade skills. The ability to fund, resource and train the warfighter skills are the issue when it comes to operating effectively in an asymmetric environment. Similar to other units in a Bde, the Svc Bn has the expertise and qualifications to run training exercises, such as marching and shooting, and the ability to conduct ranges for personal weapons qualifications. Senior Non-commissioned officers (NCOs) with the necessary qualifications to provide members the training to march and shoot collectively, is the issue. A further complication is having the experience to train soldiers in the art of having vehicles engaging targets on the move. These qualifications exist in the Snr NCOs in the combat arms units but are extremely rare among CSS Snr NCOs. It is recommended that a change to the Svc Bn TO&E take place in order to have Cbt Arms Snr NCOs posted into the Svc Bn training organization. This would allow these Snr NCOs to develop rigorous and challenging training that would greatly benefit a CSS soldier in terms of combat skills.

The intent is not to turn CSS soldiers into Cbt Arms soldiers. The intent is to allow CSS soldier’s access to the cbt experts within the Cdn Army. By placing Cbt Arms Snr NCOs within a Svc Bn, CSS soldiers would have daily access, mentorship and training from a cbt skills development and training perspective. In addition, the Cbt Arms Snr NCO would learn how the Svc Bn operates and gain an appreciation for what the CSS soldier must do in order to provide
them support on the battlefield. One could argue that this takes place in the Admin Coys in a Cbt Arms unit. While that is marginally true, it is not enough to target the majority of CSS soldiers within a Bde, as those soldiers are found in a Svc Bn. In addition, CSS soldiers could be removed from Cbt Arms units if the situation calls for it. (This is what was done in Kabul in 2003-2005, and was labeled the ‘Kabul model’.)

In contrast, one could argue that cbt arms soldiers will always be made available to participate and provide force protection to the critically vital movement of supplies across the battlefield. This support could be provided by regular force infantry and/or armoured soldiers or the FG of reserve force cbt arms soldiers to deploy and operate within an NSE construct throughout an operation. Both options are viable and have been used in the past to address the issue of FP for logistics convoys. That said, it is recommended that all Army leaders ensure that CSS units become more lethal, survivable and responsive in supporting combat forces and the assumption that these units can rely on FP provided by cbt arms elements is a false expectation that could result in disaster. The 507th Maint Coy in Iraq is a prime example of what can happen if and when basic soldier skills are neglected and develop a reliance on cbt soldiers to provide protection while the principle emphasis is conducting sustainment operations.¹⁸

Military Culture also plays a role with regards to how the CSS community must adequately prepare itself in the asymmetric environment. Noted University of Ottawa Professor Donna Wilson describes culture as representing the behavior patterns or style of an organization that members are automatically encouraged to follow.¹⁹ The American military historian

Williamson Murray postulates that military culture may be the most important factor, not only in military effectiveness, but also in military innovation, which is the essential element in preparing for the next war. If the asymmetric threat is changing the means and ways that CSS soldiers support and conduct operations, it is critical that the CSS and Log Br culture must adapt to support these changes. Not only are equipment and training changes required, the CSS soldier is much closer to the brutality of close interpersonal violence, or as noted by writer and former U.S Army Ranger Dave Grosman describes as the ‘wind of hate’. The CSS soldier nowadays must be capable of not only conducting their primary tasks of support to cbt forces, they must also be prepared and trained to overcome the psychological hardships of killing the enemy in combat.

In order to get to where we need to be, a culture change is required in the Army CSS community and the Log Br.

It remains clear that in order to fight and operate in an asymmetric environment, the CSS soldier needs access to fighting vehicles in addition to requiring tough and realistic training. It is imperative and timely for the Cdn Army to procure a fighting vehicle for the CSS soldier. This would enable them to train, create doctrine and prepare themselves for convoy operations in an asymmetric environment. The time of relying on Cbt Arms units to perform convoy escort tasks is over. Their skills are too precious and need to be focused on performing cbt operations. It is up to the CSS soldiers to fight and operate on their own in the asymmetric environment.

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22 Mann, Every Soldier a Rifleman……., 45-48.
In conclusion, conducting and sustaining combat operations in an asymmetric environment is a relatively new experience to the Cdn Army. After more than a decade of operations in Afghanistan it is clear that the Cdn Army must not lose the critical skill sets and lessons learned from that conflict. For the first time in modern history the CSS soldier faced the same threats and dangers that their cbt arms brethren faced. The fact that asymmetric warfare is more than likely the predominant warfare the CAF will face again in the future, it is critical that the Cdn Army prepares and equips their CSS soldiers with the right training and vehicles so that they can effectively sustain the cbt forces in this environment.

The introduction of a cbt fighting vehicle into the Cdn Army Svc Bns is long overdue. A vehicle that provides protection and fire power is exactly what a Svc Bn requires in order to conduct the type of tasks that it is now responsible to perform. In addition, the CSS community cannot rely on cbt arms soldiers to provide FP to their convoys in the future. This is both a dangerous and false hope, considering the current threats as well as the notion of maneuver warfare and the likelihood of a dispersed battlefield in the future. Now is the time for the CSS community to take ownership of this issue and begin to identify and train CSS soldiers who can perform these types of tasks.

The CSS community is also lacking a champion to conduct training within a cbt context and in a Svc Bn TO&E. It is recommended that Cbt Arms Snr NCOs be positioned within a Svc Bn’s Training Organization with the specific task of providing the appropriate cbt arms training to CSS soldiers to meet this training shortfall. This would allow for the development and conduct of cbt training for CSS soldiers. More specifically it would provide the Svc Bn the ability and opportunity for CLP training from within its own internal resources.
Finally, in order to implement all these recommendations, a culture change is required within the CSS community, as well as the Log Br, writ large. The culture change needs to be championed by the CSS senior leadership and it must focus on the idea that everyone is a soldier first. This idea has only been paid lip service in the past but it is now no longer a luxury in the CoE. The tragedy of the 507th Maintenance Company should serve as an eye opener for all CSS officers and soldiers within the CAF. It is hoped that this lesson is not forgotten.
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