MOVING BEYOND AD HOC: GOVERNMENT OF CANADA DEPLOYMENT CAPABILITY GENERATION FOR COMPLEX OPERATIONS

Major Wayne K. Niven
MOVING BEYOND AD HOC: GOVERNMENT OF CANADA DEPLOYMENT CAPABILITY GENERATION FOR COMPLEX OPERATIONS

By Major Wayne K. Niven

This paper was written by a student attending the Canadian Forces College in fulfilment of one of the requirements of the Course of Studies. The paper is a scholastic document, and thus contains facts and opinions, which the author alone considered appropriate and correct for the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of any agency, including the Government of Canada and the Canadian Department of National Defence. This paper may not be released, quoted or copied, except with the express permission of the Canadian Department of National Defence.

La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale.
ABSTRACT

This paper examines the methods currently employed by the various branches of the Government of Canada in the context of Whole of Government operations in fragile states. It individually explores how the Canadian Forces, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canadian International Development Agency, Correctional Service of Canada and Royal Canadian Mounted Police, recruits, selects, trains and prepares its personnel for overseas missions in hazardous environments. This work goes on to explore how similar processes are conducted by Canada’s principal allies of the United Kingdom, United States and Australia. This study then asserts that in order to improve the coherence, coordination and complementarity of its approaches to fragile states, the Government of Canada must establish a Whole of Government Stabilization Centre of Excellence with an integral training and civilian deployment organization.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to acknowledge the outstanding support and advice that I received throughout this academic endeavour from my thesis advisor, Dr. Megan M. Thompson of Defence Research and Development Canada - Toronto. Her work and knowledge in the field of the Comprehensive Approach was crucial to my research and assisted in the development of my understanding of the topics discussed herein.

I would be remiss if I failed to acknowledge the love, support and patience of my wife Bonny, as well as my two daughters, Emiko and Mischa, throughout my year in Toronto. Their understanding and sacrifice were critical to my completion of this project, for which I am eternally grateful.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**INTRODUCTION** - Complex Contemporary Problems  
Fragile States  
Comprehensive Approach  
Canada’s Comprehensive Approach (CA) to Fragile States  
Challenges of Comprehensive Approaches to Fragile States  
Force Generation  
Canada’s Comprehensive Approach Challenges  
Hypothesis  
Outline  
Research Sources  

## CHAPTER 1 – CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS  
**Section 1 – Roots of the Whole of Government (WoG) Approach**  
CA and Contemporary Security Issues  
**Section 2 – Comprehensive Approach Strategy**  
Country or Region Specific CA Strategies  
A Proposed Framework for a GoC CA to a Fragile State  
**Section 3 – The CoE Construct**  
CoE Defined  
Mission Integration as a Template for a Stabilization CoE  
**Section 4 – Organizational Culture and Socialization**  
The Role of Trust in Organizational Socialization  

## CHAPTER 2 – CANADIAN FORCES FORCE GENERATION  
**Section 1 – CF Culture and Force Generation**  
**Section 2 – CF Force Generation**  
CF Force Generators  
**Section 3 – LFC Force Generation**  

## CHAPTER 3 – DEPLOYMENT CAPABILITY GENERATION IN OTHER GOVERNMENTAL DEPARTMENTS/AGENCIES  
**Section 1 – DFAIT**  
**Section 2 – CIDA**  
**Section 3 – CSC**  
**Section 4 – RCMP and CIVPOL**  
Summary  

## CHAPTER 4 – CURRENT CANADIAN WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT DEPLOYMENT CAPABILITY GENERATION  
**Section 1 – Existing WoG DCG Education and Training Activities**  
Departmental Individual Education and Training  
Current CF WoG DCG Training Activities  
Existing OGDA WoG DCG Activities  
Summary
### CHAPTER 5 - ALLIED WOG DEPLOYMENT CAPABILITY GENERATION FOR COMPLEX MISSIONS

**Section 1 – The United Kingdom**
- UK WoG Experience in Iraq and Afghanistan 75
- The Stabilisation Unit’s Mission, role and Structure 77
- The Civilian Stabilisation Group 79
- Summary 81

**Section 2 – The United States**
- USG Direction and Legislation to Improve WoG Interaction 82
- US Civilian Response Corps 85
- US DoD, USAID and CIVPOL Civilian Expeditionary Capabilities 88
- Summary 89

**Section 3 – Australia**
- Current Australian Civil Servant Deployment Capability Generation 92
- The Australian Civilian Corps 94
- Summary 96
- **Summary** 96

### CHAPTER 6 – RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

**Section 1 – Recommendations**
- CoE Governance and Establishment 98
- CoE Roles and Mandate 99
- WoG Strategy Development 100
- CoE Training and Lessons Learned 101
- Civilian DCG 104
- CoE Funding 105
- Personnel Management 105
- **Conclusion** 106
- **Areas for Further Research** 107

**BIBLIOGRAPHY** 108
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

Figure 1.1 Whole of Government Framework
Figure 1.2 Booz Allen Hamilton Mission Integration Framework
Table 2-1 Land Forces Command Levels of Training
Figure 3.1 Current DFAIT Organization Chart
Figure 3.2 START Organization Chart
Figure 3.3 Canadian International Development Agency Organization Chart
Figure 3.4 Correctional Service of Canada Organization Chart
Table 3-1 International Police Operations Board Deployment Capability Generation Schedule
**LIST OF ACRONYMS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3C</td>
<td>Coherent, Coordinated and Complementary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3D</td>
<td>Diplomacy, Defence and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABCA</td>
<td>Alliance of Australia, Britain, Canada and America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>Australian Civilian Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADF</td>
<td>Australian Defense Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>Australian Federal Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIRCOM</td>
<td>Canadian Air Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APTF</td>
<td>Afghanistan/Pakistan Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AusAID</td>
<td>Australian Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAH</td>
<td>Booz Allen Hamilton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAB</td>
<td>Corporate Assignment Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CANADACOM</td>
<td>Canada Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAX</td>
<td>Computer Assisted Exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Canadian Defence Academy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDS</td>
<td>Chief of Defence Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEFCOM</td>
<td>Canadian Expeditionary Force Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CF</td>
<td>Canadian Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CF IMRS</td>
<td>Canadian Forces Integrated Managed Readiness System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFLI</td>
<td>Canadian Forces Leadership Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIVPOL</td>
<td>Civilian Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMTC</td>
<td>Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoE</td>
<td>Centre of Excellence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Canadian Policing Arrangement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRC</td>
<td>Civilian Response Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>Canadian Forces/Department of National Defence Chief of Review Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSC</td>
<td>Correctional Service of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSG</td>
<td>Civilian Stabilisation Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSSC</td>
<td>Civil Service Stabilisation Cadre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSSP</td>
<td>Canadian Security Studies Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>OECD Development Assistance Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DART</td>
<td>Disaster Assistance Response Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCE</td>
<td>Deployable Civilian Expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCG</td>
<td>Deployment Capability Generation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFAIT</td>
<td>Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFAT</td>
<td>Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DfID</td>
<td>United Kingdom Department for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DL</td>
<td>Distance Learning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DND</td>
<td>Canadian Department of National Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoS</td>
<td>United States Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRDC</td>
<td>Defence Research and Development Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EBO</td>
<td>Effects Based Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCO</td>
<td>United Kingdom Foreign Commonwealth Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FG</td>
<td>Force Generation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPSU</td>
<td>Australian Fragile States and Peacebuilding Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSD</td>
<td>Foreign Service Directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSG</td>
<td>OECD DAC Fragile States Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoC</td>
<td>Government of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPSF</td>
<td>Global Peace and Security Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEAT</td>
<td>Hostile Environment Awareness Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HET</td>
<td>Hazardous Environment Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOM</td>
<td>Head of Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR</td>
<td>Human Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDG</td>
<td>Australian Federal Police International Deployments Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>International Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPOB</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Mounted Police International Police Operations Branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRD</td>
<td>Correctional Service of Canada International Relations Directorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCSP</td>
<td>Joint Command and Staff Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSOP</td>
<td>Joint Staff Operations Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUG</td>
<td>Joined-Up Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPRT</td>
<td>Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LF MRS</td>
<td>Canadian Land Forces Managed Readiness System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LFA</td>
<td>Canadian Land Forces Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LFC</td>
<td>Canadian Land Forces Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LFDTS</td>
<td>Canadian Land Forces Doctrine and Training System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARCOM</td>
<td>Canadian Maritime Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILPERSCOM</td>
<td>Canadian Military Personnel Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoD</td>
<td>United Kingdom Ministry of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRP</td>
<td>Canadian Land Forces Command Managed Readiness Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPM</td>
<td>New Public Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSP</td>
<td>National Security Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSPD</td>
<td>National Security Presidential Directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSPDPP</td>
<td>National Security Professional Development Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OGDA</td>
<td>Other Government Departments and Agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMLT</td>
<td>Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPRED</td>
<td>Operationally Ready</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORG</td>
<td>Australian Federal Police Operational Response Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCO</td>
<td>Privy Council Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCT</td>
<td>Planning and Countries Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Public Safety Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSTC</td>
<td>Canadian Peace Support Training Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAMSI</td>
<td>Regional Assistance Mission - Solomon Islands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC(S)</td>
<td>ISAF Regional Command (South)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCMP</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Mounted Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RoCK</td>
<td>Representative of Canada in Kandahar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/CRS</td>
<td>United States Department of State, Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Subject Matter Expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>START</td>
<td>Canadian Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SU</td>
<td>United Kingdom Stabilisation Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TE3</td>
<td>Training, Education, Exercises and Experimentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMST</td>
<td>Theatre Mission Specific Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKG</td>
<td>United Kingdom Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAR</td>
<td>Urban Search and Rescue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WES</td>
<td>Weapons Effect Simulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WGA</td>
<td>Whole of Government Approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WoG</td>
<td>Whole of Government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

Complex Contemporary Problems

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 highlighted the potential threat that fragile states posed to international peace and security. The immediate intelligence analysis following the events in New York, Washington D.C. and in the skies above Pennsylvania quickly identified that the perpetrators, planners and supporters of the attack had been welcomed, fostered and nurtured by the reigning warlords of Afghanistan. ¹ From this war-torn and destitute state, at the crossroads of ancient trade routes and battleground of great empires across the ages, emanated the most spectacular attack ever witnessed within the continental United States.

The response of the United States and her allies was swift and stunning, rapidly driving those responsible from their camps and safe havens, effectively disrupting their capability to mount further attacks, at least temporarily. ² However once the dust had cleared, it soon became apparent that the roots of the situation that allowed the terrorists to take root in Afghanistan were extremely complex. Since the end of the Soviet occupation in 1989, a lack of world attention allowed the Taliban to rise to power in 1994. ³ Their installment of a cruel form of Islamic Sharia law based upon adherence to the code of Pashtunwali and subsequent alliance with Osama Bin Laden, Al’Qaida, and others did nothing to improve the lot of the Afghan people, turning their country into a

¹ Canada, Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services, 2008), 10


haven for extremist groups and terrorists.\textsuperscript{4} Invasion, drought, civil war, mass migrations, drug trafficking, a brutal regime and embedded terrorists all combined to create the threat to international peace and security that manifested itself on 9/11.\textsuperscript{5}

Furthermore, it was also evident that the situation within Afghanistan was far from unique. Other states like Iraq, Sudan, Somalia, Yemen and others were similarly suffering from oppressive regimes, civil war, subjugated minorities, becoming ready havens for extremists. The fragility of these states contributed to their potential to become fertile grounds from which the threats of transnational terrorism, organized crime, pandemic disease and violent conflict could potentially spread.\textsuperscript{6}

**Fragile States**

While there is no universally accepted definition of a fragile state, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has identified the features as, “a state’s inability or unwillingness to provide physical security, legitimate political institutions, sound economic management and social services for the benefit of its population.”\textsuperscript{7} Furthermore, these states are often described as failed, failing, collapsed, at risk, or precarious, all of which add to the potential confusion with respect to terminology and classification of these issues. However, there does appear to be consensus in the eyes of most of the developed world that the challenge of fragile states currently represents the greatest threat to global collective security.\textsuperscript{8} What is also

\textsuperscript{4} *Ibid.*

\textsuperscript{5} *Ibid.*, xiv.


overwhelmingly clear is that the dangers posed by these fragile states have an undeniable human and financial cost. It has been estimated that approximately one billion people are currently affected by fragility and conflict, and the annual cost to the international system is at least $270 billion USD.  

The Comprehensive Approach (CA) to Operations

Through experience forged in the crucible of the post-conflict peace-building and state-building operations in the Balkans, western states have come to realize that the complexity of the challenges facing these fragile states have exposed the limitations of traditional diplomatic and military interventions. Expeditionary campaigns in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo in the 1990s identified that predominantly military forces possess insufficient means to address the challenges presented in a post-conflict, state-building situation. Moreover, development actors were forced to face the cold reality that their aid and assistance programmes were either undeliverable or ineffective when the basic needs of security and effective governance were absent.

In response, many like-minded states have begun to experiment with and implement multidimensional mechanisms and policies in order to promote synchronized and coherent interventions into fragile states. These efforts have largely focussed on creating the ways and means of harmonizing the efforts of a state’s various governmental

---

8 Patrick and Brown, Greater Than The Sum Of Its Parts?... 2.


10 OECD, Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States... 17.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.
actors in order to respond to the challenges posed by fragile states.\textsuperscript{13} Collectively, these endeavours have become known by a number of terms including whole of government (WoG) approaches; comprehensive approaches (CA), interagency approaches, joined-up government approaches and horizontal management.\textsuperscript{14} Throughout this paper, WoG, CA and interagency will be employed depending upon the context; WoG for single country engagements, CA for more than one country, and interagency when referring to agency-agency interaction within the same country.

Led largely by members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), much recent academic effort has been expended examining the best methods that states can utilize in order to maximize both the effectiveness and efficiency of these CA interventions into fragile states. In 2005, the OECD Development Assistance Committee’s (DAC) Fragile States Group (FSG) drafted a set of \textit{Principles and Guidelines for Good International Engagement in Fragile States}. The principles were field-tested in 2006-2007 in nine fragile states by OECD member countries and have become widely recognized as a valuable tool upon which CA interventions in fragile states should be conducted.\textsuperscript{15} Subsequently endorsed by OECD DAC in 2007, these principles identify that successful engagement in fragile states is largely dependant

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Ibid}, 18.
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{14} The OECD defines a whole of government approach as “one where a government actively uses formal and/or informal networks across the different agencies within that government to coordinate the design and implementation of the range of interventions that the government’s agencies will be making in order to increase the effectiveness of those interventions in achieving the desired objectives.”
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{15} OECD, “Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States,” \url{http://www.oecd.org/document/46/0,3343,en_2649_33693550_35233262_1_1_1_1,00.html}; Internet; accessed 5 March, 2011.
\end{flushright}
upon a synchronized and coherent program of assistance coordinated between the political, economic, security and administrative spheres.16

In an effort to address the recommendations identified by the OECD DAC, many major western states have created organisations to improve their respective WoG approaches. As a joint agency between the Ministry of Defence (MoD), Department for International Development (DfID) and the Foreign Commonwealth Office (FCO), the United Kingdom has established the Stabilisation Unit.17 The United States has stood-up the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) within the Department of State (DoS) and Australia has created a Fragile States and Peacebuilding Unit (FSPU) within the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID).18

Canada’s Comprehensive Approach to Fragile States

It is clear that as a G8 nation, with a long history of leadership and participation within the international system that Canada, along with its friends and allies, has a vested security and financial interest in responding to the challenges presented by fragile states. Since the end of the Cold War, Canada’s intervention into fragile states has been largely focussed on the Former Yugoslavia, Haiti, Afghanistan and Sub-Saharan Africa. However, the Canadian intervention in Afghanistan represents the largest financial and material commitment of international aid, diplomatic and military assistance to a single country since the Korean War. Estimates indicate that the cumulative GoC expenditures, including military, for the fiscal years 2001-2002 to 2010-2011 could reach $18.1 billion

16 OECD, Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States... 7.

17 Willemijn Keizer, Review of Existing Studies & Evaluations of Whole of Government Integration and Operations, Consultant’s Report for Lessons Learned Division Directorate of Learning and Innovation Canadian Defence Academy (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy, 2009), 26.

Based on the financial commitment alone, the GoC has a considerable interest in ensuring that its resources are being applied in a manner that is coherent, coordinated and complementary to those of its partner states, international organisations (IOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). It was also with this in mind that in 2005, the GoC implemented a CA to its Afghan engagement strategy.

In a manner similar to that of many of her allies, the Canadian WoG approach has been spearheaded by the Stabilisation and Reconstruction Task Force (START) within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT).† Established in September 2005, START’s mandate is to “to help answer the growing international demand for Canadian support and involvement in complex crises – conflict or natural disaster related – and to coordinate whole-of-government policy and program engagements in fragile states”, by providing leadership on the issue of engagement in fragile states, improving interagency coordination and agility, and by providing effective integrated programming with respect to complex crises.‡

The Canadian WoG approach has been further instantiated through the deployment of an interagency team within the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (KPRT). The KPRT consisted of members of the Canadian Forces (CF), DFAIT, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) with other municipal police partners, Corrections Services Canada (CSC), as well as representatives from the US DoS, United States Agency for


‡ Willemijn Keizer, Review of Existing Studies & Evaluations of Whole of Government Integration and Operations... 41.

International Development (USAID), a US Police Mentoring Team and civilian police (CIVPOL).  

**Challenges of Comprehensive Approaches to Fragile States**

The distribution and acceptance of the OECD’s principles have begun to address some of the shortfalls surrounding the coherence, coordination, and complementarity (3C) of the approaches employed by the various actors within individual state governments. However, recent experience has identified a number of common challenges faced by state governments in the implementation of CAs to fragile states. These challenges can be grouped into five broad issues: first, the various government departments and agencies must have a common mechanism for shared assessment and early warning, in order to determine which fragile states to intervene in and when intervention is necessary. Second, they must have a shared understanding of the issues facing the fragile state, especially the perceived sources of fragility. Third, government actors must employ a unified strategy identifying how they will intervene, including common short and long term goals of intervention. Fourth, they must have access to common funding, with shared priorities in order to ensure that support flows to those priority areas. Finally, in order to implement a CA that is consistent with the 3Cs, intervening state governments must institute an integrated decision-making body that is empowered to implement that government’s strategy and ensure that member departments and agencies are held accountable to operationalizing their portions of that strategy without undermining the efforts of others.  

---


23 Stewart Prest, John Gazo and David Carment, “Working out Strategies for Strengthening Fragile States – the British, American and German Experience,” *Conference on Canada’s Policy towards*
In an effort to address these challenges, the OECD, the United Nations (UN), the World Bank and NATO have collectively developed a “3C Roadmap for Improving Results in Conflict and Fragile Situations.”\textsuperscript{24} This roadmap identifies the requirement for a CA to improve the effectiveness of support to states experiencing conflict and/or fragility. This roadmap includes six principles:

- Strengthen national ownership and national capacities;
- Respond in a timely and appropriate manner to the evolving situation in the partner (fragile) country;
- Strengthen mutual accountability of partner countries and international actors;
- Reduce the burden of aid management on partner country capacity;
- Make efficient use of limited resources and avoid duplication and funding gaps; and
- Improve and deepen joint learning and increase response capacities.\textsuperscript{25}

Within the sixth principle, it was recommended that international actors:

Promote more systematic joint learning, training and capacity development activities across agencies within donor governments, as well as among the various international organizations operating in conflict and fragile situations; in this context, the insights gained and best practices identified by relevant international, regional and sub-regional organizations and bodies should be promoted and disseminated; moreover, the expertise of the international, national and local civil society should be fully mobilized.\textsuperscript{26}

This principle clearly recommends that donor governments improve the processes by which they educate, train, prepare and coordinate their respective elements of national power to work in fragile state situations. Moreover, it calls for the full mobilization of all


\textsuperscript{25} Adapted from: 3C Conference 2009, “3C Roadmap,” \texttt{http://www.3c-conference2009.ch/}; Internet; accessed 7 April 2011. \textit{Emphasis added.}

\textsuperscript{26} 3C Conference 2009, “3C Roadmap,”…
elements of civil society to address these challenges. In military parlance, this mobilization to conduct a task is known as force generation (FG).

**Force Generation**

The Canadian Forces (CF) define FG as “the process of organizing, training, and equipping forces for employment.” Importantly, FG also provides the vehicle through which the institution of the CF indoctrinates each member with a sense of their responsibilities to gain a level of expertise in their given domain, conduct their duties in a manner acceptable to both the CF and Canadian society and by extension, foster a sense of proud identity to which they can relate and support. This process develops a hybrid identity within CF members by introducing acceptable military norms and while maintaining and enhancing the connection to Canadian society.

Applied to a CA environment, the role that FG plays could is analogous to organizational socialization. In a general sense, organizational socialization is “the process by which an individual acquires the social knowledge and skills necessary to assume an organizational role.” Reflecting the fundamental premise that a WoG team reflects the input of all partners and that the process of education, training and socialization as part of a hybrid team of specialists within a truly WoG construct, the term deployment capability generation (DCG) will be employed.

**Canada’s Comprehensive Approach Challenges**

In the implementation of its CA to fragile states, Canada has faced a number of organizational and institutional challenges to the effectiveness of this endeavour. Patrick  

---

27 Canada, Department of National Defence, *Canadian Forces Joint Publication 01 – Canadian Military Doctrine* (Ottawa: Canadian Forces Experimentation Centre, 2009), 5-9.

and Brown have suggested that the challenges which START has encountered has significantly impacted real progress in the creation of a unified strategy to address situations of state fragility. For instance, START’s broad mandate and placement within DFAIT may contribute to difficulties with respect to fostering interdepartmental consensus and sourcing interagency staff have restricted its success.\(^{29}\) This has been attributed to a lack of incentives for not only secondments to populate START’s interagency staff requirements, but also fear, primarily in CIDA, that START’s use of its $142 million per year Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF) will undermine CIDA’s development funding.\(^{30}\) While START does have a mandate to deploy Canadians to respond to humanitarian crisis and post-conflict measures, its response to the 2010 deployment of a Canadian CA mission to earthquake-ravaged Haiti highlighted a number of continuing shortfalls. According to at least one DFAIT official at a recent WoG conference these shortfalls include the absence of: a unified approach, a clear definition of WoG partner roles, as well as adequate CA mission preparation.\(^{31}\)

Similar shortfalls were also been identified in the KPRT, where in 2008, the Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan characterized the first of these issues as follows:

> The Canadian-led PRT in Kandahar also displays signs of the fragmentation and uncoordinated effort that prevail throughout the programming of international development aid in Afghanistan. Effectiveness would be enhanced by aligning national and departmental priorities and operations more closely – and more collaboratively.\(^{32}\)

\(^{29}\) Patrick and Brown, *Greater Than The Sum Of Its Parts?*, 68.

\(^{30}\) *Ibid.*

\(^{31}\) Confidential testimonial provided by DFAIT official at the Privy Council Office of Canada conference, “Focus on Afghanistan 2”, held in Ottawa, ON, 26-27 January, 2011.

With respect to KPRT preparations, a 2007 DND Chief of Review Services (CRS) Report recommended that an identified lead organization to define and guide Canadian CA training be established, which would contributed to more effective interagency training and through organizational socialization, produce a more cohesive CA team.\textsuperscript{33}

**Hypothesis**

To date, the GoC has yet to fully implement a comprehensive preparation framework that stresses the 3C approach amongst the personnel of the departments and agencies that it deploys abroad on complex missions. In order to improve the coherence, coordination and complementarity of its engagement in situations of state fragility, the Government of Canada must establish and resource a whole of government approach to stabilization with the creation of a WoG Stability Operations Centre-of-Excellence (CoE) framework with an integral civilian deployment capability.

**Outline**

This paper will begin with an examination of the CA, its roots and how it is applied to fragile states and conflict situations. This is followed by a recommended CA strategy structure as well as highlighting current GoC policy that could be tailored to meet that need. The CoE construct is then analysed along with a private sector model that could serve as a framework for an analogous GoC stabilization organization.

Subsequently, CF FG activities are examined with a focus on Land Forces Command (LFC). This will be followed by a similar study of the pre-deployment preparations for members of other government departments and agencies (OGDAs), specifically DFAIT, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA),

Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). A subsequent analysis will identify the existing GoC interagency training initiatives, with a particular focus on the preparation of WoG teams for deployment to Afghanistan. Specific attention will be paid to highlighting best practices as well as points of friction identified during mission preparation.

Focus will then shift to the civilian deployment initiatives of Canada’s principal allies, highlighting the efforts of the United Kingdom, the United States, and Australia, to address the challenges of generating WoG teams capable of operationalising coherent, coordinated and complementary national strategies in fragile states. This analysis will be conducted with a view to identifying best practices that should be considered in any analogous Canadian endeavour.

With current Canadian and allied interagency DCG practices identified, focus shifts to incorporating the feedback from both domestic and international sources in an effort to develop a framework to screen, prepare and train integrated Canadian WoG teams for deployment on GoC approved missions. As noted earlier, the creation and resourcing of a Canadian interagency training, education and preparation CoE structure along with a civilian deployment capability is ultimately recommended as the vehicle through which the GoC can achieve greater coherence, coordination and complementarity in its engagement in complex environments abroad.

Research Sources

My research for this paper draws on various sources, including open scientific literature publications, DND and Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) contractor and technical reports, CF doctrine and training documents, and unstructured discussions with twelve CF and OGDA subject matter experts (SMEs) who have
experience deploying on or selecting and training personnel for WoG missions. These discussions covered the general topics of how their respective organizations prepared their personnel to deploy into fragile states and/or conflict zones. The SME discussions took place between January and March 2011, both in person at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto and via telephone.

In writing this paper I also drew upon my own professional experience in this domain, having deployed twice to Afghanistan. On the first occasion in 2008, I was employed as the Staff Officer to Commander Regional Command (South), a Canadian Major-General who commanded 22,000 NATO and Coalition soldiers across the provinces of Kandahar, Helmand, Uruzgan and Zabul. My second tour in 2009-2010 was as a Rifle Company Commander within the Canadian Battle Group, partnered with an Afghan Army Company, living amongst the population in a former insurgent stronghold. On both occasions I had the opportunity to participate in WoG activities with Canadian and US OGDA personnel as well as work with them in the field while deployed. Throughout these two experiences, I was struck by instances of the apparent lack of common understanding and unity of effort from all WoG partners, including the military, during both training and operations. At their worst I viewed the potential fallout of these events as wasteful and dangerous. It was these experiences that provided the genesis for the requirement for an integrated DCG framework outlined in the remainder of this paper.
CHAPTER 1 – CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS

The aim of this chapter is to establish some basic concepts and theories that will form the foundation for the discussions and recommendations of resultant policies and structures later in this work. This chapter will begin with a brief study of how the comprehensive approach has been applied to the challenge of fragile states. Section 2 will identify the need for a GoC WoG strategy and will examine a British example of such a policy. This forms the basis of a recommended structure and focus for a similar Canadian endeavour. Section 3 will examine the concept of a centre-of-excellence before identifying a private sector framework that has been applied to complex public policy issues. Section 4 will outline the psychological theories of organizational culture and socialization, to provide the basis for later assessment of existing GoC WoG deployment preparations.

SECTION 1 – CA AND CONTEMPORARY SECURITY ISSUES

In an article titled *The Whole of Government Approach to Public Sector Reform*, public administration and organization professors Tom Christensen and Per Laegrid identify that one of the drivers behind the emergence of CA is the perceived insecurity and danger of the modern world. The complexity of the underlying causes associated with terrorism, pandemics, human-made and natural disasters, conflict and international crime have all forced governments to re-evaluate policy design and outcomes to avoid contradictory effects.

---


Applied to the problems described above, a recent Finnish-led international seminar on crisis management describes CA as follows:

Whilst there is no commonly accepted definition for ‘Comprehensive Approach,’ there is broad agreement that it implies pursuing an approach aimed at integrating the political, security, development, rule of law, human rights and humanitarian dimensions of international missions.\(^{36}\)

Over and above duplication of efforts, wasted resources and contradictory initiatives, motivations for pursuing a CA to complex crises and conflicts are two-fold. First, the horizontal integration of knowledge between actors inherent in a CA ideally increases common situational awareness, leading to an increased capacity to plan, and make informed decisions whilst possessing an educated appreciation for second and third order effects of those actions.\(^{37}\) Second, it has become recognized by both civilian and military actors that their efforts to address the challenges of fragile states are interdependant. Without security, development work cannot proceed, and without development, sustained security is not possible.\(^{38}\) In order to foster this relationship, understanding, cooperation, and compromise are key ingredients that all actors must be willing to engage in.

**SECTION 2 - COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH STRATEGY**

In describing what he terms a “grand strategy for a small country,” in 2003, Hugh Segal outlined a vision that:

…integrates military, diplomatic, and foreign aid instruments in a thrust that preserves security and opportunity at home, advances leverage with our allies, and responds in an integrated way to the threats that are real from abroad. … We need integrated and rapidly deployable task groups

---


\(^{38}\) *Ibid.*
made up of combat forces, police and elements of the private sector, backed up … by real and engaged CIDA spending capacity…

What now Senator Segal is describing is a CA strategy that integrates all of the elements of national power (military, information, diplomacy, legal and law enforcement, intelligence, financial, economic) to address the challenges that face us today. While Canada claims to employ a CA or WoG approach to many of its priority fragile state challenges, including Afghanistan, Haiti and the Sudan, it has yet to identify a unifying strategy to underpin its integration efforts. However Canada is far from alone in this regard, as none of her major allies have produced similar strategies. According to the OECD, this lack of a coherent unifying strategy is due to a number of issues, the first of which is that prior to 9/11, the issue of fragile states was primarily discussed in the development and international aid sectors. Secondly, the international community has yet to agree on a common definition for a fragile state. Third, due to political sensitivity, use of this label could adversely impact diplomatic and trade relations with the states in question. Fourth, the problems of individual fragile states are so complex and unique in nature that no one, overarching strategy could meet the needs of every at-risk nation.

**Sub-section 1 – Country or Region Specific CA Strategies**

With respect to this fourth problem, while no country has solved this problem of an overarching strategy that could be identically applied to every fragile state, the OECD has proposed another potential solution, to produce country or region specific strategies that address the unique natures of the situations resident in these fragile states and

---


A good example of such a strategy is the April 2009 *UK Policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan: the way forward*, which outlines a comprehensive strategy for its engagement in Central Asia. This policy document outlines ten strategic objectives along with ten guiding principles for the engagement. The strategic objectives are:

- **In the wider region:**
  - Improving regional stability.

- **In both Afghanistan and Pakistan:**
  - Ensuring Al Qaida does not return to Afghanistan, and is defeated or incapacitated in Pakistan’s border areas;
  - Reducing the insurgencies on both sides of the Afghanistan and Pakistan border to a level that poses no significant threat to the progress in either country;
  - Supporting both states in tackling terrorism and violent extremism, and in building capacity to address and contain the threat within their borders;
  - Helping both states contain and reduce the drugs trade, and divide it from insurgency;
  - Building stronger security forces, better governance, and economic development, so that progress is sustainable.

- **In Pakistan:**
  - Helping Pakistan achieve its vision of becoming a stable, economically and socially developed democracy and meet its poverty reduction targets;
  - Encouraging constructive Pakistani engagement on nuclear security and non-proliferation.

- **In Afghanistan:**
  - Helping Afghanistan become an effective and accountable state, increasingly able to handle its security and deliver basic services to its people;
  - Providing long-term sustainable support for the Afghan National Development Strategy, particularly on governance, rule of law, human rights and poverty reduction.\(^{44}\)

The guiding principles for engagement in the region are as follows:

- **An international approach:** living up to our international obligations, working closely with the international community to leverage the UK’s resources and ensure proper burden sharing;

\(^{43}\) *Ibid.*

• A regional approach: promoting peaceful relations between all countries in the region, focussed on countering the threat of violent extremism;
• A joint civilian-military approach: recognising that military force alone will not solve the region’s problems;
• A better coordinated approach: within each country; across the two countries, especially on the border areas; and across the different lines of activity, from counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency and counter-narcotics, to governance and development;
• A long-term approach focused on developing capacity in both countries, including moving to a transition process for Afghan security forces to take over responsibility in Afghanistan, with international forces moving to a training and support role;
• A political approach encouraging reconciliation in both countries so that militants renounce violence in favour of legitimate political processes;
• An approach that combines respect for sovereignty and local values with respect for international standards of democracy, legitimate and accountable government, and human rights;
• A hard-headed approach: setting clear and realistic objectives with clear metrics of success.45

This document goes on to establish in considerable detail the strategy by which the UK is currently, or intends to achieve each of the strategic objectives, while keeping the guiding principles at the forefront of its engagement. The policy then serves to inform the departments and agencies that Afghanistan and Pakistan are UK Government priorities, on what the UK government objectives in Afghanistan and Pakistan are, and are intended to achieve, as well as basic guidance outlining how they are to achieve it. The UK Policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan: the way forward, clearly lays out the ends, ways and means that the UK Government intends to conduct throughout its engagement in this critical region.

Sub-section 2 – A Proposed Framework for a GoC CA to a Fragile State

Using the British example provided in the previous sub-section as a template, in order to clearly identify the GoC international policy goals in a given state or region, a formal strategy should then contain the following components:

- Identify why this particular state or region is a policy priority for Canada;
- Outline the contextual background to Canadian involvement as well as the current situation;
- Clearly identify the Canadian strategic objectives;
- Define the guiding principles of the engagement;
- Highlight the current and planned initiatives to achieve the strategic objectives as well as identifying principal departments or agencies responsible for each objective or initiative;
- Define metrics to measure and communicate progress throughout the engagement.  

In May 2009, the GoC identified 20 countries of focus within five regions in its Aid Effectiveness Agenda. Within this document and the supporting government announcement, the GoC outlined five priority themes to guide its official development assistance (ODA) programming. These include: stimulating sustainable economic growth, securing the future for children and youth, increasing food security, advancing democracy, and promoting security, stability and sustainability. Having announced these priority themes as well as the countries and regions where the GoC intends to focus its ODA, the foundations for a series of strategic engagement policies exists. What is required is an organization to assist the government in developing these strategic policies as well as translating them into effective, coordinated, coherent, complementary and comprehensive results on the ground. I will make the case that a “centre-of-excellence” (CoE) represents an ideal organizational framework by which to accomplish this goal.

46 Adapted from UK Policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan: the way forward.

SECTION 3 – THE CoE CONSTRUCT

This section will begin with a generic description of a CoE, identifying roles and structures taken from the business world. This description will lay the foundation for later analysis recommending for the establishment of a stabilization CoE.

Sub-section 1 – CoE Defined

The US Army Training and Doctrine Command defines a CoE as:

…a premier organization that creates the highest standards of achievement in an assigned sphere of expertise by generating synergy through effective and efficient combination and integration of functions while reinforcing unique requirements and capabilities.48

Outside of a military context, the organizational structure literature identifies that a CoE’s primary role is to “leverage or make available its distinctive knowledge base throughout the firm.”49 According to business professors Karl Moore and Julian Birkinshaw, CoE’s generally share three common themes: that they are only established in areas that executive management believed were of strategic importance to the organization, that the heart of each CoE is the leading-edge knowledge possessed by a small cadre of individuals responsible to maintain the currency of the knowledge set, and that CoEs have a dual/implicit role to leverage and/or disseminate their leading edge knowledge, while at the same time ensuring that the knowledge remains state-of-the-art.50 Furthermore, Moore and Birkinshaw indicate that CoEs have two key characteristics: recognition across the organization that its role is of strategic importance and the


50 Ibid, 84.
resources to gain access to the appropriate staff and support mechanisms required to meet their aim.\textsuperscript{51}

Indicative of the strategic importance of the WoG approach, the GoC has implemented a WoG framework to facilitate the alignment of its programme activities with desired strategic objectives in four spending areas: Economic, Social, International and Governmental Affairs.\textsuperscript{52} This framework, pictured below, identifies 16 outcome areas, which forms the basis of how progress is then reported to Parliament.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Figure1.1.png}
\caption{GoC WoG Framework (www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/ppg-cpr/frame-cadre-eng.aspx)}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid, 88.

Sub-section 2 – Mission Integration as a Template for a Stabilization CoE

While many businesses and organizations have established CoEs in their various domains (information technology, accountability, productivity, banking), the applicability of many of the underlying models of many of these CoEs to the challenge of integrating the elements of national power into a unified, comprehensive approach to a fragile state or region appears limited as they are largely focussed on improving internal private industry performance. One model does however appear promising. Strategy and technology consulting firm Booz Allen Hamilton (BAH), has developed an organizational and operating framework that it employs to assist client governments develop WoG approaches to complex contemporary issues.

Specifically, BAH has targeted government initiatives aiming to approach a particular challenge with a WoG approach. They have coined what they refer to as “the guiding principle of Mission Integration” which assist governments to “adopt a WoG strategy that integrates and combines capabilities across government and civil society to address 21st-century challenges.”53

The BAH model pictured above outlines five organizational features which the firm views as key to achieving mission integration: Policy, Strategy and Planning, Management and Budgeting, People and Culture, Information Technology, and Operations. The model also allows for the integration of resources and input from what BAH terms “megacommunities.” Analogous to a CA CoE, BAH defines megacommunities as a “public sphere in which organizations – public, private, and civil – join together to address a compelling issue of mutual importance, such as climate change, economic development, conservation or energy policy.”  

In conjunction with government clients, BAH has employed this conceptual framework to tackle public policy challenges which include: developing a holistic approach to healthcare for wounded US veterans with the Department of Defense and Department of Veterans Affairs, create an information sharing environment within the US Department of Homeland Security, assisting the US intelligence community develop

---

an information sharing framework, development of a strategy for countering improvised explosive devices, sponsored a forum which brought together leadership from the megacommunity to discuss all hazard mass casualty preparedness and response, among other initiatives.\(^{55}\)

In order to address these challenges through mission integration, BAH assists clients to identify stakeholders and subsequently create a megacommunity which provides a venue for all to share information and facilitate common understanding of the challenge from the perspective of each stakeholder. Armed with this greater appreciation of the problem, megacommunities are better placed to make informed decisions on potential solutions. BAH then enables development and operationalization of these solutions through the provision of information technology, strategic communications advice, economic and business analysis, modeling, simulation, and wargaming.

The BAH Mission Integration framework appears to be a useful and field tested model for addressing contemporary complex challenges.\(^{56}\) In the following sections I will outline a similar CA Stabilization structure, task-tailored to include lessons learned as well as support and logistics, and how this structure has potential as a template upon which to base a GoC CoE. Prior to this however, I will discuss an important concomitant process that will be important in facilitating and maintaining an effective WoG approach, that is, how cultures are created within new organizations and how new members are socialized into existing organizations. Once established, these theoretical constructs will provide the foundation for later discussions regarding the effectiveness of current WoG team deployment preparations.

\(^{55}\) Booz Allen Hamilton, “Mission Integration Fact Sheet,”…

\(^{56}\) Ibid.
SECTION 4 – ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND SOCIALIZATION

WoG teams are composed of personnel drawn from governmental departments and agencies that often have vastly different mandates and cultures. This fact can make the creation of strong and harmonious WoG extremely challenging. This section will briefly identify the importance of organizational culture and socialization in fostering the development of effective WoG teams.

Organizational culture is:

…the pattern of basic assumptions which a given group has invented, discovered, or developed in learning to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, which have worked well enough to be considered valid…57

Thus, in order for an organization to exist, it must come to some level of agreement about the nature of the environment within which it exists. These assumptions include: the nature of its mission or task, its goals, the methods to achieve those goals, and the criteria to be used to measure its performance, as well as the remediation or repair strategies to address perceived deficiencies.58

The understanding and transmission of these agreed upon assumptions occur via organizational socialization:

…the process by which an individual acquires the social knowledge and skills necessary to assume an organizational role. Across the roles, the process may appear in many forms ranging from a relatively quick, self-guided, trial-and-error process to a far more elaborate one requiring a lengthy preparation period of education and training followed by an equally drawn out period of official apprenticeship. In fact, if one takes seriously the notion that learning itself is a continuous and life-long process, the entire organizational career of an individual can be characterized as a socialization process.59


58 Ibid.
Therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.  

The internal organizational challenges revolve around the agreement upon development of: a common language and conceptual strategies to facilitate communication, group boundaries and criteria for inclusion and exclusion which is directly linked to group identity, criteria for allocation of power and status – the internal hierarchy, group guidelines on internal relationships; reward and punishment framework, and ideology or “religion.” Resolution of these external and internal challenges are intrinsically intertwined. In sum, organizations must have the opportunity to work together such that they will have an opportunity to craft the history that will form the basis upon which follow-on members can be socialized.

Important to the present thesis, organizational socialization is also the method by which an organization identifies, transfers and reinforces its culture upon its members. Literature in this domain identifies six dimensions that identify what new members must learn during the socialization process, including: performance proficiency, people, politics, language, organizational goals and values, and history. Performance proficiency relates to how well an individual has identified what needs to be learned, and

---


61 Ibid.

62 Ibid.

63 Van Maanen and Schein, “Toward a Theory of Organizational Socialization,” …

subsequently mastered the required knowledge and skills. People describes the importance of identifying who in the organization to learn from and model behaviour after. Politics concerns the success of identifying the informal power and relationship structures that exist within any organization. Language deals with the ability of a new member to learn the technical language, acronyms, informal queues, and jargon that are unique to an organization. Organizational goals and values involves learning both the formal and informal goals and values of an organization, to include those tacit goals of those in powerful or influential positions. Finally, history refers to learning the traditions, customs, myths, and rituals used to instil cultural knowledge and identity within a new member.\(^65\) This discussion of establishing organizational culture will be key to later dialogue regarding the creation of WoG Teams.

**Sub-section 1 – The Role of Trust in Organizational Socialization**

One additional feature of the transmission and sharing of common organizational beliefs and practices is that it facilitates a common understanding and an ability to better predict how another will behave. These circumstances serve to facilitate organizational trust in which individuals are willing to make themselves vulnerable to another with the expectation that the other will meet their needs, or at least will not exploit their vulnerability. Defined as “a willingness to be vulnerable to another based on the confident expectation that the other will behave in a manner that will meet, or at lease not betray our needs,”\(^66\) trust is seen to be important because it positively affects team performance in ways that are particularly important to optimizing aWoG team. For instance, it facilitates more open sharing of information which in turn enables more rapid

\(^{65}\) *Ibid.*  
\(^{66}\) *Ibid, 5.*
and informed decision making. Furthermore, in situations of crisis, high levels of trust promotes the maintenance of decentralized authority and decision making, open communication, as well as the sharing of resources.

67 Ibid, 6.
68 Ibid.
CHAPTER 2 – CANADIAN FORCES FORCE GENERATION

Much of the CF’s resources are dedicated to the FG of the operational capabilities required to meet the defence tasks assigned by the GoC. Furthermore, these FG activities are conducted with a view to indoctrinating and reinforcing upon members the core elements CF culture and the profession of arms in Canada.

Building upon the conceptual foundations identified previously, this chapter sets out to define the current constructs and procedures employed by the CF as a basis of comparison for later analysis of OGDA and WoG DCG activities. This examination will begin by highlighting the tenets of organizational culture that the FG activities of training, education and professional development attempt to embed within new CF members. This will be followed by identifying the separation between FG and force employment and how this separation affects CF socialization within a WoG context. As the primary CF force generator for the GoC’s largest WoG commitment, Land Forces Command will be analysed in order to identify the principal mechanisms it employs for collective and individual FG. While both Maritime Command and Air Command force generate capabilities and/or personnel for the WoG mission in Afghanistan and other locales, due to the primarily platform-centric nature (crews for ships and aircraft) of their FG activities, they will not be discussed separately and specifically within this paper.

SECTION 1 – CF CULTURE AND FORCE GENERATION

The CF, as a professional western military, must respond to two imperatives: a societal imperative to ensure its capability to fulfill their unique responsibility to Canada, and a functional imperative to guarantee the maintenance and relevance of their specialized body of knowledge and skillsets that are associated with the profession of
arms.\textsuperscript{69} In order to meet these imperatives, the profession of arms in Canada, represented by the institution of the CF, is characterized by four specific attributes: responsibility, expertise, identity and the military ethos. Responsibility refers to the individual and collective responsibilities of CF members and the institution to meet their obligations in the defence of Canada.\textsuperscript{70} Expertise is the knowledge and skills required to meet those responsibilities.\textsuperscript{71} Identity consists of three core concepts that CF members share: voluntary military service, unlimited liability, and service before self.\textsuperscript{72} Finally, the military ethos is the combination and acceptance of Canadian values, Canadian military values and fundamental expectations and beliefs of service, that together form the foundation that binds together the profession of arms in Canada.\textsuperscript{73} Each of these attributes are reinforced in the socialization processes employed by the CF, most identifiably through all forms of training, including FG activities.

SECTION 2 – CF FORCE GENERATION

Force generation, the process of organizing, training, and equipping forces for employment,\textsuperscript{74} is clearly an integral foundation to effective force employment (the application of allocated military means to achieve specified objectives or effects through

\textsuperscript{69} Canada, Department of National Defence, \textit{Duty With Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada} (Ottawa: Canadian Defence Academy, 2003), 6.

\textsuperscript{70} \textit{Ibid}, 14.

\textsuperscript{71} \textit{Ibid}, 17.

\textsuperscript{72} \textit{Ibid}, 20. Unlimited liability refers to the concept that all members understand that they can legally be ordered into harm’s way in the conduct of their military duties.

\textsuperscript{73} \textit{Ibid}, 21.

\textsuperscript{74} Canada, Department of National Defence, \textit{Canadian Forces Joint Publication 01 – Canadian Military Doctrine} (Ottawa: Canadian Forces Experimentation Centre, 2009), 5-9.
activities\textsuperscript{75}, and operational support (the provision of direct aid, protection that complements or supports the operations of another force).\textsuperscript{76}

**Sub-section 1 – CF Force Generators**

FG with the CF comprises four major mechanisms: force structure, equipment, readiness and sustainability.\textsuperscript{77} Within the CF, there are four primary force generators who are responsible to the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) for the provision of strategic advise on environmental specific and technical matters.\textsuperscript{78} The CF FG commanders are:

**Commander Land Forces Command (LFC)** is the principal source of expertise on the development, generation, and employment of land forces. The role of LFC is to provide combat capable general-purpose land forces to meet Canada’s defence commitments.\textsuperscript{79}

**Commander Maritime Command (MARCOM)** is the principal source of expertise on the development, generation, and employment of sea power. The role of MARCOM is to provide combat capable general-purpose maritime forces to meet Canada’s defence policy objectives.\textsuperscript{80}

**Commander Air Command (AIRCOM)** is the principal source of expertise on the development, generation, and employment of air power. The role of AIRCOM is to provide aerospace forces required for the conduct of air, surface, and sub-surface operations as well as provide an air search and rescue capability.\textsuperscript{81}

**Commander Military Personnel Command (MILPERSCOM)** is assigned functional authority by the CDS and is the principal source of expertise for: all aspects of military personnel management, including recruitment; the development of military personnel; as well as health, dental, and spiritual services.\textsuperscript{82}

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{77} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{78} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{80} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{81} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{82} Ibid.
Because of the separation of FG and force employment within the CF, a CF member conducts his/her pre-deployment preparations under the guidance of their parent unit or another unit responsible to conduct their FG in preparation for a specific mission. Once confirmed and declared operationally ready, the member, and potentially the entire force generating unit, will be transferred to the operational command of CEFCOM for expeditionary operations or CANADACOM for domestic employment.

Because of this separation of responsibilities and command, most CF members and units do not face the pressures of having to complete other routine operations while conducting FG for a specified mission. Thus for the duration of the FG period, all of the activities of deploying personnel are directed towards preparation for the upcoming deployment, which as will be identified later, is quite different from nearly all of the other deploying WoG partners. These differences in the organizational cultures and constraints experienced during pre-deployment preparations for each partner contribute to the significant differences in WoG predeployment training.

SECTION 3 - LFC FORCE GENERATION

Within LFC, the responsibilities for FG are split between two entities. Commander Land Force Doctrine and Training Systems (LFDTS) is largely responsible for training development, and establishes the training objectives, standards and resource requirements. The Land Force Area (LFA) commanders are responsible to ensure that their subordinate land forces adhere to these criteria while training and achieve the necessary training gateways to meet their assigned defence tasks.\(^{83}\) This model provides

\(^{82}\) *Ibid.*

\(^{83}\) Canada, Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-008/FP-001 Training for Land Operations*, 3-1.
dual focus to the generation of both individual and collective skills in a synchronized fashion.

Operational readiness within LFC is a function of three factors: personnel, equipment and training. As resource constraints limit the ability of force generators to maintain all forces at high readiness, each of these factors are scrutinized and balanced between priorities in the preparation of forces for employment. LFC uses the Managed Readiness Plan (MRP) to manage and assign resources to units and formations who have been earmarked for planned or contingency operations.\(^{84}\) The MRP is broken down into the following three phases:

**Support.** During this phase, units recuperate from operations and support other units preparing for operations. This will include a relatively high rate of personnel turnover due to postings, career courses, individual and collective tasks and recruit intake. Ideally, new equipment and other capabilities are integrated in this phase. By the end of this phase, regenerative and foundational training should be complete.

**Training for High Readiness.** When warned for an operation or high readiness task, land forces will begin the progressive training towards being declared operationally ready (OPRED). Generally training will be initially focussed on achieving general-purpose combat skills, and as requirements are defined, this focus will switch to theatre- and mission-specific training (TMST). Personnel stability will be maintained to the greatest degree possible throughout this phase. At the end of this phase, the forces will be considered combat capable and declared OPRED.

**High Readiness/Operations.** During this phase, land forces are either held in readiness for a mission or deployed on a mission. Continuation training will be used to sustain skills, knowledge and attitudes, while TMST may be required to address new or un-forecasted missions.\(^{85}\)

In order to standardize its approach to training, LFC employs the training levels pictured below:

---

\(^{84}\) *Ibid*, 2-7.

\(^{85}\) *Ibid*, 2-7 to 2-8.
Annually, LFC produces an operational plan (Op Plan) to synchronize its individual and collective FG activities in order to meet the requirements identified by the CF Integrated Managed Readiness System. The Op Plan identifies to each formation and unit, the tasks and level to which they must prepare their personnel.

LFC’s standardized approach to training, with identified training levels, affiliated resource allocations and forecasted tasks provide a robust example of an existing GoC FG model that will be utilized later for the development of a WoG DCG structure.
CHAPTER 3 – DEPLOYMENT CAPABILITY GENERATION IN OTHER GOVERNMENTAL DEPARTMENTS/AGENCIES

The requirement to deploy large numbers of GoC civilian public servants alongside military forces on complex missions that explicitly call for the concerted coordination of Canadian government agencies such as those in Afghanistan and Haiti is a relatively new phenomenon.\(^{86}\) Traditionally, most of the federal governments and agencies have mandates that are focussed on domestic policies and service delivery. However, the recognition of the nature of the complexity underlying fragile states in terms of basic governance and security issues has led to the involvement of personnel from the RCMP, other civilian police services, Corrections Services Canada and the Canadian Border Services Agency in the KPRT, as well as the involvement of multiple government agencies in other missions such as Haiti. More generally, this recognition has provided an opportunity for these other agencies to expand their mandates by contributing their expertise to the transition of the Canadian approach to fragile states. Within this new international mandate to work outside of Canada, they too are focussed on policy development and service delivery in their given domains of expertise.

As DND and the CF are collectively the largest organization within the GoC, numbering approximately 156,000 personnel, they possess the institutional human resources (HR) within the FG structure to create a percentage of personnel billets reserved for training and education, termed a training float.\(^{87}\) This human resource dynamic sharply contrasts with the reality faced by OGDAs, who, outside of the RCMP, do not possess the institutional HR capacity to focus on training, professional

\(^{86}\) Patrick and Brown, *Greater than the Sum of its Parts?*... 70.

\(^{87}\) Nora Bensahel, Olga Oliker and Heather Peterson, *Improving Capacity for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations*, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2009), 49.
development and DCG while concurrently meeting their day-to-day responsibilities. As will become evident this constraint has significant implications for current WoG training and ultimately current WoG operations within CA missions.

Another contrast between the military and public service relates to how these two domains go about addressing personnel requirements. Militaries traditionally develop required skillsets in their personnel through a great emphasis upon on-going training and education outside of day-to-day work requirements, as the nature of these desired capabilities are not normally available for hire in the private sector. The Public Service however, tends to hire personnel from the private sector or OGDAs who already possess the basic skills they require, then focuses on shaping those skills through on the job training and more limited mission specific training and education opportunities. Because of the approach employed within the Public Service, as well as a relative lack of resources in comparison to the military, they do not possess the resources or culture directed towards investing in stand alone training and education of their personnel occurring outside of daily work activities as is the case in the military tradition, which inhibits their ability to participate in a full range of WoG predeployment training and education opportunities.

Given the differences in available human resources and organizational cultures with respect to training and education, as well as the relatively nascent requirement to deploy civilians from a wider array of public service agencies into potentially high risk

---


90 Ibid.
situations, it is understandable that the OGDAs’ approach DCG that has traditionally differed from that of the CF.

In an effort to identify how these differences in OGDA DCG practices impact the 3C nature of the Canadian WGA in fragile states, this chapter will focus on how DFAIT, CIDA and CSC (a branch of Public Safety Canada) select and prepare their personnel for deployment on international missions. While the RCMP are also subordinate to Public Safety Canada (PSC), due to the nature of their responsibilities and their international commitments under the Canadian Policing Arrangement (CPA), their DCG procedures, along with other civilian police (CIVPOL) services will be examined separately. This chapter will examine the current DCG procedures for each of these OGDAs, employing the Canadian involvement in Afghanistan as the case study.

Much of the information employed to support the analysis within this chapter was gleaned from confidential interviews with GoC officials responsible for aspects of DCG within their respective OGDAs. Additional insight was pulled from internal government documents that are not releasable to the public, and thus cannot be directly referenced.

SECTION 1 – DFAIT

DFAIT’s mandate is to:

- manage Canada's diplomatic and consular relations and to encourage the country's international trade. This includes:
  - ensuring that Canada's foreign policy reflects true Canadian values and advances Canada's national interests;
  - strengthening rules-based trading arrangements and expanding free and fair market access at bilateral, regional and global levels; and
  - working with a range of partners inside and outside government to achieve increased economic opportunity and enhanced security for Canada and for Canadians at home and abroad.\(^{91}\)

With its dual responsibilities for diplomatic affairs and international trade, DFAIT has a relatively unique organization within the GoC, as it has two ministers, each responsible for one of the departments key tasks. The current organizational chart is pictured below:

Figure 3.1 Current DFAIT Organization Chart
(http://www.international.gc.ca/about-a_propos/assets/pdfs/DFAIT-MAECI-2011-jan-05-eng.pdf)

Because Afghanistan is one of Canada’s foreign policy priorities, DFAIT has been named as the lead department for Canada’s WoG engagement in that country.  

Within DFAIT, the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) resides in the International Security Branch and its mission is to:

- ensure timely, coordinated and effective responses to international crises (natural and human-made), requiring whole-or-government action;
- plan and deliver coherent, effective conflict prevention, crisis response, post-conflict peacebuilding, and civilian protection and stabilization initiatives in states where Canadian interests and values are implicated; and

---

manage the Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF) … used to develop and deliver peace and security initiatives.\(^9\)

![START Organization Chart](http://www.international.gc.ca/start-gtsr/assets/pdfs/year_in_review_0607_en.pdf)

**Figure 3.2 START Organization Chart**  
(adapted from [http://www.international.gc.ca/start-gtsr/assets/pdfs/year_in_review_0607_en.pdf](http://www.international.gc.ca/start-gtsr/assets/pdfs/year_in_review_0607_en.pdf))

Given its international mandate and presence in embassies and consulates throughout the world, DFAIT has a wealth of experience operating outside of Canada, and therefore maintains a plethora of policies and guidance regarding how to select and prepare its personnel for overseas employment within that context. Some of the formal direction can be found in Foreign Service Directives (FSD) which are authorized by Treasury Board regulations. Collectively, the FSDs create a system of allowances, benefits and employment conditions that, in conjunction with salary, provide the

---

mechanism through which GoC departments and agencies can screen, select, train and deploy personnel outside of Canada.\textsuperscript{94}

For its routine overseas postings, DFAIT employs an annual posting cycle, where personnel are recruited in the fall, confirmed in the spring and sent to their new assignments in the summer.\textsuperscript{95} Once a prospective candidate has submitted their application, they are screened and interviewed if they meet the eligibility requirements. After interviewing with the screening panel and managers for the specific posting overseas, if they are deemed suitable, the candidate’s file is submitted to the DFAIT Corporate Assignment Board (CAB) for final approval. At this stage, the CAB will review the file of each candidate, and ensure that the Head of Mission (HOM) has been consulted and endorses each proposed individual. This provides the HOM an opportunity to review the full posting slate for a given mission and ensure each person will ‘fit’ into the broader team, rather than focusing on individual qualifications. If accepted, selected personnel are then informed of their confirmation. Once officially approved, candidates must complete all other institutional and position-based requirements to include medical/dental, diplomatic passport applications, Foreign Service Directives (FSD) awareness briefings and administrative arrangements. Once personnel are confirmed by the HOM, they may be permitted to conduct a trip to the location of their new posting, in order to finalize posting details and become familiar with their future responsibilities. Approval for this trip however is at the discretion of their current divisional manager, based upon the manager’s ability to manage their day-to-day responsibilities during their subordinate’s absence. Although this standard operating procedure functions relatively


\textsuperscript{95} Interview with DFAIT official, 24 January 2011.
well in the context of regular mission postings, it will become evident that this aspect does have significant implications for new complex missions such as Afghanistan.

In 2005, even with all of this experience and formal policy guidance, sources at DFAIT contend that the department was ill-prepared to adequately select, screen and train sufficient personnel in response to the GoC decision that relevant government agencies were to take an active role in counterinsurgency and stabilization operations in Kandahar Province. For example, one of the first DFAIT officials to deploy alongside CF elements in Kandahar in early 2006 received very little preparation training and additional administrative screening. In fact, he deployed lacking sufficient life insurance that would cover him should something untoward occur in the conflict zone. The tragic death of diplomat Glyn Berry following a suicide bomb attack in 2006 underscored the inherent risk faced by not just the CF, but all members of the Canadian mission in Afghanistan.

Unlike the CF, which treats the deployment of its personnel overseas as a temporary assignment from their parent unit in Canada, in accordance with FSD 3, DFAIT treats the deployment of its personnel to Afghanistan as a standard overseas posting. Thus, the same annual posting cycle applies to Afghanistan and is a competitive process, although the selection criteria and tools do differ significantly from other overseas missions. In order to advertise the unique opportunities and challenges posed by the Afghan mission, DFAIT hosts job fairs and “brown bag lunch” information

96 Confidential testimonial provided by DFAIT official at the Privy Council Office of Canada conference, “Focus on Afghanistan 2”, held in Ottawa, ON, 26-27 January, 2011.

97 Ibid.

sessions during the fall in order to elicit interest in available positions. Armed with this initial information, personnel interested in deploying to Kandahar or Kabul must submit an application through their organizational heirarchy in the same fashion as if they were applying for a posting to London or Washington.

If supported by their management, prospective candidates follow the same screening process through the CAB and the HOM. One additional link in the approval chain is the approval of the Representative of Canada in Kandahar (RoCK)(who differs from the HOM, who is based in Kabul), for those personnel applying to work in Kandahar. Candidates must then complete human resource screening for items such as security clearances, medical/dental condition and career planning. If they clear all of these hurdles, selected personnel are then informed of their confirmation.99

Influenced heavily by the Manley Panel recommendation to increase the civilian participation within the Canadian mission in Afghanistan, and the realities of operating in a high risk environment, DFAIT has over time, developed more comprehensive deployment procedures concerning Afghanistan, allowing for increased screening, selection and training regimes to meet the unique requirements of this operational theatre.

Because of the annual nature of their posting cycle, all DFAIT postings to Afghanistan, less the HOM, are a year in duration.100 Thus, in keeping with the general DFAIT HR process with respect to overseas postings throughout the recruiting and confirmation stages, prospective candidates remain responsible for the completion of their current duties. Within the context of the additional selection and training requirements for the realities of the Afghanistan mission however, continuing to pursue

---

99 Interview with DFAIT official, 24 January 2011.

100 Ibid.
this policy immediately creates tensions as it is often difficult for selected individuals to balance current operational requirements with preparatory training and screening requirements prior to Afghanistan postings. Managers are obligated to release the individual to participate in the training, but they are not provided any back-fill to meet ongoing requirements, which certainly contributes to a less than ideal HR situation for a small agency such as DFAIT. Indeed, given the amount of time necessary to train personnel for Afghanistan, enforcement of the release to train DFAIT personnel deploying to the Afghan mission required direction from the Afghanistan Task Force at the Privy Council Office (PCO) to each department.\textsuperscript{101} While similar friction does exist for embassy or consular postings to other countries, the pre-deployment time constraints imposed by training and additional administrative requirements are significantly less in those cases.

The mandatory training requirements for all civilians deploying to Afghanistan are as follows: 5-day Hostile Environment Training (HET) which includes conduct after capture training provided by the CF at the Peace Support Training Centre in Kingston, Ontario; Standard First Aid with Level C CPR, Combat First Aid, Intercultural Effectiveness Training – Afghanistan (1-3 days) and Media Training.\textsuperscript{102} Additionally, DFAIT has developed individual training programmes for each of its positions in Afghanistan, which include mandatory core courses specific to their position overseas as well as additional CF-led training opportunities such as Exercise UNIFIED READY and MAPLE GUARDIAN. Additional administrative arrangements candidates are required to complete prior to a posting to Afghanistan include Canadian and NATO security

\textsuperscript{101} Email to author from DFAIT official, 4 April 2011.

\textsuperscript{102} Email to author from PCO Afghanistan Task Force representative, 31 January 2011.
clearance procedures, CEFCOM travel forms, will and/or power of attorney forms, ramp ceremony form (in case of death in theatre), visas for Afghanistan and UAE, application for civilian identity tags (similar to military dog tags), a family support services briefing, a pre-departure security briefing, and a media awareness briefing.

Taken together, it is readily apparent that the training and administrative preparations for a comprehensive mission such as Afghanistan require a considerable investment of time to complete. Because DFAIT is not structured or resourced to backfill personnel absent to meet these numerous training and preparation demands, managers are often forced to go short, or simply demand that prospective candidates still complete their current responsibilities while attempting to satisfy deployment requirements. These conflicting intra-organizational interests serve to significantly complicate the DCG process for DFAIT personnel and the organization.

In summary then, while DFAIT has a mandate to regularly deploy its personnel overseas, the GoC’s engagement in fragile states has presented a number of challenges to its traditional methods of generating personnel for postings to embassies and consulates abroad. These challenges are primarily focussed on competing organizational demands for personnel who must continue to perform their daily duties while attempting to meet the considerable pre-deployment requirements. Canada’s WoG commitment to Afghanistan has required DFAIT to re-examine its practices and tailor its approach to specifically address the risks and interagency nature of the mission. Even though DFAIT’s DCG procedures for deployments into fragile states have developed and improved over the course of the Afghanistan mission, Canada’s diplomatic corps have yet to resolve all the human resource and training challenges of working in a conflict

103 Interview with DFAIT official, 24 January 2011.
zone. The even greater concern is that once the Afghanistan mission transitions in late 2011, will the DCG procedures and lessons learned thus far be institutionalized in a framework that will assist the GoC to conduct similar engagements in the future?

SECTION 2 - CIDA

As Canada’s lead agency for development assistance, CIDA has a mission to “Lead Canada’s international effort to help people living in poverty” and a mandate to:

Manage Canada's support and resources effectively and accountably to achieve meaningful, sustainable results and engage in policy development in Canada and internationally, enabling Canada's effort to realize its development objectives.\(^{104}\)

In effort to meet these aims, CIDA has the following organizational structure:

![Figure 3.3 CIDA Organization Chart](http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/ACDI-CIDA.nsf/eng/NIC-54101940-JTC)

---

Within this organization, the Vice-President Afghanistan and Pakistan Task Force (APTF) is responsible, along with the Director General, Human Resources Branch, for the generation of personnel to meet CIDA’s commitments in Afghanistan.

Prior to its commitment of personnel to Kandahar, CIDA had never deployed personnel into a war zone. The initial CIDA presence, as Canada built up its engagement in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban, was primarily Kabul-based. It’s Kandahar presence was very modest and Glyn Berry’s death in 2006 resulted in the temporary withdrawal of all CIDA personnel from Kandahar. In the face of this tragedy, much like DFAIT, the realities of the risk inherent in Kandahar forced CIDA to re-evaluate the methods by which they prepared their personnel for missions in conflict zones. The release of the Manley Report in 2008 provided the impetus for CIDA to increase its presence in Afghanistan with a particular focus on Kandahar, which has grown to the current commitment of 17 personnel in Kandahar and 9 in Kabul.

While it follows a DCG process that roughly mirrors that of DFAIT, CIDA is a relatively small agency within the GoC, thus it has been forced to go outside in order to fill its 26 positions in Afghanistan. CIDA has canvassed both the Canadian public service through job fairs, as well as the Canadian public in an effort to manage the organizational impact of this significant commitment of personnel. Selection criteria focus on identifying candidates who possess a background in international development and who have prior experience working in fragile states and who have demonstrated

---

105 Telephone interview with CIDA official, 10 March 2011.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid.
experience being able to cope with uncertainty, change and working in hardship conditions.  

CIDA also selects their candidates through its internal annual posting process, as well as advertising vacancies with civilian aid organizations in order to canvass for prospective candidates throughout the fall timeframe. Having completed initial interviews with prospective candidates, those selected for further screening are sent to participate in the CIDA-led WoG Exercise NEW FRONTIER. This activity is a key gateway in the CIDA selection process, but given its WoG nature, it will be examined in greater depth in Chapter 4. Following NEW FRONTIER, those who are selected to carry on begin more in-depth individual screening, such as medical tests and security verifications. Candidates must also complete Hazardous Environment Training (HET) provided by the CF at the Peace Support Training Centre in Kingston, ON.

Upon successful completion of these screening and training activities, candidates are confirmed and begin a series of job specific training activities within CIDA which is specifically important given that candidates are potentially coming from organizations outside of CIDA and the GoC. They are also required to become a desk officer with the APTF which provides a level of familiarization and understanding not only the current issues pertinent to the mission, but also of CIDA policies and structure. The duration of these duties is largely dependant upon their deployment schedules, but can be conducted both during and following their pre-deployment training. Select candidates, dependant upon their prospective job profile, will receive language training (Dari and

---

109 Telephone interview with CIDA official, 10 March 2011.

110 Ibid.

111 Ibid.
Pashto) and all candidates will attend a two-day WoG workshop which will be explored in greater detail in Chapter 3. Other mandatory training requirements include the same Intercultural Effectiveness training that DFAIT personnel attend, as well as First Aid Level C which is provided by St. John’s Ambulance.\textsuperscript{112} Based on availability of candidates and scheduling by the CF, candidates may attend other CF-led training events such as UNIFIED READY, MAPLE SENTRY and MAPLE GUARDIAN. These events will also be discussed further in Chapter 3, however because there is no GoC mandate to ensure participation, these events are viewed more as desirable yet optional training opportunities rather than mandatory selection and confirmation activities.

CIDA personnel and prospective candidates encounter the same DCG difficulties as DFAIT personnel in terms of the struggle to balance their commitments to their current profile and completing all of the selection, screening and training requirements associated with a posting to Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{113} The potential that candidates may be generated from organizations outside of CIDA can mitigate some of the exclusively internal organizational pressures that DFAIT experiences as they do not necessarily have the same concerns with allowing personnel to leave their current profiles to meet all of the DCG requirements. However the necessity for candidates drawn from outside of CIDA and the federal public service to familiarize themselves with all of the relevant GoC policies and regulations can add other difficulties and a steeper learning curve for these individuals in this respect.

\textsuperscript{112} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{113} Ibid.
SECTION 3 – CSC

CSC’s role is to administer court imposed incarceration sentences of two years or more. Its mission is:

…as part of the criminal justice system and respecting the rule of law, contributes to public safety by actively encouraging and assisting offenders to become law-abiding citizens, while exercising reasonable, safe, secure and humane control.114

CSC’s organizational structure is pictured below:

Figure 3.4 – CSC Organization Chart

Recognized internationally as a world leader in correctional services, CSC, in cooperation with DFAIT and CIDA, does have a modest international mandate resident within its International Relations Directorate (IRD).115 Within the organization chart


pictured above, the IRD is resident within the Executive Director Executive Secretariat, recently renamed Director General of Executive Services.\textsuperscript{116}

Thus, in partnership with DFAIT and CIDA, CSC has two primary goals for its international engagement:

- To strengthen effective correctional practices through international relationships and information exchange.
- To support Canadian foreign policy objectives which promote the rule of law, respect for human rights and international development.\textsuperscript{117}

Within these two international goals in mind, CSC has played a role within the KPRT since 2007, advising corrections officials in Kandahar province, with specific focus on the improvement of facilities and practices at Sarpoza Prison in Kandahar City.\textsuperscript{118} Infrastructure improvements include increased security measures and upgraded health and hygiene facilities, while training and mentoring are focussed on two streams, executive leadership and basic corrections.\textsuperscript{119} The deployment of personnel into Kandahar marks the first time that CSC has engaged in this type of training and mentoring mission within a war zone.\textsuperscript{120}

While CSC selects personnel for 12 month deployments into Kandahar in a manner similar to that employed by DFAIT and CIDA, they do not tie their DCG process to an annual posting cycle.\textsuperscript{121} Thus unlike CIDA and DFAIT, CSC treats the deployment

\textsuperscript{116} Email from CSC official to author, 4 April 2011.


\textsuperscript{119} Government of Canada, “Canada’s Engagement in Afghanistan,”…

\textsuperscript{120} Telephone interview with CSC official, 10 March 2011.

\textsuperscript{121} Thus unlike CIDA and DFAIT, CSC treats the deployment
of their personnel as a secondment from their regular positions meaning that personnel are not removed from their positions to fill those overseas, but are instead backfilled by personnel who are double-hatted from other senior positions, and upon redeployment, deployed personnel return to their original jobs. Nonetheless during DCG, CSC personnel still face the competing time demands in terms of completing compulsory pre-deployment activities and while delivering results in the course of their routine duties.

Since their increased presence in 2008, also tied to the Manley Report recommendations, CSC is relatively unique among OGDAs in that it has identified a pool of personnel who are willing and deemed suitable to fill their current five positions in the Afghan mission. Due to the nature of the positions in Afghanistan, consisting of two trainer/mentors, two deputy directors (one each for operations and administration) and one director, they target more senior CSC personnel for the mission, thus all prospective candidates are generated from within CSC. While CSC is a relatively large GoC agency (approx 15,000 personnel), the seniority of the personnel upon which they draw for this deployment is quite small, which makes meeting even this modest commitment difficult.\textsuperscript{122}

In order to solicit interest, on behalf of the CSC International Assignment Board the Commissioner of Corrections sends out a call letter to senior CSC management for redistribution to all CSC staff. The call letter identifies the positions that they are looking to fill as well as the selection criteria. Applications received and supported by CSC Sector Heads and Regional Deputy Commissioners are then forwarded to CSC’s Intergovernmental Relations Directorate. Once recommended files are received,
Intergovernmental Relations Human Resource Advisors and Project Management

(Director and Senior Project Officers) screen the files and assess candidates based on their correctional services expertise, experience and training, as well as cultural awareness aptitudes and suitability. From there, candidates will be further screened by CSC’s International Assignment Board – consisting of the Commissioner, Senior Deputy Commissioner, Director General Executive Services and Director of Intergovernmental Relations – during one or more rounds of interviews.

Once the interview process is made, selected candidates are informed and begin two to six months of preparations focusing on training and logistical preparations. During this process, successful candidates are pulled in and out of their current portfolios in order to conduct the necessary training and preparations as they are scheduled and become available. Due to the size of CSC, they are extremely reliant on the training provided by the CF and DFAIT as they do not have the training system or resources required to meet GoC deployment guidelines internally.123 CSC personnel must also complete HET, as well as the other health and security screening as described above for DFAIT and CIDA. When possible, deploying personnel also attend the WoG training session run by DFAIT that covers intercultural effectiveness, psycho-social counselling, stress management and computer information systems training.

With respect to corrections-specific preparations, CSC provides a 7-10 day internal training programme covering corrections in international environments which is based on accepted UN standards for corrections services. Personnel selected for senior positions (directors, deputy directors, and senior mentor/trainers) also receive NATO mentor training at Oberamergau, Germany. This training is similar in nature to the

123 Telephone interview with CSC official, 10 March 2011.
training that CF personnel selected as mentors within the Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) receive at the same NATO training centre. CSC participants receive training on the fundamentals of mentoring and are provided the opportunity to conduct detailed cultural awareness exercises with actual Afghan personnel.\footnote{Telephone interview with CSC official, 10 March 2011.}

Since 2007, based on availability of the senior CSC personnel selected to deploy, approximately half have participated in the CF’s MAPLE GUARDIAN.\footnote{Ibid.} While there has been no CSC participation on the other CF-led training exercises UNIFIED WARRIOR or UNIFIED READY, CSC directors have provided input to the writing boards who prepare the exercise scenarios for both of these activities.

In summary then, CSC, a Public Safety Canada agency with a primarily domestic mandate and usually a minority member in WoG international missions, has rapidly developed a niche deployment capability. While the size of their commitment is fairly modest, they continue to work with OGDAs to improve their capacity and efficiency to support the requirements of the GoC.

\textbf{SECTION 4 – RCMP AND OTHER CIVILIAN POLICE DEPLOYMENT CAPABILITY GENERATION}

The RCMP, as Canada’s national police force, provide law enforcement capabilities at the national, federal, provincial and municipal levels. The RCMP also has a limited international mandate under the Canadian Policing Arrangement (CPA), the framework through which the RCMP and other members from Canadian civilian police (CIVPOL) services deploy overseas to take part in international police and peace operations.\footnote{The CPA is a partnered agreement between DFAIT, CIDA, PSC and the}
RCMP, wherein the first three organizations determine which missions Canadian CIVPOL should participate in and provides the funding mechanisms to support these missions. The current 2006-2011 CPA provides the RCMP with the authority and funding to deploy up to 200 Canadian CIVPOL annually to missions around the world.\textsuperscript{127} Through this initiative, Canada currently has CIVPOL deployed on 14 missions in 10 different countries.\textsuperscript{128} One other source of deployable personnel includes RCMP or CIVPOL members who have retired within the previous five years. If selected to deploy, retired members are signed to a one year contract to become a Temporary Civilian Employee that provides all the same benefits as serving members.\textsuperscript{129} As an agreement governed by DFAIT, CIDA, PSC and the RCMP, with its own funding pool, the CPA is a relatively unique Canadian WoG mechanism upon which an analogous agreement for resourcing other deployment capabilities could be modelled.

In accordance with the GoC’s commitment to Afghanistan, since 2005, Canada is the only nation to deploy CIVPOL personnel as trainers and mentors as part of the NATO mandate in that country.\textsuperscript{130} The CPA has been utilized to deploy CIVPOL to other operational theatres, however given the unique nature and risk inherent in their mission in Afghanistan, this section will focus on how the RCMP force generates its members and members of other CIVPOL members for Canada’s contribution in Afghanistan.

\begin{flushleft}

\textsuperscript{127} \textit{Ibid.}


\textsuperscript{129} Email to author from RCMP International Police Operations Board official, 1 April 2011.

\textsuperscript{130} Email to author from RCMP International Police Operations Branch, 22 February 2011.
\end{flushleft}
Through the CPA, the RCMP’s International Police Operations Branch (IPOB) is mandated to select, train and deploy Canadian CIVPOL on UN and other international police missions. The IPOB’s DCG responsibilities also extend into maintenance of the relevance and flexibility of its pre-deployment processes as well as family and post-deployment psychological support.

Prospective candidates must apply through their respective policing organization for permission to be released from their current responsibilities and it is also the responsibility of the applying member’s parent organization to conduct initial screening. Once permission to apply has been received, a candidate’s final suitability is determined by the IPOB’s Mission Selection Team, which selects members based upon a health assessment and training performance.

In addition, the IPOB has established a set of baseline criteria that all prospective candidates for international missions must meet to even be eligible to deploy on a CPA sponsored mission. These criteria are as follows:

- Minimum of five years of operational policing service
- Possess current valid certification in first aid and CPR
- Have strong interpersonal, organizational, leadership, coaching and team skills
- Demonstrate flexibility and innovation
- Be computer literate, with knowledge of Microsoft Office
- Have excellent oral and written communications skills
- Have experience with standard shift 4x4 motor vehicles
- Be prepared to work and live in a difficult environment
- Meet medical and psychological requirements as determined by Health Services Successfully complete the RCMP’s Physical Abilities Requirement Evaluation (PARE) in four minutes or less prior to beginning the medical assessment process (and as of June 2011, prior to applying for a mission.)


As of January 2011, IPOB has instituted two on-line pre-requisite training modules that prospective candidates must meet in order to commence pre-deployment training. These training modules: “A Strategic Level Overview of Peacekeeping” and “The Establishment and Functioning of Peacekeeping Operations” as well as a short research assignment on their mission country. These training modules are designed to better prepare candidates for their mission and the requisite training. Similarly tailored programmes could be useful for WoG stabilization training.

IPOB directed pre-deployment training is an approximately two week process that covers the following elements:

- Operations (mandatory skills training, e.g. firearms, self-defence, use of force)
- Health briefing (health hazards and medication required for a given mission)
- Administrative briefings (travel allowances, Canada Labour Code, DFAIT/CIDA briefings)
- Cultural awareness briefings (social and cultural norms of the country of posting, how to work with various international partners);
- Specialized training (specific to each mission; can include human rights and international law, the structure of the UN, the role of UN Police, mine awareness, map reading, etc.).

For those CIVPOL members deploying to Afghanistan, their pre-deployment training could be up to an additional four weeks in duration in order to conduct HET, participate in MAPLE GUARDIAN, and other training, similar to those required for DFAIT, CIDA and PSC civilians. While primarily focused on law enforcement, these

---


134 Ibid.

135 Ibid.

136 Ibid.
requirements are fairly comprehensive and could generally be applied to any WoG DCG framework.

The IPOB maintains a very structured approach to DCG and rigorously schedules its screening, selection and training to meet its international commitments. The following table is a detailed example of the IPOB’s structured and organized approach to member preparation, which could serve as a non-military example of how to forecast mission requirements and tailor DCG timelines to meet the desired schedule.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Selection</th>
<th>Training Dates</th>
<th>Deploy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. HAITI (MINUSTAH)</td>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>January 2011</td>
<td>January 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. HAITI (MINUSTAH)</td>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>February 2011</td>
<td>February 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. AFGHANISTAN</td>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>January-February 2011</td>
<td>February 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. HAITI (MINUSTAH)</td>
<td>October 2010</td>
<td>March 2011</td>
<td>March 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. IVORY COAST</td>
<td>January 2011</td>
<td>April 2011</td>
<td>April 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. AFGHANISTAN</td>
<td>January 2011</td>
<td>May-June 2011</td>
<td>June 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. HAITI (MINUSTAH)</td>
<td>April 2011</td>
<td>August 2011</td>
<td>August 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. SUDAN (Rule of Law)</td>
<td>April 2011</td>
<td>August 2011</td>
<td>August 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. ISRAEL</td>
<td>May 2011</td>
<td>September 2011</td>
<td>September 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. HAITI (MINUSTAH)</td>
<td>June 2011</td>
<td>October 2011</td>
<td>October 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. HAITI (MINUSTAH)</td>
<td>June 2011</td>
<td>November 2011</td>
<td>November 2011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2-2 IPOB Deployment Capability Generation Schedule

The RCMP has clearly implemented a regimented and organized approach to DCG. The CPA maintains a relatively robust structure to generate and support its deployed personnel especially given the relatively small size of the annually deployed contingent of Canadian CIVPOL that it manages. The structure and practices of the
IPOB, supported by the funding and policies contained within the CPA provide the GoC with a deployable, flexible and responsive law enforcement capacity. Given the WoG aspect of CPA funding and foreign policy guidance in its application, and its resulting approach to predeployment training, it provides a strong existing example within the GoC that could serve as an interagency funding model for a future WoG Stabilization CoE and its integral deployment capability.

SUMMARY

This review of existing DCG processes employed by the major participating GoC OGDAs for the mission in Afghanistan has identified a number of common friction points, notably the institutional conflict facing deploying members who must complete the screening, training and administration requirements while still satisfying the job requirements of their pre-deployment jobs. Furthermore, because the CF provides and conducts many of the key training events and opportunities, the Public Service annual posting cycles employed within DFAIT and CIDA to select personnel are not synchronized to ensure maximum participation of their personnel on these CF activities. These challenges need to be addressed if the GoC is to succeed in introducing a 3C approach to WoG DCG.

On the other hand, creative WoG funding and policy mechanisms resident within the CPA, the RCMP and other CIVPOL facilitate a flexible and structured DCG framework for these agencies. This system forecasts deployments and schedules screening and training cycles to meet the operational timelines. While the CPA was developed to enable the deployment of CIVPOL to mentor and assist on international peace operations, it provides a strong, active model for WoG cooperation that generates a modest deployable GoC capability.
CHAPTER 4 – CURRENT CANADIAN WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT DEPLOYMENT CAPABILITY GENERATION

Current Canadian WoG operations DCG experience is a direct result of the WoG construct within the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (KPRT). The deployment of the first Canadian-led KPRT in 2005 represented the first major deployment of a Canadian WoG team in response to an enduring fragile state operation. In this light, the efforts to develop WoG DCG methods are extremely nascent, and much has been learned over the intervening six years. Improvements include standardized requirements for medical screening, life insurance coverage, and HET.

However a recent study indicated that the current predeployment preparation activities have been designed primarily with the training of the individual departments in mind, rather than a wholistic training opportunity that provides equal benefit for the training audiences focussed not only on security (the CF) or development (CIDA), let alone on how best to plan and deliver a coherent, coordinated and complementary strategy in a complex operating environment. This chapter will examine the existing Canadian opportunities, both individual and collective, for WoG education, training and mission preparation across the GoC. This will be followed by an analysis of the key areas for improvement that currently exist within these opportunities as well as potential solutions.

---


SECTION 1 – EXISTING WoG DEPLOYMENT CAPABILITY GENERATION EDUCATION AND TRAINING ACTIVITIES

In 2007, the CF Chief of Review Services conducted an evaluation of CF/DND participation within the KPRT. One of the results of this evaluation was a list of areas for further study, including a query regarding how best to improve the ability of CF personnel to operate in interagency environments. As part of its response, the Canadian Defence Academy (CDA) examined the existing education and training opportunities resident within various Canadian government departments, agencies and civilian institutions. This study highlighted 109 various opportunities across the GoC that could be deemed to have a WoG/interagency training, education and/or mission preparation value. A similar study conducted for Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) highlighted CF specific training venues and educational opportunities, identifying 30 selected activities (some of which were common to the CDA study), mostly focussed on training CF members, that engendered aspects of interagency and WGA requirements. Both studies clearly identify that numerous training and educational opportunities with the potential to improve 3C delivery currently exist across the GoC departments and agencies but due to the lack of an overarching structure that ensures compliance to a 3C strategy, they are limited in their ability to improve the WoG effectiveness. Furthermore, many of these activities are not aimed at specifically preparing personnel for an upcoming deployment, rather they form a portion of regular

\[139\text{ Ibid.}\]

\[140\text{ Ibid, E-3 to E-24.}\]

professional development curriculums for CF or public service members within their respective departments and agencies.\textsuperscript{142}

\textbf{Sub-section 1 – Departmental Individual Education and Training}

To date, the GoC has yet to promulgate an integrated and comprehensive policy that identifies mandates and authorities associated with implementing WoG approaches to complex contemporary challenges.\textsuperscript{143} What follows is a brief description of the individual training and education systems integral to the CF and the OGDAs and how they contribute to the coherence, coordination and complementarity of Canada’s WGA to fragile states.

\textbf{CF Individual Training and Education}

As highlighted in Chapter 1, within the CF, training and education plays a key role in cultivating and reinforcing the professional norms expected of all CF members. In this light, the CF views individual training and education as a career-long process, to which they commit significant time and resources over the course of each member’s career.\textsuperscript{144} Furthermore, as the total CF strength, including all Regular Force, Reservists and Rangers, numbers over 130,000 personnel, it possesses by far the largest amount of human resources within the GoC.\textsuperscript{145} Given that the CF maintains an organizational culture focussed on the value of training and education, coupled with its comparative wealth of personnel, the CF is in a unique and privileged position within the GoC,


\textsuperscript{143} Ibid, 7.

\textsuperscript{144} Ibid, 16.

\textsuperscript{145} Ibid.
blessed with both the ways and means to invest heavily in the professional development and on-going training of each member.

While the majority of CF learning opportunities focus on developing CF specific tactical level skillsets, there are programmes such as the Joint Staff Operations Programme (JSOP), the Joint Command and Staff Programme (JCSP), the National Security Programme (NSP) and the Canadian Security Studies Programme (CSSP), that aim to foster mutual understanding and cooperation on issues of operational and strategic importance amongst CF and OGDA leaders.\textsuperscript{146}

JSOP is an eight day course aimed at preparing officers at the Captain/Lieutenant (Navy) and Major/Lieutenant Commander rank levels with the skills necessary to work in an operational or strategic level headquarters. It focuses on joint planning skills and highlights the importance of interagency involvement in the planning process.\textsuperscript{147} JCSP is a course delivered either residentially over 42 weeks or via distance (on-line) learning over two years. Its scope is to provide senior military officers and other national security leaders with the knowledge and skills to operate in a joint, interagency, and multi-national operational environment.\textsuperscript{148} NSP is a ten month programme designed to prepare senior military officers (Colonels and Naval Captains) and other national security professionals to lead and manage at the strategic level.\textsuperscript{149} CSSP is an annual seminar with participants including senior military officers and OGDA representatives. Its aim is to

\textsuperscript{146} Ibid, 53 and E-16.

\textsuperscript{147} Ibid, E-17.

\textsuperscript{148} Ibid, E-16.

\textsuperscript{149} Ibid, E-17.
improve participants’ ability to identify, analyze and understand Canadian national security issues.\textsuperscript{150}

While these programmes primarily target the development of senior CF officers, the CF actively invites OGDA participation in these learning activities, however, attendance is often limited due to financial and human resource constraints.\textsuperscript{151} Improved OGDA access to these programmes as well as improved WoG collaboration during curriculum development would most definitely improve the 3C value of these learning opportunities.

OGDA Individual Training and Education

Due primarily to their considerably smaller budgets and human resource pools mentioned previously, most OGDAs have limited financial and personnel resources available to commit to individual training.\textsuperscript{152} As a result, OGDAs with whom the CF regularly deploys, possess far different organizational cultures with respect to training and education. Given the horizontal mobility of members of the Canadian Public Service across GoC OGDAs, individual departments and agencies rely more on experiential learning opportunities to develop their personnel.\textsuperscript{153} While there does exist a central and commonly available training and education institution, the Canadian School of the Public Service, its programmes are very general in nature, focussing primarily on improving management and communication skills.\textsuperscript{154} The Foreign Service Institute within DFAIT also provides courses to OGDA partners, most notably Intercultural Effectiveness

\textsuperscript{150} Ibid, E-16.

\textsuperscript{151} Ibid, 64.

\textsuperscript{152} Ibid, 16.

\textsuperscript{153} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{154} Ibid, E-12.
Training, which both DFAIT and CIDA use as part of their pre-deployment preparations.\textsuperscript{155}

Across the OGDAs there are numerous training and education activities that could be restructured or modified to provide OGDA personnel with the skillsets to work more effectively in WoG environments, however very few of these actually aim to cultivate a 3C foundation amongst GoC departments. Of the 58 OGDA provided learning opportunities examined in the CDA report, the author was only able to identify three significant activities that offered participation to both CF and OGDA attendees and could be considered as fostering a 3C approach to a specific function required for a mission. Two of these three opportunities were directly related to law enforcement, while the third was specific to interagency management of the CIDA led Dahla Dam project.\textsuperscript{156}

**Sub-Section 2 – Current CF WoG Deployment Capability Generation Training Activities**

In order to meet the FG criteria outlined in Chapter 1, the CF has developed a robust and detailed mission preparation regime for the deployment of its forces into theatres such as Afghanistan. These activities range from individual specialty courses such as sniper training and civil-military cooperation, to large complex scenario-based training events that serve as the confirmation event in order to receive an OPRED declaration prior to deployment. Since the introduction of the WoG Approach (or its predecessor, the 3D approach), the CF has significantly increased the involvement of OGDAs into its FG activities. Using FG for the Canadian commitment to Afghanistan as the example, the following paragraphs briefly capture the major CF collective training


\textsuperscript{156} Ibid, Annex E.
activities that include WoG partners, as well as some of their strengths and weaknesses of these activities.

Theatre Mission Specific Training

As part of their FG regime, all deploying CF members must complete theatre mission specific training (TMST). Normally conducted early in the FG cycle, TMST consists of a series of activities, including briefings, presentations as well as field training, that are designed with the training and preparation requirements in mind for an identified theatre of operations and mission. A component of TMST is a series of briefings conducted by subject matter experts (SME) from the OGDAs that CF personnel are expected to encounter in theatre. These SMEs are usually personnel with recent experience in the specific theatre of operations and the briefings cover the role and mandate of the OGDAs as well as anecdotes regarding their personal experiences.

Having participated in this training on three different occasions, it is the author’s opinion that TMST provides a basic level of knowledge that targets the information requirements for junior soldiers deploying overseas. What it does not provide is an adequate venue for the leadership at the rank of Captain and above to gain an appropriate level of understanding with respect to the other actors in the theatre, be they Canadian, allied or host nation. For example, the OGDA interaction during TMST does not adequately provide officers working at the company level and above, a functional understanding how to access the specialist development advice or financial resources resident within the civilian staff at the KPRT. Examples such as this identify a current significant weakness in mission preparation that could potentially hinder WoG

157 Canada, Department of National Defence, B-GL-300-008/FP-001 Training for Land Operations, 6-39.

158 Author’s personal experience.
understanding and cooperation in theater. Thus these aspects must be included in TMST at the tactical level. However, and just as importantly, training development must ensure WoG involvement in the creation and delivery of the training packages to support these requirements requires a GoC WoG Stabilization CoE. Although there are increasing efforts by the CF to include this type of OGDA input there is still considerable room for improvement in terms of making these activities reflect and meet truly WoG training requirements.

Exercise MAPLE SENTRY

The next major CF FG activity involving WoG participants is Exercise MAPLE SENTRY which is a command post exercise designed to provide a training opportunity for the HQs of all mission elements (Battle Group, KPRT, Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team, Air Wing, National Support Element, Task Force Engineers) to practice command and control. There is significant OGDA involvement, normally employing members with recent operational experience which adds realism to the exercise. Prior to the commencement of the exercise, CF participants receive further detailed briefings regarding the role and structure of the KPRT, with emphasis on the interaction with OGDA s.

Ideally, a training event such as MAPLE SENTRY would provide an excellent initial socialization vehicle for the leadership, both civilian and military, from each of the mission elements to begin to foster relationships prior to deployment. Unfortunately, due to the combination of a lack of synchronization of deployment timelines amongst GoC


\[160\] Ibid.
departments,\textsuperscript{161} as well as the primarily CF focus of the exercise, this rarely occurs. Because of these factors, while there is OGDA input into the planning activities during the exercise, the mutual understanding, relationships and trust building measures that could begin at this stage and continue within a theatre of operation are difficult to foster and sustain.

Road to High Readiness for Joint Task Force Afghanistan HQ

Those CF members deploying as part of the Joint Task Force Afghanistan (JTF-A) HQ must also participate in the Road to High Readiness for JTF-A HQ. This programme is delivered by the Formation Operations Centre of Excellence within the Canadian Land Force Command and Staff College and consists of the following components: Core Professional Development, Functional Area and Battle Staff Training, TMST and the Campaign Winning Seminar.\textsuperscript{162} The latter two components of this training are delivered almost exclusively by non-military SMEs, primarily by personnel from DFAIT, USAID and the US Naval Postgraduate School. Given the WoG flavour of these components, coupled with the interactive nature of TMST and the seminar, involvement of OGDA members deploying into JTF-A HQ should offer another opportunity for deploying GoC teams to share ideas and socialize.

Once these four components are complete, the training audience moves on to Exercise UNIFIED WARRIOR, which is a computer assisted exercise (CAX) designed to simulate the planning and operations environment in JTF-A HQ.\textsuperscript{163} Again, due to scheduling and availability issues, there is normally little consistent OGDA involvement

\textsuperscript{161} \textit{Ibid,} 38.

\textsuperscript{162} \textit{Ibid,} 37.

\textsuperscript{163} \textit{Ibid,} 38.
on UNIFIED WARRIOR, but certain roles are often replicated by CF members with experience working with OGDAs.¹⁶⁴ According to participant feedback, the presentations during the four component modules identified above do provide very good interagency exposure, especially as they are normally delivered by senior civilian members who have recently filled the upper echelon of Canadian billets in Kandahar.¹⁶⁵ Unfortunately, there is no consistent OGDA participation in UNIFIED WARRIOR, nor is it the case that those OGDA personnel who do participate will be those who deploy on the next rotation. As in the case of MAPLE SENTRY, if deployment schedules were synchronized and the training value was modified to ensure that WoG interaction was a critical training objective, it would significantly increase the usefulness and socialization value of UNIFIED WARRIOR as a vehicle to foster the necessary trust and relationships that will be required once overseas.¹⁶⁶

Exercise UNIFIED READY is the culmination activity for this portion of the Road to High Readiness, which is normally very well attended by OGDA and NGO participants and SMEs.¹⁶⁷ UNIFIED READY builds upon the training objectives of UNIFIED WARRIOR, while increasing the tempo and complexity of the training environment. The added dimension of the OGDA and NGO participants underscores the value and requirement of their participation to CF commanders and planners alike, as well as the necessity to build working relationships and trust amongst the WoG team.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.
¹⁶⁵ Ibid, 36.
¹⁶⁶ Author’s personal experience.
¹⁶⁸ Ibid.
While there is frequently greater OGDA participation during UNIFIED READY from actual deploying civilian members, it is important to note that this exercise serves as a critical waypoint in CF members predeployment training, and is evaluated by the chain of command. The introduction of civilian colleagues at this late juncture, while valuable, can be viewed as potentially disrupting, and result in the discounting of civilian inputs into operational plans, which by extension, hamper or limit the trust and relationship-building opportunities inherent in the exercise.\textsuperscript{169} This is yet another example of stove-piped training, that is primarily focussed on delivering training value for the CF, which has had OGDA involvement bolted on.

As alluded to prior, improved training synchronization earlier in the pre-deployment cycle would increase the socialization opportunities and value of these events. Futhermore, greater emphasis must be placed on the importance of WoG interaction throughout the training events. For example, built upon incrementally, GoC teams in each of the mission elements could be collectively evaluated by senior CF and OGDA members at each phase of their training in order to determine their ability to achieve 3C WoG outcomes.

Pre-deployment Training for Regional Command (South) HQ

Canadian personnel selected to deploy as members of the NATO HQ to which JTF-A responds in theatre must complete a condensed version of the Road to High Readiness for JTF-A HQ.\textsuperscript{170} Many of the same themes are covered during the presentations which are meant to prepare members for the collective NATO training


activities which occur in the Netherlands and Norway prior to deployment. Given the extremely limited number of Canadian OGDA members resident within Regional Command (South) HQ, outside of the OGDA members who assist in the delivery of training, there is little actual participation by civilian Canadian deploying personnel. However, once the allied HQ staff are brought together in Europe for their collective training, there is increased participation of OGDA members from the allied nations who contribute to the HQ.¹⁷¹

Exercise MAPLE GUARDIAN

MAPLE GUARDIAN serves as the culmination point and final test in the preparation of CF forces for deployment into Afghanistan. It is delivered by the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre (CMTC) in Wainwright Alberta and provides a realistic force-on-force training environment which employs a high-tech Weapons Effects Simulation (WES) system.¹⁷² This activity is the core training event during the FG cycle for Afghanistan and subsequently, more time and effort is invested to ensure that CF and OGDA inputs are worked into the training design of the exercise.¹⁷³

Recent research conducted by DRDC Toronto indicates that from the perspective of OGDA participants, MAPLE GUARDIAN is a valuable training activity as it provides the opportunity to interact with CF members and gain an understanding of their organizational culture, structure and planning procedures as well as establish the requisite relationships with the CF personnel with whom they would be interacting upon

¹⁷¹ Author’s personal experience.


As for areas that the training could have been improved, those OGDA participants interviewed suggested that exercise preparation could have been improved, as upon arrival, many knew very little about both the CF and the exercise. This was particularly evident when it came to the ability of OGDA members to participate in operational planning, most of whom had no prior exposure to this regimented military process. It was also felt that the CF were similarly unaware and ill-prepared to work with their OGDA colleagues. They also felt that more could have been done to include OGDA input into the training design.

While all of the preceding CF collective training activities are open to OGDA participation, scheduling conflicts and lack of availability of deploying OGDA members limits the WoG team and trust building value of these activities. Furthermore, additional detailed information sharing between deploying OGDA personnel and CF commanders and staff during activities such as TMST would better equip all involved for the interagency challenges they will face in theatre. The final key point that is relevant across all of the discussed CF WoG FG activities is a lack of clear training objectives and standards required to assess WoG interaction and performance.

Sub-Section 3 – Existing OGDA WoG Deployment Capability Generation Activities

Throughout his research, the author was only able to identify one truly OGDA-led collective DCG activities for WoG complex operations. Exercise NEW FRONTIER is a 3 day selection and professional development camp, that CIDA uses as part of its

---

174 Ibid, 10.


selection process for prospective candidates hoping to deploy to Afghanistan. NEW FRONTIER includes WoG participation from primarily CF and DFAIT and focusses on developing the skills required for managing the development projects that CIDA currently funds in Afghanistan. The participants on the exercise are made up exclusively of prospective CIDA deploying members. Held at the CF’s Connaught Ranges, near Ottawa, ON, NEW FRONTIER is conducted over a weekend where candidates are placed into a scenario that simulates employment and working realities in the KPRT. Prior to their arrival, participants receive joining instructions, a reading package and upon their arrival, they are required to complete a threshold knowledge test, to ensure that they are prepared to step into the scenario with a baseline of initial understanding.

Throughout the exercise, candidates work in a simulated KPRT WoG environment with CF and OGDA role players and are tested in their ability to participate in a shura, conduct a presentation to a military commander and deal with locally engaged staff. There is a committee of GoC personnel, including members of the CF, who have recent operational experience, who provide oversight for the exercise and evaluate the performance of the participants within a WoG environment, which is used as feedback at the conclusion of the exercise. The collected feedback is used as a selection tool, and prospective candidates are debriefed on their performance following NEW FRONTIER. Unfortunately to date there has not been any formal external examination of this activity.

---

177 Ibid.

SUMMARY

Through the analysis of WoG individual and collective learning opportunities outlined in the previous section, there were a number of recurring themes that contributed to limiting the 3C value of these opportunities. These shortcomings included: a lack of financial and human resources to take advantage of learning activities; activities that had training value but which were more focussed on the requirements of individual departments and agencies, rather than maximizing the 3C potential of WoG interaction; and most importantly, the absence of overarching GoC direction to clearly identify accepted definitions, roles, responsibilities, authorities and common funding to support the cultivation of a 3C WoG strategy for DCG.

The WoG interaction to improve DCG processes has been incremental and while many initial obstacles to cooperation have been overcome there is still a great deal of work to be completed if a truly 3C approach to DCG is to be adopted and implemented. The following chapter will investigate some of the methods through which Canada’s ABCA allies are addressing the challenges of force generating WoG teams for operations.
CHAPTER 5 – ALLIED WoG DEPLOYMENT CAPABILITY GENERATION FOR COMPLEX MISSIONS

As noted in the introduction, the challenges faced by Canadian WoG teams during DCG are by no means unique. All of Canada’s ABCA allies are experiencing similar issues, and have responded to these challenges with a variety of tools and approaches, along with a corresponding range of success in their ability to overcome these concerns. Beginning with a review of their recent attempts to improve WoG interaction on operations, this chapter will examine the WoG deployment capability development work that is currently under way in the United Kingdom, the United States and Australia, with a view to identifying potential solutions and best practices that may be applicable in the Canadian context. To foreshadow, one important common thread in each of their approaches has been the creation of a national civilian deployment capability in order to improve the coherence, coordination and complementarity of their individual and collective national responses to fragile state situations.

SECTION 1 – THE UNITED KINGDOM

The UK has tackled the challenges of fragile states with a very integrated approach, creating a stand-alone organization, the Stabilisation Unit (SU) that acts as the UK Government (UKG) “centre of expertise” for stabilisation.¹⁷⁹ This section will begin with an examination of the recent UK WoG deployments focussing on Iraq and Afghanistan. Focus will then shift to analysing the SU’s role, mission and structure, followed by a detailed study of the SU’s integral civilian deployment capability and its DCG procedures.

Sub-section 1 – UK WoG Experience in Iraq and Afghanistan

Following the successful ouster of Saddam Hussein from Iraq, once the need to develop and deliver a coordinated civil-military stabilization plan was identified, there was a great deal of institutional resistance to the idea of integrating UK civilian departments with the military. Part of this resistance was directly related to the lack of Foreign Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Department for International Development (DfID) personnel deployed compared to the size of the UK military contribution. FCO and DfID viewed the greater military contribution as a potential threat able to take over their traditional spheres of diplomacy and development. The effort to integrate civilian and military efforts was also hampered by a lack of similar coordination by the leadership of the US-led coalition. These two conditions contributed to UK forces missing the essential post-conflict “window” to make crucial stabilization gains in southern Iraq, which negatively impacted the security situation in Basra.

Following these experiences, the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) began advocating for a CA in its policy paper Delivering Security in a Changing World while simultaneously, US forces were just beginning to adopt the ‘effects-based operations’ (EBO) concept. While much of EBO was rejected in both London and Washington due to its mechanistic approach, it did serve as a thought-provoking catalyst for the

181 Ibid.
182 Ibid.
183 Ibid.
184 Ibid, 17.
The MoD paper initiated CA thought that led to the establishment of the Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (since renamed the SU) as well as the first UK Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Mazar-e-Sharif in Northern Afghanistan, which like its Canadian counterpart, brought together WoG partners for the first time. While need in both Iraq and Afghanistan appeared to be highest for additional cooperation, initially FCO and DfID remained cool to the ideas proposed by MoD, as both felt like MoD was treading into their areas of responsibility. When collective efforts were agreed to by these principals, these initiatives often encountered additional institutional friction from those in the Cabinet Office (UK equivalent to PCO) who viewed CA proposals, such as MoD’s and the PCRU/SU’s attempts to draft interagency doctrine, as a threat to their traditional role within government.

Despite the creation of the SU, between 2005 and 2008, the UK development and implementation of CA encountered a number of set backs including institutional jealousy and suspicion of MoD’s championing of the concept, cases of stove-piped policies in the UK effort in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, and the poor provisioning of the UK PRT in Basra by FCO and DfID which essentially neutered its effectiveness.

However, there were improvements in civil-military relations that contributed to the greater application of a CA, including the UK government (UKG) under the Brown Government identifying their strategic-level priorities for CA engagement amongst the world’s fragile states, the interagency commissioning of the *Helmand Road Map*, signed by both Commander Task Force Helmand and the FCO Head of the Helmand PRT, as

---

185 Ibid.

186 Ibid.

187 Ibid, 18.

188 Ibid, 19.
well as the increased understanding amongst the ministers and senior civil servants within MoD, FCO and DfID that effective results would only be achieved through greater cooperation.\footnote{Ibid, 20.}

Originally established in 2004 to create a robust civilian deployment capability and provide greater strategic coherence to UK post-conflict operations,\footnote{Patrick and Brown, Greater than the Sum of its Parts? ... 27.} in 2006 the SU became responsible to recruit, train and prepare the civilian experts for the integrated UK civil/military mission in Helmand.\footnote{Daniel Korski, “British Civil-Military Integration,”...20.} The SU will be closely examined in the following sub-section.

**Sub-section 2 – The Stabilisation Unit’s Mission, Role and Structure**

The SU is jointly owned by the UK MoD, FCO and DfID and is thus governed by concensus between the lead UKG departments with international mandates. The mission of the SU is to:

- To co-ordinate and support cross-government stabilisation planning and execution
- To ensure the rapid and integrated delivery of targeted expertise in a cross-government approach
- To lead on stabilisation lesson-learning and assist with implementation\footnote{The Stabilisation Unit, “What is Stabilisation?,”...}

SU’s role across the UK Government is to develop integrated planning and delivery with UK OGDs in order to:

- Develop an early common understanding of the issues in conflict-affected and fragile states, help shape the strategic approach and develop a coherent, prioritised set of realistic objectives.
- Provide mechanisms for orchestrated delivery of the approach, reporting on progress and reviewing outcomes.
- Deliver best practice and support the development of policy.
Advise Departments on specific thematic issues, such as Security Sector Reform.

Lead on the collation and dissemination of cross-government stabilisation lessons.

Support pre-deployment preparation for Afghanistan and other military exercises.

Formulate best practice with international partners.\(^{193}\)

The SU is divided into five functional teams that are responsible for five areas of work: Capabilities, Deployments, Lessons, Planning and Countries, and Security and Justice.\(^{194}\) The Capabilities Team is responsible for the recruitment, development and management of the 1000+ strong deployable Civilian Stabilisation Group (CSG). Discussed in more detail in the next section, the CSG has two components, a 200+ strong Civil Service Stabilisation Cadre (CSSC) as well as 800+ Deployable Civilian Experts (DCEs). The Deployments Team is also divided into three components, the Civil Effect Team, the Police Effect Team and the Communications and Logistics Team. The Civil Effect Team manages the deployment support (recruitment, selection, deployment, management and recovery) of the CSG to hostile environments. The Police Effect Team is responsible to manage the deployment of UK police and DCEs to hostile environments, peace support operations and other missions. The Communications and Logistics Team administers all of the SU’s information systems, security liaison and logistics. The Lessons Team focuses on informing UKG efforts on stabilisation and conflict policy and processes. The Planning and Countries Team (PCT) assist UKG departments and partners with the development of integrated strategies and implementation advice for both existing and potential operations. The PCT also provides a vital role in conflict assessment, monitoring and evaluation, and impact analysis. The Security and Justice

---


\(^{194}\) Ibid.
Group provides advice regarding security and justice components of the UKG’s Building Stability Overseas Strategy.\textsuperscript{195}

**Sub-section 3 – The Civilian Stabilisation Group**

The CSG is a civilian expeditionary capability that provides the UKG with a rapid reaction pool of personnel able to respond to situations of state fragility.\textsuperscript{196} CSG personnel provide expertise in the fields of disarmament, project management, communications, justice, infrastructure, economics, policing, agriculture, institutional reform and public finance.

As mentioned previously, the CSG consists of deployable civilian personnel drawn from two pools, the CSSC and DCEs. The CSSC is composed of UK Civil Servants, drawn from over 30 UKG departments.\textsuperscript{197} Prospective members must be current serving members of the UK Civil Service and receive the support of departmental line managers/HR sections. Applicant files are then screened by the Cadre Team and successful candidates are then interviewed with a focus on their behavioural competencies.\textsuperscript{198} Once informed of a successful interview, CSSC members are then provided access to an on-line portal in order to schedule their training and education opportunities. Core CSSC training consists of a Stabilisation Planning Course and Hostile Environment Awareness Training (HEAT).\textsuperscript{199} HEAT is a 5 1/2 day course

\textsuperscript{195} Ibid.


composed of first aid training, security/risk management planning, negotiation skills, evasive driving and exposure to working with UK military personnel. Having completed the core training, CSSC members are then rostered, and remain working with their parent departments until selected for a deployment.\footnote{Ibid.} Once selected for a mission, members must complete mission and position specific pre-deployment training. They must also complete a number of administrative preparations including, a medical examination, a security clearance process, and complete a series of briefings regarding duty of care, allowances, insurance, welfare support and career management.\footnote{Ibid.}

In order to minimize the friction due to CSSC members’ absences for training while rostered or when selected for a shorter term deployment (two weeks to three months), the SU works with department line managers to: minimise the disruption of normal responsibilities through scheduling, provide as much notice as possible, as well as explain the importance of the member in question to the CSSC.\footnote{The Stabilisation Unit, “Line Manager Support Booklet,” \url{http://www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/attachments/article/178/Line_Manager_support_booklet_-_final[1].pdf}; Internet; accessed 5 April 2011.} For longer term deployments (up to two years), the SU will again provide prudent notice, however managers are not expected to hold member positions for the duration of these deployments. Returning members are expected to apply for new positions within their home department.\footnote{Ibid.}
DCEs are recruited from non-civil servants who are available for rapid deployment to conflict zones.\textsuperscript{204} Ideal candidates have a minimum of five years experience working in the field of stabilisation in fragile states as well as possessing an understanding of UKG policy making and WoG practices. Some of the areas of expertise include: infrastructure, justice and prisons, strategic communications, governance, and policing and borders. The application process mirrors that of the CSSC except that the process is managed by functional managers rather than the Cadre Team. Functional managers are responsible for administering a particular stabilisation capability across a number of functional areas.\textsuperscript{205} Once accepted, DCEs are rostered on a database and must apply for deployment positions that are advertised by the SU to all CSG members. After applying for a posted position, applicants are then short-listed and interviewed.

HEAT is the only mandatory training for successful DCE applicants, however a number of other functional training opportunities are made available based upon the position.\textsuperscript{206} The primary administrative requirement is a security clearance for most positions.

\textbf{Sub-section 4 – Summary}

The SU’s governance structure has much in common with the CPA described in Chapter 3. The SU enjoys a strong and supported WoG mandate, coupled with a comprehensive and flexible structure to efficiently and effectively generate an expeditionary WoG capability which has enabled the SU to address a number of the


\textsuperscript{206} Ibid.
challenges that face the current Canadian WoG efforts. A similar model could prove effective for managing a comparable Canadian effort.

SECTION 2 – THE UNITED STATES

Even given the incredible number of resources available to the United States Government (USG), they too have struggled with the challenge of developing a 3C approach to generating WoG teams for deployment. The USG has implemented a number of measures to attempt to increase coherence, coordination and complementarity (3C) in its ability to field “National Security Professionals” to theatres of operations, be they international or domestic. The Executive Branch, Congress, Department of State (DoS), Department of Defense (DoD) and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) have individually and collectively worked to decrease points of friction during interagency operations. This section will examine how the USG, and its principle agencies of DoS, DoD and USAID, are attempting to improve the manner in which it screens, selects, trains and supports WoG teams for deployment to fragile states.

Sub-section 1 – USG Direction and Legislation to Improve WoG Interaction

In the wake of perceived shortcomings in its involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as domestically during the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the USG has invested significant time and resources into reinventing its interagency approach to national security missions. Recent attempts to improve the generation of USG capabilities in this regard include the following: National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44, Executive Order 13434 and the 2010 National Security Strategy. NSPD-44 will be explained in further detail in Sub-section 2.

---

Executive Order 13434, was signed by President G.W. Bush on 17 May 2007 and directs the creation of a national strategy for the development of security professionals. The resultant strategy published in July 2007 calls for the creation of a national security professional development program (NSPDP) that would consist of opportunities for education, training and professional experience because:

The successful performance of missions within each phase or function of defense, prevention, protection, response, and recovery – both military and civilian – are inextricably linked, and depends upon heightened collaboration and a mutual understanding of authorities, mission requirements, and operations across the Federal Government.\(^{208}\)

While initially envisioned as an initiative akin to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, which legislated increased joint collaboration across the services of the US military in order to reduce interservice rivalries and facilitate joint operations, the NSPDP is not enshrined in US law.\(^{209}\) Furthermore, the NSPDP is not as far reaching as Goldwater-Nichols in that the latter links interagency cross-pollination of employment with promotion to senior executive positions to the degree that Goldwater-Nichols requires senior US military officers to serve in a joint position prior to promotion to general or flag officer grade.\(^{210}\)


\(^{209}\) The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Re-organization Act of 1986 aimed to reduce inter-service rivalries and increase the “joint” - meaning the integrated employment of air, sea, and land forces – aspects of national military strategy, strategic and contingency planning, and command and control of combat operations under unified command. Taken from: Catherine Dale, “Building an Interagency Cadre of National Security Professionals: Proposals, Recent Experience and Issues for Congress,” 7.

\(^{210}\) Nora Bensahel, Olga Oliker and Heather Peterson, Improving Capacity for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, ... 49.
The NSPDP also fails to address the organizational differences that exist between USG civilian departments and agencies and that of the US military.\(^{211}\) That is, much like the CF, the services of the US military train and develop their personnel as the skillsets they require are not easily found in the private sector, whereas USG civilian departments and agencies are more akin to the Canadian public service, who hire the people who already possess many of the skillsets they desire. Nor do most USG civilian departments and agencies possess a personnel overhead capacity to backfill absences due to training and education, again akin to their Canadian cousins.\(^{212}\) At this time, it appears that NSPDP progress and development has slowed, thus its current value to USG WoG DCG efforts is questionable.\(^{213}\)

However, a separate recent strategic level development may prove to be more beneficial in this regard. The Obama Administration’s 2010 US National Security Strategy (NSS) identifies the requirement to increase cooperation, coordination and coherence amongst the civilian and military arms of government to ensure that resources and capabilities are aligned to meet national strategy objectives.\(^{214}\) The 2010 NSS seeks to reinvigorate the interagency process, and as a first step merged the National Security Council and the Homeland Security Council. Furthermore, the NSS seeks to rejuvenate the initiatives begun under the NSPDP to better prepare national security professionals to meet future challenges. A critical outcome of these initiatives is the requirement to grow the nascent interagency civilian expeditionary capability.

\(^{211}\) *Ibid.*

\(^{212}\) *Ibid.*


Sub-section 2 – US Civilian Response Corps

In 2004, following the invasion of Iraq, there was a realization that the USG had to improve its civilian stabilization and reconstruction capacity. In response, the US Secretary of State created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), with the mission to:

- Lead, coordinate, and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife so they can reach a sustainable path towards peace, democracy and a market economy.

One of the first major tasks of S/CRS was to draft NSPD – 44, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, which identified the role that S/CRS was to play in the management of interagency stabilization and reconstruction efforts. Within NSPD-44, the Secretary of State and by extension, S/CRS are tasked to:

- Coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities. The Secretary of State shall coordinate such efforts with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum of conflict. Support relationships among elements of the United States Government will depend on the particular situation being addressed.

One of the tools created within NSPD-44 to achieve the interagency coordination for the conduct of USG stabilization and reconstruction efforts is to:

---

215 Nora Bensahel, Olga Oliker and Heather Peterson, Improving Capacity for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, 34.

216 Ibid.


218 Ibid.
Lead United States Government development of a strong civilian response capability including necessary surge capabilities; analyze, formulate, and recommend additional authorities, mechanisms, and resources needed to ensure that the United States has the civilian reserve and response capabilities necessary for stabilization and reconstruction activities to respond quickly and effectively.\(^{219}\)

On 14 October 2008, the President signed *The Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2008*, which formally established S/CRS within DoS.\(^{220}\) This act also authorized the creation of the Response Readiness Corps and the Civilian Response Corps which have since been grouped together and renamed the Civilian Response Corps (CRC). The CRC when fully operational will consist of three readiness tiers: active, standby and reserve, with the active component consisting of 250 USG employees recruited from across the US interagency spectrum.\(^{221}\) This active component will have the capability to deploy to anywhere in the world within two to five days from initial warning. The standby component will eventually number 2000, while the reserve will consist of an additional 2000 personnel.\(^{222}\) It is also of note that as all three tiers of the CRC are drawn from USG departments and agencies, many of the administrative concerns and challenges that face deploying Canadian public servants are not directly comparable as US Code Title 5 provides blanket legislation for issues such as life insurance coverage and job protection that applies to all USG employees.\(^{223}\) However, the GoC could adopt a similar policy for higher security risk missions.

---

\(^{219}\) *Ibid.*

\(^{220}\) Nora Bensahel, Olga Oliker and Heather Peterson, Improving Capacity for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, ... 39.


\(^{222}\) *Ibid.*

\(^{223}\) Cornell University Law School, “U.S. Code Title 5,” [http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode](http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode); Internet; accessed 2 April 2011.
With respect to training, under the powers granted in NSPD-44, S/CRS, with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and USAID, co-chairs the Training, Education, Exercises, and Experimentation (TE3) Sub-Interagency Policy Committee. This committee is responsible for developing a training strategy and implementation plan, establishing learning goals, course and exercise priorities, as well as evaluating the feasibility of integrating existing training opportunities to meet training requirements.\(^{224}\) The TE3 developed training plan incorporates orientation training, specialized and annual refresher training, as well as pre-deployment training. The training and educational opportunities offered to CRC members is also available to US military members, and due to the interagency cooperation within the TE3 sub-committee, the training and education is provided by both civilian and military institutions, all of which advocate increased interagency cooperation.\(^{225}\) The CRC currently has over 100 active component members and over 800 personnel earmarked for its standby capability.\(^{226}\) These personnel regularly interact with US and allied militaries on training exercises and educational opportunities.

Having a standing civilian deployment capability with a comprehensive training and preparation strategy that is resourced and developed in partnership with DoD and USAID appears to mitigate many of the hurdles currently facing the Canadian approach to DCG of WoG teams, however research was not able to uncover many details pertaining to administrative preparations for the CRC.


\(^{225}\) Ibid.

\(^{226}\) US Department of State, “Civilian Response Corps Reaches 100 Active Members,” [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/04/140346.htm](http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/04/140346.htm); Internet; accessed 2 April 2011.
Sub-section 3: US DoD, USAID and CIVPOL Civilian Expeditionary Capabilities

Based upon recent operational experience in both Iraq and Afghanistan, which witnessed thousands of US DoD civilians deploy into positions supporting stabilization and reconstruction tasks, DoD has begun to develop a strategy and structure to manage future civilian deployments.\textsuperscript{227} The announced intent is to build a deployable cadre of civilian specialists capable of supporting the full spectrum of DoD mission (as discussed above), and to track the deployment readiness status in a fashion similar to the way military forces are tracked.\textsuperscript{228} DoD has also explored the possibility of developing this separate deployable civilian cadre into an interagency effort, however this would appear to duplicate S/CRS efforts and conflict with DoD support for the interagency deployable capability resident within the CRC.\textsuperscript{229}

In the area of disaster response, USAID maintains an interagency and intergovernmental capacity to rapidly deploy civilian expertise.\textsuperscript{230} The Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs) are composed of USAID personnel or part time contractors hired through a programme known as the Response Alternatives for Technical Service, who deploy into a disaster zone to provide transitional assistance within 72 hours of a crisis.\textsuperscript{231} Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) teams are generated and maintained by the municipal governments of Fairfax, Virginia and Miami-Dade County,

\textsuperscript{227} Nora Bensahel, Olga Oliker and Heather Peterson, \textit{Improving Capacity for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations}, ... 52.
\textsuperscript{229} Nora Bensahel, Olga Oliker and Heather Peterson, \textit{Improving Capacity for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations}, ... 52.
\textsuperscript{230} \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{231} \textit{Ibid}.
Florida through a funding agreement with USAID. Both the hiring of contractors and unique funding arrangements with other levels of government provides novel solutions to the challenges of generating civilians for foreign deployments.

The USG employs an ad hoc approach to the deployment of CIVPOL on international missions. Lacking a federal police force akin to the RCMP, the USG has difficulty creating incentives to state and other levels of government to offer up their police personnel for missions abroad. The DoS does manage a programme comparable to the CPA, known as the Civilian Police and Rule of Law Program, but again, the challenges of incentives and capacity impede greater participation.

Sub-section 4 - Summary

It is apparent within this section that, similar to Canada, the USG suffers from a lack of a unifying strategy with respect to how to train, prepare and deploy civilians on international stabilization and reconstruction missions. Because of this, the large and various departments and agencies of the USG often work in isolation and potentially at cross-purposes in their attempts to improve WoG interaction. However initiatives such as the CRC identify that given the will and resources, it is possible to develop and field a responsive interagency deployment capability with an integrated training and preparation regime. The following section will examine Australian efforts to develop and generate a civilian expeditionary capability.

---

232 Ibid, 51.
233 Ibid, 59.
234 Ibid, 60.
SECTION 3 - AUSTRALIA

In the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the Bali bombings on October 12, 2002, Australia also has begun to dedicate more time and resources into addressing the challenges posed by fragile states. However, much like Canada, Australia also lacks an overarching policy that directs its engagement in fragile states. Notwithstanding this policy reality, the first decade of the 21st Century has witnessed the requirement for Australia to deploy WoG teams into complex fragile states situations. Most notable amongst those was the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) in 2003. In fact, at least one review of international interagency missions characterized as the “the most comprehensive whole of government strategy toward a fragile state of any donor to date.” This is due to the fact that from the outset, the Australian Government insisted that the mission be civilian-led and include representation and input from across government departments and agencies including the Prime Minister, Cabinet, Department of Defense (DoD), the Australian Agency for International Aid (AusAID), Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), the Australian Federal Police (AFP), Treasury, Finance and administration. Thus in this instance, the mission had a clear, cross-cutting mandate with early buy-in, resources and executive support from across government.

Within the Australian Government, AusAID, a subordinate arm of DFAT, has taken the lead with respect to the development of strategies and principles for addressing situations of state fragility. To lead this effort, in 2005 AusAID established the Fragile

---

235 Patrick and Brown, Greater than the Sum of its Parts?, ... 76.
236 Ibid, 87.
237 Ibid.
States Unit which has since been renamed the Fragile States and Peacebuilding Unit (FSPU). The FSPU includes representation from OGDAs including DoD and AFP, in an effort to “strengthen understanding and policy responses to state fragility, particularly in the South Pacific.”

Unfortunately, as in Canada, the lack of an Australian WoG strategy which addresses fragile states has limited the FSPU’s influence to date. Moreover, because FSPU is housed within AusAID, the analysis that it produces is often viewed with a jaundiced eye by other arms of government. This is a challenge very similar to the one faced by START which resides in DFAIT. Finally, FSPU is a very small unit, consisting of only ten personnel, thus similar to Canada’s START, capacity is an issue. Another initiative as part of its approach to addressing the challenges of fragile states, is the Australian Government’s recently announced Australian Civilian Corps (ACC). Like the FSPU, the ACC is housed within AusAID. What is not clear however is the inter-relationship between these two organizations and how the policy advice function of FSPU affects the DCG of the ACC.

With a view to identifying best practices upon which Canada might model a future WoG DCG framework, this section will examine the current procedures for deploying Australian WoG teams before analysing the role of the ACC as well as it proposed pre-deployment preparation plans.

---

238 Ibid, 78.
239 Ibid, 76, 81.
240 Ibid, 77.
241 Ibid, 82.
242 DFAIT, “What is START,”…
Sub-section 1 – Current Australian Civil Servant Deployment Capability Generation

There is currently no structure WoG framework in place to prepare integrated Australian WoG teams for deployments into complex fragile state environments. Once the government has made the decision to deploy personnel outside of the Australian Defence Forces (ADF) or the AFP, pre-deployment preparations are primarily arranged on an ad hoc, bilateral basis between the generating department and one of DFAT, AusAID, ADF or AFP.  

In fact the model employed by the various Australian departments and agencies very closely mirrors the current Canadian WoG DCG processes. DFAT and AusAID regularly contribute diplomacy and development staff to provide pre-deployment information briefings to members of the ADF and AFP, in a manner similar to Canadian Theatre Mission Specific Training. When available and made aware of ADF pre-deployment training opportunities, deploying DFAT, AusAID and OGDA personnel do participate on exercises akin to the Canadian experience on Exercise MAPLE GUARDIAN. Deploying civilians also conduct other preparatory training such as cultural awareness and basic language skills, however in the view of the Australian Senate, it is far from adequate.

Other training activities include the preparations for AusAID’s Rapid Response Team (who deploy into disaster zones similar to the CF and USAID Disaster Assistance

---


Response Teams), which consists of a five day training package that covers humanitarian disaster response, AusAID policy, data collection and analysis, communications devices familiarization, and concludes with a two-day training exercise.\textsuperscript{246} While the context of the response is different, this package is somewhat reminiscent of CIDA’s Exercise NEW FRONTIER.

The AFP also maintains a separate DCG process which is resident within its International Deployments Group (IDG). The IDG was created in 2004 primarily to remove the burden incurred by the organization of ad hoc deployment preparations and management.\textsuperscript{247} It is tasked to provide “offshore law enforcement activities and participate in capacity development programs within the Law and Justice Sector.”\textsuperscript{248} Its deployment capability was initially based on officers recruited from within the AFP, secondments from Australian state police forces as well as Pacific Island nations. Prerequisite experience includes four years of domestic law enforcement service as well as being qualified to employ weapons. Pre-deployment training consists of a 35 day training package comprising use of force training, mentoring techniques, negotiation and conflict resolution, gender issues, human rights, humanitarian assistance and legal issues. The culminating activity is a nine-day training event designed to test their new knowledge and skills.\textsuperscript{249} With the exception of the 35 day training package, the IDG bears remarkable similarity to the Canadian Policing Arrangement administered by the RCMP.

\textsuperscript{246} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{248} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{249} Ibid.
Based largely on experiences garnered on RAMSI, in 2006, the Australian Government increased the deployable capabilities of the AFP by creating the Operational Response Group (ORG). The ORG consists of AFP SWAT, K-9, marksmen, and surveillance specialists who provide a highly skilled crowd control and riot management skillset coupled with the ability to deploy rapidly.

Outside of the notable exception of the ORG, Australia’s current DCG procedures for non-military personnel have much in common with extant Canadian practices. The lack of a centralized organization possessing the mandate and the resources to coordinate a WoG approach to DCG and the structure of the IDG are both examples of these similarities. The following sub-section will address DCG processes within the ACC.

Sub-section 2 – The Australian Civilian Corps

In response to a concept proposed at its ‘2020 Summit’ held in 2008, the Australian Government agreed to pursue the development of a civilian expeditionary capability to enable their swift deployment into situations of international disaster, stabilisation and post-conflict recovery. ACC members will remain in their regular jobs until called upon to deploy, much like their counterparts in the CSG and CRC. Employing a standby roster of up to 500 civilian specialists, it will recruit specialists in the fields of security, justice and reconciliation, governance, essential services, economic stability, community and social capacity building, as well as stabilization and recovery management. The recruitment campaign to fill the roster is expected to take approximately four years (thus complete in 2013).

---

250 Ibid.


252 Ibid.
Screening for selection to the roster will be based on technical knowledge, qualifications in their fields and experience. Interviews and other methods will be employed to determine if candidates possess the following desired personal attributes: cross-cultural sensitivity, flexibility, self-reliance and resilience.\textsuperscript{253} Medical, psychological and security verifications will also be conducted to determine candidate suitability.

Training for ACC members consists of three components: induction training, assignment specific training and ongoing training. Induction training will include the following:

- Understanding of the ACC objectives and processes
- Understanding of stabilization and recovery practice
- Gender and cross cultural awareness
- First aid
- Defensive driving
- Safety and security awareness
- Mentoring and capacity building in cross cultural environments
- Teamwork and leadership skills
- Civil military coordination
- Representing the Australian Government
- Legal environment\textsuperscript{254}

This training framework is quite comprehensive and combines many of the aspects covered in the Canadian context such as HET, and other stove-piped CF or OGDA training, however, this system captures it all under one WoG umbrella, which will make management and scheduling of activities far more efficient and effective as planners will be capable of maximising participation by advertising across their roster.

Assignment specific training will be conducted once an ACC member has been selected to deploy and will consist of situational and cultural awareness, as well as any

\textsuperscript{253} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{254} Ibid.
country specific health and psychological preparations. Ongoing training will be primarily conducted via an ACC portal website, ensuring minimal impact on members regular jobs. Some roster members will also be invited to participate in civil-military exercises. The use of web-based learning tools is another important aspect that should be utilized in any analogous Canadian effort.

**Sub-section 3 – Summary**

From this study, it is apparent that Australia currently force generates WoG teams in an ad hoc fashion, very similar to the methods employed by the GoC. The fact that all of the organizations responsible for the issue of fragile states are embedded within AusAID which itself is a subsidiary of DFAT really limits their visibility and influence across the wider Australian WoG community. This reality also limits the resources available to these bodies, as they do not manage their own funding. Because the ACC is a relatively new organization, there is very little information available regarding how successful it has been in achieving its goals, however, the detailed training regimes planned for the ACC provides a useful example that could be exploited by Canada as a model for a similar system.

**SUMMARY**

The UK, US and Australia have all struggled to address perceived shortfalls in interagency understanding and preparedness in manners that are akin to the Canadian experience. One approach however, appears to provide a more integrated model upon which Canada could base a WoG Stabilization CoE. Where the UK SU differs from its comparable organizations in Canada, the US and Australia is that from its inception, it was established as a CoE for all UKG stabilization matters outside the confines of an

---

existing department with a truly interagency governance structure. This CoE encompasses the functions of policy development and advice, operations, training, support and logistics, and lessons learned, as well as it is home to the UK Civilian Stabilisation Group, and responsible for its recruitment, generation, support and logistics. This “one-stop shopping” approach to DCG for stabilization engagements provides a functioning model which the GoC would be wise to mirror when developing a similar capability.
CHAPTER 6 – RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

This analysis has identified a number of existing shortfalls within the current GoC’s approach to deploying WoG teams that inhibits its ability to achieve 3C outcomes. This chapter will propose a framework to address these shortfalls based upon findings identified throughout this work.

SECTION 1 - RECOMMENDATIONS

As the Canadian presence in Afghanistan, both civilian and military, begins to drop in late 2011, it is essential that the WoG lessons learned and best practices that have been developed as a result of this mission are not simply forgotten. The deployment of a significant WoG mission in response to the January 2010 Haitian earthquake is evidence that this type of interagency interaction in a complex environment is not a unique event. In order for the mistakes and frustrations of the early days of the Afghanistan engagement to not be repeated, the GoC must attempt to institutionalize policies and structures that will assist planners and policy makers who will be faced with similar daunting challenges in the future.

It is therefore recommended that the GoC establish a WoG Stabilization CoE, modelled upon the UK SU, in order to institutionalize its ability to develop and field WoG teams capable of achieving 3C outcomes in fragile state situations.

CoE Governance and Establishment

Given the pan-GoC nature of this proposed organization, the WoG Stabilization CoE would likely be best placed as an organization responsible to the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs and the Privy Council Office. While not strictly a stand-alone organization, its placement outside of the confines of DFAIT, DND or CIDA would minimize much of the institutional jealousy and perception issues that exist between the
traditional 3D’s. This CoE would be governed by a Cabinet committee with representatives from all the key departments and agencies, with mandated provision of personnel from line departments to fill its ranks. Once established, in order to ensure coherence of policy and approach, the functions currently filled by START and the CPA would be assumed by this new body. In an effort to minimize departmental bias during the establishment phase, it is recommended that a private industry third party with a proven track record in interagency coordination, such as BAH’s Mission Integration Framework outlined in Chapter 1, could be engaged to assist in bringing the key stakeholders together. Due to the critical mass of public servants in the National Capital Region, it is recommended that this organization and its primary training facilities be housed in the Ottawa-Gatineau region.

**CoE Roles and Mandate**

This CoE would serve a number of purposes:

- Develop and shape strategic Canadian policy towards fragile states and regions;
- Develop pan-GoC assessment and intelligence tools to identify potential situations requiring stabilization;
- Provision of stabilization advice to GoC departments and agencies;
- Interact with international partners (ie. UK SU, US CRC, AUS ACC) to share and develop best practices;
- Establish and maintain the repository for pan-GoC stabilization lessons learned;
- Draft common standards and performance measures for the generation of WoG teams and personnel for future missions; and
- House and govern a Canadian WoG civilian deployment organization with the ability to:
  - Deploy, sustain and recover civilian stabilization experts on GoC approved missions; and
  - Work in conjunction with the CF to establish standardized training and support for deploying personnel.
As outlined in Chapter 1, thematic focus should be shaped by the *Aid Effectiveness Agenda*, focussing engagement in line with its five priority themes of: stimulating sustainable economic growth, securing the future for children and youth, increasing food security, advancing democracy, and promoting security, stability and sustainability. Country and regional priorities for focus and funding would be based upon the 20 existing countries of focus also within the *Aid Effectiveness Agenda*. These include:

- Afghanistan
- Bangladesh
- Bolivia
- Caribbean Region
- Colombia
- Ethiopia
- Ghana
- Haiti
- Honduras
- Indonesia
- Mali
- Mozambique
- Pakistan
- Peru
- Senegal
- Sudan
- Tanzania
- Ukraine
- Vietnam
- West Bank and Gaza

**WoG Strategy Development**

With this general guidance on where and what to focus upon, in consultation with allies, international organizations and NGOs, the CoE would begin to shape the individual country and regional WoG strategies that would guide future GoC

---

256 Ibid.

257 CIDA, “A New Effective Approach to Canadian Aid,”…
involvement. As the primary designer of these strategies, this CoE would be ideally suited to integrate and operationalize these strategies within its integral training and DCG organizations. This would facilitate improved adherence to the principles of the 3C roadmap, specifically Canada’s ability to educate, train, prepare and coordinate its national response to situations of state fragility.

A crucial component of each state/region strategy would be the collective development and incorporation of planning and assessment tools, similar to those resident within the UK SU’s Planning and Countries Team. These could be accessed by OGDAs to assist in the development of engagement strategies, risk assessment, course of action generation, monitoring and evaluation, and impact analysis. Provision of these services by a central organization would allow for greater coherence of engagement across the GoC, as client OGDAs would be able to conduct “one-stop shopping” when looking for advice regarding engagement in fragile states.

**CoE Training, Education, and Lessons Learned**

With adequate funding and authorities, this new body would be able to draw upon the training, education and professional development expertise resident in the CF, the Canadian Foreign Service Institute, the Canada School of Public Service, the Canadian Police College and other relevant organizations. Due to the existing resource limitations faced by OGDAs with respect to their ability to provide training and educational opportunities, there needs to be increased collaboration and synergy between the CF and OGDAs in the preparation and provision of integrated personnel DCG for

---


WoG operations. This could include the development of more flexible training delivery methods such as the incorporation of distance learning (DL) modules to existing professional development programmes, allowing OGDA participants to minimize the time away from their daily responsibilities. The financial burdens and time commitments of these opportunities could be addressed through the creation of a central funding pool within the CoE and resourced in the federal budget, which GoC departments and agencies could access to subsidize training as well as the ability to hire personnel in order to back-fill training absences.

In an effort to achieve optimal efficiency and unity of effort amongst GoC departments and agencies, there also needs to be improved communication and integration mechanisms that provide a collective venue that advertises upcoming WoG learning opportunities that can be taken advantage of. Improving OGDA awareness of and incentives to attend programmes such as CF 101, as well as the creation of similar DFAIT 101, CIDA 101, as well as WoG 101, would provide the opportunity for personnel across government to develop a baseline understanding of their fellow organizations, thus reducing the interagency knowledge barriers when WoG teams are formed.

The CF has rigorous training and screening procedures for missions such as Afghanistan, however, partnered OGDAs do not share the capacity to institute a similar robust capability within their individual organizations. Thus coupled with improved

---


access to funding to support OGDA participation, there are certainly economies of scale that can be exploited by improving the value of existing CF and OGDA opportunities such that they achieve the collective interagency training goals established in concert with OGDA partners.\textsuperscript{264}

To address the requirement to centralize management of WoG training opportunities, the CoE would act as the primary Canadian WoG training authority. The CoE would establish a clearing house for Canadian WoG lessons learned, best practices collected from allies and provide advertising and input to ensure that WoG participation is maximized for all available education and training events. This organization would have a subordinate training institution that would be charged with developing and delivering WoG curriculi for topics that could include:

- CF 101, DFAIT 101, CIDA 101, WoG 101, etc…
- Interagency Communications and Trust
- Cultural Awareness
- GoC Fragile States Policy
- Stabilization and Reconstruction Theory
- International Development Theory
- WoG Planning Processes
- Security during Stabilization and Reconstruction Missions

Specific programmes and curriculi could serve as pre-requisite training for eligibility to deploy on international missions, and successful completion would provide criteria for the rostering of personnel for the civilian deployment capability. This training institution could also provide exercise and simulation design and delivery for WoG teams, leveraging expertise and infrastructure resident within the CF Experimentation Centre in Ottawa and Director Land Synthetic Environment within LFDTS in Kingston.

\textsuperscript{264} Ibid, 65.
Training would be available to all departments and agencies of the GoC, provincial and municipal governments, NGOs, international organizations as well as allied and partner nations, thus ensuring a wide variety of views and experiences bring added value to the programmes. Moreover, the socialization aspects of these training events would lead to greater understanding across the GoC of the importance and value of interagency cooperation. This training institution could even be affiliated with a major Canadian university to provide educational accreditation for specific programmes as a further incentive.  

Civilian DCG

From the analysis of existing GoC WoG DCG training events, it is evident that there are few opportunities for WoG teams to meet and socialize prior to being deployed into harm’s way. Chapter 1 briefly identified the value of organizational socialization and the examination of the importance of CF FG activities as a vehicle to socialize its members into a cohesive team. Chapter 2 provides a strong argument for the need to increase the interaction and sharing of information between civilian and military members of the WoG team. Both of these organizational requirements would be addressed through the creation of a centralized civilian deployment group. Each of Canada’s ABCA allies have begun to develop similar groups, with common deployment standards, a baseline of foundational training, and a synchronized deployment schedule. The members of this group would then be available to train, interact and socialize with the CF and other allied civilian and military groups, further contributing to the 3C nature of Canadian engagement.

---

265 Ibid, 29.
In order to maximize the value of extant knowledge, structures and training opportunities, it is recommended that this civilian deployment organization be created with a flexible structure that is capable of deploying formed groups as well as individual stabilization experts. Best practices shaped from the examples within LFC’s individual and collective FG structures along with the RCMP’s CPA should be tapped in the creation of this organization. The UK SU’s Civilian Stabilisation Group provides another robust example of the DCG and support mechanisms required to field such a capability. Again, in an effort to minimize inter-departmental tribalism, engagement of an experienced private consulting firm such as BAH, could also prove useful in the establishment of the civilian deployment organization.

**CoE Funding**

In a manner similar to the UK SU, the Canadian equivalent would have access to its own funding outside of departmental mandates, that would be governed and managed by the Cabinet committee. The CPA provides an excellent existing example of how interagency management of a deployment capability can work. Much of this funding would be dedicated to the DCG activities of the civilian deployment cadre, as to date this area has particularly suffered from underfunding in this regard.

**Personnel Management**

Public Service collective agreements could be negotiated to include WoG participation as a promotion incentive for those prospective senior public servants looking to advance to the executive level which would aid in ensuring a deep pool of talent. Measures akin to the US Goldwater-Nicholls joint employment requirements for promotion to general or flag officer rank, could be implemented to incentivize participation of senior CF officers as well. To ensure maximum availability of
participants throughout DCG, Treasury Board regulations would need to be amended to allow for the hiring of personnel to backfill those absent while pursuing training and educational opportunities. Other personnel sourcing mechanism could feature initiatives similar to the CPA’s Temporary Civilian Employee programme, where recently retired GoC public servants could be recruited to fill deployment roster positions or to act as backfills for currently serving personnel. The CoE funding structure should include mechanisms to allow parent departments and agencies to tap into these funds to support their ability to deploy their personnel while meeting their individual organizational mandates.

**CONCLUSION**

At the outset of this study, five challenges to the coherence, coordination and complementarity of CA approaches were presented. These challenges included: the requirement for an integrated assessment and early warning system to predict when and where fragile state intervention was required, the necessity for a shared understanding of the sources of a state’s fragility, the need for a unified strategy with defined objectives, access to common funding and shared priorities, and the requirement to empower an integrated organization capable of implementing a government’s strategy.

It is with these challenges in mind that this paper has advocated the establishment of a GoC WoG Stabilization CoE, which would be placed under the PCO or the Department of Interdepartmental Affairs to clearly underscore the WoG focus of the CoE, and with membership from each contributing department and organization. The CoE would be resourced and mandated to develop achievable fragile state/region strategies with clearly defined objectives. This CoE will develop a common GoC fragile state assessment and early warning systems to provide timely and accurate advise to
political decision makers. Enabled with a distinct common funding pool, the CoE will synchronize GoC resources and responses with priority states and regions, as well as to ensure rapid and timely WoG response in times of crisis. Finally, sanctioned with these mandates and resources, the CoE will be able to field a civilian deployment cadre, trained and socialized with the CF, to ensure coherence, coordination and complementarity of the GoC approach to fragile states.

**AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH**

Throughout this endeavour a number of related areas have been identified that warrant future study. First, it is recommended that a WoG DCG training needs analysis be conducted to identify standard training vehicles and performance measures through which to evaluate a WoG team prior to deployment. Second, continued analysis of the effectiveness of on-going allied civilian DCG initiatives aimed at improving the delivery of respective national 3C outcomes, should be completed in order to inform the establishment of an analogous Canadian endeavour. Finally, it is recommended that further research into the domain of civil-military socialization be conducted in order to educate the development of future Canadian WoG team-building training.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Canada, Chief of Defence Staff. CDS Transformation SITREP 02/05 7 September 2005.


———. B-GL-300-008/FP-001 Training for Land Operations.


———. "Australia's Involvement in Peacekeeping Operations: Chapter 25." 

———. "Australia's Involvement with Peacekeeping Operations: Chapter 12." 
(accessed April/06, 2011).

———. "Australia's Involvement with Peacekeeping Operations: Chapter 13." 
(accessed April/06, 2011).


Schein, Edgar H. "The Role of the Founder in Creating Organizational Culture." 


