FINDING THE RIGHT BALANCE OF STABILITY TO COMBAT CAPABILITY IN THE CANADIAN ARMY’S TRAINING SYSTEM

Major David Hill

Disclaimer

Opinions expressed remain those of the author and do not represent Department of National Defence or Canadian Forces policy. This paper may not be used without written permission.

© Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2014.
DIRECTED RESEARCH PROJECT

FINDING THE RIGHT BALANCE OF STABILITY TO COMBAT CAPABILITY IN THE CANADIAN ARMY’S TRAINING SYSTEM

By Major David Hill

4 May 2014

This paper was written by a student attending the Canadian Forces College in fulfilment of one of the requirements of the Course of Studies. The paper is a scholastic document and thus contains facts and opinions which the author alone considered appropriate and correct for the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of any agency, including the Government of Canada and the Canadian Department of National Defence. This paper may not be released, quoted or copied, except with the express permission of the Canadian Department of National Defence.

Word Count: 17367
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTENTS</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table of Contents</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapters:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Introduction</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Literature Review &amp; Contextual Framework</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The Canadian Army:</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Land Forces 2021: <em>Adaptive Dispersed Operations</em></td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Canadian Army Training: <em>Four Initiatives to Improve Capacity</em></td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The Peace Support Training Centre: <em>Increasing Throughput</em></td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. An Advanced COIN Course: <em>A Gap in Canadian Individual Training</em></td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Enhancing the Self-Development Pillar: <em>Reinvigorating Systems</em></td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. International Military Training: <em>Army Support to Defence Diplomacy</em></td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Risks and Benefits: <em>Institutional Friction versus Qualitative Readiness</em></td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Conclusion: <em>A Holistic Assessment of Stability Capability</em></td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Thanks:

The Author was fortunate to receive substantial feedback and assistance in the process of writing this Essay - thanks to all for your time and patience! The following people in particular dedicated time to facilitate my research and discuss relevant concepts: Dr Walter Dorn, Lieutenant-Colonel D. Beyer, Lieutenant-Colonel R. Ritchie, Colonel P. Kelley, Colonel G. Smith, Colonel R. Cotton, Brigadier-General J. Simms, Brigadier-General L. Thomas and many other Joint Command and Staff peers and instructors. Their experience, comments and opinions were invaluable - any omissions or errors rest with me alone.

Special thanks to both my academic advisor, Dr. Craig Stone for his sage council and to my family for the constant encouragement throughout this academic year.
ABSTRACT:

The Canadian Army, in reconstitution from a decade of operations in Afghanistan, is re-emphasizing war-fighting in its training systems. This model has been argued to be effective, especially since the end of the Cold War. Many professionals and academics alike have suggested that the 'train for war, scale back for Stability Operations' model is the best fit for the Canadian Army. Although it has worked, it is sub-optimal. With the Future Security Environment assessing that operations in failed and failing states will continue, and an operational trend analysis demonstrating that Stability Operations will likely continue to be the norm for the Canadian Army, it is prudent to re-assess the best model to prepare for the full-spectrum of possible future operations. From a training perspective, this essay argues that there are four initiatives that could enhance the Canadian Army's ability to conduct Stabilization Operations without compromising its core war-fighting capability: by increasing throughput on Peace Support Training Centre courses, in the development of an Advanced Counter-Insurgency course, by reinvigorating the Self-Development pillar of Professional Development and by enhancing the Army's involvement in the International Military Training Programme. These initiatives would require a moderate resource investment; however, it would be scalable and the advantages disproportionately greater than the resource bill. These recommendations are aligned with public perception on the Army's role, increase ‘qualitative’ readiness, improve current training orientation to key doctrine, specifically Land Forces 2021: Adaptive Dispersed Operations, enhance key soldier skills and would facilitate the institutionalization of stability lessons learned from the 90s to the present.
CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCTION

No longer will the Canadian Forces be fixed on preparing for conventional, nation-state versus nation-state conflict. Now and for the foreseeable future, the fight against the bear will be the exception. Instead, we will shift focus to dealing with failed and failing states and their inherent complexities. The fight against the ‘ball of snakes’ will be the norm.

- Brigadier-General Wayne Eyre

A Crisis in Zefra is a fictional hypothesis of how the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) could see itself operationalized in the 2021+ timeframe. It superimposes a concept of Adaptive and Dispersed Operations (ADO) onto a Future Security Environment (FSE) envisaging a failed city-state with a combination of conventional and asymmetric threats alongside a humanitarian crisis. This ADO concept has been designed by army staff in order to best align the Canadian Army's technical capabilities through a network centric approach that allows dispersed groupings to react in near-real time to situations by reaching back to headquarters-based enablers, thereby out-pacing the adversary. This is the vision; but is the Army’s evolution to ADO on track to meet both its developmental milestones and true operational effectiveness?

This essay argues that Canada’s Army can and should amend aspects of its training systems in order to improve its Stabilization Operations capability remit to the

---

Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS). It will first answer the question, why change the status quo? Next, the concept of how to enhance the Army's training systems will be discussed. There are four specific sub-sets of training that will be examined. First, existing capacity for peace-support oriented Individual Training (IT) could be expanded. Opportunity exists on courses controlled by the Peace Support Training Centre that, if production was increased, would augment line unit effectiveness. Second, the development of an Advanced Counter-Insurgency (COIN) course would enhance specialized soldier skills useful across the spectrum of Stability Operations. This is a capability gap in the current Army’s IT system that could be bridged with a relatively small cost, but having significantly disproportionate value in the throughput of qualified specialists, a functional Centre of Excellence (COE) and the institutionalization of stability lessons learned. Third, a powerful improvement would be to modify and modernize the Self-Development sub-system of Professional Development. This would be achieved by increasing the emphasis on the Army’s reading list and by linking it to both the Canadian Defense Academy (CDA) and Directorate of Military Careers Administration (DMCA), thus necessitating member participation for career advancement. Depending on the Army's level of ambition, this could be further enhanced by leveraging technology to develop a network centric e-learning structure that links participants and provides resources and references spanning e-books to journals to movies to video games to blogs. This is reinforced by the former Army Commander Lieutenant-General Peter Devlin's comments that, “Professional Development for

---

soldiers will receive renewed focus over the coming years."\textsuperscript{4} Finally, the International Military Training concept for developing the soldiers and officers of other nation's armies could be further exploited by the Army in order to shape future activity in conjunction with the Canadian Global Engagement Strategy (GES). The following literature review sets the context to support how these four modifications to the Army's training systems should and could promote its capability for ADO in support of the CFDS without compromising on the Army's combat capability.

**Literature Review & Contextual Framework**

How should stabilization capabilities fit into the Army of 2021? This essay analyses this question from a training perspective in order to determine that there are four initiatives available for the Canadian Army to improve its capacity to conduct operations in the ‘messy-middle’ of the spectrum of conflict. Using current doctrine, and as cross-referenced to alliance partners, Stability Operations will be defined as: all operations along the spectrum of conflict from traditional Peacekeeping to counter-insurgency inclusive.\textsuperscript{5} The following are the major themes from which the four initiatives were


\textsuperscript{5} Canada. Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-000/FP-001 *Canadian Forces Joint Publication: Canadian Military Doctrine*. Ottawa: Canadian Forces Experimentation Centre, (2009): 6-13. Canada defines stability activities as "specific missions and tasks carried out by armed forces to maintain, restore, or establish a climate of order". This goes on to prescribe the inclusion of security and control (across the spectrum of conflict to include counter-insurgency), security sector reform, and support to OGDs. It stops short at combat.


**Lessons Learned**


---

United States. PCN 3000.05 *Small Wars Manual: U.S. Marine Corps*, 2009. Defines Stability Operations as “an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.”


North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO glossary of terms and definitions*, Brussels, 2013 NATO has defined Peace-Support Operations as those which impartially make use of diplomatic, civil and military means, normally in pursuit of United Nations Charter purposes and principles, to restore or maintain peace. Such operations may include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, Peacekeeping, peace-building and/or humanitarian operations. Peace-Support Operations is too narrow a term given Canada’s new precedent of preferential military support to US-led coalitions over UN-led operations. Although COIN may not be an enduring theme for Canada’s Army, it was the overarching theme of the 2000’s and given the Conservative Party’s interest in aligning with US policy over UN policy, it cannot be counted out as a potential operation in the future.

John Malevich, Briefing to Canadian Forces College, January 2014.


provide substantial insight to the Peacekeeping operations from 1991 to 9-11 with a comprehensive assessment of their effectiveness at the strategic and tactical levels. These articles discuss preparedness, structure and effectiveness for the Army; how it was often effective and how it could have been improved. The key literature regarding post 9-11 lessons are divided into two groups: secondary sources based on strategic higher-level analysis and government published documentation of lessons learned. Howard Coombs, *Afghanistan 2010-2011*,\(^{11}\) offers a historiography of the campaign arguing for the importance of a whole of government (WoG) approach to apply 'soft-power' in counter-insurgencies. The Chief of the Australian Army, Lieutenant General KJ Gillespie, *The Adaptive Army Initiative*,\(^{12}\) and his predecessor, Lieutenant General David Morrison, *Army After Afghanistan*,\(^ {13}\) describe the importance of preparing soldiers for all aspects of conflict and the transition of Australia's institutional Army given budgetary restrictions and the lessons of Afghanistan. Andy Tamas, *Warriors and Nation Builders*,\(^ {14}\) compiles an assessment of the Canadian experience and specifically, lessons learned from complex operations in Afghanistan to include Stability Operations, coalition frictions, training missions, support to police operations and domestic impacts. Mark Vinson, *Structuring the Army for Full-Spectrum Readiness* identifies many key lessons from Afghanistan in regard to the complexities involved in current Stability Operations: the importance of


tactical intelligence and human terrain, the requirement for a synchronized counter-IED
capacity to offset asymmetric threats, the value of air-land integration, the importance of
a combined-arms team and detainee management operations to name but a few.\textsuperscript{15} James
Russell, \textit{Innovation, Transformation and War}\textsuperscript{16} and Frank Ledwidge, \textit{Losing Small
Wars},\textsuperscript{17} provide opposing perspectives on the UK experience in Iraq and their lessons on
army preparedness.

Specific tactical lessons learned are captured in Dean Milner's, \textit{Whole of
Government Lessons Learned Workshop 2011},\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Task Force Kandahar COIN Best
Practices},\textsuperscript{19} \textit{The Canadian Army Critical Topics List 2011-2013}\textsuperscript{20} and its annex \textit{The
Master Observations List}.\textsuperscript{21} These documents identify the Army's assessment of priority
capabilities; specific to this essay are those training related concepts that imply a
complexity in COIN that would suggest that peacetime/reconstitution improvements to
the IT system would enhance capability. The former Canadian Army Commander,
Lieutenant-General Devlin commented in 2013, “I’ve spent an incredible amount of

\textsuperscript{15} Mark Vinson, “Structuring the Army for Full-Spectrum Readiness,” \textit{Parameters} (Summer 2000).
\textsuperscript{16} James Russell, \textit{Innovation, Transformation and War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and
\textsuperscript{17} Frank Ledwidge, \textit{Losing Small Wars: British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan}. Cornwall: T.J.
\textsuperscript{18} Dean Milner, Report on Kandahar Whole of Government Lessons Learned Workshop. NATO ISAF
Joint Task Force Afghanistan, Kandahar, 2 June 2011.
\textsuperscript{19} Dean Milner, \textit{Task Force Kandahar COIN Best Practices}. NATO ISAF Joint Task Force Afghanistan,
Kandahar 28 Dec 2010.
\textsuperscript{20} Canada. Department of National Defence, Army Critical Topics List 2011-2013. Ottawa, Canadian Army
Canada. Department of National Defence, "Lessons Synopsis Report (10-001)," Army Lessons Learned
\textsuperscript{21} Canada. Department of National Defence, Army Lessons Learned: Master Observations List. Kingston,
CADTS, 2011.
Canada. Department of National Defence, Army Lessons Learned: Key Lessons Identified. Kingston,
CADTS, 2010.
Canada. Department of National Defence, Army Lessons Learned: Priority Lessons Identified. Kingston,
CADTS, 2010.
energy and effort to pay respect to the lessons that were learned with blood in Afghanistan.”\textsuperscript{22} This denotes the command import; however, evidence exists that organizational learning has been slow.\textsuperscript{23} US key references on lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq include the Department of the Army's, \textit{Counterinsurgency lessons learned 2011},\textsuperscript{24} and \textit{Stability Operations Self-Assessment},\textsuperscript{25} as well as the Joint Coalition Operational Analysis, \textit{Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations}.\textsuperscript{26}

\textbf{Canadian Government Security Policy and Defence Strategy}

The keystone document describing Canada's military policy is \textit{The Canada First Defence Strategy}, which outlines the government's level of ambition, resourcing and priorities for defence.\textsuperscript{27} This framework highlights the six core missions and of these, two are germane to this essay: lead and/or conduct a major international operation for an extended period, and deploy forces in response to crises elsewhere in the world for shorter periods.\textsuperscript{28} This strategy is the Government of Canada’s most recent in a series of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{22} Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Peter Devlin as quoted in Murray Brewster. “Hard-won lessons of Afghan was on ‘life support’ outgoing army commander warns,” \textit{Canadian Press} (July 14, 2013): 1-2.
\item \textsuperscript{24} United States. "Counterinsurgency Lessons Learned," Fort Leavenworth: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 16 November 2011.
\item \textsuperscript{26} United States. "Decade of War: Enduring Lessons from the past decade of Operations," Joint Lessons Learned Program, Suffolk, Va. 15 June 2012.
\item \textsuperscript{28} Ibid., 4-5 The other four missions are: Routine domestic operations (including NORAD), support to a major domestic event (Pan Am games 2015), respond to a terrorist attack, support to civilian authorities in the case of a crisis in Canada (such as a natural disaster),
\end{itemize}
policies that have loosely defined Canada’s foreign and defence policy.\textsuperscript{29} The key takeaways from the CFDS are highlighted below:

Canada needs a modern, well-trained and well-equipped military with the core capabilities and flexibility to successfully address both conventional and asymmetric threats... [it must] have the necessary capabilities to make a meaningful contribution across the full spectrum of international operations, from humanitarian assistance to stabilization operations to combat... [We will] invest in people through advanced education and encouraging the continued development of a knowledge-based workforce... Through this strategy, the government is building a military that can deploy more quickly and effectively.\textsuperscript{30}

It is clear from the CFDS that it anticipates Canadian Armed Forces involvement in failed states, it demands readiness, it values the professional development of its personnel and it had best intentions for its funding and procurement. This document is slated for a reset over the next few months, but there is no indication of a substantial divergence from the above broad policy.

Joseph Jockel and Joel Sokolsky, \textit{Canada and the War in Afghanistan},\textsuperscript{31} describe the transition of Canada's Peacekeeping legacy to a more closely aligned partnership with the US for combat operations and the impacts of this, both domestically and on the international scene. Peter Jones and Philippe Lagasse, \textit{Canadian Defence planning in a time of Austerity},\textsuperscript{32} analyses the fiscal constraints and how Canada will need to make

\begin{thebibliography}{9}


\bibitem{Canada2014} \textit{Canada First Defence Strategy}, 18.

\bibitem{Jockel2008} Joseph Jockel and Joel Sokolsky. Canada and the War in Afghanistan: NATO’s odd man out steps forward,” \textit{Journal of Transatlantic Studies} 6, no. 1 (April 2008).

\bibitem{Jones2012} Peter Jones and Philippe Lagasse. “Rhetoric versus reality: Canadian defence planning in a time of austerity” \textit{Defense and Security Analysis} 28, no. 2 (2012).
\end{thebibliography}
hard decisions about procurement and capability, specifically in relation to stability capability for the near future. A highly relevant assessment of the current strategic outlook is the The Conference of Defence Associations Institute's, *The Strategic Outlook for Canada: The Search for Leadership 2014*, which assesses the Defence lobbyists' perspective of how Canada could best operationalize its military to face the next threats.

The current political aspirations for Army employment are captured in their respective policy platforms. The Liberal party of Canada has identified Peace-Support Operations under the UN as the primary function of the CAF. The official opposition, the New-Democratic Party have stated their perspective that, “the primary purpose of the Canadian Forces is Peacekeeping, defence and support during emergencies.” This is aligned with a large proportion of Canadian's who see Peacekeeping as the primary goal to Canada's international contribution. The Conservative platform is more nebulous; they have tended to lean towards supporting US-coalition operations rather than UN-led Peacekeeping, however with the withdrawal from Afghanistan and a reset of the CFDS on the horizon, clarity will likely remain murky until at least the 2015 Federal election. This could translate to a neo-isolationist policy, or conversely to providing support to regions that provide relief for the US, such as Mali or Haiti.

---

34 Liberal party website. https://www.liberal.ca/what-we-stand-for/
The implication is that the Army must continue to instill a Stability-Operation capability in order to maximize its relevance and its potential for mission success. Despite low popular support for the Afghanistan mission, maintaining a relatively large peace-time army is a very expensive investment. This alone will pressure the government and DND to look for options to gain political capital; in the absence of overwhelming public support for an option, the government will likely prefer lower risk options such as traditional Peacekeeping or International Military Training type operations to COIN. However, any of these operations would require individual stability skills that would be developed through the initiatives espoused here-in, especially given the uncertainty of the Future Security Environment (FSE).

The Future Security Environment

“Fragile and failed states will almost certainly remain a condition of the global environment in the coming decades.” This assessment by DND, The Future Security Environment, is globally accepted amongst academic and military analysts alike. Canada’s Army has internalized the probability of operations in failed states in its keystone doctrine manual, Land Operations 2021, Adaptive-Dispersed Operations.

---

(ADO). In this, Army strategists concur that current trends such as, “globalization, rapid scientific and technological innovation, demographic change, shifting regional power balances and the growing prominence of non-state actors,” are changing the paradigm away from traditional conventional force on force military threats. This shift sees political instability, civil warfare (in increasingly urban centres), asymmetric attacks from proxy transnational organizations, ethnic nationalism, trans-national criminal activity (drug operations, human smuggling, illicit arms trading, local organized criminal actions and violent crimes), terrorism (targeting of civilians, use of weapons of mass destruction, facilitation of non-state actors through international terrorist command), security forces of questionable legitimacy, media manipulation and humanitarian/environmental/industrial crises as the key conflict characteristics in these failed/failing states of the 21st century. This is supplemented by a detailed future threat analysis in Lieutenant-Colonel Michael Rostek (editor) et al, The Claxton Papers, Toward Army 2040.

40 Deshpande, Nick. “Seven Sinister Strategic Trends: A Brief Examination of Events to Come,” Canadian Military Journal 11, no. 4 (2011). Highlighted the trends that are ongoing in regions of likely CF interest and involvement including the tactical application of intelligence to human terrain mapping in order to combat the threat of asymmetry in failed and failing states.
Kelly, Justin. “Future War, Future Warfare,” Australian Army Journal 5, no. 3 (2008). Argues that future wars will continue to be limited (from a Western Perspective). He identifies the indirect approach (asymmetrical) for antagonists and how they will not likely be as bound by geography as they are by common purpose. The enemy will focus on exhausting western will vice tactical victory and the use of proxies and linkages to international criminal and terrorist organizations will increase. He also envisions the probability of WMD being employed with the assessment of proliferation and increasing technology in developing nations. He also comments on the cyber threat which will increasingly dominate western national defensive posturing.
10 “As we have seen over the last three decades and predictably will see in the next several decades, insurgency as a form of warfare has been more prevalent than main force, conventional conflicts.”
Mockaitis, Thomas. "The Phoenix of Counterinsurgency," The Journal of Conflict Studies 27, no 1 (2007). “One thing at least seems certain, insurgencies and insurgent-style conflicts will occur for the foreseeable future and armed forces must prepare to deal with them.”
Importantly, LF 2021:ADO goes beyond to comment that: “the likelihood of large force-on-force exchanges will be eclipsed by irregular warfare.”\textsuperscript{42} From this analysis, one can derive that failed and failing states are an increasing trend for which the Canadian Army must be prepared to operate. As stated in Waypoint, Force 2016, the Army “will likely be primarily engaged in complex operations in failed or failing states.”\textsuperscript{43} This is reinforced by Walter Dorn, who has assessed the trend for UN Peacekeeping requirements as increasing, as evident in Figure 1-1 below:

The Claxton papers further attests to the likely threats to be faced by Canada out to 2040. It assesses the following. 5-9 Physical environment: Resource scarcity will continue to favour developed states, but in contested regions could cause regional conflict (water in middle east, crop lands in Saharra, minerals in West Africa and oil in general). Climate change may magnify these differences. 19-23 Science and Technology: The freedom of information will continue to still dissident factions in regulated political states, continuing the trend towards information manipulation. 29-31 Economy: The global economy is expected to grow slowly due to, “increasing internationalization of markets for goods, capital, services and labour.” This will transition developing economies, especially in Africa, which may increase elements of competition and non-state corporate interests in this region. 33-35 Security and Defense: “Uncertainty, volatility and rapid change will continue to dominate the international security environment.” Threats will include, “regional hegemons, failed and failing states, trans-national criminal organizations and terrorist groups, natural disasters, and the proliferation of WMD.” Shocks may occur and these will serve to exacerbate existing friction.

\textsuperscript{42} \textit{Land Operations 2021: ADO}, 4.
\textsuperscript{43} Waypoint: Force 2016, 8.
Figure 1-1: Uniformed Peacekeepers (1992-2013).

Stability Operations are a growth industry; it is therefore prudent to prepare. This obfuscates the wishful thinking of those who want to avoid Stability Operations in order to prepare for either the last war or the war that they want to fight.

---


Army Policy, Direction and Doctrine

Current Canadian Army direction is grounded in the Chief of the Defence Staff's *Force Posture and Readiness Directive*, which is the governing directive from the Strategic Joint Staff that synchronizes resource allocation and readiness to the CFDS.⁴⁶ Supporting this is the Canadian Army (CA), *Operating Plan 2013/2014*,⁴⁷ and the Army Commander, Lieutenant-General Marquis Hainse', *Canadian Army Operating Framework, 1 October 2013*.⁴⁸ The keystone publication that looks to the next horizon is *Land Concepts and Designs, Land Operations 2021: Adaptive Dispersed Operations*.⁴⁹ This is the doctrinal epicenter for the networked centric Army of tomorrow which envisages Army operations in the context of a three block war. Describing training policy is Canadian Army Headquarters, *Training Canada's Army⁵⁰* and this is supplemented by the Army Training Authority, *Training and Exercise Requirements on the Road to High Readiness*,⁵¹ which denotes the core individual and collective Battle Tasks Standards (BTS) that units must achieve before a declaration of operational readiness (OPRED). Major Tony Balasevicius, *Adapting Military Organizations to meet future shock*⁵² has

---

⁴⁹ This keystone also includes a series of supporting documents, including designing Canada’s Army of tomorrow and Waypoint 2016.
identified the idea of a systems approach to enable a 'least unprepared' force that is agile to respond to non-conventional threats. Supporting the concept of effectively managing organizational change is Francis Amagoh, *Perspectives on Organizational Change: Systems and Complexity Theories*, who reinforces the value of normative organizational change initiatives in order to minimize institutional friction and inertia. Australian Colonel Chris Field, *Five Challenges for Future Infantry*, has emphasized the importance of continuous learning, and a balanced approach to stability and war-fighting. Brigadier-General Wayne Eyre, *The Role of the Infantry in the War of the Snakes*, argues that conventional warfare is the exception and future operations are trending towards Stability Operations necessitating consideration for a relevant preparedness model.

---

Individual Training: Peace Support Training Centre

*Training Canada's Army*,\(^56\) describes the training systems that underpin the Canadian Army's systems approach to training. This is relevant to all arguments in this essay as the fundamental premise of a systems approach to complex problems reinforces the author's intent to enable Army capability for Stability Operations. A classic Army text, Brigadier-General Ernest Beno, *Training to Fight and Win*\(^57\) speaks to a unit's health regarding the timing and allocation of training resources and the balance between critical leadership training in a war-fighting construct and peace-support capacity; of note, this was written following the Somalia Affair and is highly relevant as Beno was the Brigade Commander who oversaw the Force Generation of the troubled Canadian Airborne Regiment.\(^58\) Specific to the PSTC, the *PSTC Information Brief* by Commandant Lieutenant-Colonel Steph Dumas to the Canadian Army and the *PSTC Course Descriptions for 2014/2015* confirm the current mission, tasks, funding, and international engagements of this stability-enabling training centre.\(^59\)

Regarding Stability training in general, there are numerous perspectives. Dr. Walter Dorn has written extensively on this and has assessed a gap in emphasis on

---


Peacekeeping in the CF in *Unprepared for Peace*, 60 and *Canadian Peacekeeping: Proud Tradition, Strong Future*? 61 His underlying premise is that the CAF needs to reorient back to UN-led Peacekeeping Operations in order to fill a much needed international capability and to satisfy domestic attitudes towards military service and operations. Although this is more of a political statement, the implications have a training nexus; leadership and discipline are common, however, there are many components of stability training that are in fact mutually exclusive to warfighting. 62 Colonel Bernd Horn (editor) et al, *No Easy Task*, 63 and James Patrick, *Canada and Conflict*, 64 identify the current operations in Afghanistan and make implications relevant to stability IT. US Department of the Army, *Stability Operations*, 65 emphasizes the role of Stability Operations the US Army priorities.

**Institutionalizing Counter-Insurgency Individual Training**

COIN as a sub-set of Stability Operations is best represented in Department of Army Doctrine, *Counter-insurgency operations* 66 and the US Army and Marine Corps

---

63 Bernd Horn and Emily Spencer (Editors), *No Easy Task: Fighting in Afghanistan*. Toronto: Dundurn, 2012.
Counterinsurgency Field Manual.” ISAF's most recent references include General Allen, Security Force Assistance, and General David Petraeus' Counterinsurgency qualification standards for Afghanistan. Colonel Joseph Celeski, Operationalizing COIN speaks to the key training and tactics for COIN based on his two tours as the Commander of the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force in Afghanistan. From a Canadian perspective, Major Warren Hunt, Army Transformation in Canada and the United States during the Post-Cold War and 9-11 Eras reinforces Canada's ability to conduct Stability Operations as a component of a coalition/multinational team. Specific to a COIN course, the US Army Irregular Warfare Centre, Current Afghanistan COIN Seminar Concept includes a generic model that is task-tailorable for IT. The Gregg Centre, Journal of Conflict Studies summer 2007 is focused on COIN and Canadian Operations in Afghanistan, emphasizing how the weak can win insurgencies, the politics of insurgencies, and mitigating strategies for western conventional forces. There are also numerous supporting references which facilitated the author's development of a conceptual Advanced COIN course.

74 United States. PCN 140 121500 00 Small Wars Manual: U.S. Marine Corps, 1940.
Enhanced Self-Development

Self-development involves the efforts of individuals to further develop themselves above and beyond that professional development which is provided for them by the organization…. Self-development is a progressive and sequential process that consists of individual study, research, professional reading, practice and self-assessment.

This definition, from Directorate of Army Training, *Training Canada's Army* provides the baseline for assessment of how the current Self-Development system exists.

Commenting on the Professional Development (PD) needs of today and tomorrow is Douglas Bland, *Non-commissioned officers in the Future Army,* Directorate of Army
Training, *The NCO 2020, backbone of the Army*\(^{77}\) and *Officership 2020*.\(^{78}\) All of these references underscore the importance of a Self-Development which is currently an under-utilized training system. Maxime Rondeau and Lisa Tanguay, *What Education should non-commissioned Members Receive?*\(^{79}\) addresses the gap in the current reality of NCM PD and the opportunities that exist to make improvements.\(^{79}\) Current reading lists that are pertinent to the concept of PD are Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs, *The Canadian Army Reading List*,\(^{80}\) USFOR-A, *Pre-deployment Reading List for Afghanistan*\(^{81}\) and The Commandant of the Marine Corps, *Professional Reading List*.\(^{82}\) Articles reinforcing the importance of developing cognitive warriors are Major CW Kean, *From the Physical to the Cognitive: The Changing Nature of the Army in Post-Modern Operations*\(^{83}\) and Major Peter Brown, *Canadian Forces Junior Leadership Training and the Contemporary Operating Environment*.\(^{84}\) A fascinating historiography of the German Army in the inter-war years is Ben McLellan, *Train Better, Fight Best*,\(^{85}\) among others.\(^{86}\) McLellan describes a training model that worked extremely well for a fiscally restricted Army - clearly this is conceptually applicable to today's Canadian

---


\(^{79}\) Maxime Rondeau and Lisa Tanguay. "What Education should non-commissioned Members Receive?" Canadian Military Journal 13, no. 3 (Summer 2013).


\(^{84}\) Major Peter Brown, *Canadian Forces Junior Leadership Training and the Contemporary Operating Environment*. Canadian Forces College, Master of Defence Studies  CSC 32, April 2006.


Army. Finally, the importance of professionalization is described in David Bercuson, *Up from the Ashes*,\(^7\)


---


International Military Training

International Military Training (IMT) is a subset of Canada's Defence Diplomacy. Andrew Rasiulis, The director of the Military Training Assistance Programme (MTAP), published *MTAP: An instrument of Military Diplomacy*, identifying the benefits and potential of his programme to Canada's foreign interest. Former Army Commander Lieutenant-General Devlin directed in *The Army Operating Plan 2013/2014* for an increased assessment of options for IMT. This is further substantiated by Tony Balasevicius, *Unconventional Warfare*, who indicated that a gap in ADO doctrine is the potential for sustained conventional aggregation of forces, and that this could be overcome by emphasizing a host national Unconventional Warfare capability, trained via IMT. Lieutenant-General (retired) Mike Jeffery, *The Future of Foreign Military Training*, concluded that Canada has a credible Army that is sought out for military assistance, an area in which a more holistic government strategy of defence diplomacy could pay dividends. Goran Swistek, *The Nexus Between Public Diplomacy and Military Diplomacy in Foreign Affairs and Defense Policy*, and the UK

---

Ministry of Defence, *Policy Paper number one: Defence Diplomacy*[^96] all identify the benefits of employing conventional armies in the shaping and conflict resolution phases as opposed to solely during open hostilities; these concepts are pertinent given that Canada's Army presently has excess capacity for operational tasks. Specific recent Canadian case studies include Major-General Michael Day's Testimony to the Canadian Senate on the Training Mission in Afghanistan[^97] and Jargalsaikhan Mendee, *MTAP: Merging Interests of Mongolia and Canada.*[^98] This literature review sets the stage for an analysis of the Army's doctrinal framework and its operational trends regarding Stability Operations since the end of the Cold War.

CHAPTER TWO: THE CANADIAN ARMY:

The Canadian Army will generate combat effective, multi-purpose land forces to meet Canada’s defence. It will be well led, well trained, well equipped and properly sustained to succeed at adaptive dispersed operations across the full spectrum of conflict.

- Commander Canadian Army,
  Lieutenant-General Marquis Hainse

Land Forces 2021: Adaptive Dispersed Operations

The Army's mission statement sets the tone for today; however, the second horizon and beyond is clearly laid out in Land Forces 2021: ADO which defines the direction of Canada’s Army regarding doctrine and capability. It, “seeks to create and sustain operational advantage over adept, adaptive adversaries through the employment of adaptive land forces alternatively dispersing and aggregating.” Key to an understanding of how this concept would be operationalized can be derived from figure 2-1 below:

---

100 Land Operations 2021: ADO, 18.
Figure 2-1 identifies that View 1 (or conventional international warfare) may not be likely, but would be extremely dangerous to national security, given the propensity for casualties and political stakes. View 2 (Stability Operations) are much more likely but with less direct risk to national security. Credible combat capability is integral to both. View 2 still requires a credible fighting force; however, the Army must be multi-purpose to manage the overlap.\textsuperscript{102}

ADO was predicated on the concept of the three block war. It sees decentralized forces, network enabled, and employing technological overmatch while operating in a complex (urban) environment. This concept was developed based on several years of simulated and real experimentation by the Canadian Land Synthetics Environment and the Second Battalion of the Royal Canadian

\textsuperscript{101} Training Canada's Army, 13. 
\textsuperscript{102} Training Canada's Army, 13.
Regiment. It is a sound mid-term doctrine for a small army. However, there are two key criticisms of ADO. First, Tony Balasevicius has argued that it does not include an appropriate unconventional warfare capability. Second, the underlying premise of the three block war paradigm has been challenged as a flawed concept, based on the realistic challenges of tactically managing Peace-Support through Warfighting in close proximity. Derived from these criticisms, however, is the underlying acceptance that ADO in fact does represent the FSE. Therefore, both supporters and detractors alike at least can agree that ADO does represent a reasonable doctrine for the future army. This implies that enabling the Army’s capability for Stability Operations, those View 2 identified as 'most likely' would directly and positively affect the Army's ability to operate in the FSE.

Does emphasizing the need to be capable in Stability Operations require a diminishment of combat capability? Does Canada's Army need to 'niche' itself? This argument is addressed by many current academics and professionals alike.

Lieutenant-Colonel Mark Popov has proposed that a combat-capable small army,
not a COIN-centric force, is the best option for Canada's Army. His thesis is logical: Canada does need to remain combat capable and should not solely niche itself. However, this is not a binary question; one does not need to ask to have or have not. There is scope to improving priority aspects of the Army’s stability capability without going down the road of compromising on core-combat capability. Four of these training related initiatives will be presented in the subsequent chapter. Another argument, from both Matthew Ford and Bob Martyn is that COIN is not fighting to Western nations' strengths; therefore, it should be avoided for more dominant forms of power projection. This argument is sound when considered at the political level. For the Army, however, it reacts to government direction. If the government wants a response on the ground in a failed state, then the Army will generate options – it goes where it is told to go, and therefore it needs to be prepared for any form of stability contingency - COIN being one of them. As much as it is tempting to train for the war we want to fight, we need to be postured for the threats that we will likely encounter.

Lieutenant-General Hainse, the Canadian Army Commander, has directed that the Army be “combat capable, multi-purpose, capable of operations across the spectrum.” It is worth defining these terms. Combat capable refers to the ability to conduct combat operations when required. Second, it refers to the ability

---

108 Popov. “COIN or Conventional?” Furthermore, one could argue that since Canada does not have all of the capabilities for high-intensity war-fighting, it is already dangerously close to niching by default.
to force generate a 'combat capable' force. 111 Combat capable does not translate to only training for combat; there is a requirement to cross-train for both View 1 and 2 operations and to be balanced in a more effective manner than the status quo. Multi-purpose refers to the Army's flexibility to move throughout the spectrum of conflict.112 These are the two capabilities that the Army requires.

The Army’s own doctrine illustrates this point as indicated in Figure 2-2 below.

![Figure 2-2: The Army of Tomorrow - A sustainable land force that is strategically relevant, operationally adaptive, and effective across the continuum of operations.](image)

111 Army Operating Framework. Slide 2.
However, this visual depiction does not reflect the reality of the training-weight in the Canadian Army today. In foundation training, almost all of the training emphasis is on war-fighting. This is both reasonable and effective; there is only so much capacity that a new soldier can absorb – the focus should be on specific trade oriented skills and leadership in a conventional war-fighting environment. However, as soldiers and officers progress, there is scope to broaden their knowledge base – especially if the type of operations envisioned are stability oriented. This essay is not going to argue that 50% of all training should be on stability, however, it will identify that there could and should be more emphasis on Stability Operations in focused areas in the Army's training systems. The disproportionate benefits to this would be substantial. The Army would have the capacity to surge faster, more effectively, with shorter notice, for a sustained duration, all while at the same time enabling that mission to a much higher propensity for success. Qualitative readiness is as important as quantitative readiness, if not more-so.

Stability is further reinforced as a core competency in Army doctrine:

The army of tomorrow will have at its foundation the ability to deliver its core competencies. The core competencies are: The capability to win close combat; the capability to conduct close engagement (stability tasks), and the capability to set the essential conditions to enable success in close combat and in close engagement.114

A war-fighting focus in foundation training and the Army reconstitution cycle, however, has created a capability gap for Stability Operations that will grow with time. In fact, despite the doctrinal construct of remaining multi-role, the Army has substantially over-

weighted its training priorities on close-combat. Acknowledging that privileged units that are destined for high-readiness training will be exposed to stability-oriented scenarios in higher collective training environments, this involves a small percentage of Army units and focusses more on situational reaction instead of skill development. With this current lack of emphasis on Stability Operations, the Army is at risk of atrophying the specializations necessary for an effective multi-role capability as the current operational experience dries up over time.
Why Change? *An evolution of Stability Capability in the Canadian Army*

The Army will retain its position as a highly capable fighting force that is balanced and ready to meet Canada's Security challenges.

- Canadian Army Operating Plan 2013/2014

Key tasks in Stability Operations more similarly represent those of police than those of warfighters. Why? Because internal instability is the primary responsibility of the host national police force, not the military. Lieutenant-General Jon Vance, the former two-time Commander of Joint Task Force - Afghanistan and designated Commander of the Combined Joint Operational Command (CJOC) has likened the Afghanistan mission to the situation in Davis inlet: A municipality with limited opportunity, crime, social problems, resentment towards the federal government and a requirement for police operations. This is a key distinction. Police focus on de-escalation of violence and lethal force as a last resort. Soldiers are trained (in routine Battle Task Standards) to use force aggressively, albeit in accordance with their Rules of Engagement, in order to “close with and destroy the enemy.” The Army is not the security force of choice in Davis inlet; why is this such a challenging paradigm then when looking at policing-type expeditionary operations and applying an appropriate security force that have emphasized these stability-oriented professional skills? This training nuance changes the conditioning

---

117 The author acknowledges that Theatre Mission Specific Training will focus efforts on appropriate use of force, however in the absence of missions, leaders will only be exposed to war-fighting Battle Task Standards in their reconstitution and leadership training. Debate about the challenges to cognitive preparedness from training differently than operating forms the nexus of this emphasis on some aspect of stability training outside of Theatre Mission Specific Training. Canada. Department of National Defence, B-GL-309-003/FT-001 *The Infantry Section and Platoon in Battle*. Ottawa, LFC HQ, G3 Inf, (1996): 4-1-1.
of the soldiers; it is very difficult to shift mindsets back and forth from being a warfighter to a stability operator.\textsuperscript{118} Canadian soldiers are highly disciplined and well led, but in order to truly operate in the complexity of a failed state, there is a professional requirement to be prepared. For the past two decades the Army has lived by the mantra of train for war and scale back for stability. This principal has been nominally successful, however, not always (Somalia being the key example). However, with stability being a growth industry in security operations, serious reconsideration regarding a focused and institutional approach to institutional preparation for operations, as opposed to the ad hoc method of changing the training framework and operational culture upon the receipt of a warning order is necessary. Somalia only happened once, but the underpinning of improper focus and training were at the core of that leadership failure.\textsuperscript{119}

The Canadian Army has evolved significantly from the Somalia Affair. However, in order to further optimize the Army, the integration of stability capability into reconstitution and IT cycles needs consideration. The functionality of this is evident in a comment by Brigadier-General Pepin, the Deputy Commander of ISAF, on the requirement of conventional forces to act in both roles [kinetic and stability] at the same time and how, “when both are required, there was a tendency from both Canadian and US military forces to focus more on the kinetic.”\textsuperscript{120} This implies, and both political and


\url{http://www.ted.com/talks/thomas_barnett_draws_a_new_map_for_peace.html} Accessed on 25 February  
\url{http://www.ted.com/talks/stephenColeman.html} Accessed on 25 February

military senior leadership have reinforced this as well, that the Army was not as prepared as it could have been for the COIN operation in Afghanistan. Applying even a small amount of excess force can substantially set-back an operational mission - an expertise in an appropriate application of soft-power is required. Commander ISAF's focus on ‘Security Force Assistance’ is indicative of the command prioritization of stability oriented focus in modern and complex campaigns. Both senior leaders and lessons learned from operations assess that there is a greater place in routine training for a stabilization focus.

Presently, Canada's peace-time Army trains almost exclusively for war. The advantage to this perspective is arguably not what it may seem. Training for war provides the tactical ability to transition to combat operations within the context of stability operations and it provides credibility to the troops on the ground. This model has been proven to be highly effective, specifically in Sarajevo, the Medak pocket, and Afghanistan. Doctrine asserts that we will not likely conduct unilateral large-scale war-fighting, however, to be credible in Stability Operations, such as the three mentioned above, a credible war-fighting capability is required as a backstop. John

---

Conrad astutely commented that, “To be an effective Peacekeeper, you must be a fully competent warrior… the skills required in Kandahar do not differ from the skills required in Croatia 1994.”\textsuperscript{126} Therefore, a logical argument for having a war-fighting capable Canadian Army may not be primarily to fight in a peer-on-peer conventional war but rather to have a 'back-end' capability during Stability Operations in case the situation deteriorates and an immediate response is necessary. This is perhaps a 180 degree perspective on the value of a war-fighting capability; however, when assessed against both the Canadian Army's operational history for the past thirty years and the FSE, is this not a reasonable if not completely accurate depiction that View 1 training supports View 2 operations? If one accepts this proposal, then consideration towards facilitating cultural change in the Army institution is paramount.

There is a natural conservative friction in the Army. “For many years, military culture has acted as a check on change, often with catastrophic results. Military preparedness has been popularly characterized as ‘preparing for the last war’.”\textsuperscript{127} Simply put, armies resist change, and they do so for all the right reasons – many doctrinal concepts and principals have been tattooed into the collective Army psyche through hard fought experiences in bloody wars.\textsuperscript{128} The irony is that war is not a static entity and an army that does not adapt will not be optimally postured when next called upon.\textsuperscript{129} There are clearly no crystal ball solutions, but setting the conditions to enable a flexible

response that can be generated and projected in a reasonable timeframe would be a suitable option for any democratic government. By reinforcing the Army's systems approach to complexity and by leveraging organizational change theory, the four initiatives proposed will enhance the army’s vision of a combat capable, multi-role organization that is better enabled for mission success.
Canadian Army Training: *Four Initiatives to Improve Capacity*

*The question is not whether Peacekeeping should be taught, but how it should be layered over general purpose combat training, so that core traditional military skills are not lost or made too difficult to regenerate when required.*

---

A study prepared for the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia. ¹³⁰

There are four broad areas in which Stabilization Operations capability can be improved in the Army training system without compromising combat capability as a core function. First, there is scope to leverage existing Individual Training (IT) capacity in order to increase the throughput of non-commissioned members and junior officers. This concept would specifically target the Peace Support Training Centre courses, but could also include other stability related courses. ¹³¹ Second, the development of an Advanced COIN course would fill a current training gap. Presently, there is IT designed for both warfighting and peace-support, however, there is nothing for the ‘messy middle’ of COIN. Given the underlying context of LF 2021:ADO, this is a critical, complex aspect of the spectrum of conflict with which the Army requires some level of expertise; a specialization course would be an ideal capacity bridge for a relatively small resource bill. Additionally, although the likelihood of the Canadian government deploying the Army into a COIN-centric theatre in the near future could be considered low, the skillsets involved in the complexity of COIN are highly relevant to other forms of Stability Operations. Third, there is opportunity to re-energize the Self-Development aspect of


¹³¹ Such as a contracting specialization course and complex targeting course.
Professional Development (PD). Specifically, the invigoration of the Army reading list with a linkage to career progression would encourage a culture of cognitive warriors. This could be further expanded to better leverage e-learning technology. Fourth is the development of a long-term vision for International Military Training. There is scope for the Canadian Army to establish professional linkages to its counter-parts in those nations that the CAF has prioritized in the Global Engagement Strategy (GES), underpinned by a defence diplomacy construct.

This training revitalization is not unique to Canada; the US, Australia and UK have also reassessed their training priorities in light of the realities of the FSE, financial constraints and the probable Army tasks therein. The US military recommended that they “Create the capacity for advanced training and other preparation of US forces destined for COIN duty – in prepare, enable and operate missions.”132 The US Army has actively sought to merge aspects of the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan to the current complex realities of sequestration, transformation, and competing against asymmetry;133 The Australian army, through their Adaptive Army Initiative, is looking to "generate profound change in training, personnel management, knowledge management, learning cycles and the Army’s culture,” to realign it with the threats of tomorrow and the resource realities of today.134 It is a reassessment of “a more optimal capability… to meet contemporary

threats.” Britain is also asking similar questions. In fact, the Chief of the British Army has openly suggested that the UK consider transitioning to a niche army construct as an option to budget reductions. This concept is based on the reality of the current threats and the drastic cuts that have hit the UK Ministry of Defense.

To be clear, the proposed initiatives would not detract from the army’s capacity to conduct war-fighting, nor would it overemphasize stabilization to the degree of ‘niching’ the army. It would simply ensure that there is adequate expertise available across both the field force and institution in order to provide the needed leadership for the reality of an impending Stabilization Operation; the FSE would imply that it is a question of ‘when’ as opposed to ‘if’. As doctrine states, “success or failure in operations is largely dependent upon the way an army plans and conducts its training.” If it is known that the Army will continue to do Stabilization Operations, it is therefore prudent to prepare. Brigadier-General Beno commented that:

The focus of Army Training should be on warfighting… [however] expert training teams should be constituted to assist in developing, conducting and evaluating specific-to-mission [Peace Support] training. Such measures would undoubtedly assist in ensuring common doctrine and practices.”

As indicated by the Army Training Authority review 2011, “the strong likelihood that we will be working in a COIN environment in the future perhaps requires a re-balancing of COIN versus conventional training levels 2-5,” and that the Army Training Authority

138 Ernest Beno, Training to Fight and Win: Training in the Canadian Army, 151.
should include an appropriate balance for both foundation and high readiness training.\textsuperscript{139} 

The Army has increased the stability BTS for collective training;\textsuperscript{140} it is the author’s intent to define this nebulous balance for Individual Training, Self-development and International Military Training, using the 'expert teams' concept espoused above by Brigadier-General Beno.

CHAPTER THREE:
THE PEACE SUPPORT TRAINING CENTRE:
INCREASING THROUGHPUT

We have not put sufficient intellectual energy, and resources, and work toward the other two [non-combat] blocks specifically.

- General Rick Hillier\(^{141}\)

Army training doctrine comments that, “IT ensures that the required number of trained soldiers and leaders, with the required qualifications, are available within a unit to permit progressive collective training toward a high readiness state.”\(^{142}\) Presently, the Canadian Army’s ability to conduct both Collective Training and operations in a stability framework are based substantially on operational experience, not IT. This implies that as the veterans of the Afghanistan conflict and the Peace Support Operations of the 1990s retire, this individual leadership delta will grow if the training system does not absorb the role. At what point does this lack of knowledge become an institutional problem if left unchecked?

The Peace Support Training Centre is the Canadian Forces Centre of Excellence (COE) in delivering IT for Peace Support Operations.\(^{143}\) In reality, all aspects of theatre mission specific training that are not warfighting related are standardized at this school as the COE.\(^{144}\) Courses develop specialists in the areas of Information Operations, Psychological Operations, Civil-Military Co-operation, and Peace Support Operations (as observers, liaison officers and staff officers). Its mission statement is: "to provide


\(^{144}\) *Army Operating Plan 2013/2014*, 3-B-3-1/4.
specific, individual training to prepare selected members of the CAF, OGD and foreign military personnel for FSO, while executing our COE responsibilities.\textsuperscript{145} The courseware has developed over the last 20 years, based initially on the gross failure of the Somalia Affair and consistently enhancing itself through the lessons of ongoing Peacekeeping and Stability Operations.\textsuperscript{146} Key to understanding the delivery of this training is that training is directed only towards regular force soldiers who are tasked to deploy on a named mission or reserve force soldiers involved with the Influence Activities Task Force.\textsuperscript{147} The deduction, therefore, is that the more Peace-Support Operations that CF soldiers participate in, the more exposure they will get to this type of IT; this is obvious. However, what is more nuanced is that in the absence of named Peace-Support Operations, there will be no IT offered to Regular Force soldiers to supplement their war-fighting foundation training. As of 31 March 2014 there were only about 200 Canadian Army soldiers actually deployed on operational duty across about a dozen small missions;\textsuperscript{148} the obvious extrapolation is that over time, the skill sets will erode without a change in policy. The status quo does not support the Army of Tomorrow framework of building both a combat capable and multi-role (stabilization) capacity.

There is scope to course load soldiers on general Peace Support training at the PSTC without a named mission. This is especially relevant given that the Canadian army, for the first time since Korea, does not have an expeditionary operational mission. The

\textsuperscript{148} Brigadier-General Lowell Thomas, Chief of Staff, Canadian Joint Operations Centre, Briefing to Joint Command and Staff Course, February 2014. Reproduced with permission from the speaker.
Combat Training Centre could generate an annual production cycle that would develop a minimal capacity of Peace-Support experts in regular and reserve force units and the institution. This would have a cost associated, but this could be offset by prudent business planning: the usage of distributed learning packages, moving the course to an Area Training Centre to prevent travel expenses, and the use of qualified unit specialists to conduct pre-training/threshold development and courseware standardization to reduce training days. This IT could easily be achieved during a unit’s reconstitution cycle in the MRP.¹⁴⁹ This would increase specialist capability and be a mid-long term investment in professionally developing soldiers and junior officers in an era when many specializations, such as anti-armour, mortars and pioneers have disappeared.

The benefits of developing specialist leaders that can be leveraged in the case of a deployment are invaluable. The Special Forces would comment that “Competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after emergencies occur;”¹⁵⁰ the same applies to specialists in the Army. By the time a warning order is received at a unit, the opportunity for developing specialists has been lost and the unit will be dependent on generalist training and a base level of understanding – perhaps acceptable, but certainly at a higher risk than maintaining a competency during foundation training which can be leveraged in case the ‘glass is broken.’ Furthermore, specialists in the unit can be leveraged for in

¹⁴⁹ The author acknowledges that IT is a fact in a unit's annual routine, however in the past 5 years, there has been considerable attention paid, especially by the Army of the West, to the reduction of IT as it causes extended absences for their soldiers from both the unit and their families. A study was commissioned by the Combat Training Centre to determine if NCM leadership training could be reduced by as much as 30%. The key difference between the stabilization oriented IT proposed by the author above and the leadership IT is that specialization training has a voluntary nexus. In leadership training, all must do it in order to progress, however, for a specialization, there is no requirement. A young, keen soldier who wants to further develop him/herself will self-select. This has the dual benefit of ensuring that IT away from home is not an issue and that the person has an interest in the content. Comparable courses to this would be the Urban Operations Instructor, or Advanced Surveillance Operator courses.

house training, whereas in their absence, the unit is dependent on external trainers and schools for their development;\textsuperscript{151} this is especially poignant when looking at the in-theatre training plan.

In summary, this first concept is quite simple; there exists the IT infrastructure at the PSTC to increase the throughput in order to increase expertise in both the field force and the institution. The policy of only training regular force members upon receipt of a warning order would need to be amended and a review by the Army Training Authority to determine appropriate production numbers would be required. However, this option provides minimal structural change and therefore less friction. The following option builds upon this concept by expanding IT through the development of a new specialist course: Advanced Counter-insurgency.

\textsuperscript{151} Two other IT courses would provide an improved stability capability in the army. First would be a contracts officer specialization course. Milner, Dean. \textit{Task Force Kandahar COIN Best Practices}. NATO ISAF Joint Task Force Afghanistan, Kandahar 28 Dec 2010. 2-3 and Stuart Beare in a presentation to the Canadian Forces College December 2013. Money is the ammunition of modern conflict according to both the former Commander of Task Force Kandahar, Brigadier General Dean Milner and the Commander of the Canadian Joint Operations Command, Lieutenant General Stuart Beare. This is pertinent since it was identified by the Army G4 at the 5 CMBG sustainment conference 2012 that 80% of all operational contracts undertaken in Afghanistan were done improperly. Second would be a targeting course Targeting is a skill that is peripherally taught in various CF courses, however, with the complexity of the full range of the spectrum of conflict and the inclusion of non-kinetic targeting options this is a key skill-set that would benefit from increased scrutiny.
CHAPTER FOUR:
AN ADVANCED COUNTER-INSURGENCY COURSE:
A GAP IN CANADIAN INDIVIDUAL TRAINING

We need many more specialists who can be the 'go to' experts and future commanders in the application of this COIN art.

- Col Joseph Celeski, former Commander, Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force - Afghanistan

There is presently a gap in the Army’s IT system. On the ‘soft power’ end, there is peace-support oriented training as has been discussed in the previous chapter; ‘hard power’ is incorporated into all leadership training and most occupational specialization training. However, there is no IT that addresses COIN-oriented Stability Operations. An Advanced COIN course would meet this need while peripherally enhancing capacity for all other operations, be they Peacekeeping or war-fighting. Is this required? Are the skill sets suitably unique from either end of the spectrum? The Non-Traditional military training study that was produced for the Somalia commission recommended that:

The Canadian Forces over-all training philosophy be amended so that general-purpose combat training, while remaining the foundation of training policy, is supplemented by additional non-traditional military training geared specifically for UN Peacekeeping operations.

Although COIN is not Peacekeeping per se, the comment is relevant given the context of training left of war-fighting in a stabilization capacity; the COIN skill sets that will be introduced shortly are highly relevant in all forms of Stability Operations. Although CAF involvement in a purely COIN operation is 'politically questionable' in the near future, if

---

one subscribes to the concept of the 3 block war which underpins LF 2021:ADO, then the linkage between COIN Tactics, Techniques and Procedures and those necessary for Stability Operations becomes clear.

There are two potential counter-arguments to this type of course. First, “While admitting that peace operations are more complex and often involve humanitarian objectives, one must ask whether today’s soldiers are being over-burdened.”¹⁵⁴ Overtraining is a chain of command risk to manage, since knowledge retention becomes problematic as well as the prioritization of training – if soldiers train to be good at everything, then they will master none. There are means to mitigate against this threat of over-generalization. Primarily, there is the recognition that specializing a few soldiers does not detract from the overall general purpose war-fighting capacity of a unit; in fact, this would enhance the unit's war-fighting because these specializations would still be relevant to non-warfighting lines of operation in a war-fighting conflict. Also, in reconstitution, key themes can be drawn in accordance with the commanding officer’s priorities. The impact on the unit will be low to lose a few soldiers who actively volunteer for a specialization course, especially during a reconstitution cycle. Therefore a unit can manage its personnel to ensure a broad enough knowledge base in order to flexibly respond to training or operational needs.

Second, as argued by Brigadier General Fred Lewis, conventional operational art can be applied to Peace Support Operations and COIN.¹⁵⁵ His argument is sound and is based on the reality of the Peacekeeping Operations of the 1990s. At that time, the Army

¹⁵⁴ John English, “Canadian Peacekeeping is Not What It Used To Be,” Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute 12 no. 3 (February 2009), 15.
was high-readiness for so long that it had the capability to shift gears and function; all
army units were routinely training to Brigade level and had highly cohesive headquarters.
There was scope to transition the organization and have the leadership to succeed.
Today’s resources are far more limited and the Managed Readiness Plan defines
privileged training units from those who remain at lower readiness and conduct only
foundation and low-level CT. The HQ unity is not comparably effective. An additional
counter to this ‘transition after warning’ attitude is simply that the army would be enabled
to operate to a higher standard if the quality of its component parts were better. If the
Army is truly mission focused, then being better at what it will likely do should be a
priority. This is especially true since human lives are at risk; both those of our soldiers
and those of the host nation.

Although an easy short-term solution would be to simply pay the tuition fee
and load x number of Canadians on a foreign course in the US or UK, there are numerous
advantages to generating and managing an internal Canadian course. First, it retains
Canadian sovereignty and ownership over a key skill that has been identified in our
doctrine as a probable operating construct (ADO). This is reinforced in the CFDS, Army
vision, mission and doctrine and should therefore be of importance in the training system
in more than simply an 'after-thought' in CT for privileged units. In fact, an argument
could be made that by only testing stability capabilities in a collective training validation

---

156 United States. *Current Afghanistan COIN Seminar Concept* US Army Irregular Warfare Centre, Fort
Leavenworth, KS. (2013):1-2. Like-minded western nations have variants of a COIN course that could be
leveraged - either for content to include in a Canadian version, or as a course loading option unto
themselves. The US has a content tailored course run at its Irregular Warfare Centre which focusses on
operationally prioritized Battle Task Standards for Counterinsurgency.
phase, the lessons learned will be cursory and potentially counter-productive since the complexity of Stability Operations requires specialized skill sets.\textsuperscript{157}

Second, having formal IT would necessitate a small investment in professionalizing the instructor cadre. This is important because the most important resource in the Canadian Army is its people – to make a long term investment in its people will pay dividends throughout their career, and by extension to the institution. The counter-argument is that the CAF resource limitations cannot sustain new increases; however, based on priority of likely threats and probable operations, investing in 4-10 full/part time staff in a CoE would be reasonable. A scalable example of how a similar capability was successfully developed was the creation of a persistent surveillance course by the instructor cadre at the Infantry School from 2008 while remaining Person Year (PY) neutral. This course was built from scratch in one year and was then delivered to units deploying to Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{158} After-action reports indicate that it was a significant enabler.\textsuperscript{159} Clearly, small investments can have disproportionate impacts.

Third, the CoE can be leveraged should advice to the Chain of Command be required. This could inform decision-makers at all levels and enhance inter-agency co-operation. The training element could be flexible to surge (for training or operations) as required; an absence of such a training capacity means that there is no surge option, less the leveraging of other nations courseware. Also, an exchange could be leveraged in


\textsuperscript{158} Author's experience as Officer In-Charge Advanced Reconnaissance and Persistent Surveillance courses 2008-2009.

order to train other ABCA+ participants with reciprocal training of Canadians at their institutions in order to consolidate the lessons and training of key partner states. This would facilitate information sharing with our allies, promote good offices and develop relationships as well as tactical development.

Fourth, since the army has cut specializations, especially for the infantry, during the past 10 years, a specialization qualification would give an opportunity for soldiers to take pride in their role as an advisor, trainer and leader in their unit. A direct comparison can be drawn to the Urban Operations Instructor course, which similarly develops a unit's specialization capability through IT. This breadth of capability required for stability is acknowledged in doctrine for ADO:

> Operating across the continuum of operations within a JIMP context will present commanders, from the very junior to the very senior, with a volume and diversity of information that will require robust skills and high levels of aptitude in order to comprehend, associate holistically and manage it.”

However, the means to acquire these 'robust skills and aptitudes' is not defined. This COIN-specific course would address it directly.

Finally, it is germane to take stock nationally of the opportunity to leverage such a training opportunity in order to inject Canadian specific lessons learned - especially those from Afghanistan, into the grassroots training level. The Canadian Army paid a large price for the lessons it learned in Afghanistan. By augmenting the training system in this manner, flexibility and capacity is reinforced into the complex problem of Force

---

160 *Designing Canada’s Army of Tomorrow*, 52.
Generating for unknown missions. The following example of an Advanced COIN course describes how this could be incorporated.\textsuperscript{161}

A conceptual template for an Advanced COIN course would begin with a selection element to ensure that the right people apply and are chosen. The unit chain of command and Base Personnel Selection Officer (BPSO) team would manage this. These types of operations are personality dependent given the networks of human interactions: local civilians, security forces, government leaders, allied forces, OGDs, NGOs, etc.\textsuperscript{162} Therefore, attracting ‘people people’ would be important.\textsuperscript{163} The course could be owned by the PSTC, Tactics School, Infantry School, or the Military Police Academy depending on institutional issues (chain of command direction, staff capacity, course emphasis, stakeholder considerations, etc). The target audience would be Lieutenants-Captains and Corporals-Sergeants of all Army military occupation codes, but focussing on combat arms and with the scope for OGD participation (RCMP or other). The training content would mostly overlap for all ranks, but there would be scope for officer and NCM specific training to ensure appropriate knowledge coverage (IE. Detailed non-lethal weapons training to NCMs compared to Human Terrain mapping for officers). The timeframe would be about eight weeks of training (IE. A natural fit into the spring/fall National Training Calendar) based on a platoon sized course (24-38 personnel with

\textsuperscript{161} This is a concept to demonstrate the point, a full PRICIE is required to determine a course structure. 
\textsuperscript{162} United States. 66027-6900 Peace Operations Volume 1, Core Instructional Manual. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Publication, 1994, 556. “The selection process should use as a foundation, individuals capable of coping with a conflict environment that will produce a very different reaction than normally derived from military training.”
\textsuperscript{163} Peter Northhouse (Editor), Leadership: Theory and Practice, 6\textsuperscript{th} Ed., (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2013), 335 and Designing Canada’s Army of Tomorrow, 52. (PSEL selection process – INFP, ESFJ, ESTJ, ISFP types).
approximately a 1:6 staff: student ratio). The format would be a combination of distributed learning, classroom, and field skills. The end-state output would be an ATA approved throughput of candidates to see a critical mass of qualified personnel in all regular force combat arms units, and in the institution. Using the template of other advanced course qualifications in line units, a reasonable end-state would be 2 to 8 qualified members in each combat arms unit and 1-4 across the remaining line army units.

Key content to include is identified at table 4-1. The author developed this conceptual curriculum for an eight week template course based on COIN doctrine, other nation's courseware and lessons learned from Canadian Operations.

---

164 This is based on the student and staff numbers that are consistent with the Advanced series of courses run from the Infantry School.
165 Advisory capacity in HQ and training institutions
166 This ratio is based on the current manning in Combat arms units of specialized qualification such as Complex Terrain Instructor, Advanced Winter Warfare Instructor or Urban Operations Instructor.
167 The following resources were used in the generation of these skills and the approximate time to instruction ratio based on a 40 day course. The author has generated this course construct based on a curriculum drawn from Army lessons learned (Canadian and Coalition), pertinent COIN references, and personal experience.
Also, Petraeus, Memo thru Commander CENTCOM for COIN QS for Afghanistan peacekeeper’s handbook ch 9.
United States. PCN 140 121500 00 Small Wars Manual: U.S. Marine Corps, 1940.
Peace Operations Volume 1: Instructor material, Tab B – F.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Officers - specific 8 hr day</th>
<th>NCMs - specific 8 hr day</th>
<th>Officers &amp; NCMs (together)</th>
<th>Total 8 hour days</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COIN Lessons Learned</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Lethal force/weapons</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal capabilities (CQ/EQ)</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence Activity/Info Operations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROE theory and use of force</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close Quarter Battle (AM PT)</td>
<td></td>
<td>AM PT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Environment awareness (FSE outlook)</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Range</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine/IED awareness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Sector Reform Ops</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency driving</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct after Capture (Level B)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P3I (See footnote)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case Study Analysis</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CF joint/unique enablers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External WoG enablers</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Communications</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detainee Management</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biometrics Awareness</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elections Management</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distributed Learning Read In Package</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confirmation FTX</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Course Admin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total days</strong></td>
<td><strong>19.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>19.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>20.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>40</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4-1: A conceptual curriculum breakdown for an Advanced COIN course

Indicated previously, a key benefit to this course would be the injection of lessons learned directly into the tactical field level. This is invaluable. Organizational theory clearly indicates that when an organization's normative base values something it will

---

percolate up through the hierarchy until it becomes deeply seeded enough to enable institutional change.\(^{169}\) Contrarily, when change is regulated downward from the top through official justifications without a shared sense of identity and worldview with the support base, it is extremely challenging and in fact is likely to fail.\(^{170}\) This is evident in Eric Ouellet's triangle of institutional legitimacy as a framework below:

![Figure 4-2: Institutional Legitimacy through Shared Intents\(^{171}\)](image)

This course would offer a direct line to influence the junior leaders on the importance of stability winning tactics that would greatly enhance the chain of command should a Warning Order to conduct a similar task be received.\(^{172}\) John Nagl’s introduction of the US COIN manual comments, “The story of how the Army found itself less than ready to fight an insurgency goes back to the Army’s unwillingness to

\(^{169}\) Eric Ouellet, *Institutional Constraints on Command*, Presentation to Joint Command and Staff Programme 40, 8 November 2013.

\(^{170}\) Francis Amagoh, "Perspectives on Organizational Change: Systems and Complexity Theories," 8-10.

\(^{171}\) Ouellet, *Institutional Constraints on Command*.


internalize and build upon the lessons of Vietnam.” This framed the context of the US quagmire in Iraq, but it is worthwhile to reflect on the content. Has the Canadian Army remembered the lessons learned during the Peacekeeping Operations of the 90s? Is it remembering the lessons of Afghanistan despite a well-intentioned reversion to war-fighting operations in training? The following paragraphs break-down some of the key concepts that are included in this Advanced COIN course.

Given the fundamental importance of de-escalating violence, training on non-lethal options would be invaluable, to include: posture, presence, de-escalation, non-lethal weapons and close-quarter combat. Specific non-lethal weapons systems such as pepper spray, the asp baton, bean-bag/rubber ball ammunition for shot guns, water cannons, crowd control equipment, the laser dazzler, distraction devices, CS gas and Tasers are all options. There are currently trials and war-stock for these systems available, however, there is very limited training given to these, since the primary focus on use of force is lethal. In Stability Operations, much operational and strategic damage

---

173 The U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, xiii.
174 John Conrad, Scarce Heard Amid the Guns: An Inside Look at Canadian Peacekeeping. Toronto: Dundurn, 2011. “The most difficult principle for the blue berets serving in the Balkans was impartiality.” This is a key component that soldiers must train and develop in order to facilitate PKO successes.
175 Frank Ledwidge, Losing Small Wars: British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan. Cornwall: T.J. International, 2011, identified that a key failure for the British in Iraq was failing to understand that soldiers want to fight. Therefore, the ‘rewiring process’ to a muted use of force posture for stab/COIN is more difficult than a simple scaling back from warfighting foundational training.
177 Carl Conetta, and Charles Knight. “Vital Force: A Proposal for the Overhaul of the UN Peace Operations System and for the Creation of a UN Legion” Project on Defense Alternatives Research Monograph no 4 (October 1995). Key BTS includes: monitoring tense environment, minimizing escalation, facilitating disarmament and demobilization, humanitarian assistance, NEO, establishing defensive areas, facilitating reconstruction efforts, support to host national security forces, enforcing sanctions.
can come from the application of lethal force, even if it is tactically justified.\textsuperscript{177} Enabling operators with a knowledge of these weapons systems could allow units to establish specialists in order to manage violence with non-lethal force in circumstances where they could choose between this or a lethal option. This is a campaign enabler. In comparison, if we assess our domestic police against the forces on Stability Operations, police are equipped with both lethal and non-lethal options. This allows them the ability to avoid deadly force in favour of non-lethal options. A counter-argument is that due to the non-lethal effects of the weapons, they can be abused. Stephen Coleman argued that despite non-lethal weapons value in the ability to provide an alternative option to the use of lethal force, police organizations have used it when lethal force was not an option.\textsuperscript{178} This fundamentally altered the intent: instead of reducing lethal force incidents, it allowed police forces a tool to deal with situations that they would otherwise not have used lethal force, thereby increasing the overall number of people that were on the receiving end of police-applied force.\textsuperscript{179} However, knowledge is power and having the option is better than not. With training, this type of weapon could provide option-space where in its absence there is none.\textsuperscript{180} Given the importance of Information Operations in today's age of real-time media, minimizing lethal force is a desirable end-state; would it not be better to enable a soldier to have the option of throwing a distraction device into an insurgent’s house instead of a fragmentation grenade?

\textsuperscript{178} Coleman, Speech on the Moral Dangers of non-lethal weapons, 2012.
\textsuperscript{179} Coleman, Speech on the Moral Dangers of non-lethal weapons, 2012.
\textsuperscript{180} Jason Hayes, “Preparing our Soldiers for Operations within Complex Human Terrain Environments” \textit{Australian Army Journal} 6, no. 2 (2009), 111.
Interpersonal capabilities and awareness such as negotiating skills, cross-cultural and emotional intelligence are critical to successful Stability Operations. Dr Sarah Meharg commented that 4 out of 5 military personnel fail at cultural awareness.\textsuperscript{181} American studies reinforce this.\textsuperscript{182} A basic understanding of cross-cultural awareness could be delivered with an emphasis on generic interpersonal skills.\textsuperscript{183} This links directly to emotional intelligence, or the ability to understand how to interact with other people.\textsuperscript{184} This is a more generic skill set that is more easily transferable across cultural boundaries without specific cultural bias.\textsuperscript{185} This issue is further complicated in that security forces routinely deal with people suffering from mental disabilities;\textsuperscript{186} this is easily extrapolated to a Stability Operation clearly underscoring the importance of

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{181} Sarah Meharg, Briefing to Canadian Forces College Joint Command and Staff Programme 4, as quoted directly from class lecture, Nov 2013. Quoted with her permission.
\textsuperscript{182} Brian Selmeski, “Military Cross-Cultural Competence: Core Concepts and Individual Development,” Royal Military College of Canada Centre for Security, Armed Forces & Society Occasional Papers Series No 1, 2007. He has deduced a model that is non-theatre specific and could be applied to generalist training in order to develop skills that are universal to expeditionary theatres. Although TMST would be required to supplement, this would provide a solid foundation that would at min provide a baseline to readiness and at best, enhance the TMST to greater appreciation that would reduce the risk to mission. Cultural competence is a key component of stability training that is NOT directly covered in the warfighting training as a core component, as such it requires independent assessment. “If we do not teach military professionals these [Cross cultural competence] until they are Colonels or senior NCOs, we are doing a disservice to our junior personnel (who we routinely ask to carry out these tasks), thereby endangering both mission success and the well-being of the profession.”
\textsuperscript{183} Jason Hayes, “Preparing our Soldiers for Operations within Complex Human Terrain Environments” Australian Army Journal 6, no. 2 (2009), 10. overfocus on kinetic and lethal, should be more ‘soft skills’.
\textsuperscript{185} Michael Lehmann, “Military Operations in the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century,” Australian Army Journal 5, no. 3 (2008): 16-19. Importance of cross-cultural competence and how the Australian army has learned much but needs to do better in order to succeed in future complex operating environments.
\textsuperscript{186} Juan Castillo, “Cultural Irregular Warfare: The Crossroads Between Strategic Culture and Non-Kinetic Strategies Employed by Non-State Actors,” Canadian Military Journal 12, no. 3 (2012). He identifies importance of understanding culture and that, “For COIN practitioners, this reflects the necessity to develop strategies against any type of political, economic or cultural exploitation available to VNSAs.”
\end{flushleft}


soldiers using appropriate interaction techniques in complicated situations - a specialization that general purpose soldiers presently lack.\textsuperscript{187}

An understanding of the internal and external military linkages is vital. Internally, intelligence is a much more challenging problem-set for stability and COIN operations in contrast to traditional warfare. Also, an awareness of capabilities such as sensitive site exploitation, civil-military affairs, and biometrics screening are all campaign winning enablers - if understood and coalesced.\textsuperscript{188} By extension, an understanding of the external stakeholders and the military's role is fundamental to the requisite tactical integration of WoG efforts.\textsuperscript{189} There could be scope to have RCMP/DFATD/Public Safety participation which would enhance the WoG approach. Understanding the military piece in a civilian-led, coalition environment with NGOs and IGOs operating outside of the chain of command is challenging, but fundamental to success - especially in 5 years when corporate knowledge is significantly reduced.

A component of historical case studies, operational lessons learned and doctrinal review would be necessary. An intellectual understanding of the root causes and conditions for insurgencies would be necessary. As is indicated in the US COIN manual,

\begin{quote}
This training [COIN] is as much intellectual as it is physical. Not only do specific units and sub-units have to undertake skill training in preparation for the likely tasks (stability activities such as urban presence patrolling, cordon and search and vehicle check points) but they have to be trained in
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{187} Sarah Meharg, Briefing to Canadian Forces College Joint Command and Staff Programme 4, as quoted directly from class lecture, Nov 2013. Quoted with her permission.

\textsuperscript{188} Charles Choharis and James A. Gavrilis. “Counterinsurgency 3.0*” \textit{Australian Army Journal} 7, no. 3 (2010).


the principles unique to COIN…

Finally, there are a number of tactical skills that form a narrow slice of BTS that are highly relevant to COIN, such as urban operations awareness, counter-IED/mine tactics, security sector reform, emergency driving, conduct after capture, and austere elections management. Significant situational awareness to current policies and sensitivities on detainee operations would be paramount. Additionally, Influence Activities and Information Operations and how they fit would facilitate the tactical awareness of the strategic effects of messaging. However, it is very easy in a stability construct to allow tactical victories and short-sightedness to usurp the operational/strategic IO campaign. Other tactical capabilities could be included but this proves the point that there are numerous precise tactical skill-sets that if trained together in a course such as this would enhance a specialist's ability to operate, advise and train in a COIN oriented Stability Operation. These capabilities would most effectively be validated in a short FTX that challenges the leaders in rank appropriate positions and deals with a complex ADO problem, validating the BTS learned throughout the course, not unlike the 'longest day' scenario at CMTC.

The experience of Afghan veterans will dry up over the next 5 years. Furthermore, IT has much deeper impacts on cognitive development in comparison to CT. A course such as this would enable the complexity of the FSE to be studied in detail by the leaders that will subsequently advise commanders and build appropriate

---

190 The U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 10-1.
193 When considering that the COE and trg establishment infrastructure exist.
future campaigns. This necessity to invest in a leader's understanding of complex environments is expressed by Howard Coombs statement:

I believe practitioners and theorists like Pratt, Sewall and Kitson are correct in that military officers must be prepared and enabled to orchestrate all types of non-military activities. These efforts, aimed at reconstruction, development, and governance are necessary to achieve success in the low-intensity conflicts that we have been fighting over the past decade, and will continue to fight into the foreseeable future.194

This is also valuable because leadership institutions are taking a hard look at these 'Battle Task Standards' and reducing stability from leadership training since it is not being interpreted as ‘core’.195

In summary, Canada's Army can remain capable of combat while developing a specialization of a small tranche of leaders in COIN. By developing an advanced course, institutionalized under the Army Training Authority, this would be an investment whose dividends would greatly outweigh the costs. The lessons of Afghanistan and the PSOs since the fall of the Cold War could be directly injected to leaders without eroding the Army's war-fighting capability. As has been demonstrated in the examination of the FSE, operations in failing/failed states will be the norm, and an expertise in COIN will augment capacity for all forms of Stability Operations, no matter which side of the spectrum of conflict the actual operation exists. This course would facilitate and be further enhanced by a renewed emphasis on the Professional Development pillar of Self-Development.

CHAPTER 5:
ENHANCING THE SELF-DEVELOPMENT PILLAR:
REINVIGORATING SYSTEMS

Combat arms NCOs no longer are simply practitioners of minor unit tactics. They must be versed in combat plus have knowledge of civil-military cooperation, media relationships, propaganda and counter-propaganda, local history, culture and negotiation techniques... have the skills of a police officer and understand unconventional threats such as mines, booby traps, suicide bombers, or guerrilla activity.

- NCO: the Backbone of the Army

Figure 5-1: The four pillars of Professional Development.

---


"Self-development is taking personal responsibility for one's own learning and development through a process of assessment, reflection, and taking action."
“The challenge for the Canadian Forces today,” according to David Bercuson is, “to continue to advance the improvements in professionalism and professional development within the Canadian Forces.”

Self-Development, as indicated in the visual depiction of training doctrine above, is one of several systems of training in the army’s PD system, and it is woefully under-exploited. It “aims to provoke both intellectual and character growth and is best managed by the individual in conjunction with his superiors, but it must also be monitored.”

There are several reasons why enhancing this training system should be prioritized in order to achieve the goal stated above by Bercuson. First, the Army is not capitalizing on the opportunity to provide effective Self-Development, especially to its NCMs. This is evident in the lack of access to the now closing OPME programme, with no viable alternatives in the near future and no further specific self-development structure outside of informal unit training as devised by commanding officer’s. The Army reading list provides an option, but it is stale and not seriously employed by line units. Second, there is scope to link Self-Development to both CDA and the military career system in order to enable the process with reasonably little structural change, cost or obtrusive effort. Third, Self-Development training is relatively inexpensive and given the technological advances over

---

201 CANFORGEN 067/13.  http://www.rmc.ca/aca/ac-pe/ug-apc/dcs-dep/ap-pu-eng.php Canada. Michael Fink-Jensen, Office of Primary Importance, Canadian Forces Junior Officer Development Programme. Email to Author confirming that "NCMs are not eligible for the CAFJOD programme. If they wish to complete the OPME Programme, they will need to adhere to the process laid out in CANFORGEN 218/12." (March 2014): 1.
the past decade, could be significantly enhanced with support from CDA. Finally, it offers scope for recent lessons from conflicts and key deductions to be injected into the leadership of the next conflict during their formative leadership years. Finally, the case study of Germany during the inter-war years provides a clear historical perspective that describes the effectiveness of cognitive focus in generating military capacity despite political and financial constraints.

Self-Development training is an investment in both the short and long term. It generates a capability for the short term in that individuals are at a higher level of baseline professionalism which, upon receipt of a warning order, could enhance Theatre Mission Specific Training and the conduct of operations. In the long term, Self-Development will ensure exposure to topics so they will not be new if similar situations are encountered 5-10-20 years later. Therefore, if control can be exerted both to manage topics and encourage participation, a systems approach to institutional problem solving will be improved; as described in complex-adaptive systems theory, the more people within an organization that are exposed to unique systemic specialities, the greater the propensity to solve complex problems. The need to reassess the current model is alluded to in NCO: Backbone of the Army:

A number of factors suggest that the way the Army trains its non-commissioned officers and the types of training it offers might not be entirely appropriate to the future Army’s needs or the abilities and requirements of the candidates themselves.

204 Training Canada’s Army, 38.
206 The NCO: Backbone of the Army, 10.
The fact that a gap has been identified underpins the importance to critically re-assess this training system in order to determine if there is room for improvement. Holistically, Army training over-emphasizes technical and collective training; very little if any oversight is dedicated to the pursuit of Self-Development or even setting the conditions for keen professionals to have a user friendly tool that they could use on their own time – arguably an important component to a truly ‘professional’ organization.

An option to promote this form of Professional Development would be to link the Army reading list to both CDA and the military career system in order to provide a 'carrot' to those who participate. Co-ordination and consensus could be achieved in order to have a simple and direct list that provides material to be read by rank level, from Private to General. Upon the development of a suitable product (at this point referring to a more user friendly Army reading list, but the concept will be subsequently expanded upon to include technological options), teeth must be given to the requirement to participate in the programme; this could be achieved in the same way that Officer Professional Military Education (OPMEs) were mandatory for promotion from Captain to Major. There are many options for policing the participation in a re-invigorated Self-Development programme, from passive (it is implied that the member completes the reading based on a moral obligation) to directive (the chain of command assesses a product). There are pros and cons to both options, but key here is that there is a motivation based on career ambition to become informed through a chain of command guided Self-Development process.

If there is to be an assessment portion, CDA could facilitate a generic rubric or even contract technology so that the entire process is managed through an electronic
portal such as DNDLearn or the Army Forum. Additionally, there could be other professional incentives. The best essay at specific rank levels could be selected for publication. NCMs that demonstrate extraordinary intellect could, for example, be selected to represent the NCM corps at conferences that would otherwise be attended by staff officers. By giving a combination of incentives and penalties to appropriate adherence to the Army reading list based on career implications, this would facilitate the development of a cognitive warrior. The USFOR-A developed such a reading list that was mandatory at all rank levels. The Canadian Army reading list is a start state that could be amended to provide this type of PD.

Intellectual development can “address organizational shortfalls… and increase understanding of the second and third order effects of a unit's operations that are easily shrouded in the fog of war.” The content would range the spectrum of conflict, but given the over-emphasis of war-fighting in leadership and collective training, this would provide a venue to inject stabilization lessons to both the NCM and Officer cadres. Colonel Chris Field commented that the incorporation of continuous learning is a top priority issue for the Australian Army. This is equally relevant for Canada.

The above model of Self-Directed training is relatively inexpensive, both in terms of money and time; however, for a greater investment in technology, substantially disproportionate cognitive development could be facilitated. Consider for a moment, an internet-based site that monitors and interfaces centrally controlled curriculum that could

---


208 *The Canadian Army Reading List: A Professional Guide for Canada's Soldiers.*


be accessed on all personal electronic devices. This would allow a WO on leave to read James Davis', *The Sharp End* on his IPad in the evenings, or three corporals to play a DND authorized version of *Call of Duty* after lunch in the mess.\footnote{The Canadian Press. *Canadian Forces may use video games in war training* Dec., 2013. \url{http://globalnews.ca/news/1045901/canadian-forces-may-use-video-games-in-war-training/} Accessed 4 May 2014.} Chat rooms, reading material, and a linkage between rank levels and their interaction in the 'cloud' could provide the basis of a closed loop assessment (IE a part of the WO Self-Development task would be to comment on and facilitate the Corporals chat room to provide both sage council and leadership oversight). Although this would require a substantial start-up investment of personnel, time and funding, this is the way that the world is moving;\footnote{Razvan Deaconescu, and Stefania Matei. "The Negotiation of Knowledge and Knowing. The Challenge of Using Wiki Technology in Computer Supported Collaborative Learning," *19th International Conference on Control Systems and Computer Science*. University of Bucharest (2013): 578-580.} to embrace this technology would better interface our soldiers to relevant information in a manner that they increasingly understand and can better access. Significant research has demonstrated that leveraging electronic learning tools substantially improves the learning process.\footnote{Christina Steiner, Gudrun Wesiak, Adam Moore, Owen Conlan, "An Investigation of Successful Self-Regulated-Learning in a Technology-Enhanced Learning Environment." Memphs: The 16th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence in Education. (July 2013): 19-23.} Furthermore, Alberts and Hayes have argued that increasing informational awareness in an organization increases productivity and responsiveness.\footnote{Amanda Jefferies, and Ruth Hyde. "Building the Future Students' Blended Learning Experiences From Current Research Findings," *Electronic Journal of e-Learning* 8, no. 2 (2010): 133-140. Mary Thorpe and Jean Gordon, "Online learning in the workplace: A Hybrid model of participation in networked, professional learning," *Australasian Journal of Educational Technology* 28, no. 8 (2012): 1267-1282.} For the user, this would not need to be onerous nor time consuming, but in the same manner that officers update their financial authorities triennially, soldiers and officers at all rank levels can work on their own time towards completing their rank appropriate Self-
Development studies. The curriculum would require an oversight team, but considering the power that this system could have in regard to focusing the distribution of knowledge and the emphasis of career-long development, the benefits would significantly out-weigh the startup costs. A conceptual model follows in table 6-1, 6-2 and 6-3: 215

---

215 This model assumes that each Army member has personal access to a portal, similar to the DNDlearn construct where he/she can navigate through all military publications, PDF copies of books for e-readers, an open forum for blog posts and open access to the internet. The infrastructure behind this system would be a hardware, software and curriculum maintenance team, and an effective policy that requires all members at each rank level to complete all lines of their Self-Development PD before promotion. There would be no friction to a soldier/officer's initiative. If a Captain finishes his Self-Development milestones, he can commence immediately his tasks at the Major, then Lieutenant-Colonel levels, with the obvious exception of the ability to mentor subordinates at the appropriate level.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Requirement</th>
<th>Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Read four books: &lt;br&gt;1. LF 2021: ADO &lt;br&gt;2. Trade specific book &lt;br&gt;3. Recent operation &lt;br&gt;4. Relevant own choice</td>
<td>Blog entries: 400 words/book on leadership or ethics, comment on 20 other Pte-Sgt blog threads minimum.</td>
<td>Commented &amp; Assessed by two random WO; Min six comments in thread and reasonable content = pass. Excellent = flag for webmaster / CDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete all single player stages of DND version 'Call of Duty'</td>
<td>Stages Complete</td>
<td>Complete = pass</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Play 150 hours of networked DND Call of Duty</td>
<td>Specific Environments and tactics required IOT pass (urban, check points, negotiation security, detainees, tactical communication, etc)</td>
<td>150 hours achieved + levels complete = pass (automatic time log)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army points to improve and points to sustain consideration</td>
<td>Blog entries: 5x 200 word commentaries on members choice, comment on 10 other Pte-Sgt blog threads minimum.</td>
<td>Commented &amp; Assessed by two random WO; Min six comments in thread and reasonable content = pass. Excellent = flag for webmaster / CDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Affairs Awareness</td>
<td>Post 2 articles relevant to Army with comment, Comment on 10 other Pte-Sgt blog threads minimum.</td>
<td>Commented &amp; Assessed by two random WO; Min six comments in thread and reasonable content = pass. Excellent = flag for webmaster / CDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visual Media: &lt;br&gt;1. Blackhawk Down &lt;br&gt;2. Sector Sarajevo &lt;br&gt;3. One TED talk &lt;br&gt;4. Mental Resiliency video (Tactics School) &lt;br&gt;5. Member's choice</td>
<td>Blog entry: 400 word comment on each, comment on 10 other Pte-Sgt blog threads minimum.</td>
<td>Commented &amp; Assessed by two random WO; Min six comments in thread and reasonable content = pass. Excellent = flag for webmaster / CDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 6-2: Conceptual Self-Development requirements for WO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Task</strong></td>
<td><strong>Requirement</strong></td>
<td><strong>Assessment</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Read: 1. NDA 2. CF Military Law 3. CF COIN publication 4. The Warriors Way 5. Relevant own choice</td>
<td>Blog entries: 400 words/book on leadership or ethics, comment on 20 other MCpl-Maj blog threads minimum.</td>
<td>Commented &amp; Assessed by two random MWO/Capt; Min six comments in thread and reasonable content = pass. Excellent = flag for webmaster / CDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mentorship of Corporal posts</td>
<td>Comment on min 20 blogs and commentaries, facilitating their collaborative Self-Development.</td>
<td>Once Cpl Thread has culminated, WO assesses and terminates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army points to improve and points to sustain consideration</td>
<td>Blog entries: 5x 200 word commentaries on members choice, comment on two other MCpl-Maj blog threads minimum.</td>
<td>Commented &amp; Assessed by two random MWO/Capt; Min six comments in thread and reasonable content = pass. Excellent = flag for webmaster / CDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Affairs Awareness</td>
<td>Post 2 articles relevant to Army with comment, Comment on 10 other MCpl-Maj blog threads minimum.</td>
<td>Commented &amp; Assessed by two random MWO/Capt; Min six comments in thread and reasonable content = pass. Excellent = flag for webmaster / CDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task</td>
<td>Requirement</td>
<td>Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Read: 10x peer reviewed Journal Articles</td>
<td>Blog entries: 2x 200 word commentaries on members choice, comment on two other Lt-LCol blogs minimum.</td>
<td>Commented &amp; Assessed by two random Maj/LCol; Min six comments in thread and reasonable content = pass. Excellent = flag for webmaster / CDA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-Mentorship of WOs with MWOs</td>
<td>Comment on min 10 blogs and commentaries to facilitate their PD.</td>
<td>Once Thread has culminated, MWO/Capt terminates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Play 75 hours of DND version 'Call of Duty'</td>
<td>Specific Environments and tactics relevant to Army Capt required IOT pass.</td>
<td>75 hours achieved + levels complete = pass (automatic time log)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army point to improve and point to sustain consideration</td>
<td>Blog entries: 5x 200 word commentaries on members choice, comment on two other WO-LCol blogs minimum.</td>
<td>Commented &amp; Assessed by two random Maj/LCol; Min six comments in thread and reasonable content = pass. Excellent = flag for webmaster / CDA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Affairs Awareness</td>
<td>Post 2 articles relevant to Army with comment, Comment on two other WO-LCol blogs minimum.</td>
<td>Commented &amp; Assessed by two random Maj/LCol; Min six comments in thread and reasonable content = pass. Excellent = flag for webmaster / CDA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TED Talks (or similar)</td>
<td>Post and blog on 10. Read and comment on other posts</td>
<td>Commented &amp; Assessed by two random Maj/LCol; Min six comments in thread and reasonable content = pass.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These videogames would be specifically modeled by rank to ensure rank appropriate emphasis: IE technical skills for Corporals as opposed to planning, command and control, and sustainment issues for Captains.
Another advantage to improving the Self-Development model, regardless of the level of technology involved, is the opportunity for lessons learned to be injected. This is especially important for those leaders in their formative leadership years that may not have the same level of operational experience as those of the 90s and 2000s. There are both concepts and specific tactics that can be incorporated into the reading package. Were it an electronic/‘cloud-based’ product, lessons learned could be incorporated immediately in order to enable a feedback loop. The Army's priority lessons learned tracker confirms that:

The military needs to learn more about what is beyond the third block of the Three Block War, or the humanitarian dimension of full-spectrum operations… most military leaders have not focused on issues such as community development, governance, literacy, public administration, policing, agriculture or strengthening the private sector. 217

Chain of command directed curriculum that is offered at rank appropriate levels can facilitate this. Also, the Army lessons learned tracker identified that in light of recent operations (Afghanistan, Haiti and the Olympics specifically), a more comprehensive approach regarding professional development should be pursued. 218 To learn from history, there is precedence for enhancing Self-Development to create disproportionate effects to the initial investment: inter-war Germany.

At the close of WWI, The German Army was defeated and the economy destroyed. The Treaty of Versailles forced Germany to accept full responsibility for the

---

217 Priority Lessons Identified, 14.  
218 Priority Lessons Identified, 3-8.
war and imposed a "Carthaginian peace" that drastically reduced funding, training and military capacity. However, despite these realities, the German Reichswehr rebuilt itself to a capacity much greater than its French and British adversaries. How was this possible? The Reichswehr, under the leadership of General Hans Von Seeckt, refocused its training system to focus on the development of leaders through professional development and war-gaming. In order to train combined arms tactics without combined arms equipment, simulations were conducted that focused on the cognitive development of the participants. Von Seeckt, "fervently believed that the only constraints on the human mind were self-imposed," and strove to improve the Reichswehr's capability through developing the cognitive abilities of its junior leadership. Clearly in a time of austerity and 'peace', this model has an attractive applicability to the current Canadian Army.

Using the German case study, one can draw out several conclusions. First, and aligned to the doctrinal concept to, “ensure intellectual development,” junior leaders can be challenged cognitively, through research or by leveraging synthetic environments in the absence of large-scale, highly-expensive collective training. A reading list has been introduced as a Self-Development option, but extending this concept could be Army sponsored internet applications that link appropriate 'games' or strategy puzzles to training time. With proper control, these would enable leaders to develop problem

219 John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequences of The Peace. Cambridge University, 1919.
solving skills for complex situations.\textsuperscript{225} Examples are already in use in simulation centres but could be further enhanced so that leaders can access them on their personal electronic devices. As an example, having an incentive for someone to play a specific level on a peace-support oriented game and achieve specific results over time would encourage a positive behaviour that would reinforce the desired learning process. This is supported by Stephen Plourde, who assessed cognitive development and small team competencies as battle winning investments.\textsuperscript{226}

Emphasizing the development of cognitive warriors in the Army is not new. However, there are advantages to further investing in this pillar given the fact that it is currently under-exposed, and there are incentives that could be employed to better develop the intellectual capacity and decision-making ability of leaders. By linking the Army reading list to promotion and into CDA for both technical and standardization support, there is potential for substantial improvement in the quality of junior leaders that are developed over time. This applies generally but also specifically in the enhancement of cognitive capacity for the complexity of Stabilization Operations. This could be achieved in two models - a low technology option that simply links the Self-Development tasks by rank to promotion - or a technologically enhanced model that would leverage today's network centricity (notably a principal theme in LF 2021:ADO) in order to

\textsuperscript{225} Bellamy, understanding Peacekeeping 117. This provides an example of how case studies lessons can draw out solid deductions “UNTAG’s operational complexity exceeded earlier cases by many orders of magnitude as it combined complex civil and military tasks. Aside from its three core functions of monitoring the electoral process, demilitarization and policing, UNTAG played a significant role in the repatriation of over 50,000 refugees and penetrated the Namibian political landscape with a significant depth of authority.” Clearly the study of complex case studies such as this would be worthwhile to Army leaders who would otherwise only experience stability concepts if on the road to high readiness and even then it would be an overview.

significantly enhance cognitive development. The inter-war Germany case study provides
demonstrable proof of potential benefits of emphasizing cognitive warriors as opposed to
platform specific CT. Enabling a Self-Development system also provides the benefit of
exposing all leaders to complex operational situations that they have not been exposed to
during leadership training, reconstitution or operations. This is aligned with the Army
Training Authority's comments that, “Multifaceted training is not limited to the road to
high readiness (R2HR) and should be considered in appropriate professional development
periods in order to better prepare our forces.” 227 The proposed model would accomplish
this current shortfall in the military training institution. It is scalable, relevant, and would
reinforce in the investment in quality versus quantity. An extension of this Self-
Development construct could also be incorporated into an aspect of International Military
Training; a model which will be discussed next.

---

227 Priority Lessons Identified, 14.
CHAPTER 6: INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRAINING: ARMY SUPPORT TO DEFENCE DIPLOMACY

The Canadian Forces has excelled at providing foreign military training. However, the effectiveness is limited by the nation's lack of a strategic focus and the consequent short term provision of training... foreign military training is very effective and should form a key component of Canada's long term focus for international development.

- Lieutenant-General Mike Jeffries (ret'd)
  Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute

International Military Training (IMT) involves the engagement of military forces in the absence of, prior to, or after the conduct of hostilities. A Common definition of this programme is, "To provide forces to meet the varied activities undertaken by government to dispel hostility, build and maintain trust, and assist in the development of democratically accountable armed forces, thereby making a significant contribution to conflict prevention and resolution." Canada's foreign policy objectives specific to an overall defence diplomacy construct are nested in the Global Engagement Strategy (GES), in order to achieve better local stability, improve interoperability or facilitate alliance/coalition relations. This objective can be supported to a greater degree now that the Canadian Army has completed operations in Afghanistan; in fact, an increase in this type of bilateral mission-set would be an ideal transition for the Army. With three operational Brigade groups available and reconstituted, capacity exists to leverage small teams of leaders who can support defence diplomacy objectives including, but not limited

---

to, training. This is especially relevant to the thesis of this essay - by engaging expeditionary shaping operations either before and/or after conflict, the Army can influence the stability of a nation of interest. This long term strategy would be more effectively tied to the OGDs as opposed to the current ad hoc and short-term reaction to a crisis. There are four reasons that increasing the Army's participation in IMT missions would enhance Canada's interests disproportionately to the level of investment: the reinforcement of a Whole of Government strategy in Foreign Policy, availability of Army HQs for reciprocal exchanges, the advantages of a longer time horizon for policy implementation, and the provision of a consistent operational opportunity to available soldiers.

First, given that the CAF has a Global Engagement Strategy (GES) that is aligned with the interests of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD), an increased Army involvement in International Military Training would reinforce security in targeted nations. CANSOFCOM currently is engaged globally with unclassified operations in both Niger and Jamaica, both yielding highly successful results. There is scope for conventional Army elements to conduct similar missions that focus on non-SOF elements and tasks which would complement the departmental plan. Lieutenant-General Devlin alluded to the importance of IMT in the Canadian Army Operating Plan 2013/2014. Canada's successful training mission in Afghanistan is proof positive of the tactical through operational level effects that this type of mission can


233 Army Operating Plan 2013/2014, Chapter 3.
A potential future example would be Army involvement in the training and development of Haitian army elements to shape their development in congruence with Canadian interests over time. There would be political capital gained in that the Army is waving the Canadian flag on an operation aligned with Canadian interests, there are bilateral benefits gained through the development of relationships and networks, and the host force would be shaped to enable its success. This type of emphasis on training a host national army in a Stability Capacity would enable the host state so that they are more capable to deal with their internal or regional stability, thereby eroding the potential for greater conflict in the long term. There is a risk that Canadian trained soldiers could use their skills for undesirable reasons. However, this risk could be mitigated by prudent planning and a whole of government effort in prioritizing partner nations. An additional consideration is that this type of operation would risk fewer casualties than direct engagement in conflict while still garnering political capital and supporting coalition partners. There always exists risk, but without it, there is no reward.

Second, there is scope to bring foreign officers into Canadian Army Headquarters as Liaison or exchange officers. Currently, this aspect of nationally-hosted IMT in Canada is centered on the Military Training Assistance Programme (MTAP), which

---

brings foreign students into Canadian training establishments. This could be expanded on a case by case basis to include exchanges into HQs such as Canadian Joint Operations Centre, First Canadian Division HQ, the Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre or the field force (unit, brigade or division level). There are two distinct advantages to this. First, the Canadian officers exposed to the MTAP candidate develop a personal relationship with an officer that would become pivotal should there be a requirement for operations with that nation in the future - either with them in a third nation, or directly in their state. In an age of increased network centricity, the development of relationships should be nurtured and encouraged by the Army institution. This network development, to include partners in coalition operations, is a baseline concept in LF 2021:ADO. Augmenting this benefit is the advantage of increasing cultural awareness for Canadians that would be working with that Liaison/Exchange officer, a skill that is critical to success in Stability Operations and a skill that has been identified in chapter 3 as lacking in Western militaries. The second advantage afforded by that this type of exchange would be an increased awareness to that guest officer on how Canada does business, allowing them options for Army structure review in their nation. A potential option could be that of a foreign officer working in the Directorate of Army Training (DAT) which would then provide him/her with solution-space options to training related institutional

---


238 The author has experienced this synergy several times. The most pronounced was the linkages developed during Ranger School and the subsequent interactions both on operations and major training events with US Army units.


development issues in his/her home nation. To expand this concept, it could be developed over time into a proper exchange, enabling Canadian Army leaders to deploy into key institutional positions within their Army HQ infrastructure to provide insight and advice. It would build an expertise that could be subsequently leveraged in the case of a regional deployment into the area - an especially advantageous consideration for initial surge operations and operational level logistics. An exchange concept is a ‘win-win’ for both Canada and a potential host nation. It is also completely aligned with the FP&R which comments that the CAF needs to leverage reciprocal opportunities for capacity building.241

Third, IMT builds on a longer term view.242 Conflict resolution experts agree that solutions to stability issues are long term in nature.243 Having an element of defence diplomacy that is focussing on the far horizon better enables a WoG policy to achieve foreign policy goals. This is a political issue; however, the military can advise and influence the operational capacities and options for bilateral military training with GES nations that would support the plans of DFATD and NGO stakeholders over their time horizon.244 Despite the political nature of the decision, however, it does not need to be contentious - the CAF, on behalf of the Army, could simply propose the concept as a value-for-money option that the non-partisan parliamentary National Defence Committee

---

could steer routinely. There would be no rush to the development of an Army IMT programme. An evolutionary approach would be effective, which is advantageous when multiple government departments are required for consensus. Advantageously, the fact that this would be authorized above the DND level infers that funding could be leveraged from 'the Centre' vice from the department; this would alleviate some of the financial stress to Force Generators deploying training teams or receiving candidates/exchanges. Externally to Canada, a long term strategy could be linked into either multilateral or bilateral plans that could alleviate stress from our international partners, especially the US. For example, a long term training mission focused on Haiti could free up US resources that may have been looking at similar stability-type operations. This IMT role is an ideal fit for a small but respected and experienced military force such as Canada; to fill in the gaps that support our allies would be a worthwhile strategy investment in addition to the tactical benefits to both the host national troops and the Canadian trainers. However, it would require a champion and the political appetite to take the risk.

Fourth, IMT would provide an operational venue for Canadian soldiers to deploy. This is not an insignificant consideration given that many of today's soldiers joined to fight in Afghanistan; with the close of the war, many are leaving due to the lack of operational opportunity on the horizon. Keen tactical leaders, both officer and NCO, want to deploy and this could provide an opportunity during a period of limited missions. IMT would provide a spigot to the Canadian Army to deploy on small, relatively safe training missions. In the absence of a major line of operations such as was the case in the Balkans

---

or Afghanistan, Canada could pursue bilateral IMT, which would, among other things, give soldiers the opportunity to deploy and train foreign soldiers. This is not a priority issue, but it is a peripheral benefit to such an strategy; at the end of the day, maintaining a standing army without having any operational deployments is an expensive use of resources without any immediate political capital gained.

There are two case studies that provide context to this IMT concept: The recent Army training mission in Afghanistan, and a specific MTAP engagement with Mongolia. In Afghanistan, the Army has been able to reinforce Canada's position in NATO (and with the US) by providing support to an alliance mission. This strategic goal has been key; Canada's greater interests with the US are fundamental to its foreign policy actions. At the tactical level, several Canadian battalions have trained tens of thousands of Afghan National Army soldiers. These accomplishments, especially at the tactical level are significant - without suffering a single fatality during this phase of the Afghanistan mission, the Canadian Army facilitated an alliance approach to enable the Afghan security forces to improve self-sufficiency. For a casualty adverse decision maker, this provides option-space that could be exploited for both strategic and political gain. Major-General D. Michael Day, the former Deputy Commanding General of the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan and current Chief of Force Development commented to the Senate Defence Committee that:

I can tell you that we are on the right path. We are absolutely moving at the necessary speed to get the Afghan security forces where they need to be in order to assume full responsibility for the lead in the fight against the insurgency they face… I look at the whole military training centre, the fielding centre, the signal school and the three regional military training centres, all run by Canadians. Not only have we had a fundamental effect on Afghans, but we have also led this coalition of 37 countries.249

From the perspective of exchanges and MTAP, the Canadian Forces College will have its second senior Afghan officer on the National Security Programme in 2014.250 The Canadian Training mission in Afghanistan was highly successful and arguably the most impactful phase of the overall Canadian campaign. It is critical to hoist aboard these lessons learned in order to support a Canadian vision to have an impact internationally through IMT.

In Mongolia, Canada has developed a significant relationship since a functional Mongolian democracy was established in the mid-90s.251 In fact, Canada is now the second largest investor in Mongolia with over 60 Canadian mining companies having a stake in Mongolian natural resources. Canada has trained several Mongolian officers on the Army Operations Course and at the Peace Support Training Centre who subsequently went on to command Mongolian Forces in UN operations, including Afghanistan, Iraq and Sierra Leone.252 This training was assessed as an "Eye-Opener" to Mongolian Colonel Jargalsaikhan Mandee. The relationship was subsequently leveraged during joint training at Camp Julien, Kabul in 2004 by Mongolian Artillery trainers and CAF elements based on this MTAP relationship. This is the type of relationship that has

249 Ibid., 1,3-4.
demonstrated great success: Canadian interests in the region are supported by the defence diplomacy of the CAF. The Army has played a role in Mongolia and could play a greater one now in other GES states now that precedents, such as those in Afghanistan and Mongolia (and elsewhere), have been established.

The Canadian Army could and should play a greater role in bilateral IMT. This capacity developing option has a direct influence on shaping the security in regions of interest to Canada. The Army has a large pool of highly capable manpower that without a major line of operations is available and would be relevant to IMT, as has been evident in Afghanistan, Mongolia and other nations. This enabling option would improve networks and develop a long term solution to international engagements that are aligned with Canadian OGDs. It would offer operational opportunities to soldiers who would otherwise not be exposed to other nation's forces. This is further supported by Hugh Miall and Carolyn Bull in their assessment of national strategies to enable conflict resolution, including the pre- and post-conflict phases.\footnote{Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse. \textit{Contemporary Conflict Resolution}. London: TJ International, (2003): 141-145 and 198-203. Identification of the nuance to military force operating in stability operations regarding interagency, understanding culture, avoiding ethnocentrism, use of force, supporting concurrently the host governance, host security forces and host development. Carolyn Bull, \textit{No entry without Strategy: Building the rule of law under UN Transitional Administration}. New York: United Nations University Press, (2008): 249-265 Argues that imposing western standards can have negative second and third order effects (establishing rules, perception of occupier vice facilitator). Importance to be aware and train to these.} IMT, while limited in scope and managed centrally by the government, is proof that a little effort applied consistently over time can have a positive impact out of proportion to the investment.
CHAPTER 7:
RISKS AND BENEFITS:
INSTITUTIONAL FRICTION VERSUS QUALITATIVE READINESS

Conventional warfare approaches often were ineffective when applied to operations other than major combat, forcing leaders to realign the ways and means of achieving effects and is being corrected by institutionalizing non-conventional warfare, updating education and training, leveraging knowledge management and reassessing force alignment.

- Joint Coalition Lessons Learned\(^{254}\)

As with change in any organization, there are risks and rewards to be balanced. This essay posits that without compromising on the Army’s ability to war-fight, there are four initiatives that could enhance a Stability Operations capacity. As with any complex and politically sensitive organization, there are valid arguments and counter-arguments to these considerations. This chapter consolidates the key risks and challenges that would be encountered should the above considerations be operationalized and contrasts them to the advantages. The risks can be summarized as: Stressing limited resources, institutional friction to organizational change, and the debatable necessity to changing the status quo. Conversely, the benefits can be summarized as aligning Army function to societal preference, improving qualitative readiness, enhancing support to both Army doctrine and political direction, and improving the institutionalization of lessons learned.

Risks:

First, should these changes be incorporated, there would be a resource bill. Manpower, finances and time would be necessary. However, fundamental to the analysis of these initiatives is that all of the suggested investments are scalable over time and that they would generate disproportionate dividends. There is no need to incorporate change overnight; the process could be evolutionary in order to meet with the Army's needs-based Capability Development process. Also, there are mitigations against a prohibitive cost. Instructors in training institutions are routinely multi-rolled between instructing leadership training and specialized courses or given secondary duties for CoE unit responsibilities.195 Person Years (PYs) would be a long-term challenge, as a small re-allocation of effort would be required over time, however, this would not be insurmountable based on a prioritized PRICIE analysis.196

The question of funding allocations is equally challenging. Simply put, this would need to be a zero sum game, at least initially. In order to finance these initiatives, there would likely be a requirement for sacrifice elsewhere. Although initiatives such as IMT could garner funding from DFATD or Treasury Board, the bulk of funding for all other initiatives would come from DND's internal budget.197 The intent of this essay is neither to establish prioritization of effort nor to identify areas where reductions can be made.

---

195 Author's experience at the Infantry School 2009-2011.
196 PY's refer to the allocation of an individual, be it a soldier, officer or NCO into a specific position. These are regulated by specific allocations in order for the government to manage the total numbers of military personnel. PRICIE refers to the systemic needs based process of determining the implementation process of capability development. This detailed staff analysis would determine where institutional risks would be taken. The author’s belief is that a detailed analysis of these initiatives will determine that they should be evolved into action over the long term to facilitate the implementation process.
The question that this essay highlights is: are the four initiatives of this essay aligned with the Canadian Army's priorities? If so, then these are relevant points for discussion that could influence how resources are allocated. Although much debate has been generated over the importance of readiness, collective training and specific high-profile Army capabilities, the cancellation of the Close Combat Vehicle indicates that the Army will make prudent business decisions based on its priorities. The author is simply identifying aspects of training that could be considered for higher prioritization.

As has been discussed, any large bureaucracy that undergoes change will have inertia. Therefore, a risk to this concept is that there may be stagnation and resistance (both passive and active). To this end, any consideration for change will need to be championed through the chain of command at a minimum of the Army Training Authority (Commander of the Doctrine and Training System) level. Further, organizational change is most effective when it grows from the bottom up.258 By investing in the normative level of an organization by incorporating lessons learned into IT and Self-Development, the key curriculum will be institutionalized in order to build a better prepared Army for Stability Operations. Therefore, this risk of inertia can be mitigated through CADTC championing and support, prioritization of resources, and enabling a bottom-up approach to incorporating lessons learned into the training systems.

Finally, one must ask the question: is it really necessary? The Army of the last two decades has been able to train for war and reorient to be functional in Stability operations. The Canadian Army is good at tactical-level combat, however, if it deploys for Stability Operations, it is risking the potential success of the mission and the welfare

258 Amagoh, "Perspectives on Organizational Change: Systems and Complexity Theories," 8-10.
of the soldiers if the force is not as well prepared as possible. Combat and Stability Operations skill-sets are not completely mutually inclusive. The initiatives posited do not conflict with the Army’s ability to war-fight; therefore, what is the harm in investing in an enhanced stability capability which the FSE has determined is significantly more likely to be experienced in comparison to war-fighting.

**Benefits:**

The following four areas summarize the overall benefits to the development of these four initiatives. First, stability capability enhancement is aligned with the public's interest in their Army. Canadian society views the CAF, and its Army specifically, as a Peacekeeping force.\(^{259}\) Debates about Peacekeeping as myth or reality aside, there is a perception that pervades Canadian society to the point that upwards of 9 out of 10 Canadians see the primary role of the Army as ‘Peacekeeping’ – regardless of the definition.\(^{260}\) An increased exposure to stability IT, though a combination of PSTC courses and an Advanced COIN course would posture the army better for both traditional and hybrid Peacekeeping Operations. Similarly, enhanced Self-Development would provide continuous exposure to future Army leaders on past Peacekeeping Operations.

---


which is vital as those veterans are retiring from service. By improving the training focus on stabilization, the Army is in fact reorienting its training alignment closer to that which the public wants of it. This is good from a domestic policy perspective and it is good from a civil-military relations perspective - and no compromising of its war-fighting capability is required to achieve this.

The recommendations of this essay would also improve the 'qualitative' readiness of the Army. There are several metrics of readiness that the Army uses to measure its ability to meet the FP&R guidelines in support to the CFDS. However, these measure quantitative data: numbers of vehicles available, notice to move timings and size of forces for example. The improvements proposed would by design not focus on quantitative readiness; however, qualitatively the component parts of the force would be better enabled and prepared. The case study on the effectiveness of Self-Development and small unit leadership in inter-war Germany clearly indicates the impacts of investing in the cognitive domain of junior leaders within an army institution. By emphasizing cognitive warriors, the army will improve its overall ability to react to asymmetric threats in complex-adaptive environments. This is supported by both Tony Balasevicious’ thesis on posturing for ‘future shock,’ and Waypoint 2016 which highlighted that adaptability in the Army links training for core missions with a necessary flexibility to react to unforeseen circumstances with “minimal re-training, adapting existing skills, knowledge

262 With the obvious exception of counting the numbers of soldiers and officers with stability oriented qualifications such as Advanced COIN or Peace-Support Officer, etc.
and attitudes to new tasks." Similarly, by honing specialists in both Peace-Support and COIN, the advisors and planners in tactical units will be that much more enabled for the very operations that they will likely conduct. This readiness could be further reinforced by incorporating focused structural change to the Reserve Force; a requirement that is well beyond the scope of this essay to address. On the receiving end, by interfacing with the armies of host nations that are part of the GES or likely future operational areas through an enhanced IMT plan, relationships and host nation readiness can be developed

265 A restructure of the Reserve Force could provide a substantial enhancement to the Army's Stability Operations Capability. However, options for Reserve Force restructure are beyond the scope of this paper. The below references provide further context.


Canada. Department of National Defence, Designing Canada’s Army of Tomorrow Kingston: DND Canada, (2011): 50. The current Army reserve, from the Army OpOrder 2013/2014 is to provide individual augmentation as required. However, “A critical aspect of this burgeoning force generation problem involves a reassessment of the traditional Regular Force- Reserve Force model, where reservists are viewed primarily as an augmentation mechanism for the regular force. This model must change if we are to mitigate the negative effects of current recruitment trends and maintain a credible defence capability within Canada.

Yasmeen Abu-Laban identified in Kymlicka, Will and Kathryn Walker. Rooted Cosmopolitanism: Canada and the World. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012. The rich diversity of rooted cosmopolitanism in Canada that has great potential to facilitate the improvement of their parent nations through non-discriminatory policies. -- The translation of this policy into practice by actively seeking and employing these people in the military is a win-win for both military capability (culture, language) and the individual (employment, ability to represent Canada). A key opportunity to enable cross-cultural competence, according to Semelski, is to target recruiting to minorities and members with specific capabilities and providing opportunities for foreign postings, training and operations.

Peter Kelly, COS Land Reserve: Army Reserve Lessons Learned. Canadian Army, Powerpoint dated Apr 2010. Developing host national police, detainee management, contracting expertise (money is ammunition of warfare) and biometrics policy. Enable section augmentation of each type of capability. Enhance affiliations of Reserve to Regular Force Units for training / standardization and BTS. Option to leverage a hybrid linkage with regular force units.

The ability to create focused ‘police-auxiliary’ units based on infantry with MP and RCMP who emphasize in security development, biometric support, stability training within the Canadian Army institution and detainee management and transfer capacity and expeditionary security sector development. This could see each Army Division re-roll one infantry unit into a specialist unit that would be capable of supporting training for missions, enhancing the WoG approach to stabilization operations (through formal linkages with the RCMP) and enabling the IATF. Reserve force specialization would build a capability while allowing for symmetry in the regular force.
that would reduce the friction normally experienced during an initial rotation of Army troops.

Canadian Army doctrine is clear: Stability Operations form a 'core' component to capability.\textsuperscript{266} LF 2021:ADO is aligned with the FSE regarding likely operations in failed/failing states in a multinational/coalition context.\textsuperscript{267} All available research identifies that Stability Operations are the most probable future for the Canadian Army in expeditionary operations. In fact the concept of dispersing with the ability to re-aggregate 'as required', fundamental to LF 2021:ADO, blatantly assumes that conventional unilateral near-peer conflict will not be our doctrine but a branch consideration to Stability Operations. \textit{Training Canada's Army} and Beno's \textit{Training to Fight and Win} further reinforce the need for balance in training to include a core combat functionality with elements of stability capability included.\textsuperscript{268} This balance presently is skewed heavily in favour of war-fighting, with only nominal exposure to stability for high-readiness formation training at the CMTC or for individual soldiers tasked to deploy on named Peace-Support operations. Increasing the IT and Self-Development pillars would not compromise the Army's combat capability; it would enhance it by providing peripheral support in areas that require complex decision making models and specialist advisors. The paradigm of stabilization capability being linked to doctrinal necessity is described well in the US COIN manual:

\begin{quote}
Western militaries too often neglect the study of insurgency. They falsely believe that armies trained to win large conventional wars are automatically prepared to win small, unconventional ones… Nonetheless,
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{266} \textit{Land Operations 2021: ADO}, 22-23.
\textsuperscript{267} \textit{Future Security Environment}, 1-4.
\textsuperscript{268} \textit{Training Canada's Army}, 13 and Ernest Beno, \textit{Training to Fight and Win: Training in the Canadian Army}, 151.
conventional forces beginning COIN operations often try to use these [conventional] capabilities to defeat insurgents; they almost always fail.\textsuperscript{269}

Finally, and perhaps most impactful of all, these initiatives are aligned with organizational change theory in a manner that would facilitate the normative institutionalization of lessons learned. This essay is not suggesting that lessons learned are not currently considered important or that the Army system is not reactive to them. However, there is room for improvement. The central control of these lessons does not facilitate effective information dissemination. Further, by emphasizing war-fighting in training, the Army is increasingly relying on corporate memory for stability, which is personal, not necessarily corporate, and not always accurate. As time rolls on, those leaders will leave the Army, diminishing that corporate memory that was so crucial to operational success from the end of the Cold War to the present. Injecting the lessons of the PSOs of the 1990s and Afghanistan into an Advanced COIN course and a syllabus for an enhanced Self-Development programme would improve the Army's control over the curriculum in order to ensure that priority issues and lessons are taught, debated and ultimately institutionalized. It has been highlighted earlier that a massive price has been paid to learn these lessons; it would be unthinkable for the Army to allow them to erode over time.\textsuperscript{270}

\textsuperscript{269} The U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, lii.
CHAPTER 8:  
CONCLUSION:  
A HOLISTIC ASSESSMENT OF STABILITY CAPABILITY

The consensus was that the successful counter-insurgency operations [in Afghanistan] looked more like peace-building operations such as in Bosnia. Rebuilding government and restoring basic services were more effective than destroying the enemy.

- Lee Windsor, Kandahar Tour

Stabilization Operations are the most likely expeditionary option for the Canadian Army. This deduction is based on the analysis of the FSE and the trend analysis of Canada's Army operations since the end of the Cold War. Doctrine has oriented the Army towards a dual view construct: a capability for both war-fighting and Stability Operations; this has also clearly delineated the fact that stability is far more likely, however, war-fighting has much greater stakes and both views blur together. To this end, a doctrinal balance is struck between the need to prepare for both views, but a training reality that significantly over-focusses on war-fighting - by design. This model works, however it is not efficiently aligned with LF 2021:ADO, nor is it aligned with public sentiment towards the functionality of the Canadian Army. Furthermore, the absence of a meaningful stability training capacity in the Canadian Army translates to an erosion of stability lessons learned due to a lack of exposure in reconstitution cycles and

271 Lee Windsor, *Kandahar Tour*, 279. On the topic of conclusions from the COIN symposium at Gregg Centre in 2006 as part of the intellectual development of the TF leadership.
274 *Training Canada’s Army*, 13.
the current IT structure. This void in stability training reduces the quality of the Army for operations across the full spectrum of conflict.\textsuperscript{276}

This essay has described four training related initiatives that could be enhanced in order to improve the Army's capability for Stability Operations with minimal resource requirements and disproportionate operational effects. The first and simplest option is to simply increase the throughput of regular force candidates at the PSTC. Currently, the train to need model is inefficient; a CoE is available and more students could be taught without a substantial investment.\textsuperscript{277} A solution to this would simply be an internal policy change that allows those leaders not on immediate notice to deploy to participate on these courses.

The second concept was the development of an Advanced COIN course that fit the same conceptual model as the advanced courses that are conducted at the Combat Training Centre. This would provide the opportunity for lessons learned and stabilization oriented skill-sets to be taught to a cadre of junior leaders. This would require a moderate resource expenditure; however, this investment could be scaled up or down depending on the prioritization of the capability and desired production. Although COIN may not be the immediate future for the Canadian Army, the TTPs required for this complex form of conflict are highly relevant to other forms of Stability Operation; this is especially relevant given that they are not holistically taught elsewhere in IT. Consolidating them into one specialized course would maximize the efficiency through the development of a cadre of specialist leaders.

\textsuperscript{276} Training Canada's Army. 13.
\textsuperscript{277} Dumas, PSTC Information Briefing. Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre. 2014, 2-5.
Third, there is a gap in the self-development pillar that, if invigorated, could create substantial benefit to the Army. Despite existing as a training concept, there is very little actual content to the current Self-Development plan. This is also a scalable investment option. With a very small investment, the Army reading list could be leveraged and with some co-ordination between CDA and DMCA, the content at each rank level could be made mandatory. With a more substantial investment, an e-learning system could be developed to leverage the power of current technology. The end state would enable soldiers and officers to use their personal electronic devices to conduct tasks, research, reading, writing, blogs, games, movies, etc. in an electronically monitored environment that has been scientifically proven to be a highly effective learning option. The case study of how this concept of cognitive training was effective in Germany during the inter-war period was demonstrated as a historiography of the power of enhancing a self-development training system in a fiscally constrained environment.

Fourth, the International Military Training programme could be expanded. IMT has been identified as an under-leveraged opportunity, and the Army is highly capable in


This area.\textsuperscript{281} This would require political acceptance and ownership, but would also be funded from the centre. Several examples, including both Afghanistan and Mongolia, have been cited as areas in which this has greatly supported the WoG approach.\textsuperscript{282} There are many ways that this could be conducted, to include foreign and reciprocal training and potentially exchange positions. IMT would also support the GES.\textsuperscript{283} Additionally, since the relative risk of casualties is low in comparison to an Afghanistan-type counter-insurgency, the Canadian public would likely be apathetic if not supportive.\textsuperscript{284} With the bulk of the Army reconstituted in Canada after the closedown of the IMT mission in Afghanistan, the personnel resources are certainly more than available and prepared to provide support to a task such as this.\textsuperscript{285}

These four initiatives are not without debate. Four risks have been identified with implementing these changes, along with the means to mitigate them. The Army is undoubtedly in a period of fiscal austerity. However, all of the proposals are scalable and can be developed in an evolutionary timeframe, therefore minimizing the budgetary stress. There would be institutional friction. This is normal when a large bureaucracy undergoes change, however, by focussing the efforts on normative level incremental improvements and changes through specialized IT, this method is aligned with

\textsuperscript{283} Mendee, "The Military Training Assistance Program (MTAP): Merging Interests of Mongolia and Canada," 1.
organizational change theory.286 Some will debate the necessity of this change; certainly there is evidence that the status quo has been 'good enough' - but how good is good enough? These peripheral improvements, which will not compromise the Army's combat capability, are an inexpensive means to be more effective in the most likely of expeditionary missions - Stability Operations.

These risks are outweighed by the four benefits addressed. The initiatives are aligned with the public's interest in their Army.287 They directly enhance the Army's qualitative readiness, as indicated by the investment in PD and the development of cognitive warriors. They improves the Army's alignment with LF 2021:ADO and the CFDS, and finally, the initiatives provide a means of institutionalizing key stability lessons learned.

In summary, operations for the Canadian Army over the next horizon cannot be predicted with any certainty, but it is prudent to be the 'least unprepared' by aligning training systems to both the FSE and the Army’s doctrine of LF 2021:ADO. By enhancing these training systems, the Canadian Army will maximize its potential for success in the undoubtedly complex Stability Operations that will transpire. By investing in the intellectual capacity and development of future leaders, the Army will best posture itself to deal with future shock and 'unknown unknowns.'288 This is especially germane in that this capability can be scalably implemented in an evolutionary manner without any major structural overhauls or budgetary realignment. Since human lives are at stake, both those of our soldiers and the civilians of the affected nation, it is incumbent that the

286 Amagoh, "Perspectives on Organizational Change: Systems and Complexity Theories," 8-10.
Army prioritize its resources to ensure that it is best prepared for mission success in the Stability Operations of the future.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


Horn, Bernd and Emily Spencer (Editors). No Easy Task: Fighting in Afghanistan. Toronto: Dundurn, 2012.


Jefferess, David. “Responsibility, Nostalgia and the Mythology of Canada as a Peacekeeper,” University of Toronto Quarterly 78, no. 2 (Spring 2009).


Ouellet, Eric. *Institutional Constraints on Command*, Presentation to Joint Command and Staff Programme 40, 8 November 2013.


Spencer, Emily. "Brains and Brawn: Cultural Intelligence (CQ) as the 'Tool of Choice' in the Contemporary Operating Environment," Canadian Military Journal 11, no. 1 (winter 2010).


United States. PCN 140 121500 00 *Small Wars Manual*: U.S. Marine Corps, 1940.


Vinson, Mark. “Structuring the Army for Full-Spectrum Readiness,” *Parameters* (Summer 2000).


