A CONFLUENCE OF FACTORS:
CANADIAN FORCES RETENTION AND THE FUTURE FORCE

Major Mark N. Popov

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A Confluence of Factors: Canadian Forces Retention and the Future Force

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**ABSTRACT** .................................................................................................................................................. III  
**ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS** ......................................................................................................................... IV  
**INTRODUCTION** ........................................................................................................................................... 1  
**CHAPTER 1 - CANADIAN FORCES PERSONNEL SITUATION 2010** ............................................... 4  
  * CF Strength and Attrition .................................................................................................................. 5  
  * The CF in the World ......................................................................................................................... 7  
  * CF Personnel Strategy ..................................................................................................................... 13  
  * CF Pay and Benefits ......................................................................................................................... 15  
  * CF Demographics ............................................................................................................................ 19  
  * CF Attrition, Domestic Economy and Employment Trends .......................................................... 20  
  * Summary ......................................................................................................................................... 25  
**CHAPTER 2 - THE FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT** ................................................................. 27  
  * Canada in the Future Uncertain World ......................................................................................... 28  
  * Future Threats ................................................................................................................................. 30  
  * The Future Demands on Personnel ............................................................................................... 33  
  * Summary ......................................................................................................................................... 37  
**CHAPTER 3 - THE CHANGING PERSONNEL ENVIRONMENT** ..................................................... 38  
  * Baby Boomers ............................................................................................................................... 40  
  * The CF’s current command and leadership climate, its policies, organizational expectations and general character are all products of its Baby Boomer cohort. ........................................................................................................... 41  
  * Generation X ................................................................................................................................... 41  
  * Generation Y ................................................................................................................................... 45  
  * CF Generations and Technology ................................................................................................. 49  
  * Generational Conflicts and Challenges ......................................................................................... 53  
  * Summary ......................................................................................................................................... 58  
**CHAPTER 4 - RETAINING GOOD PEOPLE – ATTRITION’S COSTS** ........................................... 59  
  * Financial Costs – Early Attrition .................................................................................................... 61  
  * Recruiting versus Retention ........................................................................................................... 65  
  * Summary ......................................................................................................................................... 68  
**CHAPTER 5 - ASSESSING THE CHALLENGE – RETENTION RESEARCH AND RECENT TRENDS** .................................................................................................................................... 69  
  * Australian Defence Force ............................................................................................................. 69  
  * United Kingdom Military ............................................................................................................... 73  
  * United States Military ..................................................................................................................... 74  
  * Canadian Forces ............................................................................................................................. 76  
  * CF Motivation and Dissatisfaction ............................................................................................... 78  
  * Deployments and Attrition – Common Trends ............................................................................ 80  
  * Summary ......................................................................................................................................... 81  
**CHAPTER 6 - CF ATTRITION/RETENTION RESEARCH SHORTCOMINGS** ......................................... 83  
  * CF Exit Survey ............................................................................................................................... 84  
  * Attrition Reasons by Age and Career Stage ................................................................................ 87  
  * Chain of Command Input ............................................................................................................. 89  
  * Summary ......................................................................................................................................... 92
CHAPTER 7 - MILITARY RETENTION METHODS AND THEIR EFFECTIVENESS .................................................................93
   ABCA Retention Bonuses .................................................................94
   ABCA Non-Cash Retention Methods .............................................97
   Summary ......................................................................................100
CHAPTER 8 - UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES - WHY PEOPLE LEAVE AND HOW TO MITIGATE .........................102
   Institutional Honesty ....................................................................104
   Quality of Employment ..................................................................116
   Institutional Connection ..............................................................122
   Summary ......................................................................................131
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................132
BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................138

FIGURES

Figure 1.1 – CF National Footprint – Major Bases and Stations .................................................................5
Figure 1.2 – CF Regular Force Attrition Trends .................................................................................6
Figure 1.3 – CF International Deployments Worldwide ......................................................................8
Figure 1.4 – Department of National Defence Budget Allocation ......................................................13
Figure 1.5 – CF Military Personnel Management Conceptual Model ...........................................14
Figure 1.6 – CF Population Profile and Attrition Rate by Years of Service ................................19
Figure 2.1 – Foreign Policy’s 2010 Failed States Index ..................................................................28
Figure 2.2 – The Spectrum of Conflict ......................................................................................32
Figure 3.1 – Serving CF Generational Characteristics ..................................................................39
Figure 3.2 – The CF’s Digital Generations Explained ..................................................................50
Figure 4.1 – Early Attrition Patterns – Selected Occupations .......................................................62
Figure 5.1 – Top Ten ADF Personnel Departure Reasons, by Years of Service ............................71
Figure 6.1 – CF Leadership Principles ......................................................................................91
Figure 7.1 – UK Armed Forces Financial Retention Incentives and Take-up Rate ....................95
Figure 8.1 – US Army MLRS (top), CF LSVW (bottom) ..............................................................124

TABLES

Table 8.1– Pre and Post-Tax Pay differences, MCpl to Sgt Basic Pay ...........................................126
Between 2000 and 2010, the Canadian Forces (CF) faced an attrition crisis that threatened its operational capabilities. Despite a comprehensive strategic retention plan that reduced critically high attrition, the CF’s large, experienced long-service demographic cohort is approaching retirement, leaving a much smaller mid-service cohort to replace it. The demands of the future security environment, workforce generational changes, the changing Canadian economy and the necessity for the CF to develop its own leaders from within make retaining a sufficiently large pool of experienced personnel a critical requirement. This paper outlines the CF manning situation, identifies future challenges, compares American, British, Canadian and Australian retention efforts, identifies internal CF dissatisfiers and recommends future research and retention activities.

It contends that although CF research is comprehensive and well-respected, it suffers from knowledge gaps that could be closed by amalgamating scientific research with CF leader assessments to create a full personnel picture. CF pay and benefits are competitive, but a confluence of internal dissatisfiers contributes to personnel attrition, which cannot be resolved by adding pay, benefits, leave or other motivators; retaining personnel is not an economic function. Mitigating attrition requires some modification of existing policies to reduce dissatisfaction, continued efforts to ensure CF employment is challenging and satisfying, and continued vigilance and effort by CF leaders to demonstrate they and the CF are connected to and appropriately value their personnel. Retention will always be critical to maintaining a healthy force.
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INTRODUCTION

At the heart of every task completed, every battle won, every mission accomplished, stand our soldiers.¹

The Canadian Forces (CF) takes strategic personnel retention very seriously and has, since 2001, done a great deal to retain its personnel.² Retention encompasses all methods undertaken to ensure that suitable personnel remain in CF service; the CF Military Personnel Retention Strategy (CF MPRS) offers a concise, integrated plan to reduce preventable attrition.³ While the CF is not currently in a retention crisis, it

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¹ Canada, Department of National Defence, Army Public Affairs AT Poster 2 (Ottawa: Canadian Army, 2010).

² The author has served as a Combat Arms officer in the Canadian Forces since 1991. The Canadian Army’s four combat arms are Armour, Infantry, Artiller and Combat (also known as Field) Engineers. He has commanded soldiers at the sub-sub unit and sub-unit level both in domestic and overseas deployed operations and has deployed overseas three times in armoured reconnaissance sub-units and twice as a United Nations Military Observer. He also served as a unit Adjutant, which in Combat Arms units is the most senior of the unit’s Captains, responsible to the Commanding Officer for overseeing the unit’s personnel administration, administrative soldier care and properly applying the Canadian Forces Personnel Appraisal System (CFPAS) and CF personnel policy. He also served as a staff officer in the Chief Military Personnel Executive and as the Executive Assistant to the Chief Military Personnel.

³ Canada, Department of National Defence, The Canadian Forces Retention Survey - 2010 (Ottawa: Chief Military Personnel, 1-16.; Chief Military Personnel, Military Personnel Retention Strategy (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2009), 1-10. The six lines of operations are: Personnel Tempo, Career/Family Balance, Career/Employment Management, Basic Training, Recruiting/Selection and Leadership. CF retention efforts aim to reduce attrition not attributable to training failures, unsatisfactory medical fitness, conduct or performance deficiencies or compulsory retirement age. Throughout this paper, the terms “attrition”, “departure”, “left service” and “turnover” are used interchangeably. Nancy Otis and Michelle Straver, Review of Attrition and Retention Research for the Canadian Forces (Ottawa: Defence Research and Development Canada - Centre for Operational Research and Analysis), 2008, http://pubs.drde.gc.ca/PDFS/unc78/p530400.pdf (accessed January 22, 2011) uses the same methodology, which has been selected for this study in order to ensure best clarity and focus primarily on the issue of personnel leaving the CF voluntarily. They all refer to what the CF calls “voluntary attrition,” whereby personnel that could otherwise continue to serve leave the CF voluntarily. Personnel that are released from CF service for medical, disciplinary, conduct, administrative or compulsory retirement age reasons will not be examined.³ Some CF statistics focus on and count all releases in the attrition rate. When not specified, this paper employs the same rule of thumb as the CF MPRS and considers that two thirds of all attrition is voluntary and therefore preventable. Chief Military Personnel identifies this ratio in paragraph 3 of Chief Military Personnel, Military Personnel Retention Strategy, 2.
remains unclear whether CF retention efforts or Canada’s economy contributed most strongly to reductions in personnel turnover.  

The current CF personnel situation sees the CF’s large, experienced, long-service cohort approaching retirement. Given that the CF must develop its leaders from within, this demographic shift will place the burden of organizational leadership on the smaller mid-service cohort, which will be extremely sensitive to any rise in attrition. The CF’s large short-service cohort, composed primarily of Generation Y personnel, expects quick advancement and immediate gratification without long-term commitment. This characteristic will make retaining Generation Y personnel to invest in full careers a future priority.

CF research suffers from gaps that limit its ability to provide strategic leaders a complete personnel picture. Augmenting current research by including CF leader assessments will balance quantitative scientific deductions with qualitative, experience-based analysis. Coupling yet-untapped leader knowledge with scientific analysis will

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4 This paper is concerned exclusively with members of the Regular Force, defined by the National Defence Act, (1985), [http://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/N-5/index.html](http://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/N-5/index.html) (accessed February 13, 2011). as “officers and non-commissioned members who are enrolled for continuing, full-time military service.” While the Reserve Force is a vital CF element, Reserve retention and manning issues are beyond the purview of this work. As such, all references to the CF or CF personnel refer to the Regular Force, unless otherwise specified. The statistical personnel report used most widely by strategic planners is the CF Personnel Management Report (CF PMR), a quarterly report that captures CF regular force recruiting, attrition, personnel sustainment, personnel awaiting training figures, overall strength and presents critical personnel trends and facts. The CF PMR most recent to the time of writing is the FY 2010-2011 second quarter (Q2) report, dated September 2010, used throughout this paper as a baseline for CF strength figures unless otherwise noted.

5 Most CF leaders are officers and senior non-commissioned officers (Sr NCOs). CF officer ranks are Second Lieutenant, Lieutenant, Captain, Major, Lieutenant-Colonel, Colonel, Brigadier-General, Major-General, Lieutenant-General and General. CF Sr NCO ranks are Sergeant, Warrant Officer, Master Warrant Officer and Chief Warrant Officer. Jr NCO ranks are Private, Corporal and Master-Corporal. While Jr NCOs often fulfıl low-level leadership functions, they are rarely in a position to provide an organizational perspective, by virtue of more limited experience and tactically-focused employment, than
build a more complete personnel picture, fine tune research and tailor the CF MPRS to maintain a strong and stable future force.

No one single factor drives CF attrition. Rather, a confluence of numerous small factors act in concert to dissatisfy CF personnel. Personnel perceive dissatisfiers differently depending on their age and career stage, which necessitates that the CF target retention efforts individually or to small groups rather than apply them en masse in a ‘one size fits all’ manner. In many cases, the CF does not need to add benefits or pay to combat attrition, but rather reduce dissatisfaction with internal policies, employment quality or the CF as an organization. Much as a confluence of small factors can drive attrition, a confluence of small changes can combat it.

Retention is an ongoing issue that the CF must continue to institutionalize, research and address as economic resurgence, demographic and defence priority changes create new retention challenges.  

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their Sr NCO counterparts. The Canadian Navy uses naval-specific ranks such as Master Seaman for Master-Corporal, but in the interests of brevity and clarity this paper will use only generic CF ranks and not their Naval equivalents. Finally, while the generic term “non-commissioned member” or “NCM” is used in some CF publications and communication, the author will use the term “NCO” for clarity throughout this paper.

6 These changes may be felt most strongly as Canada’s commitment to Afghanistan ends and new defence priorities in the post-Afghanistan Canadian defence and security sphere, such as the Arctic, emerge.
CHAPTER 1 - CANADIAN FORCES PERSONNEL SITUATION 2010

Sailors, soldiers, airmen and airwomen are not human capital, not some faceless mass to be managed as assets, renewable or not, hired, fired and forgotten once they ‘walk out the gate.’ Rather, they are the heart and soul of the military mission.\(^7\)

The CF’s relatively small size and large geographic span necessitates that its people move throughout their careers. Movement creates personnel and funding challenges, but personnel mobility and its attendant systemic costs are necessary to maintain a well-trained, experienced military force in a large, sparsely populated and geographically diverse country. The *Canada First Defence Strategy* articulates the CF’s role and mission, and specifies that the CF must conduct six core missions:

- Conduct daily domestic and continental operations, including in the Arctic and through NORAD.
- Support a major international event in Canada, such as the 2010 Olympics.
- Respond to a major terrorist attack.
- Support civilian authorities during a crisis in Canada such as a natural disaster.
- Lead and/or conduct a major international operation for an extended period.
- Deploy forces in response to crises elsewhere in the world for shorter periods.\(^8\)

In order to fulfil its domestic commitments, maintain an adequate national footprint and sustain itself, the CF stations its regular component throughout Canada:

\(^7\) Canada, Department of National Defence, *B-GL-005-100/FP-001 - Military Personnel Management Doctrine - Canadian Forces Joint Publication 1.0* (Ottawa: Chief Military Personnel | Director General Military Personnel, 2008), 1-3.

\(^8\) Canada, Department of National Defence, *Canada First Defence Strategy*, 2008, 3.
CF Strength and Attrition

Despite consistent low-level Manning churn, the CF can, on a day to day basis, capture an accurate Manning snapshot.\(^9\) The CF’s total regular force strength is 69,090 and it employs 28,500 civilian Public Service employees.\(^10\) Since the regular force

\(^9\) The Personnel Attrition Recruiting Retention Analysis (PARRA) Report, available on the CF’s internal Defence Wide Area Network (DWAN), is updated frequently, while the Director Human Resources Information Management, a directorate within Military Personnel Command, can produce a range of statistical reports dealing with nearly every aspect of CF personnel.
military personnel number includes those pending release, still undergoing training or otherwise unavailable for employment, a more realistic figure is that of Trained Effective Strength (TES), which, as of September 2010, stood at 56,700 CF members trained, serving and effectively employed.\footnote{Canada, Department of National Defence, \textit{Canadian Forces Personnel Management Report - FY2010/2011 Second Quarter} (Ottawa: Chief Military Personnel, 2010).}

Healthy military attrition should be between 6.5\% and 10\%;\footnote{Canada, Department of National Defence, "DND/CF | Backgrounder | Recruiting and Retention in the Canadian Forces - BG 10.008 - may 4, 2010," \url{http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/news-nouvelles-eng.asp?cat=00&id=3359} (accessed January 24, 2011).} between 2005 and 2010, CF attrition rose quickly, becoming an area of strategic concern:

![Figure 1.2 – CF Regular Force Attrition Trends. Source: Canada, Department of National Defence, \textit{Departmental Performance Report 2009-10: Part III - Estimates}, 24.](image)

As a result, the CF increased its recruiting efforts between 2006 and 2008, and in 2009 implemented the CF MPRS.\footnote{Matt Gurney, "DND's Army of Bureaucrats Increases Faster than Troops," \textit{National Post}, January 6, 2011, \url{http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2011/01/06/matt-gurney-dnds-army.htm} (accessed January 6, 2011).} These efforts increased the size of the force, meeting the
Government of Canada’s expansion goal of 68,000 regular force members. A March 2010 estimate identified CF voluntary attrition at 4.7%, a significant and welcome drop.

**The CF in the World**

While its primary responsibility is defending Canada, protecting and supporting Canadians at home, the CF maintains a substantial international presence. The CF’s largest, most visible current deployment is its commitment, as part of Canada’s Whole of Government Approach, to Afghanistan. While Afghanistan dominates current public thinking, the CF also maintains “14 other important missions around the globe” and a presence in collective security bodies such as NATO. Many of these missions are under the aegis of the United Nations, in support of other international bodies such as the African Union, or are short yet large-scale deployments for humanitarian purposes to alleviate the effects of natural disasters. At any given time, the CF has 8000 personnel preparing for, returning from or deployed on international operations across the world.

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Deployment figures only tell part of international deployments’ true personnel cost. Every sailor, soldier, airman or airwoman deployed must be trained, administered and otherwise supported, making the true deployment commitment much higher than normally considered. For example, maintaining 2,500 CF personnel in Afghanistan requires a pool of at least 12,500, including those deployed, those preparing to deploy, those just returned and those supporting the deployment.¹⁹

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¹⁹ Canada, Department of National Defence, Canada First Defence Strategy, 15.
The CF’s most recent humanitarian deployment was 2010’s Operation HESTIA, where 2,046 CF personnel deployed on very short notice to Haiti to conduct humanitarian relief efforts in the wake of a devastating earthquake in early 2010. Domestic operations also incur a personnel cost; Operation PODIUM, supporting Vancouver 2010 Olympic security in conjunction with other Canadian Government departments, deployed 4,500 CF personnel. In February 2010 more than 12,000 CF personnel deployed domestically or internationally, serving Canada’s interests at home and abroad. In light of the Regular Force TES of 56,700, this figure means more than 21% of the regular force was committed to critical operations in 2010.

Canada’s navy conducts long deployments, extended sea service without respite and extended multinational coalition operations. In 2001-2002 HMCS Charlottetown deployed to the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea as part of Operation APOLLO, Canada’s contribution to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. During this deployment, it remained at sea on active operations for 74 straight days, a Canadian navy record, during which sailors and officers were physically and mentally taxed by constant threat and maintaining watch for 12 hours per day:

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22 Chief of the Defence Staff, CDS SITREP 02-11, 1.
“The 1-in-2 watch system is only meant to be followed for two to three weeks after which it is understood that people begin to seriously tire.”

Canadian ships have little spare crew capacity; every sailor has a number of primary and secondary duties to attend to during the course of every deployment. Multi-tasking, often characterized by multiple, short notice tasks, which must be completed quickly and accurately, is part and parcel of every sailor’s deployed life. Continual deployments, particularly in a Navy that is notably short of personnel, require sailors that have exceptional technical and seamanship skills, understanding families, dedication to the CF as an institution, personal commitment and endurance. Certain naval occupations are prone to “pier hopping” or “pier head jumping” due to the high demand for their critical skillsets. Pier hopping occurs when a sailor returns to home port, then immediately leaves his or her original ship to join another ship that is leaving for a deployment or training exercise.

Army deployments, particularly in today’s complex settings, find that right down to the lowest levels, soldiers were given tasks that in Canada a Sergeant [normally a supervisor with between 6 and 15 years of experience] would be expected to perform.

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24 "Top General Reverses Navy Decision to Mothball Ships - CTV News," CTV News Calgary, http://calgary.ctv.ca/servlet/an/local/CTVNews/20100514/naval-cuts-100514/20100514/?hub=CalgaryHome (accessed February 3, 2011, 2011) identifies that in 2010 the Navy was short more than 1400 personnel and millions of dollars required to operate its vessels. As of September 2010, Canada’s Navy was short 664 personnel in “Distressed Occupations” that are chronically short of trained personnel, as indicated in Dr. Karol Weneck, Reg F Recruiting and Retention: Putting the Brakes on Success (Ottawa: Director General Military Personnel, 2010), (accessed 15 October 2010).

25 Naval officer interviews, Maritime Surface/Sub-Surface operations (MARS) and Maritime Engineers (MARE), January 2011.
It is extremely difficult for soldiers to have privacy, given the demands of long-term communal living during land operations. These demands are exacerbated by the fact that deployed personnel they are often under the microscope-like gaze of the chain of command. Leaders out of touch with the realities of current operations can focus too intently on enforcing policies suited for peacetime soldiering in Canada but unsuited to the 24-hour nature of operations outside the comforting and safe confines of well-built, secure infrastructure. In larger camps, such as Camp Julien in Kabul between 2003 and 2005, some senior leaders who rarely left camp developed “a garrison mentality that…crops up all too often…like a desperate camp follower.”27 This dichotomy, the sharp contrast between operations ‘outside the wire’ and the oasis of North American military ‘normality’ found in large, well-established tactical encampments, adds stress and an element of unreality to the deployed soldier’s life.28


27 Major Tom Mykytiuk, "Company Command in the Three Block War: November Company - Task Force Kabul, Rotation 0, Operation Athena," in In Harm's Way: On the Front Lines of Leadership: Sub-Unit Command on Operations, ed. Colonel Bernd Horn (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2006), 129-142 describes how, in Camp Julien in Kabul in 2003, senior leaders questioned why soldiers were wearing Physical Training (PT) clothing at 10am rather than proper uniform. He had to explain that the soldiers had been on patrol until 3 am and were going back out again that evening at 8pm. While 10am was ‘working hours’ for office workers, it was these soldiers’ time to rest, exercise and prepare for further operations. The author has experienced similar situations during two deployments to Afghanistan as part of combat arms sub-units. In fall 2009, some of his soldiers, having spent more than a month on sustained operations in remote forward areas, to include lethal combat with insurgents, returned to Kandahar Airfield (KAF) to acquire supplies. Shortly after dismounting from their vehicles, they attempted to purchase coffee at the KAF Tim Horton’s kiosk, where they were stopped, questioned and counseled by KAF-based Sr NCOs concerned about their disheveled appearance, dusty weapons and overgrown hair. This event was detrimental to morale.

28 Leonard Wong and Stephen Gerras, CU @ the FOB: How the Forward Operating Base is Changing the Life of Combat Soldiers (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2006), 36 offers an excellent study about how Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) have changed the nature of conflict and its effect on soldiers. While most of the study’s anecdotal and other evidence comes from Iraq, the FOB concept is also present in Afghanistan. For instance, US FOB RAMROD, in western Kandahar Province, is a large camp built in the barren desert of Maiwand district, which, despite its
Air Force personnel deploy everywhere supporting land and maritime operations. Most Canadian warships carry Sea King helicopters, aircrews and air maintenance personnel, while Canadian Griffon and Chinook helicopters support land operations in Afghanistan. Air Force crews often deploy on very short notice to support humanitarian operations. For example, air transport crews deployed very quickly to Haiti in January 2010 to deliver much-needed humanitarian aid and transport thousands of evacuees out of danger. Personnel who wear Air Force uniforms but are members of ‘purple trades’ common throughout the CF, such as resource management specialists, cooks, supply technicians and medical personnel, can deploy as members of ships’ companies or army units anywhere in the world. Further, small teams of Air Force logisticians are responsible for such critical functions as ensuring the flow of supplies from Canada, through Canadian Forces Base (CFB) Trenton, to Afghanistan or other deployed operations. Given manning pressures, deployed operations and limited depth, Air Force support personnel routinely work extended hours to support deployed forces. Since aircraft, particularly Canadian CC-177 Globemaster strategic air transports, are capable of desolate and isolated setting, features a large, air-conditioned PX staffed with civilian cashiers and staff. The dichotomy becomes even more evident when, at night, American-style meals, complete with televised football games in the dining facilities, are accompanied by the sound of mortar positions in the camp firing in response to requests for support from patrols in the camp’s vicinity.


30The “purple trade” deployment potential is not limited only to Air Force personnel – Army and Navy-uniformed “purple” personnel have the same opportunities. For example, the author commanded an army Combat Team in Afghanistan in 2009-2010. Of the five medical technicians attached to the combat team, one wore a Navy uniform, while two others were Air Force personnel and had been tasked, while serving at Air Force bases, to deploy to Afghanistan. Only two wore Army uniforms and technically belonged to the Land Element.

31Major, Air Force Logistics Officer, personal discussions, November 2010-January 2011.
deploying quickly to contentious areas, Air Force personnel often deploy on shorter notice, with greater uncertainty, than their Navy or Army counterparts do.

**CF Personnel Strategy**

Trained people are most critical to meeting the *Canada First Defence Strategy’s* demands and overcoming the rigours of domestic and overseas operations. Maintaining a skilled, well-cared-for force requires significant funding; personnel costs account for more than 50% of Canada’s defence budget:

![Canada First Defence Strategy Allocations 20-year Aggregate](image)

**Figure 1.4** – Department of National Defence Budget Allocation.
*Source: Canada First Defence Strategy, 13.*

The CF takes a ‘cradle to grave’ approach in caring for its people and their families. Its approach is unique amongst Western military forces in that it applies common principles to a unified CF, to include personnel development, generation and sustainment. CF military personnel management aims to place “the right sailor, soldier, 

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32 In Canada, Department of National Defence, *Departmental Performance Report 2009-10: Part III - Estimates*, iii, Minister of National Defence Peter McKay identifies that none of the “activities [accomplished by the Department of National Defence in Fiscal Year 2009-2010] would be possible without investment in Defence’s most important resource: its people.”

33 Canada, Department of National Defence, *B-GL-005-100/FP-001 - Military Personnel Management Doctrine - Canadian Forces Joint Publication 1.0*, 3-1. Other forces such as the US and UK have disparate, service-based personnel systems.
airman and airwoman, having the right qualifications, in the right place at the right
time,”

guided by a conceptual model:

![Figure 1.5 – CF Military Personnel Management Conceptual Model.](image)

Each of the model’s five strategic pillars is a CF personnel management function,
underpinned by doctrine and legislation and synchronized at the top by common tasks and
functions undertaken centrally by elements of Military Personnel Command, under the
Chief Military Personnel (CMP). 35 While some large-scale strategic functions, such as

34 Ibid., 4-1.

35 The officer responsible for Canadian Forces Personnel Management is the Chief Military
Personnel (CMP), normally a Major-General/Rear-Admiral, who is also the commander of Military
Personnel Command (MILPERSCOM). MILPERSCOM is a Force Generating organization of the
military personnel production, are centrally managed, individual CF units have the ultimate responsibility for managing their personnel, guided by CF-wide policies under six overarching principles:

**Foresight** – anticipating long-term strategic requirements.

**Integration** – integrating demands, objectives, obligations to support operations and ensure fair and equitable treatment of CF personnel and their families.

**Synchronization** – between all aspects of personnel generation and management to support force development, generation and employment

**Discretion** – maintaining the integrity of information, balancing individual privacy and respect with operational need to know.

**Compassion** – identify and address needs in the most humane, realistic and diligent way possible.

**Flexibility** – one size does not fit all; policies must provide sufficient flexibility to allow transparent and fair application.

**CF Pay and Benefits**

CF benefits and personnel programmes are, in many cases, more generous than those found in the civilian world. CF members are entitled to a suite of “flexible compensation and benefits policies and practices - that are compassionate and responsive,

Canadian Forces and responsible for managing the CF Personnel system, to include policy and program development. Concurrently, along with the Navy, Army and Air Force, MILPERSCOM’s personnel, many from the Canadian Forces Health Services Group, deploy for operations. Other CMP/MPC responsibilities include conducting recruit training at the Canadian Forces Leadership and Recruit School in CFB St-Jean, support training at the Canadian Forces Support Training Group at CFB Borden. Often, CMP and MILPERSCOM are used interchangeably, so the term “CMP” is used both to describe the person (the actual Chief Military Personnel) and MILPERSCOM as an organization, as in “the Canadian Defence Academy is part of CMP.” Canada, Department of National Defence, "About Chief Military Personnel," Military Personnel Command, [http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/acm-scp/org/sf-cs/index-eng.asp](http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/acm-scp/org/sf-cs/index-eng.asp) (accessed February 10, 2011).

36 Canada, Department of National Defence, *B-GL-005-100/FP-001 - Military Personnel Management Doctrine - Canadian Forces Joint Publication 1.0*, 3-1, 3-2.
and that respect the evolving needs of the CF and CF Ops, and of CF personnel and their families."

Pay is a critical part of this suite, and regular force CF personnel on full-time service are paid well in comparison to their civilian counterparts.

Canada’s 2006 census identifies that the average Canadian university graduate holding a Bachelor’s degree earns $52,907 annually, while the average high school graduate earns $30,116. On enrolment, a basic Private earns $31,956 annually, which after one year of service rises to $39,072. After four years’ service, barring any misconduct or training deficiency, Privates are generally promoted to Corporal and earn a basic rate of $53,712 annually – more than the average Canadian university graduate earns. A Corporal with 4 years’ time in rank earns $59,076 annually.

Most CF NCO occupations require a high school diploma, while some require only a Grade 10 education as a prerequisite. Officer applicants holding a Bachelor’s degree or technical certificate enrol under the Direct Entry Officer (DEO), commissioned immediately as Second Lieutenants (2Lt). DEO 2Lts earn a starting annual wage of $43,728, which on promotion to Captain, normally after three years’ service, rises to $70,644. A Captain with 10 years’ time in rank earns $93,372.

All CF members earn yearly pay incentive

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40 Section 2 of Ibid.
increases, while some technical specialists, search and rescue technicians, flight engineers and Military Police (MP) earn specialist pay rates higher than the CF norm for their rank to reflect their specialized skills and training. While all CF members serve under unlimited liability, which can place them in harm’s way and does restrict some personal freedoms, CF monetary compensation is, in many cases, better than that found in the civilian workforce.

Remuneration is only part of the overall CF compensation and benefits scheme. The CF offers leave travel benefits, subsidized life insurance, significant benefits for hazardous duty or overseas service, reasonably-priced financial planning services, organized sports, recreation clubs, excellent retirement benefits and relocation benefits. All in all, CF pay and benefits are more than competitive with a great many civilian employers.

Leave sustains initiative and enthusiasm and encourages the physical and mental wellbeing of CF members by providing periodic opportunities for rest and relaxation. All CF members are entitled to at least 20 days’ paid annual leave per year, plus all Canadian statutory holidays, which rises to 25 days’ paid leave after five years’ service and 30 days’ paid leave after 28 years’ service. The CF also has provisions for providing compassionate leave, sick leave and special leave for activities such as education.

41 Table A to Section 3 of Ibid.  
42 The majority of these services are provided by the Canadian Forces Personnel Support Agency, http://www.cfpsa.com.  
44 Ibid., 23, 26
upgrading or community service.\textsuperscript{45} Unused annual leave either accumulates for later use, or the CF compensates personnel financially for unused leave.\textsuperscript{46}

Nearly all CFBs have modern fitness facilities, staffed with certified trainers, that offer more health and fitness programs “than are made available in the civilian world.”\textsuperscript{47} All CF members use base facilities and staff expertise free of charge, while CF family members pay a nominal fee, substantially lower in cost than casual civilian health club visit fees, to use military facilities.

In 2008, five million Canadians lacked a family doctor, while a 2005 survey identified that only 23\% of Canadians were able to see a physician within one day of needing one. This performance:

is among the worst of any industrialized nation: with just 2.2 physicians per thousand people, [Canada] ranks 24th out of 28 OECD countries… dead last” [amongst the G8 countries.]\textsuperscript{48}

CF personnel are all entitled to full health, vision and dental care, either provided by Canadian Forces Health Services Group personnel or contracted civilian providers. Any regular force CF member can obtain medical treatment at any military base in Canada, or by using their CF-provided Blue Cross card, at any civilian facility in the event military health care facilities are unavailable.

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., 4
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., 28
The CF offers significantly good pay, benefits and conditions of service and is well-regarded by the Canadian public. Very few other employers offer the same unique experience, cradle to grave care, benefits, training and opportunities as the CF.

**CF Demographics**

Much like many Western countries’ civilian workforces, the CF has “an unusually large long-service population and an unusually small middle-career population,” shown graphically in comparison with attrition rates by years of service (YOS) below:

![Graph showing CF Population Profile and Attrition Rate by Years of Service](image)

**Figure 1.6 – CF Population Profile and Attrition Rate by Years of Service**


Between 1994 and 2000, the Canadian Forces downsized aggressively; the two main force reduction tools were early retirement offers and recruiting reductions. This

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49 A December 2010 Ipsos-Reid survey of 1043 Canadians 18 years and older found that 81% of Canadians are “proud of the men and women who serve in our armed forces.” Darrell Bricker PhD and John Wright, *Chief of Land Staff [CLS] Presentation*, Ipsos Public Affairs Worldwide, (2011), 32, 34.

practice created a gap in the CF population amongst those with between thirteen and seventeen years of service. When this cohort reaches retirement age and begins to leave the service, the CF will face an experience gap, forcing junior people to advance quickly to fill leadership and key staff billets:

A great many personnel occupy the band between 16 and 23 years’ service...Due to the lingering effect of the CF’s 1995-1996 Force Reduction Program [FRP], replacement of this population is likely to be achieved only incrementally for the next decade.

In order to stave off the effects of this gap, the CF must retain a large portion of the institutional knowledge and skill that the small ‘FRP cohort’ currently holds. This upcoming challenge is exacerbated by the fact that many in this cohort’s will reach 20 years of service (YOS), a traditional voluntary exit point, within the next 5 years.

**CF Attrition, Domestic Economy and Employment Trends**

It appears that the CF’s attrition crisis is well and truly over. Current CF attrition is “the lowest it has been in decades” and a September 2010 quarterly personnel update,

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54 Canada, Department of National Defence, *Annual Report on Regular Force Attrition 2007/2008* (Ottawa: Attrition and Retention Team, Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis, 2009) shows that the 20 years of service (YOS) point is a historical ‘spike’ in attrition for both officers and non-commissioned members; between 20% and 25% of personnel leave at this point.

titled “Putting the Brakes on Success” predicted that the current 6.3% attrition rate will “continue falling to less than 6% by 2014/15.”

Confidence in the current low attrition rate and the CF’s inherent ability to retain its best people may be premature and misplaced. While CF service presents a number of attractive features, the fact remains that it brings its members several dynamics not found in many civilian occupations. It often entails that its members work long hours, make significant personal and family sacrifices and maintain a ‘service before self’ mentality that may kill or injure them in the line of duty. CF members often have little choice in where or how they are ordered to work, while the exigencies of military service during operations often preclude taking leave until tasks are accomplished. The CF has a well-developed Code of Service Discipline that clearly defines penalties for transgressions and offers little flexibility for personal likes, dislikes, wants and needs. CF service is a trade-off; on one hand, CF members are well paid and well cared for, while on the other they give up a significant element of personal choice and freedom, and are placed, in many cases, at higher risk than civilian workers. Not all Canadians, even those currently serving in the CF, may find this trade-off beneficial.

Canada’s economy, while healthier than several other Western countries’, remains in a recovery period, making employment opportunities in the civilian world an uncertain proposition. Canada’s January 2011 unemployment rate was 7.8%, a drop of 1.9% from January 2010, indicating a small but steady recovery trend. Alberta and Saskatchewan,

56 Wnek, Reg F Recruiting and Retention: Putting the Brakes on Success, 13.

57 Canada, National Defence Act
Canada’s ‘most employed’ provinces, had unemployment rates of 5.9% and 5.4% respectively; Alberta’s employment rose by 2.2% from 2010 to 2011, bolstered by continuous worker demand by the oil and manufacturing sectors. However, the economy remains uncertain for many Canadians, particularly in the Maritimes and in Ontario’s manufacturing field. Country-wide unemployment trends likely contribute to CF personnel remaining within the CF’s stable employment envelope and ‘social safety net’ rather than striking out on their own to pursue other employment options. While the CF took significant steps to reduce voluntary attrition between 2007 and 2009, the 2008-2009 economic crises likely played a very significant role. As the Standing Committee on National Defence reports, “the economic downturn may have dissuaded some from leaving the CF,” while US Army leaders concede that “a cratering economy might be one reason soldiers prefer to stay in uniform.” US military sources report “the weak job market is sending more people toward the uniformed services” in all four US military branches.

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59 Ibid.

60 While Standing Committee on National Defence, Recruitment and Retention in the Canadian Forces - NDDN (40-3), 1-9, asserts that CF retention programs had a more significant effect than the economic downturn on retaining personnel in the CF, neither assertion can be definitively proven. As a result, one cannot discount the effects of the downturn and allege that CF retention strategies were a definitive success.


62 The economic downturn has positively influenced US military retention, despite high-dollar signing bonuses and other incentives being reduced from past levels, as depicted in Scott Fontaine, "Army Prospers from Economic Doldrums: Re-Enlistments: Retention High as Soldiers Worry about
Brookings Institute strategist Michael O’Hanlon notes that although a US military personnel crisis no longer seems imminent, an improving economy and high casualties in Afghanistan “could return the United States to a situation in which it is difficult to recruit and retain the right people.” Since Canadian employment experienced a similar reduction, a return to 2006-2008’s low unemployment levels may once again make civilian employment more attractive to CF personnel. While Afghan casualties are unlikely to be a significant CF retention factor given the CF’s upcoming transition from combat to a training mission in Afghanistan, it does stand to reason that CF retention would follow similar patterns when the economy improves. More civilian employment opportunities will likely see CF attrition rise, placing it once more in a precarious personnel situation. A January 2011 Compas Canada poll indicated that 49% of Canadian CEOs felt the Canadian economy today was good, 47% felt it was fair and 39% indicated they felt it would become “somewhat better” within the next six months. A strong economy puts CF retention efforts in direct competition with the civilian workforce, particularly in the historically strong technology, information and resources sectors.

O’Hanlon suggests that national service may be the answer to future personnel generation challenges, an untenable CF proposition. During both World Wars,

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63 Michael E. O’Hanlon, "Who Will Fight for Us?" *Orbis* 53, no. 3 (Summer, 2009), 405-418 (accessed December 9, 2010).


conscription raised near-catastrophic national unity challenges. Even though Canada instituted limited conscription to flesh out desperately thin military ranks gutted by years of war against an existential threat, conscription nearly collapsed governments and turned Canadians against each other. National service is not a resolution for any current or future CF manning challenges; a volunteer CF is a part of Canada’s national character and, in the absence of a significant shift in Canadian culture, will endure.

The impact of a better future economy will compound current workforce-wide attrition trends:

Employees are more likely to stay with their company during lean times, and so companies have taken them for granted. When the economy strengthens, experience tells us that employees will begin weighing their options and considering other jobs. Since it takes up to 12 months to improve employee engagement, companies need to plan ahead and take the proper steps to ensure their employee retention rates remain high.  

Both private and public sector employers are concerned about employee retention once the economy improves, particularly employees that are “more productive and top-performing.” In the first half of 2010, “only 28 percent of companies were able to hold onto most of their top talent.” A recent Conference Board survey of 5000 US employees found that:

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households “revealed that 22 per cent of respondents said they didn’t expect to be in their current job in a year,”\textsuperscript{69} while a Right Management survey found that “84 percent of U.S. employees plan to look for new jobs in 2011 – up from 60 percent a year ago.”\textsuperscript{70}

**Summary**

Given the CF’s small ‘mid-level’ cohort, the CF’s pool of future commanders and key senior staff members is much smaller than the CF of the past or the present, so it is “imperative that attrition here be kept as low as possible.”\textsuperscript{71} The CF must retain as many of its best people as possible to ensure proper depth of knowledge and experience to lead the Forces in future. Failure to do this will place younger, less experienced leaders in positions ahead of their time. For example, Britain’s 19.1 million older, long-service workers will be replaced by only 1.2 million mid-generation workers, meaning “…9.7 million [short service] members ‘will be pushed faster into more high-powered jobs to fill this skills shortage.’”\textsuperscript{72} Some will rise to the occasion, but many will lack depth and experience, which could have adverse consequences for the Forces as a whole – mistakes made in a military situation by improperly experienced senior leaders can have lethal and


\textsuperscript{71} Standing Committee on National Defence, Recruitment and Retention in the Canadian Forces - NDDN (40-3), 2.

potentially disastrous consequences. While overall retention numbers may look promising, this cohort’s small size means the CF can only sustain limited attrition before losing critical skills and knowledge. While CF service is attractive, it may not remain the most attractive “employer of choice” for the future, particularly as the economy improves and Canada’s workforce changes. Retention, then, is an issue that CF leaders can ignore only at their peril.

73 "Leadership: The Boss is an Idiot and is Getting Us Killed," Strategy Page, http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htlead/20091223.aspx (accessed March 3, 2011) identifies the organizational dangers of poor leadership, particularly the dangers of not replacing overly cautious, hidebound leaders at the battalion and brigade level. It is well known in both military and civilian circles that people uncertain of themselves tend to be overly cautious and fall back on doctrine, rules and procedures vice being innovative and confident enough to be aggressive. Pushing overly young, inexperienced leaders too high too quickly could have long-term consequences.
CHAPTER 2 - THE FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Your military responsibilities will require versatility and adaptability never before required in war or in peace.\textsuperscript{74}

As the only force designed and authorized to defend Canada using a full range of force options, up to and including lethal, high intensity combat, the CF operates in a threatening and unstable world. This world places significant demands on CF personnel, making retaining skilled, experienced and knowledgeable personnel a key requirement for future success in it. Between 1990 and 2010 there were between fourteen and thirty-nine concurrent significant conflicts worldwide, some of which are ongoing at time of writing.\textsuperscript{75} Any of these conflicts could potentially develop into regional conflicts or humanitarian disasters and spur deployments for peace enforcement, stability operations or high-intensity combat. Further, the world has a significant number of failed and fragile states, which may “serve as safe havens and provide recruits for terrorist and criminal organizations:”\textsuperscript{76}


Canada in the Future Uncertain World

In 2006, Prime Minister Harper identified that Canada’s role in the world:

will extend beyond this continent. Our needs for prosperity and security, our values of freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law, are, in the view of our government, not only a heritage we share, they are also the common destiny of all humanity… we need to work for a more stable and just world.  

Canada will continue to participate in world affairs and must be prepared to deploy military forces to maintain Canada’s international credibility, demonstrate resolve, take

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77 Areas in white are protectorates, such as French Guiana, non-decolonized territories, such as Western Sahara, or autonomous countries within kingdoms, such as Greenland. Interestingly, the province of Newfoundland, a former self-governing dominion of the British empire, is identified as such an area even though it has been a Canadian province since 1949, likely an error in the map’s creation.

action to protect the helpless, support UN resolutions, safeguard international stability and to mitigate humanitarian disaster. Prime Minister Harper further identifies:

…if Canada wants to contribute to global security, we will have to participate in U.N. peace enforcement missions, not just traditional peacekeeping… Canada is a reliable and resolute partner in the quest for global security and the fight against terrorism….The successful pursuit of all of Canada’s interests around the world – trade, investment, diplomatic and humanitarian – ultimately depends on security, on the willingness of some of our fellow citizens to put their own lives on the line. Without security, Canadian companies and consumers can’t take advantage of foreign trade and investment opportunities. Without security, our aid workers can’t provide food, medicine and development assistance. And without security, our diplomats cannot work to share the peace and prosperity we enjoy with less fortunate people in the world - and thereby ensure it for our own future generations.  

Thousands of main battle tanks remain in service worldwide, while forces around the world continue to develop high-technology air and naval capabilities. China recently flight tested a prototype stealth fighter and a long range, large-capacity, precision-guided anti-ship missile that could potentially destroy an aircraft carrier. Defining the threat in a world where soldiers are killed daily by home-made bombs constructed by “poor, uneducated, disempowered youth with no prospects” from dead

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82 Stephen Metz, Rethinking Insurgency (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), 51. Metz also identifies that being an insurgent makes these disenfranchised and
batteries, saw blades and fertilizer, yet where nearly every state continues to improve its conventional forces can be overwhelming.\textsuperscript{83} There are multiple overlapping definitions and terminology used in current thought to define this future world.

**Future Threats**

Current theories define potential future wars as “small,” “new,” “fourth generation,”\textsuperscript{84} “irregular,”\textsuperscript{85} “asymmetric”\textsuperscript{86} or a series of “interactively complex or angry youth important and powerful, as well as providing them a livelihood, fulfilling “the economic and psychological needs of the insurgents.”

\textsuperscript{83}\textsuperscript{ICasualties | Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom Afghanistan | Fatalities by Nationality,” \url{http://icasualties.org/} (accessed January 17, 2011) tracks all Western force military casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan. An overwhelming majority of personnel are killed by Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), mines or other explosions, not direct combat, artillery, mortar or small arms fire. Canada, Department of National Defence, \textit{Land Operations 2021 - Adaptive Dispersed Operations: The Force Employment Concept for Canada’s Army of Tomorrow}, ed. Major Andrew B. Godfroy, PhD (Kingston: Directorate of Land Concepts and Design, 2007), 35 identifies that electronic information passage, combined with “largely unsophisticated explosive devices” have proven current worldwide insurgencies “remarkably resilient in the face of far superior military capabilities.” Author experience from service in South Lebanon and Afghanistan shows that a great many IEDs are built by foreign-trained agents who have a sophisticated information sharing and lessons learned system, facilitated by the Internet. IEDs are generally emplaced by desperate and illiterate teenagers based on instructions from IED builders and terrorist agents known as IED facilitators, who manage the nexus between money, IED raw materials, IED construction and emplacement. Many IEDs consist of a trigger made of saw blades serving as electrical contacts, connected to power sources consisting of a number of dead batteries connected in series/parallel, which, in large enough numbers, contain enough residual voltage to detonate an electrical blasting cap. When a person steps on, or a vehicle drives on, the blade trigger circuit, it is connected, the batteries’ residual voltage powers the initiator, normally a civilian construction-grade blasting cap, which then causes the main charge to detonate. Main charges normally consist of military explosives recovered from unexploded ordnance, or, in the majority of cases, home-made explosive (HME) made from an amalgam of Diesel fuel and ammonium nitrate agricultural fertilizer, stored in large plastic jugs which are normally used by impoverished families to collect and store water.

\textsuperscript{84} Barry Cooper, \textit{Democracies and Small Wars} (Calgary: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2009), 4-11. further defines these terms, which are variations on the theme of opponents attacking a force’s weaknesses, using failed or failing states as refuge, a dispersed battlespace and enemies using information technology to synchronize attacks. He further describes that military forces, terrorists, insurgents, criminals will form a nexus of opposition in future conflicts. The conflict world of the future will be dangerous and ambiguous, where nothing is simple or linear and very problem will be complex and multi-dimensional.

‘wicked’ problems.”87 Recent wars in Chechnya, South Lebanon, Kashmir, Iraq, Georgia and Afghanistan reflect global urbanization brought into conflict design, where combatants seek refuge, camouflage, tactical and media advantage by fighting in towns and cities.88 In the Horn of Africa, Somali pirates sail from the Puntland region in primitive boats, armed with small arms and inhuman viciousness to prey on maritime traffic in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean.89 In these environments, conventional forces lose much of the stand-off advantage that electronic sensors and precision

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munitions provide. Many theorists consider that future threats will be “hybrid,” where an adversary:

…simultaneously and adaptively employs a fused mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism, and criminal behavior in the battlespace… combinations of different modes of warfare.

Both state-sponsored forces and non-state actors will continue to seek advantage by attacking across the spectrum of conflict, identified below:

![Figure 2.2 – The Spectrum of Conflict.](source)

Hezbollah, the Lebanon-based, Iranian-sponsored Islamic resistance group epitomizes the modern hybrid threat. It has attacked Israel across the spectrum of conflict

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91 F. G. Hoffman, "Hybrid Threats: Neither Omnipotent nor Unbeatable," Orbis (Summer, 2010), 441-455 (accessed December 9, 2010). Military analyst and political scientist Dr. Stephen Metz also identifies that insurgencies tend to evolve into criminal organizations during the course of a conflict in Metz, Rethinking Insurgency, 51-52.
since its creation in the 1980s. During its 2006 war against Israel, it used a variety of methods to kill Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) soldiers and Israeli civilians in order to erode Israeli political will. It held ground from prepared positions using obstacle belts, used antitank missiles at long range, damaged an Israeli naval vessel with an anti-ship missile, and conducted hit-and-run guerrilla attacks using dispersed, lightly equipped gunmen in built up areas. While fighting IDF elements that had pushed into South Lebanon, it concurrently launched large-scale rocket attacks against northern Israeli towns to oppress and demoralize the civilian population.

The Future Demands on Personnel

Difficulties in operating in areas that are extremely culturally and climactically different from Canada, like Sudan, the Golan Heights and Afghanistan, are exacerbated by the seemingly erratic nature of violence in these areas of operations. Soldiers, sailors and air operations personnel may find themselves switching from a mindset of interaction and co-operation with local residents, to high intensity, sustained combat, in a matter of seconds. Former United States Marine Corps Commandant General Charles C. Krulak coined the term “the Three Block War” to describe the potential for military personnel to concurrently fight, maintain stability and conduct humanitarian support in a small

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92 An Open Letter - the Hizballah Program [Nass al-Risala al-Maftuha allati wajahaha Hizballah ila-l-Mustad'afin fi Lubnan wa-l-Alam] (Beirut, Lebanon: Hizballah, 1985), 1-6. identifies Hezbollah’s political program and goals. The author was a United Nations Military Observer in South Lebanon from May to November 2002 and witnessed Hezbollah conduct operations across this spectrum during his tenure there.

93 Exum, Hizballah at War - A Military Assessment, 11.

94 Hoffman, 'Hybrid Threats': Neither Omnipotent nor Unbeatable, 446.

geographic area. In the future security environment, all three aspects could occur at the same time within a radius of three city blocks.

Military personnel, whether overseas or in Canada, are under scrutiny, sometimes at the international level; even the lowest-level tactical action can have far-reaching effects. “Strategic Corporals,” relatively junior, often young and inexperienced military personnel can potentially have strategic impact. Ubiquitous, networked media presence “will mean that all future conflicts will be acted out before an international audience.”

Both international and domestic operations will be subject to intense scrutiny; US Coast Guard Admiral Thad Allen, national incident commander of the Deepwater Horizon US Gulf Coast oil spill response, notes “there will never again be a major disaster that won’t involve public participation.”

Once contentious social media or online news items become ‘viral’ and known throughout the user network, they become a persistent, recurring element whose messages are extremely difficult to counteract. The popular website ‘YouTube’ displays a short video clip of a United States Army tank crew destroying an Iraqi civilian car. The

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97 Krulak, The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War. It is interesting to note that Krulak developed the concept prior to the rise of Internet-based social media networks and the technological advances in mobile communications that make it possible to record video and upload it to the global audience via sites such as Facebook and YouTube.

soldiers first shoot the car with pistols, then crush it with an M1 Abrams tank, ostensibly because the car’s occupants were apprehended while looting. During the video, the soldiers make comments such as “that’s what you get when you loot” and “United States Army, tankers HOOAH” and laugh while the tank demolishes the car. The video’s documentary voice-over notes that the car’s owner claimed to be a taxi driver and the US Army had deprived him of his livelihood. In the video, the soldiers appear ill-educated, boorish, violent and uncontrolled, an army of occupation and oppression vice liberation, who use violence for entertainment. As of February 28, 2011, this video had been viewed 3,385,873 times, while 32,809 viewers made comments, many of them disparaging and uncomplimentary of the United States in general and its efforts in Iraq in particular.  

Even though the clip is more than five years old, it shows little sign of ever disappearing – many online discussion boards discuss it and several video sharing sites contain either it or a link to it.  

Every soldier, no matter how junior, constantly represents his or her country under the ever-present, often-critical eye of world public opinion.  

This new, expanded and chaotic arena, coupled with the increasing cost and technological complexity of military equipment, will tax the skills of and place new demands on, every CF member, not just leaders. CF personnel will have to be warriors, diplomats, technicians, fighters and teachers, a heavy burden. They will need to embody “adaptability, agility of thought, and timely decision-making, all in an ambiguous,
complex and lethal environment.” To meet this challenge, future CF members must be capable, fit, emotionally intelligent and prescient, exactly the same traits that will continue to be in demand by domestic security entities and business.

As the world becomes increasingly unstable, the future security environment will be more chaotic and dangerous than today’s, characterized by complex, hybrid threats both at home and abroad. Digital media proliferation and communications could potentially make every CF member a strategic influencer, particularly during deployed operations. Enemies will make best use of all available technology, so the CF must be prepared to fight conventional threats and concurrently take a more nuanced approach to winning “wars amongst the people,” conducting stability operations and acting across the spectrum of conflict, at times concurrently, in a non-contiguous battlespace. In some cases, the battlespace may extend into what are currently perceived as safe zones. For example, on March 2nd, 2011, a 21 year old Kosovar Albanian murdered two US Air Force personnel in Frankfurt, Germany “as revenge for the American mission in Afghanistan.”

101 From a study of leadership challenges evolving from the Afghan version of the “three block war” authored by Colonel Bernd Horn, quoted in Robert W. Walker Dr., The Professional Development Framework: Generating Effectiveness in Canadian Forces Leadership - CFLI TR 2006-01 (Kingston: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, Canadian Defence Academy, 2006).


103 This incident demonstrates, in a tragic and practical way, the networked nature of the modern terrorist and his ability to influence disenfranchised youth around the world, even from remote locations, to commit acts of violence. The gunman alleged that watching a YouTube video of US soldiers operating in Afghanistan prompted the attack. Police investigators noted that the gunman “was shy and had few friends, and appeared to get his ideas not from mosque attendance or personal contact, but from the Internet. German prosecutor Rainer Griesbaum assesses that the incident shows the dangers of “virtual jihad” and “underscored the threat from Internet extremism” in "Germany: Airport Shooting Suspect's Gun Jammed,"
Summary

The future will continue to challenge military personnel to their limits. Manning shortfalls, high deployment tempo and domestic operations demands, coupled with personnel shortfalls, make service today challenging, particularly for CF leaders. Maintaining discipline, morale and dedication in the future security environment will require strength of mind, initiative and impeccable character from each and every CF member. As the CF trains its people to a higher and higher standard, it increases their attractiveness to outside employers and increases the demands that retaining them will make on CF leaders.

The CF must continue to win the talent retention war; leadership importance will increase as junior members become more skilled and are placed in positions of greater responsibility. Given that the small cohort of experienced mid-level leaders, many of whom are Afghan combat or Somali counter-piracy veterans, are approaching critical exit points, the knowledge and skills they hold will grow in importance in the chaotic world of the future.

CHAPTER 3 - THE CHANGING PERSONNEL ENVIRONMENT

People resemble their times more than they resemble their parents.\textsuperscript{104}

Given the changing workplace demographic in most Western societies, rapid technological increase and CF demographics, retaining only mid-career personnel is not the CF’s only and most pressing problem. Leadership, relationships and the demands of military service are human functions that demand face to face contact and close cooperation.

The nature of CF service drives personnel from different generational demographics to work together very closely.\textsuperscript{105} For example, one could find a twenty-


\textsuperscript{105} Unless otherwise noted, “Traditionalists” are those born between 1925 and 1945, “Baby Boomers” were born between 1946 and 1964, “Generation X” was born between 1965 and 1980 and “Generation Y” was born between 1981 and 2000. While some studies refer to this generation as “Millenials,” this paper will not use the term “Millenials” as the author considers “Generation Y” is more appropriate and offers the least chance of terminology confusion. These definitions are those used in Leesa Tanner, \textit{Who are the Millenials?} (Ottawa: Defence Research and Development Canada - Centre for Operational Research and Analysis,[2010]) (accessed January 25, 2011). An extremely comprehensive study prepared by the Canadian Navy’s Operational Research Team, its definition of “Millenials” is at odds with other literature. Some authors, such as generational research expert Claire Raines, in Claire Raines and Arleen Arnsparger, "Millenials at Work," Generations at Work, \url{http://www.generationatwork.com/articles_millennials_at_work.php} (accessed February 1, 2011), refer to “Millenials” as those born post-2000, but as M. McCrindle and M. Beard, \textit{Seriously Cool - Marketing, Communicating and Engaging with the Diverse Generations} (Baulkam Hills Business Centre, Australia: McCrindle Research,[2007]), \url{http://robertoigarza.files.wordpress.com/2008/11/art-marketing-communicating-with-the-diverse-generations-mccrindle-2007.pdf} (accessed February 7, 2011) note, “there is no demographic or sociological justification for such choices.” Due to commonly-found disparities in terminology, referring to this demographic as “Generation Y” poses the least opportunity for confusion. Finally, “Generation Z” are those born post-2000. McCrindle and Beard note that Generation Z likely begins with the 1995 birth-rate pickup, while noted generational expert Tammy Erickson identifies that “1995-1997… will turn out to be the switch point – the cut off for Generation Y and the beginning of a new generation,” in "Welcome the Post-Gen-Y Generation," Harvard Business Review, \url{http://blogs.hbr.org/erickson/2008/07/welcome_the_postgeny_generation.html} (accessed November 26, 2010). However, given that it is still too early for the majority of research to concur on this generation’s actual start point, and “The Post-Gen-Y Generation” is cumbersome, Generation Z will be used when required to identify those born after 2000 throughout this paper.
two-year-old Generation Y platoon commander technically senior to his forty-six-year-old Baby Boomer platoon Warrant Officer, but reliant on the Warrant Officer as his command team partner and subject matter expert in technical details, low-level tactical activities, readiness and combat replenishment. While there is a wide gap in experience, both will complete very similar jobs, potentially under fire, and rely closely on each other, both in a field training, deployed operational or garrison setting. By understanding generational differences, one can understand the CF’s future personnel environment:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generation</th>
<th>Baby Boomer</th>
<th>Generation X</th>
<th>Generation Y</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Born</td>
<td>between 1946 and 1964</td>
<td>between 1964 and 1980</td>
<td>since 1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaped By</td>
<td>television, the Cold War, student activism, youth culture, FLQ crisis, feminisim, space travel, stay-at-home moms</td>
<td>the energy crisis, technology’s first wave, fall of the Berlin Wall, music videos, AIDS, working mothers (latchkey kids), rising divorce rates</td>
<td>explosion of technology and media, 9-11, Columbine shootings, multiculturalism, variety of family structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They Value</td>
<td>standing out, recognition</td>
<td>flexibility, honesty, feedback, work-life balance</td>
<td>strong leadership, concern for community, structure, fair play, diversity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On the job they are</td>
<td>a driven, service-oriented team player who doesn't want to be micromanaged. They live to work.</td>
<td>independent, self-reliant, unimpressed by authority and focused on self-development. They work to live.</td>
<td>self-confident, competent, optimistic, outspoken and collaborative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Career motto</td>
<td>education plus hard work equals success.</td>
<td>invest in portable career skills.</td>
<td>multi-track or die!</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3.1 – Serving CF Generational Characteristics
Baby Boomers

The oldest serving CF members are the Baby Boomers, born between 1945 and 1964, an “outsized, over-entitled, and self-obsessed demographic” that makes up almost a third of Canada’s population.\(^\text{106}\) Often described as the “me generation,” they grew up in relatively stable, nuclear families where “the father worked and the mother stayed at home.”\(^\text{107}\) They were “the first generation to declare a higher priority for work over personal life”\(^\text{108}\) and in the business world were “the primary force behind workplace practices like participative management, quality circles and teambuilding.”\(^\text{109}\) Baby Boomers have enjoyed a lifetime of job stability, economic growth and prosperity, which virtually guaranteed good prospects to those who worked hard and pursued education. As a result, they are generally in their financial prime and many are financially secure.\(^\text{110}\) By virtue of their cohort’s size, Baby Boomers have enjoyed a great deal of influence in politics and society, which many will seek to perpetuate, like the “greying Bay Street hotshots…[who are] quietly pushing to remain at the top of their profit pyramids.”\(^\text{111}\)

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\(^\text{107}\) Tanner, *Who are the Millennials?*, 12.


\(^\text{109}\) Arnsparger, *4GenR8tns: Succeeding with Colleagues, Cohorts & Customers*


\(^\text{111}\) Gatehouse, *What the Boomers are Leaving their Children*
began to see Baby Boomers reach the compulsory retirement age at the beginning of this century, and will continue to see them reach the maximum age for service over the next decade. When junior officers or NCMs complain about… senior leaders, they are talking about Baby Boomers. After all, the commonplace practice of working ‘24/7’ came from this generation.112

Baby Boomers make up the CF’s higher leadership echelons; in 2009, the 50th percentile of Lieutenant-Colonels, Colonels and General Officers were over 47 years old, as were the 50th percentile of Master and Chief Warrant Officers.113 A 2000 US Army study found:

Baby Boomer Captains admired and respected their families, but families were usually placed in the background and existed mainly to support the role of the Army officer. Likewise, hobbies and personal time were luxuries not afforded to a Boomer Army officer who devoted every ounce of energy and attention to the job.114

The CF’s current command and leadership climate, its policies, organizational expectations and general character are all products of its Baby Boomer cohort.

**Generation X**

Generation X makes up the CF’s small ‘mid-service’ cohort. Like the Baby Boomers, Generation X follows the adage “you are what you do.”115 However, many

112 Tanner, *Who are the Millennials?*, 12.


Generation X children were ‘latchkey kids’ who grew up in households where both parents worked, or were “the product of divorce.” As a result, they learned independence and self-reliance, yet, largely due to living the results of Baby Boomer work focus, “are willing to work hard, but they want a life beyond work.”

Downsizing and corporate layoffs make many Generation Xers mistrust large institutions and resent the Boomers, seeing themselves “snarled in a demographic traffic jam… stuck behind all those surplus graduates of the past decade.” Generation X prefers “self-organized teams, and tend to display loyalty to these teams rather than to the overarching organization.”

CF Generation Xers have spent their careers in constant flux, various permutations of ‘transformation’ and doing more with less. A confident generation,

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117 Arnsparger, 4GenR8tns: Succeeding with Colleagues, Cohorts & Customers


119 Tanner, Who are the Millennials?, 14.

120 There are many examples of the CF’s transformation or ‘transformation-like’ activities from 1990 to 2010. In the nineties, the post-Cold War search for a ‘peace dividend’ came in the form of budget cuts and personnel downsizing, epitomized by the Force Reduction Plan explained previously. After the Somalia Scandal of the mid-90s, the Officer Corps underwent a period of intellectual self-flagellation, was studied by a panel of noted Canadian academics external to the CF, then underwent a professional transformation which saw greater emphasis on academic study for CF officers as a necessity for service and advancement. The advent of the Year 2000 saw a series of “transformational thinking” initiatives under the umbrella of “Defence 2000 Transformation,” accompanied by glossy “D2000 News” brochures containing feel-good articles about “change-leading thinking” and “redesigning processes,” published by NDHQ and pushed to all levels of the CF. These publications’ content was completely divorced from the reality of the serving CF at the time and they were viewed derisively by many Generation X junior officers and enlisted personnel. Post-2000, many Army units were stripped of large numbers of their vehicles under an “Equipment Rationalization Program.” Service support personnel were pulled from line units and consolidated in Close Support and General Support Service Battalions, adding chain of command overhead
labelled at times as arrogant, Generation X is easily independent and self-directed; these
traits and Generation X’s “casual attitude” may be interpreted as disrespect:121

It’s not that Generation X officers are disrespectful; it is just that they
are not impressed by rank or hierarchical position. They have been let
down by too many authority figures ranging from their overworked
parents to their Commander-in-Chief. As a result, they are extremely
sceptical towards authority.122

but no real efficiencies in the provision of support. Medical personnel were pulled from line units and
centralized in specialized medical units and “Care Delivery Units” where a pool of medical personnel
provided care to several units’ soldiers, but did not belong to any of the units they “serviced,” divorcing
medical practitioners from the soldiers they cared for. The advent of high technology saw a search in
military circles for a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), whose advocates postulated that exceedingly
capable sensors and precision weapons would enable future forces to be ‘network-enabled’, ‘agile, flexible
and lethal.’ One example of such thinking can be seen in Captain Eric Dion, “The E-Fantry Warrior! the
Evolution of the Queen of Battles in the Face of 21st Century Challenges,” Canadian Army Journal
7, no. 2 (Summer, 2004), 14-23. In practical terms, this search for RMA seemed to many a thinly-veiled
renaming/repackaging of further cuts and reductions of capabilities termed ‘legacy’ and no longer relevant,
such as Main Battle Tanks, armoured combat engineers and tube artillery. ‘Legacy’ systems were to be
replaced by high technology surveillance, long range precision missiles and ever-larger, more computer-
dependent headquarters. Lieutenant-General Rick Hillier, Army Transformation- Press Conference Speech,
October 30, 2003); Dr Elinor Sloan, "Strategic Analysis - Canada and the Revolution in Military Affairs,"
Department of National Defence, Associate Deputy Minister (Policy),
http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/revolution (accessed January 17, 2011) and Canada, Department of
National Defence, Army Force Employment Concept, 2004), 45 identify this thinking. Throughout this
same time, the Navy saw a reduction in the number of ships and personnel, while Air Force flight hours for
certain airframes, notably fighters, were cut. To many Generation X service members, “transformation”
really means ‘do more with less and prepare to have tasks increase, but resources and personnel cut, with
greater overwatch from more and larger headquarters.’ CF survey findings outlined in Otis and Straver,
Review of Attrition and Retention Research for the Canadian Forces, i-66:“reveal high levels of cynicism
toward the transformation initiative. For example, many members felt that the current initiative was not
different from past initiatives, which have had few positive effects.”

121 Alberta Learning Information Service, "Tip Sheets - Bridging the Generation Gap at Work,"
2011).

122 Wong, Generations Apart: Xers and Boomers in the Officer Corps, 16. While this example is
an American one, referring to the President Clinton/Monica Lewinsky scandal, Canadian Generation X
officers and soldiers have had their own share of “command disappointments.” Examples include the
Somalia scandal and its attendant cover-up by senior CF officers, including General Jean Boyle, the then-
Chief of the Defence Staff, and DND public servants, followed by the perceived scapegoating of low-
ranking soldiers and the eventual disbandment of the Canadian Airborne Regiment. A host of other
questionable senior officer and senior public servant activities can be found in Scott Taylor and Brian
Nolan, Tarnished Brass (Toronto: Lester Publishing Limited, 1996), 266. While a sensationalized account
that verges on muckraking, this work was widely read by many Generation X CF members in the 1990s and
still remains in the CF consciousness as a series of examples of poor leadership and self-focused leaders
divorced from their subordinates.
Generation X is cynical, pragmatic and has a “survivor mentality,”\textsuperscript{123} that sees authority as “something to be earned, not declared by position.”\textsuperscript{124} Many Generation X CF personnel have led in complex and dangerous operations. They have commanded platoons and companies during stability operations in Bosnia, served on ships conducting counter-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean and interdiction operations in the Middle East and South West Asia. They have filled various roles during domestic operations and disaster assistance to Turkey, Honduras, Pakistan and Haiti. Since 2001, many have led from the front in ground combat in Afghanistan. Many Baby Boomer CF leaders were unit, Task Force or higher level commanders, or members of senior planning and operations staffs, earning campaign stars and meritorious service decorations for important service in various theatres. However, many more Generation X personnel have been actually doing the jobs they trained to do as tactical leaders in complex, lethal and arduous settings.

Despite its cynicism and overly-practical nature, the CF’s Generation X has been tried, tested and found exceptional in the crucible of combat, particularly in complex leadership roles. That it has experienced a series of military and leadership challenges not shared with Baby Boomers and very few Generation Y personnel will further make this generation unique. It will likely become even more cynical and pragmatic,

\textsuperscript{123} Tanner, \textit{Who are the Millenials?}, 13.

\textsuperscript{124} Wong, \textit{Generations Apart: Xers and Boomers in the Officer Corps}, 35.
particularly when dealing with those who have not done what they themselves have done; “Someone has to puncture irrational exuberance and Xers are ideal for the job.”  

**Generation Y**

Generation Y is the CF’s youngest group and forms most of its short-service cohort; the CF’s most attractive recruiting demographic are Canadians between 17 and 34 years old. Many of this group’s more than 7 million members (more than 20% of Canada’s population) are members of Generation Y. A well-educated generation, Generation Y has been coined “Generation Why” because of its inherent thirst for knowledge and tendency, driven by attentive, indulgent parents, to require explanations and near-constant personal attention. “When Gen Y ask why, it is not a brazen challenge of authority, unless we choose to make it so.” This thirst for knowledge, ability to connect and find answers through many channels, coupled with globalization, equity and migration trends has made Generation Y “global in their thinking. They are

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127 Statistics Canada, "Population by Sex and Age Group (as of July 1, 2009)," http://www40.statcan.ca/l01/cst01/demo10a-eng.htm (accessed January 22, 2011).


color-blind, they are gender-blind, they really don’t have the biases” found in older generations. \(^{130}\) Generation Y workers are unlikely to commit to long-term careers, preferring a breadth of experience:

…the world is full of too many choices…’If you make a bad decision and enter a new career that doesn’t align with your strengths, wants or desires, then you can simply pick up and make another career change with very little consequence,’ …they enter the workforce thinking they should be showered with things that they want…they’re ‘free agents’…there’s no such thing as job security in an uncertain economy. \(^{131}\)

Web-adept, Generation Y expects information and attention to be tailored to individual needs and has multi-tasking as “part of its DNA.” \(^{132}\) Generation Y places more importance on speed and efficiency rather than social niceties or roles within an organization, \(^{133}\) making large, bureaucratic, hierarchical organizations, where development and innovation happen glacially, inherently unattractive to it. Concurrently, Generation Y personnel require near constant feedback, coaching and mentoring to stay engaged and perform effectively, making managing them an often time-consuming proposition. \(^{134}\)


\(^{134}\) This characteristic is identified very well in the case study, comments and responses found in Tamara J. Erickson and others, Gen Y in the Workforce, Vol. 87, Harvard Business School Publication.
Without regular supervisor attention, Generation Y workers can become resentful or “feel lost,” but are willing to work hard, as long as they have the support they perceive they need. However, Generation Y’s concept of work versus reward and the necessity to earn positions of prominence is skewed from that of previous generations. Generation Y personnel seek instant gratification and are often impatient, reluctant to earn their way to positions of importance. Generation Y personnel are “accustomed to the nice stuff that their parents’ hard work provides, but reject the process that it took to get it.”

Generation Y views remuneration differently than other generations and expects work to be interesting, exciting, meaningful and personally fulfilling, not that “pays well but is boring or annoying.” While Generation Y can be reward focused, its members are also “hardworking, entrepreneurial, startlingly authentic, refreshingly candid and wonderfully upbeat.” Generation Y is extremely community-minded:

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136 Raines and Arnsparger, *Millenials at Work*


[Generation Y students] firmly believed that members of their generation held strong civic commitments. Mary Ann, a suburban high school senior, offered this opinion: “I think it is big and not just because it is required here. I do a lot of extra stuff just because I enjoy doing it. I see my friends in public schools doing it when they don’t have to. We want to use what we know and have to help others”…Regardless of whether their generation was volunteering for personal gain, personal fulfillment, or to fulfill a requirement, most students believed that such acts would ultimately improve their communities and the broader society.141

Government initiatives bolster and inculcate the bent towards public service and volunteerism; Ontario mandates that students perform a “minimum of 40 hours of community involvement activities” in order to earn a secondary school diploma.142 This characteristic makes Generation Y personnel more eager to support humanitarian, peacekeeping or stability operations than their Baby Boomer and Generation X predecessors, who tend to view them as detracting from the core military functions of fighting and winning wars. Despite critics dismissing Generation Y as “couch potatoes and computer geeks hooked on Internet video games,” modern military service, including

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combat, has found Generation Y “as courageous and dedicated in combat as any
generation.”

**CF Generations and Technology**

Canada is the world’s leader in time spent online and each Canadian spends, on average, 43.5 hours on the Web monthly. While most CF equipment is technologically advanced and all CF generations use digital technology, identifying technological differences between generations provides better understanding of differences between serving generations’ approaches and attitudes. Generational approaches to technology differ:

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Technological competence will grow in importance in “the age of technical confluence, in which advances in each field of human knowledge speed advances in all the others.”

Generation Y, the first “digital native” generation, grew up “surrounded by digital media” and is extremely adept at finding technological solutions to challenges. When learning new systems, they can “intuitively navigate through new menus and interfaces,

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146 Arnsparger, *4Gen8tins: Succeeding with Colleagues, Cohorts & Customers.*
master new control sequences and process images faster than they can process words.”

As Generation Y is comfortable networking and communicating through many means, asynchronously and concurrently, managing it “is an impossible task, at least if you define ‘manage’ as controlling their channels of communication.”

Generation X grew up seeing technologies emerge, move from science fiction to commoditized consumer goods and is more comfortable than the Baby Boomers in using technology to innovate and create. However, lacking Generation Y’s seamless integration of technology and life, Generation X uses technology as a tool only:

Gen Y… [are] the true online natives and have integrated technology into their everyday lives. They spend more time online than Gen X, watch more online video and text message more often. Technology forms a major part of their entertainment and socializing…

Gen X, on the other hand, tends to use technologies that support their lifestyle needs such as online banking and online shopping. They have hectic lives, with careers and families, and embrace the convenience of digital. While the number of Gen X’s reading blogs and using social media is rising, they still fall behind those younger than them.


148 Erickson, 10 Reasons Gen Xers are Unhappy at Work The author has seen several occasions where very senior CF leaders, such as the Chief of the Defence Staff, Chief Military Personnel and Chief of the Land Staff have received Emails directly from eager, well-meaning Generation Y soldiers offering suggestions, improvements, or asking for issues to be rectified. Often these issues were ones that saw either solutions in progress, or were the purview of lower levels of the chain of command, but Generation Y impatience saw these concerns pushed to the top of the chain of command. Generation Y seems to take the view that if one ‘can’ do something, such as send the Chief of the Defence Staff a direct Email, then in many cases one ‘should.’

While the Boomers have adopted technology and are the fastest-growing Canadian internet use segment, and Generation X grew up using ATMs and electronic devices, Generation Y “has always considered ‘google’ a verb.” It is the most prolific generator and user of online content and social media; 82% of Generation Y adults generate and contribute online content. Whether civilian or soldier, Facebook, YouTube, Google and MySpace are not tools to Generation Y, they are inextricably linked to its life.

Trooper Marc Diab, a 22-year-old soldier from the Royal Canadian Dragoons killed in action in Afghanistan on March 8, 2009, is an example of the Generation Y soldier. He documented pre-deployment training and deployment on video, which he shared with family and friends. He routinely used personal leave and free time to support a church youth group, which revered him, in his home town of Mississauga, Ontario. While older soldiers typically write sealed letters, to be opened only in the event they are killed, to loved ones, Diab “created a [video] montage called See You Tomorrow for his loved ones in case he didn’t come home alive… his reflection of life beyond death.”

150 El Akkad, Canadians’ Internet Usage nearly Double the Worldwide Average - the Globe and Mail.

151 Kitfield, Generation Y is Producing Good Soldiers, 26-27.


153 A simple YouTube or Facebook search for the term “Canadian Forces” or related topics (Canadian Navy, Army, Air Force, etc) yields many videos, pages, channels and sites generated and posted by serving members.


155 Ibid.
After his death, two Generation Y filmmakers used videos Diab created as the inspiration and basis for a documentary about Diab’s life and soldier sacrifice in Afghanistan called “If I Should Fall.” Generation Y, whether in uniform or not, masters technology, has incredible initiative, expects to be networked and truly does believe that the world is indeed a stage where information, images and opinions flow freely.

Generational Conflicts and Challenges

The brewing generational conflict between Generation X leaders and their “little velociraptor… ferociously ambitious” Generation Y subordinates will be a future challenge. Generation X, forced to earn its way into a workforce dominated by a larger, older, self-interested Baby Boomer cohort, sees Generation Y’s attention demands as unwarranted, an attitude much like “a middle child.” In addition to dealing with a cohort of “potentially the most annoying employees and coworkers you’ve ever met,” Generation X bears the burden of working within a system designed by and for the Baby Boomers, but with shifting rules:

Where the Boomers were indulged, the Xers were overlooked; the Boomers had time to ‘hang out,’” the Xers have always been pressed for time; the Boomers saw [and seized] a world of opportunity, the Xers felt

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156 If I should Fall, DVD Movie, directed by Brendon Culliton and Dan Heald (London, Ontario: Joint Media Group, 2011) (accessed January 26, 2011)

157 Details magazine editor-at-large Jeff Gordinier, quoted in Laucius, X at a Crossroads.

158 Generational relations expert Tamara J. Erickson, quoted in Interview with Tamara J. Erickson, President of the Concours Institute, Video Clip, directed by Harvard Business Publishing YouTube, 2008), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rDAdaupMno&feature=related (accessed March 10, 2011).

159 Lush, The Workplace Diva has Arrived, 56.
forced to adopt a survivor mentality [which was aggravated by the North American financial crisis] \(^{160}\)

[Generation X’s burdens will be further exacerbated by the looming pension crisis as the Boomers, en masse, age, retire and demand high standards of living and service]. By 2031, about 25% of Canadians will be aged 65 or older, up from 13% [in 2006]. Per capita spending on healthcare for those aged 65 and older is estimated to be almost five times greater than spending on the rest of the population… By 2030, it is predicted that there will be 40 retirees for every 100 working-age persons, up from 21 for every 100 in 2003. \(^{161}\)

In the CF, Generation X Sergeants (Sgts), Majors (Majs) and Lieutenant-Colonels (LCols) expect Generation Y Corporals (Cpls), Lieutenants (Lts) and Captains (Capts) to “do their time” to earn recognition, attention and eventual promotion, much as they, the Generation X personnel, had to. The military system’s inherent deference to and respect for experience, the necessity to achieve certain career milestones and demonstrate long-service institutional commitment contributes to generational friction. While not an insurmountable obstacle, Generation X leaders must be aware of and attuned to attitude differences and ensure that they do not let their subordinates feel that they have been ‘abandoned’ or ‘assessed’ rather than being mentored. \(^{162}\)

Business literature identifies

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\(^{162}\) While commanding a combat team in Afghanistan between fall 2009 and spring 2010, the author encountered this very challenge in dealing with his Generation Y junior officers. While the author felt that the level, type and style of interaction and attention he paid to the junior officers was sufficient, based on what he, as a junior officer, had received from his commanders, subordinates felt that they were abandoned and grew increasingly uncertain. This uncertainty manifested itself in their performance, and they grew increasingly hesitant to use their initiative or approach their commander with their concerns. The combat team’s Sergeant-Major, who observed this, approached the two junior officers and encouraged them to bring their concerns to the commander in a private forum. Several hours of discussion, both one-on-one and collectively, between the commander and junior officers, resolved the issue. The author made a directed effort to interact individually with each of the junior officers, both alone and together, let them air
that Baby Boomers have more affinity for and better relations with Generation Y than X, exacerbating resentment and poor relations. While unlikely to have widespread CF effect due to military hierarchy, generational favouritism could add to future leader challenges and burdens.

Maintaining mission focus and building cohesion during operations, given Generation Y’s short attention span and low-cost, readily available global communications, could pose another challenge. A US Army study of soldiers deployed to Iraq notes “unit cohesion may suffer as soldiers devote time and energy into maintaining the emotional bonds with their families rather than their comrades.”

Today’s Generation Y soldiers already demonstrate this characteristic. Even in home garrison life, the soldier “has his own bathroom, kitchenette and fully wired entertainment hub… he withdraws to his virtual life.” During deployed operations, rather than their concerns and provided individual attention, encouragement and guidance. This act, and future close interaction, had an immediate positive effect on morale and performance throughout the rest of the deployment, which was characterized by consistent threat and danger that demanded engaged, aggressive and attentive leadership.


164 A business school professor quoted in Fertik, The Kids are all Right: Why New Graduates should Give You Hope taught his classes in nine-minute blocks, punctuated by question periods to maintain student attention. Fertik hypothesizes that to meet Generation Y’s demands, this time may have to be modified to a maximum of 60 seconds.

165 Wong and Gerras, CU @ the FOB: How the Forward Operating Base is Changing the Life of Combat Soldiers, 26.
interact with their comrades during relaxed time or take part in collective activities such as sports, many retreat into video gaming, watching movies on portable terminals or connecting with distant friends and family via Internet connections, which they see as a necessity, not a luxury, even in isolated forward positions. Given that Generation Y personnel were “weaned on the frenetic pace of Sesame Street and MTV”, they may be able to successfully multitask and compartmentalize the demands on attention that a wired world brings. However:

Soldiers may develop unhealthy battle rhythms of putting in their time during their shift and then retreating for the rest of the day and night to their virtual friends and families. Units with missions off the FOB have the advantage of more interaction between soldiers, but even in these units, it is not unusual for soldiers to cloister themselves back on the FOB with their own music, videos, and Internet connection to home.

Even though individual soldiers may be able to balance the personal demands of the wired world, their commanders face the unenviable challenge of maintaining unit

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168 Wong and Gerras, *CU @ the FOB: How the Forward Operating Base is Changing the Life of Combat Soldiers*, 36.

169 Ibid., 26. The author saw this unhealthy characteristic in young CF personnel as far back as 1998, when reliable satellite telephone service became available in some of the larger Canadian camps used by the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) in the Former Yugoslavia. A soldier in the Canadian Armoured Car Squadron kept falling asleep while driving a Cougar armoured car during patrols, a hazardous proposition given the narrow, winding nature of the mountain roads that Canadians patrolled, with sharp drop-offs and very tight switchbacks. The soldier was medically examined for a physiological reason for his inability to stay awake and interviewed in depth by his chain of command. Only after examining the outgoing call records from the camp’s telephone system and surreptitiously tracking the soldier’s movements while off duty, the soldier’s supervisor discovered that this soldier was spending inordinate amounts of time, hours at a stretch, usually between midnight and 6 am, speaking with his girlfriend in Canada on the telephone. As a result, he was unable to perform his primary duties during the day and frequently put his fellow soldiers at risk during operations. After several warnings and failure to modify his behaviour, the soldier was subjected to disciplinary proceedings under the National Defence Act, administratively counseled and repatriated back to Canada.
cohesion in a force where its members have been raised with the view that collective cohesion and sacrifice may be subordinate to individual connectivity and personal balance.

A hierarchical, bureaucratic entity like the CF, which is often slow to adopt new technology and procedures, is at odds with Generation Y personnel’s attitudes. This challenge will be exacerbated by frictions between Generation X’s cynicism, gloomy outlook and mistrust of authority and Generation Y’s boundless optimism and desire for instant reward and responsibility without ‘doing its time.’ While Baby Boomers and Generation Y have relatively good working relationships, the same cannot always be said for Generations X and Y, despite the characteristics they share. Further, Generation X’s leadership challenges have only just begun:

Generation Xers will step into leadership positions and face the challenge of managing significant generational differences, which will require the best attributes of transformational leadership style. The next decade in the workplace promises to provide some interesting generational dynamics.\(^{170}\)

Generation Y’s proclivity to seek a series of jobs vice committing to long-term careers will create challenges in building human capital that can only be resolved by flexible and creative retention efforts. While ‘job hopping’ is most closely associated with Generation Y, some studies find that Generation X also views multiple career paths as “preferential to the ‘job-for-life’ mentality of past generations.”\(^{171}\) Retaining both Generation X and Y


\(^{171}\) McCrindle and Beard, Seriously Cool - Marketing, Communicating and Engaging with the Diverse Generations, 33.
personnel will require creative and different approaches, but is critical to perpetuating CF collective knowledge and skill. Culturally, the CF should abandon the attitude, endemic to nearly all military forces, that each successive “new generation” is less capable than that which preceded it. Living in the past will create a force that is stultified vice creative, defensive in the face of innovation and completely unsuited to upcoming CF Generation Y personnel.

**Summary**

To capture the collective benefit of the CF’s recent successes in complex operations, to ensure that its senior leaders have sufficient skills and experience, retaining the small Generation X cohort is critical. To sustain the future force in an increasingly uncertain world, given the lack of lateral entry in military forces, retaining Generation Y personnel for career-length commitments rather than short-term jobs is also critical.

Inherent generational differences, the changing personnel environment and potential Generation X/Y conflicts will make motivating, retaining and leading the future force a challenge that future leaders must successfully overcome.
CHAPTER 4 - RETAINING GOOD PEOPLE – ATTRITION’S COSTS

There is a body of essential knowledge and expertise relating to the deployment of violence which is unique to the profession of arms...\textsuperscript{172}

Military attrition carries costs more acute than attrition in the civilian world. While some costs are financial, others are intangible, related to the constraints of military service. The demands of military service, its members’ unlimited liability and the necessity to succeed in vital missions demand a numerically healthy force and the maintenance of corporate knowledge that can only be learned and institutionalized through experience. Unlike business, the service industries, manufacturing, agriculture or other employment sectors, military skills cannot, for the most part, be learned anywhere outside a military context. Military forces have “no lateral entry, the most able people must be identified, retained, and promoted from within the organization.”\textsuperscript{173} The military profession:

\begin{quote}
does not bring in senior leaders laterally from outside of the organization; they must be developed from its own junior leaders… in no other field are the professionals expected to willingly lay down their lives if necessary.\textsuperscript{174}
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{174} Colonel C. Thomas Climer, \textit{Maintaining the Professionalism of the U.S. Army Officer Corps} (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: United States Army War College, 2010), 12-13. While Colonel Climer’s remarks concern the US Army, they are equally applicable to navies, air forces and any other military bodies, including the CF.
Military naval service demands that leaders put sailors and ships in harm’s way to accomplish missions, regardless of sea state, weather or threat. While all service at sea demands that all professional mariners have a high degree of discipline, technical skills, seamanship and leadership, the demands of naval service in armed vessels add an additional dimension. There is no civilian maritime experiential equivalent to that of serving in armed naval vessels; civilian sailors do not face the same tactical and intellectual demands that using, or potentially being targeted by, long-range, lethal weapons brings. All military professions require the same rigour, have the same high consequences of error, and require skills that only the shared experience and pooled knowledge that military service brings can replicate. The only organizations that can effectively train military personnel are military forces. Military skills are in demand by business and industry – “former officers make up just 3% of the U.S. adult male population but about three times that of the CEOs of S&P 500 firms.”

“The most priceless thing to come from combat in Afghanistan is the Warrior Spirit, not just in the Army, but across the CF.” Unfortunately, Warrior Spirit can develop only in the company of warriors. It develops through training, experience and membership in an organization, fostered by leaders who have practical experience and the

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175 Personal Email, Lieutenant-Commander, Maritime Surface and Sub-surface Officer, January 31, 2011.


177 Lieutenant-General Peter Devlin, Commander, Land Force Command, public address, February 14, 2011, Canadian Forces College, Toronto, cited with LGen Devlin's permission.
credibility to inspire their people to excel in demanding military environments. Maintaining this spirit relies on the force having a critical mass of experienced, credible leaders; without them, the character of the force is diffused and the force loses the very cohesion and will that is the cornerstone of its capability. Further, when mid-level personnel leave, the pool of those that are institutionally experienced and skilled enough to be the next generation of leaders shrinks.

Financial Costs – Early Attrition

While mid-level leader attrition incurs intangible organizational costs, early trained personnel attrition poses less of an organizational cost, but significant measurable financial costs. While all training incurs costs and some attrition is always necessary, large-scale early attrition turns training costs from investments in capability to unrecoverable sunk costs. Army combat engineers, Electrical Mechanical Engineering (EME) officers, nurses and Medical Officers are prone to high early-career attrition:

178 No clear definition for “early” attrition exists, but it generally indicates attrition soon after completion of training, precluding personnel from using their training to provide the CF any great benefit. For most occupations, any attrition prior to attaining five years’ service can be viewed as “early”. Nurses and Medical Officers in this study are identified as “early” with seven and ten years’ service, respectively, due to the high costs the CF incurs, in most cases, by sponsoring their medical training.
Figure 4.1 – Early Attrition Patterns – Selected Occupations
Source: DND/Auditor General of Canada reports as noted below

Combat engineers, whose primary role is to enable friendly forces to live, move and fight on the battlefield, while denying the same to the enemy, had an overall 2006 attrition rate of 6%. However, early-career engineer attrition was significantly higher; after four years of service, only 65% of trained combat engineer soldiers in any given cohort remained in service. It cost approximately $220,000 2006 dollars to train a combat engineer up to his or her fourth year of service. This early attrition incurred a sunk cost, which offered very little return on investment, of 35% of total training cost, or $77,000

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180 All figures in this paragraph, unless otherwise attributed, are from Auditor General of Canada, 2006 May Status Report of the Auditor General of Canada, 65.
per soldier per cohort. Since engineers’ unique skillsets are necessary to support every type of CF operation, both in Canada or overseas, this cost is one the CF cannot afford to pay.

EME officers are a relatively small officer military occupation. Technical experts, EME officers are part of the CF’s combat service support capability, overseeing army, navy and air force land-based equipment maintenance and other service support activities.\(^{181}\) EME officers must hold a Bachelor’s degree in science or engineering unless they have sufficient technical experience, so most EME officers either graduate from a CF-subsidized university programme or enrol after earning a degree. In 2006, it cost approximately $200,000 to train an EME officer, not including subsidized university costs. While EME officers also had a 6% 2006 attrition rate, this rate, as in the case of the combat engineers described above, it was also skewed towards early attrition. In 2006, an average of 35% of any given EME officer cohort will have left the Forces within three years of completing training, leaving behind only 22 of the average of 35 EME officers recruited yearly.\(^{182}\) Monetarily, this translates to a sunk cost of $2,600,000.00 or $70,000 per officer trained. According to the CF’s 2008-09 Report on Regular Force Personnel, EME officers were 16.3% undermanned, with only 344 of the preferred Manning level’s 411 positions filled; as of January 1\(^{st}\), 2011, the CF contained only 346

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\(^{182}\) Unless otherwise noted, all facts and figures in this paragraph are from Auditor General of Canada, 2006 May Status Report of the Auditor General of Canada, 65-66.
trained EME officers. In the case of EME officers, attrition has had not only a financial, but also a capability cost in light of the highly technical nature of most military equipment.

CF medical specialists are another group sensitive to attrition. A 2006 Auditor General’s Report found that 71% of military physicians leave within 10 years of joining the CF, while two in five military nurses leave by the time they complete seven years’ service. Although civilian facilities provide their medical skills, medical professionals require the same seasoning, experience and training as the rest of the CF. To be most effective, they must also have a body of military knowledge and skill that is only acquired through CF experience. For example, Task Force Surgeons in Afghanistan, normally Lieutenant-Colonel Medical Officers (MO), must provide operational level advice to task force commanders on a host of subjects with regards to the Task Force’s health, personal readiness and medical fitness. They must know and intimately understand the conditions of service found wherever CF members serve; to do this, they often travel ‘outside the wire’ to remote forward locations to gauge the state of medical care and soldier morale in forward locations. They can only complete these responsibilities effectively if they have both in-depth medical and CF leadership knowledge, created only through experience.

High turnover will create a knowledge gap between the medical world and the rest of the CF. While medical technicians, nurses and Medical Officers currently enjoy immense credibility with the CF’s sailors, soldiers and air force personnel, those without

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‘front line’ service in ships, army field units and air force units lack a certain experiential element that only service with a line unit can bring. The gap is not impossible, but without a body of medical/military knowledge and experience, the CF medical profession’s capability and credibility will suffer.

**Recruiting versus Retention**

While it may be an attractive proposition to focus on recruiting new people rather than retaining existing ones, this thinking carries a host of long-term challenges and hidden costs. A 2007 Australian study found:

Assuming a force of 51,000, a one percent improvement in recruitment will realise some 500 enlistees. Conversely, a one percent increase in the effectiveness of retention results in two outcomes: first, it keeps 500 trained personnel within the organisation and second, it means 500 less people need to be recruited to maintain current levels of organisational capability. Thus, a one percent increase in the effectiveness of retention translates to a net benefit of 1000 people, over and above other organisational benefits such as training cost savings and the retention of valuable organisational memory, skills and experience.\(^{185}\)

Canadian figures reflect a similar trend. In the CF, combating a 1% rise in attrition requires 1,150 candidates recruited and trained. In order to attract and recruit these 1,150 suitable candidates, recruiting centres must process approximately 3,300 additional applicants.\(^{186}\) In addition to burdening recruiting centres, additional basic training pressures will further stress an already-stretched system, causing both organizational

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costs in terms of skills required to train personnel, and real, measurable, unrecoverable financial costs. Business research finds “the costs associated with recruiting, selecting, and training new employees often exceed 100% of the annual salary for the position being filled”\textsuperscript{187} and assesses “the cost of hiring and training an hourly worker at 300 to 700 times the worker’s hourly wage.”\textsuperscript{188} The US military spends approximately “$9,000 or $10,000 (USD) per recruit.”\textsuperscript{189} Recruiting new people vice retaining existing ones is costly.

Recruiting new personnel rather than retaining existing personnel creates long term expense and systemic challenges over and above the initial financial outlays noted above. The CF lacks the capacity to train large numbers of new recruits, particularly in technical occupations requiring a high degree of skill. In 2009-2010, the CF attracted and enrolled personnel beyond its expectations, creating a gap between trained effective strength and preferred manning levels due to the nearly 12,000 CF personnel training after enrolment.\textsuperscript{190} However, it lacks the capacity to train all its support and technical personnel to put them into service in a timely fashion. Technical training courses are often long and are equipment and instructor-intensive, so each course has limited student capacity. As a result, there is a backlog of untrained Personnel Awaiting Training (PAT).

\textsuperscript{187} David G. Allen, Phillip C. Bryant and James M. Vardaman, "Retaining Talent: Replacing Misconceptions with Evidence-Based Strategies," \textit{Academy of Management Perspectives} 24, no. 2 (05, 2010), 48-64, \url{http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=51827775&site=bsi-live}.

\textsuperscript{188} E. McKeown, "Retention in the Upswing," \textit{T + D} 64, no. 3 (Mar, 2010), 22, \url{http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1981689051&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD}.


\textsuperscript{190} Chief of the Defence Staff, \textit{CDS SITREP 02-11}, 15-16.
Due to the sequential nature of CF training, PATs offer little benefit; they cannot be deployed overseas or within Canada to complete other duties while they wait, they cannot be employed without supervision, nor can they be employed doing tasks they have not yet been trained to do. CF operations have a voracious appetite for skilled technicians and supervisors; although CF technical schools lack instructor depth, pulling instructors from line units to increase school staffing is not feasible. Further, long course waiting times create management challenges for Career Managers and the CF units waiting for new technicians to arrive.

Large PAT populations challenge leadership and management and drain existing resources. In September 2010, the CF had 1152 personnel who had been PAT for more than 90 days. A new CF private earns $2663 monthly, so 1152 PATs cost the CF $3,067,776 in wages every month. Supervising and administering more than 1100 untrained personnel will require at least 60 full-time staff, based on a ratio approaching of one supervisor per 20 subordinates. Given a Sgt’s monthly wage of $5142 as an average, it costs the CF a further $308,520 monthly in personnel wage costs, just to supervise its untrained personnel. Therefore, 1152 PATs can cost the CF approximately $3,376,296 monthly, or $40,515,452 per year in pay costs alone! The CF


192 It is a given in both military and management terms that one person should have a span of control that sees them directly supervise no more than 5 to 7 subordinates or subordinate reporting organizations. In 2007, the Canadian Forces Support Training Group had 60 full time staff devoted to supervising PATs (author experience), so a figure of at least 60 is realistic and historical, even though it is outside the preferred supervision ratio.

193 Canada, Department of National Defence, DGCB - CBI Chapter 204 - Pay of Officers and Non-Commissioned Members. Since Sgt is the CF’s normal supervisory/instructor rank, it is used as the baseline for this estimate.
must feed and house PATs until they complete their training, two further expenses that create additional financial drain on scarce resources.

The CF’s PAT situation causes an ongoing and significant financial cost, demonstrates institutional shortcomings and drains much-needed leadership capacity from the greater CF. New recruits, having completed their basic training, eager to train and serve, are easily disillusioned by extended wait time. This frustration can cause PAT cohort attrition. Any PAT personnel that lose motivation and release while awaiting training, prior to serving even one day in an operational role, deliver no return on CF investment – a completely sunk cost which offers the CF no value.

Summary

While healthy attrition of approximately 6% is necessary for the force’s health and development, unhealthy, high voluntary attrition is a losing proposition. PAT attrition drains CF financial and leadership resources for no return on investment, while early career attrition provides some return on investment, but is rarely commensurate with the initial costs incurred to train personnel. Mid-career attrition, particularly from the small, stressed “middle cohort” is most damaging. The knowledge and skills inherent in this cohort’s personnel cannot be easily replicated by any method other than time and experience. Recruiting new personnel to replace those who leave is financially expensive, both in initial outlay and, in the case of technical specialists, during the period between their enrolment and completion of training. In every sense, retaining existing personnel is more cost-effective than recruiting new ones.
CHAPTER 5 - ASSESSING THE CHALLENGE – RETENTION RESEARCH AND RECENT TRENDS

If soldiers are happy doing their job, they’re going to stay in... while money talks, soldiers stay if they believe their command cares about them and their families.¹⁹⁴

Both the civilian and military worlds have researched attrition and retention in some depth. Amongst Canada and its closest military allies, while there are small variances from country to country, the ABCA countries (Australia, Britain, Canada, and America) have endured similar attrition patterns and made concerted retention efforts.¹⁹⁵ This chapter will examine a cross-section of ABCA attrition patterns and trends but will not definitively explain the myriad details of each and every force’s attrition challenges and retention schemes.

Australian Defence Force

Of its ABCA allies, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) is most similar to the CF.¹⁹⁶ Slightly smaller than the CF, the ADF has 57,799 permanent military (regular force) personnel and 15,691 Australian Public Servants (APS).¹⁹⁷ From 2001 to 2010,

¹⁹⁴ A senior US Army Retention NCO, quoted in Crumbo, In the Military: Retention might be Tied to Economy's Health.

¹⁹⁵ While "American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand Armies’ Program — “Optimizing Coalition Interoperability”,” http://www.abca-armies.org/ (accessed March 13, 2011) identifies that New Zealand is a full ABCA member, it will not be covered in the scope of this study.

¹⁹⁶ In terms of personnel numbers, capability, equipment and limitations, the CF and ADF are most closely related. The CF and ADF are also both involved in operations in Afghanistan, domestic operations and smaller international operations. While ADF attrition has historically been higher than CF attrition, their personnel situations are most similar to each other than the UK or US.

ADF separation rates fell from a high of 14% in 2001, to a plateau between 10% and 11% from 2004-2007 and sat at a 12 month rolling separation rate of 7.1% at the end of 2010.\textsuperscript{198} Between 2005 and 2010, the ADF supported no fewer than 18 concurrent international deployments; at time of writing was involved in 20.\textsuperscript{199} ADF personnel are remunerated similarly to their Canadian counterparts, yet have a greater variance in wages at each rank level. For example, while a CF Corporal’s pay range runs from $53,712 to $59,076 annually depending on years in rank, his or her Australian counterpart’s salary ranges from $AUS 45,403 to $79,425.\textsuperscript{200} Australian personnel receive a range of specialist skill and allowances, much as their Canadian counterparts do, for occupations such as paratroopers, clearance divers, special operators, submarine crew members, flying, sea time and field conditions. ADF personnel also receive a host of non-salary benefits, which include, amongst others, housing and accommodation benefits, defence-supported child care, dependent care costs, transition management services and learning and development benefits.\textsuperscript{201}

\textsuperscript{198} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{200} Department of Defence, Australian Government, "ADF Permanent Pay Rates," Australian Defence Force, \url{http://www.defence.gov.au/dpe/pac/Pay_Allow_Nov_10.pdf} (accessed December 16, 2010) and Table B to Section 2 of Canada, Department of National Defence, \textit{DGCB - CBI Chapter 204 - Pay of Officers and Non-Commissioned Members}. While this discrepancy seems large, observers must take the relative value and purchasing power differential of the Australian and Canadian dollars into account, plus the higher pay rates that certain Canadian specialist occupations receive.

\textsuperscript{201} Department of Defence, Australian Government, \textit{Defence Annual Report 2009-2010}, 1-400.; Canada, Department of National Defence, \textit{DGCB - CBI Chapter 204 - Pay of Officers and Non-Commissioned Members}. 
Australia conducts a series of annual Defence Attitude Surveys. The 2004 exit survey identified the following ADF attrition reasons:


Other findings from DAS 2008 indicate dissatisfaction with work-life balance and postings’ impact on spousal employment and children’s education. About half of
personnel surveyed believed “civilian employment was more financially attractive than Service employment.”\textsuperscript{202} Chronic reasons for ADF departures include:

- to make a career change while still young enough…
- desire to stay in one place…
- including a transition towards [longer-service personnel]
- settling down [as their time in service increased].\textsuperscript{203}

As of August 2010, the ADF, like the CF, is over its funded strength. In both forces, “strong recruitment and retention performance… [and] the Global Financial Crisis” have contributed to this overage.\textsuperscript{204} The ADF and CF potentially face the same challenges once the global economy recovers, so retention cannot be ignored even though the ADF, like the CF, is not currently in an immediate retention crisis. While Australia is “in a better position than most countries in the developed world to deal with the impact of ageing and rising health costs,”\textsuperscript{205} it faces the same future worker shortage as Canada.\textsuperscript{206}


\textsuperscript{203} Thomas and Bell, Competing for the Best and the Brightest: Recruiting and Retention in the Australian Defence Force, 111.

\textsuperscript{204} Department of Defence, Australian Government, Incoming Government Brief (Canberra: Australian Defence Force, 2010), http://www.defence.gov.au/foi/docs/igb.pdf (accessed February 18, 2011) and Wenek, Reg F Recruiting and Retention: Putting the Brakes on Success, 1-24. At the time of each report’s publication, Australia was over-strength by 1552 personnel, Canada by approximately 1200 personnel.


**United Kingdom Military**

The UK’s recent Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) initiated a massive defence transformation. SDSR’s most notable results are ‘austerity measures’ that will see the UK armed forces partner closely with France for major equipment fielding, reduce capability and drastically reduce personnel. 207 In terms of personnel impact, some pay will be frozen, while selected allowances, notably daily subsistence, incidental expense, mileage, home duty travel, living out supplements, specialist pay and commitment bonuses will be either cut or reduced. 208 As of October 1, 2010, the UK’s trained military strength was 178,470; it had a voluntary officer outflow of 2.6% and 3.8% enlisted outflow. 209

UK attrition and retention studies had findings similar to those found in other forces. A 2005 UK army attrition study found:

Leavers had significantly lower job satisfaction and organisational commitment than stayers. They were also less satisfied with a number of specific aspects of Service life, most notably satisfaction with ‘career prospects’, ‘impact of Service life on family life’, ‘ability to plan your life’ and ‘sense of being valued’. Leavers were also more negative in

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209 Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom, *UK Armed Forces Quarterly Manning Report at 1 October 2010*, Defence Analytical Services and Advice, 2010), [http://www.dasa.mod.uk/applications/newWeb/wwwAccessible/apps/publications/pubsBreakdown.php?thiscontent=170&date=2010-11-10&pubType=1&PublishTime=09:30:00&styleIN=a1&fontIN=size100&from=listing&topDate=2010-11-10&disText=1%20October%202010](http://www.dasa.mod.uk/applications/newWeb/wwwAccessible/apps/publications/pubsBreakdown.php?thiscontent=170&date=2010-11-10&pubType=1&PublishTime=09:30:00&styleIN=a1&fontIN=size100&from=listing&topDate=2010-11-10&disText=1%20October%202010) (accessed December 16, 2010).
terms of their level of personal morale and motivation, perception of unit morale, cohesion and motivation, and overall Service morale.\textsuperscript{210}

A 2007 RAND study found major dissatisfiers were disruption, in terms of both short-term tasks and family churn, overstretch from being asked to do more with less, and some remuneration factors related to internal UK pay and complex benefits policies. The study noted two additional retention/attrition factors concerning prospects for promotion and the requirement to “improve perceived disparities among the Services.”\textsuperscript{211}

**United States Military**

The US military, with 1,433,174 active duty (regular force) serving personnel as of January 2011, dwarfs Canada in size and complexity, particularly the complexity of its myriad and byzantine personnel systems, programs and policies that vary from service to service.\textsuperscript{212} The US Army recruits more personnel annually than the entire CF contains; in 2009 it recruited 70,045 enlisted regular force soldiers, which contributed to a force of 458,220 full-time, uniformed Army personnel.\textsuperscript{213} Approximately “300,000 young Americans step forward every year” and enlist in US active duty and reserve forces.\textsuperscript{214}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[211] Hans Pung and others, *Remuneration and its Motivation of Service Personnel: Focus Group Investigation and Analysis* (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Rand Europe, 2007), 82.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Controversial programs such as “stop loss,” a program that “retains service members beyond their contractually agreed-to separation date,”\textsuperscript{215} wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and costly recruiting and retention bonuses overshadow any US military personnel study.\textsuperscript{216} It is difficult to find accurate statistics concerning the state of US military attrition; in a 2009 press release transcript, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Military Personnel Policy Bill Carr avoids the issue, vaguely asserting, “we’ve been driving [the attrition rate] down for a number of years to record lows. And our retention rate went up to record highs.”\textsuperscript{217} A number of salient studies exist concerning US military attrition and retention, mostly focused on evaluation of various retention strategies and focused on statistics ‘after the fact, not personnel study and attrition reasoning.’\textsuperscript{218} While the RAND Corporation, in particular, offers several lengthy, detailed...
personnel studies, there are few in-depth US studies available in the public realm. Even US contributions to NATO study groups offer limited value and limited use to the external researcher.

**Canadian Forces**

The CF has a large and comprehensive body of attrition and retention research; Australia and some NATO countries have used CF survey examples and methodologies to guide their own personnel studies.

Canada uses two tools to gauge attrition and retention. CF members leaving the CF have an opportunity to complete the **CF Exit Survey**, while **CF Retention Surveys** are administered every two years to different CF occupations on a rotating basis.\(^{219}\) Other CF research that can assist retention are the **CF Health and Lifestyle Information Survey** and the **Continuous Attitude Survey**.\(^{220}\) CF research has found dissatisfiers common to all respondents, regardless of rank or occupation:

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Career Management, CF Fairness, Civilianization of the CF, Bureaucracy in the CF, Senior and Branch Leadership, and CF future. Civilianization of the CF was the only [one, single common] factor that members identified as influencing them to leave or stay in the CF.\(^{221}\)

The CF’s 2007/2008 Report on Regular Force Attrition finds that “the way the CF deals with poor performers is the greatest point of frustration,” while access to second language training was also a dissatisfier.\(^{222}\) A recent infantry soldier retention study found that the main departure motivators were internal, namely “job dissatisfaction and career progression.”\(^{223}\) Recent aircrew officer studies found the main common factors influencing the decision to leave were career progression, job dissatisfaction and postings, all CF internal factors.\(^{224}\) The 2008/09 CF Health and Lifestyle Information Survey found personnel serving in Gagetown and Halifax reported higher job satisfaction than

\(^{221}\) Otis and Straver, Review of Attrition and Retention Research for the Canadian Forces, 14.


\(^{223}\) Nikki Holden, Retention of Infantry Soldiers in the Canadian Forces (Ottawa: Department of National Defence - Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis, 2010), 13.

\(^{224}\) Nikki Holden, Retention of Air Force Officers in the Canadian Forces (PowerPoint Briefing), International Military Testing Association / Defence Research and Development Canada, 2010. At Personal Email, Lieutenant-Colonel, Fighter Pilot, January 21, 2011.; Personal Email, Lieutenant-Colonel, Tactical Helicopter Pilot, January 21, 2011.; Personal Email, Lieutenant-Colonel, Tactical Helicopter Pilot, January 23, 2011.; Personal Email, Major, Air Combat Systems Officer, January 27, 2011.; Personal Email, Major, Air Combat Systems Officer (Maritime Helicopter), February 22, 2011.; Personal Email, Major, Tactical Helicopter Pilot - Releasing from CF in May 2011, February 18, 2011.; Personal Email, Major, Air Combat Systems Officer (Maritime Patrol Aircraft), January 27, 2011.; Personal Email, Major, Maritime Patrol Aircraft Pilot, February 5, 2011, a number of pilot and ACSO reviewed the Holden reference in January/February 2011. The reviewers supported the study’s findings, less the finding that pay and benefits were a dissatisfier for pilots. A maritime patrol aircraft pilot noted “I think the pay/benefits thing for pilots is a bit of a red herring... airline guys are getting back IN [to the CF] to top up their pensions nowadays.”
those in Ottawa, while CF-wide, “13.5% of personnel were ‘not too satisfied’ with their job, and 6.0% were ‘not at all satisfied’.”

**CF Motivation and Dissatisfaction**

CF pay is good, allowances are adequate and the other ‘baseline’ conditions that should keep personnel satisfied are in place, yet some CF members are obviously dissatisfied enough to release. Herzberg’s two-factor theory defines characteristics inherent to an organization such as salary, status, policies, supervision and working conditions as ‘hygiene factors,’ while achievement, recognition, growth and job interest are ‘motivation factors.’ He postulates that systems which lack certain hygiene factors (or suffers from poor application of these factors) will dissatisfy their employees, regardless of added motivators. Herzberg views “satisfaction and dissatisfaction not as opposite ends of the same continuum, but rather as two distinct constructs.”

The growth or *motivator* factors that are intrinsic to the job are: achievement, recognition for achievement, the work itself, responsibility, and growth or advancement. The dissatisfaction-avoidance or hygiene factors that are extrinsic to the job include: company policy and administration, supervision, interpersonal relationships, working conditions, salary, status and security…

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225 Canada, Department of National Defence, *Results from Health and Lifestyle Information Survey of Canadian Forces Personnel 2008/2009, Regular Force Version*, 60. While this document is not an official ‘personnel’ study devoted specifically to attrition and retention, its findings can and should be incorporated into CF efforts to build a ‘true picture.’ The satisfaction ratings in single quotations are taken directly from the survey’s Likert Scale responses.


Motivators were the primary cause of satisfaction, and hygiene factors the primary cause of unhappiness on the job.228

CF research supports Herzberg, identifying that attrition and retention challenges are rarely from ‘extra’ motivators the CF needs to offer, but dissatisfiers that the CF needs to reduce or eliminate. For example, many CF members are unhappy with CF posting, career management and future uncertainty; a 2006 McKinsey report found “what many employees want most of all is clarity about their future... creating that clarity requires significant hands-on effort” from supervisors.229

Major CF dissatisfiers, then, are not things that personnel lack, but inadequacies in how the CF approaches or applies some of its policies. One of the keys to retention is not to add things to motivate personnel, but remove things, such as excessive bureaucracy, that dissatisfy them. In other words, increasing good things is less important to increasing motivation than stopping or removing bad things, since “the opposite of job dissatisfaction is not job satisfaction, but no job dissatisfaction.”230 The CF should change policy application or methodology to reduce dissatisfaction, rather than trying to add additional motivators or benefits to increase satisfaction.231


231 Frederick Herzberg - 2 Factor Hygiene and Motivation Theory also theorizes that without a basic level of satisfaction in hygiene factors, no level of motivation factors will result in satisfaction. Much as racing cars gain more performance and speed from losing weight rather than gaining horsepower,
Deployments and Attrition – Common Trends

ABCA research identifies a common trend concerning deployments and operational tempo. Deployments can be both a motivator and a dissatisfier; when, what and how to decrease their dissatisfaction ability is still as of yet unknown, but a commonly held belief that deployments lead to unhappiness and therefore attrition is false. A 2002 study found that “Army and Marine Corps junior officers and Navy midgrade officers showed increased retention with increasing amounts of hostile deployment.” Recent CF studies, specifically addressing personnel leaving the CF who served in Afghanistan, find little causal relationship between deployments and attrition, which draws the often-repeated ‘truth’ that too many deployments cause attrition into doubt. Some survey results found:

service members view deployments as an opportunity to use their training…to participate in meaningful operations, which may be associated with greater retention rates.

While these findings conflicts with the general view that deployments are a dissatisfier, hostile deployments provide opportunity to actually do one’s job, rather than continually practice and train. US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates remarked that “the garrison mindset and personnel bureaucracy that awaits [recently deployed officers] back personnel systems can gain more from reducing dissatisfaction (which is also cheaper as it generally involves little additional expenditure to change existing processes) than by trying to add motivators.


home [are] often cited as primary factors causing promising officers to leave.”

Deployed US Army soldiers had a higher re-enlistment rate than those not deployed, likely due to organizational ‘connectedness’, belonging, investment, or not wanting to let down their comrades – a powerful motivator. The 2008-2009 CF Health and Lifestyle Information Survey supports these findings; CF psychological distress and depression rates “did not change with deployment history.” CF A 2007 NATO personnel study found:

A curvilinear relationship exists between OPSTEMPO and turnover… At very low or high levels of OPSTEMPO, personnel are more likely to leave or say that they are going to leave… OPSTEMPO and retention varies by the context… Within these extremes, there is an optimal level of OPSTEMPO that maximizes performance and reduces turnover.

Summary

Dissatisfaction with work-life balance, being asked to do more with less, inconsistencies in approach between services, postings, family disruption and career management/future prospects are all common across ABCA research. However, deployments, even high numbers of deployments to hostile locations, do not necessarily

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234 Gates, United States Secretary of Defense Speech: United States Military Academy, February 25, 2011

235 Asch and others, Cash Incentives and Military Enlistment, Attrition, and Reenlistment, 85.


lead to attrition. Deployments affect personnel in different career stages and at different ages differently – there is no blanket correlation.
CHAPTER 6 - CF ATTRITION/RETENTION RESEARCH SHORTCOMINGS

In hindsight, it would seem that the reason for my release was an accumulation of distasteful incidents. I was never asked why, nor did anyone ever approach me and ask if there was something in particular that triggered it.\(^{238}\)

Given Canadian attrition and retention research contributions to various international fora, it is obviously very well-regarded internationally.\(^{239}\) However, it does suffer from some gaps, shortcomings and synchronization challenges that limit its ability to provide a true attrition and retention picture. It could be improved, using existing CF resources, to round out the attrition picture and better balance research-based findings with CF leader knowledge and assessment.

CF Exit and Retention Surveys, the CF’s primary formal method of understanding what drives personnel to release, suffer from low return rates and inconclusive findings that do not assist strategic leader planning and decision making:

retention efforts are hindered by a lack of accurate, comprehensive and actionable statistics… current attrition data provides insufficient fidelity regarding the motivations which lead to individuals either submitting

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\(^{238}\) Personal Email, Master Warrant Officer, Combat Arms, February 4, 2011. The subject left the CF, then rejoined after several years out of service, motivated in large part by the desire to serve in Afghanistan and the fact that he found civilian employment, while better-paying and more stable, far less satisfying and interesting than service in the CF.

voluntary release requests or declining further Terms of Service. Information collected from Release Centre exit surveys is gathered too late and thus offers little opportunity to provide meaningful alternatives to release.\footnote{Rear-Admiral P. A. Maddison, \textit{MARLANT Retention Guidance} (Halifax: Maritime Forces Atlantic, September 30, 2008), 1-2.}

\textbf{CF Exit Survey}

Low exit survey return rates make survey findings potentially suspect. Between June 2008 and February 2010, only 1048 of the CF’s 6632 voluntarily releases completed an exit survey – a 15.8% response rate, which can hardly be interpreted as a credible representative sample of the releasing population.\footnote{Michaud, \textit{Task Force Afghanistan: CF Exit Survey 2008-2010 Results}, 3. Dr. Michaud notes on page 3 of the report that “given the low response rate, caution is warranted when interpreting these results as this sample might not be representative of the voluntarily releasing population.”} A \textit{2010 Infantry Retention Survey} had a response rate of 18.2% (660 returns of 3635); a \textit{2007 Signals Operator Retention Survey} had a slightly better response rate of 34.7% (160 of 461).\footnote{Canada, Department of National Defence, \textit{The Canadian Forces Retention Survey - 2010}, 1-16.; Canada, Department of National Defence, \textit{Canadian Forces Exit Survey}, 1-33.; Holden, \textit{Retention of Infantry Soldiers in the Canadian Forces}, 16.; Valerie Toussaint and Nicholas Marum, \textit{Factors Affecting Members Decisions to Leave the Canadian Forces: A Quantitative & Qualitative Examination of the CF Retention Survey for Signal Operators (Sig Op) MOS ID 00329 (with 0-3 Years of Regular Force Service)} (Ottawa: Department of National Defence - Director General Military Personnel Generation Requirements Attrition/Retention Team,[2007]) (accessed September 29, 2010).; Michaud, \textit{Task Force Afghanistan: CF Exit Survey 2008-2010 Results}, 17.} While other NATO countries have found similar low rates of return, the CF rate appears particularly low. For example, a 2005 UK study had a response rate of 26.6%, or 425 returns from 1600 surveys issued.\footnote{Chissick, \textit{The Effects of Separated Service on Retention in the British Army}, 7.}

\textit{CF Exit Survey} administration appears spotty, which obviously contributes to its low return rate. Five combat arms Sr NCOs who released in Toronto, Petawawa and Wainwright indicated that none had ever been asked to complete an exit survey at any
point during the release process.\textsuperscript{244} The value of exit surveys must be considered in light of the likely mental state of the respondents, which, due to emotion, mental preoccupation or feelings of regret or bitterness, may not provide a true picture as to the reasons for release:

the best employee conversations should not be held during an exit interview, ‘when employees are leaving they will likely tell you what’s politically correct… what you want to hear… [or] that they are moving for more money.’\textsuperscript{245}

Exit surveys may not capture a critical releasing element - high performers who have grown frustrated with the CF and seek more satisfying, challenging employment. As a former unit Adjutant identifies, high performers:

“tended to be really frustrated with the lack of combat opportunity or the excess admin… They probably don't fill out exit surveys either.”\textsuperscript{246}

When a group of sailors, soldiers or air force personnel understand that something, particularly something ‘paperwork-related’ is optional, their automatic response is to avoid it. While supervisors can order personnel to complete surveys, scientifically credible surveys cannot be based on results that are coerced. If coerced responses are, from a research perspective, prejudicial to proper analysis, the CF could seek a middle

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\textsuperscript{244} Personal Email, \textit{Master Warrant Officer, Combat Arms}
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\textsuperscript{246} Personal Email, Major, Combat Arms, January 31, 2011. In Combat Arms units, the Adjutant is the most senior of the unit’s Captains. He or she is responsible to the Commanding Officer for overseeing the unit’s personnel administration, taking care of the unit’s soldiers administratively, ensuring the proper application of the Canadian Forces Personnel Appraisal System (CFPAS) and CF personnel policy. This comment is supported by multiple interviews and author experience. The last comment concerning exit surveys is very telling.
\end{flushright}
ground by borrowing a technique from business. Many businesses offer a reward, normally entry into a sweepstakes draw, for completing satisfaction surveys. Administering surveys at eight o’clock on a Friday morning and offering soldiers the remainder of the day off after survey completion would likely result in high, enthusiastic and honest survey participation. This technique could provide a similar response pool to voluntary surveys, with a response rate comparable to a coerced survey. While one could scoff at the idea of rewarding CF personnel for doing something they should be doing when ordered, this method could bridge the current “survey response gap” and achieve better return rates.

At present, each CFB’s Personnel Selection Officer administers the *CF Exit Survey* to releasing personnel. However, as this chapter’s opening quote indicates, it appears that some personnel miss their exit survey opportunity during the ‘out-clearance’ process. Making the chain of command responsible for exit surveys could improve response and ensure that every releasing member is at least properly encouraged to complete an exit survey.

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247 Many businesses, such as Home Depot, Staples Business Depot and Canadian Tire offer customers the opportunity to complete a survey, which in return enters them into a contest to win a gift card, shopping spree or other reward. See [http://www.ctcsurveys.com/websurvey/ctcsurvey.aspx](http://www.ctcsurveys.com/websurvey/ctcsurvey.aspx), [http://www.greatbrook.com/home_depot_customer_survey.htm](http://www.greatbrook.com/home_depot_customer_survey.htm), or [http://www.staples.ca/ENG/Static/static_pages.asp?CT=1&pagename=help_terms_survey](http://www.staples.ca/ENG/Static/static_pages.asp?CT=1&pagename=help_terms_survey) for further information on business customer satisfaction surveys.

248 *CF Military Personnel Instructions 06/05 - Administering the CF (Regular Force) Exit Survey*, 2005

249 Personal Email, *Master Warrant Officer, Combat Arms*
Attrition Reasons by Age and Career Stage

Attrition/retention decision reasons differ by years of service, a factor which CF research has yet to fully address. Some CF surveys fail to correlate years of service, or survey respondent age, to results.\textsuperscript{250}

A critical element missing is that the study [a recent retention study of pilots and air combat systems officers] does not delineate between the 23 year old 2Lts and the 38 year old Majors.\textsuperscript{251}

Both the Australian results above and specialist opinions provided by experienced CF leaders demonstrate that motivators change as careers develop. Two fighter pilot Lieutenant-Colonels noted, during separate correspondence, that motivators for brand-new Captains who recently earned pilot’s wings are very different from motivators for 40 year old Majors who may have seen their last flying jobs.\textsuperscript{252} While this factor may seem intuitive, research draws very few solid conclusions relating motivators and dissatisfiers to years of service.

Personnel issues are not a unified block with single, unrelated solutions for every dissatisfier. Rather, CF personnel differ “by age and by [career] stage,” which is, of necessity, a moving target, but a factor of CF life.\textsuperscript{253} The ‘age and stage’ correlation

\textsuperscript{250} Otis and Straver, Review of Attrition and Retention Research for the Canadian Forces, i-66. does briefly discuss career stages in this work and also discusses Army Lieutenant-Colonels as a specific group, but in general the correlation between age/career stage and responses could be defined more clearly in future research.

\textsuperscript{251} Personal Email, Major, Air Combat Systems Officer.

\textsuperscript{252} Two Personal Emails, Lieutenant-Colonels, Fighter Pilots.

\textsuperscript{253} Interview, Lieutenant-General W. Semianiw, Commander, Canada Command, February 18, 2011. LGen Semianiw was the Assistant Chief Military Personnel from 2006 to 2007, and the Chief Military Personnel (CMP) from 2007 to 2010. In 2010 he was promoted and appointed Commander of Canada Command, responsible for all CF domestic and North American continental operations. As such,
appears sharply in assessments of deployment and operational tempo’s retention effects. Deployments can both motivate and dissatisfy, depending on individual age, career stage, the nature of the deployment and a host of other factors that cannot be easily quantified or statistically analyzed. There is often no one single factor that drives CF personnel to release, but a confluence of factors, a ‘death of a thousand paper cuts’ that finally pushes them to release. Many CF members with more than 20 years of service, who are entitled to a release in 30 days and qualify for an annuity on request, indicate they are serving “on a 30+1 program – one more stupid direction and I’m out in 30 days.” CF leaders support this thinking:

I found that it was the little things that forced troops out, not the “big things” (pay, tour length, etc). Just like the expression, “all politics is local”, I think every CF’s member’s overall experience within the CF is based on the sum of individual encounters and experiences, vice an overall impression, guided by those aforementioned “big things”.

An example of this confluence of small factor can be seen in the example of a CF member who is passed over for deployment because she is ‘too valuable’ in her present employment. Despite her ‘value,’ she is posted to an undesired location, where she works for a supervisor she has little faith in. This person may well decide that her skills could

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254 As noted by Morrow, PERSTEMPO/OPSTEMPO and Quality of Life, 3G-1-3G-16.

255 Interview, Lieutenant-General W. Semianiw, Commander, Canada Command. This anecdote was related by the interviewee from his time both as CMP and his time as an operational commander, where many of the staff officers and Sr NCOs in his headquarters fell into the “30+1” category.

256 Personal Email, Major, Combat Arms, January 24, 2011.
be better used in the civilian world. If surveyed, no one factor would stand out as ‘the’ dissatisfier that made her release, but compounded, the successive and complementary effects of a series of small dissatisfiers could be enough to push her out.

**Chain of Command Input**

In any organization, there is a gap between ‘management’ and ‘labour’, or between headquarters and ground truth. In attrition and retention research, this gap exists on several levels. CF Defence Scientists are dedicated, academically qualified, credible, and genuinely believe in improving the CF through their research, study and recommendations. However, their efforts suffer from a lack of institutional synchronization:

there is a ‘missing link’ between the sorts of studies generally carried out by social scientists…and the type of work done by those who usually have a more mathematical or scientific background… All of the documents reviewed in this study fell quite clearly into one category or the other; no reports appeared to represent a joint effort between the different types of researchers.

In addition to the ‘intra-researcher gap’ noted above, there is a gap between researchers and the CF population. Current attrition/retention research reveals a dearth of input from one very important area – the military chain of command. Defence Scientists are often, by virtue of location and methodology, divorced from all the various elements that make up the CF’s reality. Scientific survey and statistical assessments lack a certain context

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257 Interview, Major, Communications and Electronic Engineering (Army), February 10, 2011.; Interview, Lieutenant-Colonel, Communications and Electronic Engineering (Air), February 10, 2011. Both indicated that technicians in their respective occupations were often prone to being “too valuable” and forced into a certain career path, often based on specialist skills, which had the potential to create dissatisfaction.

that can only be provided by someone experienced in CF service. This shortcoming can be easily rectified with organizational and command commitment to learning from its own leaders and capturing their knowledge, assessments and insight.

Anthropologists debate whether it is better to be an ‘out group’ observing from outside an organization and potentially lacking context, or observing from an ‘in group’ perspective, inside an organization and understanding context, but potentially having one’s thinking coloured by group membership. Anthropologist Dr. Clifford Geertz identified the necessity of balancing perspectives:

> If we are going to cling… to the injunction to see things from the native’s point of view, what is our position when we can no longer claim some unique form of psychological closeness, a sort of transcultural identification, with our subjects? … Confinement to experience-near concepts leaves an ethnographer awash in immediacies as well as entangled in vernacular. Confinement to experience-distant ones leaves him stranded in abstractions and smothered in jargon… How, in each case, should [the two concepts] be deployed so as to produce an interpretation of the way a people live which is neither imprisoned within their mental horizons, an ethnography of witchcraft as written by a witch, nor systematically deaf to the distinctive tonalities of their existence, an ethnography of witchcraft as written by a geometer?259

Involving the chain of command in research and integrating its input captures the best of both worlds while mitigating potential imbalances caused by ‘insider’ or ‘outsider’ status. Neither the CF leader who is a member of the organization, nor the Defence Scientist who is an ‘outsider’ can achieve full understanding from a single perspective.

259 Clifford Geertz, ""from the Native's Point of View": On the Nature of Anthropological Understanding," Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 28, no. 1 (Oct., 1974), pp. 26-45, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3822971. Geertz defines experience-near concepts are those that an individual might naturally and effortlessly use to define what he or his fellows see, feel, think, imagine. Experience-distant concepts are ones which specialists, analysts, ethnographers or other ‘objective outsiders’ use to forward their “scientific, philosophical or practical aims.” It is a matter of degree and perspective.
Since “the idea is to get it right…to aspire to get to the heart of the matter, to distinguish the important from the trivial,”\textsuperscript{260} the two perspectives should be combined to provide the best possible understanding.

CF leaders are inculcated to put their subordinates before themselves, while the CF’s guiding leadership precepts insist that leaders:

\begin{table}[h!]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|}
\hline
\textbf{1973/1978 Principles of Leadership} & \textbf{Equivalent Responsibilities in Table 4-1} \\
\hline
Achieve professional competence. & Achieve professional competence & pursue self-improvement. \\
\hline
Know your own strengths and limitations and pursue self-improvement. & Seek and accept responsibility. \\
\hline
Seek and accept responsibility. & Direct; motivate by persuasion, example, & sharing risks and hardships. \\
\hline
Lead by example. & Clarify objectives & intent. \\
\hline
Make sure that your subordinates know your meaning and intent, and then lead them to the accomplishment of the mission. & Treat members fairly; respond to their concerns; represent their interests. \\
\hline
Know your subordinates and promote their welfare. & Monitor morale & ensure subordinate well-being. \\
\hline
Develop the leadership potential of your personnel. & Mentor, educate, & develop subordinates. \\
\hline
Make sound and timely decisions. & Solve problems; make timely decisions. \\
\hline
Train your subordinates as a team and employ them up to their capabilities. & Train individuals & teams under demanding & realistic conditions. \\
\hline
Keep your personnel informed of the mission, the changing situation, and the overall picture. & Keep subordinates informed; explain events & decisions. \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Figure 6.1 – CF Leadership Principles}
\end{table}


CF leaders have proven their ability to intimately know and care for personnel in both war and peace. The opinions of Navy Divisional Officers, Army unit Adjutants and sub-unit commanders, air force flight commanders, Ship’s Coxswains, Army Unit Regimental and Air Force Squadron Sergeants-Major are invaluable. These leaders have

\textsuperscript{260} Renato I. Rosaldo Jr, "A Note on Geertz as a Cultural Essayist," \textit{Representations}, no. 59, Special Issue: The Fate of "Culture": Geertz and Beyond (Summer, 1997), pp. 30-34, \url{http://www.jstor.org/stable/2928813}. 
insight, context and in-depth understanding of their personnel, and are able to articulate dissatisfiers, trends, points of contention and release reasons extremely clearly, bringing life and context to statistical or survey findings. Most have dedicated the majority of their adult lives to CF service, earned positions that offer them the rare ability to understand their organizations intimately and have CF-centric insights on personnel motivations, challenges and situations. They can offer context, while their opinions, if properly collated and tracked, can identify geographic, deployment-related, local-economy related and other factors that current research cannot. CF research does not currently incorporate any input, anecdotal or otherwise, from ship, unit, divisional or sub-unit leaders. While this input is used in matters of training, equipment and operations planning, it is not used for personnel matters, a failing in a relatively small force like the CF.

**Summary**

Current CF research does not adequately bridge the gap between hard science and soft personnel understanding. Survey return rates are rarely sufficient to be properly representative, while their analysis provides little useable large-picture attrition insight. As a result, CF strategic personnel planners only know portions of the attrition/retention story. No one overriding factor makes a CF member decide to leave. Rather, a confluence of factors creates a “perfect storm” and spurs the decision. By using the chain of command and integrating the observations, context, insights and opinions that CF leaders offer, the CF can build a much better, more comprehensive picture of its current attrition and retention situation.
CHAPTER 7 - MILITARY RETENTION METHODS AND THEIR EFFECTIVENESS

Make the Army community a fun place to work and live... If the Army can offer the camaraderie and cohesion desired...(and often lacking in the civilian world), then Xers will stay regardless of the economic situation.261

The CF MPRS, produced in March 2009, offers a concise, integrated campaign plan for the Canadian Forces to reduce preventable attrition. It focuses institutional efforts and identifies those responsible for achieving milestones along its lines of operation.262 While its results remain to be seen, it is a systemic, long-term commitment to fostering a CF ‘retention culture’ in the CF. At present, one cannot effectively assess the effectiveness of the strategy, much as one cannot assess many retention efforts that do not involve solid metrics identifying money spent versus retention statistics. Unfortunately, for non-cash retention efforts, the indicators are nearly always lagging and negative – an organization finds out only ‘after the fact’ that something does not work.

One retention method used across several forces, which does offer effectiveness metrics, is the retention bonus, providing cash payments to foster continued commitment to further service or reward re-enlistment. Due to the CF’s close proximity to the US, where large military retention bonuses have garnered media attention, ‘retention’ and ‘bonus’ seem interconnected. Overall, the CF groundswell of opinion, particularly from junior members’ perspective, is in favour of retention bonuses.263 However, retention

261 Wong, Generations Apart: Xers and Boomers in the Officer Corps, 19-20.


263 Virtually all CF member interviews and author correspondence, plus author experience, support this statement. Blog posts, mess conversations, interviews and discussions support this finding. A
bonuses are a short-term measure that either generally do not work as intended or are prohibitively expensive.

**ABCA Retention Bonuses**

Australia offers cash retention bonuses to certain service members in critical trades and ranks who, after reaching 15 years’ service undertake to serve for an additional five years.\(^{264}\) These bonuses range from $45,000 for Mine Warfare Clearance Diving Officers to a $1,339 annual retention allowance to Aerospace Engineer Captains.\(^{265}\) The Australian Army has a retention program that “offers financial incentives to encourage soldiers with non-trade employment backgrounds to train and transfer” to technical trades.\(^{266}\) Australia assessed that bonuses are effective and intends to continue their short-term use for critical trades where loss of skills “will have a detrimental impact on operational or supporting capabilities.”\(^{267}\)

Prior to SDSR, the UK military offered several financial retention incentives:

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search on [www.army.ca](http://www.army.ca), a popular online military-themed discussion board, offers several discussion forums concerning retention bonuses and their applicability to the CF.

\(^{264}\) Wang, *Recruiting and Retaining Military Personnel: An Exploration of Cash Reward Programs and their Effectiveness*. DGMPRA TM 2010-009, 14-15. Australian bonuses are offered to Sgts and Squadron Leader equivalent ranks, which generally tend to be Generation X members, a group most susceptible, as identified above, to dissatisfaction and early attrition, the impact of which will be most keenly felt.

\(^{265}\) Ibid., 15-20.


Between 2000 and 2008, the US military spent “$1.4 billion in selective reenlistment bonuses,”\textsuperscript{268} much of it under the US Army’s very complicated Selective Retention Bonus (SRB) program.\textsuperscript{269} On average, each additional person-year of service cost between $8292 (Army) and $67,378 (Air Force) in bonuses for first-term re-enlistments, while second term re-enlistments cost, on average, between $15,513 (Army) and $112,175 (Air Force) for each year of additional service.\textsuperscript{270} Recent reports indicate

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|}
\hline
FRI & Amount & Take-up Rate \\
\hline
Aircrew Senior Officer & £50,000 for a five-year return of service & RAF 105\% RA 98\% \\
\hline
Aircrew Senior Pilot & Additional £50,000 & RAF 81\% RA 59\% \\
\hline
Infantry & £4,500 for 2 years return service & 48\% \\
\hline
Royal Marines & £10,000 including commitment bonus for 3 years & 55\% \\
\hline
Nurses & £20,000 for 3 years & 19\% \\
\hline
Special Forces & £50,000 for 5 years & 93\% \\
\hline
Submariner (categories A2) & £25,000 for 4 years return service & Introduced April 2008 \\
\hline
Submariner (categories B2) & £20,000 for 4 years return service & 90\% between 2003-07 extended until April 2012 \\
\hline
Royal Artillery & £45,000 for 3 years return service & Introduced April 2008 \\
\hline
REME (Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers) Vehicle Mechanics & £7,000 for 3 years return service & Introduced April 2008 \\
\hline
Royal Air Force Firefighters & £9,000 (including £3,000 commitment bonus) for service to the 7.5 year point & Introduced April 2008 \\
\hline
Royal Air Force Regiment Gunners & £10,000 (including £3,000 commitment bonus) for service to the 7 year point & Introduced April 2008 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textbf{Figure 7.1 – UK Armed Forces Financial Retention Incentives and Take-up Rate}

\textsuperscript{268} Asch and others, \textit{Cash Incentives and Military Enlistment, Attrition, and Reenlistment}, iii.

\textsuperscript{269} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{270} Asch and others, \textit{Cash Incentives and Military Enlistment, Attrition, and Reenlistment}, iii.
that US cash bonuses helped retention, which can be effective, when properly applied, in the short term.\textsuperscript{271} The US military has not always applied them properly:

the US Army was trying to staunch the flow of CPTS [Captains]. So it offered retention bonuses of $30,000 to all officers. The bonuses achieved nothing since those who took it were going to stay anyway and those who turned it down left anyway. \textsuperscript{272}

This method is akin to throwing a handful of darts at a board and hoping one will stick into the bull’s-eye; an outstanding solution if one has unlimited darts, or unlimited funds. However, the CF cannot afford this approach, nor can research determine “a causal relationship between cash rewards and people’s enlistment and reenlistment behaviours.”\textsuperscript{273}

Retention bonuses can have adverse long-term effects:

fostering expectations of a continuing entitlement, retaining personnel with low commitment and loyalty as well as rising perceptions of unfairness [between service personnel entitled and those not entitled to retention bonuses]. However these potential implications have not been confirmed by scientific studies.\textsuperscript{274}

\textsuperscript{271} U.S. Military's Increased use of Bonuses has Improved Recruitment and Retention - Monday June 14, 2010 | RAND

\textsuperscript{272} Personal Email, Dr. Leonard Wong, Professor, Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, March 3, 2011.

\textsuperscript{273} Wang, Recruiting and Retaining Military Personnel: An Exploration of Cash Reward Programs and their Effectiveness. DGMPRA TM 2010-009, 32.

\textsuperscript{274} Wang, Recruiting and Retaining Military Personnel: An Exploration of Cash Reward Programs and their Effectiveness. DGMPRA TM 2010-009, iv.
Given retention bonus’ expense and potential adverse effects on the CF, a better solution would be preventative rather than reactive.\textsuperscript{275} Correcting, eliminating or mitigating the dissatisfiers that contribute to attrition obviates the requirement for retention bonuses. Why address the symptoms of a problem with a band-aid solution when the problem itself can be pre-empted or prevented? Monetary efforts including retention bonuses “can be turned on and off relatively easily and quickly” but should not be integral to long-term CF retention efforts.\textsuperscript{276} Even in the business world, where employees often lack the military member’s higher calling, operational imperative, organizational cohesion or sense of purpose:

money alone won’t do the trick... Praise from one’s manager, attention from leaders, frequent promotions, opportunities to lead projects, and chances to join fast-track management programs are often more effective than cash… \textsuperscript{277}

**ABCA Non-Cash Retention Methods**

The UK offers non-cash retention programs designed to set advantageous financial conditions for those with long service. The UK Long Service Advance of Pay (LSAP) assists qualified personnel to enter housing market or meet changes in housing

\textsuperscript{275} Major Mark Gasparotto, "Quality of Life Survey" (Survey, Canadian Forces College, Toronto, 2011), offers several anecdotal comments and statistical evidence through analysis of a survey of CF leaders identifying the adverse effects of Quality of Life initiatives, welfare programs during operations and allowances such as the Land Duty Allowance, which is selectively applied to certain Army units and not others. Clearly, any perceived inequity in a financial or other benefit will generate a degree of dissatisfaction due to perceptions of unfairness.

\textsuperscript{276} Research Brief for Asch and others, *Cash Incentives and Military Enlistment, Attrition, and Reenlistment*, 195.

\textsuperscript{277} Cosack, Sabine, Matthew Guthridge and Emily Lawson, *Retaining Key Employees in Times of Change*, 4-5. The effects of both cash and non-cash motivators also differ from generation to generation and differ in their effects on CF personnel by their age and career stage, making targeting them effectively a leadership challenge.
needs “arising from changing personal circumstances.” It offers eligible personnel an advance on their pay at an advantageous interest rate to a maximum of 8,500 pounds.

The UK Army’s Career Break program “offers limited opportunities for Service personnel to take a career break where this does not compromise operational effectiveness.” During career breaks, service personnel receive no pay and are posted out of their units, allowing backfills to be posted in to replace them. RAND Corporation studies support the use of breaks or sabbaticals as a retention and motivation method.

While the CF has a policy governing Leave Without Pay (LWOP) which CF personnel can apply to take, it is not used as a retention incentive and is not as flexible or well defined as the UK Career Break program. At present, LWOP is an untapped potential CF retention resource.

Australia takes the view that “the total ADF employment package… embraces a range of financial and non-financial benefits,” some of which have emerged as retention contributors:

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279 Ibid. To note, SDSR may see this program curtailed.

280 Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom, Arrangements for Regular Army Personnel Wishing to Apply for Career Breaks, (British Army, 2005), 1.

281 Ibid., 2-4.

282 Laura L. Miller, Give them Sabbaticals (Originally Published in USA Today on may 7, 2008) RAND Corporation, 2008)

283 Chapter 8 of Canada, Department of National Defence, Canadian Forces Leave Policy Manual - A-PP-005-LVE/AG-001, 85, governs LWOP and its limitations. The approval level for any large amount of LWOP is very high and administratively difficult.
the new Defence Home Ownership Assistance Scheme is also a retention initiative to encourage ADF personnel to serve for longer periods by providing progressively higher home loan subsidies to permanent members who serve beyond the critical departure points of 4, 8 and 12 years.  

The US Army employs Retention NCOs (non-commissioned officers), working at the Battalion or Unit level, as a non-cash retention method. These soldiers counsel, re-enlist or extend “qualified soldiers in the Army,” supervise retention activities, conduct retention interviews and advise commanders on retention matters and programs. US Army units also appoint soldiers as company-level Retention NCOs as a secondary duty:

My role was an additional duty at the company level. Every quarter I would get a list of soldiers who were 6 months out from their ETS [completion of service] date. I would meet with each to discuss their options… If they did want to enlist were there any training or new job options for them… Once I met with the soldier I would report back to the BN [Battalion] retention NCO regarding next steps. Often for those soldiers who were undecided, there was a selling process to encourage them to stay (or go in some cases!)… following the soldier’s decision I would help coordinate either the reenlistment or separation… I thought it was a great concept for a couple of reasons- I knew the soldiers so could often sell the right idea (new duty location/ airborne school, etc). I was part of the unit and did the same jobs, training, hardships etc so I was trusted by them… I think all volunteer armies can really benefit from this- the old adage is it is much easier to keep a customer (soldier) than find a new one (train them) is very true.


284 Ferguson, *Catch and Keep: Defence Looks at ADF Manpower to 2030*


286 A company normally has between 50 and 200 soldiers. Normally a unit is comprised of three or more companies.

287 Personal Email, David Smith, Vice President, Client and Market Development, Dynamic Logic, A Millward Brown Company, February 15, 2011.
Summary

While it is tempting to view retention as an economic function, where a force can spend its way to personnel success, this is not the case for the personnel of today and will not be the case for the personnel of tomorrow. Generation Y believes “if you’re not happy, it doesn’t matter how much money you’re making.” Money is necessary, but not sufficient to retain good people; “pay level and pay satisfaction are generally weaker predictors of individual turnover” than other considerations:

If soldiers felt that the work, training and deployments were meaningful, relevant and challenging, they were more likely to stay. If they held more negative views, they were more likely to leave. Another component to the nature of deployments and their impacts was the context within which it occurred. If soldiers regarded the experience as personally or professionally enhancing, they were less likely to want to leave.

Retention must encompass a range of options to reduce dissatisfaction, recognize personnel, offer fair and equitable conditions of service and mitigate dissatisfaction. “Targeting retention measures at the right people using a tailored mix of financial and nonfinancial incentives is crucial.” The current CF MPRS, while not perfect, is a

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290 Allen, Bryant and Vardaman, Retaining Talent: Replacing Misconceptions with Evidence-Based Strategies, 54.

291 Rob Morrow, HFM 107, pg 31-4.

292 Cosack, Sabine, Matthew Guthridge and Emily Lawson, Retaining Key Employees in Times of Change, 4.
balanced and multi-channel approach, which has shown “immediate positive impacts.”

Future retention efforts must continue to reflect the changing CF personnel environment and incorporate measures to enhance motivation and therefore retention across the personnel spectrum.

CHAPTER 8 - UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES - WHY PEOPLE LEAVE AND HOW TO MITIGATE

Men and women in the prime of their professional lives, who may have been responsible for the lives of scores or hundreds of troops, or millions of dollars in assistance, or engaging in reconciling warring tribes, they may find themselves in a cube all day reformatting power point slides…the consequences of this terrify me.294

The CF maintains a number of programs to mitigate the adverse effects of service on personnel and their families. Given the CF’s high conditions of service standards, good pay rates, cash and non-cash allowances and benefits, it seems inconceivable that CF personnel would find service anything but completely satisfying. However, research has found exactly that dichotomy; some personnel are so dissatisfied that from 2006-2008 CF attrition approached 10%. Studies have found that there is no one single factor, across a series of surveys, which drives CF personnel to release. There is also, in objective terms, very little ‘missing’ that CF personnel want for in terms of pay or benefits. However, continuing themes in CF attrition research, supported by other ABCA research findings, shows that reasons internal to the CF that are dissatisfying its personnel.

The 2007/08 report on Regular Force attrition identifies that half of those surveyed “found that service life has been worse or much worse than expected.”295 Some dissatisfiers are part and parcel of CF service and cannot be changed; the Navy must send ships to sea, foreign deployments are part and parcel of army life while long flights and time spent in remote locations are part of air force life. There are other dissatisfiers,

294 Gates, United States Secretary of Defense Speech: United States Military Academy, February 25, 2011

295 Canada, Department of National Defence, Annual Report on Regular Force Attrition 2007/2008, 39. This figure must be taken with caution due to the small exit survey return rate, but given the lack of other data, will be taken as representative for this paper’s purposes.
many of them internal to the CF, which alone are not important enough to consider making a career change for, yet when combined and compounded, form a body of dissatisfaction that can drive CF personnel to release. An Australian study recommended that:

the ADF could significantly improve personnel retention by widening its strategies to include intrinsic issues rather than confining them to extrinsic issues like remuneration.\textsuperscript{296}

In the civilian world separations happen “on account of trivial reasons like office timing or office ambience/atmosphere not being comfortable.”\textsuperscript{297} This confluence of multiple factors is different for every CF member and has not yet been formally studied. However, the body of knowledge held by CF leaders throughout the chain of command can shed some light on these small factors and identify how they contribute, in their own way, to the attrition challenge.

These factors are grouped according to the general effect they have on CF personnel. Institutional Honesty refers to ‘theory versus practice,’ or how the differences between stated aims and practical policy implementation affect CF member satisfaction. Quality of Employment refers to how satisfying, rewarding and relevant CF employment is. Many studies and initiatives have focused on Quality of Life, but none focus on the

\textsuperscript{296} Thomas and Bell, \textit{Competing for the Best and the Brightest: Recruiting and Retention in the Australian Defence Force}, 97-118.

\textsuperscript{297} Subhendu Dey, "Employee Retention -- A Key to Organizational Growth," \textit{Globsyn Management Journal} 3, no. 1 (01, 2009), 46, \url{http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=45828229&site=bsi-live}. 
quality of employment.\textsuperscript{298} \textit{Institutional Connection} refers to how “connected” various parts of the CF are to each other, primarily up and down the chain of command, and how this connection, or lack thereof, affects attrition and retention.

**Institutional Honesty**

A perceived disparity between what the CF says and what it does, between what CF personnel perceive the CF to “be about” and what the CF actually is, lies at the heart of Institutional Honesty:

Although creativity and innovation tend to be highly esteemed by the [US] Army in its rhetoric… ‘the reality is that junior officers are seldom given opportunities in planning training; to make decisions; or to fail, learn, and try again.’…lack of authority may neutralize a leader’s effectiveness, while detailed planning may substitute for leadership.\textsuperscript{299}

Disparities and shortcomings in personnel/career assessments, second language training, treatment of poor performers and honours and recognition are all CF internal Institutional Honesty dissatisfiers that merit further explanation.

Annually, the CF assesses personnel competitively, by rank and occupation, against each other, in terms of both current performance and perceived potential. Each CF member receives an annual Personnel Evaluation Report (PER) under the aegis of the Canadian Forces Personnel Appraisal System (CFPAS):


The aim of CFPAS is to develop CF members through constructive feedback and to accurately assess the level of demonstrated performance and potential for career administration purposes.  

CFPAS is several years old; given the personnel learning and skill effects of recent CF operations it lacks relevance. The personnel evaluation shortfall is not unique to the CF, but has been noted in other forces:

[in the US military, despite several years of war,] not just the Army, but also the Air Force, Navy and Marines – have changed almost nothing about the way their promotional systems and entire bureaucracies operate.”

US studies note, “Performance Evaluations emphasize a ‘zero-defect’ mentality, meaning that risk-avoidance trickles down the chain of command.” While CF lacks the challenges and shortfalls in trust and credibility between US military senior and junior officers, improper personnel evaluation methods can have negative strategic impact if they are not viewed as credible or relevant.


Modern operations demand leader knowledge, skills and abilities, particularly in the case of Majors and Lieutenant-Colonels, which previously were the purview of Colonels and General Officers. Personnel evaluation systems must reflect the changing institution; current CFPAS assessment criteria “do not reflect what operational commanders are looking for in today’s officer”, such as:

1. Strategic Cognition in both Staff and Command functions.
2. Written and Verbal Communication for complex subjects.
3. Working as part of a team, inspiring and enhancing unity, often in joint, inter-agency, multi-national and public settings.
4. Physical and Mental Fitness and Endurance.
5. The ability to lead the institution and offer guidance within strategic frameworks, particularly under long-term periods of stress.  

CF Senior, General and Flag Officers are not assessed according to these criteria; perhaps they and their subordinates should be.  

CFPAS assesses all CF general service personnel below the rank of Colonel, save Chief Warrant Officers, using the same evaluation form and criteria. In a practical context, the Captain of a frigate, normally a Navy Commander with upwards of twenty years’ experience, a Sgt commanding an infantry section in combat with ten or more

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Interview, Lieutenant-General W. Semianiw, Commander, Canada Command. LGen Semainiw also identified the necessity for Majors/Lieutenant-Colonels to have abilities once thought to be only the purview of General and Flag officers.

The CF identifies Majors, Lieutenant-Colonels and Colonels as Senior Officers, while those above the rank of Colonel are General (Army and Air Force) or Flag (Navy) Officers.
years’ experience and a newly-qualified MP Corporal with two years’ service are assessed and provided feedback from their supervisors using the same pro-forma.\textsuperscript{306}

While a common assessment form is administratively easy to implement and demonstrates fairness and equity, it sends a poor message. Not everyone in the CF is the same; the fact remains that the CF is a hierarchy, where personnel of different ranks, different occupations and different experience levels have differing levels of authority, responsibility and expectation. CFPAS does not reinforce this CF cultural norm and reflects a gap in CF Institutional Honesty.

Reworking and updating CFPAS to reflect differences in CF service by rank and position, could go a long way to mitigating some career dissatisfaction. Military analyst Fred Kagan recommends the US Army implement 360 degree assessments to ensure better accountability and effective leadership in the future force.\textsuperscript{307} These type of assessments may not be sound for the CF as they could make leader evaluations a ‘popularity contest’ where managing subordinate impressions becomes more important to the leader seeking a favourable 360 assessment, rather than making difficult decisions and issuing unpopular, albeit necessary, orders. However, including some measure of

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{306} This factor is particularly distressing when one considers that MP soldiers are promoted to Corporal immediately after completing training, ostensibly to give even newly promoted MPs more credibility and authority in carrying out their duties, while most other CF enlisted personnel must serve for three to four years before being eligible for promotion to Corporal. In practical terms, this policy has given rise to derision from much of the CF towards these so-called “insta-Corporals” who also receive a specialist pay rate over and above most other CF occupations. Further information concerning NCO promotion and career policy can be found in Canadian Forces Administrative Order (CFAO) 49-4, Career Policy Non-Commissioned Members Regular Force.

\textsuperscript{307} Foreign Policy Research Institute, Multimedia: Who Will Fight for Us? (Personnel) - FPRI “Defense Showstoppers” Conference. A 360 degree assessment is one where the individual being assessed is evaluated using input from superiors, peers and subordinates, giving a full or “360 degree” view of the individual from every perspective.\end{flushright}
subordinate input in leader assessments may better rounding out leader evaluations, increasing both assessment fairness and effectiveness.

The CF’s current drug policy identifies a disparity between what is stated and what is done.308 In June 2010, the Chief of the Defence Staff remarked, “We do not accept drugs at all in the Canadian Forces, especially with all our operational missions.”309 CF publications and statements by senior leaders have also identified the CF’s ‘zero tolerance’ policy concerning drug use.310 To a layperson, ‘zero tolerance’ should ostensibly mean that drug users are not tolerated and not permitted to serve. CF drug control policy differs from this view:

The CF is committed to a drug-free workplace by providing the appropriate tools and information to reduce or eliminate the drug-risk behaviours of CF members.311

The CF Drug Control Program’s essential elements are “education, detection, treatment and rehabilitation.”312 The CF Drug Control Policy Manual further identifies that in the

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308 As indicated previously, “treatment of poor performers” was identified in several surveys as a dissatisfier. Like many others, it was not a large enough dissatisfier to be identified as a primary release reason, but in concert with a host of other dissatisfiers, definitely plays a role.


311 Defence Administrative Orders and Directives (DAOD) 5019-3, Canadian Forces Drug Control Program, 2009), 2.

event a CF member is a drug user, the Director Military Careers Administration (DMCA) conducts an administrative review:

DMCA is the sole authority to conduct administrative reviews and to order administrative measures [including release from the CF] against any CF member for involvement with illicit drugs… As a general principle, the appropriate administrative action is the one that best reflects the degree of incompatibility between the CF member’s prohibited drug use or other involvement with drugs and the CF member’s continued service in the CF.\(^\text{313}\)

This policy focuses on drug user rehabilitation and centralized assessment, rather than punishment or swift administrative or disciplinary action, by the drug user’s chain of command. In fact, it leaves very little to discretion to Commanding Officers (COs):

DMCA will issue specific instructions to the CF member’s Commanding Officer regarding the conduct of the administrative review… the CO must offer new TOS [Terms of Service, meaning the offer of further employment] even though a member is under an Administrative Review for drug use.\(^\text{314}\)

COs command vessels that can have strategic worldwide effect, they can order soldiers into harm’s way, can authorize lethal weapons use and are responsible for protecting Canadian airspace and safeguarding Canadian citizens from coast to coast. However, despite the fact that they are responsible for many lives, millions of dollars’ worth of equipment, lethal weaponry and the ability to use it, COs are permitted very little leeway to enforce the CF’s stated ‘zero tolerance’ drug policy, including ordering drug testing


\(^{314}\) Ibid., 33-34
without a series of bureaucratic and legally-perilous steps. In fact, the phrase ‘zero tolerance,’ while publicly stated, does not appear in any official CF policy or guidance document concerning drug use.

Junior CF personnel who see drug users retained in the CF, offered education, rehabilitation and counselling, while, in many cases, still serving in their units and still collecting a paycheque based on their rank, the same paycheque that non-drug users collect, see glaring dissonance. To CF leaders, the inability to take direct, quick action to correct drug use and enforce ‘zero tolerance’ is a dissatisfier that saps their authority, makes the drug policy seem toothless and makes senior leader words seem hollow. As drug users cannot deploy, in many cases they miss some of the hardships, time away, risk and threat that their ‘clean,’ deployable comrades undergo. CF drug policy is an example of the difference between expectations and actions that act as a dissatisfier with regards to treatment of poor performers. The discrepancy between stated and actual expectations contributes to dissatisfaction and builds towards that confluence of multiple factors that can influence a CF member to leave. Allowing COs the authority to take swift, public action against drug users and actually making CF drug policy “zero tolerance” will increase CF policy credibility, capability and commitment and reduce the dissonance between stated policy and its application.

The CF is a bilingual institution whose linguistic spectrum is governed by a robust body of Official Languages (OL) regulations, policies, guidance, direction and reviews.

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315 Ibid., 54-56 outlines the steps that Commanding Officers must follow even to order a CF member to be tested for drug use.

316 Ibid.; Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Forces, QR&O 20 - Canadian Forces Drug Control Program, 1-13; Defence Administrative Orders and Directives (DAOD) 5019-3, Canadian Forces Drug Control Program.
As CF members increase in rank, should they expect further promotion and further responsibility, they must continue to move more and more towards being bilingual. Non-bilingual officers, in particular, who wish to advance, are required to improve second language performance consistently. While not required to maintain as high an institutional focus on bilingualism, NCOs are also, as they increase in rank, expected to become more and more bilingual.

CF OL statistics indicate inconsistent bilingualism policy application. In 2009, only 8% of Anglophone NCOs and 56% of Francophone NCOs had valid Second Language Test (SLT) results. While officers were slightly better, only 62% of Anglophone and 87% of Francophone officers had valid SLT results, including 69% of Anglophone Captains and 95% of Francophone Captains. By not ensuring that its personnel have valid language test results, the CF perpetuates a gap in following its own policies.


318 CANFORGEN 117/10 - SCORING OF PROMOTION SELECTION BOARD SECOND OFFICIAL LANGUAGE COMPETENCIES; CANFORGEN 045/01 - BILINGUAL OFFICER CORPS POLICY

319 Tables C.6a and C.7a of Canada, Department of National Defence, Annual Report on Regular Force Personnel 2008/2009, C-7, C-8. The rank of Captain was selected for examination as it is often known as the “working rank” and most populous rank for CF officers.

320 Language testing can be administratively cumbersome and is generally not offered to junior soldiers. A routine and ongoing commitment, second language profiles are valid for a period of five years,
This disparity continues into the availability of Second Official Language Training (SOLET). While it would appear, from an examination of policy and public statements, that second language training would be offered when, where and how required to CF personnel, “for the past several years, SOLET has not been based on training requirement but rather on availability of candidates to undergo training.”

So, despite comprehensive OL policies, which sees bilingualism affect promotions, employment and advancement, the CF has not made its personnel available for language training, or offered its personnel language testing and training that matches its policy aims. This disparity reflects an Institutional Honesty challenge that contributes to the confluence of factors that dissatisfy CF personnel.

Napoleon allegedly proclaimed that he could motivate soldiers to perform great deeds for a few scraps of ribbon and a shiny medal. Elton Mayo’s 1930s factory worker experiments identified the Hawthorne Effect; despite poor conditions, leader attention and recognition motivate people and increase their satisfaction.

People who feel that their superiors and the larger organization recognize and acknowledge their efforts are happier after which they expire unless a CF member is classified as official bilingual or “exempt” from further testing.

321 Personal Email, Dany Tremblay, Second Language Evaluation (SLE) Manager, Language Programs Delivery, Canadian Defence Academy - Second Language Training availability in the Canadian Forces, January 26, 2011.

322 "Human Relations Contributors - Elton Mayo's Hawthorne Experiments," Accel-Team, http://www.accel-team.com/motivation/hawthorne_02.html (accessed February 23, 2011); "Human Relations Contributors - the Hawthorne Effect," Accel-Team, http://www.accel-team.com/motivation/hawthorne_01.html (accessed February 23, 2011) discuss the Hawthorne Effect in detail. Essentially, despite the experimenters in a telephone relay assembling plant lowering worker comfort, changing lighting, enforcing longer work hours and removing breaks, employee productivity rose. Only after analysis did Mayo discover that researcher interaction, conversation, engagement with and attention towards the workers was the reason for this increased productivity and motivation. Attention and interest from authority figures was a motivator that overrode the potential dissatisfiers of poor working conditions and changes in work environment.
and more motivated; logically, they would be more amenable to remaining in an organization that validated their efforts. CF Honours and Recognition policy seeks to reward exceptional performance, service in unusual circumstances, or long and distinguished service by awarding CF personnel tangible symbols of achievement that they wear on their uniforms. However, if applied inconsistently, recognition methods can de-motivate personnel. CF personnel are often dissatisfied enough to release when they “felt their good work was not being acknowledged.”

A comment from a recent CF leader survey identifies:

A critical component missing [in discussions of Quality of Life] is that of Honours and Awards. There still remains a large discrepancy in who receives what for certain action, or inaction for that matter… I offer that our poor conduct of Honours and Awards is a lead contributor to dissatisfaction…

An example of Honours and Recognition indicating Institutional Honesty shortcomings is that of personnel appointed to the Order of Military Merit (ORMM). The ORMM is “the pre-eminent form of recognition for long term merit in the CF”; its three levels –

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323 Personal Email, Major, Combat Arms

324 Anonymous comment captured by a survey of Chief and Master Warrant Officer and senior officers in Gasparotto, Quality of Life Survey. While CF official nomenclature is “Honours and Recognition”, administered by the Director of Honours and Recognition, a CMP organization, it is known by many CF members by its historical or widely-accepted name, “Honours and Awards.” Perusing records of past Honours and Recognition at www.gg.ca, one can find some personnel awarded Meritorious Service Decorations, a fairly significant honour, for leadership in combat, while other combat leadership actions are rewarded with significant yet less-prestigious recognition such as Mentions in Dispatches. One can also find personnel awarded Meritorious Service Decorations for service in headquarters staff functions in Canada. While headquarters service is important, this perceived disparity plainly identifies a disconnect in recognition consistency.
Commander (CMM), Officer (OMM) and Member (MMM) - reflect a recipient’s relative level of responsibility. ORMM guidelines stipulate:

CMM for Gen/Flag Officers, OMM for Senior Officers, MMM for all others...OMM appointments should normally be distributed evenly between Capt(N)/Col, Cdr/LCol and LCdr/Maj...Approximately 30% of MMM appointments should be allocated to PO1/WO and below...all candidates should ideally be between 18 and 23 years of service.

January 2011’s 61st ORMM list saw an OMM breakdown of 1 Chief Warrant Officer (CWO), 2 Majors (Majs), 11 Lieutenant-Colonels (LCols), 7 Colonels (Cols) and 1 Brigadier-General (BGen); incidentally, the latter three rank categories generally all have more than 23 years’ service. Given that 23 OMM were awarded, the guidance above indicates that 7 of the recipients should have been Majs, 7 should have been LCols and 7 Cols.

The Maj awards are particularly at odds with the guidance, achieving only 28% of the suggested number of awards. Most Majs fall into the well-identified small, mid-service cohort, whose hard work often sets the conditions for LCol and Col promotions, advancement and recognition. These personnel are also generally Generation X


326 CANFORGEN 056/10 - GUIDELINES: ORDER OF MILITARY MERIT, Chief Military Personnel, 2010. For ease and clarity of reading, future references will use only Army/Air Force ranks, not their naval equivalents, although everything discussed applies equally to naval personnel at their equivalent ranks.

327 CANFORGEN 006/11 - ORDER OF MILITARY MERIT - 61ST LIST, Chief Military Personnel, 2011. The OMM is, often sardonically, known as the “Old Man Medal” by CF personnel, reflecting the general age of its recipients. A standing joke on how to nominate someone for the OMM is that the first line of the nomination letter must say “Colonel X has served in the CF since...”. Rather than seen as something earned to recognize good performance, many junior and field-grade officers see the OMM as something of a “gimme” medal awarded to senior and General officers as a pre-retirement present, not for any particularly meritorious or noteworthy service.
members, whose retention will be critical to the CF’s future. Yet, the CF is reluctant to follow its own guidance in equitably recognizing this cohort’s long-term career performance and merit. This factor is particularly distressing, given that civilian research indicates “high performers are more likely to stay when… contingent rewards are available.”

While it is unlikely that a CF member will release because they were not awarded a medal, this factor, compounded with pension availability, posting dissatisfaction, career dissatisfaction and family work-life pressures, could be ‘the straw that breaks the camel’s back’ and creates the tipping point for a release decision. CF leaders identify:

it is the guys who are just under the radar that seem to flee. Those who are competent, work hard in supporting roles but may not be the ones who consistently stand out.”

CF recognition, then, should follow its own stated policies, reward personnel for performance and motivate them to continue performing by institutionally recognizing and appreciating their efforts. The CF must avoid the situation found in some services, notably the US Air Force, where a plethora of commonly-awarded medals and awards detract from the intent of recognition and become meaningless. However, there is a middle ground that can be achieved to recognize, and therefore motivate, CF personnel

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329 Personal Email, Major, Combat Arms.

through provision of honours, particularly if this middle ground is in line with CF
guidance.

**Quality of Employment**

Quality of Employment refers to the satisfaction, pride and perception of worth
that CF personnel feel about their work; it is closely linked to the desire CF personnel
have to actually do their job. Often, aspects of CF service may not be particularly
satisfying. When CF personnel have a close, familial bond with their comrades, when
their job protects Canadian citizens or contributes meaningfully to an entity beyond the
individual CF member, this total spectrum of employment increases ‘employment
quality.’ Since CF personnel spend the majority of their waking hours at work, making
work relevant, challenging, worthwhile and important is an important factor. Quality of
Employment (QoE) can keep a CF member serving despite the potential for greater
financial rewards outside the CF:

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331 While civilian management theory uses ‘job satisfaction’ this paper does not, given that CF
service encompasses a whole lifestyle and persona, more so than just a ‘job.’

332 Toussaint and Marum, *Factors Affecting Members Decisions to Leave the Canadian Forces: A
Quantitative & Qualitative Examination of the CF Retention Survey for Signal Operators (Sig Op) MOS ID
00329 (with 0-3 Years of Regular Force Service)*, i-87 identifies that some survey respondents were
unhappy with being trained in specialist skills, yet not being employed in ways that permitted them to use
them. For Combat Arms personnel, deploying to Afghanistan and fighting is a significant Quality of
Employment issue. Personal Email, Commander, Maritime Surface and Sub-surface Officer, February 8,
2011.; Interview, Lieutenant-Commander, Maritime Surface and Sub-surface Officer, February 9, 2011.;
Interview, Commander, Maritime Surface and Sub-surface Officer, February 9, 2011. indicate that Naval
personnel view deployments the same way; not being permitted to sail and conduct meaningful operations
is a Quality of Employment issue. Interview, Lieutenant-Colonel, Pilot (Tactical Helicopter), February 5,
2011.; Personal Email, *Lieutenant-Colonel, Fighter Pilot*; Personal Email, *Lieutenant-Colonel, Tactical
Helicopter Pilot*; Personal Email, *Lieutenant-Colonel, Fighter Pilot*; Personal Email, *Major, Air Combat
Systems Officer* also reinforce that being permitted to fly is significant to aircrew Quality of Employment;
those who, in the words of one fighter pilot “hang up the goggles” due to rank and age, but do not feel that
they will attain a senior CF leadership position and rank have little motivation to remain the CF and often
seek flying employment in the civilian world.
While earnings and benefits have only a two percent impact on job satisfaction; job quality and workplace support have a combined 70 percent impact.\(^{333}\)

However, poor QoE can have the effect of making CF service little more than “a job” and its personnel little more than individuals listlessly completing day to day tasks. QoE shortcomings, noted by experienced CF leaders, encourage attrition:

1. Poor Leadership and Supervision.
2. Not having the opportunity to “do the job” – disparity among those who deploy and those who don’t.
3. Lack of Authority and Responsibility at the lower levels – not feeling trusted to do their jobs and make decisions.\(^{334}\)

The top three long-term civilian retention drivers are exciting work and challenge, career growth, learning and development and “working with great people and having good relationships,” all characteristics inherent in CF service, particularly if QoE is good.

A January 2011 Ipsos-Reid poll found:

Canadians don’t confuse the CF with being armed aid workers. They are soldiers. But, soldiers who are capable of handling a diversity of

\(^{333}\) Results of the National Study of the Changing Work Force conducted by the US Families and Work Institute, quoted in Hogue, *A Comparison Study of the Major Factors Affecting Employee Retention in the U.S. Army and Corporate America*, 18.

\(^{334}\) Personal Email, *Commander, Maritime Surface and Sub-Surface Officer*. Variations on this theme were common throughout author research. In fact, it seemed that when those ‘givens’ of CF service – strong leadership, empowering subordinates and encouraging initiative and not being permitted to complete tasks as trained – were absent, so was motivation, regardless of occupation, rank, years of service or career stage.

\(^{335}\) Rosenberg and Nixon, *Stay Interviews: A Retention Strategy for Forward Thinking Organizations*, 2. He also indicates that employees may cite pay as a reason for leaving during exit interviews, but this is ‘window dressing’ and a simple answer that employees use to avoid having to explain situations fully, often face-to-face to the supervisor that may be a prime factor in their decision to leave.
missions based on need. The warrior spirit is an attitude, not a task or mission.³³⁶

CF warrior spirit is embodied most strongly and publicly by the “Fight” media campaign. Centered on television commercials offering realistic views of a broad spectrum of CF employment, it entices applicants to “Fight with the Canadian Forces.”³³⁷ While not every CF occupation fights armed enemies, an attitude of decisive action and focus should permeate the CF. When bureaucracy stifles initiative and ambition, when soldiers do not endure challenging and arduous training, when pilots cannot fly, when sailors cannot sail, their QoE, and therefore motivation, drops:

At the 21 year mark of my career, I was the SQ [Squadron Quartermaster, responsible for all supply and equipment accounting] of a tank sqn. During my tenure there, I went through the emotional trauma of having to turn over the tanks to long-term preservation... signifying a quantum shift in the direction my Regiment was going. For a soldier who joined specifically to be a tanker, this was a huge emotional hit. Upon completion of that distasteful task, I was posted to an Area HQ. This coincided with the beginning of the large-scale deployments to an operational theatre [Afghanistan]. The scope of my job was to fill positions via CFTPO for foreign taskings while I sat in an office. That in itself was hugely distasteful.³³⁸

Some CF members are dissatisfied with their current military occupation, yet changing occupations is often administratively difficult. In fact, some soldiers release

³³⁶ Bricker and Wright, Chief of Land Staff [CLS] Presentation, 61.


³³⁸ Personal Email, Master Warrant Officer, Combat Arms. It is quite obvious that this individual’s QoE dropped from a number of factors – not being permitted to do a job he loved, a posting away from soldiering and being forced to conduct administrative tasks sending others on deployment while being precluded from doing so himself. This soldier did release from the CF and, despite earning higher wages in the civilian sector for three years, eventually rejoined the CF.
from the CF with the intention of re-joining in a different occupation due to the administrative difficulty of changing occupations.\textsuperscript{339} The fact that occupations which are short-manned often forbid transfers out compounds the administrative difficulty of reclassification. Unfortunately, closing an occupation to transfers out can create the false impression of personnel management success. If members are dissatisfied with their current military occupation, they will seek to rectify this dissatisfaction, whether an occupation forbids transfers out or not.

If a soldier determines that he would rather be a naval weapons technician than an infanteer and is serious enough in his intentions to undertake the administration required for an occupation transfer, he has crossed a significant mental boundary. If informed that infantry is too short-manned to permit any transfers out, it is extremely unlikely that the soldier will decide that he does, in fact, wish to continue serving in the infantry and suddenly develop a newfound satisfaction with it. In terms of organizational behaviour, equity theory identifies that dissatisfied people will reduce dissatisfaction either by modifying their inputs and outcomes by changing occupations or quitting their job.\textsuperscript{340} If the soldier feels his only choice is to release, then he will.

Rather than viewing occupation transfers (OT) as a loss to one occupation, the CF should view it as a shift in capacity that, while not perfect, benefits the CF more than a member electing to leave service completely. If a soldier elects to leave the infantry

\textsuperscript{339} Interviews and Emails with every Combat Arms officer who served as a unit Adjutant identified this trend. From the soldier perspective, it was administratively easier and a much clearer path to follow to release from the CF, then, in some cases in as little as a week later, rejoin the CF at a Recruiting Center in a new occupation, than attempt to reclassify while serving.

through release or OT, the departure is a sunk cost to the infantry. However it is not a loss to the greater CF. Although career managers are loath to lose personnel, it is strategically better to retain a CF member in service in any occupation than lose him or her completely.

Modifying this thinking will require a mental shift from one where career managers seek to protect their own occupation to one that realizes that while releases are a total loss, OT retains some CF benefit. If the CF makes OT easier and potentially uses it as a retention method, it may well retain personnel who would otherwise have been so dissatisfied as to release. In order to encourage soldiers to remain in CF service on completion of a contract of service, the CF could consider offering occupation transfers as an incentive to remain in service. This has the potential to reduce occupational dissatisfaction and offer personnel a way to change dissatisfying work conditions, while retaining them in the CF.

The effects of poor long-term QoE and personnel frustration manifest themselves as release decisions that overarch the potential for future rewarding and eminently satisfying positions:

my career is entering a phase of near exclusive staff jobs that quite frankly is not especially motivating for me right now. I am sure I would have been given a CO's job at some point in the future, but the where and when are completely uncertain. When it came right down to it, I really cannot justify uprooting my family again for something I am only marginally motivated to do, and with such an uncertain future… I am just way too tired of being asked to do so much with too few resources, and quite honestly I don't see this getting better any time soon. The last

341 Personal Email, David Smith, Vice President, Client and Market Development, Dynamic Logic, A Millward Brown Company identifies that the US Army would often offer a soldier his or her choice of available occupations in order to encourage a re-commitment to further service.
6 months have been the most unmotivated I have ever been towards my job. Mentally, I just need to change what I am doing.  

Army leaders identify:

Guys who break contract have tended to be really frustrated… by a system that seems to coddle the junk troops [manifested in part by CF drug control policy as outlined above]. These are the guys who only want to fight and do PT, and don't want to spend time behind a desk (even if that desk-time gave them the opportunity to fix the problems that frustrate them), and short of becoming NCO Assaulters or SAR Techs [both challenging, physically demanding, yet satisfying occupations], there probably aren't many career-long prospects that would hold these guys.

Once Canada’s mission in Afghanistan ends, the CF, particularly the Army, may face a severe QoE challenge. While CF leaders have identified the Arctic as a future strategic focus, soldiers tested in the crucible of combat may not find Arctic Sovereignty operations particularly satisfying.

CF leaders must conduct difficult, challenging training, enable junior leaders to make decisions and be pragmatic and forward-thinking in their approach. They must support the CF as an institution rather than focusing on manning pressures in disparate

342 Personal Email, Major, Tactical Helicopter Pilot - Releasing from CF in May 2011

343 Personal Email, Major, Combat Arms. This statement was supported by multiple interviews and author experience as a combat arms leader for almost 20 years.


occupations, and work to encourage and maintain CF QoE, even in the face of future fiscal challenges. As the commander of Canada’s Army has stated, “training to excite young soldiers” will be a necessity in the post-Afghanistan CF.

**Institutional Connection**

Institutional Connection refers to the perception of the CF as a unified team, where senior leaders can identify with and credibly guide their subordinates by virtue of shared understanding, credibility and mutual respect. “The sense of connectivity with an organization and what future it holds for the individual is key.” Institutional Connection also encompasses the ‘corporate’ elements of Canada’s government acknowledging that CF service is unique and demanding; as a former Chief of the Defence Staff noted, “we are not the Public Service of Canada; we are the Canadian Forces and our job is to be able to kill people.” CF personnel serve with unlimited liability and collectively hold unique skillsets not found in other institutions. However, CF personnel, like any other workers, need to feel that their organization values their skills; a series of civilian employee retention studies found that “organizational prestige

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346 *Defence Administrative Orders and Directives 5031-10, Adventure Training, 2003* identifies CF policy towards adventure training. It is currently restrictive and administratively burdensome. Other militaries, notably the UK, have more liberal adventure training policies that ensure that personnel are able to “work hard and play hard” under the aegis of military training that pushes them to seek and overcome challenges outside the purely military spectrum.

347 Devlin, 2011.


shaped the [employee’s] decision to stay." Institutional connection, then, is one area
that the CF should consider with a view to retaining strong CF personnel:

Soldiers are our credentials. We must support them with a culture that
allows honest mistakes, encourages initiative and values integrity… our
values and assumptions must be communicated in our actions as
leaders.  

The Canada First Defence Strategy provides an example of a divide between
civilian and military, between political and strategic leaders and the CF that does their
bidding. On page 17, the graphic accompanying the paragraph describing land combat
vehicles and systems modernization has a picture of a US Army Multiple Launch Rocket
System (MLRS), a system Canada does not use.  Another picture shows a Light
Support Vehicle Wheeled (LSVW), a vehicle universally reviled by soldiers that performs
dismally in field settings.

350 Hausknecht, Rodda and Howard, Targeted Employee Retention: Performance-Based and Job-
Related Differences in Reported Reasons for Staying, 284.

351 Lieutenant-General Theodore C. Stroup, "Leadership and Organizational Culture: Actions

352 MLRS is an expensive, long range, precision indirect fire system. Canada has never purchased
MLRS, although many soldiers would dearly love to see it fielded due to its exceptional capability.

353 An IVECO Italy-designed light truck built under license by Western Star Trucks in Kelowna,
British Columbia, the LSVW cost the taxpayer roughly $80,000 per copy in 1990s dollars. As Taylor and
Nolan, Tarnished Brass, 122-124 note, it failed military acceptance trial performance tests, yet was still
purchased and fielded, over better-performing competitors.
To many seasoned CF members, the LSVW epitomizes of what has been popularly termed the 1990s “decade of darkness,” a CF plagued by rock-bottom morale, leadership mistrust, a lack of institutional confidence, budget cuts that gutted readiness, and general malaise. That the CF’s capstone guiding document uses imagery of capabilities the CF cannot afford and imagery representing the CF’s darkest days in recent memory to support views on modernization, there is a disconnect:

The best bosses work doggedly to stay in tune with this relentless attention [of subordinates towards their superiors] and use it to their advantage… they know that the success of their people and

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354 “Top General Calls Liberal Rule ‘Decade of Darkness’,” CanWest Media Works Publications, [http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/story.html?id=d56d0f0b-d9ecf-4111-84eb-39dd89571625](http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/story.html?id=d56d0f0b-d9ecf-4111-84eb-39dd89571625) (accessed February 20, 2011). Former Chief of the Defence Staff General Rick Hillier used this term to describe “the immense, the negative impact of the defence expenditure reductions in 1994 and the lasting, almost negative legacy that they brought into effect… some deep wounds… in the Canadian Forces over this past, what I would call, a decade of darkness.” The term has since become part of the Canadian defence and security sphere’s popular lexicon and is widely used by defence critics, analysts, politicians, journalists and pundits.
organizations depends on maintaining an accurate view of how others construe their moods and moves...355

While bureaucracy is a necessity in any large organization, this shortfall is indicative of a bureaucratic system out of touch with the psyche of the greater organization.

Another aspect where CF Institutional Connection falls short is Sr NCO pay. CF pay is benchmarked to the Public Service (PS) of Canada.356 However, the CF Sr NCO role has no corresponding or appropriate PS or civilian employment equivalent. Sr NCOs start their service as junior workers, yet transition to a ‘working manager’ role, where they literally are the backbone of the CF. Officers identify ‘what’ tasks need to be completed, while Sr NCOs generally identify ‘how’ to accomplish them. They do this while concurrently with advising their officers, by virtue of background, experience and job knowledge, on how best to lead the CF as an institution. Sr NCOs and officers form an extremely strong, battle-tested Command Team. However, Sr NCO pay does not reflect the additional responsibility and leadership expectation that the institutional CF demands from its Sr NCOs.

A UK study found that in some cases, NCO promotion was actually a dissatisfier, given the increased social, work and other responsibilities that Sr NCOs had above their Jr NCO counterparts. Without a concomitant and measurable increase in pay, the “wage


is poor when you consider the long hours and risk of the job.” While there is no correlation in the civilian world, there is a significant difference in responsibility between a MCpl and a Sgt, yet their pay differential is very slight:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Average Tax Rate</th>
<th>Tax Payable</th>
<th>After Tax Income</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>MCpl</td>
<td>21.14%</td>
<td>12,488.69</td>
<td>46,587.31</td>
<td>$1,809.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sgt</td>
<td>21.57%</td>
<td>13,307.32</td>
<td>48,396.68</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>MCpl</td>
<td>26.97%</td>
<td>15,933.24</td>
<td>43,142.76</td>
<td>$1,619.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sgt</td>
<td>27.46%</td>
<td>16,941.60</td>
<td>44,762.40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nova Scotia</td>
<td>MCpl</td>
<td>25.51%</td>
<td>15,070.79</td>
<td>44,005.21</td>
<td>$1,613.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sgt</td>
<td>26.07%</td>
<td>16,085.64</td>
<td>45,618.36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BC</td>
<td>MCpl</td>
<td>20.14%</td>
<td>11,895.17</td>
<td>47,180.83</td>
<td>$1,847.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sgt</td>
<td>20.54%</td>
<td>12,675.69</td>
<td>49,028.31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In Canada’s Air Force, NCOs are critical to keeping aircraft flying; the majority of NCO tasks involve maintenance and ground preparation. Any mistakes they make could cost aircrews their lives, endanger personnel on the ground, cause mission failure and destroy millions of dollars’ worth of equipment:

at the end of the day the Sgt is asked to do more [than a MCpl]… it is not uncommon for Sgts to be responsible for up to 25 personnel... [Aerospace Engineer Officers] would often turn to the Sgt to discuss significant engineering issues (severe corrosion, out of the norm cracks, and other flight safety issues). This requires that the Sgt understand the

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Pung et al, Remuneration and its Motivation of Service Personnel: Focus Group Investigation and Analysis, 32.
aircraft and its systems and be able to explain… the nature of the problem, the implications of the problem and what action(s) have been taken to address them. The bottom line is that the Sgts have a lot to look after when they are employed in these positions…. The primary airworthiness function they [Sgts] can be authorized to hold is called Level C (Weapon System Release). Once in possession of this authorization Sgts can release aircraft for flight. With their signature, they are attesting to the work that was conducted by their personnel (work done by Aviation techs, Avionics techs, Structures techs) was done IAW [in accordance with] the approved maintenance program for the fleet. They are attesting that the people who were employed to fix the aircraft… held the right qualifications and authorizations and that they did the work IAW the technical manuals and installed airworthy parts, using approved tools (correctly calibrated torque wrenches as an example). This is not a trivial task and the authorization is only granted after the member has completed the required courses, has spent a certain amount of time with the fleet, and has been tested to ensure they understand all of the airworthiness implications.  

Infantry MCpls often serve as the second-in-command of a section, supervising two C9 light machine gunners and supporting their section commanders. Meanwhile, Sgts who are section commanders are responsible for between 8 and 15 soldiers, their training, readiness, morale and effectiveness, plus an armoured vehicle with the ability to apply lethal fire at targets up to 2000 metres distant, day or night. They must develop and execute tactical plans, lead patrols and be prepared to become the second in command of a 30 to 40-soldier platoon.

The difference in responsibility, accountability, authority and expectation between MCpls and Sgts are, for most CF occupations, significant. Often, they are more

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358 Personal Email, Major, Aerospace Engineer Officer (Maritime Helicopter), March 9, 2011.

359 A Canadian LAV III Infantry Fighting Vehicle’s primary turret-mounted weapon is the M242 Bushmaster 25mm cannon. This weapon fires 200 high explosive or armour-piercing projectiles per minute, which have an effective range of 2000 metres, but a lethal radius thousands of metres farther, making the consequences of fire considerable. Equipped with both optical and thermal sights, the LAV III can fire effectively during both day and night operations. For more information about CF land equipment, weapons and vehicles, see [www.army.gc.ca](http://www.army.gc.ca).
significant than the less than $2000 post-tax income increase from the MCpl to Sgt rank indicates. This disparity can be yet another factor increasing the pool of dissatisfaction that could cause a CF member to release, particularly given that many civilian defence organizations seek Sr NCOs to flesh out their ranks as exercise controllers, range patrollers and contracted instructors. Modifying NCO pay to reflect the demands that the CF places on them, and their unique skills and abilities as concurrent workers, supervisors and leaders, critical to the Command Team, will better reflect the institution’s appreciation for their service. This recognition and appreciation could make the difference between retaining or losing that experience, which is built only through experience and time.

“Civilianization of the CF,” embodied by disconnects between civilian and military elements of service, is a dissatisfier. A 2004 survey found that 72% of CF personnel surveyed believed they were “losing their military customs and traditions.”

US Army studies identify:

from officer evaluations to promotions to job assignments, all branches of the military operate more like a government bureaucracy with a unionized workforce than like a cutting-edge meritocracy.”

Canadian findings support this factor:

Members’ comments revealed that dissatisfaction with leadership has to do with the perception that leaders act more like managers than leaders. Members repeatedly commented that leaders are so preoccupied with their career and advancement opportunities that they will not make


361 Kane, Why our Best Officers are Leaving
tough and controversial decisions that would risk their chance of promotion.\textsuperscript{362}

This factor connects with Institutional Honesty; CF personnel join the CF expecting a certain level of military bearing, leadership, customs and traditions and distinct military rules and expectations. When this expectation falls short, dissatisfaction ensues; no one joins the military to be a civilian.

Canada’s Department of National Defence (DND) has added civilian bureaucrats at 300% the rate of uniformed personnel and currently employs 28,500 civilian personnel, a figure estimated to increase significantly in coming years.\textsuperscript{363} An overwhelming increase in civilian staff, where in the past five years "personnel outsourcing costs have risen 79 per cent" stands at odds with the public picture of a CF strapped for personnel.\textsuperscript{364} The CF spends “many, many dollars on consultants, contractors and professional services,”\textsuperscript{365} while sailors with critical skills ‘pier hop’ from ships returning from operations to others just departing, with no respite from sustained operations. “DND office buildings filling to capacity while the army scrambled to find troops to send off to war is lousy optics,” both in the public eye and to service members.\textsuperscript{366} To CF personnel,

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{362} Otis and Straver, \textit{Review of Attrition and Retention Research for the Canadian Forces}, i-66.

\textsuperscript{363} Gurney, \textit{DND’s Army of Bureaucrats Increases Faster than Troops}


\textsuperscript{366} Gurney, \textit{DND’s Army of Bureaucrats Increases Faster than Troops}
\end{flushright}
the lack of deployable uniformed personnel is completely at odds with the increase in civilian staff and reflects a perceived disconnect in priorities.

Officers and NCOs employed in mixed military-civilian environments such as National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ), are often dissatisfied with their civilian counterparts’ work effort and performance. Interviewees note that many civilian employees enjoy ‘flex time’ whereby the employee arrives at the workplace earlier than mandated every morning, but in return is granted a day off every other week. From the CF members’ perspective, it seems that civilian worker hours and work schedules are sacrosanct, while any additional work, late hours or additional responsibilities are heaped upon military personnel – a significant dissatisfier.\textsuperscript{367} This situation aligns with survey results identifying fairness and civilianization of the CF as dissatisfiers. CF members who may already be dissatisfied, who feel disconnected from the organization, who do not feel challenged or appreciated and are not happy with their work-life balance are experiencing a confluence of dissatisfiers all compounding each other’s effects.

CF civilianization has, in recent years, extended into overseas deployments. Deployed civilian contractors can cause “the clashing of two ‘cultures,’” the effects of which are felt in military morale and motivation.\textsuperscript{368} Operational civilianization can also

\textsuperscript{367} Interview, Major, Army Logistics, February 8, 2011 and Major, Infantry, February 8, 2011. One must remember that civilian Public Servants are not subject to the family disruption caused by CF postings, cannot be ordered to deploy overseas or within Canada and are not part of a strict hierarchy as CF personnel are. Public Servants can refuse a posting; CF personnel cannot. Many CF personnel employed in mixed civilian/military employments view these postings as a necessary evil between operational employment, whether flying, at sea, or in the field, so are, from the outset, less motivated by them as they are generally not what CF members ‘join to do.’

\textsuperscript{368} Christopher Spearin, "Not a 'Real State'?: Defence Privatization in Canada," \textit{International Journal} 60, no. 4 (Autumn, 2005), 1093, \url{http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=971836891&Fmt=7&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD}. 
hurt CF retention, as “contractors…can make anywhere from two to ten times what they make in the regular military.” A US Army officer summarizes the effect of battlespace civilianization on military personnel who may already be dissatisfied:

Though money was not an issue, if I'm dissatisfied with being a staff rat anyway, I am certainly going to be more inclined to go defend my country as a mercenary (sorry, "contractor" is the buzzword now, right?) for a LOT more money.

Civilianization and ‘over-contracting’ blurs the line between military and civilian and reduces the CF’s uniqueness and institutional identity. If the institution is no longer unique, if civilians perform the same functions as soldiers, but are paid considerably more, what non-monetary factors will distinguish CF service strongly enough from civilian service-for-hire to keep personnel in the CF?

Summary

Internal factors influence attrition and hamper retention. No one single overriding factor drives the release decision; different factors work together to influence a release. Given research shortcomings identified above, CF leader input is critical to understand the interplay between Institutional Honesty, Quality of Employment, Institutional


370 Small Wars Journal message board comment in response to Hsia, Today’s Junior Army Officers

371 Smith, The Military Profession in Australia: Crossroads and Cross-Purposes?, 184-215 identifies this challenge in an Australian context. The CF is no different in this instance and faces many of the same challenges.

372 Interview, Lieutenant-General W. Semianiw, Commander, Canada Command also identifies that the decision to release is ‘made in a nanosecond’ when the CF member actually signs his final release paperwork. Prior to that, there is always the chance that the CF could do something to change the individual’s mind and reverse the release decision.
Connection and attrition. These factors are all interrelated and affect each other – a lack of Institutional Connection may lower a CF member’s Quality of Employment. QoE shortfalls, coupled with Institutional Honesty dissatisfaction, may influence a release decision. This confluence of factors means, in a practical sense, that “one-size-fits all retention packages are usually unsuccessful in persuading a diverse group of key employees to stay.”

Money, retention bonuses, extra pay or allowances are a factor, but not the only solution. “Organizational commitment and job satisfaction are two of the most important turnover drivers.” The CF can gain better returns and better retention by reducing dissatisfaction and preventing the confluence of these factors from driving CF personnel to release, than by trying to add benefits.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

As far as taking a strategic look at retention, the US Army has learned the hard way that one aspect of being strategic is not assuming that everyone is alike. We still are using an industrial age personnel system that ignores differences.

Future CF research must:

1. Incorporate CF leader input into all future personnel studies. Given the CF’s geographic dispersion and the high tempo of personnel employed in critical leadership and command positions, simply soliciting their written input will provide limited, if any, effective response. A better method would be to have a retention team member conduct interviews with key leaders, transcribe the results and then maintain them centrally. This

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373 Cosack, Sabine, Matthew Guthridge and Emily Lawson, Retaining Key Employees in Times of Change, 3.

374 Allen, Bryant and Vardaman, Retaining Talent: Replacing Misconceptions with Evidence-Based Strategies, 48-64.

375 Personal Email, Dr. Leonard Wong, Professor, Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
effort must be supported by CF commanders and recognized as a strategic necessity for continued CF personnel effectiveness.

2. Identify the “critical mass” of dissatisfying factors that, when combined and compounded, will overarch all the benefits of CF service and encourage a CF member to release. This may be impossible on a broad scale as different personnel weight dissatisfiers differently, but a potential avenue of approach would be to further define factors “by age and by [career] stage.” In so doing, the CF could gain a clearer understanding of different factors’ importance as CF members develop and change and potentially adjust retention efforts accordingly.

3. Identify the correlation between Canada’s economy, employment rate and CF retention, to include geographic differences based on local economic circumstances. For example, soldiers serving in Edmonton or Cold Lake have greater civilian employment opportunities, given the proximity of oil companies and Alberta’s economy, than their counterparts in Gagetown, New Brunswick.

4. Develop methodology and metrics to measure Quality of Employment.

5. Examine ways of improving CF Exit and Retention Survey response rates yet still maintaining their scientific rigour and credibility.

6. Identify the correlation between Occupation Transfer attempts and attrition.

7. Examine CFPAS with a view to modifying it to better reflect actual CF requirements. It should include incorporating subordinate input into leader assessments without making the assessment reflective of popularity rather than leader effectiveness.

The CF MPRS incorporates a host of different objectives to enhance retention. However, CF leaders should consider the following as retention methods that will increase Institutional Honesty, increase Quality of Employment and improve Institutional Connection:

1. Continue to implement the CF MPRS and continue to modify it to maintain its relevance. Retention should be a CF cultural and leadership

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376 Interview, Lieutenant-General W. Semianiw, Commander, Canada Command
imperative, not a short-term problem that, once solved, is no longer important. To consider and mitigate the changing personnel environment, the CF should consider its approaches to best use Generation Y’s strengths and enthusiasm to maintain a strong and capable force. The CF must ensure that all personnel:

a. See themselves as connected to, and part of, the organization.

b. Are given opportunities to problem-solve with their colleagues.

c. Connect individual contributions with their own and… [CF] goals.

d. Feel valued, respected, and rewarded for their contributions.

e. Develop social and professional relationships within the organization.

2. Implement Retention NCOs in CF units. These positions could be filled by experienced NCOs who require a break from operational service or employment to round out their experience in preparation for senior appointments. Properly selected, they will have the personnel awareness, leadership experience and credibility to engage with junior CF personnel to enhance retention, identify retention trends and advise unit Commanding Officers on retention issues. This initiative will demonstrate tangible CF commitment and retention mindset, while providing linkages and assessments that can be centralized, analyzed and used for future personnel planning.

3. Examine the use of sabbaticals, LWOP or some variant of it as a retention method, as used by the UK military to provide potentially burned-out service personnel with a much needed break for minimal cost. While fully-paid sabbaticals are not practical, a potential middle ground, perhaps an extended period of leave on partial pay, could be used as a reward or retention method for deserving CF personnel.

4. Implement updated CFPAS criteria, to include different assessment criteria for CF personnel by rank and employment. One potential way ahead could be different assessment criteria for command/leadership and staff positions to reflect differing challenges, requirements and focus.

5. Use OT as a retention tool. Viewing OT as a CF gain, not a trade-specific loss and offering OT as an incentive for soldiers to commit to further terms of CF service at the completion of their contracts will

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377 Raines and Arnsparger, *Millenials at Work*
reduce OT-related dissatisfaction and attrition. OT must also be made administratively easier.

6. Examine CF Honours and Recognition with a view to properly recognizing the efforts of key, but often unsung, CF personnel, both enlisted and officer.

7. Modify CF drug control policy to reflect the perceived and stated “zero tolerance.” This should include granting COs more authority to take swift and decisive career action against drug users and other poorly-performing soldiers. COs or Superior Commanders, rather than analysts in Ottawa, should have authority to determine and order career action against poor performers and drug users, to include determining release. This will not only demonstrate CF organizational trust and faith in the chain of command and its commanders, but provide the chain of command the quick and appropriate authority and ability to enforce CF policy.

8. Modify Sr NCO pay to better reflect the institutional demands on and expectations the CF has of its Sr NCOs. This will make pay more equitable, but also recognize, in a tangible way, the worth and value of the Sr NCO to the CF as an institution.

Rather than looking to add benefits or motivators to the CF personnel retention environment, CF leaders must look at making existing processes, policies and procedures better to reduce dissatisfaction. The issue is not that the CF needs to give personnel more pay, benefits or amenities. Rather, it must do less of the things that, when combined and compounded, frustrate, dissatisfy and dishearten its personnel.

Today’s CF is institutionally competent, confident and capable. Well-educated, experienced and credible, it has, despite its small size, exceptional professionalism and capability. Retaining this force, capturing and perpetuating the best of its knowledge, skills and abilities, will be a challenge, particularly in the face of future fiscal restraints. The future force will need every bit of today’s skill; the future security environment will be chaotic, complicated, technologically accelerated, uncertain and lethal. As recent
history shows, revolution, conflict, regime change and instability can happen very quickly; their effects, fuelled by digital communications, can easily spill over to affect states and non-state actors across the globe.

The future personnel environment will be challenging. The CF relies on institutional knowledge and human capital development, developing its leaders from within. Military service’s inherent challenges, responsibilities and liabilities preclude lateral entry from competing industry. Unfortunately, the future personnel environment is dominated by an upcoming working generation focused on short term employment and gathering experience, not dedicating to a long-term, single-service career. This philosophy is diametrically opposed to the requirement to build leaders and critical staff skills from within. In such an environment, personnel retention and motivation will grow in importance; “even when voluntary turnover rates drop because of unfavourable labor markets, it would be shortsighted to ignore retention management.”

Attrition carries significant costs, both financially and in terms of experience and effectiveness. It is far easier and more cost-effective to recoup the investment in recruiting and training by retaining existing personnel than relying on recruiting to build and, when needed, expand the force. Given that high performers are often prone to boredom, dissatisfaction and attrition, retention activities must be continuous, even in times of manning stasis or reduction. As economic situations change, the CF may once again find itself haemorrhaging personnel and the breadth of knowledge and experience

378 Allen, Bryant and Vardaman, Retaining Talent: Replacing Misconceptions with Evidence-Based Strategies, 48-64.
they hold. The CF MPRS offers a comprehensive framework and achievable objectives to make CF retention a success.

CF personnel attrition and retention research is comprehensive and ongoing, yet does not take advantage of a critical source of information, analysis and knowledge – its own leaders. Science and academic rigour are the cornerstones of the CF’s knowledge base; balancing scientific methodology with the personnel knowledge, identification of trends and ability to bring context and assessment that the CF’s leaders have will create a winning, strategically relevant and realistic body of personnel knowledge.

No one single factor causes CF attrition, nor can attrition be mitigated through financial means alone. Retention bonuses are a tool that has limited effectiveness, particularly since the heart of retention challenges are dissatisfiers internal to the CF. Adding benefits will not resolve the dissatisfaction they bring, but removing and resolving dissatisfying factors, modifying policies to reduce personnel and administrative friction will. CF leaders need to consider Quality of Employment, not only Quality of Life. They must consider and work towards sustaining Institutional Honesty in policy application, not just policy creation. Finally, they must work to maintain and demonstrate Institutional Connection between national leadership and the very personnel that do their bidding, without fail, in dangerous and uncertain places.

Retention and its related activities must remain in the CF leadership psyche and be an ongoing, constant, evolutionary process. Even though the CF is not presently in a retention crisis, inculcating retention as a critical CF personnel factor, will work to prevent retention crises from recurring in future. Retention will always be critical to a healthy force.
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