SOCIAL POLICY AND THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES:
GENDER INTEGRATION ANALYZED

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Exercise Solo Flight

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SOCIAL POLICY AND THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES – GENDER

INTEGRATION ANALYZED

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SOCIETAL POLICY AND THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES – GENDER INTEGRATION ANALYZED

Society as a whole benefits immeasurably from a climate in which all persons, regardless of race or gender, may have the opportunity to earn respect, responsibility, advancement and remuneration based on ability.

- Sandra Day O'Connor

INTRODUCTION

A military is responsible for the ‘leviathan’ duty of protecting its state from threats, but at the same time, as one of the pre-eminent institutions in a society, it should reflect societal values.1 This duty inevitably generates frictions, specifically within the realm of civil-military control or the perceived threat of over social-engineering the military institution, which has been argued to cause a deleterious effect to the ability to conduct combat operations, or wield coercive power, in the defence of the state. While the ability to implement coercive power is the military’s primary mission, civil authorities in a liberal democracy have the legitimate ability to use the institution “…as a vehicle for advancing any number of societal goals.”2 It is through this relationship that the military remains socially relevant and subsequently legitimate to the state, as well as

2 Ibid., 154.
remaining supportive and responsive to civil authorities ability to address questions of social injustice.

Post-Second World War, sociologists observed a change in western militaries due to technological advances which created new patterns of combat, which has consequently modified organizational behaviour in the military, thereby narrowing the differences between military and non-military establishments. Charles Moskos referred to a ‘continuum ranging from a military organization highly differentiated from civilian society to a military system highly convergent with civilian structures.’

This ‘Institutional/Occupational Model’ assumes a continuum ranging from a military organization highly divergent from civilian society to one convergent with civilian structures. Thus, over time and through increased technology there will be more convergence between the military and society. The ‘civilianization’ of the military “…is seen as creating tension and paradox as traditional institutional values (often associated with combat roles) come into conflict with new individualist and occupational values (often associated with management positions).”

Moskos argued that the military has both occupational and institutional tendencies, therefore a plural military is both convergent and divergent with civilian society and it simultaneously displays organizational trends that are civilianized and traditional. The plural model indicates that

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5 Winslow, *Women in the Canadian Forces*, 643.
the emergent military will be internally segmented into areas, which will be either more convergent or more divergent than the present organization of the armed forces.⁸

These trends in civil-military relations and points of tension between society and the institution of the military have increased the importance of the demographic parallel between the military and the society it protects. Gender integration in Western militaries has been at the forefront of this demographic change in values and construct, and therefore, regulative actions by the state have followed suit. International change in military personnel policies has been attributed to the revolution of military affairs, demands in the parent society for the extension of gender equality, a wider participation of women in the national labour force, shortages of male recruits, and legal restrictions on the exclusion of women.”⁹ Despite these trends, the absolute number of military women in the West quantitatively remains under-represented (under 15%) in armed forces in comparison with their relative numbers in society.

There is a clear demographic deficit when comparing the data between of the Canadian population and its trend versus that of the CAF.¹⁰ As Winslow and Dunn point out, the CAF does not follow integration theory or reflect the society that it protects.¹¹ Multiculturalism studies in Canada evolved through three major visions and culminated by the 1980s, where demographic diversity called for debates on equal rights for all, without discrimination and prejudice. Multiple identities, often clash, but slowly more

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⁸ Winslow, Women in the Canadian Forces, 644.
¹¹ Winslow, Women in the Canadian Forces, 644.
diverse visions and structures emerge.\textsuperscript{12} In this complex process of juggling a variety of cultures, belief systems and goals, Canadians have been seeking to form a nation of multiculturalism to live in relative harmony.\textsuperscript{13}

Ideological identifications of the military as being masculine allow men to be the standard by which women are often evaluated which helps to perpetuate the stereotype that women do not belong in this institution, especially in combat positions.\textsuperscript{14} For instance, some in academia argue that because combat service is not a civil right, it need not apply to women; that combat is the natural province of men, not women; and that the presence of women in mixed-gender combat units necessarily undermines unit bonding, cohesion, and performance.\textsuperscript{15} Febbraro and McCann conclude that arguments against the inclusion of women in combat roles ignore a solid body of scientific evidence, as well as the historical record, thus demonstrating women’s combat effectiveness in numerous operational contexts.\textsuperscript{16}

The argument against a diverse military rests on anachronistic data that identifies an assimilated one as essential for military efficiency or operational effectiveness; therefore, the military requires to ensure a warrior ethos through the process of assimilation. There is a perception of a ‘zero-sum’ conflict between functional and societal imperatives.\textsuperscript{17} If a more ‘integrative approach’ is adopted, once the mechanisms and policies are in place leaders assume that it will occur more or less systematically

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{13} Driedger, \textit{Multiculturalism: Sorting Identities, Rights, and Conflicts}, 234.
\textsuperscript{14} Winslow, \textit{Women in the Canadian Forces}, 651.
\textsuperscript{16}Febbraro, \textit{Demystifying the ‘Feminine Mythtique}, 1.
\end{footnotesize}
throughout the organization. However, if this ‘differentiational approach’ is adopted, interim conflict or ambiguity concerning the change is assumed, and problem groups need to be identified and eliminated. The institutions roles are less central and less effective than that portrayed in the integration and differentiation perspectives, since their influence depends on others’ interpretations and the effect of those interpretations on behaviour.\textsuperscript{18} Organizational members are not seen as passive recipients of culture change; they are imaginative consumers of leaders’ visions.\textsuperscript{19}

Finally, by positioning the military as de-gendered and disregarding sexual dimorphism, the Canadian Forces are failing to reap the benefits of diversity.\textsuperscript{20} The Employment Equity (EE) programs make the goal of attaining a balanced workforce salient, they are unlikely to be effective at addressing the underlying problems that sub-groups face unless they are comprehensive and viewed as more than just a legislated mandate.\textsuperscript{21}

**GENDER INTEGRATION: BACKGROUND**

Military organizations are considered to be conservative organizations that are resistant to social change. Like many other male-dominated institutions in society, the military has been slow in fully integrating women as most military organizations banned

\textsuperscript{18} Winslow, *Military Sociology: Canadian Society And Its Army*, 21.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 21.
women from combat positions. Women were characterized as having a different moral voice, and the battlefield itself has been considered an exclusively male domain.\textsuperscript{22} In 2006, the CAF comprised 64,000 full-time regular force members and 24,000 reservists. Military members were on average much younger than other workers in the Canadian labour force. The number of women among both officers and non-commissioned members has grown since the early 1970s and their roles in the CAF have expanded. Yet women accounted for only 15% of the CAF (12% of regular forces) in 2002 and their numbers remain relatively static which is reflected in the CAF’s latest EE report. Visible minorities were also significantly under-represented.\textsuperscript{23}

Overall, the Canadian military is predominantly male, but female numbers have trended slowly upwards from 2% in 1972, 10% in 1988, and 15% in 2006.\textsuperscript{24} Women’s roles in the CAF traditionally are quite different from those of men. More than 30% of women belonged to the air force compared with 24% of men, while a smaller proportion was in the army (48\% vs. 57\%). Female distribution has been considerably different from men as reflected in the 2002 data, where about one-half of women worked in administration, logistics, security, intelligence, or emergency services compared with 19\% of men. This data indicates that women continue to be concentrated in the more traditional support areas, including medical and dental, with some increases in less traditional occupations, particularly naval operations, maritime engineering and the combat arms.\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{22} Winslow, \textit{Women in the Canadian Forces}, 641.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., 21.
\textsuperscript{25} Park, \textit{A profile of the Canadian Forces}, 21.
It is important to review the regulations that have supported this demographic trend. The Royal Commission on the Status of Women in 1970 targeted six requirements for the CAF: all trades in the CAF be open to women; the prohibition on the enlistment of married women in the CAF be eliminated; the length of the initial engagement be the same for women and men; release from the CAF because of pregnancy be prohibited; the CAF Superannuation Act be amended so that its provisions would be the same for men and women; and finally, women be admitted to the military college operated by the Department of National Defence.

In 1978, the Canadian Human Rights Act (CHRA) was passed, bringing more external pressure on the CAF. The Act prohibited discrimination on the following grounds: race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex (including pregnancy and childbirth), marital status, family status, a pardoned conviction and physical or mental disability (including disfigurement and dependence on drugs or alcohol. The CHRA forced the complete reassessment of military policy as it stipulated that there should be no discrimination against women, except under bona fide occupational requirement.²⁶

Further regulation occurred under Section 15 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1985)²⁷ which mandated that any policies based on discrimination would not be tolerated. The CAF had to expand the role of women in the military, but, while it attempted to integrate women, it passed two administrative orders that countered each

²⁷ The Parliamentary Committee’s recommendation that all restrictions on women’s employment be dropped was based on its belief that excluding women from so many job opportunities, most of them related to combat in an indirect way, had adverse consequences: it closed to women many well paid jobs after military service, because military training was not available to them; it hindered their promotion in the Forces because they lacked experience in occupations and units that were combat linked; and it excluded them from experience and training in leadership. (Human Rights Tribunal Decision, 1989: 29)
other, and undermined government’s overall intent. The first, Administrative Order 49-14 outlined a general employment policy for the CAF. This opened up all units or occupations to female members of the CAF. At the same time, Administrative Order 49-15 addressed mixed-gender employment and reiterated a justification for the exclusion of women in some occupations and units. The military argued its resistance to gender integration on the basis that it affected cohesion and morale.\textsuperscript{28} In 1989, the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal ruled that all trials of women in non-traditional roles were to cease and that women were to be fully integrated into all Canadian Forces roles, except service on submarines. It also ruled that the minimum-male requirement be eliminated; that gender-free selection standards be developed; that the integration of women take place with all due speed in order to achieve complete integration in both the reserve and regular forces within 10 years; and that this process be subject to external and internal monitoring.

In April 1995, the Minister’s Advisory Board on Gender Integration in the CAF issued its fifth annual report called \textit{Half-Way Through the Transition: A Mid-Term Review of the Progress of Gender Integration in the Canadian Forces 1989–1994}. The Board made the following observation that while systemic barriers to the employment of women were gradually being eliminated in the CAF, attitudinal barriers were still present among some of the supervisors and leaders.\textsuperscript{29}

It is important to put the regulated aspects to the history of gender integration of the CAF into perspective, which allows the context of the analysis. The first is a legal standard where women and men are incorporated as equals into the military. That is,

\textsuperscript{28} Winslow, \textit{Women in the Canadian Forces}, 657.
\textsuperscript{29} Winslow & Dunn, \textit{Women in the Canadian Forces}, 661.
according to Canadian law women and men have equal access to all occupations within the CAF and there is no discrimination based on gender. The second is of a social nature. Therefore, for the purposes of analysis, integration is defined as the full acceptance of women as equals.\(^{30}\) This definition extends to the multiculturalism policy, in that the same tenets need to be satisfied in order to facilitate a properly mandated regulation and weave it with the normative values.

**GENDER INTEGRATION: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK**

Wicked problems are an important concept in public policy. They are pressing and highly complex issues for policy formulation that involve many causal factors and high levels of disagreement about the nature of a problem and the best way to handle it. The term "wicked" is not something evil, but more of a problem that is highly resistant to resolution. Wicked problems involve fundamental differences between stakeholders, who typically have deeply held convictions about the correctness of their own position. Effective solutions invariably require stakeholders to change their mindsets and behaviour.\(^{31}\) The attributes of the wicked problem are laced through the history and regulated policies that the CAF has adopted to implement gender integration. Lessons from analyzing the problem in this fashion will support better social policy implementation in its future. Present indicators conclude that gender integration remains

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\(^{30}\) *Ibid.*, 642.

unresolved, and the expansion into the diversity realm to enable operational effectiveness has appeared as the next major social change.

Julie Coulthard and Leesa Tanner present a conceptual model that was created in order to provide a framework for EE and diversity within the CAF, which is annexed at the end of this paper. The primary components of this model are: 1) external factors, such as legislation and designated group member (DGM) culture; 2) perceptions of the CAF; and 3) internal factors, such as CAF policies and programs and culture. She intends that the framework is a guide utilized to categorize the key features of the discussion and to assist in the subsequent identification of the research and knowledge that is currently available in each element.32 Despite the model being designed to analyze the gaps in CAF gender integration, it presents itself as a helpful model to support a comprehensive approach to policy development and implementation to deal with the wicked problem of gender integration.

The gaps identified by Coulthard and Tanner on gender integration demonstrate the weakness in the counter argument to integration (assimilation), as well as oversights in CAF EE policy. She identifies two key areas, first the impact of diversity on operational deployment/effectiveness requires greater research and analysis, and the evaluation of pre-deployment cultural/diversity training.33 These gaps in research, as well as the tenets of the model, support the analysis of CAF EE policy, specific to gender integration, and demonstrate key areas in CAF policy that require improvement to support a diverse military that is reflective of the society that it protects.


33 Coulthard, A Gap Analysis of Employment Equity and Diversity, 44.
GENDER INTEGRATION: EXTERNAL REGULATIVE PRESSURES

The international community has increased its focus on gender integration that has had a cascading effect on liberal democracies and western militaries. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) recognizes the urgent need to mainstream a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations as it will contribute to the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security. This resolution also calls for increased involvement of women at all levels, from early conflict prevention to post-conflict reconstruction. This has had a regulative influence on alliances and their participatory militaries. In Canada’s case, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has spearheaded a comprehensive approach aimed at harnessing the tenets of the UNSCR through committees and policy. Its recent policy on gender integration demonstrates a strong awareness of what is required to move forward and enable its forces by supporting diversity within its ranks.

Specifically, there are five key areas, or ‘best practices,’ the policy targets. First, is integration into recruitment, second is the integration of the gender perspective into employment, third is on the integration of the gender perspective into operational planning and operations, fourth is the integration of the gender perspective into quality of life, and finally, the integration of the gender perspective into education and

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35 Ibid., 8.
36 Ibid., 14
37 Ibid., 20.
38 Ibid., 27.
training.39 An analysis of this policy, utilizing Coulthard’s model, it is demonstrated that all the tenets are satisfied for a comprehensive gender balanced or equity policy. Further, there are implicit pressures that target traditional normative perceptions that are noted through its best practices, which will affect its western military partners to regulate new gender integration policies if they desire to meet these ‘best practices.’ While there is little coercive power that can be exercised by the alliance on its members, it is clear that if the practices are not harnessed, then the Alliance will lose credibility and consequently affect its operations in the future.

While Canada is committed to NATO, this resolution has had less impact than expected. The main pressures for Canada to diversify its Armed Forces were generated externally, as in the case of the charter of rights and freedoms. This lengthy history of external regulation has had challenges in taking root and affecting the normative elements of the CAF as an institution. However, recent external pressures to the institution (augmented by the reality of its recruitment and retention deficits) have led the CAF to the following conclusion:

Unless the CF creates a diverse and inclusive environment that is seen as attractive to women, members of visible minorities and Aboriginal peoples, it will become increasingly difficult not only to recruit well qualified Canadians but also to retain them as part of its all-volunteer force. This, in the long term, may jeopardize its operational capability.40

There are many concerns at accurately generating a policy to resolve the gender integration issue. The CAF continues to invest in a HR mechanism and remains challenged by accurately accumulating data, especially in the EE realm. A primary

39 Ibid., 32.
concern is that the Military Factor potentially limits the Labour Market Availability (LMA) of Canadians to join the CAF. As the Military Factor may impact disproportionately on designated group members (i.e. women, visible minorities and Aboriginal Peoples), it could adversely affect the attainment of the CAF’s employment equity goals.41

Because of the regulative pressures, and the limited data available based on present reporting schema, an update to the 2006 CAF EE Plan was promulgated in November 2010. Changes incorporated into the revision included: CAF EE representation data was updated; short term CAF EE recruiting goals were increased (Women 25.1%, Visible Minorities 11.8%, and Aboriginal peoples 3.4%); a new EE and Diversity Communications Plan that positioned EE as an operational imperative was added to the Plan; updates were made to the EE Action Plan (notably to items related to EE and diversity training for CAF members).42 CAF EE goals are calculated by the Directorate of Human Rights and Diversity (DHRD) utilizing a Workforce Analysis (WFA) Methodology that was developed in 2004 and approved by Human Resources and Skills Development Canada and Treasury Board. The Canadian Human Rights Commission, as the CAF’s EE auditor, reviews and endorses the EE goals.43 One factor that should be remembered when analyzing the current CAF EE and diversity statistics is that statistical information regarding gender and first official language are tracked in the Human Resources Management System and the voluntary completion of the Self-Identification Census, which was initiated in 2001 which generates a significant error

41 Ibid., 3.
42 Korabik, Leadership And Diversity In The Canadian Forces: A Conceptual Model And Research Agenda, 9. CF administrative structure outlined as a response to the EE in this section.
Holistically, though, how has the CAF harnessed these external regulative pressures?

**GENDER INTEGRATION: CAF HR STRATEGY, POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION:**

CAF military personnel policy and implementation was outlined in *Canadian Forces Joint Publication (CFJP) CFJP 1.0 Military Personnel Management Doctrine* and it centres its doctrine on supporting operational effectiveness and its management of personnel to facilitate operational priorities. It claims to be responsive to legislated diversity; however, its policies are aimed primarily at supporting operational functions. This is an inherent dichotomy, in that, it fails to integrate with Coulthard’s model for gender integration. Specifically, it weakly addresses the wicked problem in the definition phase, and subsequently it does not address a comprehensive implementation plan to harness diversity for operational effect through the remaining documentation.

The doctrine stipulates that the problem definition, the identification of what if anything must be addressed, is the most difficult part of policy development. Available

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44 Ibid., 28.
45 Government of Canada. B-GL-005-100/FP-001 Canadian Forces Joint Publication (CFJP) CFJP 1.0 Military Personnel Management Doctrine Director General Military Personnel, June 2008, 7-1. Military personnel policy must be integrated, synchronized and coordinated across the CF as a whole and adapted as necessary to support the components and sub-components of the Total Force. CMP is responsible for military personnel policy, for setting priorities for policy development, for approving policy documents and instruments within the delegated authority, such as Defence Administrative Orders and Directives (DAOds) and CF Military Personnel Instructions (CF Mil Pers Instrs), and for approving the subject matter of instruments requiring higher authority approvals, such as regulations and other instruments requiring CDS, ministerial, Treasury Board (TB) or Governor-in-Council (GIC) approvals. Because policy development is a longer-term activity requiring coordination across the CF and integration within the CF Military Personnel Management System, DGMP is responsible for ensuring that policy priorities are established and that appropriate consultation and quality assurance are embedded within the development and approval process. Policy development follows the military personnel capability development process. As such, DGMP must be consulted early in the problem identification and policy development process.
information may range from the relatively clear and complete, as in the case of explicit
Government direction, defence plans, or changes in the law, to the quite vague and
incomplete, as in addressing indicators of low morale, declining retention rates or family-
related issues.46 But, according to the CAF Employment Systems Review (ESR) this
remains a major gap in research and application.47 Areas that received particular attention
by the ESR for review were: CAF recruiting systems, defence advisory groups, and
unreported discrimination and harassment of designated group members.

The doctrine sequences policy objectives, which are the outcomes that are
intended to result from policy implementation.48 Once a clear understanding of the
existing problem situation has been achieved, the next steps include identifying the
desired effect to be achieved, the principles for achieving the effect and whether the
effect is achievable through a policy or another remedy. Recruiting equity targets are an
example of this weakness in the definition phase that flows into the policy objective. The
targets established are not based on research or appropriate integration policies (as
demonstrated in Coulthard’s model) and serve as a reminder that the policy objectives are
flavoured by the need for assimilation versus harnessing diversity.

Policy Implementation is the final process of ensuring that appropriate policy
documents are published, policy is communicated to those affected, consequential
programmes and activities are resourced, and all necessary actions are taken to ensure
that the policy is given force and effect. Ensuring force and effect can include, policy
interpretation and administration, the tracking and monitoring of performance indicators
and/or ongoing or periodic validation. In accordance with the EE plan, CAF’s intent to

46 Ibid., 7-2.
48 Department of National Defence, Canadian Forces Joint Publication (CFJP) CFJP 1.0, 7-2.
address the implementation are: strategic outreach, the Directorate of Human Rights and Diversity (DHRD) and the Directorate of Diversity and Well-Being (DDWB) jointly delivered diversity workshops, employee consultation, research to provide a fuller understanding of the career selection process of visible minorities; and to attain increased insight into potential perceived barriers that may negatively impact interest from visible minority youth in becoming CAF members.49

Overall, it sets its implementation to strive to excel as a leading employer regarding its practices in the promotion of ‘Employment Equity and Diversity’. However, it does not address key requirements to support integration. For instance, continued themes that exist in retention surveys and OAG reports discuss that there is a need for holistic improvements in programs for effective integration implementation. These themes relate to re-designing equipment and infrastructure, facilitating physiological differences in doctrine and benefits (pregnancy policy / service couple policy), and recruiting and retention. Research has also consistently shown that the best way to attract minority groups to an organization is to have people they can identify with who are already serving in that organization do the outreach.50 Further, to add context to the wicked problem, CAF gender-integration policy and implementation require systemic changes that cover retention, mentoring, flexible work arrangements and affordable childcare. Unfortunately, outside of HR management for recruiting, little integration is covered in cultural implementation documentations or administrative orders.51

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49 Department of National Defence, Canadian Forces Employment Equity Report 2011–2012, 8. FY 11/12 achievements and best practices that are considered particularly noteworthy are listed in this section.
50 Fraser, Diversity Recruiting: It’s Time To Tip The Balance Diversity, 29.
The CAF HR strategy seeks the active inclusion of all Canadians through respect for the dignity and rights of individuals. Desiring a military ethos that is relevant to both the military imperative and Canadian society is an aspiration and it states that leadership in the CAF accepts accountability for developing and fostering an open and positive culture that is responsive to relevant change within Canadian society.\textsuperscript{52} Further, it describes its intent to develop flexible terms of service and employ contemporary work practices to meet a broader range of organizational and personal needs and to attract and retain "skilled" workers based upon Canadian demographic trends. However, this policy relies on institutional leadership, rather than having a systemic approach. Further, it relies on tenets as outlined in its manual on profession of arms to transmit its vision,\textsuperscript{53} versus gender or diversity implementation models and communications strategies to influence the organizations norms and values.

GENDER INTEGRATION: EMPLOYMENT EQUITY

The Department of National Defence (DND) and Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) state that they are committed to increasing diversity by creating a workforce that is reflective of the Canadian labour market, and seek to retain their current, valued employees by fostering an inclusive work environment. As Canada's demographics change, a diverse workforce will allow the CAF and DND to effectively support the

implementation of the *Canada First Defence Strategy* (CFDS) and the *Strategic HR Plan* 2012-15.

A challenge that is yet to be overcome to facilitate the implementation of this intent resonates within the CAF’s professional development plan. Through the development phases, there are no coherent HR strategies or plans to support a diversified model of gender integration, thus it remains relatively gender neutral. As noted in the case of the Canadian Forces Command and Staff College, women have historically been less likely to satisfy the prerequisites for attendance to CFCSC because women who enrolled prior to 1989 were excluded from serving in operational occupations. In order to address the systemic barriers impeding the career development of female officers, a special measures program for selecting additional women to attend the course was implemented in 1997. The program intended to be implemented for three years, however, due to the lack of holistic approach and being susceptible to the negative facets of tokenism, it has had to continue.54 Female utilization rates for attendance to CFCSC have been below male utilization rates for the past three years (i.e., since 2003),55 and this trend can trace its roots to the previous CAF exclusion policies. On a more normative plane, recently the CAF Employment Systems Review (ESR) found that although the special selection measure is a justified employment equity initiative, the main issue the general lack of understanding as to why positive measures such as this one exist for the purposes of employment equity.56

54 Coulthard, *A Gap Analysis of Employment Equity and Diversity* 42.
56 Ibid., 173
GENDER INTEGRATION : NORMATIVE BARRIERS

There is a widely held view that women have a role in society quite different from that of men, which impacts the implementation of integrating females into the military.57 Through the integration process, research indicates that women must cope with symbols and behaviours which perpetuate and maintain male ideology in the CAF, and therefore as a women enters a male dominated institution, they are struggling not only with questions surrounding their capability to do male-oriented tasks or roles but also with issues surrounding their identity as women.58 The research identified that male identity of the organization is strongly evident through sexualized behaviours and norms, such as male attitudes of paternalism, sexist male talk, joking and innuendo, and sexual harassment, in the day-to-day environment of work.59 This normative behavior clearly affects the implementation of gender integration policy.

To date, efforts aimed at attracting and retaining women in the military have been based on the belief that men and women are equal. However, the use of equity in all situations can actually create inequalities. Within an organization, which has unique aspects such as uniforms, housing/shelter, team deployment, and combat, the differences between men and women cannot be expected to be gender-neutral. Basic gender differences in terms of psychology, strength, structure, hygiene, reproduction, etc. are a reality.60

57 Winslow, Women in the Canadian Forces, 650.
58 Winslow, Women in the Canadian Forces, 651.
59 Ibid., 651.
60 Perley-Ann Friedman, The Gender Neutral Approach of the Canadian Forces: Integrating Women into the Military, 73.
Research identified that leadership plays an important role in facilitating gender integration. Women reported of a number of positive leadership behaviours that could enhance gender integration, including: expressing positive attitudes regarding women in combat; setting the example; not singling women out; accepting alternative leadership styles; refraining from gender stereotyping or the use of sexist humour/sexist language; demonstrating basic leadership competence; setting gender-neutral performance standards; not defining gender integration issues as simply a woman’s problem; communicating with followers; acknowledging and dealing with gender differences; and understanding family issues.\(^{61}\) In particular, the importance was placed on not singling women out, of adopting gender-neutral standards (especially occupational standards), of allowing gender integration to occur more “naturally” as opposed to pushing or over-accommodating women, and of providing suitable equipment/kit for women. Research has also identified the adoption of informal mentoring programs and role models would support effective gender integration. Most of the importance was placed on proper implementation of any integration programs in order to not affect negative outcomes.\(^{62}\)

The future of conflict may make the sociological or psychological debates about gender integration moot. Future wars are increasingly less likely to be fought only by clearly defined national combat forces and more likely to be 'virtual' wars involving the deployment of Western technologies. This too is an age in which Western states will be engaged not just in virtual wars but in 'humanitarian intervention', peacekeeping, enforcement and postwar reconstruction. This allows, even encourages, a rethinking of

\(^{61}\) Davis, *Women And Leadership In The Canadian Forces: Perspectives and Experience*, 123.

\(^{62}\) Ibid., 128.
traditional notions and debates over the place of women within the military sphere. A more interesting and pertinent question is how to move the debate away from a discussion over whether women should be fully integrated into the armed services, and is to ask rather how and where they can best serve in the new wars that require new warriors.

Some academic recommendations for overcoming social barriers in masculine organizational cultures include individual, organizational or contextual strategies. At the individual level, women are encouraged to use communal gender-congruent leadership styles (build trust before influencing and increase the salience of their task related competencies) Organizationally, they include clear measurement of and criteria for leadership performance and promotion decisions. Legitimating women selected as leaders has demonstrated an increase in their effectiveness. In the contextual domain, focusing primarily on minimizing the negative effects of tokenism enhance leadership effectiveness and supports value-added integration. In the end, a balance between male and female characteristic is argued as the best for engaging in the operation challenges of the future. Further, through these tenets, a diversified force will emerge and support further social improvements for the institution.

In support of the gender integration strategy and to improve attitudes within the institution to harness diversity, two key documents and associated training require improvement. Duty with Honour and Conceptual Foundations are core manuals that discuss the CAFs ethos, values and leadership vision. While they are cogent leadership

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documents, it is clear when considering NATO best practices, gender research and
diversity surveys that it does not offset the weakness of the CAF’s gender integration
policy. As cornerstone documents that influence leaders at the first and second
development phases, this gender neutral approach is not adequately educating the
leadership of the CAF regarding social issues, nor being prescriptive on how best to
optimize diversity as a force enabler. This demonstrates the wicked nature of the problem
and the issues with policy implementation which does not prepare the CAF for further
enhancement regarding the social paradigm.

**DIVERSITY AND BEST PRACTICES:**

The capacity of any group is greatly enhanced when it enjoys a
diversity of contributions in terms of expertise and experience.
Furthermore, to remain credible in a democratic society, both DND and
CF must enjoy the support and the confidence of the Canadian public. A
major factor of that support involves how representative it is of the
population. Thus, its composition must reflect the gender and ethno-
cultural composition of Canadian society.  

On average, CAF personnel hold mildly to moderately positive attitudes towards
cultural diversity. In addition, multicultural attitudes improved between 1996 and 1999,
there has not been further improvement between 1999 and 2005. This points to the
continued need for education aimed at acceptance and appreciation of cultural and ethnic
diversity. Approximately 50% of the general CAF population either agreed or strongly
agreed that the CAF is devoting too much effort in recruiting visible minorities and

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66 Fraser, *Diversity Recruiting: It's Time To Tip The Balance Diversity*, 26. Statement by Rear-Admiral
Smith, then the Chief of Military Personnel (CMP), November 2011.
67 Irina Goldenberg, “Diversity and Employment Equity in the CF: Results of the 2005 Your-Say Focus
Aboriginal people, whereas 18% either disagreed or strongly disagreed. The findings in this area suggest that better information is needed regarding the reasons for the CAF’s goals and efforts in recruiting DGMs. One systematic difference was that senior Officers were most likely to recognize issues with EE in CAF employment systems, to appreciate the benefits of ethnic and cultural diversity, and to have more positive attitudes with respect to supporting EE as compared to NCMs and junior Officers.68

Unfortunately, the CAF’s gender integration policy has the unintended consequence of requiring minorities to fit in by assimilating to how the majority currently does things. Assimilation has not been a successful strategy for those in the outgroup as they often have physical characteristics that distinguish them from ingroup members and that prevent them from being fully accepted. Instead, the CAF should require its leaders to promote integration as an acculturation strategy, therefore, cultural integration like gender integration, means that those in both the majority and the minority groups must change, rather than those in the outgroup conforming to the norms of the unchanged majority.69 Best practices for integrating diversity into the military include: (1) ensure top level commitment to change, (2) measure and document, (3) ensure fairness, (4) obtain input and participation, (5) communicate with those at all levels, (6) devise and implement concrete action plans (strategies at the individual/group/and organizational level) and reinforce behavioural change through accountability.70

68 Irina Goldenberg, *Diversity and Employment Equity in the CF: Results of the 2005 Your-Say Focus Section for Visible Minorities and Aboriginal People*, iv.
CONCLUSION

The long-term societal trend is clear and the CAF must be in a position to take advantage of that trend if it is to meet its recruitment goals. Intergenerational attitudinal differences may resolve themselves in time, but in the interim, institutional leadership needs to improve the climate of tolerance, acceptance of diversity, and implement a revised holistic and focused approach to its implementation. The current gender-neutral approach of the Canadian military may be further alienating women. The intent is not to offer a prescriptive recommendation for the CAF as it moves forward, rather to identify that its present system is challenged in the normative and regulative domains, which has arrested its ability to fully implement gender integration and diversity policy as intended by Canada’s government and society. To add emphasis to the CAF’s need to review the principles of its gender integration policy, the demographic deficit is being addressed by key international stakeholders, namely the UN and NATO. Therefore, the CAF needs to ensure its operational credibility by harnessing diversity.

As a gendered organization with a long history and very strong culture, the Canadian Armed Forces cannot expect gender-neutral policies or continued external regulation to compensate for the wicked problem of gender and diversity integration. The CAF can only achieve successful integration of women by recognizing and addressing their male-gendered environment through an appropriate policy definition phase.

71 Perley-Ann Freidman, *The Gender Neutral Approach of the Canadian Forces: Integrating Women into the Military*, 74. 1) the history and structure of the military is inherently male and cannot be degendered; 2) the physiological and psychological differences between men and women cannot be effectively ignored or discounted; 3) the unique nature of military service (uniforms, shelter, deployment, combat) further emphasizes these differences; and 4) by positioning the military as de-gendered and disregarding sexual dimorphism, the Canadian Forces are underlining their poor policies for women and are failing to reap the benefits of diversity.
Appropriate recognition and definition will allow a more comprehensive policy to be
developed in concert with Coulthard’s model. This will focus on optimizing diversity,
rather than assimilation, to improve operational effectiveness. Recruitment and retention
will consequently benefit, therefore making the CAF more legitimate and representative
of the society it protects.


Davis, Karen D. ed.“Women And Leadership In The Canadian Forces: Perspectives and Experience.” Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Defence. Winnipeg: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2007.


Figure 1: Conceptual Model for Employment Equity and Diversity