National Defence / Défense nationale

Canadian Forces College / Collège des Forces Canadiennes

A FINE BALANCE: CHALLENGES TO CANADA'S NAVAL RESERVE

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JCSP 37

Master of Defence Studies

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PCEMI 37

Maîtrise en études de la défense

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Canada

A Fine Balance: Challenges to Canada's Naval Reserve

A Thesis Submitted

to the Division of Graduate Studies of the Royal Military College of Canada

by

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In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Defence Studies

April 2010

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Abstract

The Defence White Paper of 1987 ushered in a new era for Canada's Reserve with its full embrace of the "Total Force Concept" and the assignment of specific roles and missions to Naval, Air and Army reserves. Each element interpreted this direction in a different fashion, and the Naval Reserve assumed the maritime defence responsibilities for coastal operations, naval control of shipping and mine countermeasures. More specifically, the Reserve was tasked with crewing the twelve new coastal patrol ships, the KINGSTON Class, and over the course of a dozen years, remade itself into an organisation that, at any given time, supports approximately 30% of its strength employed in a full-time capacity.

Today, the Reserve is challenged with a fundamental split in its structure between the traditional Class A Reservist and the needs of the cadre of the seemingly contradictory 'full-time' reservists, an increasing exodus of the full-time personnel to join the Regular Force and the resulting inability to consistently crew the ten operational KIN Class ships. The additional challenges of the various strategic reviews underway within the Navy to address its own critical issues and threats, the demands of Canadian Forces Transformation, Program Review and the demographic and social trends in Canada all have an impact on the Naval Reserve's 'room to manoeuvre' as it attempts to imagine its future.

This paper will argue that the Naval Reserve in Canada now confronts significant challenges which will require a substantive review and accompanying reforms. It will explore how the Reserve may evolve to meet these challenges and will necessarily

look at Reserve issues through the lens of the requirements of the Navy and the CF as a whole. It will also examine and analyse other reserve force models and finally will propose principals that could provide a framework for reform. It is hoped that the research in this paper may contribute to broader discussions about the future of the Naval Reserve in Canada.

Chapter One: Introduction

The history of the Naval Reserve in Canada is a story of survival. Conceived initially as little more than a proxy navy, it first enabled a few visionaries to nurture the slender but persistent ambition of a naval service before Canada was capable or willing to truly commit to a standing naval force. During two World Wars the Reserve proved to be the conduit through which the Navy was truly established: reserve divisions were the first point of contact for thousands of Canadians who joined the efforts in both World Wars; they served throughout the ordeal as reserves and at the end of hostilities returned home to their divisions. In so doing they took the navy with them to all corners of the country and made it a national institution. Inseparably wound, the Navy's and the Naval Reserve's storied achievements in the North Atlantic were proof of Canada's belief in itself and the discovery of its role in the world; they were the actions of a nation slowly shrugging off a colonial legacy and taking charge of its own destiny. And just as all stories of survival are also stories of adaptation, we have seen that as Canada has changed and evolved as a nation, so too has its Naval Reserve.

The Reserve's latest incarnation started off with what could be the most ambitious and optimistic outlook since its inception. The Defence White Paper of 1987 ushered in a new era for all of Canada's Reserves with its firm endorsement of the "Total Force Concept" and the assignment of specific roles and missions to Naval, Air and Army reserves. Each element interpreted this direction in a different fashion, and the Naval Reserve assumed the maritime defence responsibilities for coastal operations, naval control of shipping and mine countermeasures. More specifically, the Reserve was

tasked with the full-time mission of crewing the twelve new coastal patrol ships, the KINGSTON Class (KIN Class), and over the course of a dozen years, remade itself into an organisation that, at any given time, supports at least 30% of its trained strength employed in a full-time capacity. But the challenge of running a full-time mission with a part-time workforce, once so motivating to its members, has taken its toll.

Today, almost fifteen years after its confident return to the operational stage, the Reserve is challenged with a fundamental split in its structure between the traditional part-time Reservist and the needs of the cadre of the seemingly contradictory 'full-time' reservists which has evolved primarily out of the KIN Class mission. The desire to improve operational occupation training tailored entirely toward the KIN Class has unintentionally made qualification and advancement so demanding that many part time reservists, for the first time in the history of the Reserve, feel now that service at sea is beyond their reach. As a consequence, the traditional pool of part time reservists from which the ships would draw for crewing has dried up, resulting in an inability to consistently man the ten operational KIN Class ships and the overworking of the remaining full-time personnel. In its critical assessment of the state of the Naval Reserve, the *Special Commission of the Restructuring of the Reserves 1995: Ten Years Later* noted that a planned establishment of 5130 was actually sitting at less than four thousand members and that of those qualified in their occupations, fully 40% were working in a full time capacity; in 2010, it is closer to 50%. By any measure, a one-to-one replacement ratio is certainly not viable.

At the same time, the Navy is having its own serious challenges. By the Chief of the Maritime Staff's own comment in the *MARCOM Strategic Assessment 2010*, the impending demands of fleet recapitalisation will reduce operational capacity and risk compromising the maintenance of warfighting skills in "an entire generation of sailors…"[1]; this is compounded by the fact that the navy establishment is below planned levels, which negatively impacts its ability to deal with the range of environmental and Forces-wide demands. Until very recently, recruiting had consistently fallen well short of target. And yet the Reserve, in the past an augmentation force, is all but unusable to the major warship fleet because of its focussed requirement to train and retain reserve personnel for the KIN Class to the practical exclusion of other roles and platforms. Through the coastal defence and mine countermeasures missions, the Reserve is a parallel fleet, effectively a paramilitary coast guard in employment, with highly trained and motivated personnel who are unable to be effectively reassigned to any other ship in the Navy.

Clearly, the additional current challenges of the various strategic reviews underway within the Navy in order to address its own critical issues and threats, the demands of Canadian Forces Strategic Review and the demographic and social trends in Canada all have an impact on the Naval Reserve's 'room to manoeuvre' as it attempts to imagine its future. What then, might be the next stage of the on-going evolution of the Naval Reserve? This paper will argue that the Naval Reserve in Canada now confronts significant challenges which will require a substantive review and accompanying reforms. It seeks to explore how the Reserve may next adapt to meet

[1] Department of National Defence, *MARCOM Strategic Assessment* (Ottawa: Chief of the Maritime Staff, 29 October 2009),7.

these challenges and will necessarily look at Reserve issues through the lens of the context of the Navy and the Canadian Forces as a whole. It will also examine and analyse other reserve force models and finally it will propose possible principals that could provide the framework for reform.

Chapter Two: The History of the Naval Reserve in Canada

Historic Foundations

The creation of the Naval Reserve in Canada was a prolonged process, made in tentative steps as a new nation acknowledged its responsibilities and slowly marshalled its resources and the public will to meet them. In the very early days, there were no standing military forces and small populations had to rise to face existential challenges. As early as 1759, shortly after the Battle of the Plains of Abraham, 'marine militias' were formed to counter specific, temporary threats from the restive and ambitious colonies to the south. In the absence of steady Royal Naval presence in the Canadas, a "Provincial Marine' reserve was created in 1763 under the control of the Governor meant to organise the shipping industry in the Great Lakes, St-Lawrence River and Lake Champlain. Although the fleet eventually rose to twelve armed ships, the threat of the War of 1812 triggered relief through a repositioning of Royal Navy ships in the Great Lakes and, with its personnel transferring to support the Royal Navy, it was discontinued.[2]

[2] Louis Christ, "My dear Hose…it can't be done': Splicing Tradition in the Early Years," in *Citizen-Sailors: Chronicles of Canada's Naval Reserve, 1910-2010, (*unpublished manuscript, viewed with permission, 2010) , 1.

A Naval Militia was briefly created in 1837 in response to the Upper Canada Rebellion, and in the late 1800s no fewer than five acts had endorsed the creation of a volunteer naval corps of some description or another. Almost all went unrealised until the Fenian Raids in 1866 inspired the creation of stopgap companies to protect the region until, once again, the Royal Navy could arrive in defence.[3]

Following the creation of the Dominion of Canada, marine militia units were summoned under the *Militia and Defence Act* of 1868; tasked with coastal defence and fisheries protection, the lack of imminent threat or clear purpose again resulted in their disbanding a mere six years later.[4] With the 1871 Treaty of Washington, the threat of American invasion abated but instead was replaced with the threat of American abuse of Canadian fishing grounds. Control of these resources became the responsibility of the newly-created federation's Department of Marine and Fisheries and focussed Canada's marine patrol activities on fisheries protection.[5] Meanwhile, the periodic flare-ups of tensions in the late 19th century between Britain and its contemporary power rivals occupied the Royal Navy elsewhere and it was made clear to Canada by Britain that coastal protection against poachers and raiders was now a Canadian problem. [6] This eventually provoked discussion of the creation of a Canadian navy, [7] and the birth of the Navy League in Canada became one of the strongest voices for a Canadian naval force. Notwithstanding Britain's direction to

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[3] Christ, "My dear Hose…", 2.

[4] Ibid, 3.

[5] Ibid, 4.

[6] Ibid, 21.

[7] T. German, The Sea is at Our Gates: A History of the Canadian Navy, (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1991), 20.

Canada to take care of her own domestic concerns, when the early twentieth century arms race to keep ahead of the German navy became increasingly difficult, Britain started to actively discourage "colonial or dominion navies in favour of straight support to the R[oyal] N[avy]"[8]. Opinion in Canada was split as to how best to support the Empire, but the strongly nationalist Laurier government was firm in its belief in the need for independent capacity to tend to Canada's own interests. The Fisheries Protection Service fleet was augmented from its protection vessels and icebreakers to include several ships which were naval gunboats in all but name. Laurier's Minister of Militia and Defence, Frederick Borden, promoted the idea of a naval militia, patterned along the lines of the Royal Newfoundland Reserve, which would support the Royal Naval Reserve and which would form the "nucleus of a navy"[9].

When Germany finally outstripped its dreadnought quota and Britain sounded the alarm requesting immediate support from the colonies for help in continued dreadnought production for the Royal Navy, the Laurier government saw its opportunity. While Canadian public opinion was still split on whether to continue to support the Royal Navy or to create a Canadian navy, the government seized the momentum and shepherded the Naval Service act into effect on May 4th, 1910, creating the Canadian Naval Service. An ambitious programme of eleven ships, a Naval College, a Reserve and a Naval Volunteer force[10] was announced; this,

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[8] German, *The Sea is at…*,23

[9] Christ, "My dear Hose…", 18.

[10] German, *The Sea is at…,* 26.

combined with support and mentorship from Britain was the promising first step of the Canada's navy.

But as is often the case, other political crises soon intervened and the vision was not to be realised as planned. While there was some angry public opinion in Quebec that the new Naval Service was an imperialist tool which would serve only to drag Canada into British misadventure, the political issue of reciprocity with the United States had developed into a more troublesome issue which was a serious threat to the Laurier government, and indeed caused it to finally fall in 1911. The subsequent Borden government sought to curtail naval ambition and rationalise the Naval Service instead as a militia-based defensive organisation, but the recently-defeated Liberal opposition angrily rejected this about-face of their vision and the political turmoil which ensued left the immediate future of the fledgling navy uncertain. The proposed eleven ships became two; the Naval College lasted only until 1922 due to lack of funding by the Borden government and a reserve was not formally initiated at all. Nonetheless, the Navy was off to a start, tentative though it was.

The idea of the Reserve had not died, however and Commander Walter Hose, ex-Royal Navy, now of the Canadian Naval Service, the commanding officer of one of Canada's first naval ships, HMCS Rainbow, was at the vanguard of a new organisation. A "sailor's sailor", Hose had joined the Royal Navy at fourteen and had a long and distinguished record at sea and at war.[11] His Royal Navy career had seen him serve in Newfoundland and during that time he had witnessed the value of a naval

[11] Barbara Winters, "The Reserve Preserve: How the RCNVR Saved the Navy", in *Citizen-Sailors: Chronicles of Canada's Naval Reserve, 1910-2010, (*unpublished manuscript, viewed with permission, 2010), 22.

reserve force upon which the Royal Navy could draw, as there had been a Royal Naval Reserve division in Newfoundland since 1900. Now having committed himself to the Canada, Hose was a strong nationalist.[12] He had originally proposed the idea of creating a reserve in Canada to the Director of the Naval Service himself, Admiral Kingsmill, in 1912, but perhaps in view of the political turmoil surrounding the Service at the time, the idea was flatly rejected.[13] In 1913 however, far from the eyes of the headquarters, Hose encouraged a local group of enthusiastic yachtsmen to form and train a 'volunteer naval company' with the assistance of his ship, RAINBOW. Though later reprimanded by Kingsmill, the idea took hold and though unpaid, un-uniformed and with no official status, the numbers grew to 140 keen amateur mariners within a year. With the threat of conflict growing in 1914, Ottawa finally officially sanctioned a Royal Naval Canadian Volunteer Reserve in May 1914.[14]

The Early Years of the Naval Reserve

This 'Naval Volunteer Force', as authorised by Order in Council under the provisions of the Naval Service Act[15] was criticised at the time as potentially being more of a feeder for the Royal Navy than for the nascent Canadian Navy. It was to be an establishment of 3600 men, organised into regional divisions with companies of 100 sailors in the major city centres. It was to be called the Royal Naval Volunteer Canadian Reserve. With the outbreak of war in 1914, only preliminary steps had

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[12] Winters, "The Reserve Preserve…", 22.

[13]Christ, "My dear Hose…", 1.

[14] Ibid, 11.

[15] Privy Council 1313, May 18, 1914, as recorded in Gilbert Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada: Its Official History*, Tucker (Ottawa: The King's Printer, 1952), 158.

actually been taken to implement the force,[16] but Canada and its newly created RNCVR rallied to aid the Empire and by 1916 there were more volunteers than could be accommodated and some indeed were passed on to be enrolled in the Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve.[17] The war was not terribly eventful for Canada's small Naval Service but by the close of 1918 it had nonetheless "scratched together 9600 all-ranks, over 100 ships and an embryo Naval Air Service"[18], a remarkable accomplishment given the lack of support and almost complete preoccupation with the land battle by the Canadian government.[19] The exercise had been difficult however, since "no adequate steps had been taken well in advance to train crews for a greatly-enlarged fleet"[20] and ultimately, the Canadian service admitted that "Knowing full well we have not a proper organisation, we have most warmly appreciated and acted on the advice of the Admiralty on every occasion."[21] Despite its role in the protection of sea-going trade, the Canadian Naval Service's accomplishments seemed slight in the face of the events of the Western Front and, in the aftermath of the Great War, an indifferent public did not object to the navy being a target for cost-cutting. As Tony German points out in his account of the Canadian Navy in *The Sea is At Our Gates*, "Another old lesson was new to Canada, steeped as it was in the myth that militias won the wars. A navy must have a solid professional peacetime base; a navy can

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[16] Tucker, *The Naval Service*…, 219.

[17] Ibid, 12.

[18] German, *The Sea is at…,* 53.

[19]Ibid, 50.

[20]Tucker, *The Naval Service*…, 253

[21] Ibid, 254.

never be built overnight."[22] A year after the war's end, the Navy had demobilised and dispersed down to 500 men, two obsolete cruisers and two submarines. [23]

It was in this difficult context that Walter Hose, now Kingsmill's successor as Director of the Naval Service, had to decide how to bring the Navy forward. Post-war Canada was proud of its accomplishments but was still coming to terms with the cost and was suspicious of the risk of being dragged into future conflicts. Astutely, he understood that if Canadians did not understand the value of a navy or feel some connection to it, then it would forever lack the attention of government and therefore, the funding it would require in order to perform; when the call came, it would not be able to rise to the challenge. His Naval Secretary, J.A.E Woodhouse, summarised it as follows:

> If a dominion is to spend money on a navy, its people must be convinced that a navy is necessary:
> In Canada, a large majority of people live far from the sea and do not visualise the necessity for safe sea communications;
> The first necessity is to educate the people;
> The most effective way of educating the people is to bring the Navy to their doors, and the lives of their families and friends;
> A small navy is of no value as an educative measure as its personnel live in the neighbourhood of the naval bases - but a reserve force distributed across Canada would bring the Navy home to a great number of inland peoples.[24]

It was clear that the government would not make any political gain in changing this situation and therefore, within his meagre budget, and against the lingering threat of political opinion in some quarters that the Navy should truly remain strictly a militia

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[22] German, *The Sea is at…,* 54.

[23] Ibid, 55.

[24] Winters, "The Reserve Preserve…", 33.

endeavour,[25] Hose made a significant strategic decision to effectively 'run up the middle' of his rivals. Recalling the successes of the Newfoundland Division of the RNVR, the unofficial RNCVR of Victoria, and the roles they had both played in their respective communities, he decided to "scrap the Navy as a force and spend every penny he could find developing a new Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve."[26] Gambling that the benefit of instilling awareness of, and connection with a navy throughout the huge expanse of inland Canada would offset the shorter-term risk of lessened capability, he set off to build a truly national institution. As German concludes in *The Sea is At Our Gates*, "history would prove his decision sound."[27]

Lean Years

This new navy would be made up of a "bare bones regular navy" based in Halifax and Esquimalt, to be fed by a 1500-person reserve force from throughout the country whose members would train for two to three weeks on the coast every year, cycling through the calendar in order to keep the regulars busy training them. This was the compromise needed to maintain a navy, yet at the same time to increase national support for it and thereby improve its chances of future growth. Cleverly, this spread-out reserve force would not only provide broader visibility and recruiting opportunities, but the excuse for the Director of the Naval Service to "visit reserve centres throughout the country and address Chambers of Commerce, Rotarian Clubs

[25]Tucker, *The Naval Service*…, 340.

[26] German, *The Sea is at…,* 57

[27] Ibid, 57.

etc., on the elements of Naval Defence", and importantly, to gain access to local press.[28]

In January 1923, the Privy Council authorised a strategic reserve for Canada in two parts, patterned on the British model: a Royal Canadian Naval Reserve (RCNR) and a Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve (RCNVR), the first made up of those largely engaged in the marine industry, the second, untrained volunteers who were willing to learn the business of a navy. The RCNR would have 70 officers and 430 men divided among five port divisions; the RCNVR 70 officers (in the Naval, Medical, Accounting and Engineering occupations)[29] and 930 men spread in 15 companies or half-companies across the country. They would enlist for a three-year term, and a mandatory service of thirty drills annually at home and two weeks of training on the coast.[30] Bolstered by Hose's programme of constant advocacy, public engagement and strategic communication efforts, the Reserve became increasingly popular and by 1939 there were 19 naval reserve divisions and some approximately 1700 officers and men across Canada, effectively equalling the numbers in the Regular Navy.[31]

It was never proverbial 'easy sailing' however. Funding levels remained consistently extremely low to the point where what few training aids and facilities there were available were archaic and obsolete. Often Reserve companies were forced to find

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[28] Christ, "My dear Hose…", 16.

[29] Winters, "The Reserve Preserve…", 22.

[30] Christ, "My dear Hose…", 17,18.

[31] German, *The Sea is at…,* 58.

their own training vessels; fortunately, some of the first commanding officers, perhaps harkening back to the British tradition of aristocrats who raised and outfitted their own militia regiments, were very wealthy men who could afford to purchase training vessels for their divisions.[32] A new and not-well understood institution at first, the divisions struggled to gain official recognition within their community leadership and governments; the copying of the RN and RNVR models had made an organisation that also copied English traditions and assumptions, some of which were out of step with Canadian society and which undoubtedly lessened the appeal among the Canadians of non-English descent. And even at the highest levels of the Canadian military, united in 1922 into one Department of National Defence, was the continuing lack of understanding about the purpose of a navy in the Canadian context. Hose battled year after year throughout the 1920s and into the 1930s to fight those who believed only the army and air forces were worth investment in the defence of Canada.[33] In 1930 the RCNVR had had to reduce its numbers from 1500 to 1000 and in 1933, despite all Hose's efforts, the Navy came close again to being cut back to the point of no return. But then, events again beyond Canadian control intervened. The new threat of tension between the US and Japan risked impacting Canada, Hose argued, and the Navy was again grudgingly granted a stay of execution. As Germany, Italy and Japan had started their rise on the global stage, the need for military spending once again was the subject of increasing debate and support across the nation.

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[32] Winters, "The Reserve Preserve…", 22.

[33] German, *The Sea is at…,* 60.

What was the legacy of the RCNVR in the interim between the two World Wars? As Barbara Winters argues in her thesis *The Reserve Preserve: How the RCNVR Saved the Navy,* in *Citizen Sailor*, a history of Canada's Naval Reserve, the legacy is "…an ambiguous one. The Reserves clearly had saved the Naval Service from complete break-up in the early 1920s. But had they created a sense of pride in naval matters?"[34] She argues that the RCNVR did not truly educate the public or capture its imagination as much as it could have because of its reliance on 'overt British overtones'. As for operational capability, training in yachts was obsolete and by the start of the Second World War many reserve units were most effective as expanded recruiting centres; when the war broke out, the RN had to send instructors to Canada to help train wartime recruits.[35] Nonetheless, through the unwavering vision and commitment of Walter Hose, the Navy survived political consignment through the tough years following the Great War and through the Depression, and the Naval Reserve, a national institution, was born. The Reserve had indeed successfully buoyed the navy until the tide turned in the late 1930s. By then, Mackenzie King's government achieved consensus that Canada would not remain neutral in the face of Axis aggression in Europe and with that, the need was established to rebuild the Royal Canadian Navy.

Rise to the Challenge

Much is written about what became the RCN's distinguished hour, the Battle of the Atlantic, and also about how the RCNVR rose magnificently to enable this to happen; it is perhaps the best-known episode of the Canadian Naval - and Naval Reserve's

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[34] Winters, "The Reserve Preserve…", 19, 22.

[35] Ibid, 20, 22.

collective history to date. Little more than a token force in 1939 of just over 1800, (3843 on paper)[36], the RCN was to became by war's end the third largest allied navy, which had expanded from 13 ships, 1800 regulars and 1700 reserves to 100 000 personnel in over 1300 ships, 400 of them 'fighting ships'.

This was accomplished however in the face of a predicted adversity; the political environment which had not valued a standing naval force meant that the conditions for success did not exist at the outset of the war. The lack of naval policy, of experienced staff, doctrine, technical expertise and infrastructure all resulted in a difficult and costly learning curve; even in 1943 the right organisation was not yet fully in place. The numbers nonetheless are impressive: within the first six weeks of the war there were over 5000 applications to join the RCNVR and the divisions were overwhelmed. [37] It doubled in size by December 1939 and exceeded the numbers of the Regular Force in February 1940. [38] The home divisions struggled to keep up and were on their own to offer some basic naval familiarisation instruction until schools were developed on both coasts to manage and regularise naval training.[39] By 1942 over two thousand new recruits were streaming into the Navy each month via the now twenty-one reserve divisions.[40] At its peak, the Royal Canadian Navy's population was 96 000, 78 000 (or 84%) of whom were from the RCNVR. They served all over the world in platforms from aircraft carriers to landing craft and everything in

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[36] Joseph Schull, *The Far Distant Ships*, (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1950), 1,2.

[37] Richard Mayne, "The People's Navy: Myth, reality and life in Canada's Naval Reserves, 1939 – 1945", in *Citizen-Sailors: Chronicles of Canada's Naval Reserve, 1910-2010, (*unpublished manuscript, viewed with permission, 2010), 23.

[38] Mayne, "The People's Navy…", 7.

[39] Ibid, 23.

[40] Schull, *The Far Distant…,* 126.

between; in addition to the traditional sea-going occupations they included pilots, doctors and even accountants.[41] The sheer numbers of the reserve, and the need to optimise the knowledge and experience of the regulars by spreading them throughout the fleet, resulted in ships of all classes having ship's companies which were over 80% reserve members.[42] Over the course of the war fully two thirds of ships came under reservist command, including thirty-six RCNR and RCNVR officers commanding destroyers.[43]

Serving as little more than recruiting centres and mobilisation staging points at the outset of the war, the reserve had risen to an unprecedented challenge. It was in no small part due to this contribution that, for the first time in its history, the Royal Canadian Navy as a whole enjoyed the new public perception that it was indeed, finally, the "people's navy".[44] As Joseph Schull wrote in *The Far Distant Ships*,

> …in the event, necessity had mothered a navy which was perhaps, more soundly based on the breadth of the whole country than if it had been confined to a class set apart and segregated in the ships and seaports.[45]

The surge of the Navy brought together Canadians from all corners of the country and was a nation-building exercise of shared enterprise and sacrifice. The experiences, losses, legendary exploits and battle honours accumulated over those six years formed a Canadian legacy that looms large today and remains almost totemic in the

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[41] Mayne, "The People's Navy…", 20.

[42] Ibid, 20.

[43] Ibid, 20.

[44] Ibid, 23.

[45] Schull, *The Far Distant*…, 429.

demonstration of what is possible in the face of significant odds. Through it all a distinct and separate sense of Reserve identity was forged.

And then, just as at the close of the First World War, Canada had a choice. As Tony German notes, "That war too had laid a base of hard experience on which a navy to meet the country's future needs could well be built…if the country did not turn its back once more, and if its will was there."[46] Hopefully, Canada had learned its lesson from the last war. But how to hold a navy together when the lure of home and release from the drudgery of war were so immediate and compelling? And how to reduce the fleet to a sustainable peace-time size without losing its hard-won skills? For the Regular Force it meant in part hoping that some former reservists would decide to remain in the regular navy. It also meant retaining a large and capable reserve force. For many RCNR and RCNVR, a return home and to civilian occupations would mean continued reserve service at their local division.

Post War

In the confident years following the war, some sweeping changes took place in the Navy and in the Reserve too. As a founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and a member of other alliances such as North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD), Canada found itself in a position where it required a standing, permanent force of all three elements; for the first time in Canadian history, the focus had shifted from the necessity of a militia to the necessity of a standing Regular Force.[47] Post war domestic debate warned against repetition of

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[46] German, *The Sea is at…,* 203.

the scenario in 1939 when Canada found itself virtually without a navy. The organisation was urged to retain sailors with experience in either the regular or reserve navies, and there were calls to keep reserve divisions open even when bases or ships were being decommissioned. [48] Reserve divisions had been granted the full stature of 'His or Her Majesty's Canadian ships' in 1941 and the Reserve by then also had its own command and a seat in the Minister of National Defence's top advisory body, the Naval Board.[49] This stature allowed significantly better advocacy than the Reserve had previously enjoyed.

And the standard expected of reservists changed too. Defined by the experience and professionalism gained during the war years, the Reserve was expected to maintain the same levels of combat skill as its Regular Force counterparts in what was now an anti-submarine warfare navy.[50] Pay was equalised, and reservists had access to the same training, deployments and cruises in major warships. Each reserve division mirrored a ship's organisation and crew, and trained as such as well, with all officer branches and non-commissioned trades engaged in their specialist training. The Reserve missions were minesweeping, escort and coastal patrol. [51] HMCS MALAHAT, the division in Victoria, conducted two-week cruises in its own minesweeper. The units served not only to maintain and pass on naval skills and

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[47] Corinne McDonald, *The Canadian Armed Forces: The Role of the Reserves*, Political and Social Affairs Division, 29 November 1999, 3, at http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/BP/prb9911-e.htm, Internet, accessed 06 March 2010.

[48] Michael Hadley, "The Impact of Public Policy on a Naval Reserve Division", in *RCN in Retrospect: 1910-1968*, (Vancouver: The University of British Columbia Press, 1982), 309-310.

[49] Hadley, "The Impact…", 316.

[50] Michael Hadley, "From Wavy Navy to Jolly Green Giants: 1945 to 1968" in *Citizen-Sailors: Chronicles of Canada's Naval Reserve, 1910-2010, (*unpublished manuscript, viewed with permission, 2010), 12.

[51] Hadley, "From Wavy Navy…", 20.

experience, but in no small part also served as social clubs which sustained wartime brotherhood. The divisions engaged the interest and attention of their communities through glamourous formal balls and mess dinners, ensuring naval profile within communities across the country.

In 1947 the RCNVR and the RCNR were melded (eleven years before the Royal Navy merged its RNR and RNVR) to form the RCNR, but, as elsewhere, merchant mariners were still sought-after recruits. Also in 1947, the navy expanded the University Naval Training Division, which had been created during the war to provide officers for the fleet. Hundreds of university students from across the country, including francophone students, would spend their summers training with the Regular Force and would receive their commission upon graduation, at which point they could join the Regular Force, accept three-year contracts of continuous duty as reservists, or proceed to their civilian careers and remain active with their local division. It was an extraordinary opportunity to see the world, to gain unique and challenging training and to also receive sufficient pay to cover their year's tuition.

From the Navy's perspective it was probably one of the most enlightened strategic communication opportunities of its history; over the programme's approximately twenty five years, over seven thousand candidates gained intimate and extraordinary understanding of the purpose and capability a navy provides its nation. Many of these men went on to be professionals, businessmen, journalists, diplomats and the like – leaders who would become influential in their communities and who could shape

opinion in support of the Navy.[52] The programme was discontinued in 1968 and has never been formally replaced.

Ideas were big in the early 1950s: while the total armed forces grew from 41 500 to 84 000 between 1949 and 1951 (the Navy increasing in that period from 8000 to 12000) the goal was to have a Reserve of eight to ten thousand men by 1952. This was perhaps rather ambitious, as in 1951 strength was only 3769. Despite this, a new command was formed in 1953 for the Reserve, the 'Commanding Officer, Naval Divisions', located in headquarters in Hamilton. From there it oversaw summer training on the Great Lakes.

But in the later years of the 1950s came a shift in thinking, triggered by the threats of the nuclear age. The high levels of readiness and technological knowledge now required in ships were a challenge for a part-time force to maintain and, in the face of a nuclear attack, a division's mobilisation time was judged to be too slow to be useful.[53] In 1957, the Reserve was no longer be thought of as a force would could mobilise as a combat-capable ship's company. Rather, the Reserve once again became a 'force in being' which, if called up, would augment positions ashore and at sea, filling gaps in ship's companies.[54]

By 1960 the Naval Reserve drifted even farther away from its war-time legacy, now officially focused on 'generalist' skill sets in keeping with a part-timer's perceived

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[52] Ibid, 20.

[53] McDonald, *The Canadian Armed Forces* …, 3.

[54] Hadley, "The Impact of Public Policy…", 314.

capacity to keep up.[55] This decline in skills was partly blamed on the increasing lack of access to training billets in sea-going ships. To rectify this, the small trawler-style Gate Vessel ships were eventually dedicated to the Reserve and allowed divisions to take their ship's companies to sea for training weekends and readiness performance checks. Sturdy and forgiving, gate vessels were eventually crewed by a small core of reserve members who worked on a more or less full-time basis, but otherwise they were the platforms which enabled Reserve divisions to take their ship's companies out to sea for a long weekend without having to rely on outside support. The gate vessels served loyally for forty years, were the ticket to sea for generations of reservists and were excellent platforms for learning and practicing basic seamanship and navigation. But as gate vessels eventually had no operational relevance whatsoever, the Reserve became a force with limited operational capacity.

Still, the continued sea-going capability allowed the Reserve to scrape by with wry dedication. The Naval Reserve did not have the same level of political advocacy as the militia enjoyed from its powerful support[56], but the occasional editorial advocacy that scolded against eliminating the reserve didn't hurt either, reminding that the loss of the Reserve would have negative effect on the Regular Navy and if eliminated, would be very difficult to recreate.[57] Post-unification, the Naval Reserve no longer had any formal role in the defence structure and no combat capability except through the Naval Reserve Naval Control of Shipping (NCS) organisation and the associated

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[55] Ibid, 315.

[56] J.L Granatstein, LGeneral (Retd) Charles Belzile, *The Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves, 1995: Ten Years Later*, Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, (Calgary: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2005), 9.

[57] Hadley, "From Wavy Navy…", 17, 20.

Convoy Commodore organisation (CCO). It has been argued that together they were in fact one of Canada's most relevant contributions to Europe's Cold War survivability.[58] Founded in the experience of the Second World War and further developed during the Cold War[59], NCS was and remains today a naval reserve specialty in many nations.

The lack of focus during the 1970s allowed - or perhaps required - the organisation to exercise a certain degree of creativity and ingenuity in delivering training in the face of limited resources. It still had a structure which remained fundamentally independent of the navy, developing its own leadership and largely administering itself with some support from the Regular Force. In a familiar pattern from earlier eras, commitment and esprit de corps seemed to be ends in themselves. The 1973 celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the Reserve was marked by a 1400-mile sail from Yellowknife down the Mackenzie River to Tuktoyaktuk in whalers, and two Gate Vessels sailed into the Eastern Arctic to the Northwest Passage.[60] The RN sent over a minesweeping squadron to visit Halifax to celebrate the anniversary, and regattas and parties abounded.

Despite the 'country club' image,[61] there was nonetheless always a core of dedication to professionalism. Reserves served in major warships whenever possible, augmented UN missions and in 1976 the organisation was mobilised to support the Montreal

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[58] Ian Holloway, "The Quest for Relevance: 1968-1990", in *Citizen-Sailors: Chronicles of Canada's Naval Reserve, 1910-2010, (*unpublished manuscript, viewed with permission, 2010), 1.

[59]Holloway, "The Quest…", 15.

[60] Ibid, 6.

[61] Ibid, 7.

Olympics. The 1972 introduction of a new programme to employ students for eight weeks during summer triggered an important change in the reservist demographic; it offered the option of joining the Reserve upon completion of this summer training and the numbers which did biased the recruit base firmly towards late high-school or university-aged candidates. Units expanded and the training cycle became driven entirely by accommodation of the university year and the availability of students, [62] a pattern which continues today. Mariners were no longer sought out as primary recruits.

With the closing years of the 1970s and the start of the 1980s, the next evolution drew the Reserve along the same paths that the society in which it was based was following. Women started going to sea in the 1970s and by the late 1980s no occupations or positions were restricted to women in the Navy except in submarines. The strategic 'Naval Presence in Quebec' initiative was implemented primarily through the Reserve, with the move of the headquarters away from Hamilton, and the expansion of four reserve units along that great maritime gateway, the St-Lawrence river. Most NATO countries were starting to strengthen their reserve forces, partly because they were less costly.[63] Canada started to examine what role its own navy reserve might offer. Classes of service had started to evolve, with the part-time reservist training at the home unit one or two nights a week deemed 'Class A' service; the short term contract from two weeks to three years deemed the full time 'Class B' with the eventual clarification that those full time positions in an operational setting were 'Class C' contracts in order to offer the full range of protection and benefits

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[62] Ibid, 11.

[63] McDonald, *The Canadian Armed Forces*, 1.

appropriate to the risk of the job. With the exception of Class C contracts, Reservists received a roughly 85% ratio of the salary of the Regular Force equivalent rank and seniority level. Gradually, the desire for a return to operational relevance started to take hold.

Total Force Shift

Canada's 1987 White Paper on defence policy, *Challenge and Commitments* was a watershed moment for the Reserve when it reaffirmed the 'Total Force Concept' which called for a unified force – integrating full-time and part-time military personnel to provide multi-purpose, combat-capable armed forces. This new philosophy for a reserve force was taking hold world-wide, as nations moved away from considering a reserve a strategic asset to be mobilised only in times of war, but rather now saw a reserve as "complementary and integral"[64] to the force as a whole, on a day-to-day basis. In Canada, the navy and army reserves had remained very much geared to a student recruit population and the training year schedule revolved around the predominant availability for training of students during the summer months. But the 1987 White Paper now tasked the Reserves in Canada with the augmentation and sustainment of Regular Force units - and in some cases, for tasks not performed by Regular Forces – such as mine countermeasures operation[65], thus permitting a hybrid combining some augmentation capacity with niche roles. All the reserve components in the Canadian Forces interpreted the Total Force missions and roles slightly differently, in accordance with their particular requirements.

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[64] Richard Weitz, *The Reserve Policies of Nations: A Comparative Analysis* (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, September 2007), vii.
[65] Air Reserve Structure, "The Total Force Concept", http://www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/ar-ra/page-eng.asp?id=118, Internet, accessed 29 January, 2010.

Today there are four main categories of reservist: the Primary Reserve (of which the Naval Reserve is part); the Supplementary Reserve (a non-mandatory list of former regular force members who may volunteer for limited service and may be called up but are otherwise an inactive, dormant group); the Cadet instructors List and the Canadian Rangers. Unlike other nations which were also embracing the Total Force construct, Canada chose to do so without also the framework of policies which other nations felt to be key enablers to maintaining reliable niche expertise assigned to their reserves. Canada did not require any mandatory time or training commitments from its members, other than relatively loosely interpreted expectations for attendance at reserve divisions and placing a limit on the amount of time recruits could take to become qualified in their selected occupation. On the other hand, it also did not place any limits on the amount of full-time service a sailor could perform, effectively allowing him or her to have a full career of twenty or thirty years entirely and exclusively working full-time as a reservist. Canada also did not implement any policy requiring former Regular Force personnel to contribute compulsory active service (active or otherwise) in the reserves upon completion of their regular engagements, leaving the Supplementary Reserve list as a voluntary activity. Nor did Canada implement job protection policies to better facilitate leaves of absence by reservists from their civilian jobs to optimise their availability for the new, steady-state roles, although this has since changed to some degree with different levels of protection in the different provinces.[66]

[66] http://www.cflc-clfc.forces.gc.ca, Internet website.

In a stroke, the 1987 White Paper reversed years of operational near- irrelevance of the Naval Reserve by adding, in addition to the existing NCS and the CC organisations, the specific role of coastal defence, including mine countermeasures (MCM), and this new role came with the Maritime Coastal Defence Organisation and twelve new coastal patrol ships (the Maritime Coastal Defence Vessel project) which would be crewed predominantly by reservists. The Reserve would also maintain standing Port Inspection Diver teams on each coast, support the Regional Dive Centres and supply four non-standing Port Security units and four Naval Control and Guidance to Shipping (the former NCS, now NCAGS) units. In order to assist in the management and administration of the above, the Naval Reserve would also contribute to Forces-wide training establishments, supply a Minor War Vessel Sea Training team on each Coast, support the coastal formations, manage its own headquarters and support twenty four naval reserve divisions across the country. Such a significant challenge had not been encountered since 1939. By the time the 1994 follow-up White Paper came out confirming the Total Force concept, the first of the KIN Class ships was in construction and an entirely new organisation was being built up around the ships and their mission. With that, the second most ambitious era of the Naval Reserve began.

Coastal Defence Era for the Naval Reserve

In 1996 HMCS KINGSTON, the first of the KIN Class coastal patrol ships was accepted and commissioned into the Navy. These versatile little ships triggered a rebirth of sense of purpose for the Naval Reserve. Each coast would receive six, of which five at any given time would be in operational service with the sixth in a scheduled maintenance period, manned only with a minimal caretaker crew. Tasked

with these new coastal defence missions, the crew concept was based on a small core of critical positions to be filled on a longer term-basis (one to three year contracts) to be amplified by the remaining billets filled on a more flexible basis, to a total of approximately forty ship's company depending on the mission. This was designed to allow the part-time Class A reserves to sail for a few weeks or months at a time, when able to take a leave of absence from their civilian job, or during school breaks. All the ship's positions were reserve billets except for two electricians, trades not offered in the reserve. The intent was that, around a nucleus of reservists serving on a longer-term, continuous basis (Class B or C reserves), a KIN Class-qualified Class A cadre could be developed and relied upon to periodically and even cyclically fill the other crew positions. The attraction was significant: the KIN Class ushered in a new world of operational opportunity and ships were assigned to missions and exercises which had them active in Europe, Hawaii, the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico.

De rigueur missions included preventive patrols in support of the RCMP, fisheries, sovereignty and search and rescue zone patrols, trips up the Great Lakes in support of naval strategic communications, submarine escort on the West Coast , forays into the near-Arctic and mine warfare exercises with NATO and the USN. Integration into the larger coastal fleet exercises occurred whenever possible and there was, for the first time since the last war, a sense of rightful operational place for the Reserve within the Navy at large. As the Regular Force had lost its 'small boat navy' with the retirement of the former minesweeper / patrol boats in the mid 1990s, the KIN Class took on the mantle of the charismatic small boat mentality: hard working little ships plying the coasts, handy in the seamanship required of operating constantly in the littorals, small

ships' companies foregoing some of the big-ship formalities in the interest of getting the job done.

It was an exciting time not only for the ship's companies but also for the shore establishments which sprang up seemingly overnight in order to manage this new fleet. Long-serving reservists, rightfully seeing the KIN Class and the coastal defence mission as the realisation of a long-held dream of more meaningful naval contribution, took leaves of absence from civilian careers to serve at sea for as much as a year or more, and the attraction of a real mission and sense of purpose for the Reserve inspired many to stay on in the organisation. The energy and optimism were indeed so powerful that, in the 1995 *Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves*, tasked largely with the challenge of sorting out the predominantly militia-specific shortcomings of the Reserve as a whole, little mention was made of the Naval Reserve because it was seen to be a successful and well-organised force. According to the Commission:

> …[the Naval Reserves] are in good order, thanks to the assignment of specific tasks to the reserve, especially the manning of MCDVs [KIN Class]. This role has had a positive impact on morale and training. Naval reservists are generally satisfied that they are needed and that they can meet their commitments.[67]

But by the time KINGSTON was ten years old, the concept was starting to unravel. The follow-on report to the original Restructuring the Reserves study, called *The Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves, 1995: Ten Years Later* now had a very different view of the Naval Reserve. Among the problems it now

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[67] J.L Granatstein and LGeneral (Retd) Charles Belzile, *The Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves, 1995: Ten Years Later, as* quoted in *The Canadian Armed Forces*, 9.

identified were the inadequate personnel throughput required to sustain a full-time mission, the creation of two solitudes between the part-time and full-time communities and an overall weakening morale. What had happened? And what would be the overall effect on the ability of the Navy to deliver on its priorities?

Chapter Three: The Current Situation

The mission of the Naval Reserve today is to "Generate sailors to support and sustain CF operations"[68]. The Naval Reserve continues to be led by a reserve commodore who reports to the head of the Navy, the Chief of the Maritime Staff, and is based in the Naval Reserve Headquarters complex in Quebec City. As a result of a key 2000 study to analyse and validate the establishment of reserve personnel required to fulfil its roles to 2020,[69] a standard naval reserve division (NRD) organisation has been implemented in the twenty-four units across the country and the regional organisation structure is now aligned with the Joint Task Force regions resulting from CF Transformation. An establishment has been proposed which allows for both full-time and part-time career paths and has attempted to determine a Force Generation 'factor' required to provide an adequate selection pool to sustain both the full- and part-time missions. The study also proposed a total Naval Reserve establishment of 5130 with a trained effective strength (not including those still in initial training, on restricted

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[68] http://www.navyforces.gc.ca/navres/0/0-n_eng.asp?category=115&title=1017, Internet; accessed 1 April 2010.

[69] *Naval Reserve Establishment Review Validation Study* (NERVS), 2000, and *Naval Reserve Establishment Review Validation and Sustainment Project 2005,*(NERVS-RP 2005, as quoted in "Naval Reserve Establishment Review Validation and Sustainment Project (NERVS-RP 2005) Final Report Briefing", Captain(N) A. Zuliani, Powerpoint presentation to Command Working Seminar, Naval Reserve Headquarters, 24 February 2008.

duties due to medical categories, on maternity/paternity leave, awaiting release and the like) of 4492, of which 3671 were to be Class A part-time positions and 821 were 'continuous service positions'. As of the most recent count however, fully 1370 are on full-time service.[70] Because so many of the KIN Class billets continue to go unfilled, it seems that many of the reservists who are gainfully employed in full-time positions are not the qualified operational occupations needed to crew the ships.

Personnel

The stresses of the coastal defence role started to take their toll in the mid 2000s as the Reserve struggled to crew the KIN Class from a smaller and smaller pool of volunteers. The demands of operational missions of the full-time coastal defence role required highly skilled and competent crews; to maintain that level, there was less and less allowance for unpracticed part-time personnel. With the push to achieve and maintain the highest levels of capability, training and qualifications increased in complexity and time and started to tax the part-time members' ability to keep up. Slowly, the rotation through of part-time personnel slackened and the ships relied more and more on cycling through a decreasing pool of all full-time reserve personnel, a situation seemingly at odds with the very purpose of a reserve.

Because some of the qualifications for occupation and rank progression started to seem out of reach of the part time members, they simply ceased trying to get to sea to pursue a now seemingly unattainable qualification and instead focused on continued contributions to their home unit, or to working out-of-trade or branch. The Reserve's

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[70] Department of National Defence, Commodore L. Hickey, "Director General of Naval Personnel Sitrep 2", E-mail, 7 April 2010, 2139.

other missions of Port Security and NCS could provide gainful part-time employment and an adequate replacement for the sea-going opportunities which now seemed too difficult. A split was developing between the part-time and full-time reserve worlds, strangely replicating the situation which had previously existed between the Regular Force and the Reserve.

Policy

Several policy shifts would contribute to the increasing unbalancing of the relationship between the Regular Force, the full-time and part-time Reserve and the ability of the Reserve to crew the KIN Class. All were developments which largely mirrored the evolution in thinking about the Total Force concept in other countries: the need to match the increased importance of the roles (and the accompanying risk and responsibility) required of reservists with increased compensation and benefits in line with their regular force counterparts.

First, the March 2002 policy which restricted Class C positions to those employed on operations of usually over a year's duration (including pre-deployment training taking place in Canada and, on the occasion, search and rescue missions), was clarified to include the "preparation, deployment, employment, redeployment and leave related to an operation"[71] and then expanded to include "routine naval operations".[72] This was welcomed as appropriate recognition of the duties and responsibilities of reservists in seagoing (KIN Class) billets, ensuring that reserve personnel would be protected in event of incident just as Regular Force members would be. But beyond receiving

[71] www.cfgb-cgfc/English/perspectivesjune09.html, Internet, accessed 14 March 2010.

[72] Ibid.

access to the same benefits and insurance coverage as their Regular Force comrades, it also meant that, for the first time in decades, Reserve members serving in sea-going billets in ships which were tasked with day-to-day coastal operations would receive the same level of pay as their Regular Force counterparts, instead of the average 85% compensation offered by Class A or B service.

While this was interpreted as fair recognition of equal pay for equal work, it had other perhaps unforeseen effects. While it served as an excellent incentive to retain sailors in sea-going positions, the unintended effect was that it caused a short-circuit in the normal personnel management cycle of posting individuals back to positions ashore in the training, policy or headquarters establishments. In fact, the policy made it undesirable for that individual to cycle out of the sea billet as it would result in a 15% drop in pay once back on shore. While these decisions helped keep ships crewed, it also stagnated turnover, decreased access to the platform by others and was a disincentive to accept full-time employment in non-Class C positions.

The second important policy evolution was the introduction of the Reserve Force Pension, made after years of study and exhortation to do so. A first study in the 1980s had resulted in a Reserve Force Gratuity Program which was effectively a severance package upon departure or retirement. In 2003 a plan was announced to create a pension in earnest to "support the flexibility and expected utilisation of the Reserve Force while respecting the career diversity and expectation of its members."[73] It was aimed specifically at those who were mainly part-time reservists who served the

[73] http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/new-nouvelles-eng.asp?cat=00&id=1076, Internet, accessed 14 March 2010.

occasional full-time contract, and made allowances to permit those who had worked predominantly in a full-time capacity to join the Regular Force pension, in accordance with Treasury Board rules. It was a much appreciated recognition of Reserve service as valid contribution to a federal government pension, but when it first came into effect in 2007, the impact on the population of full-time reservists was immediate. Many members who had worked for years in a full-time capacity in the ships or otherwise calculated the cost to them to 'buy back' their now-pensionable time; when faced with a significant sum and the lack of certainly of continued full-time service with the Reserve, many opted to join the Regular Force. It was a windfall in a sense for the Navy and likely not to continue as it was the direct result of a new policy being implemented, but the departure of so many mid-level and senior-level sailors and officers in the operational occupations left many of the full-time Naval Reserve establishment positions empty with no foreseeable replacement. A more recent assessment has mentioned that in the fiscal year 2009-2010 alone, there were 123 component transfers out of the Naval Reserves, 69 of which were to the Navy. But that 129, almost entirely from the full-time pool of reservists, was equivalent to one third of all the KIN Class billets.[74]

The cumulative effect of the various policy and demographic shifts took its toll. The pension-triggered losses and the decline in Class A numbers from which the ships drew meant that personnel managers were unable to fill out their ship's companies. By the end of the first decade of the 2000s, it was conceded the intended five KIN Classes could no longer be run on each coast. Ships started to be tied up. By 2010, only four were operating on the East Coast, and three on the West Coast.

[74] DGNP Sitrep 2...

The Effect in the Naval Reserve Divisions

The effect of these roles and policies has not only been felt within the full-time mission of the Naval Reserve; the part-time world has also felt an impact which, though more subtle, is no less damaging for the Naval Reserve as a whole. As part time members resigned themselves to the fact that pursuing KIN Class employment was unachievable, they also limited their potential for advancement and promotion, which was geared to KIN Class requirements for the sea-going occupations. By extension, NRDs were witnessing a slowing of rank progression among their members, affecting the sea-going occupations, including MARS, the most dramatically. Fewer experienced, senior MARS officers now meant there were fewer NRDs likely to take advantage of opportunities to take their sailors to sea for weekend sails in small training vessels based in Esquimalt, as they had been able to do in the past on an independent basis. The weekend trips – once so important a method of getting reservists with civilian careers to sea – were less and less available.

The build-up of the full-time force to crew the KIN Class also meant a disruption of the traditional rotation of personnel between full-time employment for a few months at a time on the coast before returning to work in NRDs on a part-time basis. Now, an entire 'generation' of operational occupations remained on the coast for prolonged full-time employment. The bubble of full-time personnel on the coast meant a commensurate hollowing-out of part-time personnel in the NRDs. Ten years later, these missing sailors and junior officers are now the missing senior Lieutenant(N)s and Lieutenant-Commanders, Petty Officers and Chief Petty Officers – in short – the middle and upper management. This has resulted in the need to 'parachute' full-time

reservists senior leadership into more and more units as NRDs became less able to reliably bring their own senior leadership up through the ranks. It has also meant that there are proportionally fewer sea-going occupations in NRD leadership positions than there used to be.

The Effect on the Regular Force

The shift to a full-time reserve role has not only affected the Reserve – a case could be strongly argued that it has also had an effect – perhaps less immediately tangible – upon the Regular Force navy as well.

First, the coastal defence role isn't in itself a true Total Force niche role as other countries define it but rather a core naval function which every ship in the Navy conducts; therefore, for the most part, Total Force in the Canadian Navy means 'niche platform', not 'niche role' (while nominally reservists are responsible for the niche roles of mine warfare, NCS and port security, these missions are equipped, exercised and employed only to varying degrees – NCS arguably highly successfully but mine warfare the least so). As a result, focusing reservists in the KIN Class platform discouraged them from being able to sail in any other platform, narrowing their training and experience to a single class of ship of relatively limited operational capability. This eliminated the cross-pollination which had occurred in the past when regular and reserve sailors sailed in the same ships together, and also mostly eliminated the Regular Force ability to call on reservists to augment the major warship fleet when required, preventing the ability to shift human resources as required to support the highest priority missions.

Second, the implementation of pay parity and matching benefits – without adding any restrictions on time of service or even mandatory service commitments within the Reserve - has removed the financial incentive to join the Regular Navy instead of the Reserve, which existed in the past. In fact, because the reservist can theoretically control their careers more by being able to choose which jobs they will accept, yet still attain commensurate pay and benefits, there is possibly a disincentive to commit to the Regular Force, with its multi-year engagements and mandatory postings. This situation may even encourage more Regular Force sailors to leave the Navy upon completion of the standard twenty-year engagements, to join the Reserve and to continue working in an essentially full-time capacity while drawing on their Regular Navy pensions, picking the jobs they wish to take and no longer having to worry about compulsory moves. In summary, the Reserve is now directly competing against the Regular Force for the same limited human resources, with a seemingly unfair advantage of allowing continued self-determination of postings and jobs.

What conclusions may therefore be drawn about the current state of affairs in the Naval Reserve? The first and foremost is that, despite the enormous early success of the Reserve's ability to rise to the challenge of crewing ten KIN Class ships for more than a decade, this particular stage of the evolution of the Naval Reserve, as it unfolded, has ultimately shown itself to be unsustainable. Even if the current reserve model/policy framework wasn't actually unsustainable, it is certainly undesirable from many perspectives. The full-time mission has unleashed a series of unintended consequences which are eroding the very core that has sustained the Naval Reserve since its beginnings, and are now potentially affecting the Navy itself. Was the full-time mission of manning ten ships without integration with the Regular Force the

problem? Was it how the mission was managed? Could the split between full-time and part-time have been closed if there were mandatory limits to full-time service? Could a part-time pool of personnel have made themselves reliably available for cyclical short-term engagements of a month or less? Finally, does Canada truly need a small full-time force, separate but in parallel with the Navy, to handle the bulk of coastal and sovereignty patrol? And if so, can it be expected to be reliably performed by a volunteer force? If it could be done, it could be assumed that the Navy itself could also be a volunteer force, instead of requiring the engagements that it does. What then is the way ahead for the Naval Reserve? Before we can answer this, we must first understand the current CF and Naval contexts within which solutions to this issue must be determined, and examine how some other nations have tackled the same challenges.

Chapter Four: Current Government of Canada Challenges

This is a period of significant reflection for the Canadian Forces and for the Department of National Defence (DND), and during this stage of analysis and inevitable change, the Reserves – including the Naval Reserve - will find their futures being determined by factors partly outside of their control. In order to have most positive and effective influence on decision-making during this transition, the broader policy environment and context must be understood.

DND Strategic Review

Strategic Review is a government-wide expenditure management tool which cyclically assesses all government spending, department by department. One of the

goals is to enable departments to identify lower-performing programmes which may then permit funding to be reallocated to higher priorities – either within the department, of the government as a whole. DND is currently undergoing Strategic Review and accordingly, all programmes are being scrutinised in order to identify the "lowest-performing 10%" in anticipation of reallocation of the bottom 5% of funding.[75] With budget 2010, the identified bottom 5% of DND funding was not been directed to be returned to general government revenue.

The Maritime Command Strategic Review Team (MARCOM SRT) is conducting the naval component of this review, under the following 'commander's guidance from the current Commander, Maritime Command:

- Maintain core competencies essential for international maritime leadership and a sea control navy;
- Support his three stated pillars: Purpose, People and Platforms;
- Analyse options from a consolidation and basing perspective where that makes sense to do so: and
- When analysing options, consider their contributions to a balanced Fleet Structure, effective Maritime Forces and efficient Maritime Readiness construct.[76]

As could be expected, the assessment of performance will be a complex process, and reserve performance value is potentially especially difficult to quantify. How, for example, can the community relations and communications role of reserve units be

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[75] Department of National Defence, *Naval Board 2-09 Record of Decisions Held in Crowsnest at BYTOWN Mess 3/4 September 2009*, 3371-1150-1 (MSHQ COS/RDIMS 180643, 09 September 2009, 7.

[76] Ibid, 8.

assessed? In a rationalisation exercise, any perceived duplication of effort between elements would be an easy target for elimination, as would any role which may be less clearly defined as belonging to one element or another. For example, it could likely be argued convincingly that Port Security could become a militia role, given minimal boat operation and handling training requirement. In a resource-constrained environment, if any reserve element cannot demonstrate with certainty that it delivers a necessary, effective and clearly proprietary role, it may well risk elimination. All Naval Reserve activities will be subject to this challenge.

Defence Force Structure Review

At the same time, Defence Force Structure Review seeks to conduct an all-encompassing survey and assessment of the workforce of DND, including Regular and Reserve forces, Public Service and contractors. In the wake of the implementation of Canadian Forces Transformation, which sought, among other things, to reorganise the command and control of the CF to optimise operational planning and response, reviews were necessary to assess establishment and resources issues and in 2009, the Force Structure Review team was established to:

> …reconcile the demands for personnel growth beyond the approved CF expansion targets; to apportion the personnel establishment in line with strategic direction; and ensure the makeup of (the) workforce is the right one.[77]

One of its goals will be to rebalance the operations / support / overhead ratio of personnel and to find a more efficient and effective ratio of those engaged in Force Development versus Force Generation, Force Employment and Force Sustainment. It

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[77] Department of National Defence, *Project Charter MARCOM Force Structure Review*, Draft Version 1.0, CMS, 12 June 2009, 7.

may also challenge the status quo in assessing how best to generate the increasingly important national/command/joint capabilities, including the 'new' capabilities which do not necessarily fall within traditional environments, such as cyber warfare. It is reasonable to assume that the balance between full- and part-time reserve establishment numbers, and the roles in which reservists are employed by the Regular Force will also be carefully examined.

MARCOM Force Structure Review

Last, in support of the above reviews, and in recognition of its own particular demographic and force development challenges, the Navy is conducting its own MARCOM Force Structure Review (MFSR). Launched in June 2009, the MFSR must address the many demographic and force employment challenges now facing the Navy. The naval establishment is currently undermanned by 11%, even though the Navy, at an establishment of 8541 Person-Years (PY), is already the smallest it has been since the Second World War[78] and at only 13.25% of overall DND manning, is by far the smallest of the three components (Land Force Command holds 34.63%; Air Command 20.22%) and less even than the Military Personnel Command (14.75%). The annual attrition rate has risen from the historic 6% level to 9% and at any given time, and 10% of positions are vacant due to medical issues. Recruiting and retention remain a significant area of concern, with continued failure, until this year, of the Navy to achieve its full recruiting allocation in a number of occupations. A recent 5000 'Person Year' (PY) growth in the CF establishment has not been of benefit to the Navy despite the fact that it has new capabilities which it has to fill in addition to its existing requirements, including the introduction of the new ORCA Class of

[78] Ibid, 8.

patrol/training vessels, the proposed Arctic Operations Patrol Ships (AOPS), the new operations headquarters (CEFCOM and CANADACOM) and the Maritime Security Operations Centres. There is also a pressing need to supply project management expertise to manage the future fleet capital projects. In light of these personnel challenges, it is even more crucial to question the current reserve model. To add perspective, in Canada the strength of the Naval Reserve is 5130 members or 60% of that of the Navy's; in Australia the ratio is 37%; in the USA it is 19%; and in the UK it is only 9%. The Canadian naval forces ratio seems to remain closer to that of a more typically strategic reserve ratio – yet a high percentage of those reservists are in full-time employment. Are some of the missing 11% of the Regular Force currently sitting in the full-time Naval Reserve?

The final medium-term challenge for the Navy is the impending dearth of operational platforms that will be available for Force Generation and Employment through the period of the modernisation of the frigates, when several platforms will be removed from the operational rotation; the challenge then will be to retain operational expertise and perishable warfighting skills with fewer of the warfighting platforms. The MFSR Project Charter expresses the challenges thus:

> In summary, there are insufficient numbers of key personnel to advance all naval priorities. The shortfalls are distributed across all Formations. The ability of the Navy to fill positions across the Canadian Forces is equally affected. These demand / supply gaps will worsen in the near future before the concerted efforts of the Navy and CMP (Chief Military Personnel) on the recruiting front reverse the downward trend of the last ten years It is clear that in the medium term (6-10 years) the current force structure demands of the Canadian Forces and the Navy cannot be sustained….(the Navy) is constrained to live within the bounds of a reduced number of senior officers and NCMs (Non-commissioned members).[79]

[79] Ibid, 9.

The MFSR is to deliver a first tranche of recommendations to be effected in mid-2010 aimed at freeing up positions for the fleet recapitalisation projects. The second phase will examine the structure of the Navy and re-align it as required. MFSR activities culminate in the phase 3 Regular / Reserve Force Component Review, to be completed by mid- 2012.[80] Of note, some of the planning assumptions of the MFSR are:

> There will be zero growth / reduction in the CC1 (Capability Component) establishment (Regular, Reserve and civilian) to 2018. Offsets for new demand will have to come from within CC1. However a model with a modest increase of establishment (up to 5%) is to be developed;
> The shortfall in the number of MARS and MARE (Marine Engineering Officer) LCdrs will persist for at least 5 years; and
> To satisfy organisational requirements, DND/CF positions may be manned by any combination of Regular Force, Reserve Force or civilian personnel.[81]

Finally, it is made clear that the potential solutions must all fall within the goals of the *Canada First Defence Strategy*.[82]

It is in this challenging space that Reserve issues must be examined and resolved and it is to be expected that the lens through which the Navy will assess the potential of the Reserve will be coloured by its own mid- and long-horizon challenges, if not actually its short-term problems as well.

Chapter Five: What Should a Reserve Be?

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[80] *Naval Board 2-09 ROD…,* 4.

[81] *Project Charter MARCOM…*, 12.

[82] Department of National Defence, *Canada First Defence Strategy* (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2008).

The factors which must be weighed by any nation when calculating what it needs of a reserve are serious indeed. National history, economic capacity, constitutional frameworks, human resources and the perception of threat [83]– including an assessment of 'strategic depth' – are all taken into account. It is useful to remember too that 'threat' is not limited to the perception of actual geographical threat but rather, is broadly assessed as possible threat to any of the nation's interests. Just as the militaries of countries differ significantly, so too do the relative size (ratio to standing regular force), functions and anticipated methods of use of their reserve forces. In his 2007 study *The Reserve Policies of Nations: A Comparative Analysis*, conducted for the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, Doctor Richard Weitz assembled a comprehensive review of the (then) current dispositions and challenges of the reserve forces of eleven nations, including the United States and Canada, in support of American reserve planning and development. Noting the increased reliance in many nations upon their part-time forces with the shift to the currently popular Total Force concept, his international survey identified the potential costs and compromises associated with this policy shift, and the various attempts to mitigate them by different forces. He concluded, without making judgment on the value of the 'Total Force' versus strategic reserve paradigms, that

> Since the United States will continue to engage these military powers – in cooperation, conflict or both – the U.S. defence community needs to keep abreast of these developments and differences. In certain cases, American defence planners might wish to adjust their own forces and policies to respond to – or even preemptively influence –changes in foreign countries' reserve policies.[84]

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[83] Weitz, *The Reserve Policies of Nations*…, xiii.

[84] Ibid, page xiii.

It is important too, that Canada's rationalisation for its Naval Reserve be founded not only in rigourous domestic analysis, but also, to a degree, with a strategic understanding of other nations' experience and intent.

Strategic or Operational Reserve

In Weitz's high-level survey, the first issue in determining a reserve force purpose and structure is to establish whether it should be a strategic force meant to be mobilised exclusively in times of crisis, or an operational reserve which, (likely within a 'total force' type construct) performs or contributes specific functions which may or may not be held within the regular forces. While not necessarily mutually exclusive, the two have significantly different implications for cost, recruitment, training and employment.

In recent history, the Cold War model of the strategic reserve meant mass armies prepared to support drawn-out continental campaigns. One of the most notable examples of this was the former Soviet model, which Weitz describes as having planned for a 'large-scale, protracted battle' of attrition and which, therefore, implemented a less costly structure of fewer career professionals offset with the capacity to mobilise its massive reserves more quickly than the opponent.[85] For the Israeli Defense Force, with a relatively small population within the region and no strategic depth, it meant viewing reservists as "core combat troops – essential in any major operation"[86] shaping its policies, structure, training and equipment accordingly, including significant investment in "intelligence assets designed to provide the

[85] Ibid, 109.

[86] Ibid, 97.

military with the advanced warning required to mobilize reservists rapidly in an emergency."[87] For the Canadian Navy during the Cold War it meant a small skeleton force with decreasing operational currency but the core skill to mobilise, sufficient prestige and accessibility for a civilian with an interest in 'things naval' to recruit and retain, and which cost very little to maintain.

At the other end of the spectrum, the operational 'Total Force' reserve is increasingly "complementary and integral " to a military force and in fact relies upon reserves for specific functions which are not held within the regular forces. This usually necessitates the introduction of more demanding training, time commitment and even mandatory deployment within a given time period for the member. In some cases, it results in tiered-readiness system where a reservist is compensated to remain deployable for extended periods on short notice (UK, Australia). Weitz reported that in the United States, the 2006 *Quadrennial Defence Review* stated that the strategic reserve was outdated and must be operationalised so that "select reservists and units [become] more accessible and more readily deployable than today."[88] As a result, he wrote, the new Army Force Generation model anticipated that deployments of a year in length could be expected by every Army reservist within a five year cycle and for the Army National Guard within a six year cycle.[89] In the United Kingdom, the reserves also have changed from a "large but little-used force to one that is ready and capable of providing an integrated component of defence…",[90] attaching mandatory

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[87] Ibid, 97.

[88] Ibid, 8,9.

[89] Ibid, 11.

[90] Ibid, 17.

training obligations to each member depending on their component of service.[91] Generally, a total force reserve requires significant investment and resources as the members are considered - and compensated – for all intents and purposes as members of the Regular Force who happen to work on a part-time basis, rather than reservists who occasionally mobilise.

Domestic or Expeditionary Roles

A nation must also determine if their reserve forces are meant to support domestic operations primarily, or whether the roles they support will be deployable as well. Again, the two need not be mutually exclusive, but have implications either way. Some nations rely more and more on reserves for their expeditionary campaigns (in 2005, 40% of US military deployed to Iraq in Operation Iraqi Freedom were reservists),[92] but this role must be accepted in the knowledge that response to domestic crises may be affected. It is widely believed for example that the US government's response to Hurricane Katrina was compromised in part by the fact that state National Guard units were deployed in Iraq at the time.[93] Many nations gear their reserves in part or in whole to domestic crisis response either in niche roles, such as the US 'Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams',[94] China's medical and engineering reservist teams serving as first-responders[95] or more general aid-to-civil power type support, common to all.

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[91] Ibid, 17-19.

[92] Ibid, 8.

[93] http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/iraq-war-delayed-katrina-relief-effort-inquiry-finds-509339.html, Internet, accessed 9 April 2010.

[94] Weitz, *The Reserve Policies of Nations…,* 7

[95] Ibid, 85.

Core Mission Skills and Occupations

Once decisions are taken about the primary roles and dispositions of a reserve force, the required skills sets can be defined. Must the skills mirror, where possible, those in the regular force? Should they be niche, rarely-used or complementary 'plug and play' enhancements to the core regular force? A reserve which attempts to mirror the regular force skills will, as Canada has witnessed, come up against the difficulty of maintaining the highly-perishable relevant operational skills; some skills will be entirely unachievable by part-time personnel. On the other hand, the risk of the niche role Total Force reserve, which may have been developed as a cost-saving way to maintain the skill for the force, is that when suddenly that role is required extensively, the regular force ability to react is limited by the ability to mobilise the desired reserve capability. In terms of attractiveness to recruits, it is possible too that the enticement of joining an organisation whose role will always be restricted to 'support', or niche roles may not be sufficient to draw in candidates whose image of the forces, and desire to contribute as a reservist, lies in the core operational roles of that element. And in the face of rapidly evolving technologies, niche roles may risk becoming obsolete more quickly, requiring costly reorganisation, re-training and re-equipping of forces for newer, more relevant roles.

Second and Third Order Skills

There is also the desire in militaries to take advantage of the broader skills resident in the civilian population which are not strictly military but can enhance military capabilities – second order skills such as information technology skills – and third order such as language skills. China for example, is reported to have reservists, whose

civilian careers are in the chemical industry, serve within chemical warfare units; likewise those in the telecommunications industry find themselves in the information operations and information warfare units.[96] While these civilian occupation skills, and language or cultural knowledge may be specifically targeted by military occupations and roles, the risk again is that many potential reservists would not wish to join the reserve to use their civilian skills but instead wish to learn and apply different skills.

Ultimately, the degree of skill required – and the time and energy which must be invested in maintaining or employing it - must be weighed against expectation of time commitment in a part-time force. As Weitz puts it, nations must determine the 'comparative advantages' of the reservist who may not be able to maintain the skill levels of his or her regular counterpart. One of the risks to assess in this case is the compromise which may result to the reservist's civilian occupation; excessive expectation of time of a reservist could reduce recruitment and retention and may also threaten the support of the broader population of civilian employers.

Resources

Finally, the nation must weigh its desired reserve role against the cost it will incur. Less-skilled, and less costly strategic reserves in the past were likely also to be limited to fewer roles they could perform if mobilised and in what degree of risk or harm's way they could be placed. Conversely, operational reserves are more costly to train, equip and to employ; their equal role in the Total Force generally means that they must receive benefits and be compensated on par with their regular colleagues. There might also be a question of compensation to civilian employers when their employees

[96] Ibid, 85.

are mobilised, and there is potentially a broader cost to society when the reservist is no longer performing their civilian duties. Because more commitment of time and effort is demanded of a reservist in a Total Force model, more potential candidates may be deterred from joining, requiring the military to expend more resources in recruitment campaigns. In the worst case scenario, a rebalancing of the regular force may occur to reduce vulnerability in that niche area of expertise. Finally, most militaries attach commitments to the significant cost that is made in training candidates, in order to realise return on the investment the organisation has made in the individual. This commitment is usually proportional to the investment, as evidenced by the longer service contracts expected of pilots, for example.

Other Reserve Benefits to the Nation

No matter how its military role is defined, the reserve offers a nation several other potential benefits. First, it represents the military to the civilian population in what is likely its most accessible medium - local reserve units serve as the face and connection to the civilian population. Reservists remind local populations of their roles when present at civic events (such as Naval Reserve units in the Canadian prairie cities), and can serve as the focal point for local interest in, and recruitment for the unit or element in question.

Second, as stated above, reserves give militaries potential access to 'second' and 'third' order skills – civilian professional or occupation qualifications, and language and/or cultural fluency. The Royal Navy Reserve has created non-commissioned trades and officer branches for 'Human Intelligence' which specifically recruits those with "proven fluency in one of the core languages (Arabic, Farsi/Dari, Pashto, Serbo-

Croat, French and Spanish)", 'Media Operations', aimed at those with skills in journalism and media, and 'Information Operations', targeted at those with "civilian backgrounds in advertising, sales and marketing or PR."[97]

Third, service in the military is often seen as a crucial national service which binds the population in shared endeavour and increases the basic national understanding of the military and national interests. In some countries this is accomplished by mandatory military service, including Russia, Germany and Israel (some also require subsequent terms of reserve service). Israel, an immigrant nation, finds that national service is a key integrator for new Israelis. In Germany, it is believed that conscription "fulfils an essential function in keeping the armed forces firmly connected to the general population…and in integrat[ing] the former East German citizens…," and that reservists are:

> …mediators between the Bundeswehr and the civilian sector of society. They contribute to sustaining motivation for military service and help people to see security issues in a wider context.[98]

In France, this outreach function is extended through its 'reserve citoyenne' which is tasked with public relations and education functions and provides a pool upon which its 'reserve operationelle' may draw, but doesn't actually have any combat or support responsibilities.[99]

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[97] http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/operation-and-support/royal-naval-reserve/jobs-roles/, Internet; accessed 30 March 2010.

[98] Weitz, *The Reserve Policies of Nations…,* 49.

[99] Ibid, 40.

Lastly, a reserve may provide a pool of personnel with past military experience upon whom the forces may draw in times of crisis or when specific experience or knowledge is required. Many countries have mandatory periods of reserve service for former military personnel with varying training and call-up commitments; Canada does not.

How Will the Reserve Work?

As previously stated, the decisions to the above questions must be answered within each nation's analysis of what it historically has done, what its constitution (and public opinion) will support, what it can afford and what threats it believes it must challenge. Weitz presents a high-level list of constraints and restraints within which a nation must define its reserve force. But after having made the decisions as to 'What', the devil often lies in the details of 'How' and because of this, it is worthwhile to establish some ground rules which may qualify what roles are actually realistic.

What key factors then must be in place in order to enable a viable reserve that the nation deems it requires? These questions are no less pressing and critical in their importance and the necessity to 'get it right'. Does the reserve exist as an end in itself – or is it a means to an end? Practically speaking, this asks - which has precedence in funding, doctrine and policy decisions– the reserve or the regular force? Can a policy which benefits the reserve – at the expense of the regular force - be tolerated? Under the assumption that reserve force employment is managed within a nation's regular force (possibly joint) command and control structure, does the reserve otherwise exist as a separate, self-generating force, or does it rely on existing regular force structures for its administration, development and generation? Does the reserve have its own

capacity, career development and rank structure to generate its own leadership at the highest levels? Or will it rely always upon the regular force to fill the higher-level leadership and decision-making appointments? And if so, how might retention of reserves be affected if they cannot develop and advance in their careers in some reasonable proportion with their regular counterparts? These questions too must be very carefully weighed for the opportunities or limitations they will place upon their effectiveness, especially for their unintended consequences.

In view of the above, it is worthwhile then to make a more specific survey of the naval reserve forces of a few nations which may be particularly relevant to Canada: the United States, as Canada's most important ally and strategic interest; the United Kingdom, the nation upon which Canada first patterned its naval forces; and finally, Australia, a 'like-minded' country of similar history, size and economy, which also patterned its navy and reserve upon the British tradition but which has since evolved differently. From this overview, some conclusions may be drawn which may allow Canada's situation to be better understood, and a possible future framework to be suggested.

United States Naval Reserve

In the United States, the Navy Reserve is actually one of three reserves which fall under the Department of the Navy, the other two being the Marine Corps Reserve and the Coast Guard Reserve (in wartime). Though, as in Canada, there were a variety of semi-official naval militias throughout American history, the Naval Reserve Force was finally created by law in March 1915. Unlike the army and air forces, there are no National Guard naval components. The USNR mission is to "provide strategic depth

and deliver the full range of operational capabilities to the Navy and Marine Corps team as well as to joint forces – in peacetime and in times of war." In 2005 the United States Navy had a strength of 353,000, and a Reserve of 66,700, roughly twenty percent of the regular force. Reservists are now considered "an integral part of the US Navy – in fact they have "never before…been more integrated into global operations and planning."[100]

USNR components of service are the Ready Reserve, made up of the 'Selected' and 'Individual Ready' reservists, which forms the primary source of immediate call-up strength and who are treated essentially as their Active Duty (regular force) counterparts; the Standby Reserve, former 'Ready Reservists' who no longer train or belong to a unit but who could be mobilised in times of need, and the Retired Reserve - Inactive, those either drawing "retired pay or are qualified for retired pay upon reaching age 60."[101] Ready reservists commit to serving a minimum of one weekend a month at a local reserve unit (at least one in each American state), and at least two weeks a year training in the U.S. or "anywhere in the world."[102] Members of the USNR may or may not have prior experience in the USN. Upon joining the Navy, every recruit signs a contract requiring a period of subsequent service in the USNR which will be proportional to the amount of time eventually served in the USN; if a member serves long enough in the regular force, there may be little or no follow-on reserve service requirement. The service commitment for reservists with no prior military experience is eight years, with the option to sign on for further

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[100] http://www.navyreserve.com/about/, Internet, accessed 4 April 2010.

[101] Ibid.

[102] Ibid.

engagements.[103] Job protection ensures members can return to their civilian jobs following mobilisation.

The USNR operates five classes of ships, including guided-missile frigates, mine countermeasures ships and landing ship (tanks) (Perry, Avenger, Osprey and Newport classes) which are integrated into the USN fleets, hold "full readiness" status and will in fact deploy with their active service counterparts when required.[104] Despite a very broad range of occupations open to Navy reservists, many of the core occupations such as Surface Warfare officer (equivalent of MARS), Aviation and Special Operations are open only to those who had previous experience serving in that capacity in the regular navy. On the other hand, many of the trades such as electrician, gas turbine systems systems technician, missile technician and sonar technician do not require previous service and the USNR will deliver that training. Many of the officer occupations are targeted at specific civilian professionals, including the engineering, legal, medical and public affairs branches.

Similar to the experiences of the navy reserves of other nations, the First and Second World Wars saw the USNR expand multi-fold and mobilise extensively throughout the world in support of the allied war effort; the USNR also extensively supported the campaigns in Korea and Vietnam and even today, while making up twenty percent of naval manpower, the USNR "accounts for approximately fifty percent of Navy

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[103] http://www.navyreserve.com/about/joining/non-prior-service/#commitment-details, Internet, accessed 6 April 2010.

[104] http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/navy/navsurfresfor.htm, Internet, accessed 6 April 2010.

personnel serving in support of overseas contingency operations."[105] In 2004, the USN made organisation changes to more closely align the USN and USNR active duty forces in order to "reduce the strain of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan."[106] In 2007 Weitz observed that the Navy Reserve "began to experience force structure stress during the US-led military interventions of the 1990s" which led them to adopt "new deployment systems based on rotating 'force packages'" which attempted to make active and reserve deployments more predictable, especially for enduring 'steady state' operations."[107] The organisation now tries to 'optimise responsiveness' by delivering significant training in advance of deployment and makes transition to active duty service as smooth as possible.

The US Department of Defense (DOD) has also attempted to make all its reserves more joint-oriented and capable but has also rebalanced the mix of capabilities between active and reserve components to ensure that regular forces possess sufficient full-time capacity to initiate any operation without having to mobilise a reserve unit.[108] Weitz also reported that at the time of writing, DOD policy makers were proposing changes to mobilisation policy to improve its ability to mobilise reserve units in times of domestic crisis. The proposal sought, among other things, to extend

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[105] http://www.destroyers.org/news%20from%20todays%20navy/news%20from%20todays%20navy.htm#Navy_Reserve_Force_Changes_Command, Internet, accessed 6 April 2010.

[106] http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2004/September/Pages/At_War3412.aspx…, Internet, accessed 6 April 2010.

[107] Weitz, *The Reserve Policies of Nations…* 11.

[108] Ibid. 13.

the maximum length of active duty service under this authority from 270 to 365 days.[109]

The USNR is headed by a Vice Admiral reservist 'Chief of Navy Reserve' within the Chief of Naval Operations staff (the current CNR served six years in the USN upon graduation from the Naval Academy, and the subsequent 27 years in the Reserve while running a construction company; the previous CNR was a former naval aviator now commercial pilot). The USNR chain of command incorporates regular naval officers in its senior staff, just as reserve officers are employed in positions of senior leadership, including command, throughout the greater USN establishment.

Royal Naval Reserve

The original Royal Naval Reserve was founded under the Naval Reserve Act in 1859 and drew mainly upon merchant mariners and the fishing fleets for members, while the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve was created in 1903 to accommodate amateur mariners, the models which Canada subsequently copied. Both focused on core naval skills (seamanship, navigation, gunnery) and both were mobilised in the First and Second World Wars, supplying huge numbers of sailors and officers throughout the two campaigns. The two were eventually amalgamated in 1958 to create the Royal Naval Reserve (RNR) as it is known today, but unlike in Canada, the RNR still seeks to recruit merchant mariners.

As late as the early 1990s the RNR maintained its own sea-going capacity and exercised its units in a fleet of minesweepers in support of its Cold War Mine

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[109] Ibid, 15.

Countermeasures role. In 1991 however the navy's role in general was reviewed with dramatic result. Enormous defence spending cuts occurred and a new strategic assessment led the RN to "…[begin] changing its emphasis from North Atlantic operations and anti-submarine warfare to what used to be called "out of area" (i.e. outside the North Atlantic) operations."[110] The new focus was on amphibious forces, SSN nuclear attack submarines and aircraft carriers.[111] RNR ships were eliminated and the reserve lost its sea-going role, had its strength reduced by 1200 and saw several units closed. The restructured RNR was then shifted toward the Total Force concept where core sea-going skills were replaced exclusively with niche "reinforcements for the Fleet" roles, mainly in logistics and communications. A partial shift back to operational skills sets was triggered by the second Gulf War which required the RNR to again readjust, now providing 'Above Water Force Protection' (AWFP) teams which mobilise to protect naval and merchant ships and establishments, and to re-activate some mine warfare and diving capabilities.[112]

In 2007, Britain had a total of 191,030 regular forces and 199,280 reservists of all components, a significant decrease from the 1990 number of 306,000 regular and 340,100 reserve force members. These large reserve numbers were made up of two cadres: the Regular Reserve, who are former members of regular forces subject to mobilisation as part of their contract and who form a strategic reserve), and the Volunteer Reserve Force (VRF), of which the RNR is part. Nonetheless,

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[110] http://navy-matters.beedall.com/history.htm, Internet, accessed 6 April 2010.

[111] Ibid.

[112] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Royal_Naval_Volunteer_Reserve, Internet, accessed 14 March, 2010.

approximately a quarter of RNR members have previous service in the RN. More recent figures from April 2009 holds the Royal Navy strength at approximately 39,100 regular personnel and 3,600 Volunteer Reserve personnel, including some 720 on full-time service - 9.2% of the RN population (though reportedly under strength).[113] In addition to mandatory training commitments, officers and ranks serve in full-time service billets throughout the RN, including mobilised positions in foreign theatres.[114]

The mission for the RNR today is to "provide an expanded pool of personnel to provide additional reinforcements for the Fleet, mainly in logistics and communications."[115] RNR members commit to at least 27 days of training a year, typically conducted in units on weeknights, a weekend a month and two consecutive weeks once a year – often as the entire unit training together. Training courses are therefore geared to two-week blocks of time. Mobilisation can range from three to twelve months in duration, but reservists can serve for up to three years of continuous service without losing reserve status. To enable these different levels of commitment, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) has developed new categories of service with time and mobilisation requirements to match a candidate's desire to serve, including the 'Full Time Reserve Service' category which allows a reservist to serve in regular forces positions during manning shortages. Another innovation is the 'Sponsored Reserves' concept where civilian contractors supplying services to the military agree

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[113] Weitz, *The Reserve Policies of Nations…,* 35.

[114] Ibid, 35.

[115] http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/operation-and-support/royal-naval-reserve/jobs-roles/, Internet, accessed 30 March 2010.

to join the reserves in order to integrate them into the forces and to better 'acclimatise' them to the military environment.

The Reserve Forces Act of 1996 made all reservists subject to possible compulsory mobilisation for both "national emergencies and in support of military operations outside the UK."[116] Essentially it enabled the MOD to call up selected individuals as required instead of the previous situation which was an 'all or nothing' mobilising of the entire force. Since then, the Iraq war triggered the first call-up of all three services' reserves for the first time since the Korean conflict.[117] A Canadian Forces Liaison Council-like organisation mediates between civilian employers and the MOD. Mobilisation expectations for the individual are to be deployed for twelve months in every five year period of service, and compensation and benefits are available to offset the disruption; civilian rate of pay, if higher than the military rate, will be essentially 'topped-up' for the period of mobilisation, and a tax-free 'bounty' is rendered for "[satisfactory] completion of the minimum training commitment."[118] Job protection is offered through the "Safeguard of Employment Act of 1985.[119]

There are thirteen RNR units throughout the UK, charged with the delivery of:

> … trained reservists as elements of the Operation Capability to support the Royal Navy...Units are required to recruit personnel into the RNR, provide a visible naval representation within the area and to develop relationships with the civil community and authorities.[120]

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[116] Weitz, *The Reserve Policies of Nations…,* 30.

[117] Ibid, 36.

[118] http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/operations-and-support/royal-naval-reserve/introduction-to-the-rnr/overview/, Internet, accessed 6 April 2010.

[119] Weitz, *The Reserve Policies of Nations…,* 34.

Non-commissioned occupations include 'Seaman' (generalist ship's company augmentation including the AWFP teams), Diver Underwater Force Protection, Logistics, Submarine Operations, Maritime Trade Operations (NCAGS and Allied Worldwide Navigation and Information System (AWNIS)), Human Intelligence, C4ISR, Air and Medical trades. Officer occupations include Amphibious Officer (recruitment targeting merchant mariners), Mine Warfare (limited to junior officers and watchkeepers at sea an in operations rooms), Diver Underwater Force Protection, Logistics, Submarine Operations (submarine controllers), Maritime Trade Operations, Media Operations (aimed at recruiting those in civilian media occupations), Information Operations, Human Intelligence, C4ISR, Operations Intelligence, Defence Intelligence, Air, Medical and Chaplain.[121] The equivalent of Canada's MARS officer no longer exists in the RNR as a career stream. While typically RNR units and even regions are commanded by RNR personnel, the Commander, Maritime Reserves is a position held by a RN commodore.

The RNR also operates fourteen 'University Royal Naval Units' (URNUs) located in key university towns in the UK, with the mission to

> …educate a wide spectrum of high calibre undergraduates who show potential as society's future leaders and opinion formers in order to better inform them of the need for and role of the Royal Navy, and to develop awareness of career opportunities in the Service. [122]

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[120] http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/reserves/naval/commanding-officer/225700, Internet, accessed 14 March 2010.

[121] http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/operation-and-support/royal-naval-reserve/jobs-roles/, Internet, accessed 30 March 2010.

[122] http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/operations-and-support/surface-fleet/patrol-vessels/p2000-class-urnu/, Internet, accessed 5 April 2010.

A strategic communication exercise not unlike the UNTD of the RCN's past, undergraduates join the URNU as RNR members for their university years, with no follow-on commitment. Training is conducted one evening a week in shore units at or near the university and at sea, over the weekends and during the school vacations including sessions in patrol craft dedicated to the URNU programme.

Royal Australian Naval Reserve

The roots of the RANR reach back to the formation of the New South Wales Royal Naval Reserve brigade in 1863, but became more entrenched in Australian society with 'compulsory training' introduced in 1911; during the First World War mobilisation it was an organisation made entirely of officers. In 1921 the complementary Royal Australian Naval Volunteer Reserve was created but it struggled as an institution until the massive mobilisation and influx of the Second World War, where the reserve collectively formed 80% of the Australian Commonwealth Naval Forces. It wasn't until 1973 that the RANR and the RANVR were consolidated into a single reserve organisation, as today's RANR,[123] and only in 2001 was an amendment to the National Defence Act made to permit the government of Australia to employ reservists in foreign operations. Since then, Australian reservists have been deployed far and wide in support of various campaigns.[124] Reservists also extensively support domestic operations including such events as the 2000 Sydney Olympics and the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting.[125]

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[123] http://www.navy.gov.au/reserves/brief-history, Internet, accessed 7 April 2010.

[124] Weitz, *The Reserve Policies of Nations…,* 72.

[125] Ibid, 72.

Through the 1970s and 1980s, RANR personnel were members of reserve units, commanded by RANR officers, with attached vessels.[126] They were required to operate Attack or Freemantle Class Patrol Boats (FCPB) and Landing Craft (Heavy) depending on their unit's assignment and were largely self-administered and self-trained with support from RAN training facilities.[127] Rather like other reserve models, they trained on weeknights, some weekends with the occasional longer training deployment. They conducted a significant amount of Australian coastal patrol including fisheries enforcement and surveillance operations. Reservists also sailed in the RAN fleet and typically officers received their watchkeeping, navigation and command certificates in RAN ships.[128]

At the end of the 1980s however, the Total Force concept was introduced, resulting in the closure of the RANR units, and the eventual integration into the RAN of RANR personnel. The 'final phase of integration' was implemented in 1999, with the RANR command and control being entirely absorbed within the RAN; reservists in Australia are now considered as 'part time members of the RAN' rather than as a separate force to provide surge capacity,[129] and are career-administered within the RAN structure.[130] The RANR was commanded by a RANR commodore of the Seaman Officer branch

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[126] http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/operations-and-support/surface-fleet/patrol-vessels/p2000-class-urnu/, Internet, accessed 5 April 2010.

[127] http://www.navy.gov.au/reserves/brief-history, Internet, accessed 7 April 2010.

[128] http://www.defencejobs.gov.au/navy/reserve/, Internet, accessed 7 April 2010.

[129] http://www.navy.gov.au/reserves/brief-history, Internet, accessed 7 April 2010.

[130] Weitz, *The Reserve Policies of Nations…,* 75.

until the early 1990s restructuring, when it became absorbed into the regular navy chain of command.

In 2007, the International Institute for Strategic Studies listed the strength of the RANR as 1973[131], but a more recent source lists the 2008-2009 strength of the RAN at 12,977 and the RANR at 4771[132], or roughly one third of the strength of the regular forces. To address its service needs, Australia has created six categories of reserve service:

- High Readiness Reserves (members undergo additional training and accept higher service obligations);
- High Readiness Specialist Reserves (who posses skills of high value to the military);
- Specialist Reserves;
- Active Reserves;
- Standby Reserves (former members of regular forces); and
- "other categories' as required by each Branch.

Most reservists fall into the 'Active' and 'Standby' reservist categories, meant to supplement active-duty units.[133] The Australian government also uses four types of reserve service:

- ordinary service;
- voluntary unprotected full-time service (no special job protection);

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[131] Ibid, 72.

[132] http://www.defencejobs.gov.au/navy/reserve/, Internet, accessed 7 April 2010.

[133] Weitz, *The Reserve Policies of Nations…,* 73.

- voluntary protected; and
- compulsory full-time service (requiring government call-up).

Many RANR members have experience in the RAN, but some occupations continue to be recruited from the civilian population. Most of the officer occupations, and some of the non-commissioned trades are 'target recruited', requiring significant previous qualification and experience in the field, not only within the professional branches (Legal, Dental, Medical, Nursing, Psychologist and the like) but also the more core naval occupations including Operational Logistics (a reserve-only occupation requiring extensive civilian logistician qualifications) and Seaman Officer (equivalent of MARS, which requires applicants to "be fully qualified as deck watchkeepers and hold an AMSA ticket for at least a 500 tonne vessel…"), and even the Maritime Trade Operations Officer (NCS), which requires merchant marine experience.[134] There is rather limited opportunity then, for what would be a typical Canadian naval reserve recruit - a university or college student - without existing extensive qualification and experience in a field in demand by the navy.

Perhaps as a result of the very narrow pool of candidates to which the RANR limits itself, Australia now has extensive job protection and generous benefits for reservists and their civilian employers including various pieces of legislation which require employers to grant their reservist employees leave for training; which make illegal the discrimination of employees or prospective employees serving in the military, which guarantee to employers that reservists will return to civilian positions upon completion of service, which offer compensation to employers for any loss attributed

[134] http://www.defencejobs.gov.au/navy/reserve/, Internet, accessed 7 April 2010.

to a reservist's absence and even which make payments to employers for every member deployed on service. The desire to recruit a generally older, more qualified population of reservists has resulted in an Australian reserve policy focus on enabling leave from civilian employment to be as feasible as possible for both employees and employers.

Because the RANR is completely absorbed within the RAN structure, training for reservists may or may not be able to accomplished in continuous blocks but rather depend of the regular force courses available. Reserve service is voluntary but after completion of initial training, twenty days per year of work or addition courses are required "to maintain …military skills and remain employable."[135] Members have the option to work up to 200 days (tax free) per year in "approved positions."[136] Officers generally commit to a six-year period of service, and most of the non-commissioned members to three years. Payment is similar to Canada's scheme of day and half- day increments and as an incentive, RANR salaries and allowances are tax free.

Reservists may be eligible for full time employment within the regular force establishment if vacancies exist, with full regular benefits and contribution to a pension, but this salary will be taxed. Most 'basic employment courses' have national accreditation and can therefore help advance a member's civilian prospects or career as well. [137] Most reservists will be trained, employed and administered within the RAN structure, but some reserve-only occupations will be employed predominantly

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[135] http://www.defencejobs.gov.au/navy/reserve/, Internet, accessed 7 April 2010.

[136] http://www.defencejobs.gov.au/navy/reserve/, Internet, accessed 7 April 2010.

[137] http://www.defencejobs.gov.au/navy/reserve/, Internet, accessed 7 April 2010.

within the 'reserve formed (standing) units' for Diving Teams, Band and Maritime Trade Operations (NCS). Otherwise, they will work in the RAN Medical, Dental, Seaman, Legal or Engineering branches ashore or at sea.

Despite the generous compensation packages, recruitment into the ADF reserves in general is reportedly inadequate and the resulting shortages of personnel are having an impact on reserve performance within the Total Force system; studies are underway to assess how to check this problem and to mitigate the growing perception of the reserve as the 'weak link' in the Australian Defence Force.[138]

Comparison

It is interesting to see the differences between the three countries' approaches to their naval reserve forces, and an excellent point of comparison with Canada's. All four countries have emerged from essentially the same tradition and today remain for the most part 'like-minded allies', with similar constitutional frameworks and beliefs, but differing, in varying degrees, national histories, economic capacities, human resources and perceptions of threat. Of the four, one is a superpower with a 'Rank 1' navy, defined by *Leadmark* as a "Major Global Force Projection Navy (complete); one is a global power with a 'Rank 2' navy, a "Major Global Force Projection Navy (partial), and the last two are medium powers with 'Rank 3' or "Medium Global Force Projection" navies.[139] It is curious nonetheless to observe that despite the differences in the elements of national power, each reserve has historically followed the same

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138 http://www.reserveintelligence.com/articulo.asp?pagina=index.asp&seccion=20&titulo=Australia%/3A+Army+reservists+are+the+weak+link+in+the+defece+plans&id=61, Internet; accessed 7 April 2010.

139 Department of National Defence, *Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy for 2020* (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 2001), 44.

basic patterns and shifts in response to geopolitical events - from creation, World War mobilisation and shift from strategic force to the leveraging of a Total Force. But the method and degree of implementation is where they diverge.

Of the four, all have made the Total Force shift with Australia perhaps the most integrated with the regular navy, having essentially eliminated a naval reserve establishment; all have enabled reserves to deploy in support of expeditionary roles; and all retain some sort of true strategic reserve, if all but dormant in nature. Although all have strong immigrant populations and three are essentially nations which rely on immigration, none identifies its reserves as a binding national experience or integrator of immigrants, as does Germany, for example.

It is perhaps more interesting to analyse what the differences are: perhaps a reflection of resources to some degree, but maybe also more specifically revealing of the national perception of threat and assessment of geopolitical responsibility. The American geopolitical role is immense and its military capacity is a key enabler; to that end, the USNR is an order of magnitude larger than the other three, but this is in proportion to its relative population as well. The UK, with twice the population of Canada, has a navy over four times the size of Canada's – reflective of its continuing desire to play a highly engaged global strategic role - but a reserve that is smaller than Canada's. Australia has a population which is only two thirds of Canada's, but, making very careful assessment of the potential threats in its region and its own strategic depth, has a navy that is half again as large as Canada's, and a reserve that is slightly larger. Overall, the nations' respective ratios of naval reserve in proportion to their populations (per 1000 capita) are, in order from lowest, the UK with 5.9;

Canada's at 13.5; and the US and Australia almost the same at 22 and 22.3 respectively.

Three of the four reserves can leverage the connection to the civilian world for strategic communication, but because of its being absorbed into the RAN structure, the RANR no longer exists as a presence in communities across the country. While all four countries' naval reserves continue to offer long-standing niche capabilities and support roles, not all still see the reserve force any longer as contributing to the core business of taking a warship to sea - the RNR has forsaken this capability altogether – and while the USNR and the RANR retain organic sea-going capability, they have both given up the training of core MARS equivalent sea-going officers, choosing instead to rely upon former regular force officers or more easily-converted merchant mariners for this capacity. It seems that all but the US are experiencing shortfall in recruitment. Perhaps the US is experiencing the same drop in recruitment, but the effect is being masked by the continuous influx of retired USN personnel. Of those reserves which still see organic sea-going capability as fundamental to its naval reserve, only Canada is prepared to train reserve officers and trades in order to achieve this.

On the other hand, Canada is the only country to not deliberately and specifically target civilian expertise for naval reserve employment, even merchant marine expertise, nor really for language and cultural knowledge. Nor finally does it even seriously recruit retired naval personnel. In view of this, it makes sense that Canada continues to ensure its sea-going reserve capacity by training it. The decision in the RANR to no longer train niche roles internally has resulted in its being entirely

dependent on its ability to attract candidates with extensive civilian expertise, relying on elements outside of its control to deliver essential training. But Canada also stands alone in attempting to run a full-time mission with an entirely volunteer workforce, and is struggling with it.

Perplexingly, the only conclusion which seems to emerge is that there is no magic formula for success in a modern naval reserve – except perhaps to have mandatory service following a regular force career. But perhaps this works only for the US because of the sheer size of the USN – and because of the 'up or out' career management policy in place in the American military. The RNR's restriction to non-core naval roles may have inadvertently limited its attractiveness to recruits, who would otherwise join the navy to go to sea in core naval roles. The RANR's almost complete integration into the RAN, its lack of distinct presence in communities and almost complete reliance on skills trained outside of the RANR may have eroded the sense of community and esprit de corps needed for retention. It is also possible that demographics - an uncontrollable factor – is truly at the root of the issue. If so, then the models must change. Nonetheless, having better understood the issues and responses in other countries, we may better analyse Canada's own context.

Chapter Six: A Way Ahead for the Naval Reserve

No matter what future roles the Naval Reserve may move toward, the starting point is where the reserve is now, and the legal and contextual framework in which it sits. That means that even if, for example, it were clear that mandatory service by former Regular Force personnel in the Reserve would improve the effectiveness of the

Reserve, it is extremely unlikely that the legal framework required to make this happen would occur for many years. Within these limitations however, a number of principals upon which the foundation of a next evolution may be based, can be proposed.

Some General Principals for a Reserve:

1. Whatever functions and roles the Reserve is expected to deliver, they must be able to be achieved on a part-time basis. This is the core raison d'être of a reserve and, with some possible small exception, reservists must be able to be trained and employed on a part-time basis. To expect otherwise, or to create an organisation based on the assumption of full-time service, is to be in direct conflict with the Regular Force. This may also, upon further reflection, lead to the conclusion that the Reserve must not be tasked with a full-time mission, either.

2. No policy or employment scheme can benefit the Reserve at the expense of the Regular Force's operational capability. For now, the Reserve in Canada does not exist as an end in itself but rather as a support to the Regular Force and therefore must be subordinate in priority to the needs of the Regular Force when operational capability is at stake. This should include pay, benefits and terms of service. For example, a system of terms of service which were to loosen engagements and allow easy transfer back and forth between Reserve and Regular Force might allow too many Regular Force personnel to 'opt out' of undesirable postings or difficult career courses by switching to the Reserve for a period of time. While there would certainly be quality of life benefits to this type of policy, the exercise would have to be carefully circumscribed so as to not risk operational capability. Another example of

this risk is the current condition which allows reservists to be employed on a full-time basis for an entire career, with the same pay, benefits and pension as a Regular Force member, but with none of the engagement requirements. This is a policy which clearly benefits the Reserve at the expense of the Regular Force.

Today, Canada is a medium global power, with its associated roles and responsibilities in pursuit of "significant autonomy and capacity for self-help in the preservation of national identity and vital interests."[140] Over the last decades, several themes have consistently recurred in the definitions of Canadian national interests made by succeeding federal governments, which include 'Peace and Security' and 'Sovereignty and Independence'.[141] Whatever the philosophical leanings of any particular government in power at the time, Canada has largely exercised liberal internationalist engagement in the world and used multi-lateral organisations, partnerships and coalitions to leverage its influence on the world stage. To that end, Canada has consistently sought to maintain some degree of global force projection capability through its naval forces, allowing it to exercise specific naval capabilities and expertise, either autonomously or in partnership with other countries, throughout the world.[142] The Navy provides the government with these capabilities in support of military, constabulary and diplomatic goals.

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[140] Peter Hayden, "Sea Power and Maritime Strategy in the 21rst Century: A "Medium" Power Perspective", *Leadmark*...29.

[141] Steven Holloway, "Defining the National Interest." Chapter 1 *from Canadian Foreign Policy: Defining the National Interest*, Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 2006, 17.

[142] *Leadmark*…, 44.

The first priority of the *Canada First Defence Strategy*, the current government summary of national defence roles and mission, is to defend Canada. From the Navy's perspective, the threats of illegal activities such as arms and drug smuggling, human trafficking, illegal immigration and terrorism are all exacerbated by the fact that Canada also has the longest coastline in the world, including immense northern and arctic archipelagic landmass, requiring surveillance and control. On the other hand, Canadians' typical perception of threat to national interests is that it is very low, and the appreciation of strategic depth (psychologically, if not in fact) is all but unlimited, likely due to the close proximity of the United States. This might be quite different if Canada were not in such close proximity to a superpower. If Canada shared a border with Mexico, for example, national defence might well be higher in priority in the national psyche. But because of this sense of security, there is little public will to have significantly larger armed force, including the Navy.

Given this restraint, it would seem that to exclusively assign niche roles to a reserve is a luxury Canada cannot afford. It is a small navy which, at any given time, would benefit most from basic augmentation. Given the demographic trends in Canada, this is unlikely to change. Therefore, the focus of a reserve for the Canadian Navy should not lie exclusively in the provision of niche, seldom-mobilised roles but must also retain the core capability to augment the regular navy in support of its core missions and roles. This would likely imply that the Reserve would still mirror certain core occupations of the Regular Forces – including some the operational occupations needed to take a ship to sea. It would also mean that the organisation could no longer be geared to segregated platforms, which place artificial restrictions on employment of personnel. This does not meant the KIN Class should be eliminated but simply that,

pending acknowledgement of continued operational relevance to the Fleet, the KIN class should be crewed by both Reserve and Regular Force personnel.

That said, the part-time niche roles such of Port Security, Port Inspection Diving and NCAGS (now with the Intelligence occupation), are all valid and successful Naval Reserve contributions to the spectrum of naval roles in Canada – most recently demonstrated by the highly successful Port Security contribution to Operation PODIUM in support to the 2010 Vancouver Olympics. Even support to Mine Countermeasures (MCM), through collaboration with Fleet Diving Units (FDU) and with more state-of-the-art equipment could remain within the reservist realm of expertise and capability. The support occupations, already moving to align their career progression and roles more closely with their Regular Force counterparts, will continue to have important augmentation roles to play.

And what of the traditional and most iconic role of the Reserve – that of the surge to meet a contingency requirement? Most likely scenarios continue to be the aid-to-civil power responses to natural disasters such as the Winnipeg Floods, and to security operations such as the port security surge for the 2010 Vancouver Olympics, where both operational and support occupations have roles to play. But, from the naval perspective, the arm's length assessment of Canadian vulnerability returns to the largely unmonitored and undefended coastline of Canada; not only the approaches to Halifax and Esquimalt, but the far-flung littorals where roles in support of the mandates of 'Other Government Departments' – more constabulary in nature – are missions at which the Reserve already excels. In that case, 'Coastal Defence',

assigned under the 1987 White Paper, remains viable for the 'What' – and simply requires an update of the 'How'.

If a full-time, dedicated platform mission is no longer reasonable to expect of a reserve force in Canada, then two alternatives may be offered. First, the Reserve could continue to be trained and employed in the platforms which will conduct these littoral missions – including the KIN Class and the forthcoming Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship (AOPS) – but simply not to the extent that these vessels rely exclusively upon full-time manning by reservists. In fact, the northern-oriented mandate of the AOPS (as opposed to its other regular patrol duties) might benefit significantly from the contribution of the Reserve, given that patrols to the Arctic will only occur in the summer, when many of the student reservists will be available. The other opportunity lies in the role of the ORCA patrol craft, designed primarily to conduct MARS officer training, but which have significant operational potential as was most recently demonstrated in the Operation PODIUM, support to the 2010 Vancouver Olympics. While these vessels are not seaworthy in all of the littoral environments, they deliver a credible and useful entry-level operational capability which is completely achievable by the part-time reservist, which would allow NRDs to deploy on their own to conduct training –and even the occasional assigned mission – and which provide the baseline of a reserve operational and career progression continuum from ORCA, to KIN Class, to AOPS. Therefore:

3. The Naval Reserve should, at its core, retain an organic sea-going capability. This would provide ORCA-ready ship's companies to deploy rapidly in support of contingency coastal operations. This would ensure that at the NRD - the

most fundamental level of the Reserve - the core role of going to sea would be preserved at its most accessible level. It would maintain operational focus in the Reserve, and flexibility in augmentation to the Regular Force. It would also mean that training and career progression for the sea-going occupations be retained, to the extent that officers and trades would be able to sail an ORCA vessel without Regular Force support, and play significant and leadership roles in KIN Class and AOPS, including command. It would also clearly establish the Naval Reserve as a support to a fundamental naval capability, therefore less vulnerable to rationalisation and/or elimination in strategic or structure reviews. Finally, it would also mean that there would continue to be a viable career progression for a naval reservist with advancement in rank and responsibility achieved within the part-time career stream, in proportion to the reservists' ability to contribute. As an extension:

4. The Reserve must be able to 'grow its own leadership'. Because the Navy is small, it is reasonable and desirable to expect that the Reserve continue to deliver its own primary leadership within NRDs, the Regions and ultimately, to the full extent required to ensure appropriate advocacy at the policy decision-making levels, perhaps even to the role of the Commodore. This would retain the requirement for each occupation – operational and support – to have career progressions which can produce senior non-commissioned members and officers to lead the organisation. This would mean that, though closely aligned, they cannot be an exact mirror of their Regular Force counterparts, where career progression could never be achieved on a part-time basis. It also suggests that the task of Force Generation, administration and career management will also remain distinct from the Regular Force. The Naval Reserve has always been an independent organisation and in the face of shortages in the Navy, it is

reasonable and prudent that the Reserve retain this capacity. This may introduce a contradiction to the desire to retain a part-time focus, and therefore a review of the current roles, and the balance of part-time (Class A), full-time (Class B) and Regular Force would be required.

In order to widen its base, the Naval Reserve could learn some of the lessons of its allies and consider expanding its recruiting pool beyond the current cadre of university and college students. Already, pilot projects are underway targeting technical colleges for recruitment to Naval Reserve technical trades, but the merchant marine remains an untapped pool of potential officers and trades as well.

Finally, several policy changes could be studied in order to better assess their potential to improve reserve recruitment, retention, effectiveness and efficiency, all of which exist in other reserves in the world, to varying degree. These policies include consideration of:

- The addition of specific niche language and cultural or other '2nd and 3rd' areas of expertise, of potential benefit to the Navy, to reserve recruiting and roles;
- The introduction of mandatory service requirements for reservists in proportion to the investment made in training them:
- The introduction of a tiered readiness scheme which would reward reservists with niche expertise who are prepared to remain in a state of higher readiness for call-up; and
- The limitation of the amount of full-time service a reservist can complete before they must transfer to the Regular Force. Treasury Board pension rules already provide a reasonable framework for this.

The challenges for the Naval Reserve – and for the Navy – right now are significant, but so too are the opportunities. This paper has demonstrated that the Naval Reserve in Canada now confronts significant challenges which will require a substantive review and accompanying reforms. It has reviewed the history of the Naval Reserve in Canada and has analysed the current state of affairs in order to identify some of the factors which have led to its current problems. It has used a current survey of different reserves across the world and list of factors which determine a reserve model, proposed by the Strategic Studies Institute, in order to provide the framework for better understanding the opportunities and constraints within which the Canadian Naval Reserve may correct its own current issues. Finally, it has made some conclusions about what is possible in the Canadian context, and drawn some high-level basic principals which may help guide the discussion and decision-making for the next evolution the Naval Reserve.

Throughout its history, the Naval Reserve in Canada has swung between being a highly-trained, operational force, and a less capable, strategic force-in-being. The swing must finally be arrested in order to achieve a sustainable balance between operational relevance to the Navy and an acceptable level of commitment for the part-time sailor.

As it approaches the century mark, the Naval Reserve once again faces the need for adaptation and change. As it has done throughout its history, it will tackle the challenge with imagination, determination and energy, and the same esprit de

corps which has sustained it for its first hundred years will carry it - with audacity - into its next century.

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