

Canadian  
Forces  
College

Collège  
des  
Forces  
Canadiennes



## PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL ATTRIBUTES OF GENERAL OF THE ARMY DOUGLAS MACARTHUR

LCdr D.L. Crosman

**JCSP 40**

**Master of Defence Studies**

### **Disclaimer**

Opinions expressed remain those of the author and do not represent Department of National Defence or Canadian Forces policy. This paper may not be used without written permission.

© Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2016.

**PCEMI 40**

**Maîtrise en études de la  
défense**

### **Avertissement**

Les opinions exprimées n'engagent que leurs auteurs et ne reflètent aucunement des politiques du Ministère de la Défense nationale ou des Forces canadiennes. Ce papier ne peut être reproduit sans autorisation écrite.

© Sa Majesté la Reine du Chef du Canada, représentée par le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2016.

CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE – COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES  
JCSP 40 – PCEMI 40

MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES – MAÎTRISE EN ÉTUDES DE LA DÉFENSE

**PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL ATTRIBUTES OF GENERAL OF  
THE ARMY DOUGLAS MACARTHUR**

LCdr D.L. Crosman

*“This paper was written by a student attending the Canadian Forces College in fulfilment of one of the requirements of the Course of Studies. The paper is a scholastic document, and thus contains facts and opinions, which the author alone considered appropriate and correct for the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of any agency, including the Government of Canada and the Canadian Department of National Defence. This paper may not be released, quoted or copied, except with the express permission of the Canadian Department of National Defence.”*

Word Count: 14 905

*“La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale.”*

Compte de mots: 14 905

## ABSTRACT

Few Americans have elicited as widely diverging sentiments as MacArthur, the iconic U.S. military commander. Most who knew him well lavished praise upon him. President Herbert Hoover stated that “he was one of the world’s outstanding military commanders.”<sup>1</sup> President Dwight Eisenhower lauded him as “one of the outstanding military leaders of American history.”<sup>2</sup> Few contest that MacArthur was amongst America’s most brilliant and competent military commanders. MacArthur was, however, a complex individual, whose personal vulnerabilities revealed themselves in eccentricities and in a larger-than-life persona that garnered both adulation and derision.

In many ways, MacArthur was an excellent choice for the positions of Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in the Southwest Pacific Area during World War II and Commander UN Command in the Far East during the Korean War. MacArthur’s early life and early military career established the personal and professional attributes that enabled him to realise the remarkable achievements that marked his influence on the U.S. and the Asia-Pacific. MacArthur’s intellect, military competency, and sense of responsibility set the conditions upon which his performance during WWII in the Pacific and the Korean War were enabled. His interpersonal skills, however, were his Achilles’ heel, which ultimately led to his demise.

---

<sup>1</sup> Edgar Puryear, *19 Stars: A Study in Military Character and Leadership* (New York: Random House Publishing Group, 1971), 103.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid*, 103.

## INTRODUCTION

On 10 April 1951, at the height of the Korean War, U.S. President Harry Truman relieved General of the Army Douglas MacArthur of his duties as Commander United Nations Command in the Far East and ordered his repatriation. This action elicited front page stories across America declaring: “Gen. MacArthur Fired.”<sup>3</sup> Truman proclaimed that MacArthur’s relief was required to avert general war with China, while MacArthur’s perspective portrayed a very different reality. Pundits and historians have largely rallied against the flamboyant and egotistical MacArthur, with many incorrectly deriding his remarkable strategic perspective. Commenting upon MacArthur’s relief in the *New Republic*, Harold Ickes stated: “[whatever] America may possess in Army officers who ... follow the instincts of a rodent, we can at least pride ourselves upon the fact that in Harry Truman, we have a President.”<sup>4</sup> Regardless of ignominious assertions, MacArthur’s decisions and actions throughout the Korean War deserve careful scrutiny from the perspectives of the extant global and regional security environments, Truman’s handling of the War, and MacArthur’s singular achievements and knowledge of the Asia-Pacific.

Mostly known for his roles as Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in the Southwest Pacific Area during World War II (WWII) and Commander United Nations Command in the Far East during the Korean War, MacArthur already possessed a profound familiarity with the Asia-Pacific prior to the outbreak of WWII in the Pacific. In 1935, MacArthur left the position of Chief of Staff of the Army and proceeded to the American

---

<sup>3</sup> Frazier Hunt, *The Untold Story of Douglas MacArthur* (New York: Devin-Adair Company, 1954), 515.

<sup>4</sup> Harold L. Ickes, “Harry S. Truman is President,” *New Republic* 123, no. 11 (September 11, 1950): 17.

Commonwealth of the Philippines with the mission to build an army.<sup>5</sup> Having served seven previous tours in the Far East in various positions including Commander 23rd Infantry Brigade, District Commander Manila, and Commander Philippine Department, as well as Aide-de-Camp to the Military Attaché to Japan and Special Observer of the Russo-Japanese War, MacArthur was returning to familiar ground.<sup>6</sup> In 1936, he left active service in the U.S. Army to accept the appointment of Field Marshal of the Philippine Army, but he was recalled in 1941 as Commanding General of Far East Command in the Philippines.<sup>7</sup>

Few Americans have elicited as widely diverging sentiments as MacArthur. Most who knew him well lavished praise upon him. President Herbert Hoover stated that “he was one of the world’s outstanding military commanders.”<sup>8</sup> His fellow Commander in Chief in the Pacific, Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, was quoted as saying that MacArthur was “one of [America’s] greatest military leaders.”<sup>9</sup> Several members of MacArthur’s staff unabashedly declared that he was “the greatest man who ever lived.”<sup>10</sup> Conversely, MacArthur’s detractors were nearly as extreme in their criticisms.<sup>11</sup> David Horner, in his essay “General MacArthur’s War: The South and Southwest Pacific Campaigns 1942-45,” opined that MacArthur’s repute as an egoist was partially responsible for this animosity.<sup>12</sup> One of MacArthur’s officers provided the perspective that “he was too enormous.”<sup>13</sup> His

---

<sup>5</sup> Manchester, *American Caesar*, 176, 177.

<sup>6</sup> MacArthur, *On War*, 10, 11.

<sup>7</sup> Stephen Ambrose, “General of the Army Douglas C. MacArthur,” 422; MacArthur, *On War*, 11, 12.

<sup>8</sup> Puryear, *19 Stars*, 103.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid*, 103.

<sup>10</sup> Ambrose, 420.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid*, 420.

<sup>12</sup> David Horner, “General MacArthur’s War: The South and Southwest Pacific Campaigns 1942-45,” in *The Pacific War Companion: From Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima*, ed. Daniel Marston, 124 (Great Britain: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 2005), 124; Manchester, 9; Puryear, 392.

<sup>13</sup> Ambrose, 420.

long time staff officer and later President of the United States, General of the Army Dwight Eisenhower, knew him well and captured his brilliance and peculiarities with the seemingly contradictory statements that he was “one of the outstanding military leaders of American history,” and “I studied dramatics under him for five years in Washington and four in the Philippines.”<sup>14</sup> As Eisenhower implied, MacArthur was a complex individual, whose brilliance was widely recognised, but whose personal vulnerabilities revealed themselves in eccentricities and in a larger than life external persona that garnered both adulation and derision. Few, however, contest that MacArthur was amongst America’s most brilliant and competent military commanders.

In many ways MacArthur was an excellent choice for the positions of Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in the Southwest Pacific Area during WWII and Commander United Nations Command in the Far East during the Korean War. MacArthur’s early life and military career up to his appointment as Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in the Southwest Pacific Area were themselves impressive, and established the personal and professional attributes that enabled him to realise the achievements that marked his subsequent influence on the U.S. and Asia-Pacific.<sup>15</sup> MacArthur’s interpersonal skills, intellect, military competency, and sense of responsibility are all worthy of note, as they set the conditions upon which his performance during WWII in the Pacific and the Korean War were enabled. A review of MacArthur’s methodologies, achievements, and contributions to the Allied effort during

---

<sup>14</sup> Puryear, 103; Manchester, 166.

<sup>15</sup> While this analysis of MacArthur’s personal and professional attributes focuses upon his life prior to his appointment as Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in the Southwest Pacific Area, subsequent incidents and relationships are employed to demonstrate or reinforce conclusions.

WWII and during the Korean War through these attributes provides an instructive template for generalship in the Far East. While MacArthur's personal and professional attributes were impressive, his tumultuous relationships with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and with Truman underscored his generalship, and revealed his Achilles' heel, which ultimately led to his relief.

Over the past half century, the number of conflicts that have ensnared and exhausted western forces in the Asia-Pacific has relentlessly accumulated. From General Matthew Ridgway's deliberate symmetrical approach to operations during the Korean War, General Raoul Salan's conventional defensive operations during the 1<sup>st</sup> Indochina War, and General William Westmoreland's attrition-based search and destroy operations during the Vietnam War, western generals have largely failed to understand the nature of the conflicts in which they were engaged in the Far East and employed unsuitable methodologies that ultimately exhausted their armies and national popular support.<sup>16</sup>

Today with the growing precarious situation on the Korean peninsula, and the rapidly rising economic and military powerhouse of China, which has exhibited a selective approach to forthright communications and belligerent relations with its neighbours, the likelihood of conflict in the Asia-Pacific is again rising. Given this increasing likelihood of major conflict in the Asia-Pacific, and America's apparent reliance on its commanding generals to enable the successful prosecution of its wars, it would be instructive to

---

<sup>16</sup> Ted Morgan, *Valley of Death – The Tragedy at Dien Bien Phu that led America into the Vietnam War* (New York: Random House, 2010), 82, 84, 102, 541-554, 615, 624-630; John Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 118; Andrew Krepinevich, *The Army in Vietnam* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1988), 17-19.

understand the professional and personal attributes of the general who reversed the course of two Asia-Pacific wars.

A wide body of literature chronicles MacArthur's life and actions, but individual works are often prejudiced by the tendency to focus upon and accentuate his real and perceived faults, failures, and eccentricities. Other works, including MacArthur's autobiography, *Reminiscences: General of the Army Douglas MacArthur*, provide useful insights and balance sometimes overly critical ruminations of other authors. None, however, truly explore why MacArthur succeeded in a milieu which confounded others. This paper focuses upon MacArthur's successes with emphasis on his personal and professional attributes.

## **PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL ATTRIBUTES**

MacArthur was the son of a Medal of Honor winner, Philippine War hero, and Military Attaché to Japan. He passed his formative years on isolated Army posts on the American frontier during the Indian wars.<sup>17</sup> While this austere, martial environment engrained a strong sense of self and the ambition to follow in his father's footsteps, it offered little opportunity to develop his interpersonal skills.<sup>18</sup> Imbued with a sense of duty, honour, and patriotism from an early age, he excelled at the United States Military Academy at West Point, where his diffident nature, extraordinary intellect, and privileged upbringing presented an image that was viewed as aloof and arrogant, which further

---

<sup>17</sup> MacArthur's father was U.S. Lieutenant General Arthur MacArthur; Douglas MacArthur, *Reminiscences: General of the Army Douglas MacArthur* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), 6-25; Ambrose, 419-420.

<sup>18</sup> MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 6-25.



hindered the development of his interpersonal skills.<sup>19</sup> MacArthur's formative years prepared him well for the rigours and demands of military life, but they also deprived him the opportunity to fully develop the ability to connect with peers on a personal level.

During his early years in the Army, MacArthur did not excel socially or develop a substantive circle of trusted confidants.<sup>20</sup> On this subject, Lieutenant George Marshall remarked that he stayed "at arm's length" from MacArthur because he "rubbed [him] the wrong way."<sup>21</sup> Despite MacArthur's challenges with building a trusted peer group, he rose quickly, finishing World War I (WW I) as a division commander, and one of the most highly decorated soldiers of the war.<sup>22</sup> During the war, MacArthur garnered considerable loyalty and respect from his subordinates and profuse accolades from his superiors; however, his outwardly pretentious persona and disregard for military dress regulations resulted in animosity from his peers. Mark Perry, in his book *The Most Dangerous Man in America*, asserts that MacArthur's poor relations with the American Expeditionary Force Headquarters staff officers deprived him of a well-deserved Medal of Honor.<sup>23</sup> His non-conformity also led to an investigation being initiated by his peers on the general staff, led by Colonel George Marshall. While General John J. Pershing (Commander of the American Expeditionary Force in Europe) halted the investigation, this incident resonated deeply within MacArthur, causing him to further distance himself from his peers and distrust staff officers.<sup>24</sup> MacArthur's underdeveloped interpersonal skills and growing

---

<sup>19</sup> Manchester, 51.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid*, 51.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid*, 71.

<sup>22</sup> Puryear, 104, 109-111, 372.

<sup>23</sup> Mark Perry, *The Most Dangerous Man in America* (New York: Basic Books, 2014), 161.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid*, 84.

sensitivity resulted in strained relations with staff officers and particularly Marshall, the influences of which would resonate for the remainder of his career.

While MacArthur's meteoric career saw him promoted to general and appointed to the office of Chief of Staff of the Army at age 50, he had developed few lasting personal relationships, and exhibited an aloof, disciplined external persona, which lacked popular appeal. He was, however, a perpetually positive person and an optimist, with complete confidence in his own abilities.<sup>25</sup> Bolstered by his marriage to a doting and supportive aristocratic wife, and an environment within which he was revered, MacArthur's years in the Philippines before WWII provided him with the opportunity to refine his interpersonal skills and external persona.<sup>26</sup> This refinement was attested by General George Kenney, his air commander during the subsequent Pacific Campaign, who stated: "I found myself admiring him as a general, liking him as a man, and inspired by his innate gift for leadership."<sup>27</sup> MacArthur's staff officer, Colonel William Ganoe, stated: "MacArthur treated you with great consideration; you worked hard for him because you liked him."<sup>28</sup> Major General Courtney Whitney stated: "he made his staff feel that their contribution was an important one – that they were somebody."<sup>29</sup> While Marshall described MacArthur as "supersensitive about everything," it is noteworthy that those who knew him best described him as "a terribly shy man, ... [without] the slightest egotism," who would "truly admit his mistakes."<sup>30</sup> Despite beginning his military career with underdeveloped interpersonal skills,

---

<sup>25</sup> Puryear, 359, 392; Horner, 124; Manchester, 9, 210.

<sup>26</sup> Ambrose, 422; Manchester, 174-180.

<sup>27</sup> Puryear, 149.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid*, 148.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid*, 149.

<sup>30</sup> Manchester, 9, 302-303, 359.

by WWII MacArthur had refined these skills to the degree that he was able to garner the devoted effort and loyalty of his direct subordinates and staff.

MacArthur's external persona was less well developed than his ability to directly influence others, but it was nonetheless effective. Whenever visiting units in the field, MacArthur was uncomfortable with giving haranguing speeches, and as a result, he was often described as aloof. In his analysis of MacArthur in *19 Stars: A Study in Military Character and Leadership*, Edgar Puryear opined that MacArthur "did not have the infectious grin of an Eisenhower or display the flamboyance of a Patton," but his subordinates respected his abilities and were in awe of him as they would be a king.<sup>31</sup> One naval officer serving under MacArthur's command in the Pacific shrewdly framed MacArthur as "a man many admire but few love."<sup>32</sup> MacArthur's formal demeanour and aloof persona with those outside his immediate circle of confidants did not engender amity; however, his renowned professional competence and his aggrandized imposing and confident bearing elicited respect. Buoyed by a deliberately manufactured external persona intended to instil a sense of confidence in his units, MacArthur projected and accentuated a confident and imposing nature.

With his peers in the Pacific, MacArthur's ability to ingratiate himself and garner their support was notably impressive. Despite significant inter-service tensions, his fellow flag officers in the Pacific enjoyed cordial relations with MacArthur. Admiral Bull Halsey "was charmed by the eloquence and logic of MacArthur," stating: "I had seldom seen a

---

<sup>31</sup> Puryear, 141.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid*, 148.

man who makes a quicker, stronger, more favourable impression.”<sup>33</sup> Admiral Chester Nimitz stated that MacArthur’s “professional knowledge, his ability to express his ideas, his consideration for his colleagues, his preparations, his drive were a winning combination.”<sup>34</sup> Notwithstanding MacArthur’s issues with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, his ability to form collegial relationships and win the support of his fellow Pacific commanders was superb.

For reasons not entirely attributable to MacArthur, his relationships with the Joint Chiefs of Staff were stressed. The relationship between MacArthur and Marshall had never been cordial; nonetheless, Marshall considered MacArthur to be America’s most brilliant general. For this reason, Marshall recommended him to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson for the position of Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in the Southwest Pacific Area, stating: his “dominating character is needed [in the Pacific] to make the Navy keep up their job.”<sup>35</sup> While laudable, Marshall’s scheme to manufacture competition between the Army and Navy in the Pacific and thereby promote efficiency backfired.<sup>36</sup> While not having met MacArthur, Marshall’s fellow Joint Chief, Fleet Admiral Ernest King’s treatment of MacArthur was atrocious.<sup>37</sup> King believed that MacArthur’s presence in the Pacific theatre infringed upon the Navy’s domain, and refused to place forces under his control.<sup>38</sup> In his study, *Japan’s War: The Great Pacific Conflict, 1853 to 1952*, Edwin Hoyt concludes that King’s “attitude was responsible for what might have been about a year’s delay in the

---

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid*, 138.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid*, 139.

<sup>35</sup> Manchester, 4; Stanley Weintraub, *15 Stars: Eisenhower, MacArthur, Marshall: Three Generals Who Saved the American Century* (New York: Free Press, 2007), 34; Puryear, 134.

<sup>36</sup> Perry, *The Most Dangerous Man in America*, 208.

<sup>37</sup> Puryear, 77.

<sup>38</sup> Horner, 125; Perry, 163.

American prosecution of the war.”<sup>39</sup> With King’s antagonistic behaviour toward MacArthur reaching such fervour, and MacArthur doing little to alleviate the strain, Marshall eventually intervened on MacArthur’s behalf, but with little effect.<sup>40</sup> Rather than attempt to ingratiate himself to King and improve his relationship with the Joint Chiefs, MacArthur remained aloof and publically criticised their decisions.<sup>41</sup> To MacArthur’s detriment, he lacked the interpersonal skills to deal with complex relationships of an antagonistic nature, and instead allowed his animosity toward, and his disagreements with, the Joint Chiefs cloud his judgement. This stance resulted in an unhelpful, persistent antagonistic relationship between MacArthur and the Joint Chiefs, which transcended his career.

By the time of his appointment as Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in the Southwest Pacific Area, MacArthur had developed his interpersonal skills and external persona to the degree that he could inspire subordinates and gain the cooperation of his peers. He was, however, not able to effectively manage his complex, antagonistic relationship with the Joint Chiefs, and instead permitted the relationship to deteriorate. Ultimately, MacArthur possessed sufficient interpersonal and leadership skills to enable him to function effectively during WWII and beyond.

While MacArthur at times struggled with interpersonal skills and managing antagonistic relationships, his intellect and ability to innovate was his most distinctive characteristic. At West Point, MacArthur established himself as a genius, surpassing all

---

<sup>39</sup> Edwin Hoyt, *Japan’s War: The Great Pacific Conflict, 1853 to 1952* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1986), 304.

<sup>40</sup> Manchester, 352.

<sup>41</sup> Weintraub, *15 Stars*, 60.

members of his class, and finishing with the highest marks ever attained.<sup>42</sup> Later, as the Superintendent at West Point, he introduced sweeping changes to the curriculum that transformed it into one of the world's outstanding military colleges.<sup>43</sup> As the Army Chief of Staff, MacArthur demonstrated his brilliantly innovative mind by initiating “a comprehensive program of modernization in the army's tactics, equipment, [and] training” that enabled the Army to enter WWII as a modern mechanised force.<sup>44</sup> MacArthur's brilliance was notably demonstrated via his academic prowess, and his intellectual agility and penchant for innovation marked him as an exceptional officer.

As Commanding General of the U.S. Far East Command in the Philippines at the outset of WWII, the Japanese conquest of the Philippines challenged MacArthur's cultural beliefs and understanding of how war was waged. His initial assessment of the Japanese forces had been a critical error. According to William Manchester, “when [MacArthur] saw the skill with which Japanese warplanes were flown in the first days of the War, he concluded that the pilots must be white.”<sup>45</sup> He also initially incorrectly dismissed the likelihood of a large amphibious operation against the hostile shores of the Philippines based upon his understanding of the failed WWI amphibious operation at Gallipoli.<sup>46</sup> Rather than remain tied to incorrect assumptions, MacArthur's impressive intellectual agility enabled him to readily re-evaluate the Japanese and adjust his professional outlook to incorporate the new security environment. MacArthur's subsequent mastery and ingenious use of the new form of joint amphibious warfare significantly enhanced extant

---

<sup>42</sup> Manchester, 3, 148; Ambrose, 420.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid*, 421-422.

<sup>44</sup> Puryear, 114-115, 122.

<sup>45</sup> Manchester, 187-188.

<sup>46</sup> Ambrose, 422-423; Manchester, 185.

doctrine, and proved his continued capacity to innovate.<sup>47</sup> Having graduated with the highest marks ever at West Point, been appointed the youngest Superintendent of West Point as well as the youngest Major General in U.S. history, and having conceived and executed a brilliantly innovative concept of manoeuvre during the Pacific Campaign, even MacArthur's detractors respected his intellect.

Emanating partially from his prominent intellect, MacArthur possessed great professional competence. As a frontline division commander and one of the most decorated U.S. soldiers in WWI, and an innovative Chief of Staff of the Army, MacArthur was already renowned for his professional competence prior to WWII.<sup>48</sup> While his initial defeat in the Philippines could be viewed as discreditable, in the context of 1942, the defeat by the vastly superior Japanese forces was widely viewed as inevitable. That the Japanese forces were not able to immediately vanquish the U.S. force was seen as commendable.<sup>49</sup> MacArthur's performance had been appreciably better than his U.S. and Allied counterparts in the Asia-Pacific.<sup>50</sup> Manchester asserts that during Japan's initial conquest of the Asia-Pacific, "MacArthur was the only allied general who had proven that he knew how to fight the Japanese."<sup>51</sup> While his presence on the Philippines during Japan's assault did not alter their eventual fall, his performance was indicative of his stellar military competence. Manchester summed-up MacArthur's military prowess with the assessment:

---

<sup>47</sup> Horner, 134.

<sup>48</sup> Manchester, 165; Horner, 124.

<sup>49</sup> Puryear, 150; Manchester, 250; Ambrose, 420.

<sup>50</sup> Manchester, 191.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid*, 251.

“[unquestionably] he was the most gifted man-at-arms this nation has produced.”<sup>52</sup>

MacArthur’s military competence was singular.

MacArthur’s competence as a military commander was accentuated by his devout devotion to his country. In the environment within which MacArthur was raised and educated, the essence of the credo “duty, honour, country” was imbued into the very fabric of his character.<sup>53</sup> While MacArthur’s iron will and egocentric nature were outwardly dominant aspects of his personality, his sense of duty, honour, and country was always paramount. As an example, a lengthy debate with Admiral William Halsey regarding boundaries was settled when Halsey asserted to MacArthur: “if you stick to this order of yours, you’ll be hampering the war effort.”<sup>54</sup> MacArthur immediately acquiesced.<sup>55</sup> To his core, MacArthur lived to fulfil his childhood ambition and emulate his father by devoutly and heroically serving his country.<sup>56</sup> MacArthur placed duty and country foremost.

MacArthur felt acutely responsible and accountable for fulfilling his duty and for the lives of the service personnel under his command. While he passionately sought to defeat adversarial forces, his personal staff and confidants recall many occasions on which he expressed great concern for his responsibility to fulfil his duty while minimising casualties.<sup>57</sup> The night prior to the amphibious operation to recapture the Philippines, Major General Courtney Whitney asked MacArthur if he felt “a sense of great power having such

---

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid*, 15.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid*, 107-108.

<sup>54</sup> Puryear, 131-132.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid*, 132.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid*, 108.

<sup>57</sup> Horner, 124.



a mighty armada,”<sup>58</sup> MacArthur responded: “It doesn’t. I cannot escape the thought of the fine American boys who are going to die on those beaches.”<sup>59</sup> Later, en route to Manila, he ordered his field commanders to “go round the Japs, bounce off the Japs, save your men.”<sup>60</sup> MacArthur valued the lives of his soldiers, and characteristically looked for alternative methodologies to minimize casualties.

MacArthur’s overarching approach to operations throughout his career focussed on minimising casualties and the expenditure of resources. While describing his concept of operations for the Pacific Campaign to his staff, MacArthur explained that “there would be no need for storming the mass of islands held by the enemy. Island-hopping, with extravagant losses and slow progress, is not my idea of how to end the war as soon and as cheaply as possible.”<sup>61</sup> MacArthur insisted upon striking where the enemy was weakest, bypassing or encircling strong points, and only striking enemy positions when necessary, and then from unexpected directions or under unexpected conditions.<sup>62</sup> In MacArthur’s words, he would not countenance “island-hopping, which is the gradual pushing back of the enemy by direct frontal pressure, with the consequent heavy casualties.”<sup>63</sup> While on occasion MacArthur pushed his subordinates to advance rapidly or to assume greater risk, a wider view of the situations reveals that he was attempting to employ high tempo to unbalance the enemy and reduce overall exposure and casualties.<sup>64</sup> In addition to

---

<sup>58</sup> Puryear, 329.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid*, 329.

<sup>60</sup> Manchester, 410.

<sup>61</sup> MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 169.

<sup>62</sup> Puryear, 135, 329-330, 359-360; Manchester, 430; MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 169.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid*, 169.

<sup>64</sup> Horner, 134-135.

accomplishing his mission, MacArthur felt a personal sense of responsibility to safeguard the lives of his troops.

MacArthur's fierce sense of responsibility and accountability compelled him to occasionally question direction issued by the Joint Chiefs. As an example, as Supreme Commander, MacArthur was responsible to the President for the defence of those sectors within his area not already occupied by the Japanese. He was also responsible to his subordinates to ensure that when they entered battle, they did so with all possible precautions taken to minimise risk.<sup>65</sup> MacArthur believed that he had been allocated insufficient resources to execute the mission assigned to him with a reasonable chance of success, and as such he believed that he was duty bound to challenge the Joint Chiefs' allocation of resources.

In addition to accountability to the President, MacArthur steadfastly demonstrated loyalty to his subordinates. The loss of his soldiers on Bataan and during the subsequent "Death March" haunted MacArthur. In his words, "the bitter memories and heartache will never leave me."<sup>66</sup> When explaining why he wished to accompany paratroopers to a drop zone on a Japanese held island, MacArthur told Kenney: "they're my kids."<sup>67</sup> Equally, if MacArthur believed that the actions of a subordinate commander unnecessarily exposed his troops to danger, "he was released immediately."<sup>68</sup> It is noteworthy, however, that after Lieutenant General Lewis Brereton handled the air battle for Luzon so poorly that most of his planes were destroyed on the ground MacArthur was furious, but nonetheless shielded

---

<sup>65</sup> MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 153.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid*, 146.

<sup>67</sup> Puryear, 370.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid*, 130.

him from severe external criticism, and in so doing exposed himself to criticism.<sup>69</sup> MacArthur did, however, subsequently discretely release Brereton and authorise his replacement, Kenney, to “fire anyone who was incompetent.”<sup>70</sup> While superficially incongruous, MacArthur’s handling of the Brereton situation, provides a glimpse into his steadfast loyalty to his subordinates and his paternalistic instincts, but also reveals his unforgiving drive to ensure that his troops were properly led.

While Manchester describes MacArthur as “a great thundering paradox of a man,” examination of his character as revealed through his actions and interactions exposes an understandable and consistent man, who was shaped by innate inclinations and environmental influences, but most of all by his superior intellect, his childhood experiences, and his years in command appointments.<sup>71</sup> Naturally shy and sensitive, and having had few opportunities to build interpersonal skills during his youth, MacArthur’s interpersonal skills were initially not well developed. To mitigate his challenges in this area, MacArthur employed a practiced external persona that generally garnered respect from his troops. However, it also resulted in derision. His professional knowledge, ability to express ideas, and consideration for his colleagues, enabled him to ingratiate himself with his staff, subordinate commanders, and peers in the Pacific. His relationship with the Joint Chiefs was, however, strained, and while he was not entirely to blame, he antagonised the situation to his own detriment. Highly intelligent, his innovative concept of employing deep envelopments combined with bold operational manoeuvres bewildered his adversaries, negated their strengths, and resulted in their rapid defeat. MacArthur lacked

---

<sup>69</sup> Perry, 76, 80, 81, 84.

<sup>70</sup> Puryear, 133.

<sup>71</sup> Manchester, 15.

refined interpersonal skills and was overly sensitive to criticism; however, he was an intelligent and gifted commander, with iron will and resilience.

## **SUPREME COMMANDER OF ALLIED FORCES SOUTHWEST PACIFIC**

At the beginning of WWII in the Pacific, the U.S. military's situation on the Philippines was precarious. With concentrations of Japanese warplanes, warships, and ground forces strategically posed in Formosa, southern-China, and Indo-China, a pessimistic outlook pervaded official Washington.<sup>72</sup> Within hours of the December 7, 1941 Japanese air attack on Pearl Harbor, Japanese air attacks began on the Philippine main island of Luzon, and within two days of the air attacks, Japanese amphibious landings commenced on Luzon. MacArthur's combined U.S. and Filipino force were fully aware of the threat posed by the Japanese and had ardently prepared to defend the Philippines. Mark Perry, in his book *The Most Dangerous Man in American: The Making of Douglas MacArthur*, asserts, however, that despite MacArthur's preparations, the U.S. and Philippine forces were woefully unprepared due to "the neglect and unconcern that had long been handed out to them by Washington, [which was] absorbed with European affairs."<sup>73</sup> In Washington, Marshall held no illusions about the inevitable outcome of the uneven battle for the Philippines, and ordered his staff officer, Brigadier General Eisenhower, to: "Do your best to save [the U.S. forces]."<sup>74</sup> While MacArthur and his combined U.S. and Filipino force ardently prepared to defend the Philippines against the Japanese war machine, Washington had already recognised the futility of the endeavour.

---

<sup>72</sup> Hunt, 228; Perry, 89-90.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid*, 229-230.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid*, 234.

By May 1942, the rapid and seemingly unstoppable advance of the imperial Japanese war machine throughout the Asia-Pacific had forced the Allies out of many of their territories, including Hong Kong, Indochina, the Dutch East Indies, Guam, and the Philippines.<sup>75</sup> Having destroyed the myth of British invincibility, the Armed Forces of the Empire of Japan had swept the British from Singapore and Burma, and with shattered morale and confidence, the British withdrew into India and slipped into a passive, defensive mentality.<sup>76</sup> The Japanese military seemed unstoppable.

Despite having been apprised of the strength of the Japanese force, MacArthur displayed his customary optimism and fortitude. As Commander U.S. Army Forces in the Far East, MacArthur was assigned the task to defend the U.S. Commonwealth of the Philippines.<sup>77</sup> While he had been granted the authority to command in situ Philippine and U.S. forces, the Philippine army was years away from operational effectiveness, and with the U.S. priority on Europe, the U.S. lacked the capability to secure sea lanes to the Philippines to provide sufficient resources to enable its defence.<sup>78</sup> MacArthur nonetheless arduously requested additional troops and resources, but none were forthcoming.<sup>79</sup> Rather than surrender to the seemingly inevitable, MacArthur rallied his forces and “bitterly opposed” the Japanese forces, which had disembarked from an 80 ship armada, supported by overwhelming naval and air power.<sup>80</sup> With the poorly trained and equipped Filipino troops battling valiantly beside the U.S. forces, MacArthur’s combined forces earned the

---

<sup>75</sup> Donovan Weber, *The Road to Burma* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003), 13, 28; Hunt, 228-229.

<sup>76</sup> Chindits Veterans Association, “Chindits Special Force Burma 1942-1944,” last accessed 10 August 2016, <http://www.chindits.info/Longcloth/Main.htm>.

<sup>77</sup> Manchester, 191.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid*, 190-191, 268; Puryear, 125; Ambrose, 422; Hunt, 234, 237, 245.

<sup>79</sup> Manchester, 192-193.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid*, 229.

respect of the Asian-Pacific peoples, and acclaim in America and across the Allied world.<sup>81</sup> MacArthur's forces became revered for their "courage and stubborn fighting ability," and for the singular feat of pushing the Japanese back.<sup>82</sup> As a result of overwhelming Japanese power, and the lack of supplies and sea and air support, the attacking Japanese forces eventually overwhelmed the defending Philippine and U.S. forces.<sup>83</sup> While succumbing to the inevitable setback in the Philippines, MacArthur nonetheless refused to contemplate defeat.

After MacArthur's ordered departure from the Philippines on 11 March 1942, and despite MacArthur's preparations, the Allied forces soon surrendered. Major General Edward King ordered the surrender of 70,000 U.S. troops on Bataan on 9 April 1942, and Lieutenant General Jonathan Wainwright ordered the surrender of all U.S. forces in the Philippines on 6 May 1942.<sup>84</sup> To forestall the possibility of one commander surrendering all U.S. forces in the Philippines, and to facilitate the re-conquest of the Islands, MacArthur had established a decentralised chain of command, with himself retaining overall command from Australia. He had also instituted a regional command structure, designed to facilitate guerrilla warfare, and established a remote base from which a counterattack could be initiated. Without consulting MacArthur, Marshall negated these preparations by reaching into MacArthur's command and appointing Wainwright as Commanding General, which led directly to the complete collapse of the U.S. forces

---

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid*, 249.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid*, 249.

<sup>83</sup> Manchester, 190-191, 268; Puryear, 125; Ambrose, 422; Hunt, 234, 237, 245.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid*, 259-262.

throughout the Philippines.<sup>85</sup> While the Philippines fell in May 1942, MacArthur had displayed his customary dogged nature, intellectual agility, and novel approach to bolster their defence. However, his and Marshall's strained relationship thwarted MacArthur's plans.

Following the fall of the Philippines, the Japanese forces continued their advance toward Australia, landing on New Guinea on 21 July 1942, and launching air raids on Darwin, Australia on 23 and 24 November 1942.<sup>86</sup> Upon arriving in Australia, MacArthur was appointed Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in the Southwest Pacific Area, and was ordered to defend those territories within his area that had not already been captured by the Japanese.<sup>87</sup> The situation was truly desperate.

MacArthur's performance in Australia exhibited the depth of his interpersonal skills, intellectual agility, military competence, and sense of responsibility. U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt, U.K. Prime Minister Winston Churchill, Australian Prime Minister John Curtin, and Marshall were counting on MacArthur's reputation, fortitude, and innovativeness to calm the Australian population and defend Australia.<sup>88</sup> Paradoxically, immediately upon landing at an airfield near Darwin, Australia, MacArthur was embarked for Alice Springs due to the imminent threat of attack by Japanese fighters.<sup>89</sup> With Churchill directing Australia's returning brigades to defend India, MacArthur was met by an anxious Australian Prime Minister and population, which were aware that the Japanese had in excess of two divisions supported by four

---

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid*, 259-261.

<sup>86</sup> Perry, 144-156, 163.

<sup>87</sup> Manchester, 283.

<sup>88</sup> Perry, 160.

<sup>89</sup> Perry, 155-156.

aircraft carriers and land based aircraft poised to capture Darwin, and one division supported by two to three aircraft carriers and land based aircraft poised to capture Port Moresby.<sup>90</sup> While MacArthur was presented this herculean task without an army or resources, and none forthcoming, his presence alone buoyed the Australian nation, instilling a sense of reassurance and confidence in the leadership and population.<sup>91</sup> MacArthur's renown was, however, the product of his lifetime of accomplishments, founded upon his intellectual and professional prowess, and accentuated by his combined U.S. and Philippine forces' stubborn resistance against the Japanese.

Over the ensuing months, MacArthur demonstrated intellectual agility and innovation by devising plans intended to out manoeuvre the powerful Japanese forces through the skilful disposition and use of his limited resources. MacArthur first worked with the Australians to stiffen the resolve of the population, recruit and train a new army, and acquire sufficient resources to enable operations.<sup>92</sup> Leveraging his renown in the U.S. and "his popularity among the Australians," MacArthur rapidly built a capable fighting force.<sup>93</sup> Still lacking sufficient resources to enable the implementation of his plans, MacArthur envisioned a long-term strategy based upon the innovative concept of "hopscotching" across the Southwest Pacific, and thereby "paralyzing" the numerically and tactically superior Japanese forces on by-passed islands.<sup>94</sup> First, however, MacArthur

---

<sup>90</sup> Churchill's order to divert the returning Australian brigades to India was altered prior to their arrival; Douglas MacArthur, *Reports of General MacArthur: The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), 23; Perry, 161-162.

<sup>91</sup> Perry, 161-162.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid*, 207; Manchester, 285; Horner, 123-124.

<sup>93</sup> Manchester, 330.

<sup>94</sup> Perry, 165.



had to defend Australia, which he clearly lacked the resources to accomplish.<sup>95</sup> Instead, he took the unorthodox, and “shocking,” decision to launch operations into the jungles of New Guinea, which dislocated the Japanese and thereby stymied their assault on Australia.<sup>96</sup> During this period, MacArthur’s personal interjection, public persona, determination, and penchant for innovation set the conditions that contributed to the reversal of the course of the war in the Southwest Pacific.

Heightening the enormity of the demands placed upon him, MacArthur was suffering emotionally from the defeat in the Philippines, and the reports of the Bataan Death March. With his acute sense of responsibility to his soldiers and to his country, the developments in the Philippines had shaken MacArthur.<sup>97</sup> Concerned with the full effects of this development, Marshall dispatched then Lieutenant General Hap Arnold to assess MacArthur’s state. Arnold found MacArthur to be “much more nervous than when [he] formally knew him,” “haunted by reports of the Bataan Death March,” and “darkly pessimistic.” Arnold nonetheless assessed that MacArthur possessed “a brilliant mind” and the complete confidence of his staff and subordinate commanders.<sup>98</sup> Arnold also remarked upon the contrast between the painstaking logistical planning demanded by MacArthur and that of Vice Admiral Robert Ghormley, who was commanding the attack on Guadalcanal.<sup>99</sup> Arnold’s insight into MacArthur’s frame of mind and capabilities

---

<sup>95</sup> Manchester, 364, 345.

<sup>96</sup> Horner, 124; Manchester, 298, 345; MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 152; MacArthur, *Reports of General MacArthur: The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific*, 34-40.

<sup>97</sup> Perry, 206-207.

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid*, 205-208; Manchester, 346.

<sup>99</sup> Perry, 205-208; Planners and participants sarcastically referred to Ghormley’s operation as “Operation Shoestring;” Beckman, “Personality and Strategy: How the Personalities of General MacArthur and Admiral King Shaped Allied Strategy in the Pacific in World War Two,” 68.

provide an unbiased and balanced perspective of his acute sense of responsibility, soaring intellect, military prowess, and his capacity to elicit loyalty.

While still reeling from his ordeal in the Philippines, MacArthur steadfastly pushed himself and his staff to prepare for operations against the Japanese. With the arrival of brigades of Australian infantry from North Africa, Greece, and Crete, and two divisions and supplies from the U.S., MacArthur embarked upon operations in New Guinea.<sup>100</sup> As the Japanese were certain that MacArthur lacked the resources to establish himself in Port Moresby and seize New Guinea, the Allied push into the jungles of New Guinea psychologically and physically dislocated them.<sup>101</sup> Having the compounding tasks of fighting the jungle and the Allied force, while managing extended lines of communications, the Japanese faltered.<sup>102</sup> The Allied advance through the jungles of New Guinea was, however, gruelling. When the advance stalled, MacArthur took the rare decision to relieve the Commander of the 32<sup>nd</sup> (U.S.) Division, Major General Edwin Harding.<sup>103</sup> He replaced him with Lieutenant General Robert Eichelberger, who MacArthur ominously directed to “remove all officers who won’t fight ... [and] if necessary, put sergeants in charge of battalions. ... I want you to take Buna, or not come back alive.”<sup>104</sup> While MacArthur’s strategy and determined approach ultimately produced results out of proportion to the Allied commitment, the deplorable conditions in the jungle combined with ostentatious press releases emanating from his headquarters

---

<sup>100</sup> Perry 207; Manchester, 334, 344.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid*, 345.

<sup>102</sup> Perry, 208, 209, 210; Manchester, 345, 351.

<sup>103</sup> Perry, 210, 223.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid*, 218-219.

resulted in considerable derision and bitterness within the field force.<sup>105</sup> Eichelberger both lauded MacArthur as “an inspiring leader,” and complained about his penchant for self-promotion.<sup>106</sup> MacArthur’s chronically exaggerated press releases, however, both reinforced his reputation and buoyed the U.S. and Australian populations.<sup>107</sup> While MacArthur’s actions during the recapture of eastern New Guinea displayed tremendous intellectual agility and military competence, his communications skills with his field force were distinctly lacking.

The hard fought New Guinea campaign was a military masterstroke. It checked the Japanese advance on Australia with comparatively fewer troops, furnished MacArthur with an enhanced understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the Japanese forces, provided reassurance of the quality of the Allied force, and provided the opportunity to experiment with amphibious operations.<sup>108</sup> The campaign also tempered MacArthur’s new fighting force, and revitalized his spirits.<sup>109</sup> MacArthur’s intellectual agility and tremendous military prowess were key determinants of the Allied success in New Guinea. His communications and interpersonal skills, exemplified through his press releases, however revealed his weakness.

Following MacArthur’s operations to drive the Japanese out of, and secure, east New Guinea, he embarked upon a series of ambitious operations, again designed to dislocate the Japanese forces. His first goal was to capture the strategic town of Rabaul, located at the northern tip of New Britain. To achieve this objective, MacArthur

---

<sup>105</sup> Manchester, 351.

<sup>106</sup> Perry, 228.

<sup>107</sup> Manchester, 334, Perry, 227.

<sup>108</sup> Perry, 210.

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid*, 216.

orchestrated a series of divisional leaps involving dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, and tens of thousands of troops, seizing key enabling objectives, including New Guinea's Huon Peninsula, New Georgia's Munda Point, and airstrips on Bougainville and New Britain.<sup>110</sup> Once Rabaul was captured, MacArthur launched a highly successful, audacious amphibious operation to capture the Admiralty Islands, which saw an Allied force of 1,000 men capture a garrison of 4,000 troops.<sup>111</sup> He then directed a series of ambitious bounds forward, conducting amphibious operations up New Guinea's northern coast, which bypassed and surrounded in excess of 60,000 Japanese troops on New Guinea, 50,000 on New Britain, and 10,000 on New Ireland, and 20,000 on Bougainville.<sup>112</sup> MacArthur's revolutionary operational concept of operations, detailed planning and coordination of the new genre of amphibious operations, and mastery of the enabling art of logistical support betrayed a brilliantly innovative mind, a tremendous capacity to manage complexity, and an intrinsic understanding of the art of war.

MacArthur's methodologies confounded the Japanese. He insisted upon striking where he assessed that the Japanese were weakest, bypassing or encircling strong points, and only striking Japanese positions when absolutely necessary, and then from unexpected directions or under unexpected conditions.<sup>113</sup> To MacArthur, symmetrical, attritional campaigns and "frontal assault [were] only for mediocre commanders."<sup>114</sup> Critically, in his own words, he would not countenance "island-hopping, which is the

---

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*, 230-232.

<sup>111</sup> Beckman, 73; MacArthur, *Reports of General MacArthur*, 140.

<sup>112</sup> General of the Army George C. Marshall, *Biennial Report of the Chief of the United States Army July 1, 1943 to June 30, 1945 to the Secretary of War* (New York: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1947), 225; Ronald Spector, *Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan* (New York: Vintage Book, 1985), 150; MacArthur, *Reports of General MacArthur*, 146-147.

<sup>113</sup> Puryear, 135, 329-330, 359-360; Manchester, 430; MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 169.

<sup>114</sup> Beckman, 75.

gradual pushing back of the enemy by direct frontal pressure, with the consequent heavy casualties.”<sup>115</sup> While on occasion MacArthur pushed his subordinates to advance rapidly or to assume greater risk, a wider view of the situations reveals that he was attempting to employ high tempo to unbalance the Japanese and reduce Allied overall exposure and casualties.<sup>116</sup> MacArthur has been criticised for pursuing his own agenda in these operations. However, the Joint Chiefs and the President authorised all major operations en route to the Philippines.<sup>117</sup> In pursuing this concept of operations, MacArthur was not only achieving his objectives, but he was doing so rapidly and efficiently, which significantly reduced the risk to his troops.

MacArthur’s performance during this series of daring, ambitious operations solidified his renown as a brilliant military commander. His use of joint assets and his concept of bypassing Japanese strong points, and enveloping those positions that had to be captured, produced results that defied conventional attacker to defender ratios. It resulted in significantly fewer casualties than conventional wisdom contemplated, and unprecedented advances.<sup>118</sup> In his analysis of MacArthur’s capture of New Guinea and subsequent advance to the Philippines, Edgar Puryear wrote: “Never has a commander done so much with so little. It was truly brilliant leadership that permitted MacArthur to make so much of his resources. MacArthur’s brilliance in decision making could be equalled by few [others].”<sup>119</sup> Manchester records that “[even] Admiral King, MacArthur’s bitterest critic among the Joint Chiefs, conceded that it had been

---

<sup>115</sup> MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 169

<sup>116</sup> Horner, 134-135.

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid*, 129.

<sup>118</sup> Ambrose, 425; Puryear, 135, 329-330, 359-360.

<sup>119</sup> Puryear, 358.

brilliant.”<sup>120</sup> Puryear concludes that even “the most severe critics of MacArthur have never questioned his professional competence.”<sup>121</sup> MacArthur had displayed his formidable intellect and professional competence.

By late 1943, U.S. wartime production had reached the point at which the Joint Chiefs were able to iteratively increase the resources available to MacArthur to enable him to embark upon increasingly rapid and bold leaps forward. By April 1944, American army and air personnel under MacArthur’s command numbered 450,000 and in July 1944, President Franklin Roosevelt endorsed the re-conquest of the Philippines, which resulted in MacArthur commanding the second largest concentration of U.S. forces during WWII.<sup>122</sup>

The re-conquest of the Philippines displayed MacArthur at his best. He began the invasion by forcing the Japanese off the Island of Leyte, which MacArthur saw as “the anvil against which ... to hammer the Japanese into submission in the central Philippines – the springboard from which I could proceed to the conquest of the Philippine main island of Luzon.”<sup>123</sup> As remarkable as MacArthur’s planning to orchestrate this complex attack involving two massive fleets and assault forces arriving from Hawaii and New Guinea and 1,400 aircraft had been, his logistics plan, which involved nine support bases each stockpiling tens of thousands of tons of ammunition and supplies, was masterful.<sup>124</sup> Again, MacArthur’s vast intellectual capacity and military experience proved vital to

---

<sup>120</sup> Manchester, 344.

<sup>121</sup> Puryear, 150.

<sup>122</sup> Horner, 123-134; Ambrose, 425; Puryear, 329.

<sup>123</sup> MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 248; Manchester, 446.

<sup>124</sup> Perry, 284; Marshall, *Biennial Report of the Chief of the United States Army July 1, 1943 to June 30, 1945 to the Secretary of War*, 229; MacArthur, *Reports of General MacArthur*, 179-180.

enabling this massive and complex operation to be planned and launched in a fraction of the time that it took to plan the only slightly larger Allied invasion of Normandy.<sup>125</sup>

MacArthur's direct influence was the key to the Allied success on Leyte.

MacArthur's interpersonal skills were demonstrably successful during the Leyte operation. Upon landing, MacArthur delivered a vital address that was much maligned by American critics, but which resonated with the people of the Philippines.<sup>126</sup> In this highly emotional, biblical style address, MacArthur proclaimed: "People of the Philippines, I have returned. ... Rally to me. ... Rise and strike. ... Let every arm be steeled. ... Follow in His Name to the Holy Grail of righteous victory!"<sup>127</sup> While this address may not have achieved the desired results with an American audience, MacArthur understood the Philippine people, and delivered the resounding proclamation, with the biblical undertone that resonated and inspired. MacArthur's communications skills in this instance were entirely appropriate for his intended audience.

MacArthur's direct influence on the subsequent fight for Leyte was also pivotal. With the initial assault on Leyte, MacArthur had achieved surprise, which enabled the Allied force to move inland and firmly establish itself. The Japanese, however, rushed tens of thousands of reinforcements from Luzon, and in the face of this heavy resistance, Allied progress slowed.<sup>128</sup> MacArthur remained positive, and unlike other commanders in the Pacific theatre, he deliberately paused and levelled every enemy strongpoint with

---

<sup>125</sup> Perry, 284.

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid*, 289.

<sup>127</sup> *Ibid*, 289; MacArthur, *Reports of General MacArthur*, 198-199.

<sup>128</sup> Manchester, 460.

overwhelming artillery before exposing his troops.<sup>129</sup> When questioned about the slow progress, MacArthur stated: “I can finish Leyte in two weeks, but I won’t. I have too great a responsibility to the mothers and wives in America to do that to their men. I will not take by sacrifice what I can achieve by strategy.”<sup>130</sup> MacArthur’s sense of responsibility outweighed any short-term desire for success or glory.

When, after over a month and with 180,000 soldiers on Leyte, victory was still not forthcoming, “a bold, imaginative stroke” was needed. MacArthur provided it.<sup>131</sup> MacArthur directed a daring amphibious assault, coordinated with a major land operation that split the Japanese force and unhinged its supply lines.<sup>132</sup> In so doing, MacArthur had trapped over 60,000 Japanese soldiers.<sup>133</sup> Over the following month, the Japanese death toll accumulated to 56,263; whereas, the Allies lost 2,888 men. The Japanese had fought tenaciously, employing mass suicide charges and kamikaze attacks, and refused to surrender. With Leyte captured, the way to Luzon was clear.<sup>134</sup> MacArthur’s steady influence, sense of responsibility, and penchant for innovation transformed what could have been another bloody operation on the scale of Guadalcanal into a major Allied victory with comparatively few casualties.

While the Allied assault of Leyte amply exhibited MacArthur’s military competence and intellectual capacity and agility, the Allied campaign on Luzon revealed his genius. MacArthur had initially employed a deceptive supporting amphibious landing

---

<sup>129</sup> *Ibid*, 460-461.

<sup>130</sup> *Ibid*, 460-461; Stanley Falk, *Decisions at Leyte* (New York: Berkley Publishing, 1966), 71, 273.

<sup>131</sup> Clay Blair, *MacArthur* (Markham, ON: Kangaroo Book, 1977), 205.

<sup>132</sup> *Ibid*, 205; Marshall, 233; MacArthur, *Reports of General MacArthur*, 233-234.

<sup>133</sup> Manchester, 471.

<sup>134</sup> Hunt, 350; Marshall, 234.



on the Philippine western island of Mindoro, and bold operational manoeuvre to confound the Japanese and force them to disperse and freeze their forces in place.<sup>135</sup> Within 48 hours, MacArthur landed upward of 218,000 troops on Luzon's Lingayen beaches virtually unopposed on land.<sup>136</sup> Assessing the subsequent operations on Luzon, Marshall was "rhapsodic."<sup>137</sup> MacArthur's brilliant manoeuvres included "lightning" advances on land that "dazzled" the Japanese, two subsequent amphibious assaults, which isolated and rendered the Japanese strong points impotent, and an airborne assault that finished the encirclement of Manila.<sup>138</sup> MacArthur had "caught every major hostile combat unit in motion."<sup>139</sup> The Japanese were unable to cope with MacArthur's swift moves, which placed them in an impossible situation. Marshall asserts: "[it] was a situation unique in modern war. Never had such large numbers of troops been so outmanoeuvred, and left tactically impotent."<sup>140</sup> William Manchester concludes: "if MacArthur had never fought another battle, his reconquest of Luzon would have vindicated his own high opinion of his generalship."<sup>141</sup> MacArthur's military genius was fully exhibited during the re-conquest of Luzon. Above all, MacArthur's soaring intellect, his exquisite military competence, and his bounding sense of responsibility for the lives of his men were fully on display.

After the re-conquest of Leyte and Luzon, MacArthur executed nearly a dozen subsequent amphibious operations to mop-up Japanese forces still active in the central

---

<sup>135</sup> Manchester, 479.

<sup>136</sup> Perry, 309; Hunt, 357; Blair, *MacArthur*, 214.

<sup>137</sup> Manchester, 479.

<sup>138</sup> *Ibid*, 479-480; Marshall, 236.

<sup>139</sup> Manchester, 479.

<sup>140</sup> *Ibid*, 479.

<sup>141</sup> *Ibid*, 479.

and southern Philippines. It has been suggested by a number of authors, including Manchester, that MacArthur executed these “unauthorized” operations to satisfy his vanity as “the liberator of all the Philippines.”<sup>142</sup> Leaving enemy divisions free to wreak havoc throughout the Philippines, however, would not have been prudent, and waiting for the newly formed Commonwealth Army to attain the level of readiness required to eradicate these seasoned Japanese divisions was not a credible alternative. MacArthur’s decision to mop-up these remaining Japanese troops was not careless. During the operations, MacArthur’s forces annihilated 23 Japanese divisions, with 21,000 Japanese troops killed. The U.S. forces lost 820 soldiers.<sup>143</sup> Despite his insistence that the operations were launched to satisfy MacArthur’s vanity, Manchester asserts that they were a “strategic masterwork, magnificently executed, with a minimal loss of life.”<sup>144</sup> That the Joint Chiefs did not initially specifically direct MacArthur to employ the available forces to mop-up these divisions seems clear. That they did not assume that MacArthur would mop-up these remnants of the occupying Japanese forces with the resources available, or were unaware of MacArthur’s operations, is unlikely given MacArthur’s daily reports. It is indicative that this matter did not warrant mention in MacArthur’s *Reminiscences*, and that the Joint Chiefs did not view the operations as an affront. Rather, they endorsed them and directed additional operations into Borneo and Brunei.<sup>145</sup> Marshall, in his Report to the Secretary of War, specifically mentioned each of these operations in positive terms.<sup>146</sup> While these operations have been cited as examples

---

<sup>142</sup> *Ibid*, 501.

<sup>143</sup> *Ibid*, 502.

<sup>144</sup> *Ibid*, 501-502.

<sup>145</sup> *Ibid*, 501; MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 293-296.

<sup>146</sup> Marshall, 236-237

of MacArthur placing his troops at unnecessary risk, MacArthur's "intense aversion" to exposing his troops to unnecessary risk is well documented.<sup>147</sup> Rather, these mopping-up operations were the actions of an experienced commander minimizing the risks imposed by 23 Japanese divisions, numbering over 21,000 troops, in his rear area. Eliminating this risk through a series of brilliantly conceived and executed amphibious assault at minimum cost is testament to MacArthur's exceptional intellect and military competence. That there was an apparent miscommunication between MacArthur and the Joint Chiefs is again indicative of MacArthur's challenges with interpersonal relations.

As Supreme Commander for much of WWII, MacArthur was responsible for many of the largest, most complex, and brilliant operations of the war.<sup>148</sup> MacArthur's initial task was to defend Australia without an army or resources, and none forthcoming. MacArthur worked with the Australians to stiffen the resolve of the population, recruit and train a new army, and acquire sufficient resources to enable operations. To defend Australia, he took the unorthodox, but brilliant, decision to launch operations into the jungles of New Guinea, which dislocated the Japanese and thereby stymied their assault on Australia. Still lacking sufficient resources, MacArthur envisioned a strategy based upon the innovative concept of "hopscotching" across the Southwest Pacific, and thereby "paralyzing" the numerically and tactically superior Japanese forces. MacArthur's use of joint assets and his concept of bypassing Japanese strong points, and enveloping critical Japanese positions produced results that defied conventional attacker-defender ratios, and

---

<sup>147</sup> Hunt, 357.

<sup>148</sup> Manchester, 268, 283, 436; Ambrose, 419; Horner, 124.

resulted in significantly more gains, with significantly less casualties, than conventional wisdom contemplated.<sup>149</sup>

Finally, MacArthur's re-conquest of Leyte and Luzon was masterful in execution. His deceptions and rapid manoeuvres caught every major hostile combat unit in motion and isolated and rendered the Japanese strong points impotent. The Japanese were unable to cope with MacArthur's military genius.

Had MacArthur's military career ended at the conclusion of WWII, his soaring intellect, remarkable military competence, and overpowering sense of responsibility would have already won his place as one of America's greatest generals. However, the Korean War would again test MacArthur's genius. MacArthur was an excellent choice for the position of Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in the Southwest Pacific Area during WWII.

## **COMMANDER UNITED NATIONS COMMAND IN THE FAR EAST**

At four o'clock on the morning of 25 June 1950, the North Korean Army crossed into South Korea with the intent of conquering it within three weeks.<sup>150</sup> The attacking North Korean force consisted of eight infantry divisions, an armoured brigade, heavy artillery, and fighter aircraft.<sup>151</sup> The unexpected attack was greeted with shock in Washington, where President Harry Truman saw it as "a flagrant violation of the United

---

<sup>149</sup> Ambrose, 425; Puryear, 135, 329-330, 359-360.

<sup>150</sup> Michael Schaller, *Douglas MacArthur: The Far Eastern General* (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1989), 178; Max Hastings, *The Korean War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), 15; Halberstam, *The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War* (New York: Hyperion, 2007), 1.

<sup>151</sup> Schaller, *Douglas MacArthur: The Far Eastern General*, 178; Halberstam, *The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War*, 1; Halberstam estimates that only seven divisions of "elite" North Korean troops crossed in to the ROK on 25 June 1950.

Nations Charter.”<sup>152</sup> That the attack was a shock in Washington was, however, indicative of the Truman administration’s misapprehension of the situation in the Asia-Pacific, and Truman’s “clumsy and ill conceived [foreign] policy.”<sup>153</sup> With South Korea and the U.S. unprepared for an unexpected war, Truman needed a general to do the seemingly impossible: to arrest the advance of the North Korean forces and safeguard America’s international reputation.

At the conclusion of WWII, MacArthur was appointed Supreme Allied Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan. In this capacity, MacArthur presided over Japan’s demilitarization and democratization.<sup>154</sup> David Halberstam and Clay Blair assert that MacArthur’s occupation and reconstruction of Japan, which included military, political, economic, and social reforms, were likely the most successful of a major defeated power in history. William Manchester attributes this success to MacArthur’s profound understanding of Far Eastern culture.<sup>155</sup> In this role, MacArthur’s brilliant and agile mind, combined with his interpersonal skills within that cultural milieu were key attributes, which enabled his success. MacArthur was in the position of Supreme Allied Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan with the North Korean Army crossed into South Korea to initiate the Korean War.

Korea occupies a strategically located peninsula on the invasion route between the historically dominant East Asian empires of China and Japan. These empires have existed in an almost continuous state of antagonism or war since before Kublai Khan’s invasion

---

<sup>152</sup> Halberstam, 89-90; Truman was actually visiting his home in Independence Missouri when he was informed of the attack.

<sup>153</sup> Hastings, *The Korean War*, 43.

<sup>154</sup> Manchester, 545; Blair, 244.

<sup>155</sup> Halberstam, 60; Manchester, 546-553, 616; Blair, 264.

fleets were swept away by the ‘heavenly wind’ in 1274 and again in 1281.<sup>156</sup> Notably amongst these conflicts was the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, which saw Japan’s occupation of Korea, and its subsequent annexation in 1910.<sup>157</sup> As both China and Japan saw Korea as the natural invasion corridor to their arch enemy’s homeland, Korea has been in an almost continuous state of military occupation.

Following Japan’s annexation of Korea, Japan occupied China in 1937. This conflict precipitated the cessation of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) ongoing revolt against the ruling Chinese Kuomintang government and its leader, Chiang Kai-shek, and resulted in the two factions waging war separately against Japan.<sup>158</sup> After the end of WWII in the Pacific, the CCP renewed its revolt against the Kuomintang, which ultimately resulted in Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist Army escaping to the Island of Formosa in 1949.<sup>159</sup> With the communist government of Mao Tse-tung in control of the strategically vital Chinese mainland and its massive population, and the American-backed Kuomintang government of Chiang exiled to the island of Formosa, the Asian-Pacific security environment was fundamentally altered.<sup>160</sup> With expansionist communist governments controlling both the Soviet Union and mainland China, the U.S.’s ability to guarantee the

---

<sup>156</sup> Gina Barnes, *China, Korea, and Japan: The Rise of Civilization in East Asia* (London: Thames and Hudson Ltd, 1993), 261.

<sup>157</sup> *Ibid*, 261; David Halberstam, 64.

<sup>158</sup> Richard Rovere and Arthur Schlesinger, *The MacArthur Controversy* (New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux, 1965) 204, 205, 207, 211; Based upon the misunderstanding that the CCP was not truly communist, at the conclusion of World War II the Truman administration proposed that a coalition government, under Chiang Kai-Shek, be formed to govern China. The Soviet Union agreed and ordered the CCP to enter into the coalition government.”

<sup>159</sup> BBC News, “Taiwan Country Profile,” last accessed 10 August 2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-16164639>; The Island of Formosa, now referred to as Taiwan, is located in the Pacific Ocean 130 kilometres off the east coast of mainland China.

<sup>160</sup> Rovere and Schlesinger, *The MacArthur Controversy*, 212; Mao Tse-tung was the Chairman of the Communist Party of China.

security of its allies and possessions, and to influence actions in the Asia-Pacific was diminished.

The post-WWII handling of the Korean Peninsula by the Allied powers had been inadequate. The ‘Big Four’ had discussed the disposition of Korea at Cairo in 1943, but the matter was dropped. At the Potsdam Conference, in July 1945, the Allied powers agreed that Korea would be liberated by both American and Soviet troops; however, the details of how the liberation would occur and how Korea would be administered remained unsettled.<sup>161</sup> On 9 August 1945, Soviet troops landed on Korea’s northern tip, and a month later, American troops arrived to join the Soviets in disarming the Japanese forces.<sup>162</sup> To forestall any unfortunate encounters between U.S. and Soviet troops, the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel was established as the administrative dividing line that separated the U.S. and Soviet occupation areas of Korea.<sup>163</sup> The unintended political and security ramifications of this hastily established “temporary” administrative division of Korea began shortly after it was instituted.

In the north, the Soviets immediately established the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) in Pyongyang, with a Red Army major, Kim Il Sung, as premier. In the south, the Republic of Korea (South Korea) was established, with Syngman Rhee leading it from Seoul.<sup>164</sup> The UN subsequently adopted a resolution calling for peninsula-wide general elections and reunification in 1948, but the Soviets and

---

<sup>161</sup> Manchester, 637; Hastings, 26.

<sup>162</sup> Manchester, 637, 638; Hastings, 28.

<sup>163</sup> Hastings, 27; The geopolitical division of Korea was decided in haste by “several one-star generals [who hurried] into an office at the Pentagon with the statement, ‘we have got to divide Korea ... by four o’clock this afternoon;’” Manchester, 639.

<sup>164</sup> Manchester, 638; Hastings, 32.

North Koreans refused to allow elections north of the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel.<sup>165</sup> This action directly contravened the UN resolution, and prevented Korea from peacefully unifying under one democratically elected government.

This dissenting action by the Soviet Union and North Korean communist regimes foretold the instability and conflict that would subsequently dominate the Korean Peninsula. In May 1946, Rhee publically stated that the security of South Korea was dependent upon U.S. policy, and implored Truman to stand-by his nation.<sup>166</sup> Without apparent regard for Rhee's appeal, in "April 1948, on the advice of the [Joint Chiefs of Staff], Truman declared that military action by either side of the divided country [of Korea] would not constitute a *casus belli* for the United States."<sup>167</sup> America's assessment of the strategic utility of Korea, and Moscow's belief in the strength of the 'ruthlessly disciplined, totalitarian Stalinist society' that it left in North Korea, led both the United States and the Soviets to withdraw their occupation forces in 1949.<sup>168</sup> Coincidentally, and to MacArthur's frustration, South Korea was removed from his area of responsibility and placed under the Department of State, which accentuated the appearance of the U.S.'s ambivalence of South Korea's defence.<sup>169</sup> By 1949, the U.S. government's permissive policy vis-à-vis the Korean Peninsula seemed apparent.

American Secretary of State Dean Acheson unambiguously reinforced this perception of U.S. Korean policy on 12 January 1950. In a speech to the National Press Club, he stated that America's "defensive perimeter runs along the Aleutians to Japan and

---

<sup>165</sup> Manchester, 638; Hastings, 41, 42.

<sup>166</sup> Manchester, 640.

<sup>167</sup> *Ibid*, 639.

<sup>168</sup> *Ibid*, 639, 640; Hastings, 41, 42, 43.

<sup>169</sup> Halberstam, 61; MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 323.



then goes to the Ryukus, ... [and] runs from the Ryukus to the Philippine Islands.”<sup>170</sup>

Acheson concluded his policy statement with the clarification that “so far as the military security of the other areas in the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that no person can guarantee those areas against military attack.”<sup>171</sup> With these statements, the U.S. was conveying the apparent message that South Korea was outside of its defensive perimeter, and the U.S. would not guarantee its security.

In addition to the apparent abandonment of its erstwhile protectorate, the Truman administration also refrained from providing South Korea with the arms that it needed to defend itself. MacArthur described South Korea’s military as a well trained, but poorly equipped constabulary force, which lacked tanks, artillery, air, and naval forces. He asserted that the State Department took the deliberate decision to underarm South Korea to prevent it from attacking North Korea, and likened it to an open invitation to North Korea to attack with its tanks, heavy artillery, and fighter aircraft.<sup>172</sup> In March 1950, the Central Intelligence Agency predicted that the North Korean army would attack in June.”<sup>173</sup> On 20 June 1950, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Omar Bradley, concluded that “an invasion of South Korea seemed imminent.”<sup>174</sup> When North Korea attacked, it should not have been a surprise. Over the preceding two years, the Truman administration’s apparent permissive Korean policy was clearly conveyed to the

---

<sup>170</sup> Rovere and Schlesinger, 100.

<sup>171</sup> *Ibid*, 100.

<sup>172</sup> MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 330.

<sup>173</sup> Manchester, 644.

<sup>174</sup> Stanley Weintraub, *MacArthur’s War: Korea and the Undoing of an American Hero* (New York: Free Press, 2000), 8; Manchester, 644; MacArthur’s G2 confirmed this assessment with the “report that a massive build-up of Red shock troops ... was under way north of the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel.”

world, and despite signs of imminent North Korean attack, the U.S. failed to reframe its policy.

North Korea's attack was predictable. Truman's response was not. Despite Truman's assurance that Korea was not of concern to the U.S., Michael Schaller and David Halberstam assert that Truman took advantage of the opportunity afforded by the attack to prove his tenacity to the Soviets and his Republican critics.<sup>175</sup> En route to the first meeting to consult with senior diplomatic and military advisors, "[Truman] told Assistant Secretary of State James Webb, 'by God, I'm going to let them have it.'"<sup>176</sup> Manchester describes Truman's decision as "a stunning reversal of [his] public policy," and questions Truman's motive for deciding to defend South Korea, which so far as the world knew had been written off by Washington.<sup>177</sup> Kim Il Sung was, understandably, stunned by Truman's reversal.<sup>178</sup> Paradoxically, U.S. official policy on the security of South Korea was decidedly dissimilar to that which had been so imprecisely and ineptly imparted to the world. Truman's actions appeared inconsistent because U.S. policy had been poorly communicated.

While U.S. diplomatic statements had stipulated that South Korea was not of strategic concern, several top secret National Security Council (NSC) policy statements reveal a different position. In April 1948, Truman approved a NSC policy that stated the "United States would not abandon the southern regime since the extension of Soviet control would enhance the political and strategic position of the Soviet Union with

---

<sup>175</sup> Schaller, 183; Halberstam, 90, 91, 97; Manchester, 648.

<sup>176</sup> Schaller, 185; Halberstam, 93.

<sup>177</sup> Manchester, 648.

<sup>178</sup> Halberstam, 50.

respect to both China and Japan.”<sup>179</sup> Inexplicably, after this policy was adopted, Truman pulled the U.S. military out of South Korea and denied it the weapons required to defend itself.

On 25 April 1950, Truman approved a second NSC policy. This second policy, known as NSC-68, specified: “the United States would resist any Red threat to non-Red nations anywhere.”<sup>180</sup> Once Truman approved NSC-68, it was classified top secret, and with the previous Korean policy, its existence was unknown to the outside world.<sup>181</sup> In Manchester’s words, “[NSC-68] should never have been kept secret. ... Unaware of it, Stalin and Kim Il Sung assumed that South Korea was ripe for the plucking.”<sup>182</sup> Had the Truman administration been clear with its Korean policy, the war would not have occurred.

Truman accentuated his administration’s vague Far Eastern foreign policy with a decision that he took within twenty-four hours of North Korean’s invasion. He directed the “Seventh Fleet to prevent any Communist attack from the mainland or any assault

---

<sup>179</sup> Schaller, 162.

<sup>180</sup> Manchester, 642; United States Department of State, “National Security Council Paper NSC-68,” last accessed 5 August 2016, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/NSC68>; NSC-68 depicted the Soviet Union as a ‘slave state’ that sought to impose its absolute authority over the world. The Report asserted that the Kremlin had already expanded its area of dominance to the point beyond which any further extension would raise the possibility that a Western coalition could not confront it. The West was, therefore, existentially challenged by Soviet Union and communism world-wide. The Report asserted that the U.S. must view the defeat of free-states anywhere in the world as a defeat everywhere, and concluded that the U.S. must contain communism from any further expansion.

<sup>181</sup> Manchester, 642; Halberstam, 178.

<sup>182</sup> As the General Secretary of the Communist Party’s Central Committee, Joseph Stalin ruled the Soviet Union from 1922 to 1953; Ronald Hingley, “Joseph Stalin,” in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, last modified 23 November 2015, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Joseph-Stalin>; The first time that a potential diametric shift in the U.S.’s South Korean security policy was made known was when John Foster Dulles, a special representative of the Secretary of State, assured the South Korean National Assembly on 17 June 1950 that South Korea “will never be alone so long as you continue to play worthily your part in the great design of human freedom;” Halberstam, 56; “Unfortunately, the language was imprecise, and Moscow, Peking, and Pyongyang, aware that the speaker’s party was out of power, ignored the warning;” Manchester, 643.

from Formosa against the mainland.”<sup>183</sup> MacArthur immediately advised Truman that positioning the Seventh Fleet in the Formosa Strait would shield the Chinese from Chiang’s Nationalist Army, and make two Chinese armies in defensive positions in South China available for intervention in Korea.<sup>184</sup> Truman ignored MacArthur’s advice, which Halberstam assesses as “a fateful [decision], much more than the United States had realised.”<sup>185</sup> With the threat from Formosa removed, and with Mao’s certain knowledge that a conflict between the U.S. and China was inevitable, Mao relished the opportunity to ‘take on’ the U.S. in a war of attrition in Korea, which was readily accessible to his vast land-based army.<sup>186</sup> In early August 1950, Mao began massing his now available armies north of the Yalu River.<sup>187</sup> Under the conditions established by Truman, the Korean Peninsula became the ideal battleground upon which Mao could personally orchestrate the actions of the massive Chinese army against the U.S. military.

That Truman did not welcome MacArthur’s advice could have been anticipated. There was considerable animosity between Truman and MacArthur. In 1945, Truman referred to MacArthur as a “Prima Donna, Brass Hat, Five Star,”<sup>188</sup> and Halberstam asserts that Truman “viscerally disliked and distrusted” him.<sup>189</sup> Additionally, Truman had publically ridiculed MacArthur on several occasions. Blair describes one instance in which Truman fabricated a version of MacArthur’s and General Jonathan Wainwright’s reunion. Truman asserted that when Wainwright entered MacArthur’s office and started

---

<sup>183</sup> MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 331; Manchester, 671; Halberstam, 93.

<sup>184</sup> Manchester, 674.

<sup>185</sup> Halberstam, 319.

<sup>186</sup> *Ibid*, 319; Manchester, 674.

<sup>187</sup> Halberstam, 338; The Yalu River delineates the Sino-Korean border.

<sup>188</sup> *Ibid*, 132.

<sup>189</sup> *Ibid*, 132-133.

to salute, MacArthur was having lunch and arrogantly said: “General, I told you I’d see you at three o’clock. I’ll see you then.”<sup>190</sup> CBS correspondent William Dunn witnessed the reunion and reported it very differently. Dunn recalled that “when MacArthur heard that Wainwright’s car had arrived, he dashed out of his office, grabbed Wainwright and embraced him with more emotion than [he] had ever seen the General display.”<sup>191</sup>

Truman’s genuine disdain for MacArthur was palatable, and would undermine their relationship by subverting trust and rendering attempts at frank discussion unproductive.

MacArthur held Truman in equal disdain. MacArthur believed that “Truman’s credentials could not have been less imposing.”<sup>192</sup> Their relationship was complicated by MacArthur’s iconic status amongst the American people, who considered him to be one of the most respected military commanders in U.S. history.<sup>193</sup> MacArthur’s subsequent success rebuilding and governing Japan marked him as one of the world’s more experienced and accomplished leaders, which heightened Truman’s hostility. While MacArthur’s accomplishments and repute antagonized Truman, MacArthur’s critical assessment of the Truman administration during his pursuit of the 1948 Republican presidential nomination rankled Truman.<sup>194</sup> Amongst other criticisms, MacArthur proclaimed that Truman was ignorant of the global security situation and was

---

<sup>190</sup> Blair, 249-250; Wainwright had been ordered by General George Marshall, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, to succeed MacArthur as U.S. Commanding General of the Philippines after MacArthur was ordered to depart the Philippines by President Franklin Roosevelt in March 1942. Wainwright had ordered the surrender of all U.S. forces in the Philippines despite having been ordered to fight on until death by MacArthur; Hunt, *The Untold Story of Douglas MacArthur*, 259-263.

<sup>191</sup> Blair, 249-250.

<sup>192</sup> Halberstam, 133.

<sup>193</sup> Manchester, 652.

<sup>194</sup> *Ibid*, 652; Schaller, 159-160.

encouraging a communist attack on South Korea.<sup>195</sup> Manchester assesses that Truman subsequently aggravated this dysfunctional relationship by acting timidly towards MacArthur, and projecting ambiguity and weakness when issuing direction to him.<sup>196</sup> It was, however, a testament to Truman's sense of responsibility that despite his personal dislike of MacArthur, he chose his most experienced Far East general, MacArthur, to command the United Nations Command in Korea.

At the commencement of the war on 25 June 1950, South Korea was under the U.S. Department of State, and was external to MacArthur's area of responsibility. With South Korea's constabulary force unable to stand against the North Korean tanks and attack aircraft, it was almost immediately evident that the U.S. would be required to intervene militarily if South Korea was to continue to exist as an independently governed state.<sup>197</sup> Despite Truman's initial aggressive posturing and his assertion that "if we don't put up a fight now, no telling what they'll do," he initially refrained from committing U.S. forces to the defence of South Korea.<sup>198</sup> Instead, he ordered the evacuation of American citizens, and the delivery of ammunition and military equipment to South Korea.<sup>199</sup> As the situation continued to deteriorate, Truman released a cable to MacArthur on 26 June 1950, in which he informed MacArthur that he would command the U.S. military action in Korea.<sup>200</sup> Thus, the U.S. again called upon MacArthur to take control of a war, which was all but lost militarily due to the Department of State's policy to restrict the armament and training of the South Korean military.

---

<sup>195</sup> Schaller, 160, 163.

<sup>196</sup> Manchester, 653.

<sup>197</sup> Ibid, 651

<sup>198</sup> Schaller, 187.

<sup>199</sup> Manchester, 648, 656; Halberstam, 93; Blair, 292.

<sup>200</sup> Hunt, 542; Blair, 292.

Relying upon his vast military experience and his professional judgement, MacArthur rapidly assessed the emerging situation on the Korean Peninsula. On 27 June, he informed the Pentagon that unless two U.S. divisions were committed to Korea immediately, it would not be possible to hold a bridgehead from which to base subsequent military operations.<sup>201</sup> Again, Truman hesitated. On 29 June, Truman finally authorised MacArthur to commit one regiment to the defence of Korea, and promised an expedient decision on the requested two divisions.<sup>202</sup> Despite ambiguous orders and inadequate resources, once Truman authorised the deployment and use of ground troops in South Korea, however, MacArthur's influence immediately began changing the nature of the war.

The skills that had served MacArthur and his Allied force in WWII were again on display. MacArthur's penchant for outwitting a powerful foe through the skilful disposition and use of his forces immediately began to stymie the North Korean advance.<sup>203</sup> In their book, *The MacArthur Controversy*, Richard Rovere and Arthur Schlesinger conclude "that he did what he had to do superbly," and Manchester concludes, "his tactics were both brilliant and unorthodox."<sup>204</sup> MacArthur rapidly restored order and transformed the South Korean Army's panicked rout into an organized delaying action that slowly ground the North Korean Army to a stand-still in a semi-

---

<sup>201</sup> Hunt, 452; Blair, 292.

<sup>202</sup> John Toland, *In Mortal Combat: Korea, 1950-1953* (New York: William Morrow and Company Inc, 1991) 67; Schaller, 189; Halberstam, 101.

<sup>203</sup> Manchester, 664; Hunt, 453-458.

<sup>204</sup> Rovere and Schlesinger, 100; Manchester, 664.

circle around the South Korean port of Pusan.<sup>205</sup> Still critically short of personnel, MacArthur's next unorthodox, but sage, decision was to increase the size of his force by thirty thousand men by instituting what he called the 'buddy system.' Under this system, each American company integrated 100 South Korean soldiers into its structure, and each American front line soldier was assigned a Korean soldier to fight beside.<sup>206</sup> MacArthur's intellectual agility and remarkable military competence had immediately changed the nature of the war. His performance to this point was flawless.

Having stemmed the North Korean onslaught, an unfortunate miscommunication not of MacArthur's doing aggravated his already strained relationship with Truman. On 30 July 1950, MacArthur cabled the Joint Chiefs of Staff to request permission to conduct a visit to Formosa, with the intent of conducting an assessment of Formosa's defences. MacArthur believed this visit to be an essential undertaking to "prevent military violence to Formosa, as [had been] directed by the President."<sup>207</sup> The Joint Chiefs responded, "feel free to go."<sup>208</sup> Following the trip, MacArthur cabled an innocuous report to the Joint Chiefs, which unexpectedly appeared in the *New York Times* on 1 August 1950.<sup>209</sup> Truman learned of the visit from reading the *Times*, and considered MacArthur's visit to have been an unauthorized, insubordinate act. He

---

<sup>205</sup> Hunt, 456; South Korea was not a member of the UN; thus, its forces were not within the UN Command. On 19 July 1950, Rhee appointed MacArthur as Commander-in-Chief of the South Korean armed forces.

<sup>206</sup> *Ibid.*, 456; Manchester, 665.

<sup>207</sup> Hunt, 460, 461; Dennis Wainstock, *Truman, MacArthur, and the Korean War* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999), 39.

<sup>208</sup> Wainstock, *Truman, MacArthur, and the Korean War*, 39.

<sup>209</sup> The Korean War and its Origins, "Douglas MacArthur's Statement Regarding His Trip to Formosa, August 1, 1950. President's Secretary's Files, Truman Papers," last accessed 7 August 2016, [https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study\\_collections/koreanwar/documents/index.php?documentdate=1950-08-01&documentid=ma-2-3&pagenumber=1](https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/koreanwar/documents/index.php?documentdate=1950-08-01&documentid=ma-2-3&pagenumber=1).



directed Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson to censor MacArthur.<sup>210</sup> Having previously sought permission, as America's Far East commander directed by the President to "prevent military violence to Formosa," MacArthur had not surpassed his authority in visiting Formosa; however, this misunderstanding fuelled Truman's antagonism and suspicion of MacArthur. MacArthur had not actually erred, but to not follow-up this perceived affront to his direct superior and Commander-in-Chief, was an error, and revealed his underdeveloped interpersonal skills.

MacArthur erred again in August 1950. MacArthur released a speech intended to be read at the Veterans of Foreign Wars convention in Chicago, which was critical of the Truman administration's decision to not include Korea and Formosa in the U.S. defensive perimeter.<sup>211</sup> When informed, Truman's immediate reaction was to fire MacArthur; however, given the critical situation in Korea, Johnson was able to dissuade Truman.<sup>212</sup> As Commander U.S. Far East Command, MacArthur was entitled, and required, to provide professional advice on defence related policy in the Far East; he should not, however, have done so publicly.<sup>213</sup> MacArthur had again erred as a result of his deficient interpersonal skills.

---

<sup>210</sup> Wainstock, 39.

<sup>211</sup> Rick Johnston, "Harry Truman's Decision to fire Douglas MacArthur came after months of insubordination," *Military History* 21, Issue 1 (April 2004): 76; MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 341.

<sup>212</sup> Blair, 299; Hunt, 463.

<sup>213</sup> Ambrose, 429; Ambrose asserts that MacArthur had the duty to disagree with Truman when Truman was wrong, but MacArthur's criticism should have been made privately; Department of National Defence, A-PA-005-000/AP-004, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations* (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy, 2005), 51; Department of National Defence, A-PA-005-000/AP-006, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading the Institution* (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy, 2007), 16; CAF leadership doctrine requires leaders to provide "judicious professional counsel concerning the deployment and use of military assets." The doctrine also, however, requires leaders to "work to maintain bonds of collegiality and mutual respect." MacArthur was obliged to advise the President on defence related

MacArthur's military performance was in stark contrast with his dealings with the President. Simultaneous with his orchestration of the allied forces' defensive actions in the vicinity of Pusan, MacArthur conceived and organized a decisive amphibious landing at the western port of Inchon, adjacent to the South Korean capital city of Seoul.<sup>214</sup> Despite resistance from the U.S. Navy, the Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of the Army, Secretary of State, and severe reservations of the President, MacArthur forced the approval of his plan through strength of personality alone.<sup>215</sup> The amphibious operation at Inchon and subsequent actions in the vicinity of Seoul and the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel, and the simultaneous Eighth Army's breakout from Pusan shattered the bulk of the North Korean Army and set the conditions for the rapid conclusion of the war.<sup>216</sup> On MacArthur's performance, Truman wrote "few operations in history can match either the delaying ..., or the brilliant maneuver which has now resulted in the liberation of Seoul."<sup>217</sup> Winston Churchill said: "I never was apprehensive of a Dunkirk in Korea. In trading space for time and in the counter-attack MacArthur did a perfect job."<sup>218</sup> Admiral William Halsey proclaimed: "characteristic and magnificent. The Inchon landing is the most masterly and audacious strategic stroke in all history."<sup>219</sup> MacArthur displayed renowned intellectual agility when envisioning the Inchon operation, tremendous intellectual capacity when planning and coordinating it, and ample interpersonal skills in obtaining approval to launch it.

---

policy in his area of responsibility; although, he should have done so in a manner that would have maintained bonds of collegiality and mutual respect.

<sup>214</sup> Hunt, 470-471; Blair, 305-308.

<sup>215</sup> McCullough, *Truman*, 797, 798; MacArthur, *Reminiscence*, 346-352; Manchester, 686-688.

<sup>216</sup> Blair, 305-307; McCullough, 798-799; MacArthur, *Reminiscence*, 354-355.

<sup>217</sup> Harry Truman, *Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company Inc, 1956), 360.

<sup>218</sup> MacArthur, *Reminiscence*, 357.

<sup>219</sup> *Ibid*, 357.

Having regained all lost territory and all but destroyed the North Korean army, MacArthur exhibited uncharacteristic caution and restrained his UN and South Korean force from venturing north of the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel. According to Manchester, “[MacArthur] was cautious. ... He wanted precise orders before pressing northward.”<sup>220</sup> Aware that Truman’s decision to blockade Formosa enabled Mao to shift as many as two armies into Manchuria, and understanding that China would never feel secure if it believed that the US controlled the historic invasion route, MacArthur “called upon the commander-in-chief of the North Korean forces to cease hostilities ‘in order that the decisions of the United Nations may be carried out without further loss of life.’”<sup>221</sup> While MacArthur advised caution, Truman’s biographer, David McCullough contends that “Truman became caught up in the spirit of the moment.”<sup>222</sup> On 27 September 1950, Truman ordered “the destruction of the North Korean Armed Forces,” and directed MacArthur to proceed north of the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel, but “not to carry the fight beyond the Chinese or Soviet borders of North Korea.”<sup>223</sup> MacArthur’s keen intellect and extensive knowledge of the Far Eastern cultures had enabled his astute judgment in restraining his forces from venturing north of the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel.

Having received unambiguous orders from the President, the Joint Chiefs followed up Truman’s instructions with a more restrictive one. They issued the unequivocal statement that “[your] military objective is the destruction of the North

---

<sup>220</sup> Manchester, 696-697; Hunt, 456.

<sup>221</sup> MacArthur, *Reminiscence*, 358-359; Hunt 471-472.

<sup>222</sup> McCullough, 799.

<sup>223</sup> Schaller, 199; McCullough, 799; Michael Schaller asserts that “the Truman administration spurned all talk of a diplomatic solution ... [as] Truman and Acheson feared Republican criticism if they ‘compromised’ with communism;” Truman, *Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope*, 360; In his Memoirs, Truman asserts that he placed extensive restrictions on MacArthur, but this assertion is not corroborated by other period materials.

Korean armed forces. In attaining this objective, you are authorised to conduct military operations north of the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel in Korea.”<sup>224</sup> The instruction contained the caveat that MacArthur was not “to send aircraft over Sino-Russian territory, and only South Korean troops could approach the [Manchurian border].”<sup>225</sup> Two days later Defense Secretary George Marshall provided MacArthur with far greater flexibility by instructing MacArthur “to proceed north of the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel, [and be assured that] “we want you to feel unhampered strategically and tactically.”<sup>226</sup> MacArthur had received conflicting guidance, which he should have clarified. Having little confidence in Bradley, who MacArthur had rejected as a senior commander in the Pacific due to his uninspiring performance during the Battle of the Bulge, MacArthur chose to follow Marshall’s direction.<sup>227</sup> This failure to consult with Bradley and the Joint Chiefs about the conflicting direction was another example of MacArthur’s deficient interpersonal skills.

This failure to deconflict inconsistent direction was compounded three weeks later, when Truman and MacArthur met on Wake Island. Truman asked MacArthur if China would intervene in the war.<sup>228</sup> MacArthur’s response was based upon the intelligence available at that time, and the understanding that his operations would be unhampered strategically and tactically. According to MacArthur, he replied as follows:

My answer could only be speculative; that neither the State Department nor the Central Intelligence Agency reported any evidence of intent by the Peiping government to intervene with major forces; but that my own local intelligence reported heavy concentrations near the Yalu border in Manchuria; that my own military estimate was that with our largely

---

<sup>224</sup> MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 358.

<sup>225</sup> Manchester, 697.

<sup>226</sup> Schaller, 201, 202; Manchester, 697, 698, 799.

<sup>227</sup> *Ibid.*, 682-683.

<sup>228</sup> McCullough, 802.

unopposed air forces, with their potential capability of destroying, at will, bases of attack and lines of supply north as well as south of the Yalu, no Chinese military commander would hazard the commitment of large forces upon the Korean peninsula.<sup>229</sup>

Given that MacArthur's assessment was based upon employing air power against bases and lines of supply in Manchuria, Truman's decision not to mention, or to discuss the implications of, his intention to forbid the use of air power in Manchuria should China attack displayed poor judgement. Truman's recollection of the discussion confirms that MacArthur stated his intent to employ air power north of the Yalu to halt any Chinese intervention.<sup>230</sup> Had Truman been forthright about his intentions to restrict the use of air power, MacArthur's response would have differed, which would have precipitated a much required earnest discussion. MacArthur had not considered the possibility that Truman's response to a Chinese attack would vary considerably from his response to North Korea's attack.<sup>231</sup> Regardless, MacArthur had the duty to confirm Truman's intent. That he did not effectively communicate with Truman can again be attributed to a lack of interpersonal skills.

Due to faulty communications between Truman and MacArthur on 30 September, the South Korean forces crossed the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel on 3 October. The UN forces followed on 9 October.<sup>232</sup> China's Foreign Minister, Chou En-lai, informed India's ambassador to China that "if American troops (as distinct from the South Korean

---

<sup>229</sup> MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 362.

<sup>230</sup> McCullough, 804.

<sup>231</sup> Manchester, 708.

<sup>232</sup> Stanley Weintraub, *MacArthur's War: Korea and the Undoing of an American Hero* (New York: Free Press, 2000), 166-168; Schaller, 202; Schaller and Hunt state that the South Korean forces crossed the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel on 1 October. This discrepancy is likely attributable to time zone issues.

army) crossed the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel, they would “encounter Chinese resistance.”<sup>233</sup> Truman and Acheson regarded Chou’s warning as posturing with the United Nations, and disregarded it.<sup>234</sup> In this instance, Truman’s judgement and communications skills were found wanting.

Truman’s compounded errors, rather than MacArthur’s were responsible for expanding the war. It was not until British diplomats Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean informed the Chinese leadership of Truman’s restrictions on interdicting Chinese troop concentrations and supply routes within Manchuria that the Chinese decided to send forces into Korea.<sup>235</sup> Chinese General, and Politburo member, Lin Piao, asserted: “I would never have made the attack [into Korea] and risked my men and military reputation if I had not been assured that Washington would restrain General MacArthur.”<sup>236</sup> Truman’s decision to place the Seventh Fleet in the Formosa Strait, his poor communications with MacArthur, and his ill-conceived manoeuvres to limit the Korean War resulted in the war’s escalation. MacArthur was not to blame for the expansion of the war.

With the conditions set to enable Mao to orchestrate the actions of the massive Chinese army against the U.S. military under favourable conditions, the nature of the war was about to change. Unbeknownst to the U.S., Chinese forces began crossing the Korean border in strength on 18 October 1950.<sup>237</sup> In hope of ending the war before the

---

<sup>233</sup> Schaller, 202; Manchester, 700.

<sup>234</sup> Manchester, 700; Schaller, 203; McCullough, 799; Blair, 308, 309.

<sup>235</sup> Schaller, 201; Manchester, 712.

<sup>236</sup> Manchester, 712.

<sup>237</sup> Stanley Weintraub, *MacArthur’s War*, 197, 210; Halberstam, 382; Hunt 487, 488; By November, over 260,000 Chinese troops were in Korea, and another 868,000 were in Manchuria.

onset of winter, on 24 October, MacArthur ordered a general advance to the Yalu River.<sup>238</sup> On 28 October, a South Korean force nearing the Yalu River was engaged by a Chinese army unit, and over the ensuing days, elements of five of Mao's divisions were identified across northern Korea.<sup>239</sup> Allied units across northern Korea "found themselves in fierce fights with Chinese units."<sup>240</sup> In response, on 6 November, the Eighth Army pulled back and established defensive positions 50 miles south of the border, and X Corps strengthened its positions on the Changjin-Choshin reservoir.<sup>241</sup> Although established in new defensive positions, MacArthur's forces nonetheless remained in a precarious situation, which necessitated that MacArthur take a critical decision the consequences of which would alter the outcome of the war.

Relying upon his vast experience, MacArthur sought to reduce the risk posed by the presence of Chinese forces in North Korea by anchoring the allied force in a sound military and political position. Aware that the war had changed, but not aware to what extent it had changed due partially to the restricted use of air reconnaissance north of the Yalu, MacArthur concluded that the UN and South Korean forces had a fleeting opportunity to close to the Yalu River and end the war before winter.<sup>242</sup> Despite the reservations of the Joint Chiefs and the White House, MacArthur determined that a general withdrawal, or remaining in situ, would be more dangerous than advancing to disrupt, dislocate, and destroy the Chinese force before it was fully prepared to reassume

---

<sup>238</sup> Manchester, 713-714.

<sup>239</sup> *Ibid.*, 716-717; Hunt, 478-481; Weintraub, 214.

<sup>240</sup> Manchester, 717.

<sup>241</sup> *Ibid.*, 721; Weintraub, 214, 215; Simultaneously, General Peng Dehuai, Commander of China's People's Army, declared that his troops and supplies were exhausted, and concluded the Chinese counteroffensive. During these first days of China's entrance into the war, Mao had been gauging the capabilities and weaknesses of the allied force.

<sup>242</sup> Hunt, 483; Manchester, 718; MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 371.

the offensive.<sup>243</sup> MacArthur understood the criticality of the situation, and the potential outcome of the course of action upon which he was embarking.<sup>244</sup> He, however, concluded that of the options available, resuming the advance to the Yalu was the least likely course of action that the Chinese would anticipate, and the course of action that would offer the greatest potential for bringing the fight to the Chinese on other than their terms. Under the extant conditions, MacArthur's agile mind and vast experience enabled him to weigh the dangers inherent in each of the available options, and to choose a course of action that appeared counterintuitive, but ultimately saved the allied force.

To mitigate the risks posed to his force by the Chinese army already in and preparing to enter North Korea, MacArthur began instituting countermeasures intended to restrict the Chinese army's ability to prosecute sustained operations. As a precursor to the allied offensive, MacArthur ordered his air component to close the border by destroying the crossings over the Yalu River.<sup>245</sup> He intended this action to prevent further Chinese troops and supplies from entering Korea, and to isolate and facilitate the destruction of Chinese forces within Korea. Within hours of MacArthur issuing orders to commence this decisive action, Marshall sent a dispatch countermanding MacArthur's order and directing that all air strikes within five miles of the Manchurian border cease.<sup>246</sup> MacArthur was astonished by this counter-order and protested immediately.<sup>247</sup> That Mao was already fully committed to the war had still not become clear in Washington. Marshall's counter-order was precipitated by advice from the European

---

<sup>243</sup> Hunt, 483.

<sup>244</sup> *Ibid*, 484.

<sup>245</sup> MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 368.

<sup>246</sup> *Ibid*, 368.

<sup>247</sup> *Ibid*, 368.



focused Joint Chiefs, who incorrectly assumed that U.S. aircraft entering Chinese territory would elicit greater Chinese involvement in the war. The Joint Chiefs also postulated that Moscow and Peking were acting in unison, hoping to draw the U.S. into a war of attrition in Korea, which would enable the Soviets to act with impunity elsewhere.<sup>248</sup> According to David Halberstam and Manchester, however, Mao had already fully committed China to a war of attrition against the U.S. in Korea, and Moscow was nowhere near ready to risk hostilities against the U.S.<sup>249</sup> Washington's understanding of the war and the global strategic situation was deeply flawed. MacArthur's intellect, experience, and situational awareness permitted him to not only assess the regional security situation more clearly than his less gifted and overly cautious peers in Washington, but also the global strategic security situation. While Washington, through Marshall, had intended to limit the conflict, neither the Joint Chiefs nor Marshall possessed the intellect, operational experience, or situational awareness of MacArthur. As a result, their interference facilitated Mao's build-up of forces in Korea and the expansion of the war.

The air battle was also hampered by Washington's imposed restrictions on hot pursuit. This oppressive operational restriction enabled Chinese fighters to streak across the Yalu, engage South Korean and UN troops and aircraft, and flee back across the border essentially unopposed.<sup>250</sup> After receiving repeated requests to review its air policies, Washington revised its restrictions; however, hot pursuit was still prohibited,

---

<sup>248</sup> Manchester, 719.

<sup>249</sup> Halberstam, 92, 93, 319, 343; Manchester, 674, 800.

<sup>250</sup> *Reminiscences*, 365; Truman, 382.

and sufficient restrictions were left in place to prevent the border being closed.<sup>251</sup>

MacArthur privately commented: “[for] the first time in military history, a commander has been denied the use of his military power to safeguard the lives of his soldiers and safety of his army.”<sup>252</sup> MacArthur called the order “the most indefensible and ill-conceived decision ever forced on a field commander in our nation’s history.”<sup>253</sup>

Eisenhower later asserted to the press that had he been in MacArthur’s place, and received this order, he would have ignored it.<sup>254</sup> Instead, MacArthur cabled the Joints Chiefs the statement: “he could not be held responsible for what might happen unless he was given permission to bomb the Yalu bridges.”<sup>255</sup> As events revealed, despite Washington’s imposed restrictions, MacArthur’s bold approach to thwarting the Chinese attack was appropriate. MacArthur’s advance disrupted and dislocated the Chinese force before it was fully prepared to spring its trap. Truman’s restrictions on the use of air power, however, greatly reduced MacArthur’s ability to fix the Chinese army and thereby facilitated the Chinese army’s initial operations in the Korean War. MacArthur’s protests were appropriate, as was his decision to keep his criticisms private.

On 24 November, the allied forces renewed their advance to the Yalu in what MacArthur coined as a ‘reconnaissance in force.’ On the second day of the advance, ‘no

---

<sup>251</sup> *Ibid*, 369, 370; Truman, 376; Manchester, 720; MacArthur’s air contingent was authorized to fly half way across the Yalu River, which, with 1950’s technology and the hilly terrain of North Korea, made the destruction of the bridges practically unachievable, while imposing tremendous risk upon the pilots. With the restrictions of ‘not one inch into Manchuria’ and the hilly terrain flanking the Yalu River, most bridges could only be attacked from one approach, which enabled the Chinese to engage inbound bombers with their air defence systems along this approach with impunity. Lacking situational awareness and MacArthur’s intent, the Director of the CIA,

<sup>252</sup> MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 370.

<sup>253</sup> Manchester, 720.

<sup>254</sup> MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 370.

<sup>255</sup> Hunt, 480.

less than seven Chinese divisions' drove a wedge through the South Korean divisions in the centre of the allied advance, and attempted to cut Eighth Army's and X Corps' lines of communications.<sup>256</sup> MacArthur deftly orchestrated Eighth Army's and the South Korean divisions' retreat.<sup>257</sup> Within six days, MacArthur established the Eighth Army in defensive positions north of Pyongyang, with only one of its divisions having been heavily engaged, but still taking less than twenty five percent casualties.<sup>258</sup> Simultaneously, X Corps found itself surrounded in a mountainous pocket.<sup>259</sup> MacArthur, however, brilliantly orchestrated X Corps' fight to the coast, where it was extracted by the Seventh Fleet, with relatively few casualties.<sup>260</sup> Despite having achieved a ten to one numerical advantage at the decisive points, by early December 1950 both of the Chinese enveloping forces had failed, with shocking losses.<sup>261</sup> While Manchester's assessments of MacArthur's actions were routinely critical, in this instance he concluded that MacArthur's orchestration of the withdrawal was superb, and "one of his most successful feats of arms."<sup>262</sup> MacArthur again displayed extraordinary generalship despite opposition from the Joint Chiefs and interference from the Whitehouse. With a ten to one numerical advantage, the trap that the Chinese sprang on the allied forces should have been decisive. That MacArthur prematurely sprang the trap, orchestrated an orderly retreat, and re-established a coherent defence was extraordinary. It was a testament to his phenomenal intellectual capacity and military competence. It also demonstrated his capacity to positively influence his subordinates under the most trying

---

<sup>256</sup> Weintraub, 237, 238; Hunt 486, 487; Toland, 280.

<sup>257</sup> Hunt, 487, 492.

<sup>258</sup> Manchester, 728; Hunt, 486, 102, 193.

<sup>259</sup> *Ibid*, 487, 492.

<sup>260</sup> *Ibid*, 495.

<sup>261</sup> Manchester, 726, 729; Hunt, 495.

<sup>262</sup> *Ibid*, 727, 728; Hunt, 493.

conditions. MacArthur, however, failed to influence the Joint Chiefs and the President to lift the border restrictions, which compounded the threat posed by the Chinese. In the United States, MacArthur's highly effective actions during this portion of the campaign elicited considerable criticism.

Despite MacArthur's extraordinary feat of generalship, he was obliged to defend his actions. At the height of uncertainty during the retreat, the *New York Herald Tribune* proclaimed that MacArthur had made "a momentous blunder."<sup>263</sup> The *Washington Post* demanded his immediate recall, and the *London Times* reported that UN forces had been 'ingloriously crushed,' with staggering casualties.<sup>264</sup> As Manchester concludes, these reports were not in the least accurate.<sup>265</sup> While Truman eventually responded that he would never fire someone "when he is in a little trouble," in the midst of the retreat, MacArthur was compelled to devote considerable time defending himself and his command.<sup>266</sup> In one of many interviews, MacArthur vigorously asserted that he should have been permitted to employ airpower north of the Yalu, and that despite Truman's recent step back from his reunification of Korea policy: "there was no substitute for victory."<sup>267</sup> Again, MacArthur was entitled, and required, to provide professional advice to the President. He should not, however, have done so publically. Truman,

---

<sup>263</sup> Ambrose, 428; Hunt, 489.

<sup>264</sup> Ambrose, 428; Manchester, 728, 729; Hunt, 497; McCullough, 819, 822.

<sup>265</sup> The President, who was widely and warmly liked by the press, had become unnerved by the eroding situation in Korea, and "told a press conference on November 30 that nuclear bombs might be used against the enemy." While this statement "had been devastatingly foolish," it initiated a succession of condemnations of, and has been widely accredited to, MacArthur. Truman; Manchester, 729; In his Memoirs, Truman insinuates that MacArthur's wish to use air power to interdict the Chinese war effort in China could have led to the use of "atomic weapons and all." There is no evidence that MacArthur ever contemplated the use of nuclear weapons against China. MacArthur had previously condemned the use of nuclear weapons, including their use by the U.S. on Japan in 1945; Truman, 395, 415.

<sup>266</sup> McCullough, 820.

<sup>267</sup> Ambrose, 428; Blair, 328.

understandably, responded with a general order requiring that all statements on foreign policy be cleared through the State Department.<sup>268</sup> MacArthur's weak interpersonal skills had again precipitated a significant error. MacArthur should have discussed his misgivings with the President's war restrictions and foreign policy directly with the President, and not through the press. The President's capacity to weather MacArthur's increasingly vocal criticisms was understandably diminishing.

Having stymied the Chinese main attack, and their best opportunity to decisively win the war, MacArthur began exploring options to regain the initiative and push the Chinese back. The Chinese, however, launched another offensive on New Year's Day in 1951 that temporarily forced the abandonment of Seoul. Seoul was recaptured by North Korean forces on 14 March 1951.<sup>269</sup> This Chinese attack captured the attention of the world, and briefly precipitated planning by MacArthur and his staff to evacuate the Korean Peninsula. MacArthur's strategy of continuously attriting the Chinese force, and constantly attacking its lines of communications, however, caused the Chinese force to lose momentum. MacArthur subsequently ordered the Eighth Army' to retake Seoul via a complex three prong attack, which encountered only light resistance. MacArthur used this Chinese attack to attempt to manipulate the Joint Chiefs into sending additional resources to Korea. At this point, instead of communicating directly with the President and clearly articulating his intent and requirements, MacArthur attempted an inappropriate massive manipulation of the Joint Chiefs.

---

<sup>268</sup> *Ibid*, 329; Ambrose, 429.

<sup>269</sup> MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 383, 384.

Coincidental with halting the Chinese advance below the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel, MacArthur recognised the weakening of Chinese forces. He commenced a blatant and ill-conceived attempt to manipulate Washington into strengthening Eighth Army, to set the conditions for a general offensive into North Korea.<sup>270</sup> As MacArthur's long-range planning to reunite the country began in earnest, he was informed that Truman would be calling for a cease-fire in Korea in order to discuss conditions of settlement.<sup>271</sup> MacArthur saw this action as nothing less than defeat, and, according to Halberstam, he set out to sabotage it.<sup>272</sup> Despite full knowledge of the risks of personal censure, MacArthur released a public statement on 24 March 1951 in which he explained the weakness and vulnerabilities of the Chinese military, and stressed the suffering of the North Korean people and the consequences to the North Korean people and the world of acquiescing to the continued division of Korea into free and slave states.<sup>273</sup> Rather than discuss this release and his opinion directly with MacArthur, Truman had General Omar Bradley remind MacArthur of his previous general order requiring that all statements on foreign policy be cleared through the State Department.<sup>274</sup> Again, both Truman and his direct subordinate in the Far East, MacArthur, failed to communicate with each other.

Despite Bradley's reminder, within two weeks of releasing his 24 March 1951 statement on Truman's call for a cease-fire, MacArthur again publically criticized Truman's policies. MacArthur penned a letter to Joseph Martin, Minority Leader of the

---

<sup>270</sup> *Ibid*, 384; Blair, 331, 332; Hunt 507; Manchester, 729, 738-749; MacArthur exaggerated the threat to the UN forces in Korea to force the Joint Chiefs to reinforce Eighth Army. This blatant and opaque manipulation eroded support amongst the Joint Chiefs of Staff, whose parochial inclinations, European focus, and conventional predispositions restricted their perspectives and visions.

<sup>271</sup> Blair, 334, 335.

<sup>272</sup> Halberstam, 599.

<sup>273</sup> Hunt, 508, 509; Truman, 440.

<sup>274</sup> Truman, 443.

U.S. House of Representatives, in which he again presented his dissenting view of U.S. foreign policy in the Far East.<sup>275</sup> On 10 April 1951, Truman relieved MacArthur due to his inability “to give his whole-hearted support to the policies of the United States Government.”<sup>276</sup> MacArthur’s poor interpersonal skills had clearly failed him.

Truman was entirely within his authority to both seek a diplomatic solution and to fire MacArthur. MacArthur, however, had the duty to advise the President, and to vehemently disagree with him. He did not, however, have the right to do so openly. MacArthur showed great courage in expressing his opinions, particularly in the manner in which he chose to express it. While he was ethically correct to have stood by his beliefs, he was professionally incorrect to have done so openly. MacArthur’s appropriate action would have been to express his opinion directly to the President, and to have resigned. MacArthur’s weakness, his underdeveloped interpersonal skills, had finally led to his demise.

The Korean War, as viewed from the Truman-MacArthur perspective, was one of a poorly advised and ineffectual president and a highly intelligent, extremely experienced and accomplished, but arrogant and socially inept general. Although Truman’s mistakes were many and severe, his greatest shortcoming was his failure to develop a trusted relationship and communicate openly with his direct subordinate in the Far East. MacArthur’s greatest shortcoming was his failure to develop a trusted relationship and communicate openly with his direct superior in the Whitehouse.

---

<sup>275</sup> Ambrose, 429; Hunt, 512.

<sup>276</sup> *Ibid.*, 512; Truman, 449.

MacArthur's soaring intellect and vast experience enabled insights, vision, and operational prowess that altered the course of the Korean War. His personal interventions halted the North Korean conquest of South Korea, dislocated and destroyed the North Korean forces via a daring amphibious landing at Inchon, halted the subsequent Chinese invasion of Korea, and set the conditions for the re-conquest of North Korea. MacArthur's greatest accomplishment was to achieve these military feats with remarkably few casualties.<sup>277</sup> MacArthur's dealings with Truman and the Joint Chiefs, however, displayed interpersonal ineptitude, arrogance, and insubordination. It was unfortunate for the allies that as Secretary of Defense, Marshall was no longer in a position in which he could moderate, steer, and shield MacArthur.

MacArthur's advice was astute, and he was correct in offering it. His public approach to offering advice was, however, unacceptable. Truman was correct to have relieved MacArthur. It is, however, doubtful that any other general could have twice turned the tide of the Korean War and saved the UN and South Korean forces. Despite MacArthur's public criticisms of U.S. foreign policy, he was an excellent choice for the position of Commander UN Command in the Far East during the Korean War.

## **CONCLUSION**

MacArthur was an excellent choice for the positions of Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in the Southwest Pacific Area during WWII and Commander UN Command in the Far East during the Korean War. MacArthur's early life and military

---

<sup>277</sup> Manchester, 774; approximately three-fourths of U.S. casualties suffered during the Korea War occurred after MacArthur's recall.



career up to the point at which he was appointed Supreme Commander in the Southwest Pacific established the personal and professional attributes that enabled him to realise the remarkable achievements that marked his influence on the U.S. and the Asia-Pacific. MacArthur's interpersonal skills, intellect, military competency, and sense of responsibility set the conditions upon which his performance during WWII in the Pacific and the Korean War was enabled. His interpersonal skills, however, ultimately led to his demise. A review of MacArthur's methodologies, achievements, and contributions to the Allied effort in the Asia-Pacific during WWII and in Korea during the Korean War through examination of these personal and professional attributes provides an instructive model for successful generalship in the Far East.

As Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in the Southwest Pacific Area for much of WWII, MacArthur was responsible for many of the largest, most complex, and brilliant operations of the war. MacArthur's defence of Australia revealed acute intellectual agility. Rather than defend Australia in Australia, a task for which he had clearly insufficient resources, MacArthur assembled and trained an army, and took the unorthodox, but wise, decision to launch operations into the jungles of New Guinea. While his unexpected decision to launch this operation into New Guinea shocked his disbelieving staff, it also dislocated the numerically superior Japanese force and stymied the Japanese advance on Australia. Still lacking sufficient resources, MacArthur executed a brilliantly innovative strategy of "hopscotching" across the Southwest Pacific, and thereby "paralyzing" the numerically and tactically superior Japanese forces. MacArthur's agile mind and vast military experience enabled him to adapt and innovate. His expert use of joint assets and his concept of bypassing Japanese strong points, and

enveloping critical Japanese positions, produced results that defied conventional attacker-defender ratios, and resulted in significantly more gains, with significantly fewer casualties, than conventional wisdom contemplated.

Clearly demonstrative of his exceptional intellect and military competence, MacArthur's re-conquest of Leyte and Luzon was masterful. His deceptions and lightning manoeuvres caught every major Japanese unit in motion, and isolated and rendered their strong points impotent. The Japanese were unable to cope with MacArthur's military genius, which resulted in their numerically superior force being so outmanoeuvred that they became powerless as a formed military force.

Pervading MacArthur's brilliantly envisioned and executed operations; however, was an unfortunate series of miscommunications and interpersonal blunders, which revealed MacArthur's weakness. While his military exploits were remarkably successful, his underdeveloped interpersonal skills often precipitated derision amongst the field force, and strained relations with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Despite his interpersonal challenges, MacArthur's soaring intellect, exquisite military competence, and bounding sense of responsibility for the lives of his men rendered him an exceptional commander. MacArthur was an excellent choice for the position of Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in the Southwest Pacific Area during WWII.

In Korea, MacArthur was thrust into a situation created by the Truman administration's appalling diplomatic and military policies. While U.S. diplomatic statements clearly stipulated that South Korea was not of strategic concern, several classified NSC policy statements revealed the opposing position. Had Truman's Korean

policy been clear, the Korean War would likely not have occurred. The Truman Administration also bungled South Korea's defence. First, it removed it from MacArthur's area of responsibility, and then took the decision to equip and train its military as a constabulary force. The Truman administration then enabled China to mass its armies in Manchuria by blockading Formosa, and later unknowingly encouraging the Chinese to send forces into Korea by making it known that MacArthur would be restrained.

Once thrust into this diplomatic and military quagmire, MacArthur's influence was immediately felt. MacArthur's genius fundamentally altered the war, turning two potential military catastrophes into successes, and twice creating the conditions for allied victory. MacArthur's dealings with Truman and the Joint Chiefs, however, displayed social ineptitude, arrogance, impatience, and insubordination. MacArthur's advice to President Truman was astute, and he was correct in offering it. However, his public approach to offering advice was clearly unacceptable. Without Marshall in a position to moderate and shield him, MacArthur's deficient interpersonal skills proved to be his undoing. While MacArthur's personal and professional attributes were impressive, his tumultuous relationships with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and with Truman underscored his generalship, and revealed his Achilles' heel, which ultimately led to his relief. It is, however, doubtful that any other general could have saved the UN and South Korean forces in Korea.

MacArthur's actions throughout his career, but most notably as Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in the Southwest Pacific Area during WWII, and

Commander UN Command in the Far East during the Korean War, won him wide recognition as a great general. His singular soaring intellect, agile mind, vast experience, and personal familiarity with the region in which he was operating were keys to his success, and mark the personal and professional attributes required of a successful commander in the Asia-Pacific.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Addington, Larry, *The Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth Century*. Bloomington: Indiana University, 1984.
- Ambrose, Stephen A. "General of the Army Douglas C. MacArthur." In *The War Lords: Military Commanders of the Twentieth Century*, edited by Field Marshal Sir Michael Carver, 419-430. Great Britain: Cox and Wyman Ltd., 1976.
- BBC News. "Taiwan Country Profile." Last accessed 10 August 2016.  
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-16164639>.
- Barnes, Gina. *China, Korea, and Japan: The Rise of Civilization in East Asia*. London: Thames and Hudson Ltd, 1993.
- Barris, Ted. *Deadlock in Korea: Canadians at War 1950-1953*. Toronto: Thomas Allen Publishers, 2010.
- Beckman, Kyle. "Personality and Strategy: How the Personalities of General MacArthur and Admiral King Shaped Allied Strategy in the Pacific in World War Two." Master's thesis, U.S. Command and General Staff College, 2002.
- Bianco, Lucien. *Origins of the Chinese Revolution, 1915-1949*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1971.
- Blair, Clay. *MacArthur*. Markham, ON: Kangaroo Book, 1977.
- Bradford, Jeffery. "MacArthur, Inchon and the Art of Battle Command." *Military Review* Volume 81, Issue 2 (March-April 2001): 83-86.
- Canada, Department of National Defence. A-PA-005-000/AP-001, *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*. Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy, 2009.
- Canada, Department of National Defence. A-PA-005-000/AP-004, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*. Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy, 2005.
- Canada, Department of National Defence. A-PA-005-000/AP-006, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading the Institution*. Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy, 2007.
- Carew, Tim. *The Korean War: The Story of the Fighting Commonwealth Regiments 1950-1953*. London: Pan Books Ltd, 1967.
- Catchpole, Brian. *The Korean War, 1950-53*. London: Constable, 2000.

- Chindits Veterans Association. "Chindits Special Force Burma 1942-1944." Last accessed 10 August 2016. <http://www.chindits.info/Longcloth/Main.htm>.
- Crosman, Donna. "General of the Army Douglas MacArthur: The Pacific Campaign." Joint Command and Staff Programme Paper, Canadian Forces College, 2014.
- Cumings, Bruce. *The Korean War: A History*. New York: Modern Library, 2010.
- Dunn, Joe. "On Legacies and Lessons: The Literature and the Debate." In *The American War: Lessons, Legacies, and Implications for Future Conflicts*, edited by Lawrence Grinter and Peter Dunn, 7-12. New York: Greenwood Press, 1987.
- Falk, Stanley. *Decisions at Leyte*. New York: Berkley Publishing, 1966.
- Fairbank, John. *The Great Chinese Revolution: 1800-1985*. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1986.
- Halberstam, David. *The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War*. New York: Hyperion, 2007.
- Hastings, Max. *The Korean War*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987.
- Heefner, Wilson. "The Inch'on Landing." *Military Review* 75, Issue 2 (March/April 1995): 65-77.
- Hickey, Michael. *The Korean War: The West Confronts Communism, 1950-1953*. New York: Overlook, 2001.
- Hingley, Ronald. "Joseph Stalin," in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. Last modified 23 November 2015. <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Joseph-Stalin>.
- Horner, David. "General MacArthur's War: The South and Southwest Pacific Campaigns 1942-45." In *The Pacific War Companion: From Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima*, edited by Daniel Marston, 123-139. Great Britain: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 2005.
- Hoyt, Edwin P. *Japan's War: The Great Pacific Conflict, 1853 to 1952*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1986.
- Hunt, Frazier. *The Untold Story of Douglas MacArthur*. New York: Devin-Adair Company, 1954.
- Ickes, Harold L. "Harry S. Truman is President." *New Republic* 123, no. 11 (September 11, 1950): 17-18.
- Johnston, Rick. "Harry Truman's Decision to fire Douglas MacArthur came after months of insubordination." *Military History* 21, Issue 1 (April 2004): 74-77.
- Kennan, George. *The Long Telegram. Moscow: 861.00/2 – 2246*, 22 February 1946, 9 PM.

- Krepinevich, Andrew. *The Army in Vietnam*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1988.
- Lagace-Roy, Daniel. "Ethics." In *The Military Leadership Handbook*, edited by Bernd Horn and Robert Walker, 261-274. Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2008.
- Lesh, Bruce. "Limited War or a Rollback of Communism?: Truman, MacArthur, and the Korean Conflict." *OAH Magazine of History* 22, Issue 4 (October 2008): 47-53.
- MacArthur, Douglas. *On War*. London: Lowe & Brydone Printers Ltd, 1943.
- MacArthur, Douglas. *Reminiscences: General of the Army Douglas MacArthur*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964.
- MacArthur, Douglas. *Reports of General MacArthur: The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966.
- Maihafer, Harry. "Message to MacArthur." *American History* 31, Issue 2 (May/June 1996): 28-37.
- Manchester, William. *American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964*. New York: Back Bay Books, 1978.
- Marshall, General of the Army George C. *Biennial Report of the Chief of the United States Army July 1, 1939 to June 30, 1941 to the Secretary of War*. New York: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1947.
- Marshall, General of the Army George C. *Biennial Report of the Chief of the United States Army July 1, 1941 to June 30, 1943 to the Secretary of War*. New York: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1947.
- Marshall, General of the Army George C. *Biennial Report of the Chief of the United States Army July 1, 1943 to June 30, 1945 to the Secretary of War*. New York: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1947.
- McCullough, David. *Truman*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992.
- Medley, John. *Korea: Canada's Forgotten War*. Toronto: MacMillan, 1983.
- Milkowski, Stanlis. "To the Yalu and Back." *Joint Force Quarterly* 28 (Spring 2001): 38-46.
- Miller, John. "MacArthur and the Admiralties." In *Command Decisions*, edited by Kent Roberts, 287-302. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960.
- Morgan, Ted. *Valley of Death – The Tragedy at Dien Bien Phu that led America into the Vietnam War*. New York: Random House, 2010.

- Morris, Seymour. *Supreme Commander: MacArthur's Triumph in Japan*. New York: Harper Collins, 2014.
- Nagl, John. *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005.
- New Republic. *Editorial*. 11 September 1950.
- Perry, Mark. *The Most Dangerous Man in American: The Making of Douglas MacArthur*. New York: Basic Books, 2014.
- Pigeau, Ross, and Carol McCann. "Re-conceptualizing Command and Control." *Canadian Military Journal* 3, No. 2 (2002): 53-64.
- Puryear, Edgar F., Jr. *19 Stars: A Study in Military Character and Leadership*. New York: Random House Publishing Group, 1971.
- Richardson, Colonel William. *Valleys of Death*. New York: Berkley Caliber, 2010.
- Rovere, Richard, and Arthur Schlesinger. *The MacArthur Controversy*. New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux, 1965.
- Schaller, Michael. *Douglas MacArthur: The Far Eastern General*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.
- Smith, Robert, "Luzon Versus Formosa." In *Command Decisions*, edited by Kent Roberts, 461-477. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960.
- Spector, Ronald. *Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan*. New York: Vintage Book, 1985.
- Stockner, Matthew. "The Ingrained Leadership of Douglas MacArthur." *URL* Volume III, Issue II (Winter 2013): 16-25.
- The Korean War and its Origins. "Douglas MacArthur's Statement Regarding His Trip to Formosa, August 1, 1950. President's Secretary's Files, Truman Papers." Last accessed 7 August 2016.  
[https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study\\_collections/koreanwar/documents/index.php?documentdate=1950-08-01&documentid=ma-2-3&pagenumber=1](https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/koreanwar/documents/index.php?documentdate=1950-08-01&documentid=ma-2-3&pagenumber=1).
- Thompson, Robert Smith. *Empires on the Pacific: World War II and the Struggle for the Mastery of Asia*. New York: Basic Books, 2001.
- Toland, John. *In Mortal Combat: Korea, 1950-1953*. New York: William Morrow and Company Inc, 1991.



- Truman, Harry. *Memoirs: Years of Decision*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company Inc, 1955.
- Truman, Harry. *Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company Inc, 1956.
- Truman, Harry. Speech. "Dismissal of MacArthur from Duty," 4 November 1951.
- United States Department of State. "National Security Council Paper NSC-68." Last accessed 5 August 2016. <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/NSC68>.
- Wainstock, Dennis. *Truman, MacArthur, and the Korean War*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999.
- Weber, Donovan. *The Road to Burma*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003.
- Weintraub, Stanley. *15 Stars: Eisenhower, MacArthur, Marshall: Three Generals Who Saved the American Century*. New York: Free Press, 2007.
- Weintraub, Stanley. *MacArthur's War: Korea and the Undoing of an American Hero*. New York: Free Press, 2000.
- Yap, Yong, and Arthur Cotterell. *Chinese Civilization: from the Ming Revival to Chairman Mao*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977.