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AVOIDING SISYPHUS: CANSOFCOM AND INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION IN THE CANADIAN NATIONAL SECURITY SECTOR

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**AVOIDING SISYPHUS: CANSOFCOM AND INTERAGENCY
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ABSTRACT

Challenges to Canadian national security have arguably become more complex in the contemporary operating environment due to factors such as globalization, climate change and shifting geopolitical power. Transnational threats present difficult problems that most Western states, including Canada, have responded to by enacting varying forms of a comprehensive governmental operating concept which emphasizes collaboration between the different departments and agencies involved in national security. Unfortunately, interagency collaboration is an academic field that is not fully established and despite a wealth of recent research, a comprehensive theory of interagency collaboration does not exist. Consequently, in the rush to implement Whole of Government operations within the national security sector, there is a danger of producing a sub-optimal system due to a lack of understanding about what collaboration entails.

This paper examines how CANSOFCOM could prepare to become an effective interagency partner within the Canadian Whole of Government security community. To establish the context for the examination, the paper first considers major developments in the contemporary security environment and the evolutionary responses of successive Canadian governments to respond to these threats. After describing the principal actors in the Canadian security sector, the paper presents a brief overview of major concepts and issues within interagency collaboration theory. These ideas are subsequently applied to the unique circumstances of CANSOFCOM to suggest methods regarding how the organization could best prepare to succeed in interagency operations. The paper concludes by suggesting that as interagency operations appear to be a constant within the Canadian national security sector for the foreseeable future, developing a collaborative capacity would be a worthwhile investment for CANSOFCOM.

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AVOIDING SISYPHUS: CANSOFCOM AND INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION IN THE CANADIAN NATIONAL SECURITY SECTOR

INTRODUCTION

Never have the nations of the world had so much to lose, or so much to gain. Together we shall save our planet, or together we shall perish in its flames.

- President John F. Kennedy

Alone we can do so little; together we can do so much.

- Helen Keller

Interagency collaboration is not a new phenomenon, although the prominence that this approach to governmental operations possesses in most western democracies is indeed relatively new. While neither of the above quotes from either President John F. Kennedy or Helen Keller can be considered to be all-encompassing definitions regarding interagency operations or collaboration, they do highlight two important aspects of this current trend. First, the world remains a dangerous place, perhaps more so than at any time in history, although that is a subject for a different argument. Second, responding in a piecemeal fashion to contemporary threats, either through unilateral departmental or national efforts, will result in sub-optimal solutions. Consequently, most western governments have recognized the existence of this cross-road of sorts and embraced a comprehensive approach to national security operations which relies on interagency collaboration. As a potentially key actor in the Canadian national security sector, this paper will examine how Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) can best prepare to operate within the Canadian interagency environment.

Any investigation into how an organization can get ready for operations in the contemporary interagency security environment needs to begin by understanding the context, particularly the threat. Fortunately, there is no shortage of strategic analyses

seeking to understand current affairs. In 2009, the Canadian Forces (CF) Chief of Force Development (CFD) released an analysis on the future security environment. Within, the analysis predicted that significant trends such as globalization, climate change and trans-national criminal and terrorist groups would necessitate an adaptation of how the CF worked in furtherance of Canadian national security.¹

More recently, in December 2012 the National Intelligence Council released *Global Trends 2030* which identified megatrends and potential game-changers within contemporary geopolitical events. This report also highlighted possible issues due to globalization and expected resource shortages associated with climate change, while also touching on how the international diffusion of power would likely shift to a multipolar world.² While many additional analyses exist, there is broad agreement that the contemporary operating environment is characterized by complex problems that span the traditional jurisdictions of existing organizations. This has understandably lead many governments to adapt their responses to national security.

Like many other countries, Canada's response to national security has evolved as the implications of the modern security environment became clearer. The events of 9/11 were truly a watershed moment in international affairs and precipitated Prime Minister Jean Chretien's Liberal government to take such policy actions as enacting the Anti-Terrorist Act and forming special committees.³ Prime Minister Paul Martin's government

¹ Department of National Defence, *The Future Security Environment 2008 – 2030* (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2009), 5 – 9.

² National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds*, (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2012), ii.

³ Office of the Auditor General of Canada. *2004 Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons* (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2004), 1

would initiate the move to a more collaborative government by publishing a comprehensive policy statement for Canadian national security.⁴

Under Prime Minister Stephen Harper's Conservative government, the trend to implementing greater interagency collaboration has only increased. Building on the Liberal approach of blending defence, diplomacy and development, or the 3D approach, the Conservative government progressed first to a Whole of Government Approach (WGA) to operations and most recently to a comprehensive approach.⁵ The main differences between these approaches were the scope of organizations involved and the degree of coordination. For instance, the 3D approach envisioned mostly informal coordination between the Departments of Foreign Affairs, Defence and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). Conversely, the comprehensive approach incorporates more diverse roles played by additional organizations, such as Public Safety Canada (PSC) and the Privy Council Office (PCO), while recognizing the need for more formal coordinative processes. Throughout this policy evolution, a number of organizational actors have gained primacy within the Canadian national security sector.

Some of the principal organizational actors in the Canadian security community are long-term departments and organizations, such as the PCO, the CF, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT)⁶. Other organizations, such as the Canadian Security

⁴ Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's Place in the World* (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2004), 1.

⁵ Ann Fitz-Gerald and Don Macnamara, "Comprehensive Security Requires Comprehensive Structures: How Comprehensive Can We Get?" in *Strategic Studies Working Group Papers* (Calgary: Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, March 2012), 4.

⁶ Notwithstanding the fact that DFAIT's official name was only recognized by the Canadian Parliament in 1995, as well as the fact that DFAIT has gone through numerous organizational changes in its

Intelligence Service (CSIS), were more recently formed. Lastly, some actors, such as PSC, were founded as part of the current evolution toward national security.⁷ Altogether, each of these departments and organizations has a distinct organizational culture which complicates the efficacy of collaborative ventures. As CANSOFCOM increasingly has a legitimate role in the national security sector, it needs to consider not only how best to respond to threats, but also how best to collaborate with other organizations.

Unfortunately, interagency collaboration has often been implemented without a true understanding as to the theory, objectives and goals of the concept in and of itself.

As mentioned earlier, interagency collaboration is not new and some academics would suggest that modern examples can be found as early as the post-Second World War years.⁸ Nonetheless, only limited research has been conducted into this academic field and until the 1990s, there were only a few principal contributors to interagency theory. Following the increased adoption of interagency concepts in the 21st Century, both normative and empirical literature has increased dramatically. In addition, the overall theory has also leveraged complementary work in other fields such as strategic

history, Canada has maintained a department entrusted with foreign affairs going back at least to the Department of External Affairs founded in 1909. See Jasmin H. Cheung-Gertler, "Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade," *The Canadian Encyclopedia*, accessed 12 March 2013, <http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/articles/department-of-foreign-affairs-and-international-trade>. In addition, despite the announcement in the 2013 Federal Budget that CIDA would be subsumed by DFAIT to form the new Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD), at the time of writing this change has not yet been implemented. Consequently, this project uses pre-Budget 2013 information to describe DFAIT's role in the national security process. This project did not consider CIDA to be a primary stakeholder in the national security community and consequently, the analysis should not reasonably be affected by omitting the expanded mandate of the DFATD. See Stephanie Levitz, "Budget 2013: CIDA to be Merged with Foreign Affairs," *CTVNews.ca*, accessed 24 March 2013, <http://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/budget-2013-cida-to-be-merged-with-foreign-affairs-1.1205746>.

⁷ Initially called the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, Public Safety was authorized in 2004. See Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society*. . . , viii.

⁸ Bernard Carreau, "Transforming the Interagency System for Complex Operations" (Case Studies in Defense Transformation Paper Number 6, National Defense University, 2007), 1.

management and organizational behavior. Nevertheless, as of yet there remains no comprehensive theory of interagency collaboration. At the same time, it remains possible to identify both several key conceptual foundations of the broader subject, as well as many common obstacles and associated best practices.

Since interagency collaboration lacks a comprehensive theory, any explanation into the subject must define key terminology and concepts, such as the levels of collaborative relationships and what collaboration actually entails.⁹ With this in mind, some other considerations that theory can inform include how collaborative relationships form as well as what types of organizational structure should contribute or inhibit interagency collaboration. From research such as this, as well as empirical studies, several common obstacles to collaboration have been identified, including unclear roles and responsibilities, poor accountability and poor communication.¹⁰

Fortunately, due to both increasing research and incidence of interagency ventures, these limitations on interagency collaboration are generally offset through appropriate best practices. In sum, the current status of interagency theory leaves CANSOFCOM with three conceptual bases which can be used to prepare for interagency operations. These bases include, planning to work in the interagency environment, organizing for the interagency environment and workforce development for the interagency environment.

⁹ Rebecca Gajda, "Utilizing Collaboration Theory to Evaluate Strategic Alliances," *American Journal of Evaluation*, Vol. 25, no. 1 (2004): 68.

¹⁰ Government Accountability Office, *National Security: Key Challenges and Solutions to Strengthen Interagency Collaboration*, GAO-10-822T, (Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2010), 5, 16.

Planning for the interagency environment is a vital step and principally consists of identifying a legitimate basis for establishing a collaborative enterprise with other organizations. While this step does include simply recognizing the need to collaborate, it also involves identifying who to collaborate with and what degree of collaborative relationship is needed to accomplish the desired goal.¹¹ Following an analysis into these areas, a collaborative venture can subsequently develop and agree on complementing aspects such as defining roles and responsibilities and implementing appropriate accountability mechanisms.

In the Canadian context, there are particular challenges to implementing interagency accountability in the national security sector which CANSOFCOM will need to address.¹² Even with all these measures to plan for the interagency environment, collaborative ventures should likely develop on a case-by-case basis and only when it benefits all participating organizations. Nonetheless, although CANSOFCOM cannot force its way into the interagency environment, there are still many organizational and developmental steps it can take to prepare.

Structurally, there are a number of organizational methods based on both theory and practical experience that CANSOFCOM could implement to increase its capacity to collaborate in interagency operations. Some methods are relatively simple, such as embedding personnel from partner organizations, whereas other methods require more drastic change and accompanying commitment. For instance, the experience of United

¹¹ Bob Hudson et al., "In Pursuit of Inter-Agency Collaboration in The Public Sector," *Public Management: An International Journal of Research and Theory*, Vol. 1, no. 2 (1999): 240, 253.

¹² Reg Whitaker and Stuart Farson, "Accountability in and for National Security," *IRPP Choices*, Vol. 15, no. 9 (September 2009): 37.

States (US) Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) in changing its entire organizational structure to facilitate collaboration would offer significant challenges for CANSOFCOM to implement.¹³

Both extremes have advantages and disadvantages; what is important is that CANSOFCOM understand the options so it can select and commit to an organizational structure that best achieves the desired level of collaborative capacity. Included within this assessment is the development of organizational enabling structures, such as those associated with information sharing, decision-making and organizational learning. At the same time, to best succeed in a collaborative environment CANSOFCOM should consider how best to prepare its workforce for interagency operations.

First and foremost, preparing a workforce for interagency operations involves identifying what skills are required and developing a strategy to obtain these skills.¹⁴ Once CANSOFCOM has identified these requirements, it can decide what combination of training, education and professional experience will be implemented. As with organizational changes, simple measures to develop CANSOFCOM personnel for interagency operations exist, such as in piggybacking off existing CF courses. Conversely, CANSOFCOM could expend much effort in this area, including making such significant policy changes as requiring interagency rotations as part of career progression. Again, the important factor is that CANSOFCOM consider its requirements and the associated costs and benefits from a variety of options. In doing so,

¹³Government Accountability Office, *Defense Management: U.S. Southern Command Demonstrates Interagency Collaboration, but Its Haiti Disaster Response Revealed Challenges Conducting a Large Military Operations*, GAO-10-801, (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2010), 21 – 23.

¹⁴Michael Spirtas et al., *Department of Defense Training for Operations with Interagency, Multinational, and Coalition Partners* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2008), 45.

CANSOFCOM will have taken steps to becoming a valued collaborative partner in an interagency environment.

To better understand how CANSOFCOM should prepare for interagency operations in the Canadian national security sector, this paper will look at a variety of relevant ideas. Chapter One will begin by examining the context of the current operating environment, including a brief overview of the contemporary threats and challenges, as well as Canada's evolutionary policy response. In addition, this Chapter will explore the principal organizational actors in the Canadian security sector and on what basis CANSOFCOM would constitute a value-adding partner in this environment.

Following the establishment of context in Chapter One, Chapter Two will study the current state of interagency collaboration theory. Whereas a comprehensive literature review would constitute a project in and of itself, this paper will seek to briefly describe relevant aspects of the evolving theory, as well as some of the more pertinent foundational concepts and common best practices. Lastly, Chapter Three will seek to apply the normative lessons to the contextual environment, with particular application to CANSOFCOM. Specifically, this chapter will seek to provide suggestions regarding how CANSOFCOM can plan for, organize for and develop its workforce for success in interagency operations.

As can be interpreted from President Kennedy's opening quote, the world remains a complex and dangerous place where Canada has much to potentially lose, but also much to potentially gain. Practically speaking, the heart of Canada's progress in this uncertain world will undoubtedly include continuing to provide for the security of Canada's national interests, and the protection of all Canadians. By accepting this

realization, security practitioners must recognize that the contemporary operating environment has necessitated a Canadian whole of government response to address modern national security problems. Correspondingly, any organization participating in the Canadian security sector should be prepared to operate in an interagency context. Therefore, as CANSOFCOM has both the potential and accompanying mandate to be a legitimate contributor in this setting, it should implement measures to enhance its interagency collaborative capacity so as to set the conditions for both organizational and collective success in national security operations.

CHAPTER 1: THE CANADIAN SECURITY SECTOR

The world is probably a freer and more democratic place today when I look at it than at any point in my lifetime. Yet, paradoxically, rarely has the future of the free and democratic world been less secure.

- Prime Minister of Canada, Stephen Harper

To state that the contemporary operating environment is characterized by high degrees of uncertainty, risk and volatility has almost become a truism, although this in no way diminishes the importance of the observation. Developments in technology have enabled exponential evolution in areas such as transport, communications and the Internet, which have all ultimately contributed to the phenomenon of globalization.¹⁵ In turn, globalization has empowered non-state actors on the international stage to a degree rarely, if ever, seen before. When combined with other megatrends, such as the changing diffusion of power in the international system, growing demographic patterns and the unknown effects of climate change, it becomes clear that national governments will be challenged in responding to a plethora of complex problems.¹⁶ From a security perspective, this reality only becomes more evident with the present-day incidence of threats such as terrorism, irregular warfare, and the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Like all countries, Canada will not be immune to these global developments and will need to consider how to effectively respond.

Fortunately, successive Canadian federal governments have recognized these trends, along with their corresponding threats, and have iteratively progressed Canadian security policy. Understanding that complex security problems require comprehensive

¹⁵ Regan Reshke, "Science and Technology," in *Toward Army 2040: Exploring Key Dimensions of the Global Environment*, (Kingston: Queen's University, 2011), 21.

¹⁶ National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2030*. . . , iv.

governmental responses, the Government of Canada (GoC) has moved from a 3D¹⁷ approach, through a WGA, to a comprehensive approach in an effort to achieve better integration and cooperation.¹⁸ Concurrently, these efforts have been paralleled by new security policies, structures and organizational actors within the Canadian security sector. These positive and relatively rapid developments have understandably been accompanied by some growing pains, such as in how each agency or department can contribute to the overall governmental security effort. One example of this case is the contributions of CANSOFCOM.

To better understand how CANSOFCOM can best offer security options to the GoC, this chapter will establish the overall context by first examining the defining features and emerging trends of the contemporary operating environment. This will be followed by a brief look at Canada's evolutionary security responses to emerging threats, including developments in policy and governmental structure. The chapter will then highlight various organizational actors in the Canadian security sector, concluding with a brief exposé of the capabilities that CANSOFCOM offers in assisting interagency security responses. Through this process, it will be demonstrated that CANSOFCOM has the potential to be a strong contributor and partner in the GoC's interagency response to contemporary security threats.

¹⁷ The 3D approach refers to the integration of defence, development, and diplomatic activities by respective Canadian governmental actors. The term was first officially coined in *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy* to describe Canada's policy approach to international security. See Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society . . .*, 47.

¹⁸ Ann Fitz-Gerald and Don Macnamara, "Comprehensive Security Requires Comprehensive Structures . . .," 4.

THE CONTEMPORARY SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

“It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair, we had everything before us, we had nothing before us, we were all going direct to Heaven, we were all going direct the other way...”¹⁹

A full and complete analysis of the contemporary operating environment is quite simply beyond the scope of this project. Nevertheless, with the presence of several key defining characteristics and megatrends, it is possible to adequately convey both the complexity of the current environment as well as the direct implications to Canada’s security. First and foremost amongst these contemporary trends is globalization, which is a complex concept in itself due to its many interrelated aspects and differing perspectives. For the purposes of this paper, globalization is defined as “...a process of increased connectivity and interdependence transcending social, economic, and political spheres.”²⁰ Importantly, as Dickens’ quote from another time suggests, there are just as many negative aspects to globalization as positive ones and consequently, the implications of this definition demand further explanation.

Modern improvements in communications technologies and transportation have resulted in a greatly increased ability for goods, services and people to cross international borders. Termed transnationalism, this phenomenon poses several challenges for states at the same time that it has facilitated a high degree of international economic

¹⁹ Charles Dickens, *A Tale of Two Cities: A Story of the French Revolution* (Public Domain Books, 2000), iBooks edition, 1 – 2.

²⁰ National Defence, *The Future Security Environment 2008 – 2030 . . .*, 10.

interdependence.²¹ For instance, transnationalism is a complex phenomenon due to the interrelation of numerous economic, social and cultural sub-trends, such as new migration patterns and cultural convergence. Notwithstanding many sub-trends, this paper will only consider several prime aspects of globalization due to their potential to exacerbate the international security environment concurrent to their benefits. Firstly, no matter what outcome is predicted, globalization is generally accepted to be a transformational force on international relations, particularly regarding the diffusion of power and the traditional role of the state.²² Secondly, the combination of transnationalism, economic globalization and the expected effects of climate change are likely to affect both the causes of contemporary security threats, as well as the nature of those threats in some cases. However, to fully understand the implications of the latter point, it is necessary to delve into the former point in more detail.

The diffusion of power that globalization has introduced in the contemporary international order has both a state and non-state aspect. From a broad statist perspective, historian Niall Ferguson has argued that with respect to power, globalization is actually a paradox since power tends to become more diffuse as the world becomes more integrated.²³ Indeed, this observation appears to be prescient when considered against the apparent trend away from an international hegemony under the United States of America (USA) accompanied by the rise of states such as China, India and Brazil. From a narrower statist perspective, traditional state structures have been argued to be unsuitable

²¹ Norrin M. Ripsman and T.V. Paul, *Globalization and the National Security State* (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2010), 6 – 7.

²² Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Shannon L. Blanton, *World Politics: Trend and Transformation*, 2012 – 2013 Edition, (Boston: Wadsworth, 2013), 329.

²³ Niall Ferguson, *Colossus: The Price of America's Empire* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004), 298.

for addressing the nature and accompanying complexity of contemporary global problems.²⁴ This observation is predicated on the perspective that the most serious modern threats transcend borders and are thus not susceptible to states acting in isolation. However, this view also includes the viewpoint that most threats go beyond the mandate of any single governmental organization. For instance, there is an increasing recognition that national security goes beyond being primarily the responsibility of a state's military.²⁵ Contrasted against this changing dynamic of a state's role in the changing international power system is the increasing role of non-state actors.

Paralleling the seeming limitations of the state in today's international system has been the increase in power of a variety of international organizations. Aided by transnationalism and the proliferation of communications technology, a variety of groups and organizations are now able to influence international agendas to a degree that in some cases eclipses relatively less powerful states. Non-state actors such as corporations, social groups, and international organizations are all contributing to continued globalization through the increased presence they enjoy on the international stage.²⁶ While these groups can generally play positive roles, transnationalism equally enables negative groups to achieve influence as well, such as criminal networks, terrorists and a variety of ideologically extreme organizations.²⁷ The net result of this rise in non-state actors is an increase in stakeholders able to influence international issues and a corresponding

²⁴ Nana K. Poku, "Globalization, Development and Security," in *Contemporary Security Studies*, 2nd Ed. edited by Alan Collins (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2010), 272.

²⁵ Bryan Mabee, *The Globalization of Security: State Power, Security Provision and Legitimacy* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 50.

²⁶ Ripsman and Paul, *Globalization and the National Security State*, 9.

²⁷ Fathali M. Moghaddam, *The New Global Insecurity: How Terrorism, Environmental Collapse, Economic Inequalities, and Resource Shortages Are Changing Our World* (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2010), 75.

increased complexity in addressing contemporary security threats. The combined state and non-state effects of the international diffusion of power are magnified when contrasted against some of the changing reasons for and types of conflict that have arisen with globalization.

While there are many benefits to globalization, some of the accompanying disadvantages have been extremely destabilizing, such as the unequal distribution of wealth and its resultant impacts of unemployment, migration and resource scarcity.²⁸ This aspect has and may continue to fuel international resentment and provide the grounds that actually fuel transnational threats like terrorism. Indeed, as the global population expands, competition for scarce non-renewable resources, such as water, is expected to be an increasing source of both intra- and inter-state conflict.²⁹ This likely trend will possibly be aggravated by climate change, which has the potential to drastically impact countries that are the least able to cope, such as those in sub-Saharan Africa. Notably, it is also important to understand that the emerging doctrine of responsibility to protect suggests that states could be dragged into intra-state conflicts to prevent humanitarian suffering.³⁰ At the same time, while new reasons for conflict are emerging, the ways in which those conflicts are fought are also changing.

Although inter-state conflict remains a possibility under globalization, several other types of non-state conflict have come to the forefront. The rise of non-state actors has diversified the threat, which spans the range from transnational criminal

²⁸ Lynn E. Davis, "Globalization's Security Implications," (Santa Monica: RAND, 2003), 4.

²⁹ Moghaddam, *The New Global Insecurity...*, 81.

³⁰ Kegley, Jr. and Blanton, *World Politics...*, 34.

organizations to terrorist groups.³¹ In response to western military superiority, hostile non-state actors are expected to increasingly incorporate asymmetric techniques and use the technologies of globalization to conduct attacks while preserving their freedom of manoeuvre.³² The seriousness of these threats is magnified by the proliferation of WMD, particularly when considered against the efforts of terrorist organizations to acquire and use these devices.³³ When these threats are combined with other transnational phenomenon like the possibility of natural disasters and pandemics, the complexity of the contemporary international security environment becomes clear, as does the threat to Canada.

The bottom line deduction that can be taken from the above information is that the conceptualization of Canada as “...a fireproof house far from inflammable materials,”³⁴ is outdated. As a state on the international stage, Canada is equally subject to transnational threats and shocks in the contemporary operating environment. Recognizing the nature of the threats that potentially affect Canada, the GoC must be prepared to work as part of a diversified and international network in order to truly address these issues. Similarly, understanding that the complexity of modern security issues under globalization transcends the ability of any one governmental department to effectively respond, the GoC should strive to incorporate effective processes that integrate all the instruments of national power in a synergistic manner. With that thought

³¹ Moghaddam, *The New Global Insecurity...*, 75.

³² National Defence, *The Future Security Environment 2008 – 2030*, 81.

³³ Elinor C. Sloan, *Security and Defence in the Terrorist Era: Canada and the United States Homeland*, Second Ed., (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010), 49.

³⁴ Kim Richard Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy* (Scarborough: Prentice Hall, 1989), 141.

in mind, this chapter will now turn to an examination of the relevant Canadian policy and governmental organizations that reflects this realization.

THE EVOLUTIONARY CANADIAN RESPONSE TO NATIONAL SECURITY

Contrary to the optimism that accompanied the end of the Cold War, Canada's contemporary national security policy can be said to draw its roots primarily from the events that occurred on 9/11. These terrorist attacks precipitated a number of immediate policy projects and impacts, such as the formation of an Ad Hoc Cabinet Committee on Public Security and Anti-Terrorism, and the passing of the Anti-Terrorism Act.³⁵ While Canada had potentially grasped the depth of one transnational threat, a true appreciation of the breadth and complexity of the modern transnational threats to security arguably was not achieved until the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) crisis in 2003. With these two diametrically opposed, yet related threats, the early years of the 21st Century were filled with a drastically changed perspective on national security for Canadians, as well as citizens in most Western states. In light of the haste with which some security measures were imposed, it should come as no surprise that there were some initial inefficiencies, as documented by the Auditor General of Canada in 2004.³⁶ In the wake of this report, the Canadian approach to national security would drastically change.

³⁵ Office of the Auditor General of Canada. *2004 Report of the Auditor General . . .*, 1.

³⁶ With respect to National Security, the 2004 Report From the Auditor General of Canada specifically makes mention of the management inefficiencies found between the Privy Council Office, the Treasury Board Secretariat and the Department of Finance Canada. In addition, the Report identified a lack of co-ordination amongst national intelligence agencies, which had led to gaps in some areas and duplication of effort in others. See Office of the Auditor General of Canada. *2004 Report of the Auditor General . . .*, 1 – 2.

Following the Report of the Auditor General in 2004, Prime Minister Paul Martin's Government released what was heralded as Canada's first comprehensive policy statement for National Security, called *Securing an Open Society: Canada's Place in the World*. This policy showcased an understanding regarding the complexity of the threats at the time, as well as the need for Canada to incorporate an integrated governmental response grounded in policy and new organizations and is represented in Figure 1.³⁷




Figure 1 - Interrelation of Threats to Canada's National Security

Source: PCO, *Securing an Open Society*, 4.

From an organizational perspective, this policy statement formalized several new stakeholders in the national security landscape, including the new Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC), the appointment of a National Security Advisor (NSA), and the creation of a Cabinet Committee on Security, Public

³⁷ Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society* . . . , 1 – 4.

Health and Emergencies.³⁸ The statement also allowed for the creation of an Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC), as well as a Government Operations Centre (GOC) within PSEPC. Regarding the conduct of operations, the statement called for an integrated governmental approach to international security, which incidentally became the first formalization of the interdependence between defence, diplomacy and development, or the 3D approach.³⁹ Although the concept would subsequently evolve, the 3D approach was initially not very descriptive and left much room for interpretation.

With the release of *Canada's International Policy Statement (IPS)* in 2005, the Martin Government would in fact expand on some of the concepts found within *Securing an Open Society*. Demonstrating an increasingly nuanced appreciation of the transnational threat, this document reiterated a commitment to integrated governmental operations, while concurrently continuing to organizationally adapt so as to better respond. For instance, the Defence portion of the document heralded the beginning of CF transformation with the revision of the CF command structure and the stand-up of a Special Operations Group (SOG), which would later become CANSOFCOM.⁴⁰ Functionally, the IPS held to the 3D approach, although with a growing acknowledgement of the role of international commerce, it has been argued that this was more accurately a 3D+C approach.⁴¹

Notwithstanding this terminology, the IPS did not significantly expand on how the integrated 3D approach was intended to be conducted. This vagueness lead to

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 9.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 47.

⁴⁰ National Defence, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World – Defence*, (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2005), 11 – 12.

⁴¹ Andrew Godefroy, *Canada's International Policy Statement Five Years Later* (Calgary: Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, 2010), 3.

differences in how various departments understood the concept. For instance, although the Diplomacy section of the IPS called for improved coherency between civilian assistance and military operations,⁴² terminology on distinct measures to achieve this was notably absent. Conversely, the Defence section of the IPS repeatedly recognized the inability of military forces to act independent of other departments and Non-Government Organizations (NGOs), while also specifically identifying measures to improve coordination and collaboration, such as creating Canada Command.⁴³ These clearly differing departmental interpretations of an integrated approach lead some to claim that 3D operations were not integrated at all,⁴⁴ although this would be changed by Afghanistan.

In 2005, several initiatives occurred in Afghanistan that would serve to expand the Canadian concept of integrated operations. First, military members of the Strategic Advisory Team - Afghanistan (SAT-A) worked in close concert with both DFAIT and CIDA in providing strategic and operational advice to senior levels of the government of Afghanistan.⁴⁵ Second, Canada took command of a Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kandahar (PRT-K) and third, the CF began an intensive combat mission in Kandahar that eventually saw close coordination between security, development and governance initiatives. With the growing commitment and interdepartmental importance of

⁴² Foreign Affairs, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World – Diplomacy*, (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2005), 9.

⁴³ National Defence, *Canada's International Policy Statement*. . . , 9 – 11.

⁴⁴ Michel Fortmann and Frederic Merand, "Life in 3D: The Challenges Facing an Integrated Approach to Canadian Security Policy," in *The Canadian Interest? Assessing Canada's International Policy Statement* ed. David J. Bercuson and Denis Stairs, 44 - 49 (Calgary: Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, 2005).

⁴⁵ Michel-Henri St-Louis, "The Strategic Advisory Team in Afghanistan: Part of the Canadian Comprehensive Approach to Stability Operations," *Canadian Military Journal* Vol. 9, no. 3 (2009): 59.

Afghanistan post-2005, these activities would become a major forcing function in driving an integrated governmental approach. However, it would take the conclusions of the Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan, or the Manley Panel, to force a truly transformational change.

In reviewing Canada's commitment to Afghanistan in 2007, the Harper Government appointed a panel of distinguished Canadians to investigate the issue lead by a former Deputy Prime Minister, John Manley. This Independent Panel made a number of observations, however, the most significant with respect to the 3D approach, or WGA as it was now called,⁴⁶ was the identification of poor interdepartmental coordination.⁴⁷

The panel subsequently recommended that:

These efforts should be led by the Prime Minister, supported by a special cabinet committee and by a single task force directing the activities of all departments and agencies. The objective is to ensure better balance, tighter coordination and more systematic evaluation of Canada's contributions.⁴⁸

This recommendation ultimately resulted in the creation of the Afghanistan Task Force (ATF) Secretariat within the PCO, which in turn lead to substantial integration of defence, diplomacy and development initiatives.⁴⁹ Combined with increasing Canadian interagency operations in Afghanistan itself, this would lead to the evolution of the WGA to one of comprehensive operations.

⁴⁶ After being elected with a minority government in 2006, the Conservative Party of Canada relabeled the 3D approach as a Whole of Government Approach (WGA). See Godefroy, *Canada's International Policy Statement*. . . , 3.

⁴⁷ Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan, *Final Report* (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services, 2008), 28.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 37.

⁴⁹ Nicholas Gammer, "Integrating Civilian Military Operations: The Comprehensive Approach and the ATF Experience, 2008 – 2009," Paper presented at the Canadian Political Science Association Annual Conference, University of Alberta, Edmonton, June 2012, 10-11.

The next major policy document released was the 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS). Consistent with the evolutionary trend, the CFDS continued to demonstrate an improved comprehension of the complexity of transnational threats, while simultaneously advocating for an improvement in the WGA to operations. Interestingly, whereas the CFDS identifies the requirement to have an overarching interdepartmental strategy for national security,⁵⁰ this was paralleled by an increasing reference to comprehensive operations in both CF doctrine and professional articles.⁵¹ This trend would continue to be seen in subsequent federal policy documents.

Among the incremental developments in the government's comprehensive approach to security was the release of the interim Federal Emergency Response Plan (FERP) in 2009 with the aim of integrating a national emergency response through a comprehensive management system.⁵² After this, and following reelection in 2011, the Harper government formed a Cabinet Committee on National Security chaired by the Prime Minister.⁵³ More recently, *Building Resilience Against Terrorism: Canada's Counter-Terrorism Strategy*, was released in 2011 and embraces the language of a

⁵⁰ National Defence, *Canada First Defence Strategy* (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services, 2008), 9.

⁵¹ For examples of initial references to comprehensive operations in CF professional discussions and doctrine see Andrew Leslie, Peter Gizewski and Michael Rostek, "Developing a Comprehensive Approach to Canadian Forces Operations," *Canadian Military Journal* Vol. 9, no. 1 (2009): 11 and National Defence, *Canadian Forces Joint Publication 01: Canadian Military Doctrine* (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2009), 6-5.

⁵² Public Safety Canada, *Federal Emergency Response Plan* (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2011), 9.

⁵³ Tim Naumetz, "Harper extending personal control to oversight of national security and intelligence gathering," *The HillTimesonline*, 18 May 2011, accessed 29 January 2013, <http://www.hilltimes.com/news/2011/05/18/harper-extending-personal-control-to-oversight-of-national-security-and-intelligence/27872>.

comprehensive approach by advocating interdepartmental collaboration and partnerships as opposed to simple coordination.⁵⁴

Overall, these actions provide the most recent examples of the evolution of a federal interdepartmental approach to security from what was initially a primarily coordinative approach under the 3D model to a truly integrative comprehensive approach. Of course, as briefly touched on within this section, this evolution has not been without problems and the question of how best to execute interdepartmental operations remains an important issue to resolve. However, to better understand complications with the execution of operations, it is necessary to understand the stakeholders within the Canadian federal security sector, their mandates, and their capabilities.

PRINCIPAL ACTORS IN THE CANADIAN SECURITY SECTOR

As illustrated in *Canada's Counter-Terrorism Strategy* and the FERP, there are a number of different federal departments and agencies that have roles and responsibilities relating to Canada's national security. In appropriate recognition of the complexity of the contemporary threat, the inclusion of a breadth of organizations from the Department of Finance, to Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), to Health Canada is incredibly important. However, since sufficiently addressing all organizations is beyond the scope of this paper, this chapter will necessarily constrain a further examination to several primary organizations as determined by their relationships to the Department of National Defence (DND) / CF and CANSOFCOM. Consequently, this section will look at the

⁵⁴ Public Safety Canada, *Building Resilience Against Terrorism: Canada's Counter-Terrorism Strategy* (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2011), 4, 11.

roles, mandates and responsibilities of security stakeholders such as the PCO, DFAIT, PSC, CSIS, the RCMP, DND and the CF and of course, CANSOFCOM.

The first major organizational actor in the Canadian security sector is the PCO. The PCO has three broad roles consisting firstly in advising the Prime Minister, secondly in providing a secretarial function for Cabinet, and thirdly in promoting public service leadership and professionalism.⁵⁵ Within the PCO, security and intelligence issues are overseen by the NSA, whose primary responsibilities include coordinating the actions of Canada's security and intelligence organizations, providing intelligence assessments and overseeing the Communications Security Establishment of Canada (CSEC) in conjunction with the Deputy Minister (DM) of the DND. To assist in their duties, the NSA is supported by two Secretariats within PCO, the Security and Intelligence Secretariat, and the International Assessment Staff.⁵⁶

When viewed against the powerful central role that the PCO plays *vis a vis* other departments, it would seem that the NSA would have extensive powers and authority within the Canadian security sector. In practice, the influence of the NSA is debatable as some accounts have described the position as low-profile. Further, there is also a degree of active resistance to expanded powers for the NSA on the grounds that this would undermine the concept of ministerial responsibility.⁵⁷ Nonetheless, as the PCO is the

⁵⁵ Privy Council Office, "About the Privy Council Office," *Privy Council Office*, accessed 24 March 2013, <http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/index.asp?lang=eng&page=about-afpropos>.

⁵⁶ Privy Council Office, "The Role and Structure of the Privy Council Office 2011," *Privy Council Office*, accessed 24 March 2013, <http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/index.asp?lang=eng&page=information&sub=publications&doc=Role/role2013-eng.htm#a3>.

⁵⁷ More on the concept of ministerial responsibility in Chapter Two. See Jim Bronskill, "CSIS director balks at new powers for national security adviser," *The Globe and Mail*, accessed 24 March 2013, <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/csis-director-balks-at-new-powers-for-national-security-adviser/article561637/>.

PM's department and the hub for all other departments, this organization exerts great influence in the national security sector.

The second major Canadian organizational actor is DFAIT, whose mandate is to, "...manage Canada's diplomatic and consular relations and to encourage the country's international trade."⁵⁸ As expressed in the 2012-13 Reports on Plans and Priorities,

DFAIT accomplishes this by:

...undertaking diplomacy and programming in support of international peace and security, democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and provides whole-of-government coordination in response to unanticipated events, such as international crises and natural disasters abroad.⁵⁹

Of note, DFAIT's priorities are an obvious manifestation of the observation that Canada's economic stability is dependent on international security, which can diplomatically be effected by promoting a variety of global institutions and targeted initiatives. For instance, DFAIT's Counter-Terrorism and Capacity Building Program (CTCBP) seeks to assist other states in combating terrorism through a variety of measures, including the provision of training, equipment and technical assistance, which could include working with partners such as the CF and CANSOFCOM.⁶⁰ DFAIT is also responsible for the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START), which aims to coordinate Canadian peace operations in fragile states.⁶¹ With these responsibilities, and

⁵⁸ Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, "About the Department," *Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada*, accessed 30 January 2013, http://www.international.gc.ca/about-a_propos/index.aspx?view=d.

⁵⁹ Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, "Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada – 2012-2013 Reports on Plans and Priorities," *Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat*, accessed 31 January 2013, <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rpp/2012-2013/inst/ext/ext01-eng.asp#s1.4>.

⁶⁰ Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, "Terrorism," *Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada*, accessed 31 January 2013, <http://www.international.gc.ca/crime/terrorism-terrorisme.aspx?lang=eng&view=d>.

DFAIT's primary responsibility for conducting Canada's affairs abroad, it is clear that this department is a major stakeholder in the Canadian security sector.

The next major department within the Canadian security sector is PSC, which also includes CSIS, the RCMP, Correctional Services Canada (CSC), the Parole Board of Canada (PBC), and the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA). Indeed, a primary role of PSC is to unite these like agencies and thereby achieve better integration amongst stakeholders engaged in national security, law enforcement and management of emergencies.⁶² As mentioned earlier, PSC houses the GOC, which assists the department in its responsibility of coordinating and supporting the activities of other departments and agencies in accomplishing their own respective mandates regarding the safety of Canadians. Considering the scope of responsibilities for PSC, particularly in its role of advice, coordination and support, integration with this department is critical to ensure the smooth functioning of the overall governmental apparatus. Notwithstanding the importance of CSC, the PBC and the CBSA in providing for national security, the roles of CSIS and the RCMP are particularly relevant considering their implications for the CF and CANSOFCOM.

The role of CSIS is to, “. . . investigate threats, analyze information and produce intelligence,”⁶³ which it subsequently uses to advise the federal government on how to protect its national interests. Initially founded to counter foreign espionage in Canada,

⁶¹ Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, “About the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START),” *Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada*, accessed 31 January 2013, http://www.international.gc.ca/START-GTSR/about-a_propos.aspx?view=d.

⁶² Public Safety Canada, “Who We Are,” *Public Safety Canada*, accessed 31 January 2013, <http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/abt/www/index-eng.aspx>.

⁶³ Canadian Security Intelligence Service, “Role of CSIS,” *Canadian Security Intelligence Service*, accessed 31 January 2013, <http://csis.gc.ca/bts/rlfcss-eng.asp>.

with the evolving post-Cold War threat the primary interest of CSIS shifted to terrorism. Although there are no geographical limitations on the primary operational mandate of CSIS, it is important to note that CSIS is not responsible for countering security threats through direct action.⁶⁴ Consequently, CSIS must work in close concert with other departments and agencies to facilitate appropriate responses, such as the RCMP for law enforcement activities, or the CF for counter-terrorist activities, amongst others. Given the importance of intelligence and analysis for countering contemporary threats, it is clear that CSIS plays an important role in the Canadian interagency security environment.

As the national police force of Canada, the RCMP also plays an important role in the security sector. Their mandate includes, but is not limited to, conducting national security criminal investigations, marine security, protective policing and critical incident management.⁶⁵ To accomplish these tasks, the RCMP makes extensive use of interagency teams, such as the Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams (INSETs). The RCMP also has a mandate to conduct extraterritorial investigations with respect to terrorist activity if a Canadian citizen is involved.⁶⁶ Notwithstanding this role, the RCMP lacks some of the capabilities that reside in the CF and consequently, mechanisms are in place to provide military assistance to the RCMP through either Assistance to Law Enforcement (ALEA) legislation or through the Canadian Forces Armed Assistance

⁶⁴ Canadian Security Intelligence Service, “CSIS Backgrounder No. 1 – The CSIS Mandate,” *Canadian Security Intelligence Service*, accessed 31 January 2013, <http://csis.gc.ca/nwsrm/bckgrndrs/bckgrndr01-eng.asp>. Notably, Article 12 of the CSIS Act was drafted so as to consciously not arbitrarily restrict CSIS operations geographically, so long as they are conducted on threats to Canada. For more background, see Canadian Security Intelligence Service, “Backgrounder: Collection of Security Intelligence Outside of Canada,” *Canadian Security Intelligence Service*, accessed 31 January 2013, <http://csis.gc.ca/nwsrm/bckgrndrs/bckgrndr200706-eng.asp>.

⁶⁵ Royal Canadian Mounted Police, “National Criminal Investigations Program – Royal Canadian Mounted Police,” *Royal Canadian Mounted Police*, accessed 31 January 2013, <http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/nsci-ecsn/index-eng.htm>.

⁶⁶ Public Safety Canada, *Building Resilience . . .*, 17.

Directives (CFAAD). As such, there is a strong imperative to maintain a close relationship between these organizations.

As the national military, the role of the CF in providing for Canada's security seems largely self-evident. Illustratively, the *Canada First Defence Strategy* clearly articulates three defined roles for the CF in, "...defending Canada, defending North America and contributing to international peace and security."⁶⁷ However, with deeper analysis the symbiotic relationship between the CF and other government departments and agencies becomes more evident. For instance, the CF has a range of capabilities that are not pure warfighting and which can contribute to security, such as the conduct of defence, diplomacy and military assistance (DDMA) tasks.⁶⁸ In working to stabilize fragile states,⁶⁹ the CF must and does work in close coordination with other departments, such as DFAIT, to ensure the harmonization of effects. The CF also has a number of capabilities, such as the ability to respond to Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) events which can greatly assist other departments in meeting their own responsibilities. At the same time, the CF is both a user and a provider of intelligence, implying a necessity to be closely integrated into the overall national intelligence

⁶⁷ National Defence, *Canada First Defence Strategy*, 7.

⁶⁸ Defence, diplomacy and military assistance includes tasks which contribute to nation building "...through the provision of specialized military advice, training and assistance." See National Defence, *Canadian Special Operations Forces Command: An Overview*, (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2008), 9. Bernd Horn and Emily Spencer, "Force of Choice: SOF as a Foreign Policy Enabler," in *Special Operations Forces: Building Global Partnerships*, ed. Emily Spencer, 1 – 28 (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2012), 12.

⁶⁹ There are a number of ways in which the CF can assist in the stabilization of fragile states, including, but not limited to, security and control operations, security sector reform, support to civilian infrastructure, support to governance and assistance to other government departments and agencies. All of these activities require close interagency coordination. For further information on these activities, see National Defence, *Canadian Forces Joint Publication 01*, 6-12 – 6-13.

structure. Within this environment, CANSOFCOM has a unique role that merits separate attention.

CANSOFCOM was formed in 2006 as part of CF Transformation.⁷⁰ By way of a broad overview to special operations, this remains a maturing capability within the CF, however, they are “...particularly well suited for denied and politically sensitive environments.”⁷¹ With respect to operations in support of national security, just as the conventional military has a range of capabilities that can be brought to bear across the spectrum of conflict, so too do Special Operations Forces (SOF). In general, the core activities of SOF include direct action missions, special reconnaissance,⁷² counter-proliferation of WMD, counter-terrorism, DDMA and counterinsurgency operations.⁷³ Additionally, the SOF luxury of selecting individuals for service normally results in the line units being composed of service members who are creative, self-reliant, adaptive and culturally attuned. Consequently, the normative output of a state’s SOF units should be something:

. . . that provides governments with a wide range of kinetic and non-kinetic options to pre-empt, disrupt, react to, or shape strategic or operational effects domestically or abroad.⁷⁴

With this in mind, there are a number of areas in which CANSOFCOM can contribute to the interagency security sector beyond those activities of the broader CF. In addition to

⁷⁰ National Defence, *Canadian Special Operations Forces Command* . . . , 2.

⁷¹ Department of Defence, *Joint Publication 3-05: Special Operations*, (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 2011), I-1.

⁷² Special reconnaissance is defined as, “. . . reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as special operations in hostile, denied, or diplomatically sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces. These actions provide an additive collection capability for commanders and supplement other conventional reconnaissance and surveillance actions.” *Ibid.*, II-7.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, II-1 – II-13.

⁷⁴ D. Michael Day and Bernd Horn “Canadian Special Operations Command: The Maturation of a National Capability,” *Canadian Military Journal* Vol. 10, no. 4 (Autumn 2010): 72.

the purely counter-terrorist tasks which SOF are generally known for and which must continue to be provided for, CANSOFCOM has a high degree of potential to provide non-kinetic effects as well. For instance, CANSOFCOM efforts at DDMA would provide expertise in unique and high-demand areas that would be particularly useful in fragile states combatting terrorism on their own. Practically, CANSOFCOM is already conducting these operations in concert with DFAIT in areas such as Jamaica and Africa.⁷⁵

At the same time, CANSOFCOM has the capability to augment national intelligence capabilities through activities such as special reconnaissance, which could complement collection efforts. Further, service members from CANSOFCOM units can provide a degree of situational awareness, ground truth and networking that can inform senior civilian and military decision makers on matters of strategic importance.⁷⁶ To accomplish these operations, the interagency effort would benefit if CANSOFCOM were highly integrated with national intelligence agencies to ensure fused intelligence, an understanding of requirements and the promotion of intelligence driven operations. Similarly, CANSOFCOM would benefit from exposure with line departments such as DFAIT to both ensure an understanding of strategic intent and the operating environment, but also to reassure those departments about the professionalism of SOF. Thus, through a variety of capabilities limited only by the imaginations of those involved, CANSOFCOM has the potential to greatly assist the Canadian interagency security framework.

⁷⁵ John Vass, "The Canadian Special Operations Regiment: The DDMA Experience," in *Special Operations Forces: Building Global Partnerships*, ed. Emily Spencer, 61 - 69 (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2012), 62 - 68.

⁷⁶ Horn and Spencer, "Force of Choice. . .," 18.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has concluded that CANSOFCOM has much to offer the Canadian government's comprehensive approach to national security through a variety of unique capabilities which can complement the mandates of other departments. This deduction is grounded primarily in the complexity of the modern threat environment resulting from globalization, particularly transnational threats such as terrorism. Understanding that threats to Canada's national security can originate from far away, successive governments have recognized that Canada cannot isolate itself from these problems. In response, and appreciating that contemporary threats span departmental jurisdictions, Canada has adopted an evolutionary policy response that integrates all responsible departments.

Beginning as the 3D approach under the Liberal government of Prime Minister Paul Martin, this approach has gradually evolved into a more integrated comprehensive approach to national security operations. With many important stakeholders mandated to work in this space, it should be no surprise that efforts have not always been smooth. That being said, CANSOFCOM appears to have a number of capabilities that would greatly benefit the interagency process in a number of areas and in support of a number of agencies and departments. How CANSOFCOM best prepares to work in this interagency space is thus a matter of great importance. However, before answering that question, this paper will first turn to a review of various theories and studies on collaboration from both academics and practitioners. By doing so, this literature review will better inform how CANSOFCOM could apply the theory of interagency collaboration to its own efforts to work in the Canadian national security sector.

CHAPTER 2: INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION THEORY

It is the long history of humankind (and animal kind, too) those who learned to collaborate and improvise most effectively have prevailed.

- Charles Darwin

Although the professional literature on interagency collaboration does not universally acclaim the notion as a tool of public management, this has not stopped many contemporary Western democracies from adopting the concept in practice. Indeed, similar to how Darwin's theory of evolution is generally accepted within the scientific community, it would seem that the public policy community has generally accepted the necessity and potential of collaboration between agencies in the public sector. While understandable, this observation appears curiously disconnected when considering the reality that there is as yet no comprehensive theory that addresses either the interagency or collaboration. Instead, many gaps remain within the overall concepts, ranging from common definitions for key terminology like coordination, cooperation and collaboration, to how to reliably measure the effectiveness of collaborative mechanisms and practices. As such, an examination into how any actor would incorporate itself into the interagency security sector in Canada must commence by clarifying the major ideas, issues and best practices of interagency collaboration.

This chapter will begin by briefly examining the historical evolution of interagency theory, starting with its initial roots in the post-Second World War years, and concluding with contemporary models. Included in this narrative will be concise descriptions of the major plateaus in interagency theory, including resource dependency theory, Eugene Bardach's craftsmanship theory, and modern theories of collaboration. In addition, the broad influences of other academic disciplines such as strategic management

and organizational theory will be considered. After establishing this groundwork, the chapter will then shift to confirming the commonly accepted ideas, concepts and issues associated with current versions of interagency theory. Of note, while it is not possible to do complete justice to interagency theory in one chapter, as a minimum an explanation of major characteristics such as definitions, rationales and processes will enable a better understanding of how to practically apply the theory to CANSOFCOM.⁷⁷

The last part of the chapter will look at key factors that can inhibit the development of collaboration, as well as commonly accepted best practices for addressing these challenges. While the lack of an all-encompassing normative theory remains problematic in this regard, in a practical sense, several cross-cutting empirical observations have identified general principles and considerations. Although these lessons may not guarantee success, they appear to be prerequisites in facilitating collaboration and as such, will be useful in subsequently examining how CANSOFCOM could effectively act in an interagency environment. Overall, this chapter will demonstrate that notwithstanding the absence of comprehensive interagency theory, there remain many considerations that must realistically be applied for an organization to effectively function in an interagency environment.

⁷⁷ As identified in the text, a full accounting of all the literature related to the evolution of interagency collaboration theory is quite simply beyond the limitations of this project, in addition to being somewhat secondary to the main argument. Consequently, only the very broad highlights will be presented, accepting that this treatment in no way does justice to the depth of research that exists. Any of the major theories expressed in this project are considered ideal starting points for further reading.

THE EVOLUTION OF INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION THEORY

The problem of interagency collaboration is not a new one, although some organizations may have had more experience than others in dealing with it over the years. For example, the experiences of the United States in developing and implementing the Marshall Plan in the post-Second World War years provide much substance for studying a process that spanned a variety of departments and agencies.⁷⁸ The theory associated with collaborative governance steadily developed throughout the 1960s, aided by such works as those by economist Mancur Olson, who challenged conventional wisdom regarding how groups would act together in pursuing their respective self-interests.⁷⁹ Many other models spun off from this work, such as elements of game theory, however, the theory of resource dependency would come to be the accepted view of group relationships until approximately the early 1990s. In essence, resource dependency theory suggests that forms of collaboration will emerge when organizations are dependent on other organizations for required resources, albeit in an admittedly adversarial

⁷⁸ The Marshall Plan, more formally known as the European Recovery Program (ERP), was implemented to achieve political stability in Europe following the end of the Second World War primarily through restoring the economies of Western Europe. In 1947, newly appointed Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, began planning the ERP and involved the Departments of War, Navy, Commerce, Agriculture, Interior and State. Marshall struggled with how the plan should be administered and eventually proposed an organization semi-independent from the DoS called the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA). In the end, the ECA was fully independent from the DoS and was required to coordinate and cooperate with other governmental organizations to implement the ERP. Over the four year period from 1948 - 1952, the Marshall Plan was an outstanding example of American interagency operations. See Carreau, "Transforming the Interagency System . . .," 1-3.

⁷⁹ At the time, Olson observed that conventional wisdom suggested that where a group of organizations shared common interests, they would naturally coordinate their actions and act together in order to best accomplish their respective aims, which was an idea that was essentially grounded in the economic assumption of rational, self-interested behavior. Olson would challenge this observation and in fact claimed that unless coerced, groups would not act collectively to achieve their aims, even when it made sense to do so. See Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Goods* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2002), 1-2.

collaboration.⁸⁰ In the late 1980s, management professor Barbara Gray would begin to challenge the dominance of resource dependency theory by calling for the development of a comprehensive theory of collaboration.

Gray significantly expanded on collaboration theory in her 1989 book, *Collaborating: Finding Common Ground For Multiparty Problems*, but also in other studies. Importantly, Gray and other researchers recognized the absence of a comprehensive theory and began to fill in the gaps. For instance, in 1991 Gray worked with business administration professor Donna J. Wood to highlight what a definition for collaboration would entail, when collaboration should be conducted, and what the relationships might be between organizational self-interests and collective interests in a collaborative alliance.⁸¹ This steady theoretical progression would continue with the theory of craftsmanship as proposed by renowned public policy professor Eugene Bardach.

Some of Bardach's earlier work towards a comprehensive theory consisted of attempting to apply emerging work on networks to the problem of interagency collaboration. In presenting how different types of networks might contribute to collaboration in differing environments, Bardach subsequently began to identify key principles, such as the importance of trust in developing interagency partnerships.⁸² These ideas ultimately culminated in Bardach's theory of craftsmanship, which suggested

⁸⁰ Richard L. Daft and Ann Armstrong, *Organization Theory and Design*, First Canadian Edition (Toronto: Nelson Education Ltd., 2009), 149.

⁸¹ Donna J. Wood and Barbara Gray, "Toward a Comprehensive Theory of Collaboration," *The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science*, Vol. 27, no. 2 (June 1991): 143.

⁸² Eugene Bardach, "Can Network Theory Illuminate Interagency Collaboration?" *Graduate School of Public Policy, University of California at Berkeley*, accessed 12 February 2013, <http://www.umass.edu/digitalcenter/events/2002Workshop/Papers/bardach.pdf>.

that building a collaborative endeavor was analogous to building a house; it was challenging, but could be accomplished with skilled craftsmen.⁸³ More specifically, successfully creating a collaborative endeavor, or inter-organizational collaborative capacity (ICC) as Bardach called it, would depend on the quality of the raw materials, the presence of finite and critical skills, the quality of practices employed by the collaborators and the overall environment.

In a broader sense, Bardach's concepts were providing the normative answers to questions of structure, process and training for developing collaboration. Bardach would subsequently expand on the sequences for building interagency collaboration, or "platforming," in addition to identifying significant obstacles to successful collaboration.⁸⁴ As well as specific insights on interagency collaboration, Bardach's work also highlighted the influence of crossover academic disciplines such as theories on strategic management, organizational behavior, and networks, which continues to this day.

Strategic management theory augmented interagency theory by highlighting such issues as the different types of alliances, why organizations might consider an alliance and how alliances could contribute to creating competitive advantage. In addition, strategic management also considers how alliances can be structured and the

⁸³ Eugene Bardach, *Getting Agencies to Work Together: The Practice and Theory of Managerial Craftsmanship* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1998), 29.

⁸⁴ Bardach identified ten platforms in the development of an inter-organizational collaborative capacity, or ICC, with each subsequent platform being supported by the principle below it. Examples of platforms included trust, leadership, intellectual capital and continuous learning. For a brief overview, see Eugene Bardach, "Developmental Dynamics: Interagency Collaboration as an Emergent Phenomenon," *Journal of Public Administration and Theory*, Vol. 11, no. 2 (2001): 152 – 157.

determinants behind making an alliance successful.⁸⁵ Further, strategic management began to answer questions on how to qualitatively assess and measure both the desirability and effectiveness of partnerships. For instance, the emphasis on the financial bottom line in the private sector is useful in understanding the importance of implementing monitoring systems in a collaborative partnership, and also in analyzing potential partners for strategic fit.⁸⁶ These concepts are clearly also relevant to interagency collaborations and have been incorporated as such. Similarly, theory on organizational behavior and networks has also been adapted.

Like craftsmanship theory, contemporary organizational theory challenges the adversarial foundation of resource dependency in suggesting that voluntary collaboration can enhance competitiveness through increased performance and greater innovation.⁸⁷ A key to this proposition is an organizational orientation that stresses partnership, including how to manage issues of interdependence, trust, and communications. In proposing a collaborative-network perspective, organizational theory draws on parallel work on networks, such as practical methods for structuring and managing relationships. For instance, network theory would suggest that a shared governance model would be more appropriate within an all-channel network, whereas a lead organization governance model would be better suited to a hub-and-spoke network.⁸⁸ Altogether, theory on interagency collaboration is strengthened with a strong evolution and by drawing on other

⁸⁵ Mason A. Carpenter and Wm. Gerard Sanders, *Strategic Management: A Dynamic Perspective Concepts and Cases*, Second ed., (New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc., 2009), 295 – 315.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 317 – 318.

⁸⁷ Daft and Armstrong, *Organization Theory and Design*, 170 - 171.

⁸⁸ An all-channel network would see every actor in the network equally connected to every other actor, whereas a hub-and-spoke network would see central nodes acting as primary connectors between other actors. For further explanation, see Chad Whelan, *Networks and National Security: Dynamics, Effectiveness and Organisation* (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2012), 44 – 49.

professional disciplines, such as strategic management, organizational behavior and networks. Unfortunately, significant research gaps remain⁸⁹ and consequently, this chapter will proceed with a summary of the major conceptual components of interagency collaboration theory.

MAIN CONCEPTS OF INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION THEORY

The first part of understanding contemporary collaboration theory is to confirm the major terminology and definitions. As mentioned earlier, Wood and Gray stressed the requirement for a definition of collaboration, suggesting that any definition would need to answer, “. . . who is doing what, with what means, toward which ends.”⁹⁰ Unfortunately, this issue is not as easy as simply defining collaboration as many sources have used significantly different definitions. In addition, several other similar words and concepts are sometimes used interchangeably with collaboration, such as coordination and cooperation.⁹¹ To clarify this terminology issue, Bardach’s 1998 definition of collaboration has generally been accepted as meeting the requirements for academic theory. Specifically, Bardach defined collaboration as “. . . any joint activity by two or more agencies that is intended to increase public value by their working together rather than separately.”⁹² With respect to this definition, it is also useful to conceive of joint

⁸⁹ Rosemary O’Leary and Nidhi Vij, “Collaborative Public Management: Where Have We Been and Where Are We Going?” *The American Review of Public Administration XX(X)*, Vol. 42 (2012): 10.

⁹⁰ Wood and Gray, “Toward a Comprehensive Theory. . .,” 146.

⁹¹ Carmel Duggan and Carmel Corrigan, “A Literature Review of Inter-Agency Work with a Particular Focus on Children’s Services,” *Children Acts Advisory Board Research: Report No. 4*, (Dublin, Children Acts Advisory Board, 2009), 9.

⁹² Bardach, *Getting Agencies to Work Together . . .*, 8.

activities along a collaborative continuum, which assists in defining cooperation and coordination relative to collaboration.

One such example would see the continuum defined with cooperation on one end, collaboration on the other and coordination in the middle.⁹³ In this formulation, cooperation would be defined as merely the sharing of information between independent groups and coordination would be defined as the joint delivery of services or events between different groups.⁹⁴ Lastly, the degree of collaboration would be defined as separate organizations actually relinquishing a degree of control and authority so as to create a somewhat unified structure to accomplish a shared goal. This conceptualization is largely consistent with most literature on the degrees of collaboration, although in some cases networking is used to refer to simple information exchange⁹⁵ while coadunation is used to refer to creating a completely unified interagency structure, which can be seen at Figure 2.⁹⁶ Out of all these considerations, the most important factor is that




Figure 2 - Continuum of Interagency Integration

Source: Gajda, "Utilizing Collaboration Theory. . .," 69.

⁹³ There are clearly issues in having the physical term collaboration refer both to the overall concept of working together as well as to a quantitative or qualitative degree of working together. This project does not seek to rationalize this dispute in the academic literature; it merely presents the state of research as it currently stands. This does, however, reinforce the broader issues still attendant within the theory of interagency collaboration.

⁹⁴ Rebecca H. Woodland and Michael S. Hutton, "Evaluating Organizational Collaborations: Suggested Entry Points and Strategies," *American Journal of Evaluation*, Vol. 33, no. 3 (2012): 371.

⁹⁵ See Duggan and Corrigan, "A Literature Review of Inter-Agency Work . . .," 12.

⁹⁶ Gajda, "Utilizing Collaboration Theory. . .," 69.

there can be degrees of collaboration based on the amount of integration. Since each level of collaboration comes with its own respective challenges to be successfully implemented, it is extremely important for an organization to understand what its motivation is for undertaking a collaborative endeavor.

In general, there are three broad rationales underlying why organizations would choose to collaborate. These rationales include solving problems beyond the ability of any one organization, creating economies of scale and creating a collaborative advantage. With respect to the first rationale, the complexity of modern security problems as outlined in the first chapter of this project has led to the creation of the Iron Law of Interagency, which is that, "... no national security or international affairs issue can be resolved by one agency alone."⁹⁷ Indeed, with the rising incidence of so-called 'wicked' societal problems, interagency collaboration enables organizations to mitigate uncertainty in the operating environment by sharing or diffusing risk.⁹⁸

The second rationale for interagency collaboration is to create economies of scale, which is extremely relevant in the face of current fiscal pressure to reduce overall governmental expenditures. Aside from effective service delivery, there is also a question of efficient service delivery. Understanding that many problems span the jurisdictions of multiple agencies and organizations, governments have incentives to avoid redundancy and duplication, which simultaneously achieves a more efficient comprehensive

⁹⁷ Gabriel Marcella, "Understanding the Interagency Process: The Challenge of Adaptation," in *Affairs of State: The Interagency and National Security*, ed. Gabriel Marcella (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008), 25.

⁹⁸ Kirk Emerson et al., "An Integrative Framework for Collaborative Governance," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, Vol. 22, no. 1 (2012): 9 – 10.

governmental response.⁹⁹ At the same time, it is important to distinguish between the second rationale of creating simple economies of scale, and the third rationale of creating a collaborative advantage, which is something above and beyond.

Although still on a financial level, a collaborative advantage can occur when organizations undertake joint investments which they may not be able to do when acting independently. Similarly, organizations can implement a series of collaborative activities such as sharing knowledge and combining complementary resources and capabilities.¹⁰⁰ Significantly, when these latter types of shared activities lead to an interdisciplinary approach to problems and lateral thinking, organizations can develop true collaborative advantage through innovation.¹⁰¹ These advantages can become more pronounced the more trust and familiarity are shared between the organizations. Having briefly explained three broad rationales behind why collaborating makes sense for organizations, the next major segment of interagency theory looks at the structures and organizations that can be used to facilitate collaboration.

Essentially, organizations can structure themselves for collaboration through two broad manners, consisting of formal and informal structures. Unfortunately, as late as 2009 there was a general lack of academic work relating to formal structures that enable collaboration.¹⁰² Notwithstanding, this part of the literature is highly related to work on degrees of integration, with the underlying assumption being that certain types of structures are more suited to certain degrees of desired, or actual, integration. For

⁹⁹ Frederick M. Kaiser, *Interagency Collaborative Arrangements and Activities: Types, Rationales, Considerations* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2011), 17 – 18.

¹⁰⁰ Carpenter and Sanders, *Strategic Management*. . ., 298.

¹⁰¹ O’Leary and Vij, “Collaborative Public Management. . .,” 3 – 4.

¹⁰² Duggan and Corrigan, “A Literature Review of Inter-Agency Work . . .,” 14.

instance, Rebecca Gajda, a professor specializing in program evaluation and collaboration, has proposed a relative spectrum of structures based on the relationship integration continuum between organizations.¹⁰³ On the low integration end of the spectrum, a network type structure might be suitable for relationships that only encompass the communication of information and interests, or coordination. Conversely, a structure at the high end of the spectrum may be characterized by such actions as planning and executing mutually shared goals, albeit maintaining separate organizational identities. In this high integration case, a formal partnership or coalition may be the appropriate structure.¹⁰⁴ Other types of organizational structures that may be found on the spectrum could be alliances or task forces when the desired relationship is one of medium integration. While there are a variety of formal structures that organizations can implement to facilitate degrees of collaboration, there are also informal structural mechanisms.

Similar to research on formal structures, the understanding of informal structure as the micro foundation of inter-organizational networks has not been widely studied. Based on network theory, an informal structure is characterized by the formation of an informal network, which can form in a number of ways. For instance, the basis for an informal network may be actor similarity, which engenders relationships based on trust, or actor proximity, which promotes relationships by shared proximity.¹⁰⁵ In either case, these informal structures and interpersonal ties can be leveraged to obtain knowledge that

¹⁰³ Gajda, "Utilizing Collaboration Theory. . .," 68.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.* There is admittedly much ambiguity between the various definitions used by Gajda and their relative meanings and implications *vis a vis* actually implementing these structures. This is another example of the requirement for additional research into interagency collaboration theory.

¹⁰⁵ Whelan, *Networks and National Security*. . ., 120.

could not be communicated through a formal network, or to overcome obstacles caused through formal structures. Because of this, in many ways informal structures have come to characterize the term, “networking,” particularly when used in a business or social context.¹⁰⁶

While beneficial, it is important to note that informal structures suffer from at least two significant drawbacks. First, these networks are generally highly reliant on specific personalities and as such, often do not survive personnel rotation. Second, it is difficult to enforce accountability within an informal structure.¹⁰⁷ For these reasons, in most cases informal structures should be viewed as a vital multiplier to formal structures, but not as a replacement for them. Understanding the general structures that can be used to implement collaboration, it is next useful to examine the processes through which collaboration emerges.

The study of how collaboration develops amongst organizations has a bigger depth of research as it draws from psychologist Bruce Tuckman’s group development model of forming, storming, norming, and performing. Specifically, this model sees the forming stage consisting of members orienting to the group and developing dependence relationships, whereas the storming stage features intragroup conflict and resistance to group influence.¹⁰⁸ Subsequently, the norming stage consists of the development of group cohesion, which subsequently proceeds into the performing stage where structure

¹⁰⁶ In a business context, networking can be defined as, “...creating a group of acquaintances and associates and keeping it active through regular communication for mutual benefit.” See BusinessDictionary.com, “What is networking? Definition and meaning,” *BusinessDictionary.com*, accessed 9 April 2013, <http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/networking.html>.

¹⁰⁷ Whelan, *Networks and National Security*. . ., 124.

¹⁰⁸ Bruce W. Tuckman, “Developmental Sequence in Small Groups,” *Psychological Bulletin* Vol. 63, no. 6 (1965): 396.

supports task performance. Although Tuckman's basic theory continues to have relevance, further stages and details have been added to make it even more applicable to interagency collaboration.

In opposition to stages of collaborative development, some researchers have proposed the implementation of components, which refers to the fact that the process of developing collaboration is likely to be an iterative and evolutionary experience.¹⁰⁹ For example, some components would consist of an organization recognizing its individual limitations, a need to collaborate and also identifying a legitimate basis to collaborate with another organization. Similarly, other components might entail assessing collaborative capacity, a clearly articulated purpose and the selection of both an appropriate collaborative partner, as well as a suitable structure.¹¹⁰ Lastly, other components could be related to the management of relationships, such as building trust and promoting organizational buy-in. When these components are added to Tuckman's basic model of group development, the subsequent model for interagency collaboration becomes quite powerful.

When adapted to address the emergence of collaboration amongst organizations, Tuckman's forming stage ideally encompasses considerations such as developing shared clarity on the purpose of a collaborative endeavor.¹¹¹ Basically, this stage addresses the components of recognizing a need to collaborate and subsequently identifying appropriate stakeholders in the proposed collaborative alliance. Subsequently, the

¹⁰⁹ Bob Hudson et al., "In Pursuit of Inter-Agency Collaboration in The Public Sector," *Public Management: An International Journal of Research and Theory*, Vol. 1, no. 2 (1999): 237.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 238.

¹¹¹ Woodland and Hutton, "Evaluating Organizational Collaborations. . .," 376.

storming stage becomes more robust as each partner to the collaborative venture seeks to clarify their roles in the process, the strategies that will be employed and the metrics that will be used to measure possible outcomes.¹¹² In an interagency environment, this stage can be particularly emotive as discussions on how resources and capabilities will be shared can often lead to protection of departmental turf and expertise. Nonetheless, this stage is important in adding detail to how the organizations involved will meaningfully accomplish the purpose of the collaboration that was identified in the forming stage.

With respect to adapting Tuckman's next two stages, most recent literature combines the norming and performing into a single state of collaborative development. In this conceptualization, the organizations involved focus on implementing the various systems, structures and processes that were identified in the storming stage.¹¹³ Lastly, an additional stage is generally added to Tuckman's model, which is the transforming stage. In this step, which can happen once a significant milestone or event occurs, the partner organizations conduct a reassessment of their desired goals and motivations from the collaborative endeavor.¹¹⁴ Possible outcomes may be as simple as making modifications to the existing processes and structures, or may be as drastic as deciding that the rationale for collaborative behavior no longer exists, leading to a termination of the relationship. In any case, with a broad understanding of the basic definitions, rationales, structures, and processes underlying interagency collaboration, it is now possible to examine some of the common inhibiting factors and associated best practices.

¹¹² Gajda, "Utilizing Collaboration Theory. . .," 70.

¹¹³ Woodland and Hutton, "Evaluating Organizational Collaborations. . .," 376.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 377.

ISSUES AND BEST PRACTICES IN SUCCESSFUL COLLABORATION

One of the first problems that can undermine a collaborative endeavor is a lack of commitment on behalf of participating organizations to dedicate resources to the effort. This can occur for a number of reasons, such as where an overlap in mandates leads to rivalry or jurisdictional turf battles.¹¹⁵ Indeed, in this case collaboration may be viewed as a threat since participating organizations may feel they will lose some autonomous control, particularly over their resources. This may be further aggravated if there is an unclear return on investment for the endeavor.¹¹⁶ Conversely, a severe resource asymmetry between participating agencies may lead to fears that one organization will dominate the others. For instance, the resource dominance of the Department of Defense (DoD) *vis a vis* the Department of State (DoS) in the US has led to concerns over the ‘creeping militarization’ of American foreign policy.¹¹⁷ While these different perspectives to resource sharing are serious impediments to collaboration, there are some simple best practices to address them.

First and foremost, creating commitment requires participating organizations to identify a legitimate basis for collaboration. There are a number of ways to accomplish this, however, the most basic includes the simple mutual appreciation of the need or existence of interdependence. In most cases, this appreciation should be paralleled through a clearly expressed statement of collaborative purpose, which articulates the reasons behind the interdependence and what each organization hopes to achieve in the

¹¹⁵ Kaiser, *Interagency Collaborative Arrangements*. . ., 25.

¹¹⁶ Hudson et al., “In Pursuit of Inter-Agency Collaboration. . .,” 242.

¹¹⁷ Marcella, “Understanding the Interagency Process. . .,” 37 – 39.

relationship.¹¹⁸ To further address these issues, organizations must pay careful attention to developing structural and governance mechanisms, which can alternatively mitigate or aggravate power imbalances.¹¹⁹ One example of a structural mechanism may be the identification of a leader, lead agency or shared responsibilities. When these structures are strengthened by leadership buy-in and continuity, commitment issues can be greatly mitigated.¹²⁰ Similarly, dealing with competing priorities is another potential obstacle for interagency collaboration.

Bardach's craftsmanship theory identifies reasons why the mandates and priorities of individual agencies may interfere with collaboration. Particularly in public administration, most agencies are created for a central purpose. This arrangement not only addresses that respective issue, but is also desirable for governmental accountability.¹²¹ While efficient, in a second order sense this arrangement also creates a situation where most agencies will focus resources on their core mission to the detriment of peripheral activities. Unfortunately, this can ultimately lead to a situation where some organizations will collaborate only under duress due to the perceived opportunity costs *vis a vis* their core mandate.¹²² Fortunately, competing priorities can generally be addressed in a similar fashion to resource issues.

Appreciating the requirement for collaboration and developing a clear statement of purpose are both equally applicable in assisting organizations to effectively prioritize

¹¹⁸ Hudson et al., "In Pursuit of Inter-Agency Collaboration. . .," 242, 247.

¹¹⁹ O'Leary and Vij, "Collaborative Public Management. . .," 7.

¹²⁰ Government Accountability Office. *Managing for Results: Key Considerations for Implementing Interagency Collaborative Mechanisms*, GAO-12-1022, (Washington, D.C.: September 27, 2012), 15 – 17.

¹²¹ Bardach, *Getting Agencies to Work Together . . .*," 168.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 170.

interagency activities versus core activities. At the same time, it is acknowledged that particularly in the national security sector, simply acknowledging the requirement for collaboration may not be enough to appropriately address governmental, as opposed to agency, priorities. Consequently, much of the contemporary practical literature on interagency collaboration suggests the requirement for strategic direction and an overarching, integrated strategy.¹²³ This principle is arguably reinforced through empirical data, such as in the recommendations of the Manley Panel which lead to the creation of the ATF.¹²⁴ From this, it can be concluded that the presence of a strategy helps to define agency roles and responsibilities, and enables a more effective prioritization of core and peripheral mandates against governmental objectives. Indeed, the issue of roles and responsibilities is significant enough to treat as a separate issue.

Roles and responsibilities within a collaborative endeavor can be a challenge for a number of reasons, from developing effective and efficient mechanisms for accomplishing an objective, to enforcing accountability. With regards to the former issue, a lack of clarity on roles and responsibilities can lead to uncoordinated efforts, poor decision making and attainment of national goals, even with an overarching strategy.¹²⁵ For example, the United States government has an overarching strategy to respond to a pandemic influenza and identifies the Department of Health and Human Services, and the Department of Homeland Security, as primary stakeholders. Unfortunately, the strategy is ambiguous on defining when these departments would be in the lead during a

¹²³ Government Accountability Office, *National Security: Key Challenges and Solutions to Strengthen Interagency Collaboration*, GAO-10-822T, (Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2010), 4.

¹²⁴ Gammer, "Integrating Civilian Military Operations . . .," 4.

¹²⁵ Government Accountability Office, *Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight of National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce, and Information Sharing*, GAO-09-904SP, (Washington, D.C.: September 25, 2009), 12.

pandemic.¹²⁶ Clearly, this arrangement has the potential to create confusion and interagency disagreement during an intense scenario, leading to an inefficient overall governmental response. This would ultimately lead to a second important issue, which is enforcing accountability.

Accountability within the interagency environment is a complex issue in and of itself. Bardach provides a broad overview of the challenge that accountability plays in the public sector by identifying the organizational dilemma of being held accountable for an activity entrusted to another agency.¹²⁷ In the Canadian governmental system, this concept fits nicely with the convention of ministerial responsibility, which holds that ministers are individually responsible and accountable for the mandates of their department. A fundamental component of ministerial responsibility is that for accountability to effectively function, the minister's responsibilities cannot be shared.¹²⁸

An additional difficulty that public sector accountability presents toward successful interagency collaboration is the unique characteristics of the security environment. Specifically, accountability procedures for national security organizations must carefully balance transparency, disclosure of sensitive or classified information, and the necessity to forestall the misuse of capabilities available to agencies in the security sector.¹²⁹ Thus, accountability effectively presents a double jeopardy toward developing collaboration as agencies may naturally view collaboration as detrimental to their existing accountability frameworks, while it also seems structurally difficult to practically

¹²⁶ Government Accountability Office, *National Security: Key Challenges and Solutions*. . . , 5.

¹²⁷ Bardach, *Getting Agencies to Work Together* . . . ,” 181 – 182.

¹²⁸ Philippe Lagasse, “Accountability for National Defence: Ministerial Responsibility, Military Command and Parliamentary Oversight,” *IRPP Study*, No. 4 (March 2010): 8.

¹²⁹ Reg Whitaker and Stuart Farson, “Accountability in and for National Security,” *IRPP Choices*, Vol. 15, no. 9 (September 2009): 4 – 5.

implement. Fortunately, there are several best practices that can be used to facilitate accountability, as well as the broader issue of clarifying roles and responsibilities.

Fundamentally, one of the best ways to clarify roles and responsibilities is simply for the participating agencies to discuss and mutually agree on the issues at stake. Several mechanisms exist to capture these agreements, such as policies, laws or memoranda of understanding.¹³⁰ With respect to ministerial responsibility in the Canadian system, political scientist Philippe Lagasse argues that there is also a degree of collective responsibility to this convention given the requirement for cabinet solidarity.¹³¹ Conceivably then, it is possible to develop accountability frameworks that can accommodate for the interdependence inherent in interagency collaboration. To do so, however, requires that accountability systems answer the questions of accountability for what, accountability to whom, accountability by whom, accountability of whom and accountability when.¹³² While potentially difficult, mechanisms are clearly available with which to do so. At the same time, successfully developing solutions for roles and responsibilities often requires organization to overcome another obstacle to collaboration, that of organizational culture.

Organizational culture, and its subsequent impact on collaboration, can manifest in a number of ways. For example, an organization's approach to structure and planning processes may lead it to approach problems in unique ways. Unfortunately, differences

¹³⁰ Government Accountability Office. *Managing for Results*. . . , 18.

¹³¹ Lagasse, "Accountability for National Defence. . .," 40.

¹³² Whitaker and Farson, "Accountability in and for National Security," 6 – 7. The variety of mechanisms available within the Canadian governmental system, such as central actors like the Treasury Board of Canada, the Privy Council Office and the Department of Finance, are beyond the scope of this project. Although this will be touched on in slightly more detail in the next chapter, readers interested in more information on this subject are encouraged to consult either Philippe Lagasse's work or Reg Whitaker and Stuart Farson's article as cited.

with other organizations may lead to poor coordination and subsequent problems in collaboration.¹³³ At the same time, different organizational cultures may be better suited for different environments and strategic focus. For instance, organizational theory suggests at least four different types of culture based on a stable or flexible environment, as well as an external or internal strategic focus, captured in Figure 3.



Figure 3 - Relationship of Environment and Strategy to Organizational Culture

Source: Adapted from Daft and Armstrong, *Organization Theory and Design*, 340.

While none of the cultures are inherently better than the others, they may present obstacles to collaboration when different organizational cultures attempt to work together. A key to bridging these differences in organizational culture is the creation of a collaborative capacity within an organization.

There are a number of ways of creating an internal culture of collaboration and bridging organizational cultures. Internally, organizations can facilitate the development of a collaborative culture through structural processes, such as establishing key positions

¹³³ Government Accountability Office, *National Security*. . . , 6.

for interagency partners.¹³⁴ Ideally, staffing these positions not only contributes to creating a culture suited to support collaboration, it also results in some of the earlier identified benefits such as a collaborative advantage through cross-disciplinary innovation. Externally, organizations can implement such methods as developing shared terminology to mitigate the impacts of organizational slang, or implementing compatible processes.¹³⁵ These mechanisms may be further developed through the pursuance of joint exercises or activities with the aim of increasing familiarity. In essence, the root of bridging organizational cultures is the establishment of trust and open communication, which can understandably both be impediments to collaboration if not conducted properly.

As a prerequisite for collaborative relationships, the establishment of inter-organizational trust has generally been recognized as a critical element.¹³⁶ Indeed, it would seem strikingly obvious how collaboration would be impeded should the participating organizations not trust each other. However, to the extent that trust is based on communication, organizations often fail to emplace appropriate mechanisms to ensure that an effective dialogue can occur. Interestingly, poor communication can manifest itself in failure to implement either horizontal or vertical communications methods.¹³⁷ In a national security setting, information sharing becomes even more difficult amongst participating agencies due to the sensitive nature of information being discussed and

¹³⁴ Government Accountability Office, *National Security: Interagency Collaboration Practices and Challenges at DOD's Southern and Africa Commands*, GAO-10-962T (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2010), 10.

¹³⁵ Government Accountability Office. *Managing for Results*. . . , 14.

¹³⁶ O'Leary and Vij, "Collaborative Public Management. . .," 8.

¹³⁷ Duggan and Corrigan, "A Literature Review of Inter-Agency Work . . .," 29.

security clearance issues.¹³⁸ In addition, the design of technical systems may introduce problems of interoperability due to incompatibility or conversely, problems of information overload.¹³⁹ Consequently, it is easy to see how an inefficient communications infrastructure may undermine efforts at developing inter-organizational trust, particularly when aggravated through such things as different organizational cultures. Nonetheless, there are several mechanisms to mitigate these issues.

With respect to trust itself, collaborating organizations should first understand the elements of trust, such as the initial conditions, the negotiation process, reciprocal experiences and outside behavior, such as reputation.¹⁴⁰ Understanding these basic concepts will allow an organization to comprehend the effects of such simple actions as demonstrating follow through, good intentions, and competency. Similarly, the importance of open communication, transparency and information sharing should also become evident.¹⁴¹ To facilitate communication, organizations should look to define information sharing methodologies, both procedural and technical. As part of a broader agreement, roles and responsibilities should be clearly identified and baseline inter-organizational standards can be implemented.¹⁴² In addition, organizations should commit to regular interaction to facilitate overall communication. As part of improving communications and trust, organizations should also consider requirements for training and professional development of personnel.

¹³⁸ Government Accountability Office, *National Security: Key Challenges*. . . , 16.

¹³⁹ Whelan, *Networks and National Security*, 104.

¹⁴⁰ Carpenter and Sanders, *Strategic Management*. . . , 315.

¹⁴¹ O’Leary and Vij, “Collaborative Public Management. . .,” 8.

¹⁴² Government Accountability Office, *Interagency Collaboration*. . . , 52.

The importance of competent and skilled personnel in the interagency environment was identified in Bardach's craftsmanship theory, where he drew particular attention to the requirement for collaborative specific skills.¹⁴³ Empirically, Bardach's observations have been borne out in many studies verifying that collaboration is more successful when a workforce has the required skills and training. Unfortunately, many organizations create a negative climate towards collaborative positions amongst their personnel through a variety of inadvertent means. For instance, an out of agency position potentially has negative impacts on an individual's career due to time out of trade.¹⁴⁴ Conversely, some personnel lack knowledge regarding vital information about the organization they will be responsible for collaborating with. This ignorance can lead to devastating results in aggravating differences in organizational cultures or structures.¹⁴⁵ Combined, the effects of failing to adequately train for and support collaborative positions can ultimately undermine what might otherwise be a successful collaboration. Fortunately, the solutions to these problems can be easily derived.

As part of creating a collaborative workforce, some researchers have claimed that education, training and experience are the pillars of an interagency personnel program. The process of education itself can be conducted in a comprehensive interagency fashion and represents an opportunity to enhance the capacity for innovative thinking in all organizations.¹⁴⁶ Similarly, training is an opportunity to refine the collective ability to

¹⁴³ Bardach, *Getting Agencies to Work Together . . .*, 29.

¹⁴⁴ Government Accountability Office, *Interagency Collaboration: State and Army Personnel Rotation Programs Can Build on Positive Results with Additional Preparation and Evaluation*, GAO-12-386, (Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2012), 7.

¹⁴⁵ Government Accountability Office, *National Security: Key Challenges . . .*, 11.

¹⁴⁶ Catherine Dale, *National Security Professionals and Interagency Reform: Proposals, Recent Experience, and Issues for Congress*, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2011), 12 – 14.

apply knowledge, while also developing interagency relationships. Likewise, experience can be developed by properly motivating individuals to pursue interagency positions. Some critical steps for incentivizing personnel is the demonstrated commitment of organizational leadership to rotational positions, the development of rewards for interagency rotations in a personnel management system, as well as mutually agreed governance mechanisms.¹⁴⁷ Lastly, participating organizations should ideally commit to staffing interagency positions with high-quality personnel. By implementing these best practices, in addition to the others previously identified, organizations can set the conditions for succeeding in interagency collaboration.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has demonstrated that despite the absence of a comprehensive theory of interagency collaboration, there are many practical interdisciplinary concepts that greatly contribute to a series of interagency best practices. While the contemporary roots of these methods can be traced to the implementation of the Marshall Plan following the Second World War, true academic rigor emerged much later. Collaborative pioneers such as Gray and Bardach provided a strong foundation for future research through such concepts as craftsmanship theory, which continues to inform collaboration today. When combined with related academic disciplines, such as strategic management and organizational theory, a large basis of applicable normative ideas emerges.

¹⁴⁷ Government Accountability Office, *Interagency Collaboration: State and Army Personnel Rotation Programs*. . . , 10 – 12.

These ideas, personified in the terminology, rationales, processes and structures of interagency collaboration, provide much insight toward a broader understanding. Indeed, one of the strengths that might come from lacking an overall theory of interagency collaboration may be the flexibility to apply a multitude of inter-disciplinary concepts to this complex issue. This can partially be seen through the normative and empirical best practices to a variety of challenges that can potentially detract from successful collaboration. For instance, craftsmanship theory provides the initial rationale for having a highly skilled collaborative workforce, which is borne out by numerous empirical studies from the US government. Likewise, organizational theory and network theory provide normative solutions to issues of bridging organizational cultures and the sharing of information, both of which are verified in practice. Consequently, and notwithstanding the requirement for additional research, the current state of interagency collaboration theory does suggest several key elements for interagency operations. These elements consist of plans and preparations for interagency operations, organizing for interagency operations and the development of a collaborative workforce for interagency operations. As such, a solid normative basis exists with which to assess how CANSOFCOM can best prepare to act within the Canadian interagency security environment.

CHAPTER 3: CANSOFCOM IN THE CANADIAN INTERAGENCY ENVIRONMENT

What we need to do is learn to work in the system, by which I mean that everybody, every team, every platform, every division, every component is there not for individual competitive profit or recognition, but for contribution to the system as a whole on a win-win basis.

- W. Edwards Deming

As discussed in the first chapter, the contemporary operating environment is characterized by numerous complex threats. Indeed, to the extent that many of these challenges are deeply interconnected with other issues and trends, responding to these matters has been recognized as being beyond the mandate of any one governmental department. Consequently, the Canadian national security sector should be viewed as effectively operating as a system of systems, whether Canadian federal departments and agencies choose to operate collaboratively or not. Ideally, the entire system will work in an effective, efficient and holistic manner, as characterized in the words of statistician W. Edwards Deming. Practically, concepts and ideas from interagency collaboration theory can provide the normative basis for enabling efficiency and effectiveness in an interagency environment. More specifically, applied interagency collaboration theory can help organizations in planning to work in an interagency environment, organizing for an interagency environment and personnel development for an interagency environment.

As it applies to CANSOFCOM, there are several essentials that can be applied in planning to act as a partner in the Canadian interagency security environment. All efforts should begin with recognizing a legitimate basis for collaboration in conjunction with identifying the most appropriate collaborative partners. This will lead to subsequent considerations such as the extent of collaborative relationship required to address the issues at stake, as well as developing shared understanding for accountability, established

roles and responsibilities. Having worked through these concerns, CANSOFCOM can then apply collaboration theory to the question of how to organize to best facilitate interagency collaboration, including a determination of what degree of organizational change may be feasible or even desirable.

To determine what organizational structures and guidelines would be best suited for interagency collaboration, CANSOFCOM can draw on not only the concepts of interagency collaboration theory, but also the lessons of Allied organizations such as Joint Interagency Task Force – South (JIATF-South). The experiences of JIATF-South and other organizations such as US Africa Command (AFRICOM) would likely help CANSOFCOM in considering the functioning of interagency enabling mechanisms, such as those dealing with information sharing and decision making processes. Lastly, both normative and empirical information can inform how CANSOFCOM prepares its workforce to operate in the interagency environment. For instance, CANSOFCOM can turn to a number of sources to determine what skills are required for its members to successfully operate in an interagency context, as well as assessing what mixture of education, training and experience is required to achieve this skill level. By considering and applying best practices regarding planning, organizing and working in an interagency environment, CANSOFCOM can set the conditions for collaborative success in being a committed and credible interagency partner.

PLANNING FOR THE INTERAGENCY ENVIRONMENT

As many researchers and practitioners of interagency collaboration would attest, the first steps in planning to work in the interagency environment are to first, recognize

the need to collaborate and second, to identify a legitimate basis for collaboration.¹⁴⁸ On this subject, there are numerous indicators that CANSOFCOM has done both. For example, current Commander of CANSOFCOM, Brigadier-General Dennis Thompson, commented on the need for CANSOFCOM interagency collaboration in a 2011 interview.

We're engaged with a number of government departments. Domestically, it tends to be the RCMP and, internationally, it tends to be Foreign Affairs. There are not many places I can think of where SOF doesn't operate without interacting with other government departments by necessity. I think we are pretty comfortable with the concept and certainly, given my background, I'm comfortable making sure we stay on that glide path.¹⁴⁹

Similarly, CANSOFCOM's mandate for a variety of counter-terrorism tasks provides a legitimate foundation for collaboration with many other agencies, such as CSIS, on the basis of intelligence sharing. In the presence of compatible mandates, one of the next things for CANSOFCOM to do would be to establish where joint action might be beneficial in non-obvious ways, such as in reducing policy fragmentation or achieving efficiencies in resourcing.¹⁵⁰ However, to accomplish this analysis would first require CANSOFCOM to assess the degree of fit¹⁵¹ with other actors in the interagency environment and how this would potentially impact a collaborative venture.

¹⁴⁸ Hudson et al., "In Pursuit of Inter-Agency Collaboration. . .," 240 – 242.

¹⁴⁹ BGen Dennis Thompson, "Special Operators: Unique Skill Set in High Demand," *Vanguard*, Issue 3 (April / May 2011), accessed 4 March 2013, <http://vanguardcanada.com/special-operators-unique-skill-set-in-high-demand/>.

¹⁵⁰ Kaiser, *Interagency Collaborative Arrangements*. . ., 16 – 17.

¹⁵¹ In brief, the concept of fit considers overall inter-organizational compatibility based on a variety of sub-categories, such as compatible objectives, willingness to contribute, compatible cultures, compatible structures and processes, and other criteria as deemed relevant. In some cases, the differences between organizations may simply be too large to make any collaborative venture worthwhile. See Carpenter and Sanders, *Strategic Management*. . ., 319 for further explanation of fit criteria.

This point can be further explained by illustratively assessing the fit between CANSOFCOM and another actor in the Canadian security sector, as selected from the PCO, DFAIT, PSC, CSIS or the RCMP. In each case, there are a number of different areas where CANSOFCOM has a legitimate basis to collaborate with any of these organizations. For instance, DFAIT participates in the Counter-Terrorism and Capacity Building Program (CTCBP) as part of their mandate to enable counter-terrorism through cooperation with other states. Designed to assist other states in developing counter-terrorism capabilities, this program includes the delivery of security, military and intelligence training,¹⁵² all areas where CANSOFCOM has degrees of expertise. Based on mutually compatible goals and competencies, or strategic fit, a strong argument could potentially be made for interagency collaboration in this case.

Conversely, CANSOFCOM would also need to consider the impact of differences with DFAIT based on dissimilar organizational cultures, structures and processes.¹⁵³ In this case, CANSOFCOM could assess that differences in cultural and structural fit would make collaboration problematic. Although this assessment of fit would not necessarily lead to the conclusion that a collaborative venture with DFAIT was undesirable, it would almost certainly inform CANSOFCOM about the requirement for additional structural, procedural or other mechanisms designed to facilitate successful collaboration. Similar assessments could likewise be done for the PCO, PSC, the RCMP and CSIS. Based on

¹⁵² Foreign Affairs, “Counter-Terrorism and Capacity Building Assistance,” *Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada*, accessed 6 March 2013, <http://www.international.gc.ca/crime/ctcb-rcat.aspx?lang=eng&view=d>.

¹⁵³ Michael H. Thomson et al. document how DFAIT differs from the CF in being a policy driven organization vice a planning driven organization. This results in both structural and cultural differences between DFAIT and the CF in approaches to problems and can act as a potential barrier to interagency collaboration. See Michael H. Thomson et al., *Canadian Forces Education and Training for Interagency Operational Contexts*, (Ottawa: Her Majesty The Queen in Right of Canada, 2010), 63 – 64.

this analysis, the next step would be to assess what type of collaborative relationship would be required with each of these organizations.

Interagency theory would suggest that the first consideration in determining appropriate collaborative relationships between CANSOFCOM and other agencies would be to clearly define terms such as coordination, cooperation and collaboration.¹⁵⁴ Of course, this determination can only happen after consideration has been given to the basis for collaborating. In some cases, such as providing military trainers in support of the CTCBP, low-level coordination may be sufficient.¹⁵⁵ However, in more complex and enduring scenarios, a semi-permanent organization designed to promote full interagency collaboration might be more appropriate.¹⁵⁶ In essence, each individual issue should drive the appropriate degree of integration. Further, the more complex and enduring the issue, the greater the likelihood that a fully collaborative organization would best be able to manage an interagency response. From an Allied perspective, the case of JIATF-South would be a good demonstration of this point.¹⁵⁷ While Canada unfortunately does not have a similar organization, an illustrative example could be derived from the issue of human trafficking.

¹⁵⁴ Kaiser, *Interagency Collaborative Arrangements*. . . , 3.

¹⁵⁵ Coordination in this sense is defined based on terminology used in Chapter 2. Specifically, coordination is defined as the joint delivery of services or events between different groups.

¹⁵⁶ As above, collaboration in this case consists of separate organizations relinquishing a degree of control and authority to create a somewhat unified structure designed to accomplish a shared goal.

¹⁵⁷ JIATF-South is composed of four branches of the US military, nine US agencies and includes the participation of eleven other nations. The mission of JIATF-South is to conduct counter-drug operations in support of the security of the US and partner nations and the organization is generally hailed as the gold standard example of interagency operations. See Evan Munsing and Christopher J. Lamb, *Joint Interagency Task Force – South: The Best Known, Least Understood Interagency Success*, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2011), 1-5, and also, Department of Defense, *Joint Interagency Task Force – South*, accessed 27 March 2013, <http://www.jiatfs.southcom.mil/index.aspx>.

In 2012, the Government of Canada released a *National Action Plan to Combat Human Trafficking*. As human trafficking is a crime, agencies such as the RCMP, CIC and CBSA are generally identified as lead organizations. Nonetheless, there is an intelligence collection aspect to human trafficking as identified in the strategy.¹⁵⁸ With the interconnectedness of threats in the contemporary operating environment, human trafficking can also be linked to terrorism.¹⁵⁹ In addition, these threats to Canada may originate in countries that do not have fully functioning rule of law institutions. As presented, this scenario has important considerations for how participating organizations will accomplish their mandates.

In fulfilling its mandate as Canada's national police service, the RCMP normally operates in a generally permissive domestic environment. Based on the necessity for a domestic focus, it could reasonably be assumed that the RCMP may not have an equally effective ability to conduct tasks in a less-than-permissive foreign environment. Taken with the human trafficking case described above, CANSOFCOM could potentially be used as an intelligence collection tool to augment investigations which originate extra-territorially. In this scenario, a standing organization may be required depending on the enduring nature of the threat. One of the considerations that would probably emerge from

¹⁵⁸ Public Safety, *National Action Plan to Combat Human Trafficking* (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2012), 17 – 18.

¹⁵⁹ The case of the MV Sun Sea provides a good example. The MV Sun Sea was a smuggling vessel that originated in Thailand and carried approximately 500 Tamil refugees to Canada's west coast in 2010. The vessel was linked to the Tamil Tigers, leading to the overturning of some refugee claims. See Stewart Bell, "Court overturns asylum claims of two MV Sun Sea passengers after refugee board 'misinterprets the law'," *National Post*, 27 February 2013, accessed 6 March 2013, <http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/02/26/court-overturns-asylum-claims-of-two-mv-sun-sea-passengers-after-refugee-board-misinterprets-the-law/>.

this discussion would be the governance and control mechanisms used to task this organization

Centralized leadership, or designation of lead agency status, is often the preferred method of structuring for interagency operations as it generally facilitates both timely decision-making, as well as accountability.¹⁶⁰ At the same time, lead agency status for a non-CF organization may prove problematic for CANSOFCOM given the normal requirement for the CDS to retain command of CF elements. However, by retaining command the CDS may inadvertently be slowing decision times by increasing the layers of command. Fortunately, there are some provisions in Canadian law that can enable efficient decision making by non-CF organizations in charge of CF assets, such as the secondment process.¹⁶¹

Although the seconding of personnel is an established and viable process that would facilitate both decision-making and accountability, it is important to note that this mechanism is aimed at addressing temporary operational needs. In the case of more enduring issues, other structural mechanisms may be needed. For example, the establishment of the ATF in PCO has been hailed as a major milestone for improving interagency coordination for the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan.¹⁶² Conceivably, a similar organization for an enduring threat could be created in PCO again, perhaps

¹⁶⁰ Government Accountability Office. *Managing for Results*. . . , 15 – 16.

¹⁶¹ The Treasury Board of Canada defines a secondment as a, "...temporary move of an employee to another department or agency in the core public administration and other organizations for which the Treasury Board is the Employer." Secondments are designed to facilitate lateral inter-departmental movement to address temporary operational needs or for professional development. With this in mind, seconding personnel from a supporting department to a lead agency would be a feasible way of creating an interagency organization to meet a temporary operational need. At the same time, secondment status may not be appropriate for more enduring organizations, nor for time sensitive requirements. See Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, "Secondment / Assignment," *Treasury Board of Canada*, accessed 27 March 2013, <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/faq/seas-eng.asp>.

¹⁶² Gammer, "Integrating Civilian Military Operations . . .," 10 – 11.

leveraging the unique role of the NSA to provide strategic level guidance. Conversely, changes to legislation could perhaps be examined, such as adapting the secondment process for enduring operational needs. In any case, depending on the organization selected, the next step for CANSOFCOM to consider would be the accountability mechanisms that would enable oversight.

As above, the appropriate accountability mechanisms would be dependent on the degree of integration, with simple cooperation likely requiring no or marginal additional changes to existing oversight. With respect to fully integrated interagency collaboration, there would likely be a requirement for significant changes. Primarily, this is because the Canadian system currently has no individual organization mandated or able to oversee the broader security and intelligence community, with the exception of the executive branch of the government.¹⁶³ Nonetheless, there are a number of both existing and untried accountability mechanisms that could potentially be adapted or modified.

A sampling of existing accountability mechanisms that could possibly be revised range from Senate Committees and ad hoc forums to arms-length review bodies such as the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) Commissioner. As well, other central actors such as the PCO could also possibly play a role based on their existing mandates.¹⁶⁴ For instance, the responsibilities of the NSA could be expanded to include an oversight function in areas where multiple organizations are collaboratively acting in

¹⁶³ In considering the broader role that Parliament itself might play, it is important to remember that even this may arguably not be effective. As political scientists Reg Whitaker and Stuart Farson have suggested, the general organizational culture of Parliament is largely ambivalent with respect to the scrutiny of intelligence and security activities, which undoubtedly would have a corresponding degree of influence in how the executive branch approaches this issue. See Whitaker and Farson, "Accountability in and for National Security," 37.

¹⁶⁴ Lagasse, "Accountability for National Defence. . .," 51.

the security sector. This aside, it should almost certainly be assumed that implementing a statutory level change in accountability and oversight would preclude the timely enabling of a truly collaborative interagency organization, which may limit the scope of integration possible in short term ventures. Either way, CANSOFCOM should carefully consider the implementation of appropriate accountability mechanisms, particularly as they inform the development of roles and responsibilities with partner organizations.

Empirically, there are numerous examples regarding the importance of developing joint strategies with mutually agreed and clearly defined roles and responsibilities. Regarding the former, the experiences of US SOUTHCOM provides an illustrative example of how this could be done, such as soliciting feedback from interagency partners in the development of SOUTHCOM's command strategy.¹⁶⁵ There are multiple methods to accomplish this, such as simply coordinating inputs, to arranging collaborative conferences where the strategy is developed jointly. At the same time, not only is the process of strategy development important, but the mission and goals need to be clearly articulated. In this case, JIATF-South again provides an excellent example through a distinctly understood sense of purpose that defines specific goals and makes it clear to each participating organization what they are trying to accomplish.¹⁶⁶

This point becomes better understood through a closer examination of JIATF-South's mission statement and how it is understood by participating organizations.

¹⁶⁵ Government Accountability Office, *Defense Management: U.S. Southern Command Demonstrates Interagency Collaboration, but Its Haiti Disaster Response Revealed Challenges Conducting a Large Military Operations*, GAO-10-801, (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2010), 8.

¹⁶⁶ Richard M. Yeatman, "JAITF-South: Blueprint for Success," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Issue 42 (July 2006): 26.

Specifically:

JIATF-South conducts interagency and international Detection & Monitoring operations, and facilitates the interdiction of illicit trafficking and other narco-terrorist threats in support of national and partner nation security.¹⁶⁷

At face value, this mission statement may seem to add little value with respect to delineating roles and responsibilities for the partner departments and agencies. In fact, there was indeed a tendency to primarily focus on the military aspects of the mission during the initial years of JIATF-South operations.¹⁶⁸ However, when JIATF-South leadership re-conceptualized the problem from start to finish, the organization was able to incorporate the capabilities of all participants in a fashion where everyone clearly understood their distinct roles. JIATF-South was subsequently able to adjust its operations so that military operations transitioned smoothly to law enforcement activities and vice versa. This example illustrates the importance of identifying a legitimate basis for collaboration and clearly defining an interagency sense of purpose as a means to inform the development of roles and responsibilities for each participating partner.

One of the second-order benefits in defining agency roles and responsibilities is that this will assist in overcoming challenges from resource asymmetry, interagency cultural differences and potential turf battles.¹⁶⁹ For example, one of the logical deductions from Bardach's craftsmanship theory is that the ability to conduct interagency activities is a capability in the sense that it requires funding and resourcing. Ideally,

¹⁶⁷ Department of Defense, *Joint Interagency Task Force – South*, accessed 27 March 2013, <http://www.jiatfs.southcom.mil/index.aspx>.

¹⁶⁸ Munsing and Lamb, *Joint Interagency Task Force – South . . .*, 34.

¹⁶⁹ Marcella, "Understanding the Interagency Process. . .," 36 - 37.

additional funding would be allocated to departments and agencies to develop an interagency capacity, however, that is likely unrealistic in Canada's current fiscally constrained environment. As such, organizations will by necessity likely need to fund the development of an interagency capacity by prioritizing their existing budgetary allocations.¹⁷⁰

The result of this current constraint is that relatively smaller and less resourced departments may be leery of participating in collaborative ventures. This wariness toward collaboration would stem first from having to divert funds from other priorities, but also from concern over being a secondary partner to a better resourced organizational partner. In particular, where roles and responsibilities are undefined, smaller departments may be concerned about losing control to a relatively larger partner. Conversely, if all the contributing partners know their boundaries, as well as the boundaries of other partners, they should theoretically be less worried about competition and loss of internal control. In addition, the definition of roles and responsibilities should also serve to enable accountability mechanisms, which actually reinforces the checks and balances within a democratic system.¹⁷¹ By providing clearly defined roles, it will be easier to incorporate

¹⁷⁰ While DND has recently undergone significant budgetary reductions, it remains true that DND still accounts for the largest portion of federal government spending relative to any other department. Illustratively, in Fiscal Year 2011 – 2012, DND composed 8.4% of all government expenses whereas all other departments and agencies combined accounted for only 18.3% of total government expenses. See Finance Canada, "Annual Financial Report of the Government of Canada Fiscal Year 2011–2012," *Department of Finance Canada*, accessed 27 March 2013, <http://www.fin.gc.ca/afr-rfa/2012/report-rapport-eng.asp#toc336524257>. As such, DND would likely be asked to shoulder the financial burden of any interagency endeavour. Again, in the current fiscal environment, this fact may preclude the development of a true interagency capability in either CANSOFCOM or the broader CF unless resource managers are willing to divert funds away from other priorities.

¹⁷¹ Anthony L. Webber, "Interagency Coordination and Effectiveness: Employing the JIATF Model" (Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy Paper, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, 2011), 43.

existing accountability mechanisms generally designed to provide oversight over constituent activities.

With respect to illustrative roles for CANSOFCOM as an interagency partner, this project is unfortunately unable to recommend specific roles as they will undoubtedly be case dependent and subject to individual circumstances. However, some of the roles that CANSOFCOM could assume include augmenting national intelligence collection efforts through a variety of surveillance and reconnaissance activities, or enabling international security efforts by delivering military assistance and training to select partners. CANSOFCOM could also provide protected and secure command and control infrastructure, or even simple force protection, to interagency organizations working in non-permissive or austere environments. Just as in the JIATF-South example, these tasks and responsibilities have the potential to be clearly bounded and defined against the roles of other departments and agencies.

Importantly, none of the foregoing is intended to suggest that CANSOFCOM is not currently conducting some or all of these activities to some degree.¹⁷² Rather, these case dependent roles should simply reinforce that as part of preparing to work in an enduring fashion in the interagency environment, it is vital that the aims, roles and responsibilities of CANSOFCOM *vis a vis* other participating organizations be clearly expressed. To enable this, CANSOFCOM leadership will play a vital role.

¹⁷² All of the activities mentioned can be found or easily deduced from CANSOFCOM's own unclassified overview publication. See National Defence, *Canadian Special Operations Forces Command* . . ., 9.

Leadership is critical as a driver of collaboration, particularly in initiating the process and in the allocation of resources.¹⁷³ Additionally, the behavior of leaders will set the appropriate organizational tone regarding the importance of collaboration.

Illustratively, the leadership of US SOUTHCOM has demonstrated a sustained commitment to developing collaboration that has been extremely successful in building trust, establishing communications and ensuring interagency transparency.¹⁷⁴

Elements of SOUTHCOM's interagency commitment have manifested themselves through a willingness to organizationally change so as to facilitate collaboration, such as the establishment of a directorate tasked with improving collaboration.¹⁷⁵ Further, multiple studies have demonstrated that interagency trust is a function of time, effort, energy and commitment. For instance, commitment might be exemplified through implementing a policy of slower personnel turnover so that critical interagency relationships can be nurtured.¹⁷⁶

In the CF context, a high personnel turnover could be argued to approach part of the institutional culture. As such, implementing policies that run against this trend will require strong leadership to implement and subsequently incentivize. For CANSOFCOM, many of the measures that will enable interagency collaboration will likely initially cause friction within the organization. To succeed in the interagency environment,

¹⁷³ Emerson et al., "An Integrative Framework. . .," 9.

¹⁷⁴ Government Accountability Office, *Defense Management. . .*, 19.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 14.

¹⁷⁶ Gajda, "Utilizing Collaboration Theory. . .," 69. The analogy of Sisyphus works well in describing the effect of high personnel turnover on the development of interagency relationships. Whereas Sisyphus pushed a rock up a hill every day only to have it fall to the bottom every night, high personnel turnover would be akin to changing the person pushing the rock (or developing the interagency relationship) before making it to the top of the hill (or prior to achieving interagency trust), leading to the same pattern of futility.

CANSOFCOM leadership will need a requisite degree of buy-in and commitment to implement these measures. An additional item for CANSOFCOM leaders to consider will be how to best organize for the interagency environment.

ORGANIZING FOR THE INTERAGENCY ENVIRONMENT

The previous section demonstrated that planning to work in the Canadian interagency security environment will be highly issue dependent for CANSOFCOM. However, from an organizational standpoint there remain numerous measures that CANSOFCOM can proactively pursue to both prepare for and subsequently use to successfully operate in an interagency context. In particular, the development and use of both formal and informal organizational structures will go a long way to ensuring CANSOFCOM is ready to work in a collaborative manner. Further, the careful consideration of enabling structures, such as collaborative decision making processes and organizational learning, will further CANSOFCOM's collaborative capacity. This section will begin by examining some of the formal structures that CANSOFCOM could consider in organizing for the interagency environment.

In addition to normative interagency theory, empirical lessons from the American interagency experience would suggest that there are four broad organizational models that CANSOFCOM could use to organize for collaborative operations. In brief, these models include integrated interagency task forces lead by the department most appropriate to the mission, non-DoD-lead task forces, DoD-lead task forces and parallel structures. Using evaluative criteria from past interagency experiences, American military analysis demonstrated that the interagency task force model was the most robust

of the four.¹⁷⁷ Given aforementioned accountability issues in the Canadian context, a JIATF model may be especially appropriate if organized to support all participating departments equally.¹⁷⁸ Consequently, although the other models cannot be discounted, CANSOFCOM should consider mechanisms that would facilitate interagency task force models. One measure that achieves this is simply embedding personnel within the existing structure.

Embedding interagency personnel within the existing CANSOFCOM organizational structure is a simple way to increase collaborative capacity, however, care must be taken to ensure unexpected negative effects do not occur. For example, lessons from US AFRICOM show that interagency personnel are often employed in areas unrelated to their expertise.¹⁷⁹ As a best practice, interagency personnel are ideally employed in areas that both capitalize on their skills and links to their parent organization, while also empowering them in the gaining organization.

One measure that would ensure interagency personnel were employed in key positions would be to consider employing them in critical leadership positions within CANSOFCOM. This measure is in practice in other commands, such as the existence of civilian deputy commanders in each of US SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM, and greatly

¹⁷⁷ Robert S. Pope, "Interagency Task Forces: The Right Tools for the Job," *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 5, no. 2 (Summer 2011): 134 – 138. As this study is one of the first to qualitatively compare different organizational models, the criteria used to evaluate the differing structures were unfortunately not universally recognized as appropriate. Therefore, while the study is useful, it must be noted that the criteria and evaluation scheme used were admittedly qualitative and subjective to a certain degree. Unfortunately, with the current state of interagency theory, the establishment of evaluation schemes for organizational structures in the interagency environment remains an area for future study.

¹⁷⁸ H. Steven Blum and Kerry McIntyre, *Enabling Unity of Effort in Homeland Response Operations* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, April 2012), 25.

¹⁷⁹ Government Accountability Office, *National Security: Interagency Collaboration Practices*. . . , 12.

facilitates interagency collaboration.¹⁸⁰ By having personnel from other departments in leadership positions, CANSOFCOM would go a long way to demonstrating a commitment to collaboration and setting a facilitative command environment. This could also be accomplished through limited organizational changes.

Even without the presence of a permanent interagency task force, one organizational change that CANSOFCOM could make would be to develop internal personnel tasked solely with enabling interagency collaboration. For instance, US SOUTHCOM created a Partnering Directorate dedicated to improving collaboration with both Other Government Agencies (OGAs) and NGOs.¹⁸¹ While CANSOFCOM should not necessarily consider dedicating an entire directorate to enabling collaboration at this juncture, the identification of even a few permanent positions would likely accomplish similar effects at this stage.

By institutionalizing collaboration and a means to promote it, CANSOFCOM would also greatly address some of the negative effects that come from relying on informal networks. Specifically, the loss of informal networks due to turnover would be mitigated if the overall mechanism was institutionalized. In addition, by implementing a complementary formal structure, CANSOFCOM would likely increase the overall reliability of interagency networks while introducing a mechanism for accountability.¹⁸² CANSOFCOM could potentially also complement organizational mechanisms with technical mechanisms by providing the supporting Command and Control (C2) architecture for initial collaborative ventures. Of course, this would have to be tempered

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 10.

¹⁸¹ Government Accountability Office, *Defense Management*. . . , 14.

¹⁸² Whelan, *Networks and National Security*, 124.

with the understanding that it may not always be appropriate to use CF assets as the operational backbone and that the establishment of mission specific operations centres would be case dependent. At the same time, any of these changes in organizational structure should be augmented with amendments to enabling structures.

An important supporting structure that empowers interagency collaboration is information sharing, which is made more difficult within a national security context. Indeed, those national security agencies that collect and analyze intelligence have typically developed organizational cultures that emphasize the protection of information as opposed to the sharing of information.¹⁸³ This may be a problem even between intelligence agencies and law enforcement agencies.¹⁸⁴ Importantly, in some cases an agency's fears about the ability of other agencies to protect information are proven valid. Given the sensitivity of national security information, and the ever present concern that it will be used incorrectly, this understandably leads to reluctance for some agencies to share information.¹⁸⁵

Unfortunately, in efforts to ensure that information is protected, national security organizations often implement measures that impede collaboration. For instance, inconsistent policies or application of security clearances can have significantly negative second-order effects. Fortunately, there are a number of simple mechanisms to address information sharing which CANSOFCOM can implement, if it is not already doing so.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, 23.

¹⁸⁴ In Canada's case, the creation of CSIS occurred following the McDonald Commission and a recognition of the frictions involved between intelligence and police work. See Canadian Security Intelligence Service, "History of CSIS," *Canadian Security Intelligence Service*, accessed 11 March 2013, <http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/hstrtfcts/hstr/brfcssndx-eng.asp>.

¹⁸⁵ Government Accountability Office, *Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight*. . ., 46 – 47.

Improving information sharing in the national security context encompasses both policy and technological considerations. From a policy perspective, there is a requirement to establish clear rules and procedures governing the interagency communication of information and how it will be protected.¹⁸⁶ If CANSOFCOM is not already participating in developing these policies, then it would be recommended to do so given the possibility of affecting broader change. For instance, the development of policy will assist in enabling different network typologies, such as a hub-and-spoke model or an all-channels model.¹⁸⁷ Depending on which typology CANSOFCOM prefers, it could assist in shaping policy to enable that model.

From a technology perspective, there are numerous actions that can be taken, such as creating compatible databases, developing automated tools and investing in information management (IM).¹⁸⁸ Similarly, the technological infrastructure to support information sharing could be organized around the management of rights as opposed to the traditional method of access management.¹⁸⁹ In any case, CANSOFCOM should be an active participant in promoting both policy and technological solutions to interagency information sharing, especially given the impact these systems have on interagency decision-making.

There are a number of potential difficulties regarding decision making in an interagency environment that need to be managed for collaboration to be successful. For

¹⁸⁶ Government Accountability Office, *National Security: Key Challenges*. . . , 16.

¹⁸⁷ Whelan, *Networks and National Security*, 44.

¹⁸⁸ Government Accountability Office, *Defense Management*. . . , 17.

¹⁸⁹ In brief, access management is the conventional method of managing information sharing in terms of approving or denying the access to a system in its totality. Conversely, rights management would involve allowing all agencies to access a system, but with differing degrees of access within the system based on the degree of security classification. See Whelan, *Networks and National Security*, 113.

instance, in many collaborative ventures there is often no decisive authority, leading to paralyzing indecision and subsequent disenchantment amongst participating organizations.¹⁹⁰ While decision by consensus is a broadly recognized principle of collaboration, organizations which are not committed to the interagency partnership may exploit this aspect to undermine actions they do not support.¹⁹¹ In addition, organizational differences regarding decision-making processes and risk acceptance in general may become problematic and a source of disagreement between organizations.

These potential pitfalls of interagency decision-making are particularly concerning in the conduct of special operations based on the probability of employment in politically sensitive, ambiguous and asymmetric environments. Successful special operations in these environments are generally characterized by limited tactical windows of opportunity, which makes it important for SOF to be supported by a chain of command that is flexible, agile and capable of making timely decisions.¹⁹² Unfortunately, when differences in organizational culture regarding decision-making and risk occur, combined with the possibility of an unclear decision-making authority, it is feasible that this support may not exist. Understandably, the importance of decision-making in an interagency context is widely recognized, and there are several theoretical solutions that may assist in bridging this gap.

Retired military officer and executive strategist Edward A. Smith has suggested that an Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) may provide answers to

¹⁹⁰ Marcella, "Understanding the Interagency Process. . .," 37.

¹⁹¹ Gail Funke, "Leading for Team Success," in *The Trusted Leader: Building Relationships That Make Government Work*, 2nd Edition, ed. Terry Newell, Grant Reeher and Peter Ronayne (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2012), 160.

¹⁹² Department of Defence, *Joint Publication 3-05: Special Operations*, III-1.

interagency decision-making. Recognizing the complexity of the contemporary operating environment, Smith uses a living systems model to conceptualize the security environment as being composed of interacting complex adaptive systems.¹⁹³ In Smith's view, bounding the complex problems presented by current threats requires a network-enabled and human-centric model that bridges organizational cultures to create shared awareness. At the same time, any system must carefully balance centralized control to maintain unity of effort against the decentralization needed for making agile and timely decisions.¹⁹⁴

Smith's work is complemented by the work of military researchers David Alberts and Richard Hayes on network-centric warfare (NCW). As part of their argument, Alberts and Hayes suggest that the current Information Age will require militaries to evolve past traditional hierarchical organizations as these models actually undermine collaboration by impeding information sharing.¹⁹⁵ Instead, so-called "edge" organizations would be empowered by information technology to be "flatter,"¹⁹⁶ and more effective through the decentralization of decision rights to the lowest levels.¹⁹⁷ Unfortunately,

¹⁹³ The specific model referenced by Smith is James Grier Millier's Living Systems Model composed of eight levels from individual cells to supranational systems. Each higher level constitutes all the sub-systems of the levels below it, all of which undergo ongoing interaction with the external environment, which significantly increases complexity towards the top of the model. See Edward A. Smith, *Complexity, Networking, & Effects-Based Approaches to Operations* (Washington, D.C.: CCRP Publications, 2006), 45 – 46.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 297 – 298.

¹⁹⁵ David S. Alberts and Richard E. Hayes, *Power to the Edge: Command...Control...in the Information Age* (Washington, D.C.: CCRP Publications, 2004), 64.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 176.

¹⁹⁷ David S. Alberts and Richard E. Hayes, *Understanding Command and Control* (Washington, D.C.: CCRP Publications, 2006), 84. This summary of both Smith's model and NCW does a gross injustice to the depth of research available in these areas, however, it is beyond the scope of this project to review the application of NCW in an interagency context. Readers interested in more information on this subject are encouraged to read Steve Hunter, "Breaching the Barriers: A Comprehensive Approach to Special Operations Decision Making in Non-Traditional Security Environments," (Masters in Defence Studies Paper, Canadian Forces College, 2012), 48 – 59.

despite touching on how to enable effective interagency decision-making, these works do not generally provide practical organizational solutions, although the experiences of some existing interagency organizations do offer some empirical best practices.

JlATF-South is again a great example as the organization invests enormous effort into its decision-making framework. As a general rule, JlATF-South employs consensual decision-making with a view to leveraging the diverse agency viewpoints. This framework produces a longer decision time frame, but has the added benefit of generally producing better solutions while maintaining interagency support.¹⁹⁸

While a consensual framework may work well when time is a luxury, such as at the strategic and operational levels, JlATF-South implements a directive decision-making framework at the tactical level. In this case, the senior person issues orders regardless of agency affiliation and objections are adjudicated by responsible directors.¹⁹⁹ While this arrangement unfortunately does not present CANSOFCOM with a magic solution, it does offer some key guidelines. First, decision-makers should strive for consensus and revert to directive decision-making only if the tactical situation warrants rapid response. Second, for those situations requiring rapid decisions, participating agencies should develop mutually agreed policies that clearly express who has the authority to make what kind of decisions. Ideally, these decisions will be authorized at the lowest possible level, thereby enabling organizational agility. This may correspond to a flatter organization than what would typically be the norm for military organizations. Lastly, an easily understandable dissent option must be enacted that will allow all partners to voice their

¹⁹⁸ Munsing and Lamb, *Joint Interagency Task Force – South*. . . , 50 – 52.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 51.

concerns, while not detracting from the necessity to make timely decisions. In this manner, CANSOFCOM may be able enact both the normative theory of academics such as Smith, Alberts and Hayes, with the proven experiences of organizations like JIATF-South.

CANSOFCOM could also examine processes that enable organizational learning. Organizational learning is arguably just as important inter-organizationally as intra-organizationally and CANSOFCOM should actively promote a capability in this area. Importantly, the resourcing of interagency organizational learning is a demonstrable commitment to developing a relationship with organizational partners. Just as important, however, is the impact on operational effectiveness as common terminology, practices and procedures are derived.²⁰⁰ Unfortunately, many of these lessons come through informal networks and connections. If formal mechanisms are not implemented to institutionalize both the experience itself, as well as the associated change if required, then organizations will find themselves repeatedly learning the same lesson.²⁰¹

Consequently, CANSOFCOM should consider formalizing the responsibility to capture inter-agency lessons learned, collaboratively analyze observations and recommendations, and suggest changes to improve the process. For instance, should CANSOFCOM create a partnering directorate, this responsibility could rest with those personnel in that cell. Of course, hand-in-hand with developing organizational learning is implementing appropriate assessment mechanisms to determine if the process of collaboration is actually working.

²⁰⁰ Government Accountability Office. *Managing for Results*. . . , 14.

²⁰¹ Government Accountability Office, *National Security*. . . , 10.

Level of Integration	Purpose	Strategies and Tasks	Leadership and Decision-Making	Interpersonal and Communication
Networking 1	Create a web of communication Identify and create a base of support Explore interests	Loose or no structure Flexible, roles not-defined Few if any defined tasks	Non-hierarchical Flexible Minimal or no group decision making	Very little interpersonal conflict Communication among all members infrequent or absent
Cooperating 2	Work together to ensure tasks are done Leverage or raise money Identify mutual needs, but maintain separate identities	Member links are advisory Minimal structure Some strategies and tasks identified	Non-hierarchical, decisions tend to be low stakes Facilitative leaders, usually voluntary Several people form "go-to" hub	Some degree of personal commitment and investment Minimal interpersonal conflict Communication among members clear, but may be informal
Partnering 3	Share resources to address common issues Organizations remain autonomous but support something new To reach mutual goals together	Strategies and tasks are developed and maintained Central body of people Central body of people have specific tasks	Autonomous leadership Alliance members share equally in the decision making Decision making mechanism are in place	Some interpersonal conflict Communication system and formal information channels developed Evidence of problem solving and productivity
Merging 4	Merge resources to create or support something new Extract money from existing systems/members Commitment for a long period of time to achieve short and long-term outcomes	Formal structure to support strategies and tasks is apparent Specific and complex strategies and tasks identified Committees and sub-committees formed High	Strong, visible leadership Sharing and delegation of roles and responsibilities Leadership capitalizes upon diversity and organizational strengths	High degree of commitment and investment Possibility of interpersonal conflict high Communication is clear, frequent and prioritized degree of problem solving and productivity
Unifying 5	Unification or acquisition to form a single structure Relinquishment of autonomy to support surviving organization	Highly formal, legally complex Permanent re-organization of strategies and tasks	Central, typically hierarchical leadership Leadership capitalizes upon diversity and organizational strengths	Possibility of interpersonal conflict very high Communication is clear, frequent, prioritized, formal and informal

Figure 4 - Strategic Alliance Formative Assessment Rubric (SAFAR)

Source: Gajda, "Utilizing Collaboration Theory . . .," 71.

Unfortunately, the assessment of interagency collaboration is admittedly difficult

and remains an area where much more research is required.²⁰² Although some models have been developed, such as the Strategic Alliance Formative Assessment Rubric (SAFAR) found in Figure 4, in general these assessments tend to assess whether the desired degree of collaboration has been achieved as opposed to how efficiently the objective of collaboration is actually being met.²⁰³

Notwithstanding, the important thing for CANSOFCOM to consider in this case would be to simply develop and implement an assessment mechanism, understanding that it will likely need to be amended as any collaborative relationship matures. In combination with other measures designed to organize for the interagency environment, CANSOFCOM should be able to set the conditions for collaborative success. However, one final element remains to fully prepare for interagency operations, which is training personnel to work in the interagency environment.

DEVELOPING PERSONNEL FOR INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS

Just as CANSOFCOM must consider what organizational mechanisms it can implement to develop collaborative capacity, so too must it assess what skills its personnel must possess in order to best succeed in an interagency environment. This skills assessment should ideally be part of developing an overall personnel development strategy geared toward interagency success. Subsequently, CANSOFCOM can implement measures in training, education and experience to improve the collaborative capacity of its workforce. Similar to organizational measures, some personnel

²⁰² Kaiser, *Interagency Collaborative Arrangements*. . . , 28.

²⁰³ Duggan and Corrigan, "A Literature Review of Inter-Agency Work . . .," 14.

development measures will require greater degrees of commitment and resources. Consequently, any personnel strategy should first consider the overarching strategy.

A primary part of any interagency development strategy would be to first determine what workforce characteristics CANSOFCOM needs to best accomplish interagency operations.²⁰⁴ In this regard, there is a wealth of research that documents beneficial skills for working in an interagency environment. For instance, in analyzing CF training requirements for interagency operations, a group of Canadian defence researchers identified broad categories of soft skills in cultural awareness, communication, teamwork and social awareness.²⁰⁵

In addition, CANSOFCOM may be able to identify needs for additional skills in response to changes in the operating environment. One example of this might be the convergence in law enforcement and military operations as personified through employment of biometric technology and evidence collection.²⁰⁶ Having identified the required skills, CANSOFCOM could proceed to selecting appropriate methodologies to develop these skills.

Similar to the tension between the trait theory of leadership and other theories, there remains a level of professional debate as to whether so-called soft collaborative skills can realistically be trained, or if individuals are simply predisposed to do better at certain skills. Recognizing that some people do possess traits that appear to serve them better in an interagency environment, an initial interagency personnel development

²⁰⁴ Spirtas et al., *Department of Defense Training* . . . , 45.

²⁰⁵ Thomson et al., *Canadian Forces Education and Training*. . . , 48 – 56.

²⁰⁶ John B. Alexander, *Convergence: Special Operations Forces and Civilian Law Enforcement* (MacDill AFB: Joint Special Operations University, July 2010), 79.

methodology may simply involve the judicious selection of people until the training and education system can meet demand. With respect to skill development, there is also ongoing academic discussion regarding whether more emphasis should be placed on training responses proven to be effective in known scenarios, or on learning how to reasonably determine appropriate actions to unexpected situations.²⁰⁷ Unsurprisingly, the most enduring solution to developing interagency skills probably combines elements of training, education, and a degree of personnel selection, such as in the ‘Package Model’ advocated by Royal Military College of Canada (RMCC) Associate Professor Grazia Scoppio.²⁰⁸ With this in mind, this section will now look at specific initiatives that CANSOFCOM could pursue in the education, training and experience areas of personnel development.

From an educational perspective, one of the biggest skills that a collaborative workforce should possess and that can be learned is an understanding of cultural factors, such as how culture develops and how an organizational culture affects processes such as decision-making.²⁰⁹ This will serve as a foundation for understanding and developing proficiency in communication, particularly between organizations. Similarly, not only should personnel be proficient in communicating between different cultures, this skill

²⁰⁷ While conceptually very similar, the nuance between repetitive rehearsal of a known response to a known scenario versus developing the ability to critically deduce a reasonable response to an unknown scenario provides the differentiation between training and education in a personnel development strategy. See Emily Spencer, *Solving the People Puzzle: Cultural Intelligence and Special Operations Forces* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2010), 118.

²⁰⁸ The Package Model sees a mixture of learning soft skills combined with the development of inherent personality traits and is part of a wider life-long learning approach. See Grazia Scoppio and Robin Schock, *The Importance of Culture: Soft Skills for Inter-Agency, Complex Operations* (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2011), 68.

²⁰⁹ Spencer, *Solving the People Puzzle*. . ., 122.

should also be complemented with education in organizational behavior and important complementary processes such as strategic planning and decision-making.²¹⁰

Further, simply educating CANSOFCOM personnel in the Canadian interagency structure would better prepare personnel as to the roles and responsibilities of the different organizational actors. In addition to communication and cultural awareness skills, a workforce trained for interagency operations should also possess the simple ability to think critically.²¹¹ To develop this type of learning, there are a number of different options that could be incorporated into a personnel development strategy.

As a simple solution, in many cases the CF already has existing courses that could meet the needs of educating personnel in these skills. The RMCC, Canadian Forces College (CFC) and the Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC) offer a variety of academic and professional courses, some of which are specifically geared toward interagency proficiencies.²¹² As such, CANSOFCOM could theoretically just piggy-back off these existing courses with a minimum of time and resources expended.

With some additional effort, CANSOFCOM could potentially also adapt existing courses to better suit practical requirements. In either case, CANSOFCOM has the opportunity to leverage educational opportunities for more than just personnel development. For instance, CANSOFCOM could be instrumental in incorporating interagency partners into existing courses where possible, or promoting their participation for external courses. Although Canada is likely a long way away from an integrated national security agency education system as envisioned in the US, CANSOFCOM could

²¹⁰ Marcella, "Understanding the Interagency Process. . .," 43 – 44.

²¹¹ Scoppio and Schock, *The Importance of Culture. . .*, 66.

²¹² Thomson et al., *Canadian Forces Education and Training. . .*, 9, 49.

still take steps to promote this where feasible.²¹³ This could also include several initiatives under a training regime.

While many of the skills that enable success in an interagency environment are best developed through education, there is generally also a degree of training that can be used to refine proficiency. For instance, basic elements of cultural intelligence can be trained. In this case, there are many models that can assist in the learning process, such as applying Geer Hofstede's value dimensions model.²¹⁴ Similarly, many aspects of communication that are especially pertinent to interagency work lend themselves well to being trained and rehearsed. Being able to negotiate is a vital communication skill in achieving collaborative decisions, as is the simple ability to effectively communicate through differences in organizational languages.²¹⁵ These skills can all be trained to a certain degree and include many of the same options as are available for education opportunities.

Again, the CF already offers many existing training opportunities that can assist in developing these skills in CANSOFCOM personnel. As one example, the Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Courses offered through the PSTC include modules on negotiation theory, influence theory and employing influence techniques.²¹⁶ At two weeks long, the course is a reasonable amount of time for investing in skills applicable to the interagency.

²¹³ Dale, *National Security Professionals and Interagency Reform*. . . , 12.

²¹⁴ Spencer, *Solving the People Puzzle*. . . , 125.

²¹⁵ Marcella has coined the term 'bureaucratically bilingual' to refer to the ability to effectively communicate across differences in organizational languages and slang. See Marcella, "Understanding the Interagency Process. . .," 44.

²¹⁶ Thomson et al., *Canadian Forces Education and Training*. . . , 28.

For more effort, CANSOFCOM could invest in specialized training activities specifically designed to meet their needs. Notably, the CF has already initiated much research into training skills for interagency operations. This includes assessing which methods are likely to be more successful, such as through contextualized learning,²¹⁷ Red Teaming or adapting the successful practices of allies.²¹⁸ As a general principle for all training activities, CANSOFCOM should leverage available opportunities to have interagency partners train jointly with CANSOFCOM personnel. The last pillar of personnel development that CANSOFCOM should consider as part of an overall strategy is that of developing professional experience.

The benefits of obtaining professional experience in interagency operations are clear, and provide another way of cementing lessons learned through education and training. Practically, the main method through which professional experience is obtained is through job postings or rotations in interagency positions. Although recognized as an important component of any workforce development strategy, there are many examples of organizations undermining their efforts in this area. For instance, too high a turnover rate not only prevents the development of true professional knowledge, but it may also undermine the development of inter-organizational trust.²¹⁹

²¹⁷ Contextual learning occurs when trainees are able to adapt what they are learning to their own particular frame of reference. This will likely involve such activities as project-based learning, training out of the classroom and leveraging training opportunities that closely parallel real-world experiences. See The Center for Occupational Research and Development (CORD), “What is Contextual Learning?” *CORD.org*, accessed 12 March 2013, <http://www.cord.org/contextual-learning-definition/>.

²¹⁸ Red Teaming involves the training of critical thinking by viewing issues from the perspective of another organization or the adversary. As an example of a successful practice in use by allies, the US 10th Mountain Division has employed a Specialty Skills Initiative (SSI) that focuses on improving civil-military partnering activities prior to deployments. See Scoppio and Schock, *The Importance of Culture*. . ., 12 – 13.

²¹⁹ Hudson et al., “In Pursuit of Inter-Agency Collaboration. . .,” 250.

Similarly, individuals employed in interagency rotations often suffer negative career consequences due to the position being viewed as time out-of-trade.²²⁰ Examples such as these understandably lead many personnel to view interagency positions negatively, which may lead to difficulty in filling these positions with the appropriate personnel. This trend can ultimately lead to negative experiences with the partner organization, which only exacerbates the cycle. Fortunately, there are a number of best practices to implement in the development of interagency professional experience.

First and foremost, an organization's leadership must set the appropriate climate and use a corresponding methodology toward developing interagency experience. In a RAND study that examined US military training for interagency operations, four broad methodologies were identified. These included a leadership framework, competency framework, skill framework or an available person framework.²²¹

Each of the frameworks has advantages and disadvantage regarding their ability to develop collaborative capacity versus effects on individual careers. CANSOFCOM should assess how important developing professional experience is in its workforce and implement an appropriate framework accordingly. As a minimum, CANSOFCOM should still identify key personnel that would likely succeed in inter-agency rotations due to

²²⁰ Government Accountability Office, *Interagency Collaboration: State and Army Personnel Rotation Programs*. . . , 7.

²²¹ In brief, the leadership framework links interagency experience to promotion and career advancement. Ideally, serving in an interagency position is a prerequisite to subsequent command positions. A competency framework would aspire to developing a high degree of skill in a lesser number of people, who coincidentally would likely not advance as much in their careers. The skill framework involves rotating as many people as possible through interagency rotations to obtain broad collaborative capacity, but little depth. Lastly, the available person framework simply fills an empty position with whoever is available. For further information, see Spirtas et al., *Department of Defense Training*. . . , 47 – 48.

personal traits or existing experience.²²² In addition, CANSOFCOM should also consider implementing appropriate incentives to reward interagency rotations, as well as matching personnel to the needs of the host agency.²²³ Through these measures, in combination with education and training initiatives, CANSOFCOM will have all the constituent parts needed to develop a workforce for interagency operations.

CONCLUSION

For CANSOFCOM to set the best conditions for success as an interagency partner, it should apply a variety of best practices in preparing for, organizing for, and training its workforce for interagency operations. Arguably, the analysis involved in preparing for interagency operations is perhaps the most vital stage. By carefully considering and identifying a legitimate basis for inter-agency collaboration, CANSOFCOM would lay a solid foundation for the other components of developing collaborative capacity. This analysis would subsequently enable CANSOFCOM to identify what type of collaborative relationship is required, the role and responsibilities of participating agencies and the appropriate governance and accountability mechanisms for the relationship. Admittedly, this step will be issue dependent and may in itself limit the extent of interagency collaboration, however, it must be remembered that interagency collaboration is a means to an end, not an end in and of itself. Regardless, CANSOFCOM can still examine organizational and workforce issues that facilitate collaboration when it occurs.

²²² Hudson et al., “In Pursuit of Inter-Agency Collaboration. . .,” 251.

²²³ Government Accountability Office, *Interagency Collaboration: State and Army Personnel Rotation Programs*. . ., 9 – 12.

The practical experience of organizations such as JIATF-South and AFRICOM provide a large spectrum of organizational measures that CANSOFCOM could apply to increase its collaborative capacity. Although embedding interagency personnel at any level will increase collaboration, having those personnel fill key positions, such as the Deputy Commander position in both AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM, drastically increases participation and the development of trust. Similarly, tasking personnel with facilitating interagency collaboration would be an important enabler, although it must be balanced against limited resources and personnel. In any event, CANSOFCOM should be at the forefront of developing organizational enabling processes that facilitate interagency operations, such as in information sharing, decision-making and organizational learning. At the same time, CANSOFCOM can increase its internal collaborative capacity through innovative personnel development strategies.

Using a variety of education, training and professional development methods, CANSOFCOM has several options to choose from in improving the ability of its personnel to work in an interagency environment. With the CF having already invested research in this area, CANSOFCOM could even simply piggyback off existing courses and training opportunities offered through other institutions. Concurrently, a number of frameworks exist for CANSOFCOM to employ in obtaining professional experience for its workforce. Although some methodologies, such as the leadership framework, would likely require more commitment and cultural change, there remain a number of less extreme yet still practical solutions, like the development of appropriate incentives for interagency work. By applying these measures, in addition to preparing and organizing for the interagency environment, CANSOFCOM will be able to ensure that it has best

prepared to contribute to the national security system as a whole. When viewed against the likely trends in the contemporary operating environment, CANSOFCOM's efforts to develop an interagency capacity will go a long way to achieving W. Edwards Deming's win-win solution for all Canadians.

CONCLUSION

CANSOFCOM must, and does, continue to evolve and transform and develop those organizations, capabilities, and processes that will allow it to retain an advantage over those who seek to impose their will upon Canada or its allies.

Importantly, CANSOF must be positioned to perform demanding and specialized tasks in hostile, denied, and politically sensitive areas – alone or in conjunction with other government departments or its allies.

- D. Michael Day and Bernd Horn

Within the Canadian national security sector, CANSOFCOM has a legitimate mandate and role, as well as the potential to enhance the overall efficacy of Canada's national security system. Recognizing that the Canadian approach to national security is through comprehensive or interagency operations, CANSOFCOM can increase its capacity to succeed in this environment by evolving its ability to conduct collaborative operations with other agencies and departments. In essence, just as CANSOFCOM would plan, organize and train to operate in a variety of tactical environments, it must apply the same rigorous process to operating in the interagency security environment. As may be deduced from the epigraph which opens the conclusion, the impetus to evolve is not a nice-to-have, it is an operational imperative. Succeeding in enacting this process begins by understanding the interagency context of the contemporary operating environment which has evolved in response to complex threats.

Numerous analyses have studied the current and future security environment, resulting in broad agreement on several important trends. Undoubtedly, globalization will continue, symbiotically pushed by advances in communications technology, economics and changing geopolitics. Within this setting, threats that exploit gaps within the infrastructure of globalization will likely continue and will almost certainly need to be effectively addressed through a spectrum of correspondingly diverse conventional and

asymmetric capabilities.²²⁴ Although traditional threats such as inter-state conflict will remain residual dangers, the complex security problems presented by trans-national threats such as criminal organizations, terrorists and other non-state actors will continue to strain the customary jurisdictions of departments. This analysis would therefore suggest that evolving governmental approaches that promote interagency approaches to national security are a fixture of the operating environment for the foreseeable future.

The trend in Canada, as with many other Western democracies, has certainly reinforced this observation. Since the events of 9/11, Canada's approach to national security has evolved from an independent departmental approach to a 3D approach, to a WGA to operations, and most recently to a comprehensive approach to operations.²²⁵ With the progressive release of policy documents such as the FERP and *Building Resilience Against Terrorism*, the nuances and sophistication of Canada's interagency approach continue to be refined. Notably, this evolution of national security operations has empowered a variety of existing and new departments and agencies within the Canadian security sector. For CANSOFCOM to succeed in this interagency setting, it must understand these principal organizational actors in this environment.

Organizations such as the PCO, the CF, the RCMP and DFAIT clearly have had and will continue to have roles in promoting Canada's national security and the protection of Canadian interests. At the same time, this should not take away from the importance that relatively newer organizations such as PSC and CSIS possess within Canada's national security community. Composed variously of military members, law

²²⁴ National Defence, *The Future Security Environment 2008 – 2030*, 88.

²²⁵ Fitz-Gerald and Macnamara, "Comprehensive Security Requires Comprehensive Structures. . . ,

enforcement personnel, spies, and bureaucrats, these organizations all have differing organizational processes, cultures and even language.

At the same time, many characteristics of the current departmental system lend themselves well to preserving organizational boundaries, such as the concept of ministerial responsibility and accountability. Consequently, there are many challenges to that will potentially impede collaboration in this environment. With CANSOFCOM possessing the potential to enhance national security through collaboration with most, if not all, of these departments, an understanding of interagency collaboration theory is vital.

Despite the existence of interagency operations since at least the end of the Second World War, the overall state of collaboration theory has suffered from relatively little attention. Pioneers such as Eugene Bardach, with his craftsmanship theory, significantly advanced the general understanding within this academic field, however, even at this point there remains no comprehensive theory regarding interagency collaboration. Nonetheless, with the surging popularity of collaborative approaches to governmental operations, there has been an accompanying increase in both normative and empirical literature.

In addition, collaboration theory has been able to draw from complementary academic fields, such as strategic management and organizational behavior. As such, although much work remains to be done to fully understand how interagency collaboration works, there is common agreement on basic conceptual foundations. This body of work can constitute a foundation for understanding how CANSOFCOM should approach preparing to work in the interagency environment.

A key part of comprehending this academic foundation is grasping what collaboration entails at a basic level, including the different degrees of collaboration and the types of collaborative relationships that generally facilitate a desired level of partnership. This knowledge is critical for any collaborative organization so it can subsequently develop what it wants to achieve out of a collaborative venture and how to best proceed in the endeavor. Similarly, understanding why organizations choose to collaborate is important so as to determine whether a legitimate basis for collaboration actually exists.

Likewise, knowing basic theory regarding how collaborative relationships develop, such as through Tuckman's stages of group development, will enable an organization to assess whether it is meeting or diverging from its goals. As CANSOFCOM works to add value in the interagency environment, it should as a minimum understand these foundational concepts. From these, it is subsequently possible to negotiate some of the common obstacles to collaboration by enacting interagency best practices.

Successful interagency collaboration is difficult and examples of truly effective instance of collaboration, particularly in a national security setting, are few and far between. Jurisdictional rivalries, differing organizational cultures and tensions with competing priorities are simply a few examples of factors that can inhibit interagency collaboration.²²⁶ In addition, unclear mission statements, vaguely defined roles and

²²⁶ Kaiser, *Interagency Collaborative Arrangements*. . . , 25.

responsibilities, and poor communication can also present obstacles to organizational partnerships.²²⁷

Fortunately, for each one of these obstacles there is generally a corresponding best practice that in many cases has been normatively and empirically assessed. Although the lack of a comprehensive theory implies that practitioners may not fully understand why these best practices work, or how best to apply them in different contexts, the fact remains that these are not unsolvable problems. As such, there is a wealth of information and experience that can guide CANSOFCOM in preparing to work in the interagency environment.

The first step in preparing to undertake interagency operations is to plan for the environment. Specifically, this step entails assessing where there is a legitimate basis for CANSOFCOM to create a win-win collaborative relationship with other actors in the national security sector. Failure to identify this relationship mutually with other departments and agencies will likely impede the collaborative venture from the outset. If nothing else, by understanding the needs and goals of other interagency actors and how CANSOFCOM could potentially support in these areas, CANSOFCOM leadership will better appreciate what is realistically possible with respect to forming or enhancing a collaborative relationship.

In some cases, such as through practical considerations like maintaining accountability in a complex national security sector, CANSOFCOM may place internal limitations on what can be achieved through collaboration. Notably, the aim of planning

²²⁷ Government Accountability Office, *National Security: Key Challenges and Solutions* . . . , 5, 16.

for interagency operations should not simply be to enact collaboration as an ends, but to identify the means through which collaboration will assist CANSOFCOM and other actors in achieving the ends of promoting Canadian national security. In any event, even if an analysis should determine that no pressing basis for collaboration exists, there are still benefits in enacting several organizational steps to prepare for future collaborative ventures.

As a relatively simple method of developing a collaborative advantage, CANSOFCOM need only consider embedding personnel from interagency partners within its own organization. Indeed, it would be surprising if CANSOFCOM has not already enacted this measure. At the same time, as the experiences of organizations such as JIATF-South and AFRICOM demonstrate, greater commitment to organizational change should likely result in a greater collaborative advantage. Emplacing interagency personnel in key leadership positions within CANSOFCOM would potentially increase collaborative capacity in a measurable manner, in addition to helping establish interagency trust. Other organizational actions that CANSOFCOM could implement include forming a cell or directorate with the primary responsibility of facilitating interagency collaboration. In terms of enabling structures, CANSOFCOM could be at the forefront of devising methods to share information, make decisions and organizationally learn across departments and agencies. Lastly, there are also many actions that CANSOFCOM can take to develop its workforce for interagency operations.

No different to how CANSOFCOM develops personnel to succeed in tactical environments, the organization should possess a strategy regarding how to develop its personnel to succeed in interagency environments. As with organizational measures, a

spectrum of mechanisms exist to meet these aims, from relatively quick fix solutions to ones that will require greater commitment of time, people and resources. Notably, the CF has already begun research in developing interagency competency and there are many courses, research projects and initiatives that CANSOFCOM could leverage to develop its personnel. Other mechanisms, such as institutionalizing interagency experience within career progression, may have their appropriate place, although perhaps not at this juncture. This project does not suggest a solution one way or the other; the important thing is that CANSOFCOM analyze what level of collaborative capacity is needed within the organization and then subsequently enact steps to resource its capacity development appropriately. In this way, CANSOFCOM will have done everything possible to prepare for success in the interagency environment.

The world is a dangerous place and is expected to remain this way for the foreseeable future. Recognizing this characteristic of the contemporary operating environment, the leadership of CANSOFCOM has articulated the requirement for a continual evolution in order to add ongoing value to Canadian national security. As a former Commander and Deputy Commander of CANSOFCOM wrote in 2010:

In the end, as the global security environment continues to grow in ambiguity, complexity, chaos, and uncertainty, so also will CANSOFCOM adapt and evolve to provide the government and the people of Canada with dedicated, highly trained and skilled special operations forces capable of providing the wide spectrum of special operations options to deter, disrupt, dislocate, and when necessary, to destroy those that would do harm to Canadians, our allies and friends, or our national interests.²²⁸

²²⁸ Day and Horn “Canadian Special Operations Command. . .”, 74.

In the process of evolving, CANSOFCOM must also recognize that in addressing a range of complex security threats, Canada has opted to implement a comprehensive approach to operations that emphasizes interagency operations. As an actor within this environment, CANSOFCOM should therefore invest in understanding interagency collaboration and taking preparatory steps to flourish in this environment. To succeed in this endeavor, adapting to interagency challenges should not be viewed as a choice, although the degree of adaptation remains open to discussion. Regardless, the evolution of CANSOFCOM to best meet the national security goals of Canada and all Canadians will necessitate the continued development of an ability to operate effectively in an interagency environment.

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