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MULTICULTURALISM AND DIVERSITY IN THE CANADIAN FORCES: THE TIP OF THE ICEBERG

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**MULTICULTURALISM AND DIVERSITY IN THE CANADIAN FORCES:
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**MULTICULTURALISME ET LA DIVERSITÉ DANS LES FORCES CANADIENNES:
LA POINTE DE L'ICEBERG**

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CONTENTS

ABSTRACT

Fundamental to this essay are four themes rooted in Canadian multiculturalism; differentiation between multiculturalism and diversity, articulation of the military benefits and liabilities of diversity, suggestion that the Canadian Forces (CF) should pursue the recruitment of diversity and demonstration that further analysis of the challenges associated with recruiting that diversity is required.

The opening chapter constructs the framework for defining and differentiating cultures in addition to examining the origins and various cleavages of Canadian multiculturalism in order to demonstrate the pervasive nature of multiculturalism in relation to the CF.

Chapter 2 examines Canadian strategic culture and the culture of the CF which is subordinate to it. The need for a particular CF culture is articulated as is how conflict between popular culture and the military culture are resolved. The chapter concludes by offering that the CF should strive not to be more multicultural, but rather more diverse.

Chapter 3 explores the benefits and liabilities of a more diverse CF. The role of cultural awareness training is identified as being critical to the success of future operations, in no small part to avoid cultural misunderstandings.

The final chapter reviews some of the myriad literature regarding social integration and poses questions for further study about the effect that multicultural policy has had on the CF's ability to recruit diversity.

CHAPTER 1

WHY THE CF SHOULD CARE ABOUT MULTICULTURALISM

This chapter examines the constructs of culture and multiculturalism in order to

frame the subsequent discourse about whether or not, and to what extent, the Canadian

Forces (CF) should be concerned about the idea of multiculturalism. Later chapters in

this paper will discuss whether or not the CF should be 'more multicultural' as well as the

benefits of organizational diversity before finally posing some questions bearing further

analysis regarding why the CF has failed to recruit the diversity it has sought. In order to

discuss those issues, it is first necessary to define culture and multiculturalism writ large,

prior to examining the Canadian case of each. This chapter will introduce the reader to

the fundamental concepts of culture and argue that because multiculturalism is such a

significant fact of Canadian life, it should be paid more heed in the CF.

There is no universally accepted definition of what is meant by the term 'culture'

in the academic or layman lexicon. It is a nuanced term that means something slightly

different to each of those who study the social sciences in particular. An anthropological

definition of culture varies from that of the historian and again from that of the political

scientist. If a random survey were conducted of people on the average Canadian street

corner, the responses would be at least as varied.

Notable organizational theorist Edgar Schein's research on *organizational culture*

has informed much of the subsequent analysis on the topic of cultures that exist within

finite organizations. Schein's work is therefore an excellent starting point for an analysis

of the organizational culture of the CF. Schein defined organizational culture as "a pattern of basic assumptions, invented, discovered, or developed by a given group, as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration"[1]. These assumptions, Schein argues, "worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, is to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems."[2] Schein writes that the primary driver of culture is the need to make sense of or cope with one's external environment while simultaneously avoiding social discord; referred to as external adaptability and internal integration respectively. In spite of the qualifiers of internal integration and external adaptability that Schein offers, that culture can be summarized simply as the means to solve the problems inherent in these domains is found to be somewhat wanting for the purpose of the analysis undertaken in this paper. Are there no cultures, organizational or otherwise which have evolved in response to some stimuli other than the need to cope with some external or internal problem?

Contributing several chapters to *Cultural Intelligence and Leadership*, political scientist Bill Bentley first reduced the definition of culture "associated with such a social structure [to]…a "web of meaning" shared by members of a particular society or group within society"[3], prior to expanding on seven characteristics of culture. Bentley's elements are of import to the analysis of culture and multiculturalism in the CF because

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[1] Edgar H. Schein, "Organizational Culture," *American Psychologist* 45, no. 2 (1990): 111.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] Bill Bentley, "Systems Theory, Systems Thinking and Culture," in *Cultural Intelligence & Leadership: An Introduction for Canadian Forces Leaders*, ed. Karen D. Davis (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2009), 1.

they clearly articulate those things which constitute a bone fide culture, no matter the context, time or place in which that culture exists. Understanding these elements should eliminate conflict between traditional understandings of culture (sometimes understood to mean heritage or ethnicity) and the case of organizational culture (in the CF for example) in order to proceed with subsequent chapters. Bentley's seven characteristics of culture expand upon Schein's culture-as-coping-mechanism imperative and describe attributes of social interactions that can be used as a type of test to indicate if those interactions may be considered a culture.

Bentley's first characteristic of culture is that it is "a system of shared beliefs, values, customs, behaviours and artifacts that members of a society use to cope with their world and one another"[4]; this is similar to the definition of culture offered by Shein. At the crux of this characteristic is that there is some inherent purpose driving cultures to emerge the way they do. While the link between the causes and effects of culturally common actions may at times seem tenuous, nothing is said to be done without some reason. The other aspect of this characteristic, that a cultural system is comprised of both tangible and intangible commonalities, indicates that to a large extent, culture is a metaphysical phenomenon existing in the collective consciousness of adherents.

Bentley's second characteristic that culture is "learned through a process called enculturation"[5] indicates that some sort of method exists through which culture is imparted onto others. The degree to which the method of enculturation, also referred to

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[4] *Ibid.*, 2.

[5] *Ibid.*

as acculturation, is overt is immaterial to the point that the method exists. Prominent

Canadian psychologist J.W. Berry points out that cultural groups in contact are each

acculturated by their interaction with one another; acculturation does not imply cultural

take-over.[6] The degree to which the dominant culture demands or the subordinate culture

wishes to participate in acculturation processes defines a spectrum of intercultural

relations spanning assimilation, integration, segregation and marginalization.[7]

Assimilation requires that an acculturating culture give up significant parts of their

cultural identity that do not fit in the dominant culture, while integration implies

maintaining one's cultural identity intact during interactions with the dominant culture.[8]

Segregation involves the removal of oneself from the dominant culture in order to

maintain cultural identity while marginalization infers removal with an accompanying

loss of cultural identity.[9]

The third and fourth characteristics that Bentley describe are that culture is

"shared by members of a society (there is no culture of one)" and is "patterned, meaning

that people in a society live and think in ways forming definite, repeating patterns".[10]

These characteristics imply a level of consistency and repeatability with respect to the

beliefs and actions of members of a culture. This repeatability is not only of consequence

in demonstrating that a specific culture exists, but also in predicting how individual

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[6] J. W. Berry, "Intercultural Relations in Plural Societies," *Canadian Psychology/Psychologie Canadienne* 40, no. 1 (1999): 14.

[7] *Ibid.*

[8] *Ibid.*

[9] *Ibid.*

[10] Bentley, *Systems Theory, Systems Thinking and Culture*, 2.

members of a culture might behave in comparable circumstances. These two characteristics are not to be confused with a notion that culture is permanent or stagnant however.

Bentley's fifth characteristic is that "social interaction between people and groups"[11] is the mechanism for cultural change. Changes in the nature of the problem that a culture evolved to solve, or to the enculturation process itself, are two of many reasons that a culture might morph over time. Caution should therefore be exercised when applying a historical perspective to a present day multicultural situation, as historically accurate aspects might have changed.

Sociologist Victor Satzewich stresses that culture is neither "monolithic, static, uniform, [n]or homogeneous". This fluidity describes culture as a "set of dynamic social processes and practices" evolving as the "collective response of socially constituted individuals to their ever-changing external conditions, largely determined by social structures".[12] Satzewich corroborates Bentley's definition that culture is derived in response to some problem or condition and elaborates that cultures are constantly changing.

The sixth characteristic that Bentley uses to define culture is that culture is "arbitrary, meaning assumptions cannot be made regarding what a society considers right

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[11] *Ibid.*

[12] Victor Satzewich and Nikolaos Liodakis, *'Race' & Ethnicity in Canada: A Critical Introduction* (Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 2010), 143.

and wrong, good or bad."[13] In spite of culture being a means to cope with a common set of problems, there is an element of unpredictability that takes place in the evolution of culture which makes it difficult to deduce it from 'first principles', particularly if one's own cultural biases are considered.

Bentley's final characteristic of culture is that it is "internalized, in the sense that it is habitual, taken for granted, and perceived as natural by people within a society".[14] This is not to say that individual actions cannot be guided by contemplative thought, but rather that the parameters of that though are constrained to a large extent by cultural norms.

In *Leadership: Theory and Practice,* communications professor Peter Northouse corroborates much of Bentley's conceptualization of culture but omits one key element which is often overlooked and bears emphasis here. He defines culture as "the learned beliefs, values, rules, norms, symbols, and traditions that are common to a group of people".[15] This is entirely what Bentley argues but misses the characteristic that organizational culture evolves in response to a problem which needs coping with. This coping aspect will prove to be an important consideration when analysing how Canadian and CF cultures formed, how and why they change. In spite of Northouse's disagreement with respect to the importance of an imperative cause of culture, this paper will make use of Northouse's arguments in other areas but concludes that Bentley's assumption

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[13] Bentley, *Systems Theory, Systems Thinking and Culture*, 2.

[14] *Ibid.*

[15] Peter G. Northouse, *Leadership: Theory and Practice* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2007), 302.

regarding the evolution of culture to solve some problem is germane to the analysis herein.

This macroscopic understanding of the characteristics of what makes up a culture is important to begin this analysis, but if all cultures share these broad characteristics, they are of no value in differentiating between cultures. Notwithstanding that renowned cultural expert Geert Hofstede has expressed some concern about how accurately certain survey questions "captured what the researchers supposed them to measure"[16], the Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness (GLOBE) study edited by House et al, is a comprehensive and well regarded reference for the study of leadership and culture. The GLOBE's emphasis on leadership and culture makes it particularly applicable to the study of multiculturalism in the CF. The GLOBE uses eight dimensions to differentiate between cultures.

According to GLOBE, the first dimension of culture is *performance orientation* and "reflects the extent to which a community encourages and rewards innovation, high standards, and performance improvement".[17] *Performance orientation* describes the importance a culture places on the accomplishment of worldly goals over ascetic ones. Given the primacy of mission accomplishment in CF operations, sub-cultural *performance orientation* may be an impediment to operational effectiveness.

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[16] Geert Hofstede, "What did GLOBE really Measure? Researchers' Minds Versus Respondents' Minds," *Journal of International Business Studies* 37, no. 6 (Nov 2006): 885.

[17] Mansour Javidan, "Performance Orientation," in *Culture, Leadership and Organizations: The GLOBE Study of 62 Societies*, eds. Robert J. House and others (London, UK: SAGE Publications, 2004), 239.

The next dimension of culture also has particular relevance to the CF. Cultural *future orientation* "refers to the extent to which people engage in future oriented behaviours such as planning, investing in the future, and delaying gratification" and "emphasizes that people…prepare for the future as opposed to enjoying the present and being spontaneous".[18] The relevance of *future orientation* to military operations is easily understood and manifest at all three levels of war (tactical, operational and strategic) in addition to the administration of a force.

Quoting Hofstede, the GLOBE chapter on *gender egalitarianism* opens with "one of the most fundamental ways in which societies differ is the extent to which each assigns different roles for men and women."[19] Northouse describes the *gender egalitarianism* dimension as "how much societies de-emphasize members' biological sex in determining the roles that members play in their homes, organizations, and communities".[20] Given that service in the CF is not limited to either gender, the concept of *gender egalitarianism* is relevant particularly during military interactions with cultures that have a different perception of the importance of this dimension, or in regards to the recruiting of new members.

While the Bible states that the meek will inherit the earth, military leadership values assertiveness over meekness. The degree to which assertiveness is valued in

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[18] Northouse, *Leadership: Theory and Practice*, 307.

[19] Cynthia G. Emrich, Florence L. Denmark, and Deanne N. Den Hartog. "Cross-Cultural Differences in Gender Egalitarianism: Implications for Societies, Organizations, and Leaders," in *Culture, Leadership and Organizations: The GLOBE Study of 62 Societies*, eds. Robert J. House and others (London, UK: SAGE Publications, 2004), 343.

[20] Northouse, *Leadership: Theory and Practice*, 307.

society is known as *cultural assertiveness*. Broadly speaking and according to GLOBE, "cultural assertiveness reflects beliefs as to whether people are or should be encouraged to be assertive, aggressive, and tough, or nonassertive, nonaggressive, and tender in social relationships".[21]

The GLOBE study chapter on the concepts of individualism and collectivism details the origins of the terms and describes the variations of each that occur within societies, organizations, families and individuals.[22] The two constructs relate in different ways depending on the size, context and other variables of a group. For the purposes of this analysis the subdivision of *institutional collectivism* and *in-group collectivism* defined by Northouse and examined using the GLOBE study will be used.

Institutional collectivism "is concerned with whether cultures identify with broader societal interests rather than individual goals and accomplishments."[23] It goes without saying that the CF values high *institutional collectivism*.

The concept of *in-group collectivism* can either be complementary to, or in opposition to *institutional collectivism,* depending on the relationship between the in-group and the institution. Northouse states that "in-group collectivism is concerned with

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[21] Deanne N. Den Hartog, "Assertiveness," in *Culture, Leadership and Organizations: The GLOBE Study of 62 Societies*, eds. Robert J. House and others (London, UK: SAGE Publications, 2004), 395.

[22] Michele J. Gefland and others, "Individualism and Collectivism," in *Culture, Leadership and Organizations: The GLOBE Study of 62 Societies*, eds. Robert J. House and others (London, UK: SAGE Publications, 2004), 437-512.

[23] Northouse, *Leadership: Theory and Practice*, 306.

the extent to which people are devoted to their organizations or families".[24] If

considering the case of the CF as an organization, *institutional collectivism* and *in-group*

collectivism goals are complementary. CF members with a strong desire to meet

institutional goals and who also consider other CF members to be their primary *in-group*

are likely to find that their *institutional* and *in-group* goals are aligned. In considering the

CF and the needs of individual families, these two types of collectivism may be in

conflict. Consider the CF member who considers his family the primary *in-group* to

which he belongs. This member may at once have a strong desire to meet CF

institutional goals but also have an equally strong desire to meet the *in-group* goals of his

family. In this example, the member would be at odds with himself if a conflict between

the goals of his family and the CF existed.

The cultural dimension of *power distance* is manifest in the rank and positional

authority structure of the CF. *Power distance* as studied by GLOBE "reflects the extent

to which a community accepts and endorses authority, power differences, and status

privileges".[25] It is the tolerance and acceptance of the stratification of a society that

determines its relative level of *power distance.*

The second from final dimension of culture used to compare and contrast different

societies is *humane orientation* which Northouse defines as "the degree to which a

culture encourages and rewards people for being fair, altruistic, generous, caring and kind

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[24] *Ibid.*, 307.

[25] Carl Dale, Vipin Gupta and Mansour Javidan, "Power Distance," in *Culture, Leadership and Organizations: The GLOBE Study of 62 Societies*, eds. Robert J. House and others (London, UK: SAGE Publications, 2004), 513.

to others".[26] This dimension refers to how well people treat one another and the degree to which social programs are institutionalized.[27]

The final dimension of culture in need of defining for an analysis of multiculturalism in the CF is termed *uncertainty avoidance* and is referred to by Northouse as "the extent to which a society, organization, or group relies on established social norms, rituals, and procedures to avoid uncertainty".[28]

By considering these dimensions, it is possible to compare and contrast cultures with one another and to understand how the interaction of peoples from different cultures can be complicated. Having described what constitutes culture and differentiates between cultures, a brief examination of multiculturalism will follow.

At root the concept of multiculturalism is the existence of, reference to and accounting for more than one distinct culture in a social system. For the purpose of this analysis, the construct defined by Northouse will be used. He states that multiculturalism "refers to the existence of multiple cultures such as African, American, Asian, European, and Middle Eastern"[29] but "can also refer to a set of subcultures defined by race, gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and age".[30] Multiculturalism also "implies an approach or

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[26] Northouse, *Leadership: Theory and Practice*, 308.

[27] Hayat Kabasakal and Muzaffer Bodur, "Humane Orientation in Societies, Organizations, and Leader Attributes," in *Culture, Leadership and Organizations: The GLOBE Study of 62 Societies*, eds. Robert J. House and others (London, UK: SAGE Publications, 2004), 569.

[28] Northouse, *Leadership: Theory and Practice*, 306.

[29] *Ibid*., 303.

[30] *Ibid*., 302.

system that takes more than one culture into account".[31] Accordingly, and for the

purposes of this paper, *multicultural* will describe the state that occurs when relatively

disparate cultures exist within a given social structure. *Multicultural* implies the presence

of cultures that are separate and distinct and which do not share an over-arching or

uniting culture. Interactions between sub-cultures exist in *multiculturalism*, but the

integrity of sub-cultures is immutable. *Diversity* on the other hand will refer to the

existence of sub-cultures united by a commonly held or trans-(sub)cultural architecture.

Diversity implies that a degree of assimilation has occurred whereby sub-cultural

newcomers are acculturated within the dominant culture. *Diversity* will require that sub-

cultures adopt elements of the dominant culture which may be different or indeed in

conflict with their culture of origin. This distinction is consistent with Northouse's view

that *diversity* is "the existence of different cultures or ethnicities within a group or

organization".[32] Figure 1.1 depicts this construct of *multiculturalism* and *diversity*:

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[31] *Ibid.*

[32] *Ibid.*, 303.

Figure 1.1 – Multicultural versus Diverse

These conceptualizations of *multicultural* and *diverse* are similar to Berry's

notions of integration and assimilation previously cited.[33] The application of these

concepts to the CF cut across several divides. Probably most apparent is the case of the

cultures of origin of CF members. Each member brings a particular cultural background

to the CF upon being recruited. Once enrolled in the CF, a degree of enculturation to the

dominant CF culture takes place. In this way, the CF can be characterized as *diverse*. A

way to frame the concept of *multiculturalism* in the CF context is to examine individual

service cultures. To what extent are the Navy, Army and Air Force actually acculturated

into a Joint CF culture? The state of affairs in this regard is arguably rather *multicultural*

[33] Berry, *Intercultural Relations in Plural Societies*, 14.

at this time, in spite of efforts to engender a uniting CF culture. The cultural relations

between CF environmental services will not be examined further in this paper but serves

to highlight the fact that there are many different ways to view the various sub-cultures of

the CF, be they based on ethno-cultural, gender or environmental service grounds. In

subsequent analysis, this paper will focus primarily on the cultures of origin of CF

members when referring to *diversity* and *multiculturalism*.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to recount a detailed history of the events that

led to the establishment of a government policy of multiculturalism in this country,

instead an analysis of various cleavages of the policy of multiculturalism will be

undertaken in order to contribute to the dialogue regarding its relevance to the CF.

Political philosopher Will Kymlicka observed that at its core, the factors of timing

and geography affect not only the origins of Canadian multiculturalism, but also the

viability of its export to other countries.[34] By considering these two factors, the

conditions during which multiculturalism was adopted and the unique aspects of

Canadian multiculturalism, the particular relevance of multiculturalism to the CF are

better understood.

The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism of the 1960s

investigated and made recommendations regarding the status of French Canadians in

response to (or to quell) the Quiet Revolution nationalist uprising in Quebec. Among

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[34] Will Kymlicka, "Marketing Canadian Pluralism in the International Arena," *International Journal* 59, no. 4 (Fall, 2004): 10.

other things the Commission made recommendations to increase the prominence of the

French Canadian culture across the country and to officially make Canada a bilingual

nation. The polarizing recommendations had the effect of alienating "Canada's 'other'

ethnic groups (non-English and non-French) who were dissatisfied with the terms of

reference of the Royal Commission."[35] From this origin, Canadian multicultural policy

grew, essentially in response to concerns voiced by ethnic minorities who sought to not

be marginalized by a cultural duality. Owing to immigration policy at the time,

Kymlicka notes that the "ethnic minority was still white and pretty homogeneous by

today's standard."[36] The 'whiteness' of immigrants during the formative years of

Canada's multicultural policy was critical and highlights the importance of timing that

Kymlicka identified. Immigrants to Canada in the 1960s "were seen as sharing a

common 'western' and 'Judeo-Christian' civilization" with established Canadians.[37]

Kymlicka elaborates that "as a result the idea that the multiculturalism policy might

involve a 'clash of civilizations' between western liberal-democratic values and

conflicting religious or cultural traditions did not arise.[38] Furthermore, Kymlicka

believes that:

> …if multiculturalism in Canada had initially been demanded by non-
> European groups who were perceived as having strong religious or
> cultural commitments to illiberal practices-say, by Somalis or
> Pakistanis, rather than Ukrainians and Italians-and if their demand for
> multiculturalism was perceived as a demand that such illiberal practices

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[35] Satzewich and Liodakis, *'Race' & Ethnicity in Canada: A Critical Introduction*, 157.

[36] Kymlicka, *Marketing Canadian Pluralism in the International Arena*, 6.

[37] *Ibid*.

[38] *Ibid*.

be tolerated and accommodated, then…multiculturalism would not
have been adopted, or taken root.[39]

Kymlicka's second point is that the nature of Canada's geographic isolation from any threat of unrestrained migration has also contributed to the success of multiculturalism policy.[40] The potential routes of access to Canada are few and involve crossing at either the well-defended US border, or voyaging across the Atlantic or Pacific Oceans, neither of which are small feats. In contrast to Mediterranean states whose proximity to Africa make them viable destinations, Canada "faces no threat of a large-scale influx of unwanted migrants from neighbouring poor countries-whether it be illegal immigrants or asylum seekers".[41]

Buoyed by time and geography, the evolution of contemporary Canadian multiculturalism was also born of a need to combat American cultural influence. As sociologist Raymond Breton points out in *Ethnic Relations in Canada,* nascent Canadian multicultural policy in the 1970s was part of the "reconstruction of the symbolic system, in that it was perceived as one of the elements that would counterbalance the Americanization of Canada".[42] By aspiring to a societal integration ideology distinct from the melting pot of the US, Trudeau and the other proponents of contemporary multiculturalism were effective in using multiculturalism to create a measure of distinct Canadian identity.

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[39] *Ibid.*, 7.

[40] *Ibid.*, 8.

[41] *Ibid.*

[42] Raymond Breton, *Ethnic Relations in Canada: Institutional Dynamics* (Montreal, QC: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005), 274.

Canadian contemporary multiculturalism can be divided into three temporal phases. When an individual came of age will likely influence their impression of multiculturalism. While the period from 1971-1980 was marked by celebrations of our differences and a folkloric honeymoon period, it set the stage for the later bureaucratization of multiculturalism.[43] From 1980 to 1988 a process of institutionalization took place which culminated in the coming into force of the Multicultural Act of 1988 which gave multiculturalism legal equality with bilingualism[44]. In the period since 1988, multiculturalism, immigration and public sentiment towards the two have increasingly been seen from an economic perspective.[45] The motivations for Canadians to embrace multiculturalism have changed a great deal in the fifty years since the policy was first introduced. At present Canada's model of accommodating a diverse population has been continually refined and can be summarized by today's three-pronged approach:

- Multicultural citizenship to accommodate ethnic communities formed by immigration;
- Bilingual federalism to accommodate the major sub-state national(ist) group in Quebec; and
- Self-government rights and treaty relationships to accommodate indigenous peoples[46]

Beyond studying the history of the origins of Canadian multiculturalism, the development of a cognitive framework of 'what it all means' must be articulated before

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[43] Satzewich and Liodakis, *'Race' & Ethnicity in Canada: A Critical Introduction*, 157.

[44] *Ibid.*, 158.

[45] *Ibid.*

[46] Kymlicka, *Marketing Canadian Pluralism in the International Arena*, 4.

proceeding with an analysis of multiculturalism in the CF. Satzewich has distilled the various aspects of multiculturalism down to four distinct approaches or angles: demographics, ideology, competition and government.

The demographic aspect of multiculturalism refers to a defining fact that has resulted from our immigration policy; the Canadian population comprises members of more than 100 ethnic groups.[47] As an ideology, multiculturalism describes normative concepts about what a pluralist Canadian society ought to be.[48] There is a common Canadian sentiment that seeking a pluralist society is a nobler goal than seeking a homogeneous one. Consequently, Satzewich writes that multiculturalism also results in "a process of competition among and between ethno cultural groups for the acquisition of valuable economic and political resources".[49] Finally, and of direct importance to the CF, is that "multiculturalism refers to all government initiatives and programs that seek to realize multiculturalism as ideology and transform it into a concrete form of social intervention and organization".[50] The codification of multiculturalism as policy was the commencement of the government's role as lead advocate for pluralism in Canada.

The extent to which multiculturalism permeates the whole of various levels of government bears further consideration. In Section 27, the cornerstone of Canadianism "states that the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms will be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of

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[47] Satzewich and Liodakis, *'Race' & Ethnicity in Canada: A Critical Introduction*, 155.

[48] *Ibid*., 156.

[49] *Ibid*.

[50] *Ibid*.

Canada".[51]   Despite the first century of Canadian culture having been a relatively

homogeneous mix of British and French cultures, the Charter effectively codifies

Canadian heritage as multicultural. In a co-authored article in the British Journal of

Canadian Studies, Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka note that while "multiculturalism is

also a government-wide commitment that all departments are supposed to consider in

designing and implementing their policies and programmes",[52] "the Canadian

Multiculturalism Act covers only federal government departments and agencies".[53] It is

important to note however, that it is not necessary for federal government departments to

adhere to any aspect of the Multiculturalism Act that they deem would cause them to be

unable to fulfill their mandate. The portion of the act which reads that "ministers of the

Crown…shall take such measures as they consider appropriate to implement the

multiculturalism policy of Canada"[54] allows the CF to temper aspects of the Act which

would compromise its effectiveness as a military force. A similar ability to modify the

application of the Employment Equity Act (EE) to which the CF remains fully bound also

exists in the form of the Canadian Forces Employment Equity Regulation.[55] It is

important to note that any deviation from the intent of these Acts must be based strictly

on the imperative of CF operational effectiveness, and that there is no 'carte blanche' for

the CF to pick-and-choose which aspects of the Acts it will operationalize. Chapter 4

will analyse in more detail the relationship between EE and CF recruiting.

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[51] Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka, "Canadian Multiculturalism: Global Anxieties and Local Debates," *British Journal of Canadian Studies* 23, no. 1 (2010): 5.

[52] *Ibid*.

[53] *Ibid*.

[54] Minister of Justice, *Canadian Multiculturalism Act,* (1988): 1.

[55] Minister of Justice, *Canadian Forces Employment Equity Regulation,* (2002): 1.

Some critics of the government nexus of multiculturalism like political philosopher and sociologist Richard Day have proposed that the underlying rational for Canada's multicultural policy needs further development. In his book *Multiculturalism and the History of Canadian Diversity* he writes that Canadian policy makers "must become cognizant of [multiculturalism's] application within the system of states, and begin to address the ongoing failure of state-sponsored rational-bureaucratic action to solve the problem of diversity".[56] Failing that, he opines "it would be interesting to see an explicit theorization of, and justification for, the role of the state in multiculturalism".[57] In response to this own challenge for the government to justify itself, Day offers that multiculturalism is a government construct designed first to create and advertise the 'problem' of ethnic pluralism and then to act as the solution of the same. Day writes that "with all the means of modern coercion and postmodern seduction at their disposal, legislators and bureaucrats have set out to bolster the reality of Canadian multiculturalism as fact and act, problem and solution, dystopia and social ideal".[58]

Others have criticized multiculturalism as a divisive rather than uniting force between citizens. Satzewich in particular offers the view that multiculturalism promotes cultural relativism and undermines social cohesion. By "enshrin[ing] into law our 'good intentions' of bilingualism, multiculturalism, and anti-racism by institutionalizing appropriate policies…we have become a fractious nation that lacks a sense of

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[56] Richard J. F. Day, *Multiculturalism and the History of Canadian Diversity* (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 222.

[57] *Ibid*.

[58] *Ibid*., 18.

community.[59] Put another way, "multiculturalism has encouraged division by dividing

and conquering diverse cultures rather than fostering reasonable diversity within rigorous

unity".[60] This argument of national division is a primary criticism of multicultural

philosophy in the literature.

Sociologist Jeffrey Reitz agrees with the need for further study of

multiculturalism but approaches this need from a different perspective. In his book

Multiculturalism and Social Cohesion, he writes that:

> …the very success of Canadian multiculturalism politically - as
> indicated by popular support within Canada and the extent of
> international interest in this distinctively Canadian approach to
> diversity - justifies that more attention be given to how the policy
> actually works, and what its effects actually are.[61]

Not all parts of the country have embraced multiculturalism. The notable

exception is Quebec. Quebec has instead designed a more assimilatory approach to

societal integration known as interculturalism. As Satzweich explains, "interculturalism

promotes cultural exchanges in the hope that as people of different cultures are exposed

to various elements of other cultures, the ensuing dialogue may lead not only to tolerance

but to an understanding".[62] In this regard interculturalism seems indistinguishable from

multiculturalism. It is the desired end state that differs. While multiculturalism seeks

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[59] Satzewich and Liodakis, *'Race' & Ethnicity in Canada: A Critical Introduction*, 162.

[60] *Ibid*., 163.

[61] Jeffrey G. Reitz, "Behavioural Precepts of Multiculturalism: Empirical Validity and Policy Implications," in *Multiculturalism and Social Cohesion* (Toronto: Springer, 2009), 171.

[62] Satzewich and Liodakis, *'Race' & Ethnicity in Canada: A Critical Introduction*, 168.

cultural pluralism, Quebec interculturalism "should lead to a fusion of all *commonalities* (emphasis in original) of cultures within a francophone framework".[63] If multiculturalism exists near integration on the enculturation spectrum, intraculturalism edges ever-so slightly closer towards assimilation.

The final view of multiculturalism that will frame subsequent chapters is the notion that multiculturalism represents the evolution of international relations from the Westphalian nation state into something beyond. Reflecting on the history and evolution of Canadian multiculturalism, Day finds that it "marks a shift from the modern nation-state, which simulated a unity and dissimulated its multiplicity, to the postmodern nation-state, which dissimulates its unity and simulates a multiplicity".[64] The implication of multiculturalism changing the nature of the state in such a way would have enormous ramifications for the CF and should be considered by planners at the strategic level.

This chapter has attempted to construct the frameworks for defining and differentiating cultures in addition to examining the origins and various cleavages of Canadian multiculturalism. Canada's history and geography were demonstrated to form the basis of Canadian multiculturalism, the contemporary nexus of which was born of the need to establish Canadian national unity in response to the divisive forces of bi-nationalism, immigrant concerns of cultural marginalization and an increasing American cultural influence. That Canadian multiculturalism can be viewed as ideology, demography or economy speaks to the degree to which the construct has become woven

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[63] *Ibid*.

[64] Day, *Multiculturalism and the History of Canadian Diversity*, 209.

into the fabric of the Canadian identity. Considering these various constructs, and the pervasiveness of multiculturalism, it becomes evident why the CF should be focused on multiculturalism. It should not seem an oversimplification that multiculturalism is a fact of life in Canada and that an understanding of how it affects the operations and administration of the CF is essential. Multiculturalism in the CF need be understood in both its historical and contemporary contexts. In order to reap the benefits of diversity in the CF, one must understand how to view multiculturalism as ideology, demography and economy. Subsequent chapters of this paper will not deliver a glad-handing or feel good message, instead it will elaborate on the degree to which the CF should strive to be multicultural, the benefits that can be realized, the pitfalls to avoid and the recruiting challenges that are faced. By pointing out various points of view on the topic of multiculturalism this paper may make broad recommendations for changes in the CF's outlook, all of which are grounded in the operational imperative of the CF. A revived discourse on the study of multiculturalism in the CF is arguably of ever increasing importance not only because of immigration trends, but also due to the global theatre in which we operate.

CHAPTER 2

MULTICULTURAL CF OR DIVERSE CF

There is an argument that the Canadian Forces (CF) does not sufficiently represent the multicultural nature of Canada. The aim of this chapter is to present arguments related to the need for a 'more multicultural' CF. By investigating the nature of Canadian strategic culture to which the culture of the CF is subordinate, it will be shown that achieving a greater degree of cultural diversity vice multiculturalism should be the goal of the CF. Recall that *multicultural* describes the co-existence of relatively disparate cultures within a given social structure, while *diversity* refers to the presence of sub-cultures united by a commonly held or overarching cultural architecture. An examination of social cohesion and leadership will be conducted in order to demonstrate the need for increased cultural intelligence in the CF, particularly at senior levels, and the challenges associated with attaining this cognitive (vice knowledge based) skill.

As an instrument of the government of Canada for the application of controlled violence in the pursuit of geo-political goals, the CF conducts a wide spectrum of activity ranging from the strategic to the tactical levels of war. In order to translate strategic intent into tactical action, it is necessary for CF decision makers to have an understanding of the strategic culture in which they operate in addition to the type of organizational culture they wish to create for the CF.

In *Cultural Intelligence and Strategic Culture,* Bill Bentley defines strategic culture as "the socially transmitted habits of mind, tradition and preferred methods of operations that are more or less specific to a particular geographically-based security community".[65] The essence of strategic culture is its nexus in national security and in its geographical base. Like Canada's multiculturalism policy, so too has our strategic culture been shaped by geography and history. Bentley confirms that "the primacy of policy and the subordination of the military to civilian control is an enduring characteristic of strategic culture deriving primarily from geography and history".[66]

Canada's geography has proved both a security challenge and advantage throughout history. During colonial times, says Bentley, "membership in the British Empire and Britain's command of the sea reassured Canadians in security terms".[67] But as the Empire's colonial power faded by the turn of the 20th century, direct British protection was no longer a realistic expectation. The hegemonic rise of the US following the Second World War has benefited Canada immensely, "for as long as reasonably good relations [can] be maintained with the US, geography seem[s] an almost insurmountable barrier to any direct military threat".[68]

From a military perspective, it was Canada's history of citizen based militia that formed the basis of CF strategic culture. While a detailed history of Canadian militia

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[65] Bill Bentley, "Cultural Intelligence and Strategic Culture," in *Cultural Intelligence & Leadership: An Introduction for Canadian Forces Leaders*, ed. Karen D. Davis (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2009), 28.

[66] *Ibid*., 38.

[67] *Ibid*., 32.

[68] *Ibid*.

forces will not be undertaken in this paper, Bentley found that both the English and French rulers of early Canada employed citizen based forces which had the effect of not only entrenching the militia paradigm in Canada, but also that the "tactics of Canadian militiamen…to take the fight to the enemy rather than fight at home," was the genesis of the "Canadian preference for expeditionary forces, usually small and only when required, rather than maintaining large standing forces at home".[69]

In addition to history and geography, three other factors have influenced the nature of Canadian strategic culture. The construct of religion, ideology and culture has played a significant role its determination and to a lesser degree, so have the influences of governance and technology.

Religion, ideology and culture have influenced Canadian strategic culture in two distinct ways. The first is in relation to Canada being a Western democracy, and the second is inherent in our bilingual nature. Bentley argues that because of Canada's Western democratic ideological basis, we have maintained close ties with likeminded Western nations and "shar[ed] a common ideology…[that] found any kind of totalitarianism anathema to the desired international order".[70] That our 'Westerness' has influenced our strategic culture is apparent in the international coalitions to which we belong and participate in operations with abroad, as well as the types of civil liberties and social programs we enjoy at home.

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[69] *Ibid.*

[70] *Ibid.*, 35.

Bentley argues that it is the bicultural nature of confederation however, which is the most important contribution that religion, ideology and culture have made to Canadian strategic culture. Specifically, it is the "peaceful managing [of] English-French relations throughout Canada's history [that] pre-disposes Canadian political culture to tolerance, mediation and patience.[71] This point of view could be criticized for being overly anecdotal; it is hard to quantify the direct effect that bicultural consensus building has had on strategy.

Bentley recognizes this and suggests that because "national unity has been paramount to Canadian political leaders since Confederation, the threat of national disintegration has been an overriding concern".[72] In specific reference to strategic culture, "French-Canadian reluctance to wholeheartedly support the British Empire in any significant military way from the Boer War onwards meant that military commitments had to be managed very carefully".[73] The significant degree to which the Francophone population objected to Canada's potential participation in the US-led invasion of Iraq was certainly a considerable factor in the federal government's decision not to participate.[74]

In spite of the clear and present danger of a nuclear weapon exchange during the Cold War, Canada only ever maintained a relatively moderate and clandestine counter capability, albeit supplied and supported by the Americans. Bentley concludes that it was

[71] *Ibid.*

[72] *Ibid.*

[73] *Ibid.*

[74] *Ibid.*, 36.

Canadian ideological opposition to nuclear weapon technology that constrained our response thusly "and generally rejected the idea that Canada should ever become a nuclear weapons state".[75]

More recently, the governance of the CF itself has impacted on Canadian strategic culture. Until the last decade, the Canadian military operated almost entirely at the tactical level of war.[76] Prior to the transformation initiated by former Chief of the Defense Staff Rick Hiller, the CF had been a joint force in name and theory only, and possessed no dedicated joint planning capability for major operations. The now defunct office of the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff fulfilled this role but was arguably under-manned and had insufficient organic environmental diversity to function as a truly joint operational staff. With CF transformation and the standing up of Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command (CEFCOM) and Canada Command (CANADACOM), Bentley confirms, "for the first time in Canadian history, truly joint, operational-level headquarters were established and an explicit strategic staff organization was put in place".[77] The tangible effect transformation had on strategic culture was realized by the scope and complexity of Canadian operations in Afghanistan and Libya in which Canada participated to a degree that had not been possible since Korea.

As a well networked and allied Western nation, Canada has the state-of-the-art in military technology available to it. Bentley's final factor of Canadian strategic culture is

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[75] *Ibid.*

[76] *Ibid.*, 38.

[77] *Ibid.*, 37.

the technology that we do and don't acquire for our military forces. In spite of the

relative ease of access to American defence technology and the considerable defence

industry within Canadian borders, our sailors, soldiers and air force personnel do not

have the state-of-the-art. Notwithstanding some ultramodern equipment that was

procured with haste to prosecute the recent war in Afghanistan, by and large, Canada's

military spending is a small fraction of GDP compared with likeminded Western nations.

It is the "perceptions of the threat, the relatively small size of the military, and constant

downward pressure on defence spending [that] have meant acquiring the most recent

technology in sufficient quantity is a problem".[78] The predilection for boom and bust

procurement has been a factor in the Canadian strategic culture stretching as far back as

the First World War when Canada first became a military nation and will likely continue

to shape the culture of the CF in the future.

The effect that Canada's multicultural policy has had in shaping strategic culture

has been debated increasingly as Canada's pluralistic nature has increased. The debate is

centered on the extent to which recent immigrants and ethnic minorities attempt and are

able to influence Canadian strategic culture.

On one side of this debate, in her essay *Assessing the Impact of Recent*

Immigration Trends on Canadian Foreign Policy, political scientist Elizabeth Riddell-

Dixon offers that recent immigrants to Canada have four specific foreign-policy interests,

namely "liberalizing Canada's immigration and refugee laws, expanding trade links with

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[78] *Ibid*.

their countries of origin, securing increased Canadian aid for their places of birth, and

getting Canada to take sides on political issues involving their countries of origin".[79] The

underlying theme of this point of view appears to be that in spite of having gone through

a lengthy process of leaving their homeland in order to live in (and for the most part

become citizens of) Canada, the foreign policy interests of newcomers are firmly rooted

in their places of origin.

In *Whose War is It?* Canadian historian Jack Granatstein describes a decidedly

more extreme perspective to the same side of the immigrant-influence-on-foreign-policy

debate. He notes that "Muslim leaders in organizations such as the Canadian Arab

Federation or the Canadian Islamic Congress argue that the key to checking extremism in

their communities is for Canada to change its foreign policies".[80] He objects to the

notion that foreign policy change should be affected by succumbing to the demands of

violent extremists and offers instead that the only way is through civil discourse and

public debate. Most Canadians would agree. The extent to which multicultural policy

has encouraged the expression of this view by groups like the Canadian Arab Federation

and Canadian Islamic Congress however, is debatable.

Sociologist Victor Satzewich contests Granatstein's sentiment that ethnic foreign

policy lobby is related to multiculturalism by pointing out that "transnational identities

and activities on the part of immigrants and members of ethnoreligious communities

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[79] Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, "Assessing the Impact of Recent Immigration Trends on Canadian Foreign Policy," in *The World in Canada: Diaspora, Demography and Domestic Politics*, eds. David Carment and David Bercuson (Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2008), 34.

[80] J. L. Granatstein, *Whose War is it?* (Toronto, ON: HarperCollins, 2007), 180.

existed before the announcement of the policy of multiculturalism in 1971".[81] Satzewich

elaborates that "this historical evidence alone should lead us to be skeptical of the link

that Granatstein and others make between contemporary multiculturalism and

transnationalism".[82]

       Given that Canada's multiculturalism policy is integrative vice assimilative, a

certain level of homeland affiliation should be expected and is arguably encouraged.

Riddell-Dixon elaborates that the foreign policy goals of newcomers are sought through

the lobbying efforts of individuals and groups and notes that "not only do most ethnic

communities have their own lobby groups but there are national umbrella groups, which

in turn participate in the work of the macro-level…organization: the Canadian

Ethnocultural Council".[83] The result is that through non-governmental organizations, the

'immigrant lobby' functions at all three levels of government in this country.

Admittedly, Riddell-Dixon concludes, "NGO efficacy is determined by a wide range of

factors: a group's resources, its tactics, the nature of its objectives, its timing, and

perceptions of its legitimacy"[84] which are as varied as the groups themselves.

       Similar to Riddell-Dixon and Granatstein, Satzewich also concludes that

"multiculturalism may admittedly open the door to some forms of so-called ethnic

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[81] Victor Satzewich, "Multiculturalism, Transnationalism, and the Hijacking of Canadian Foreign Policy: A Pseudo-Problem?" *International Journal* 63, no. 1 (Winter, 2007): 4.

[82] *Ibid*.

[83] Riddell-Dixon, *Assessing the Impact of Recent Immigration Trends on Canadian Foreign Policy*, 42.

[84] *Ibid*., 43.

lobbying, and it may encourage and/or force politicians to take ethnic group concerns

seriously or at least listen to them". But in contrast Satzewich points out that "lobbying

on the part of ethnic communities for homeland issues takes place on a political terrain

that is already crowded with a variety of other and often competing interests".[85] The

sheer volume and variety of groups lobbying the government for action simply dilutes the

voice of any specific lobby and renders it to the relative background of the political

landscape. Beyond lobbying and considering the electoral process itself , Satzewich

additionally offers that the "presumed existence of ethnically homogeneous voting blocs

that make political choices on the basis of how their leaders tell them to vote is a

simplistic picture of ethnic politics in Canada".[86]

Notwithstanding the arguments regarding whether recent immigrants to Canada

seek to influence foreign policy and the degree to which they are able to do so,

Granatstein's position of the supremacy of national interests may prove to be a kind of

trump card in the debate. He argues that "defence and foreign policy…must spring from

the fundamental bases of a state-its geographic location, its history, its form of

government, its economic imperatives, its alliances, and, yes, those who form its

population"[87]. His realist perspective is that "national interests are and must be the

key".[88] It is in the definition of the national interest where the devil is in the detail. At

present, there may be insufficient popular mass supporting any individual ethnic lobby,

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[85] Satzewich, *Multiculturalism, Transnationalism, and the Hijacking of Canadian Foreign Policy: A Pseudo-Problem?*, 6.

[86] *Ibid.*

[87] Granatstein, *Whose War is it?*, 170.

[88] *Ibid.*

but Granatstein suggests that if Canadian immigration policy continues to permit the inflow of disparate cultures in increasing numbers this very well may change. At the extreme, this kind of rationale is tantamount to the concern that lead to the internment camps of the two World Wars, when it was feared that Canadians of Japanese and Ukrainian descent would be sympathetic to their homelands and conduct acts against Canada from within. As history has shown that these fears were highly exaggerated, while it is conceivable that popular support for an ethnic lobby may at some point have enough of a support base to drive foreign and indeed domestic policy, we should be skeptical of claims to this affect. Notwithstanding a prudent amount of caution, while the national interest is indeed paramount, it is not necessarily static or enduring. How the national interest is defined by the population constantly trumps any previous understanding of it; that is the nature of democracy.

Given the nature of the multi-faceted strategic culture in which the CF operates, how has Canada created an effective military culture that is simultaneously subordinate to the strategic culture and sufficiently separate in order to avoid institutional cronyism? The various aspects of Canadian history, geography, ideology, national unity and national interests present a tightly interleaved set of challenges for CF institutional leaders. What are the specific challenges that must be resolved in developing a citizen-based military culture that balances individual cultures with these strategic considerations? Recall from the previous chapter that the characteristics of culture are:

-shared system of beliefs used to cope with the world and one another;
-learned through a process of enculturation;
-changeable over time through social processes;

-patterned and repeatable; and
-internalized or habitual.[89]

That a specific CF culture should exist can easily be deduced from anecdotal analysis alone. Enculturation starts during boot camp and continues throughout one's career. The notion of courage and sacrifice in the pursuit of a just national cause binds service members together and facilitates their performance of dangerous duties. Any notion of excessive social rigidity is countered by comparisons of the culture of military service now to that of only a generation ago. That the CF has its own culture is clear. What is it specifically? Why does it exist? How is it maintained? An analysis of the culture of the CF will now be conducted based primarily on works published by the CF itself.

Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Doctrine, a CF Leadership Institute publication, describes the fundamental nature of CF culture as open. *Doctrine* elaborates that "an open culture means that people are encouraged to engage in broad inquiry, to think critically, and to venture and debate new ideas in the interests of contributing to collective effectiveness".[90] A culture described by non-specific openness may position the CF at one end of an open-closed dipole, but only frames the nature of CF culture in one dimension. Broadly speaking, it would appear that CF culture has its roots in three interrelated and co-existent spheres. CF culture arguably has a Canadian nexus, a military nexus and a leadership nexus.

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[89] Bentley, *Systems Theory, Systems Thinking and Culture*, 2.

[90] Department of National Defence, *A-PA-005-000/AP-003 Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Doctrine* (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy - Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2005), 13.

Owing to the subordination of the CF to the broader society it serves, there is inevitably a Canadian-centric aspect to military culture. In *Duty with Honour,* a professional code of conduct published for all members of the CF, emphasis is placed on the core values of Canadian society that members of the CF represent and ascribe to as the foundation of CF culture. The values of democracy, peace, order and good government, individual rights and freedoms, respect for the dignity of all persons, obeying and supporting lawful authority and diversity are said to form this foundation.[91] Examining these values against the GLOBE dimensions of culture, it can be seen that a subtle but nonetheless existent dichotomy exists in *power distance* between the concepts of democracy and the obedience of lawful authority. Also of note is that the dimension of *individual collectivism* seems to be high in these Canadian values given the emphasis on individual rights and freedoms and diversity. These *individual collectivisms* are in contrast to the *institutional collectivisms* described below as part of the CF culture.

The military nexus of CF culture is defined in *Duty with Honour* in terms of the beliefs and expectations that Canadians have about service in the CF. These expectations include the concepts of unlimited liability, fighting spirit, teamwork, discipline and physical fitness.[92] These are the military specific attributes of CF culture that make it unique. By examining these attributes through the lens of GLOBE's dimensions of culture, variations in the way several dimensions are viewed from a Canadian perspective and a military perspective appear. Unlimited liability and teamwork can be characterized

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[91] Department of National Defence, *A-PA-005-000/AP-001 Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada* (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy - Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2003), 35.

[92] *Ibid*.

as being high on the *institutional collectivism* scale in contrast to the Canadian values of individual rights and freedoms and diversity mentioned above. The fighting spirit is necessarily related to high levels of *assertiveness* while discipline is related to a high level of *uncertainty avoidance* and at times a low level of *assertiveness*. It can already be seen that one task of CF institutional leaders is to resolve the any conflicts that may exist between Canadian and CF cultures.

The third nexus of CF culture is leadership. Reconciling competing Canadian cultural values with military ones falls to the body of leadership in the CF. Wittingly or not, this reconciliation takes place in the articulation of the CF Effectiveness Framework described in *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*. The leadership effectiveness dimensions of mission success, internal integration, member well-being and commitment, external adaptability and military ethos accomplish this by giving primacy to the CF's role of accomplishing the mission, while stressing the importance of the other dimensions as enablers.[93] *Mission success* infers that the dominant imperative of military service is always the accomplishment of the mission at hand, while *member well-being and commitment* "signifies a concern for people and the quality of their conditions of service".[94] *Internal integration* relates to the stable structures and routines that coordinate service activities whereas *external adaptability* speaks to a leader's ability to "fit into the larger operating environment and to anticipate

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[93] Department of National Defence, *A-PA-004-000/AP-006 Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations* (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy - Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2005), 48.

[94] *Ibid.*, 20.

and adapt to change".[95] The *military ethos* relates to the leader's adherence to military,

civic, legal and social values.[96] CF doctrine has codified these concepts and expects that

leaders at all levels in the CF will ascribe to them. A further examination of leadership

and culture is conducted later in this chapter.

Through *internal integration*, the *power distance* conflict between democracy and

obedience of authority resolved, as is the *assertiveness* conundrum of when an individual

should be a leader and when they should be a follower. These are accomplished by

enculturating members to understand when their personal input to a problem or situation

is appropriately given and when it is time to follow orders. The tension between

individual and *institutional collectivism* is resolved partly in the same way but also by

enculturating the primacy of *mission success* with secondary emphasis on *member well-

being and commitment*. CF members accept that institutional goals are always

paramount; their individual concerns are tempered by the knowledge that concern for

their welfare follows closely behind it.

Duty with Honour mixes the Canadian societal values with the expectations of

military service and distills them down to what are referred to as the Canadian Military

Values of duty, loyalty, integrity and courage.[97] Having just dissected the constituents of

the Canadian Military Values, aspects of both Canadian values and military expectations

can be recognized in these four tenets. A detailed examination of how each GLOBE

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[95] *Ibid.*, 21.

[96] *Ibid.*

[97] Department of National Defence, *A-PA-005-000/AP-001 Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*, 35.

study dimension of culture impacts specific ethno cultural groups will not be undertaken in this paper. If we assume however that the CF culture is high in some specific dimensions of GLOBE, namely *performance orientation, future orientation, institutional collectivism and uncertainty avoidance,* then it is possible (albeit overly simplified) to speculate why some cultures which do not value those areas as highly may be less likely to volunteer for service in the CF. For example, Northouse adapted the results of GLOBE by comparing the dimensions of culture against the cultural clusters that scored highest and lowest in terms of the value placed in each dimension. Northouse points out that the Eastern European and Latin American cultural clusters place less emphasis on *performance orientation, future orientation, institutional collectivism and uncertainty avoidance* than other cultural clusters.[98] That Eastern European and Latin American cultural clusters scored low in the areas which are high within CF culture, might explain to some rudimentary degree why peoples from those cultural clusters might tend not to join the CF.

In addition to the military efficacies of a well-integrated force, the process of enculturation generates social cohesion among members. Activities like the CF Effectiveness Framework identified above have been described as bonding social capital by Charles Husband and Yunis Alam in their book *Social Cohesion and Counter Terrorism.* They wrote that bonding social capital "relates to those social networks and relationships which operate within relatively homogeneous groups and which help to

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[98] Northouse, *Leadership: Theory and Practice*, 311.

sustain shared identity and civility within the group".[99] In contrast to social cohesion is

the concept of diaspora which Maghissi et al articulated as being "marked by feelings of

'not belonging', of being in exile or suffering as a psychological outsider".[100]

The 2001 riots in Brandford, Burnley and Oldman, UK are extreme examples of

the possible outcomes of a lack of social cohesion. According to Husband and Alam, the

"three key agendas that underpinned the urban unrest [were]: ethnic segregation, limited

cross-cultural interaction and the absence of shared identity and values.[101] This is

avoided by the fostering of bridging social capital, which they describe as "a product of

those relationships and networks that transcend differences of ethnicity, religion or

socioeconomic status and hence build civility across group identities".[102] Aside from the

direct prospect of mutiny, the concept of social cohesion is highly relevant to military

service.

Given the type of environments in which the CF and its allies are likely to operate

intertwined with a cultural populace very different from its own, the fostering of bonding

and bridging capital will prove to be a critical capability that CF leadership must not

ignore. That is to say that the role of CF leadership is not only to create an appropriate

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[99] Charles Husband and Yunis Alam, *Social Cohesion and Counter-Terrorism* (Bristol, UK: The Policy Press, 2011), 42.

[100] Haideh Moghissi, Saeed Rahnema and Mark J. Goodman, *Diaspora by Design: Muslim Immigrants in Canada and Beyond* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), 5.

[101] Husband and Alam, *Social Cohesion and Counter-Terrorism*, 45.

[102] *Ibid.*, 42.

institutional culture within the CF[103], but also to create a culture that is sensitive to and can naturally interact with other global cultures in the pursuit of military objectives. In deference to Husband and Alam, future CF operations might benefit from placing troops in close contact with local populations in order to foster relationships and establish a common cultural understanding. One can make a comparison between the state of affairs existing in UK riot towns and locales where the CF interacts with the local population. As the 2001 UK riots indicate, if the CF is segregated from the local population and does not make attempts at cross-cultural interactions, the risk of negative interactions probably increases. By setting the conditions for CF members to positively interact with local cultures, CF leadership assists in preventing this. In order to realize the benefits of common cultural understanding, CF members need first to be open and sensitive to other cultures, the establishment of this sensitivity falls to institutional leaders. With that cultural sensitivity in place, CF members will be better equipped to interact with other cultures and to build social cohesion with local populations.

According to the CF Leadership Institute publication *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading the Institution*, there are primary and secondary mechanisms by which institutional leaders can embed culture into an organization such as the CF. Primary mechanisms cited include:

-deliberate role modeling, teaching, mentoring and coaching;

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[103] Department of National Defence, *A-PA-005-000/AP-006 Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading the Institution* (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy - Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2007), 10.

-reacting quickly, decisively and transparently to critical incidents and organizational crises;

-ensuring that resources are allocated in accordance with observed criteria; -paying attention to what is important to the organization and to measure and control it on a regular basis;

-allocating rewards and status based on observed criteria; and

-recruiting, selecting and promoting members in accordance with observed criteria[104]

Secondary mechanisms cited are more overt in nature and include:

-formal statements of institutional philosophy, values and creed

-initiate and maintain institutional rites and rituals;

-collect and publish stories, legends and myths about people and events;

-match philosophy and doctrine with organizational design and culture;

-align organizational systems and procedures with the desired cultural outcome; and

-maintain a coherent body of knowledge and doctrine[105]

Having considered the nature of Canada's strategic culture, CF culture and the need and mechanism for embedding specific cultural traits, an examination of cultural intelligence and leadership will now be undertaken.

In *Leadership*, Peter Northouse identifies five broad leadership tasks related to interacting with other cultures. To determine that these tasks are germane to CF leaders requires recognition of the multinational environment into which the CF deploys as well as the global areas where the CF operates. The first thing leaders need to do is develop a

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[104] *Ibid.*, 13.

[105] *Ibid.*, 14.

high level of international situational awareness. "Second, they need to learn the perspectives, tastes, trends, and technologies of many other cultures".[106] Next, leaders must be capable of working with people from many cultures at the same time. "Fourth, leaders must be able to adapt to living and communicating in other cultures".[107] Finally, leaders must relate to people from other cultures from a position of equality rather than cultural superiority.[108]

The most significant barrier to achieving this level of cultural awareness is ethnocentrism, defined by Northouse as "the tendency for individuals to place their own group (ethnic, racial or cultural) at the center of their observations of others and the world".[109] In leading people and in the pursuit of tactical, operational and strategic objectives, "ethnocentrism can be a major obstacle to effective leadership because it prevents people from fully understanding or respecting the world of others".[110] How then does the CF prevent ethnocentrism from undermining leadership?

In *Culture and Cultural Intelligence,* sociologist Karen Davis offers that the attainment of cultural intelligence is critical to overcoming ethnocentrism. In their book *Cultural Intelligence: Individual Interactions Across Cultures,* notable management and organizational psychology experts P. Christopher Earley and Soon Ang define cultural intelligence (CQ) as "a person's capability to adapt effectively to new cultural

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[106] Northouse, *Leadership: Theory and Practice*, 302.

[107] *Ibid*.

[108] *Ibid*.

[109] *Ibid*., 303.

[110] *Ibid*.

contexts."[111] Karen Davis similarly defines it as "the ability to recognize the shared beliefs, values, attitudes and behaviours of a group of people and, most importantly, to effectively apply this knowledge toward a specific goal or range of activities".[112] CQ is dependent on the prior acquisition of social intelligence – the ability to understand "the feelings, thoughts, and behaviours of persons including one's own in interpersonal situations and to act appropriately on that understanding", and emotional intelligence – "the ability to monitor one's own and other's emotions, to discriminate among them, and to use the information to guide one's thinking and actions".[113] Furthermore,

> …CQ, in a military context, has been understood predominantly in terms of knowledge and cultural awareness derived frequently from the analysis of social, political, economic, and other demographic information that provides an understanding of a people or a nation's history, institutions, psychology, beliefs, and behaviour.[114]

This military context is often referred to as 'cultural awareness training' and is in contrast to the intellectual process that CQ is. Analogous to the difference between intelligence (IQ) and the acquisition of knowledge is the difference between cultural intelligence (CQ) and the acquisition of cultural knowledge.

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[111] P. Christopher Earley and Soon Ang, *Cultural Intelligence: Individual Interactions Across Cultures* (Stanford, California: Stanford Business Books, 2003), 59.

[112] Karen D. Davis and Justin C. Wright, "Culture and Cultural Intelligence," in *Cultural Intelligence & Leadership: An Introduction for Canadian Forces Leaders*, ed. Karen D. Davis (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2009), 9.

[113] Bentley, *Cultural Intelligence and Strategic Culture*, 41.

[114] Davis and Wright, *Culture and Cultural Intelligence*, 9.

Given the apparent importance of CQ for the successful conduct of military operations, one would expect the CF to be heavily invested in its advancement if not its detection within its members. Davis has found however that "CQ in the CF finds its foundations within the life experiences of members, including their membership in the CF itself" and that emphasis is placed on the cultural awareness of those about to deploy on operations abroad.[115] Bill Bentley concludes that "a homogeneous military culture that relies on pre-deployment cultural information to raise awareness…will experience a limited capacity to develop effective CQ and apply effective understanding when confronted with unique experiences and circumstances".[116] In addition to bolstering cultural intelligence development within the CF, perhaps entrance criteria should employ some level of social, emotional and cultural elements in addition to conventional intelligence testing.

CQ is required not only in the conduct of operations abroad, but also in the successful administration of the force at home. According to Davis, "internal integration, member well-being and commitment, and mission success are dependent upon the application of CQ at the national level"[117]. It is the ability of the CF and its leaders to understand and meet the expectations of its members and Canadian society that to a very large degree impact the health of the CF.[118] Additionally, it is the *military ethos* that "guides the moral application of CQ across all dimensions of the effectiveness model, as

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[115] Bentley, *Cultural Intelligence and Strategic Culture*, 42.

[116] *Ibid.*, 46.

[117] Davis and Wright, *Culture and Cultural Intelligence*, 16.

[118] *Ibid.*

well as the national, international, host-nation and enemy domains".[119] The importance of cultural intelligence to leadership in the CF cannot be overstated. Perhaps it is worth considering as a factor for potential career advancement within those officers designated for senior command appointments. The definition, acquisition of, and military benefits associated with cultural awareness training will be further discussed in the next chapter.

This chapter has analysed Canadian strategic culture and the culture of the CF which is subordinate to it. Of note is the definite need for a particular CF culture and how conflict between the dimensions of Canadian popular culture and the military culture are resolved within the CF. Culture and leadership were discussed and cultural intelligence was shown to be a critical leadership capacity. While the CF has identified CQ as such, it has done relatively little to increase CQ in the CF.

If by *multiculturalism* we mean the existence of disparate cultures with no over-arching or uniting culture, can the imperatives of military culture exist along-side other cultures? Is there instead a need for the military culture to be superior to those of individual CF members? Essentially, should the CF strive to be 'more *multicultural*'? It seems that it should not. The emergence of the CF culture was in response to a common history, geography and Canadian strategic culture which the cultures of origin of CF members may not share. The continual refinement of CF culture by institutional leaders is in pursuit of military objectives while remaining true to Canadian society. Having no overarching or superior military culture to which individual sub-cultures must assimilate

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[119] *Ibid.*

does not seem viable given the nature of military service. That is not to say that the CF should not become more *diverse*. As will be shown in the next chapter, there are significant benefits to be derived from becoming a more diverse force that is united by a rigorous common culture. All those who serve in the CF must become assimilated into the CF culture, and the dialogue surrounding diversity in the CF should be reflective of that fact while also aggressively attacking the need for increased *diversity*.

CHAPTER 3

MILITARY BENEFITS AND LIABILITIES OF DIVERSITY

It is commonly said that the Canadian Forces' (CF) most valuable asset are its people. The individual skill sets and embodiment of the Canadian Military Values of duty, loyalty, integrity and courage are at the core of the CF's capability base. In the previous chapter it was argued that the CF should not strive to be more *multicultural* in nature as that implies that no overarching, superior or uniting culture exists. Multiculturalism stresses the equality of disparate cultures and does not subordinate any to another. It was previously argued that this is different from *diversity*, by which is meant the inclusion of numerous sub-cultures within and united by a common culture, in this case a CF one. The nature of military service has necessitated the genesis of a distinct CF culture, which while not static, must be considered to displace members' individual cultures. Striving to make the CF more ethnically representative of the Canadian population is a goal in keeping with the Employment Equity Act, but is that in itself sufficient impetus?[120] What are the tangible military benefits that would likely result from the diversification of the CF and with what degree of rigour should these benefits be pursued?

This paper will not speculate on what the future global security environment will look like. The CF may be called upon at any time to venture to far flung lands in the

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[120] Department of National Defence, *Canadian Forces Employment Equity Report 2010-2011* (Ottawa, ON: Department of National Defence,[2011]), 2.

pursuit of Canada's national interests there. Some, like retired French Army Colonel

Henri Boré believe that the future military focus will be the African continent. He

assesses that with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan largely behind the West and the US in

particular, Africa looms on the strategic horizon due to the lack of security on the

continent and the ability of terrorist groups to capitalize on that lack of security to build

operational bases.[121]   In an interview with the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation,

Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper corroborated the assessment that the "biggest

security threat to Canada a decade after 9/11 is Islamic terrorism".[122] If we assume that

the heart of near future conflicts will be the disruption of ideological and/or religious

fanaticism, how do we prepare ourselves to fight in these wars?

Recent experience fighting insurgency and terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan have

led some to believe that culture should be regarded as a centre of gravity in prosecuting

these operations. In an Infantry Magazine article entitled *Cultural Understanding: The

Cornerstone of Success in a COIN Environment,* US Army Major Mark Leslie wrote that

"it is indisputable that the population is the center of gravity in a COIN fight, and

therefore, our understanding of their culture and our attitude and demeanor in respect to

that should be a significant factor that is taken into consideration".[123] Similarly, retired

Admiral Eric Olson, former commander of US Special Operations Command, stressed

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[121] Henri Boré, "Cultural Awareness and Irregular Warfare: French Army Experience in Africa," *Military Review* 86, no. 4 (Jul/Aug 2006, 2006): 2.

[122] Canadian Broadcasting Corporation News, "Harper Says 'Islamicism' Biggest Threat to Canada," http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2011/09/06/harper-911-terrorism-islamic-interview.html (accessed 10/26/2011, 2011).

[123] Mark S. Leslie, "CULTURAL UNDERSTANDING: The Cornerstone of Success in a COIN Environment," *Infantry* 96, no. 4 (Jul/Aug 2007, 2007): 2.

that while "manhunting, killing and capturing the enemy…was crucial in the short term[,] in the longer term…getting to know local people, choosing where to dig new wells, building schools, training the country's military -- was more effective in winning the war".[124] Even if culture is not the centre of gravity in a specific military operation, it is clear that culture will have an impact on future wars, and very likely a large one. Former Canadian General Romeo Dallaire notes that "many factors besides military power can influence the success in complex resolution situations[,] cultural perceptions and societal sensitivities are among the most influential".[125] This appreciation for the importance of cultural awareness in war was hard won. Recent conflict is replete with instances of cultural misunderstandings which have had operational consequences.

In *Lessons Learned – Culture and War*, diversity consultant Neil MacDonald identified several occurrences of cultural misunderstanding in past conflicts. One such instance occurred during the ill-fated Somalia campaign where the circled-finger A-OK sign used by western troops is considered an insulting gesture.[126] Imagine the population's reaction when patrolling foreign soldiers essentially gave everyone 'the finger'. Another example which garnered international media attention was the two-fingered peace symbol used by American troops greeting Serbs. Unfortunately the symbol was commonly used among their enemies, the Croats.[127] A cultural faux pas is one thing which can be avoided with cultural sensitivity training, but the acquisition of

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[124] Michael Evans, "Special Forces Get Lessons from Lawrence of Arabia [Edition 2]," *The Times,* Apr 2, 2010.

[125] Neil MacDonald, *Lessons Learned - Culture and War (*Canadian Defence Academy, [2009]), 1.

[126] *Ibid.*, 27.

[127] *Ibid.*, 27.

capabilities such as linguistics are significantly more difficult and time consuming to obtain. From his Rwanda experience, Dallaire has cited several circumstances where the inability of his force to speak the local language had negative strategic effects. The high level of illiteracy in the operating area meant that radio was the primary means of public communication. "The lack of linguistic capability…put the command at a distinct disadvantage because it could not counter the negative propaganda that aroused the antagonists to such a murderous frenzy."[128] Compounding the lack of linguistics was a dearth of awareness about almost any aspect of Rwandan culture.[129]

In specific reference to the 2003 Iraq war and US forces, social anthropologist Montgomery McFate of the United States Institute of Peace, advanced development of a cultural database to bolster the knowledge of deploying troops. In doing so she remarked not only on the importance of cultural knowledge but also on the effect that a lack of cultural awareness had on operations and identified barriers to the acquisition of cultural knowledge among the troops. McFate categorized these barriers as:

>   -low spending priority on social science;
>   -high priority spending on military hardware;
>   -lack of shared research among government agencies;
>   -incorrect assumption by one agency that another is conducting the research;
>   -over reliance of the military on external subject matter experts;

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[128] *Ibid.*, 28.

[129] *Ibid.*

-too few personnel who have country/region linguistic skills or cultural knowledge[130]

The barriers McFate identified were all systemic in nature and changeable. As such, McFate identified four specific recommendations for the amelioration of cultural awareness among US forces:

-initiation of a large-scale social science research program;

-development of a centralized database for each country/region where troops are likely to be deployed;

-expansion of current academic programs…to bring young scholars into government service;

-creation by the federal government of a centralized clearing house for all socio-cultural related research and practices with easy access for military command.[131]

The response to McFate's recommendations has been remarkable. War and culture have become flourishing areas of research and the genesis of the US Human Terrain System is manifestly due to her recommendations. Two historical examples of cultural awareness in particular which have garnered much recent study are the exploits of T.E. Lawrence and David Galula.

T.E. Lawrence 'of Arabia' is perhaps the most well-known example of cultural awareness and the exploitation thereof in the waging of war. His role and recounting of the Arab Revolt against Turkey during the First World War has experienced resurgence

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[130] *Ibid.*, 7.

[131] *Ibid.*, 8.

in popularity lately as a result of McFate's work.[132] Even popular media culture has tuned into the US military's concentration on Lawrence and his lessons for the conduct of counter-insurgency operations in Iraq.[133] Lawrence is best known for his successful exploitation of tribal fighters who were more knowledgeable of local terrain and skirmishing techniques than conventional forces of the time would have been.   In *T.E. Lawrence and the Character of the Arabs,* Jeffrey Meyers wrote that Lawrence "invented a new kind of guerrilla warfare-with sudden strikes and unexpected detonations-that avoided high Arab casualties but inflicted carnage on the static Turks, and transformed a series of separate incidents into an effective military operation".[134] In spite of dissimilarities between the US and Britain's imperial past, broad similarities in their own Iraq conflict were noted and not wanting to be 'the Turks', the US felt they could glean much from Lawrence's tactics and knowledge of the human terrain.[135]

The 1956-58 Algerian experience of Lieutenant Colonel David Galula of the French Army has also risen in popularity as a result of the West's most recent wars. For Galula, population control was the key to success; the people were certainly the centre of gravity in his counter-insurgency operations. US Army Lieutenant Colonel Terence Daly effectively summarized Galula's center of gravity in a recent *Military Review* article:

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[132] T. E. Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* (London, UK: Alden Press, 1935), 700.

[133] Oliver Poole, "Pentagon Promotes Words of Wisdom by Lawrence of Arabia," *The Daily Telegraph,* Jul 6, 2005.

[134] Jeffrey Meyers, "T. E. Lawrence and the Character of the Arabs," *The Virginia Quarterly Review* 80, no. 4 (Fall 2004, 2004): 136.

[135] Poole, *Pentagon Promotes Words of Wisdom by Lawrence of Arabia*.

…only by gaining and keeping control of the population can the counterinsurgent establish the secure environment in which those who support the counterinsurgent and his cause can come forward to organize for their own governance and eventual self-protection.[136]

Conventional military forces are not traditionally well-equipped to deal with close-quarters relationships with the populace. When operating in such close proximity, it is not merely the actions of senior officers through access to media that affect the population, it is every soldier on patrol that has an impact on how the force is perceived. Leslie points out that "in COIN, there is a lot of gray area; there is a lot of room for low-level leaders to make cultural mistakes that could affect the strategic level".[137] It is because of this 'strategic corporal' concept that service members at all levels have much to gain from McFate's recommendations. By educating the lower-level in the avoidance of potential cultural pitfalls, higher level commanders are freed from damage-control to focus instead on the manipulation of the cultural battlespace in order to achieve strategic aims.

In spite of the lessons re-learned from the study of Lawrence and Galula, Neil MacDonald notes that there "is a wide-ranging debate centered on the need for cultural training".[138] On one side of the argument is the intense enthusiasm for cultural awareness training demonstrated through the recent myriad of research that militaries have

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[136] Terence J. Daly, "Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice," *Military Review* 86, no. 5 (Sep/Oct 2006, 2006): 113.

[137] Leslie, *CULTURAL UNDERSTANDING: The Cornerstone of Success in a COIN Environment*, 9.

[138] MacDonald, *Lessons Learned - Culture and War*, 4.

conducted on the topic.[139] On the other hand, some in the academic community have

objected to the use of social scientists and academic research for the betterment of war.[140]

The American Anthropological Association (AAA) in particular, has made it their

position that the US Army's Human Terrain System (HTS) of embedding anthropologists

into military units "is likely to put anthropologists in positions in which they might

violate their professional Code of Ethics".[141] As described in a 2009 report on the US

Army's HTS, the specific tenets of the AAA Code of Ethics in peril are:

1) disclosure of research purposes to research subjects;
2) maintenance of research subject confidentiality;
3) disclosure of risk to research subjects;
4) avoiding (or mitigating) harm to research subjects;
5) voluntary participation;
6) dissemination of research to the sponsor and public.[142]

If social scientists employed in the HTS are members of the AAA and bound by

these tenets, it is understandable that the AAA would object to the study of culture for the

betterment of war. How could any military abide by these tenets and still conduct

cultural research to obtain a military advantage? It seems unlikely that while studying

local cultures for the purpose of winning a war that anyone would disclose the purpose of

their research activities or the level of risk to the enemy after requesting their permission

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[139] *Ibid.*

[140] *Ibid.*

[141] *Ibid.*

[142] AAA Commission on the Engagement of Anthropology with the US Security and Intelligence Communities, *The Army's Human Terrain System Proof of Concept Program (*American Anthropological Association,[2009]), 66.

to study them. Failing to do so violates AAA tenets 1, 3 and 5. Nor is it likely that the military would avoid doing harm to an enemy they were studying in order to avoid compromising tenet 4; controlled violence is the nature of war.

If however, military social scientists were referred to by some name other that 'anthropologist' and were not bound by the AAA code of ethics, would this debate have merit? The literature shows a definite objection by anthropologists to the use of their profession and corresponding code of ethics within war zones, but is this objection shared by the majority of those with a background in social sciences? What if military social scientists were not anthropologists but were considered in a similar manner to other supporting occupations such as military lawyers, engineers and logisticians? Military social scientists would advise commanders on cultural matters related to operational goals but not be employed in positions of command authority vis-à-vis combat operations. To further insulate themselves from AAA concerns, military social scientists could focus on the general aspects of cultures, vice the specific aspects of any individual culture when briefing commanders. This approach is consistent with the stated task of the HTS to "recruit, train, deploy, and support an embedded, operationally focused sociocultural capability; conduct operationally relevant, sociocultural research and analysis; develop and maintain a sociocultural knowledge base" and their stated purpose to "support operational decision-making, enhance operational effectiveness, and preserve

and share sociocultural institutional knowledge" without jeopardizing the AAA code of ethics.[143]

Having concluded that increased cultural awareness is a reasonable and achievable goal of military forces and having identified Lawrence, Galula and McFate as designers of cultural awareness training, investigation of the means and methods of cultural awareness instruction is warranted. The experiences and writings of Leslie and Boré, who have both served in counter-insurgency operations, as well as the research of Neil MacDonald will form the basis of this discussion.

The first aspect of cultural awareness training is that it must be initiated as early as possible during a combat workup process and that the training must be embedded in all aspects and levels of training.[144] This has the desired effect of simultaneously creating 'strategic corporals' and practicing senior command in considering operational planning and cultural factors. By embedding cultural training as early and robustly as possible, the consideration of cultural factors becomes part of a unit's operating culture.

During combat workup processes, preparation time is usually limited and precious. This is particularly true of units that are deploying to volatile regions with limited warning. There may be a tendency to omit or truncate cultural awareness training

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[143] "HTS Home " http://humanterrainsystem.army.mil/ (accessed 3/3/2012, 2012).

[144] Leslie, *CULTURAL UNDERSTANDING: The Cornerstone of Success in a COIN Environment*, 7.

in the interest of time. The importance of cultural awareness requires that this not be the case.[145]

Cultural awareness should be conducted holistically but with specific reference to the types of tasks that forces expect to conduct while deployed. As a combat multiplier, cultural awareness should be trained in such a way that it is relevant to each soldier's trade.[146] Cultural awareness training for infantry soldiers should be conducted in a way that is relevant to them, and should be conducted in a different manner than what is given to a medical specialist or an engineering officer as each will likely face a different set of cultural interactions and challenges while deployed.

This targeted cultural training must take place in as realistic a situation as possible. Cultural training is commonly associated with and often given as academic-style lectures that detail the 'do's and don'ts' of living in a host nation society. While classroom instruction lays the foundation of cultural awareness training, it is in exposure to practical military situations which are influenced by host-nation culture, where the most valuable training lies.[147] Research on the efficacy of training methods favours highly integrated[148] and interactive approaches over stand-alone classroom ones.[149]

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[145] *Ibid.*

[146] *Ibid.*

[147] *Ibid.*

[148] MacDonald, *Lessons Learned - Culture and War*, 30.

[149] *Ibid.*, 31.

The experience of the French Army in Africa that Henri Boré cites, provides a practical example of successful cultural awareness training. Having understood the necessity of conducting cultural awareness training as early as possible, even before deployment planning starts, French "platoon leaders go through an overseas operations training course designed primarily to teach them how to fight an insurgency. They learn about the diversity of African cultures, traditions, and war fighting approaches".[150] Boré, an inexperienced platoon commander when he was first exposed to cultural training, praised its practicality for having taught him "how to be both a rifleman and a vital intelligence collector" and "how to translate subtle changes in the population's habits or in individual behaviors into vital intelligence data".[151] Beyond the specifics he learned about African cultures, he was sensitized to the fact that there was a great deal he did not know. He "became familiar with the iceberg metaphor, which served to remind [him] that one key to mission success is knowing about the expanse of culture that exists below the surface of immediate perception".[152]

In order to conceptualize the continuum of cultural training and its applicability to multiculturalism in the CF, the terminology identified by Leslie is of particular value. Leslie defines a continuum from cultural awareness to cultural competence that describes the degree to which culture is understood and applied to military aims. Cultural awareness is defined as the ability to recognize and understand that culture plays a role in a given military operation. Cultural consideration refers to a level of understanding

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[150] Boré, *Cultural Awareness and Irregular Warfare: French Army Experience in Africa*, 110.

[151] *Ibid.*

[152] *Ibid.*, 111.

beyond cultural awareness about why it is necessary to study applicable aspects of culture, and how to go about studying it. Cultural knowledge refers to exposure to the history, facts and figures of a culture. Cultural understanding refers to having acquired a sufficient level of cultural knowledge to make general determinations about the thoughts and motivations of peoples of a specific a culture. Cultural competence is the combination of cultural understanding with the notion of cultural intelligence (recall CQ from chapter 2) to arrive at an internalized understanding or insight into how a culture operates, beyond what has been explicitly taught. Cultural competence implies a level of insight into the "intentions of specific actors and groups".[153]

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[153] Leslie, *CULTURAL UNDERSTANDING: The Cornerstone of Success in a COIN Environment*, 8.

| Cultural Awareness	Cultural Consideration	Cultural Knowledge	Cultural Understanding	Cultural Competence
Knowledge that culture plays a role in military operations	Knowledge about the importance and methods of studying culture	Exposure to the history and general facts and figures of a culture	General insight into cultural thought processes and motivations	Specific and implicit cultural insight into the intentions of individuals and groups

Figure 3.1 - Cultural Training Continuum

How realistic is it to expect that any level of military cultural training beyond *cultural knowledge* can actually be obtained? The development of *cultural understanding* and *competence* in the CF may require a level of cultural immersion that is beyond what can actually be accomplished. The military benefits of cultural exploitation that Lawrence achieved were extraordinary, but are they reasonably repeatable? The degree to which Lawrence was able to morph into an Arab was not formed merely by studying their ways. Indeed, Lawrence himself had been a student of archeology and

"had learned to admire the Arabs during the tranquil digs before the outbreak of war".[154]

It was partly Lawrence's lengthy cultural immersion that developed his impressive

cultural competence. Beyond cultural immersion however, Lawrence's *cultural*

competence was also very much a product of the various compulsions inherent in his own

personality. Meyers points out the aspects of Lawrence's personality that almost

certainly played a large role in Lawrence's success. Lawrence was "a lonely person from

an austere background" and "he was delighted by their tribal brotherhood" [155]. His

narcissism was satisfied by the Arabs colorful and embroidered clothing while "their

delicious intimacy appealed to his homosexuality" [156]. Lawrence was particularly

attracted to the austere lifestyle of the Arabs, "their compulsion to deny the

body…matched his own hatred of the physical and…their inhuman endurance…matched

his own need for self-punishment.[157] Lawrence's personal history and psychology casts

doubt on the possibility that cultural training will yield any results in the future that are

comparable to those of Lawrence.

In addition to the argument that culture cannot be learned within the timelines

available to militaries or that personality traits are really the overriding element of

cultural competence, there is a question of the extent to which the West is willing to

exploit the types of cultural differences that in the past were essential to the winning of

wars. Studying and developing an understanding of a host-nation in order to endear

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[154] Meyers, *T. E. Lawrence and the Character of the Arabs*, 136.

[155] *Ibid.*

[156] *Ibid.*

[157] *Ibid.*

yourself to it or intellectually dissecting an enemy culture in order to defeat it is one thing, it is entirely another to exploit the norms of another culture in order to conduct military operations that are outside the moral bounds of your own force. Is it possible or should it be permitted for the Western military conscious to use such tactics? This type of cultural exploitation was required by Lawrence. Meyers wrote about an instance where "Lawrence-a foreigner and outsider-was forced to execute a murderer to avoid a blood feud that would have undermined their ability to fight the Turks".[158] During the Arab Revolt, the intersection of Lawrence's personality and the Arab culture encouraged several "unremitting massacres…as revenge for Turkish slaughter of the Arabs, as well as to satisfy his own lust for blood".[159] It is unlikely that the law and conscious of Western forces would permit such an act today. By becoming *competent* in a foreign culture, might we risk subjugating parts of our own culture to the mission or otherwise knowingly put ourselves in a position to offend the foreign culture?

Even if we are successful at exploiting cultural differences in a way that we find morally acceptable and achieve victory at the tactical and operational levels of war, it is still entirely possible that we could experience strategic defeat. By manipulating someone at such a fundamental level may cause wounds that take much longer to heal and could create enduring animosity. As Meyers points out, Lawrence's success in the Middle East was relatively short lived and has not resulted in a lasting strategic victory in the region. According to Meyers, "to fulfill his promises and assuage his conscience, [Lawrence] helped establish conservative Arab kings who, although loyal to Britain, were

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[158] *Ibid.*, 140.

[159] *Ibid.*

unable to govern. By fulfilling dynastic ambitions, he helped to create a time bomb in the

Middle East".[160] A resentment of the West has endured in the Middle East long after

Lawrence has left. Perhaps the cultural exploitation accomplished by Lawrence is

indicative of the fact that the GLOBE dimensions of some cultures are just so different as

to render them irreconcilable. Meyers rather directly points out the futility of asserting

Western geo-political ideology into the Middle East "which is still corrupt and torn by

religious and tribal conflicts"[161] today. "The Arabs, in the six thousand years since

Babylon" Meyers concludes, "have never had a democratic government".[162]

Having considered the benefits of cultural awareness and the inherent difficulty in

attaining it, wither the CF? Given that cultural awareness training already takes place

prior to some international deployments and that at best, a degree of *cultural knowledge*

is attained, is the CF doing enough? Overcoming the challenge of attaining any

significant level of *cultural knowledge* and beyond is where the CF has the most to gain

from recruiting diversity. Diversity will give the CF an inherent degree of *cultural*

competence rapidly and with minimal additional training or human resource bill. The CF

should strive to not only educate members in culture, but also to recruit individuals that

already have heightened levels of cultural intelligence or *cultural competence*. By

recruiting diversity, the CF will have at its disposal individuals who are already aware of

the most nuanced aspects of foreign cultures. The benefits of recruiting diversity will

begin to be felt at the tactical level in approximately five years, the time it commonly

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[160] *Ibid.*, 143.

[161] *Ibid.*

[162] *Ibid.*

takes to train and advance officers and non-commissioned members into junior leadership roles. The operational and strategic benefits of recruiting diversity are unlikely to be realized until fifteen years after a dedicated campaign begins as that is about how long it takes for officers and non-commissioned members to advance into senior appointments. It is worth investigating some systematic method to ensure that diversity is recognized as a factor for potential career advancement. Given that the bilingual nature of Canada and the operational benefits of bilingualism have translated into points on CF merit boards, it logically follows that members of the CF who bring diverse cultural capabilities should also be recognized. The challenge will be to separate cultural capability from ethnicity; just because someone looks a certain way, does not mean that they possess a deeper understanding of culture than does anyone else. Diversity recognition should be instituted for what it is, recognition of the possession of a critical combat capability, not an ethnic background. It is recognized that such an approach may prove controversial.

The major liability associated with diversity in the military is the concept of divided loyalties. The encouragement of high levels of *diversity* in the CF may strain the enculturation process and risk developing a *multicultural* environment. This might manifest itself in two ways. First, it is possible that diverse members of the force are not accepted by the majority owing to their cultural differences. In Canada, this is unlikely to transpire due to the multicultural nature of the country. Alternatively it is possible that diverse members never fully assimilate into the military culture due to ties to their culture of origin. This would result in questionable loyalties and likely a decrease in *internal integration*. Boré wrote of the challenges of working closely with members of another culture. Boré found that on some occasions "loyalty to lineage, family, and religious and

ethnic groups often far outweigh[ed] allegiance to the state or national institutions".[163] There is an inherent risk that "ethnic and religious obedience, as well as caste identity, remain particularly strong, shaping mentalities and conditioning behaviours".[164]

In this chapter, the benefits and liabilities of a more diverse CF were explored. The role of cultural awareness training was identified as being critical to the success of future operations, in no small part to avoid cultural misunderstandings. The CF is in the enviable position of being able to draw from the highly multicultural society it serves for its recruiting base. By recruiting diversity, the CF will be able to go beyond the limits of cultural awareness training and operationalize *cultural understanding* and *competence* with a minimal increase in resources. There is a risk of divided loyalties inherent with such a strategy, but the process of military enculturation, and the nature of Canadian multiculturalism will mitigate against it. In order to fully realize a diverse force at senior levels, it is suggested that 'diversity points' be considered for CF merit boards to recognize the inherent value in bone fide cultural understanding, this is not to be confused with belonging to an ethnic group. Recognizing that this will likely be a contentious suggestion, it appears to be no different philosophically from the way in which bilingualism is recognized for potential advancement. In the next chapter the challenges associated with recruiting diversity will be discussed.

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[163] Boré, *Cultural Awareness and Irregular Warfare: French Army Experience in Africa*, 110.
[164] *Ibid*.

CHAPTER 4

RECRUITING DIVERSITY

In the previous chapter, the benefits of a diverse Canadian Forces (CF) were discussed. Cultural training conducted prior to the deployment of troops overseas is at best a temporary solution to the lack of *cultural knowledge* in the CF. A more permanent solution is to generate an inherent cultural diversity from within the CF which would more naturally sensitize the force to cultural differences and lead to the development of *cultural understanding* and perhaps *competence*. Diversity will increase sensitivity to cultural differences through peer exposure, and diverse individuals will have a direct influence on CF activities through the duration of their employment. The distinction between cultural diversity and ethnic origin was discussed and it was determined that the former is what the CF should strive to recruit, the latter being meaningless from an operational effectiveness standpoint.

Having determined the need for increased diversity within the CF, this chapter will discuss the recruitment of diversity as well as postulate several reasons why the CF is not recruiting the level of diversity desired. An exhaustive analysis of the CF recruiting system is beyond the scope of this chapter which will instead endeavour to raise questions about recruiting that warrant further examination.

At present, the recruitment of diversity in the CF is understood in a context of making the CF 'look more like' Canadian society. There is a sense that the ethnic

diversity of the CF should be reflective of the overall ethnic diversity of Canadian society. This notion of ethnic representation is codified in the Employment Equity Act (EE), under which the CF came in 2002. Since falling under EE the CF has "striven to reflect the face of the Canadian population it serves".[165] While the CF strives to reflect the face of the Canadian population it serves, there is also an appreciation of the unique purpose of military service which informs the application of EE to the CF. The Canadian Forces Employment Equity Regulations (CFEER) "adapt the provisions of that Act to accommodate the Canadian Forces, taking into account their operational effectiveness".[166] Section 7 of the CFEER allows the CF, through the National Defence Act (NDA), to enroll and retain individuals on the basis that they are "at all times liable to perform any lawful duty".[167] This liability to perform any lawful duty at any time, in order to remain operationally effective, restricts service in the CF to those who are fit to serve above else. It is from this imperative for military action that the CF derives modification to the applicability of the EE Act. In chapter 2, the existence of a distinct CF culture that fuses Canadian societal values with specific military values was discussed. This military culture and the various characteristics of service life "collectively known as the Military Factor, set it apart from other professions and make direct comparisons with civilian occupations difficult".[168]

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[165] Department of National Defence, *Canadian Forces Employment Equity Report 2010-2011*, 2.

[166] Minister of Justice, *Canadian Forces Employment Equity Regulations*, 6.

[167] *Ibid*., 4. and *National Defence Act,* (1985): 24.

[168] Department of National Defence, *Canadian Forces Employment Equity Report 2010-2011*, 2.

The most recent CF report on employment equity, dated September 2011, stated a targeted visible minority enrollment of 11.8%[169]. This is more than double the reported enrollment of 4.6%[170]. What is this number based on? Given that more than 16% of the Canadian population self-identified in the 2006 census as being a visible minority, how is a target of 11.8% arrived at?[171] There appears to be a degree to which the CF concludes it should be representative of the Canadian population which modifies the census results to arrive at this smaller percentage. If so, how is that factor determined? Is the number based on what the CF determines to be reasonably achievable in order to avoid grossly failing to meet targets?

Perhaps a rethinking of the visible minority enrollment metric is required. An enrollment metric that uses service requirements as its basis may be favourable. Given the benefits of recruiting diversity identified in chapter 3, the CF could change its thinking from one of recruiting popular representation to one of recruiting critical cultural capabilities. The CF could view the recruitment of diversity as the 'procurement' of *cultural competence* to its ranks, diminishing the need for challenging and time consuming cultural training. This is not to say that striving to reach the goals of EE should be abandoned, but rather that a more holistic approach to recruiting that considers the specific military advantages of a diverse military force may yield better operational results.

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[169] *Ibid.*, 4.

[170] *Ibid*.

[171] Statistics Canada, *Canada's Ethnocultural Mosaic, 2006 Census* (Ottawa: Government of Canada,[2008]), 5.

Critics of this shift to targeting cultural skillsets for recruitment should not confuse the advantages of recruiting diversity with the exploitation of an individual's culture of origin. The challenge of implementing a strategy to recruit individuals from cultures specifically targeted for their potential military benefit is compounded by the fact that at present targeted recruiting is not conducted by the regular component of the CF. Essential to improving recruiting practices is the study of the reasons why visible minorities are not enrolling in numbers proportional to their representation in the overall population. Diversity expert Neil MacDonald has recommended that the Canadian Defence Academy research the successes and failures of the CF in recruiting from ethnocultural communities in order to better understand this phenomenon.[172]

To what extent do newcomers consider themselves accepted by Canadian society and what bearing, if any, does this have on their propensity to join the CF? If they feel accepted in Canada, why is the CF not more representative of Canada's ethnic diversity? If they do not feel accepted, is it more likely that they will join the CF in order to gain that acceptance or that they will avoid national institutions such as the CF altogether? This chapter will first examine the nature of societal integration, the difference between integration and assimilation and look at the arguments for and against the success of social integration in Canadian society.

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[172] MacDonald, *Lessons Learned - Culture and War*, 40.

The scale of the Canadian integration construct is massive. In 2006, 6.1 million individuals living in Canada were born outside its borders.[173] They are collectively known as first generation Canadians. In 2006, first generation Canadians accounted for 23.9% of the total population aged 15 and over.[174] While there are varying degrees of cultural similarity between established Canadians and first generation Canadians, the sheer volume of immigration represents a challenge to integration. The challenge of integrating newcomers into Canadian society is not based solely on volume, but also on the cultures of origin from whence new Canadians came. The more divergent the culture of origin is from Canadian culture, the bigger the integration challenge. The extent to which Canada is admitting immigrants from non-Western parts of the world (South-Asians and Chinese are the most populace visible minorities in Canada)[175], poses at least as significant a challenge to societal integration as does the volume of recent newcomers.

Canada has not always practiced cultural integration. In their article *Canadian Multiculturalism: Global Anxieties and Local Debates,* Banting and Kymlicka characterize Canada's early immigration practices as assimilationist. They write that in the past "immigrants were encouraged and expected to assimilate to the pre-existing British mainstream culture, with the hope that over time they would become indistinguishable from native-born British Canadians in their speech, dress, recreation and way of life generally".[176] Not only was assimilation expected, but immigration

[173] Department of National Defence, *Canadian Forces Employment Equity Report 2010-2011*, 9.

[174] *Ibid*.

[175] Statistics Canada, *Canada's Ethnocultural Mosaic, 2006 Census*, 5.

[176] Banting and Kymlicka, *Canadian Multiculturalism: Global Anxieties and Local Debates*, 4.

policies were tailored to only permit the entry into Canada those peoples that were deemed capable of cultural assimilation. Those such as Asians and Africans who were deemed incapable of assimilating, were denied access.[177]

At the root of assimilationist theory is the construct of cultural relativism. In her book *Ethics: The Fundamentals*, philosopher Julia Driver describes cultural relativism as the way in which people tend to associate the level of "rightness of an action…by what people in a given culture, by and large, believe".[178] Cultural relativism explains the notion that while something may be considered impermissible in one culture, it may be encouraged by another. That "cultural differences in moral beliefs and attitudes exists is a certainty" to Driver.[179] To previous generations of Canadian policymakers, the inherent rightness of Canadian society justified the assimilation of newcomers to void them of the inherent wrongness of aspects of their parent cultures.

In *Whose War Is It?* Jack Granatstein recounts the history of a Second World War era bureaucrat who wrestled with the task of assimilating new Canadians with a view to ensuring they would not pose national security risks. In 1939, Norman Robertson of the Department of External Affairs suggested a heavy handed approach to dealing with German pro-Nazi Bundists and Italian Fascisti groups in Canada in the event of war. "He proposed that the government make full use of the law to block the import of seditious,

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[177] *Ibid*.

[178] Julia Driver, *Ethics: The Fundamentals* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2007), 14.

[179] *Ibid*., 15.

disloyal, or scurrilous propaganda".[180] Robertson designed a plan to leverage the full

extent of state resources to control anti-Canadian propaganda including the targeted

auditing of tax returns and RCMP investigations of applicants for naturalization.[181] The

dire circumstances of the looming global war made palatable these measures. But

Robertson also saw the advantage of integration techniques to defeat foreign cultural

influence. Robertson made recommendations for the provision of English classes, social

workers, legal aid and medical care which considered the well-being and integration of

recent immigrants.[182] He proposed that national media outlets such as the Canadian

Broadcasting Corporation and the National Film Board be used to assist enculturation and

encouraged community involvement for newcomers in political parties, churches and

community groups.[183] This two pronged approach of screening applicants for admission

while encouraging the integration of newcomers has essentially endured in Canada

through the use of merit based immigration criteria and 'welcome literature'.[184]

Is there anything to the notion that some cultures are more 'integratable' than

others? It seems an anachronistic idea given the collective disuse of the notion of 'race'

in the academic literature. If it is the case that there is nothing from preventing all

individuals from integrating into Canadian society, why then does Reitz conclude that

"ethnic attachments among visible minorities are strong, and remain stronger over time

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[180] Granatstein, *Whose War is it?*, 174.

[181] *Ibid.*

[182] *Ibid.*, 175.

[183] *Ibid.*

[184] Citizenship and Immigration Canada, *Welcome to Canada: What You should Know* (Ottawa, ON: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2010), 1-51.

and through generations, compared to minorities of European origins"?[185] Reitz believes

that the answer may be found in the degree to which visible minorities are treated as

equals in Canadian society. Furthermore, "the data suggest that it is discriminatory

inequality that is most critical".[186] That discrimination exists at an individual level for

some Canadians is certainly true. Does systematic discrimination lead to the

disenfranchisement of ethnic groups and result in their failure to join institutions like the

CF? It is possible, and perceptions about discrimination in society and within society

should be better understood in order for the CF to recruit diversity.

Canada has developed from a concept of assimilation to one of integration. The

difference between the two essentially boils down to the degree to which Canadians of all

cultural backgrounds are meant to share a common Canadian culture. Recall from

chapter 1 that assimilation requires that an acculturating culture give up significant parts

of their cultural identity that do not fit in the dominant culture, while integration implies

maintaining one's cultural identity intact during interactions with the dominant culture.[187]

In *Marketing Canadian Pluralism in the International Arena,* Kymlicka writes that since

the late 1960's a dramatic reversal of the assimilationist approach occurred in two ways.

First "the adoption of race-neutral admissions criteria" allowed increasing immigration

from non-European societies and second, by

> …the adoption of a more multicultural conception of integration, one
> which expects that many immigrants will visibly and proudly express

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[185] Reitz, *Behavioural Precepts of Multiculturalism: Empirical Validity and Policy Implications*, 160.

[186] *Ibid.*, 168.

[187] Berry, *Intercultural Relations in Plural Societies*, 14.

their ethnic identity, and which accepts an obligation on the part of public institutions to accommodate these ethnic identities".[188]

There are two sides to the debate about the role that multiculturalism has played in the integration of new Canadians. Jack Granatstein cites recent cultural clashes in the Netherlands, France and Britain, each with its own distinct approach to multicultural policy, as evidence that multicultural integration results in some immigrants being "excluded from the mainstream".[189] To combat this in Canada, he proposes that "we must make Canadians of those who come here"[190]. This point of view essentially argues that by allowing disparate cultural groups to exist, they congregate and self-segregate from the rest of Canadian society, with negative security consequences.

The other view is that by allowing disparate cultures to exist, they do not fear assimilation and are more likely to engage in integration activities. Reitz points out that "properly directed [ethnic community development] may actually bolster resources within ethnic communities that serve to promote social integration".[191] Where these two arguments converge is the realization that support for diversity alone will not ensure integration of newcomers. There is a requirement for the active participation of communities and government to assist in the integration process if it is to be effective.[192]

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[188] Kymlicka, *Marketing Canadian Pluralism in the International Arena*, 5.

[189] Granatstein, *Whose War is it?*, 179.

[190] *Ibid*.

[191] Reitz, *Behavioural Precepts of Multiculturalism: Empirical Validity and Policy Implications*, 170.

[192] *Ibid*.

It is the specific nature of these integration activities that will likely remain the source of debate for some time.

Given these two perspectives on the role that multicultural policy has played in either building or dividing Canadian society, how well has Canada fared in integrating newcomers? What are the arguments for the success or failure of Canadian integration? From a CF recruitment point of view, what, if any, link exists between the successful integration of newcomers and their propensity to join the CF?

It is interesting to preface this discussion with the notion of cultural learning proposed by Clotaire Rappaille, author of the popular book *The Culture Code.* Rappaille argues that the majority of our learning is accomplished during our childhood. "By the time we are seven" says Rappaille, "most of our mental highways have been constructed". [193] His emphasis on the importance of youth is of note to the enculturation of second generation Canadians; the first to be born here. In addition to youth, Rappaille theorizes that emotion is the most important process in the learning of culture. By having a strong positive or negative emotional response, memories are more easily created and retained.[194] His emphasis is on the instinctive nature of emotional learning and proposes that "it is in our reptilian brains that the real answers lie".[195] Rapaille details several principles of enculturation which at their heart state that: (1) culture is imprinted through

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[193] Clotaire Rapaille, *The Culture Code* (New York, NY: Broadway Books, 2006), 17.

[194] *Ibid.*

[195] *Ibid.*, 15.

highly emotional processes[196] and (2) there is a finite time in one's life for the imprinting of cultural values.[197] He believes that these principles offer "irrefutable evidence that there is an American mind, just as there is a French mind, an English mind, a Kurdish mind, and a Latvian mind". Rappaille argues that "every culture has its own mindset, and that mind-set teaches us about who we are in profound ways".[198] If Rappaille is correct, how does the multicultural nature of Canada integrate anyone into a distinctly Canadian society if first generation Canadians have already been enculturated and are encouraged to teach subsequent generations their ancestral culture from an early age?

Granatstein has suggested that the "reaction of ethnic groups to such events as the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict and the Canadian Forces participation in the Gulf or in the Former Yugoslavia might well be explained as a failure of Canada to integrate newcomers to the body politic".[199] Is sympathy for old country issues indicative of a failure to integrate newcomers or the outcome of Canada's multicultural concept of integration? Here again is raised the question of 'how much' in terms of subordinating one's cultural origins to a distinctly Canadian culture.

Some believe that the most pressing security nexus to cultural integration facing the West today is that of Islamic fundamentalism. Moghissi et al believe that "like Africans historically" Muslims in the West "have become another prime example of a

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[196] *Ibid.*, 17.

[197] *Ibid.*, 21.

[198] *Ibid.*, 27.

[199] Granatstein, *Whose War is it?*, 168.

population against whom 'ethnic absolutism' is applied, and with destructive effects".[200]

They state that "the relationship between communities of Muslim culture and dominant

cultures in Canada and other countries in the West has changed" and that there is an

urgent need "to abandon the fixation on 'Islam' as the most important factor in defining

private and public behaviour, social expectations, and aspirations" as this leads to "an

unbalanced focus on differences between Muslim and non-Muslim citizens and

migrants".[201] From a security perspective it is appropriate that the stated aim of Islamic

terrorism be focused on, but Moghissi presents an interesting argument that the

segregation of a cultural group in Canada need not be precipitated by the group itself, in

fact it may not exist at all but only be imagined by the rest of society. Moghissi et al

argue that any perceived segregation of the Canadian Muslim community has been

imagined as a result of Canada having "developed the habit of talking only or mainly to

the most conservative and religiously orthodox elements in the community" which have

presented a perspective of religiously driven Islamic-Canadian cultural homogeneity.[202]

What data can be used as an effective measure of integration in Canada? If it is

the attainment of citizenship by newcomers, Reitz's finding that among "those

emphasizing the importance of ethnic customs and ancestries…acquisition of citizenship

is slower" suggests a failure to integrate.[203] If a 'sense of belonging' is used, Reitz

paradoxically found that while "minorities who maintain ethnic attachments do feel a

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[200] Moghissi, Rahnema and Goodman, *Diaspora by Design: Muslim Immigrants in Canada and Beyond*, 12.

[201] *Ibid.*, 15.

[202] *Ibid.*,193.

[203] Reitz, *Behavioural Precepts of Multiculturalism: Empirical Validity and Policy Implications*, 163.

stronger sense of belonging", they also "seem to be slower in developing a sense of identification with Canada".[204] Asking people directly seems to point to a failure to integrate as well; "in the 2006 Census, 10.1 million people, or 32.2% of the total population, reported Canadian as their only ethnic origin or in combination with other origins".[205] Trends in census metrics may indicate that not only is integration failing but also that the rate of failure is increasing; during the previous census in 2001 "11.7 million, or 39.4% of the population reported Canadian as their ethnic ancestry".[206]

In spite of these metrics, Reitz states that "there is no evidence that visible minorities are less interested to adopt a Canadian identity, or to acquire identification with Canada".[207] Having examined various aspects of the issue - economic, political, and social, the Institute for Research on Public Policy, a Canadian federal policy think tank, would agree in that "there is little evidence of the deep social segregation feared in parts of Europe, Canada is not 'sleepwalking into segregation'".[208] Why is it then that "when asked about the group to which they feel they belong today, the frequency with which visible minorities mention 'Canada' is less than for persons of European origins"?[209] The effect of multiculturalism policy on social cohesion is, to say the least, complicated, while contemporary discourse on the subject confounds as much as it reveals. Given the

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[204] *Ibid.*, 165.

[205] Department of National Defence, *Canadian Forces Employment Equity Report 2010-2011*, 8.

[206] *Ibid.*

[207] Reitz, *Behavioural Precepts of Multiculturalism: Empirical Validity and Policy Implications*, 162.

[208] Banting and Kymlicka, *Canadian Multiculturalism: Global Anxieties and Local Debates*, 8.

[209] Reitz, *Behavioural Precepts of Multiculturalism: Empirical Validity and Policy Implications*, 162.

complications of multiculturalism and social integration, how can the CF best approach recruiting?

From a CF perspective, a lack of integration into Canadian society might help explain the difficulties in recruiting diversity. What can be done by the CF to overcome any lack of social integration? It is interesting to note that while the Citizenship and Immigration Canada publication *Welcome to Canada* serves to inform recent immigrants about gender equality, the justice system and the trustworthiness of police services in Canada, it does not mention the role or character of the CF. [210] Perhaps this manual would be a good starting point in opening the dialogue with new Canadians that may never again be in a position to encounter their military service.

Related to the concept of a failure to integrate new Canadians are the concepts of divided loyalties, transnationalism and citizenship. These three elements of a failure to integrate may explain more directly why the CF struggles to recruit diversity.

The concept of divided loyalties questions the allegiance of new Canadians owing to the recentness of their immigration and to any dual citizenship they may have. It is intuitive that someone would not volunteer to serve in the CF if their loyalty was to another country. Satzewich questions the degree to which divided loyalties exist in Canada, citing that there is no compelling evidence that immigrants are not "loyal" to

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[210] Citizenship and Immigration Canada, *Welcome to Canada: What You should Know*, 1-51.

Canada or that racial and cultural separation is widespread in this country.[211] In

Development and Diasporic Capital, Pablo Bose counters that "political and economic

elites in developing countries pursue policies that facilitate the transfer of remittances,

and encourage economically successful members of diaspora communities to invest in

the country of ancestral origin to foster socioeconomic development".[212] What reasons

are there for new Canadians not to have divided loyalties? Satzewich points out that the

Government of Canada is complicit in encouraging people to have divided loyalties by

taking the citizenship of two nations.[213] The Department of Foreign Affairs and

International Trade offers a publication explaining how dual citizenship functions and

suggests that "many Canadians remain or become citizens of another country because of

practical advantages, including...a sense of belonging through personal ties to more than

one country".[214] With this kind of national looseness associated with the rights and

responsibilities of Canadian citizenship, is there really any doubt that divided loyalties

exist?   The CF must better understand if and how divided loyalties affect the recruitment

of new members.

        In *The Study of Transnationalism*, Alejando Portes writes that "there is a growing

number of persons who live dual lives: speaking two languages, having homes in two

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[211] Satzewich, *Multiculturalism, Transnationalism, and the Hijacking of Canadian Foreign Policy: A Pseudo-Problem?*, 8.

[212] Pablo Bose, "Development and Diasporic Capital: Non-Resident Indians and the State," in *Organizing the Transnational: Labour, Politics and Social Change* (Vancouver, BC: University of British Columbia Press, 2007), 173.

[213] Satzewich, *Multiculturalism, Transnationalism, and the Hijacking of Canadian Foreign Policy: A Pseudo-Problem?*, 5.

[214] "Dual Citizenship: What You Need to Know " http://www.voyage.gc.ca/publications/dual-citizenship_double-citoyennete-eng (accessed 2/27/2012, 2012).

countries, and making a living through regular continuous contact across national borders".[215] Going one step beyond the concept of divided loyalties, these individuals live not only divided, but transnational lives. In *Multiculturalism, Transnationalism and the Hijacking of Canadian Foreign Policy,* Satzewich writes that the

> …quantitative growth in transnationalism is accompanied by qualitative changes in the nature of transnational activities and identities…made possible by the growth of electronic communication technologies, fast and relatively inexpensive air travel, and the wider process of globalization.[216]

What impact does transnationalism have on the recruitment of diversity? Do the children of transnationals perceive national institutions like the CF differently from those of non-transnationals? Commentators like Granatstein would argue that transnationalism is but one symptom of "a failure of Canada to integrate newcomers to the body politic".[217] On the other hand, Satzewich points out that "transnational identities on the part of immigrants and members of ethno-religious communities existed before the announcement of the policy of multiculturalism in 1971"[218] and that "there is no easy way to systematically determine whether there has been a quantitative growth in the scale of transnational political activities and identities over the past century".[219] With the debate about the effect of transnational identities on Canadian policy ongoing in

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[215] Alejandro Portes, Luis Guarnizo and Patricia Landolt, "The Study of Transnationalism: Pitfalls and Promise of an Emergent Research Field," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 22, no. 2 (1999): 217.

[216] Satzewich, *Multiculturalism, Transnationalism, and the Hijacking of Canadian Foreign Policy: A Pseudo-Problem?*, 11.

[217] Granatstein, *Whose War is it?*, 168.

[218] Satzewich, *Multiculturalism, Transnationalism, and the Hijacking of Canadian Foreign Policy: A Pseudo-Problem?*, 4.

[219] *Ibid.*, 3.

academia, how can the CF begin to make sense of it in order to inform recruiting? It seems that transnationalism is a fact of life for the CF recruitment effort that should be considered when determining how to best recruit diversity, but how?

The final element of a 'failure to integrate' discourse is the way in which Canadian citizenship is bestowed upon newcomers. Granatstein opines that "at the moment, the only requirements are that an applicant for Canadian citizenship be reasonably fluent in English or French and able to answer a few simple questions about Canadian history, geography and the country's political system".[220] Some residing in regions with a large recent immigrant population might question what exactly constitutes reasonable linguistic fluency. Considering the family reunification, business and provincial nominee classes of immigration, which of these stands the best chance of recruiting diversity into the CF? The answer is that probably none do. Family class immigrants are typically of an age to be unable to serve in the CF. They are also unlikely to be functional enough in English or French to be able to serve owing to the reduced requirements for family class immigrants.

Business class immigrants will almost certainly not be recruited into the CF as their citizenship is dependent on holding significant business interests here. Notwithstanding the additional debate that "some critics [of business immigration] have raised ethical issues associated with what amounts to the sale of permanent residence

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[220] Granatstein, *Whose War is it?*, 191.

status and, eventually a Canadian passport"[221] how likely are the children of business

class immigrants to be candidates for CF recruitment? There is simply no data on the

subject.

In a similar manner to business class immigrants, provincial nominees are

unlikely to be recruited into the CF. Although the "rules and regulations of provincial

nominee programs vary by province" each essentially "develop their own selection

criteria for immigrants".[222] If immigration is contingent on meeting the specific needs of

individual provinces, it is unlikely that these immigrants will become employed by the

CF.

The most likely way that Canada's immigration and citizenship policy will aid in

recruiting diversity is through the skilled-workers and professionals 'points based' route.

While Canada does not currently offer a fast track to citizenship for those capable and

agreeing to enter into military service, this has been offered with success in the US and

the merits of this approach should be considered for the recruitment of diversity within

the CF.

This chapter has reviewed some of the myriad literature regarding social

integration and posed many questions about the effect that multicultural policy has had

not only on Canadian social cohesion, but also on the CF's ability to recruit diversity. In

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[221] Satzewich and Liodakis, *'Race' & Ethnicity in Canada: A Critical Introduction*, 89.
[222] *Ibid.*, 93.

stark contrast to the CF actual population of visible minorities (in 2011) at 4.6%[223] is the

fact that a 2002 survey on people's interest in joining the CF enumerated that 31% of

visible minority respondents were "at least somewhat interested in joining the CF".[224]

This chapter has done little to determine why this may be, but has proposed some

possible areas for further research. Is Employment Equity whereby the CF strives to be

ethnically representative of the Canadian population an appropriate approach, or should

the CF investigate the development of more militarily meaningful way to determine the

desirable cultural competencies of the force? The concepts of societal integration were

discussed as were possible ways in which Canada has failed or succeeded integrating

newcomers. Given the significant amount of immigration to this country, and the

benefits to be realized by recruiting diversity described in chapter 2, it is certain that the

topics introduced in this chapter will form the basis of the CF's future recruitment

challenges for some time to come and bear further analysis.

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[223] Department of National Defence, *Canadian Forces Employment Equity Report 2010-2011*, 1.

[224] L. Tanner and N. Holden, *The Interest and Propensity of Designated Groups to Join the Canadian Forces* (Ottawa, ON: Department of National Defence), 7.

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