BACK TO THE FUTURE: THE EVOLUTION OF NATO AFTER THE COLD WAR PERIOD AND THE RESURRECTION AS A COLLECTIVE DEFENCE ALLIANCE IN THE NEW MILLENIUM

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Exercise Solo Flight

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Introduction

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established on 4 April 1949 as a collective defence alliance to counter the threat of Soviet expansion in Eastern Europe and, in particular, the 10-month blockade of Berlin; NATO’s establishment was part of a global security belt to contain Soviet influence.¹ The concept of collective security was fundamental for NATO’s existence during the Cold War and NATO was considered a success when the threat of an invasion disappeared with the disbandment of the Warsaw Pact in 1991. The Cold War was NATO’s raison d’être and after the demise of the Soviet Union it seemed to be an organization in search of a mission. However, the Alliance has never been more involved in operations since the fall of the Iron Curtain.²

This paper will demonstrate that while crisis management has dominated NATO over the past two decades, collective defence has once again become its main task. This is exemplified in NATO’s response to both the Russian annexation of Crimea and the fighting in Eastern Ukraine since 2014. The essay will start by analyzing NATO’s search for legitimacy after the end of the Cold War. It will then show that, with its enlargement policy, the Alliance found a new raison d’être in out-of-area operations and the provision of security. While this reason for being remains

vital, an assertive Russian foreign policy coupled with events in Ukraine in 2014 mean that the Alliance is once again required to prioritize deterrence and defence as its main tasks, in order to protect Eastern Europe member countries. It will be shown that the declaration at the NATO summit in Wales in September 2014 laid the foundation for this renewed focus on collective defence. Conclusions will then be drawn as to what NATO’s current path means for Alliance members’ military capacities.

NATO’s Search for Legitimacy

Political Turbulence and Uncertainty in the Post-Cold War Area

With the end of the Cold War, the raison d'etre of NATO seemed to have passed. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, there were no serious demands among the member states to dissolve the Alliance. As former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher remarked at the time, “You don’t cancel your home insurance policy just because there have been fewer burglaries on your street in the last 12 months!”3 The need to counter uncertain challenges was reflected in NATO’s new strategic concept, adopted in November 1991 by NATO Heads of State and Government just shortly before the breakup of the Soviet Union. This concept was a non-confrontational document and pointedly noted that the need to “preserve the strategic balance in Europe” would remain one of NATO’s fundamental security tasks.4 Since then, NATO has been redefining itself according to its new missions and goals. Plans were developed to extend NATO’s activities to areas that had not formerly been part of its strategy. The Alliance shifted its focus to broader and more geographically diverse threats, especially in the field of peacekeeping and in the area

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of crisis management. Emerging threats requiring new approaches as well as recent changes in international system have caught NATO in a persistent process of reforming and adapting. Since the 1990s NATO has consistently evolved into an organization whose main functions are crisis management, collective security, and peace and stability operations.

The US Drives NATO Out-Of-Area

During the Cold War, there was a consensus among NATO members that the Alliance would not engage in out-of-area operations, since these were viewed as potential sources of intra-Alliance discord. In the early Cold War years, it was the United States that opposed such operations, fearing that it could be dragged into conflicts resulting from Europe’s withdrawal from its colonial possessions. Later, Europe opposed NATO’s out-of-area engagement for fear of becoming embroiled in disputes resulting from the globalization of the US-Soviet rivalry. With the end of the Cold War, however, a widespread belief emerged that confining NATO’s actions and interests to Alliance territory was no longer viable. The United States was instrumental in driving this process of change. US policy has itself undergone a transformation. From being ardently opposed to the idea of a broad geographical scope for the Alliance, the US has become the main advocate of a ‘global Alliance.’ It was the US, which placed “out-of-area” operations firmly on the NATO agenda after the end of the Cold War. As US Secretary of State Albright has said, NATO should be “the institution of choice when North America and Europe must act together

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5 For a detailed description see Margarita Assenova, “The Debate on NATO’s Evolution,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (March 2003).
militarily.”

An alliance of collective interests would not be a global NATO, but rather it would place NATO within a global instead of a regional context. In this era of globalization, placing geographical limits on NATO’s reach and purpose would marginalize the Alliance in the foreign and security policy of the United States and its major European allies, all of whom have interests that reach well beyond the geographical confines of the Euro-Atlantic region. As Secretary Albright explained in December 1997 to her NATO colleagues in Brussels, “The United States and Europe will certainly face challenges beyond Europe’s shores. Our nations share global interests that require us to work together to the same degree of solidarity that we have long maintained on this continent.”

In 1999, the year of NATO’s 50th anniversary, Allied leaders adopted a new Strategic Concept that committed members to common defence and peace and stability of the wider Euro-Atlantic area. It was based on a broad definition of security which recognized the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the defence dimension. It identified the new risks that had emerged since the end of the Cold War, which included terrorism, ethnic conflict, human rights abuses, political instability, economic fragility, and the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their means of delivery.

Out-of-Area Operations as the New Raison d’Être

The Starting Point: The Balkan Wars in the 1990s

From the early 1990s onwards there were prominent calls for NATO to become involved beyond its borders. It was in this context that US Republican

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Senator, Richard Lugar, coined his now infamous phrase in 1993, that NATO either “go out-of-area or out of business.” Early in the 1990s, the break-up of Yugoslavia presented a challenge to the stability of Central Europe. NATO forces played a pivotal role in the Bosnian War from 1992 to 1995; NATO launched its first ever combat operation in 1994. The NATO involvement in Bosnia was a key event, showing the relevance of the organization following the Cold War. The conflict in the Balkans during the 1990s offered NATO a serious mission to which it could respond and held the Alliance together around the common goals of preparing other out-of-areas operations, enlargement, and forming partnership networks. While they are out-of-area in the sense of not within NATO territory, the Balkans were still in the neighborhood.

The Culmination: The Stabilization Operation in Afghanistan

NATO’s most significant out-of-area operation to date was initiated in response to the terrorist attacks in the US on 9/11 when the Alliance formally invoked the mutual defence clause in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Shortly thereafter, the Bush administration in the US shifted its focus to the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, causing intra-alliance divisions over the legitimacy of military intervention. With NATO divided, discussions within the Alliance focused on whether Afghanistan could reconcile its differences. NATO subsequently announced that it would assume command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), established by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1386 (2001) and tasked to assist the

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11 Mark Thompson, “NATO’s Back in Business, Thanks to Russia’s Threat to Ukraine,” Time, 16 April 2014.
12 Jamie Shea, the Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges at NATO Headquarters, states, that “in hindsight, and somewhat ironically, the conflict in Yugoslavia was more important for NATO’s post-Cold War evolution than the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union.” See Jamie Shea, “NATO at Sixty – and Beyond” in NATO in Search of a Vision, ed. by Gülnur Aybet and Rebecca Moore (Georgetown University Press, 2010), p 18.
Afghans to maintain the security situation in the country, until the Afghans were able to do so independently. NATO formally assumed leadership of the ISAF mission in August 2003 and, shortly thereafter, began to expand its reach, originally limited to Kabul, to cover the whole of Afghanistan. As the establishment of ISAF was not covered by Article 5, some member countries did not contribute to common efforts in the way in which or to the degree with which the Bush administration would have liked. That has caused quite a severe discussion inside the Alliance on burden-sharing. Much of the Alliance’s national defence planning, primary threat perceptions and decisions on procurement of military equipment have been focused on Afghanistan.

NATO’s partnership policy, meaning its construction of a network of countries which cannot, or do not want to become members but support NATO’s activities, has also been determined, to a large extent, by requirements of burden-sharing in Afghanistan.

**Providing Security: The Alliance is Growing**

NATO’s Enlargement Policy

NATO’s enlargement is an ongoing and dynamic process which has been a top priority on the Alliance agenda, since the 1949 constitution. Through six rounds of enlargement, both during and after the Cold War, NATO membership expanded from an original line-up of twelve founding members to twenty-eight members. The enlargement process has been based on the Alliance’s “Open Door” policy, which derives from Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty. However, after the Cold War and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, NATO recalibrated its strategy and re-evaluated its goals for the future. NATO members opted for collaboration and partnership with their former Warsaw Pact adversaries in order to

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The Study set new standards for enlargement and established modalities for completion of this process. With the creation of new partnership programs such as the Membership Action Plan (MAP), aspirant members may prepare for eventual NATO membership by closely cooperating with the Parties, participating in missions and fulfilling obligations alongside NATO members and partner countries.

The Alliance is Going East

On March 12, 1999, following intensive talks based on the findings of the Study on NATO enlargement, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic joined NATO; this resulted in the fourth NATO enlargement, or the first official post-Cold War enlargement. After joining the MAP, a team of seven countries from the Vilnius Group (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia and Slovenia) were invited to start accession talks at the Prague Summit in 2002; these countries subsequently joined NATO on March 29, 2004, in what is known as the fifth round of NATO enlargement. In April 2008, Croatia and Albania were invited to start accession talks at the Bucharest Summit. Croatia and Albania formally became NATO members on April 1, 2009. This was the sixth enlargement of NATO and the final to date. Continuing enlargement lost its momentum by 2008, when Ukraine and Georgia were not offered MAP status, even though there were talks of an eventual membership. The Russian invasion of Georgia a few months later pushed any negotiations about its entry into NATO into a very distant future. The Russia-

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16 Ibid.
17 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO Enlargement,”…
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
Georgia war in 2008 had a strong impact on discussions within NATO about the Alliance’s future strategy towards Russia.

NATO-Russia Relations and the Outbreak of the Ukraine Crisis

Relations between NATO and Russia have always had a special place in NATO’s strategic decisions and in all post-Cold War transformations and adjustments to new global challenges. Although NATO’s interests are different from those of Russia, NATO has managed to adjust its policies and find common ground. NATO is aware that Russia has faced many problems on its path towards transition, and that it has a desire to return to its former status, that of a strong player in the international arena; NATO is cognisant that Russia, still a sizeable country, cannot be ignored nor isolated from global international order. Therefore, NATO has founded numerous institutional forms of cooperation with Russia. However, relations between NATO and Russia have always been characterized by mutual suspicion. Russian opposition to NATO enlargement in the former Soviet areas is a constant in Russian foreign policy strategy. Despite all differences, diplomatic relations between NATO and Russia were for the first time endangered in 2008, after the Georgia crisis. NATO–Russian relations improved somewhat after that conflict. However, following Russia’s invasion and illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula in March 2014, NATO was caught off-guard and the Alliance’s relationship with Russia plunged into deep crisis. At the time, NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen described Russia’s actions as causing “the most serious crisis in Europe since the fall of the Berlin Wall”

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21 Russia is a member of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), the Partnership for Peace (PIP) and Council 19+1. NATO and Russia have signed numerous agreements to fight global security challenges, based on which they participate in common activities. Until the Ukraine crisis (Crimea crisis), there was even a possibility of a joint construction of a missile shield in Europe, see North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO-Russia relations: The background,” Media Backgrounder (September 2014), last accessed 6 May 2015.
and declared that the alliance could “no longer do business as usual with Russia.”

NATO’s response, however, has been limited to strengthening cooperation with Ukraine, reaffirming its commitment to defend central and eastern European allies, and rebuking Russia. On 1 April 2014, the Alliance suspended all practical cooperation with Moscow. This was the second time it had done so since 2008, when Russia invaded Georgia. Such words and actions, however, scarcely hide the fact that the Alliance failed to deter Russia’s aggression; it was ill-prepared to counter Russia’s use of unconventional warfare and its information war.

**The NATO Summit in Wales 2014 and the Recurrence of Collective Defence**

The crisis in Ukraine/Crimea strengthened the perception of NATO members that Russia had returned to its role of assertive regional power and was seeking to secure its spheres of influence – the former Soviet space – by military force. This perception meant that the “true strategic partnership” between NATO and Russia required redefinition. Shortly after the Crimea crisis began in 2014, NATO Secretary General Rasmussen stated that NATO would focus on protecting its members, that a strong and united NATO is needed in a changed world. As he put it, “NATO’s core task is to protect and defend our Allies.” Deterring potential Russian military aggression in Europe would become one of the Alliance’s most pressing missions in coming years.

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25 The true strategic partnership was proclaimed by the NATO 2010 Strategic Concept, the Rome Declaration in 2002 and the Founding Act on Mutual Relations in 1997. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO-Russia relations: The background,” Media Backgrounder (September 2014).
27 Richard Weitz stresses that “the ongoing crisis in Ukraine has provided NATO with fresh impetus and new challenges”. See Richard Weitz, “NATO on Edge,” International Relations and
The NATO Summit in Wales in September 2014 should have announced the transformation from the so-called operations phase into the post-operations phase. The Summit intended to mark the end of combat operations in Afghanistan, the largest, longest and definitely the most complex and most expensive peace mission in NATO history. However, the Ukraine crisis had intervened and surprised the Alliance. In light of the Russian approach, the allies set aside much of the planned agenda for the Wales Summit and concentrated not so much on the situation in Crimea and the crisis in Ukraine but on Russia itself.

In reaction to the Ukraine crisis, NATO allies decided at the September 2014 Summit in Wales on the most fundamental military adaptation of the Alliance since the end of the Cold War. The objective was a large scale reinforcement and reorganization of defence capabilities. Although NATO had given itself three equal tasks in its 2010 Strategic Concept: collective defence, crisis management, cooperative security, in reality, crisis management dominated over recent years. In particular, the operation in Afghanistan informed strategic thinking and decisions regarding how NATO states equip and train their soldiers. With the Ukraine crisis, collective defence had once again become the primus inter pares of NATO tasks. The Alliance solidified this at the Wales Summit with a work programme. The Readiness Action Plan (RAP), agreed upon in Wales, is the most important steering instrument with which NATO plans to orient its military setup, once more, towards collective defence. In their first meeting, at the beginning of February 2015, NATO defence ministers agreed on initial proposals for RAP implementation. The Wales decisions should be implemented as far as possible by the 2016 NATO Summit in Poland.

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The RAP constitutes the starting point for a military reorganization of the Alliance; it requires far-reaching changes in planning and logistics as well as in equipment and exercises. The RAP went hand in hand with a political “Declaration on the Transatlantic Bond,” making it unequivocally clear that “should the security of any Ally be threatened, we will act together and decisively,” underlining NATO’s Article 5 doctrine of collective defence. The RAP’s purpose, reassuring NATO’s eastern Allies, was also relevant in a larger strategic context than simply collective defence against Russia. The Wales Summit Declaration says that the RAP is supposed to respond “to the challenges posed by Russia and their strategic implications” as well as “to the risks and threats emanating from our southern neighborhood, the Middle East and North Africa. The Plan strengthens NATO’s collective defence. It also strengthens our crisis management ability.” Pleas by Western European states to acknowledge challenges elsewhere on the European periphery were therefore not ignored.

With the exception of reassuring its Allies, the NATO Summit shows that there is little the Alliance can do about the Ukraine crisis. Ultimately, a political solution is required. The Summit illustrated NATO’s unity in its political and diplomatic support for Ukraine; it enhanced its pre-existing Distinctive Partnership with the country with additional support for the reform of Ukraine’s defence sector.

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29 The RAP consists of a reinforcement of the NATO Response Force’s (NRF) ability to deploy rapidly by the establishment of a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF). After the political decision in Wales, this VJTF or “spearhead” of the NRF is still in its planning phase, but it will consist of land, air, maritime and special-operations forces. The RAP entails 12 measures, among them increasing the frequency of exercises with emphasis on advance planning and responses to “hybrid wars”, including working more with other international organizations. This new Force will also need command and control centers probably located in Poland, the Baltic states and Romania, the prepositioning of equipment, including fuel and munitions, and the construction of infrastructure. See Claudia Major, “NATO’s Strategic Adaption,” *SWP Comments* 16 (March 2015): 2.


and improved interoperability between Ukrainian and NATO forces.\textsuperscript{32} The Baltic States and Poland had their minds set on permanent NATO bases on their territory as part of the RAP, but this was deemed, by Germany in particular, as a breach of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act.\textsuperscript{33} In this Act, which is mostly considered as having political rather than legal significance, NATO stated that it would not need to establish additional permanent bases for its collective defence or other missions.\textsuperscript{34} The use of the legalistic explanation for refraining from establishing any permanent new bases is most likely meant to disguise differences of opinion as to whether such an act would be too provocative towards Russia, or a measure too expensive to realize. The RAP in its totality, including all extra reassurance measures, constitutes a de facto permanent presence of NATO forces on the soil of the Baltic States and Poland. It also halted further decrease of US forces in Europe, which is of utmost importance. President Barack Obama’s European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) requires rotational presence on territory of eastern Allies. As such, US support for the RAP would probably entail an end to the US European Command’s force reductions and the increase of rotational forces from the United States.\textsuperscript{35}

**Conclusion**

New opportunities in the international arena caused by the crisis in Ukraine and the position that Russia now holds in international relations have shown that NATO is back to the business of defending of European member countries. Since the end of the Cold War and the demise of bipolar relations, followed by the creation of a

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[32] \textit{Ibid.}, paras 24-30.
\item[34] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO-Russia relations: The background,”…
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New World Order, the North Atlantic Alliance had gone through political and institutional changes. These changes not only landed NATO in the opposing camp to the Warsaw Pact; more importantly, NATO became a new foundation for ensuring international security. NATO has undergone several crises since the end of the Cold War: the collapse of the Soviet Union; the adaptation of NATO’s collective defence remit to a changed international system; now Russia is returning to the scene of international politics.

The Wales Summit struck the right tone on reaffirming NATO’s commitment to Article 5 and was suitably dismissive and firm on Russia. President Putin has brought NATO back to its core business, but what will it mean for the Alliance’s military capacities? Over the last two decades most Allies have restructured their armed forces to lighter, more deployable and leaner capacities; this is due to out-of-area operations. Tanks, artillery and other heavy weapons have been reduced across Europe. In some cases, capacities have been reduced to the minimum or even disbanded. The NATO Summit set ambitious targets on the input side. Member states currently underspending should make an effort to reach the defence spending norm of 2% GDP within a decade. As in the past, this target will most likely remain nothing more than a promise on paper. Nevertheless, the free fall of defence spending has come to an end. Hopefully, the Summit marks the turning point in reversing the trend to meet the future challenges.
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