

Canadian
Forces
College

Collège
des
Forces
Canadiennes



NO GOOD DEED GOES UNPUNISHED: MEMBER WELL-BEING AND COMMITMENT INITIATIVES

Major M.A. Gasparotto

JCSP 37

Master of Defence Studies

Disclaimer

Opinions expressed remain those of the author and do not represent Department of National Defence or Canadian Forces policy. This paper may not be used without written permission.

© Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2011.

PCEMI 37

Maîtrise en études de la défense

Avertissement

Les opinions exprimées n'engagent que leurs auteurs et ne reflètent aucunement des politiques du Ministère de la Défense nationale ou des Forces canadiennes. Ce papier ne peut être reproduit sans autorisation écrite.

© Sa Majesté la Reine du Chef du Canada, représentée par le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2011.

CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES
JCSP 37 / PCEMI 37

MASTERS IN DEFENCE STUDIES

**NO GOOD DEED GOES UNPUNISHED:
MEMBER WELL-BEING & COMMITMENT INITIATIVES**

By Major MA Gasparotto

This paper was written by a student attending the Canadian Forces College in fulfilment of one of the requirements of the Course of Studies. The paper is a scholastic document, and thus contains facts and opinions, which the author alone considered appropriate and correct for the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of any agency, including the Government of Canada and the Canadian Department of National Defence. This paper may not be released, quoted or copied, except with the express permission of the Canadian Department of National Defence.

La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale.

Word Count: 15,278

Compte de mots: 15,278

CONTENTS

Table of Contents	ii
List of Figures	iii
List of Tables	v
Acknowledgments	vi
Abstract	vii
Introduction	1
Chapter	
1. Theoretical Foundations	11
2. External Factors That Influence CF Policy	21
3. Specific CF Policies Studied	42
4. Survey Results	47
5. Analysis and Implications	78
Conclusion	97
Annex A	105
Bibliography	113

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Integrated Conceptual Framework	7
Figure 2: Clausewitz’s Trinity within the Global Security Environment	12
Figure 3: Clausewitz’s Trinity linked to Huntington’s Imperatives of Civil Military Relations	13
Figure 4: The CF Effectiveness Model	14
Figure 5: The CF Effectiveness Model - Elements of values based leadership	19
Figure 6: Representation of the conceptual limits of CF Policies in general	22
Figure 7: Specific CF Policies studied	43
Figure 8: Survey breakdown by Service	48
Figure 9: Survey breakdown by rank grouping	48
Figure 10: Survey breakdown by highest level of command	48
Figure 11: Survey breakdown by operator/non-operator status	49
Figure 12: Survey breakdown by number of operational tours	49
Figure 13: Survey breakdown of members who had at least one operational tour that involved combat	49
Figure 14: Participant familiarity with the CF doctrinal concepts and publications pertaining to this paper	50
Figure 15: Participant familiarity with the CF policies pertaining to this paper	50
Figure 16: Overall deployment preference	51
Figure 17: Distribution of how the current tour length addresses the requirements for operational effectiveness and member well-being	53
Figure 18: Distribution of the balance between operational effectiveness and member well-being for a 6 month tour with one HLTA	54
Figure 19: Distribution of how extending tour length to 8 months with one HLTA would influence operational effectiveness and member well-being	55
Figure 20: Standards of support to deployed operations	59
Figure 21: Distribution of participants with opinions on the CF’s ability to deploy ‘austere’	60
Figure 22: Distribution of CF members’ expectations and the impact that force bed-down standards have on mission success	61
Figure 23: The impact of Environmental Duty Allowance on posting statistics	64
Figure 24: Behaviour modulation based on Environmental Duty Allowance consideration statistics	64
Figure 25: Responsibility of care and universality of service statistics	70
Figure 26: Thematic questions (1/2) statistics	75
Figure 27: Thematic questions (2/2) statistics	76

Figure 28: CF Policy sustainability statistics	77
Figure 29: The relationship between personnel support programs and readiness	89
Figure 30: Representation of the non-linear relationship between member well-being initiatives and individual performance	92

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Task Force Afghanistan Engineer Support Financial Plan versus CEFCOM Contingency Fund expenditures by fiscal year	93
Table 2: Average Military Ethos Ratings by Rank Group 1979-2004	94

ABSTRACT

The the release of the 1997 SCONDVA report and subsequent implementation of its recommendations continues to inform and mould CF personnel policy to this day. The CF has enacted many initiatives in an effort to address the significant quality of life deficit that once existed. This paper argues that the accumulation of discrete benefits over the last 15 years, which were designed and implemented to increase member well-being and commitment, has inadvertently and negatively impacted operational effectiveness and undermined military ethos.

In addition to the construction of an integrated conceptual framework and citing research into human motivation in the military and corporate domains, the thesis is supported by the results of a targeted survey of 127 senior CF members that focused on four specific CF policies. The said policies comprise: tour length and home leave travel assistance; support to deployed operations; environmental duty allowances; and universality of service. This paper points out the unintended consequences emanating from each of the policies and makes recommendations to correct the current imbalance within the CF between the requirements for member well-being and mission success.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The writing of this paper would not have been possible without the countless hours of assistance that I received from many individuals. Accordingly, I would like to take this opportunity to personally thank those who took a keen interest in this endeavour and whose insights have allowed me to maximize this paper's potential.

My appreciation is extended to all those who took the time to respond to the survey questions and provide me with their invaluable comments and perspectives on, what I believe to be, such an important matter concerning the Canadian Forces. I wish to thank Lieutenant-Colonel Yvan Martineau, of the Army G1 Staff, who provided me not only with research support but who took the time to read my thesis proposal and challenged many of my initial assumptions. Major Jeff Hall, Major Cindy MacEachern, Major Chad Rizzato and Cathy Murphy also contributed greatly.

Finally, I deeply grateful to my parents, Renato and Stephanie, for several rounds of their editing efforts. Once again, "if I have seen further, it is [only] by standing on the shoulders of giants."¹

¹Sir Isaac Newton, "Quotes Database," <http://www.quotedb.com/quotes/3102>; Internet; accessed 19 April 2011.

INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

For the Canadian Forces (CF) the 1990s were known as “the decade of darkness.”² Due to the cost of living on the West Coast, some sailors posted there had to rely on food banks to feed their families. Salaries were frozen for five years at 1991 levels.³ Soldiers returning from the Balkan peacekeeping missions were often left to their own devices to cope with their combat stress injuries.⁴ The Canadian Airborne Regiment’s ill fated deployment to Somalia in 1992, and the subsequent commission that investigated the incident brought all of these issues to the fore within Canadian society. This intense soul searching also resulted in the 1997 Standing Committee On National Defence and Veterans Affairs (SCONDVA) report, whose far reaching recommendations continue to inform and mould CF personnel policy to this day.⁵ In 2002, the CF deployed to Afghanistan, engaging in combat operations for the first time since the Korean War. To date, 155⁶ CF members have been killed and hundreds more injured.

²Canada.com, “Top General calls Liberal Rule: Decade of Darkness,” <http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/story.html?id=d569d0fb-d9cf-4119-84cb-39dd89571625>; Internet; accessed 15 January 2001.

³Department of National Defence, “Moving Forward – A Strategic Plan for Quality of Life Improvements in the Canadian Forces,” <http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/scondva-cpdnac/rd/sco-psa/report-rapport-02-eng.asp>; Internet; accessed 12 April 2011.

⁴Department of National Defence, “Systemic Treatment of CF Members with PTSD,” <http://www.ombudsman.forces.gc.ca/rep-rap/sr-rs/pts-ssp/rep-rap-02-eng.asp>; Internet; accessed 12 April 2011.

⁵The SCONDVA reports conclusions are enumerated on pages 25-26.

⁶CBC, “In the Line of Duty: Canada’s Casualties,” <http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/afghanistan/casualties/list.html>; Internet; accessed 14 April 2011.

Demographics and social norms in Canada continue to evolve, with significant implications for the CF. Given an aging population, it is estimated that in 2026, the projected recruitable cohort will be 16.6% of the population, down from 20.0% currently.⁷ Canadian demography continues to “become less Western European and more ethnically and racially diverse. . . . Meanwhile, social attitudes have become more liberal⁸ and individually focused, largely as a result of social legislation, educational attainment, and improved access to information.”⁹

Addressing the need to improve Quality of Life (QOL) for CF members and their families; the demands of expanding operational commitments at home and around the globe in general, and combat operations in Afghanistan specifically; and the requirement to compete with the civilian labour market to recruit and retain talented Canadians, have all had an indisputable impact on the CF. Each one of these issues, along with many others have resulted in the accumulation of incremental changes to CF policies. What is needed now, at the institutional level, is a collective stock-taking to assess whether the net

⁷The recruitable cohort is defined by the ages of 15 to 29. Department of National Defence, *Military HR Strategy 2020: Facing the People Challenges of the Future* (Ottawa: ADM(HR-Mil), 2002), 11.

⁸The definition of *Liberalism* in the Canadian context: “It is [its] individualistic essence which distinguishes liberalism from conservatism or socialism. Whatever their disagreements about the ends of society, both conservatives and socialists believe that society is more than a collection of autonomous individuals. Conservatives favour an organic hierarchical society, socialists stress the primacy of class but the central concept for both is a collectivity. Liberalism, therefore, is a particular way of thinking about human needs and the political good. It is not the property of a single political party. In Canada it forms almost as an important a strand in the ideology of the Progressive Conservative, Reform and New Democratic parties as it does in the Liberal Party for, whatever the party label, if the primary focus of one's concern is individual self-realization, liberalism has won a convert.” The Canadian Encyclopedia, “Liberalism,” <http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/index.cfm?PgNm=TCE&Params=a1ARTA0004671>; Internet; accessed 15 January 2011.

⁹Department of National Defence, A-PA-005-000/AP-004 *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations* (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy – Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2005), xiv.

effect of these policies is greater than the sum of their parts, and if so to identify any unintended consequences resulting from the said accumulated incremental changes.

What will the future hold? Chief of Force Development's (CFD) report entitled *The Future Security Environment 2008-2030* offers several insights - all of them pointing to an uncertain, complex and chaotic world.¹⁰ What tasks will the Canadian government demand of the CF? The Canada First Defence Strategy lists six core tasks and is clear about one thing. Canada will continue to need its armed forces to be able to conduct operations across the spectrum of conflict, up to and including war.¹¹ A combat capable force requires an inherent martial spirit, which sits at the core of its military ethos. CF policies, therefore, must be fundamentally designed to reinforce that ethos.¹²

What imperatives, external to the institution, influence its policies? Understanding those factors allows for a determination of how much discretion the CF has in shaping those policies. How sustainable are those policies, not just at present but in an uncertain future? In an effort to take care of its people, the CF has attempted to do the right things, but has it done them correctly? It has been proven that increasing a member's well-being has a direct bearing on that member's individual performance, leading to an increase in collective operational effectiveness.¹³ However, there is a dearth of research investigating whether there is a threshold after which any further increases to benefits,

¹⁰*Department of National Defence, The Future Security Environment 2008-2030* (Ottawa: Chief of Force Development, 2009), 5.

¹¹*Department of National Defence, Canada First Defence Strategy* (Ottawa: Minister of National Defence, 2008), 9.

¹²DND, *Military HR Strategy 2020: Facing the People Challenges of the Future*. . ., 1.

¹³DND, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*. . ., 19, 24.

especially tangible¹⁴ ones, would actually produce a decline in individual performance and thus negatively impact on military ethos. Any decrease in individual performance across a wide segment of the CF would, as a consequence, result in decreased operational effectiveness. In essence, does a focus on tangible benefits indulge, and therefore perpetuate, a generational sense of entitlement, or, are these member well-being and commitment initiatives simply the unavoidable ‘cost of doing business’ in the current Canadian context?

THESIS

Using a series of related frameworks, this paper will argue that the accumulation of discrete benefits over the last 15 years,¹⁵ which were designed and implemented to increase member well-being and commitment, has inadvertently and negatively impacted operational effectiveness and undermined military ethos. To atone for the sins of the past and to compete within today’s labour market, the CF’s focus on tangible benefits to increase member’s QOL threatens to usurp the primacy of mission success and to degrade the martial spirit.

THEORY

Samuel Huntington, the widely published American political scientist, once stated that “[u]nderstanding requires theory; theory requires abstraction; and abstraction requires

¹⁴Tangible benefits include both monetary (pay and allowances) and in kind (housing, medical care, education, etc...) benefits. Elizabeth A. Stanley-Mitchell, “The Military Profession and Intangible Rewards for Service.” in *Filling the Ranks: Transforming the US Military Personnel System* (Cambridge, MA: The Belfour Center for Science and International Affairs, JFK School of Government, Harvard University, 2004), 94.

¹⁵A 15-year timeframe was chosen because it corresponds to the changes instituted since the 1997 SCNDVA Report and the CF deployment to Afghanistan.

the simplification and ordering of reality.”¹⁶ The relationship between the member well-being and commitment, mission success and ethos domains exists¹⁷ within a complex and open system.¹⁸ Taking Huntington’s advice, three principal, existing and theoretically associated frameworks will be used to demonstrate the non-linear links between the domains and the influences acting upon them. These frameworks are Clausewitz’s Nature of War Trinity, Huntington’s Imperatives of Civil - Military Relations and the CF Effectiveness Model. Two additional frameworks, offspring of the original three, were constructed to further refine our understanding. One is a conceptual model of how the various imperatives affect CF policy writ large. The other is a representation of the non-linear relationship between member well-being initiatives and individual performance, as related directly to mission success. These external factors that influence CF policy are: threat based functional imperatives, which in theory should translate into government mandated and publicly supported military capabilities; the military - social contract; Canadian law; the competition for personnel within a demographically changing labour market; and Canadian societal values. A graphical depiction of this system of frameworks is included on the next page.

¹⁶Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (New York: Random House, 1957), cvii.

¹⁷Those domains are part of the CF Effectiveness Model. DND, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*. . . , 19.

¹⁸Complex Open Systems, also known as adaptive systems, interact with their environments and often have feedback loops, which create non-linear causalities. Free Management Library, “Systems Thinking and Systems Tools,” <http://managementhelp.org/systems/systems.html>; Internet; accessed 10 January 2001.




Figure 1: Integrated Conceptual Framework

Sources: 1) CF Effectiveness Model - Department of National Defence. A-PA-005-000/AP-004 *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*. (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy – Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2005), 19. 2) Clausewitz's Trinity - Adapted from Michael I. Handel, *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought*, 3rd ed. (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 106. 3) Imperatives of Civil-Military Relations - Adapted from Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (New York: Random House, 1957), 2.

METHOD

Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada, Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations, Huntington's *Soldier and the State*, Hackett's *The Profession of Arms*, and Clausewitz's *On War* provide the theoretical basis for the paper's integrated conceptual framework. CFD's *The Future Security Environment 2008-2030*, is used as the principle source to define the global security

environment. *The Canada First Defence Strategy* is the Government of Canada's direction to the Department of National Defence (DND) outlining its expectations in terms of military capabilities. *CFJP 1.0 Military Personnel Management Doctrine*, and the various specific policy directives provide the background to an investigation of CF member well-being and commitment initiatives. CMP's *Military HR Strategy 2020* speaks to the changing Canadian demographics, the impact on the labour pool and the CF's intended response to those challenges. The 1997 SCNDVA report, and the four internal studies it commissioned, frame the social contract debate. A 2011 Ipsos Reid poll that was presented to the Chief of Land Staff (CLS) is used to gauge Canadians' perceptions of the CF and the threats that face the nation. Finally, the many academic papers, CF and allied studies / surveys, business reports, books and magazine articles pertaining to prevailing western attitudes provide the background to assess the ramifications of society's increasingly liberal values on military culture.¹⁹

To demonstrate its thesis, this paper limits its focus on four groups of specific CF policies. Firstly, the question of tour length was selected given that the debate concerning the extension of deployments illustrates the inherent tension between the requirements for member well-being and mission success. Secondly, studying the force bed-down and personnel support standards for deployed forces highlights the notion that CF members

¹⁹The following references were the notable sources used in this paper with respect to assessing society's increasingly liberal values on military culture: 1) Director General Land Capability Development - *Canada's Soldiers: Military Ethos and Canadian Values in the 21st Century*; 2) Charles A. Cotton - *The Divided Army: Role Orientations Among Canada's Peacetime Soldiers*; 3) McGonigle et al. - *The Relationship Between Personnel Support Programs and Readiness: A Model to Guide Future Research*; 4) Capt(N) Dan Murphy, *Military Ethics, Ethos and Professionalism: Can the Martial Spirit be Accommodated by Modern Canadian Society?*; 5) Elizabeth Stanley-Mitchell - *The Military Profession and Intangible Rewards for Service*; and 6) Colonel Andre Wiley - *Generation Challenges for Army Transformation*.

have unreasonable expectations stemming from their sense of entitlement. Thirdly, environmental duty allowances were selected for examination as they demonstrate how tangible benefits can adversely affect ethos - in that CF members are making career choices based on financial considerations vice their own professional development or for the institution's common good. Finally, investigating the issue of universality of service²⁰ affords a discussion on the relative importance of past versus future orientations with respect to force posture and the challenge of balancing societal and functional imperatives within the CF.

Senior CF members (Master - Chief Warrant Officers and Majors and above) were surveyed for their views and opinions. Students from the Joint Command and Staff Program (JCSP) 37 were polled to give the survey a tri-service representation. Elements from the current Army chain of command²¹ agreed to participate, giving the study the benefit of their experience and authoritative opinions on these pressing matters. The survey was distributed to 205 personnel resulting in 127 responses.

This paper is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 begins by describing the theoretical underpinnings (Clausewitz and Huntington) for the integrated conceptual framework. It concludes by explaining, the mission success, member well-being and commitment, and ethos domains of the CF Effectiveness Model and their inter-

²⁰ Section 33(1) of the NDA states that, “[all Regular Force members] are at all times liable to perform any lawful duty. [The legislative imperative means that a member who cannot] at all times perform any duty [cannot serve within the Regular Force, except of course during recovery and transition periods].” Department of National Defence, B-GL-005-100/FP-001 *CFJP 1.0 Military Personnel Management Doctrine* (Ottawa: Director General Military Personnel - Chief of Military Personnel, 2008), 2-1.

²¹ Commanders, their sergeants-major, and key staff from the Brigade, Area and Army, along with 14 Commanding Officers agreed to participate. It should be noted that, given its complete anonymity, it is impossible to determine who among those invited to participate actually completed the survey.

relationship. Chapter 2 summarizes the major external factors that influence CF Policy in order to demonstrate that the CF does have some discretion in the formulation and application of its own policies. In Chapter 3, the CF policies under review are described in some detail providing the necessary background for the following chapter. Chapter 4 lists and explains the survey results. Finally, Chapter 5 analyses the survey findings with the aim of answering the questions posed earlier in the introduction and thus demonstrating the paper's thesis. Furthermore, the chapter offers several recommendations for action and additional research.

It must be stressed that, despite conducting a targeted survey, this project is exploratory and therefore, limited in scope. The underlying aim of this paper is to provoke a frank discussion. In the profession of arms, no topic should be too sensitive to explore. If the CF is to endure as a fighting force then it must at least confront these issues. It was the intent and expectation in undertaking this assignment that useful and relevant conclusions might be drawn to serve as a starting point for additional study and refinement of CF policies with the object of optimizing operational effectiveness.

CHAPTER 1: THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

Three separate models provide the theoretical underpinnings for this paper's integrated conceptual framework. In order, they are: Clausewitz's Nature of War Trinity, Huntington's Imperatives of Civil - Military Relations, and the CF Effectiveness Model.

CLAUSEWITZ'S TRINITY

The Prussian military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz observed that “[w]ars vary with the nature of their political motives and the situations which gave rise to them.”²² Clausewitz distills the complex essence of war down to three basic dominant tendencies (those of the people, the military, and the government);²³ the inter-relation of which he labelled ‘war’s paradoxical trinity.’ He stated that,

[t]hese three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another. A theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with reality . . . Our task therefore is to develop a theory that maintains a balance between these three tendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets.²⁴

Even though Clausewitz, in the 19th century, was describing the relationship within the context of war among the great powers, the trinity remains valid today in the Canadian context and applicable in peacetime. Michael Handel, a strategist at the US Naval War College, expanded Clausewitz's single trinity theory when he wrote that “the

²²Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 88.

²³Clausewitz attributes the following characteristics to the People, the Military, and the Government respectively: “primordial violence, hatred, passions and enmity; chance, probability, creative spirit, talent and courage; and reason, subordination, rational calculations, and political aims.” *Ibid.*, 89. Arguably, Clausewitz's rather antiquated judgement of the ‘people’ diminishes its relevance in the modern Canadian context, however the interaction within any given nations of those three tendencies remains extant.

²⁴*Ibid.*

nature of war can never be defined in isolation by one country alone because it is shaped by the dynamic interaction among the belligerents' individual trinities."²⁵ To account for this expansion of the definition, this paper uses the term 'Global Security Environment' to factor in the "dynamic interaction between the belligerents."




Figure 2: Clausewitz's Trinity within the Global Security Environment

Source: Adapted from Michael I. Handel, *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought*, 3rd ed. (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 106.

HUNTINGTON'S IMPERATIVES OF CIVIL - MILITARY RELATIONS

Samuel Huntington, in the introduction to his seminal work *Soldier and the State*, wrote that,

functional imperative[s] stem from the threats to the society's security and social imperative[s] aris[e] from the social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within the society. Military institutions which reflect only social values may be incapable of performing effectively their military function. On the other hand, it may be impossible to contain within society military institutions shaped purely by functional imperatives.²⁶

²⁵Michael I. Handel, *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought*, 3rd ed. (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 106.

²⁶Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*. . . , 2.

These imperatives represent the two extremes. Every country's military will sit somewhere on this continuum, depending on nature of the threat it faces and how the interaction of its particular trinity decides, consciously or unconsciously, to position its armed forces to deal with that threat.

The amalgamation of Clausewitz' theory to that of Huntington's is diagrammatically presented in Figure 2, seen below. In it, the global security environment is analogous to the threats to society and therefore, provide the basis for the functional military imperatives that concern the nation. The character and desires of the nation's government and people determine to what extent social imperatives will influence the construct and conduct of its armed forces.




Figure 3: Clausewitz's Trinity linked to Huntington's Imperatives of Civil - Military Relations

Sources: 1) Clausewitz's Trinity - Adapted from Michael I. Handel, *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought*, 3rd ed. (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 106. 2) Imperatives of Civil-Military Relations - Adapted from Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (New York: Random House, 1957), 2.

CF EFFECTIVENESS MODEL

The CF Effectiveness Model represents the ‘Military’ in Clausewitz’s Trinity and is broken down into essential outcomes and conduct values. Quoting directly from Huntington, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations* states that “[t]aken together, [these CF values] are representative of the functional imperative to ensure the territorial and political security of Canada and the societal imperative to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of Canadians and the international community.”²⁷ *Mission Success* is listed as the primary outcome with *External Adaptability*, *Internal Integration* and *Member Well-being and Commitment* as enabling outcomes. The conduct value is embodied in *Military Ethos* which constitutes “key civic, legal, ethical and military values.”²⁸ For the purposes of this paper, only the mission success, member well-being and commitment, and military ethos domains of the CF Effectiveness Model will be discussed.

Mission Success

As the nation’s last line of defence, the military’s *raison d’être* is to prevail on



Figure 4: The CF Effectiveness Model
 Source: Department of National Defence.
 A-PA-005-000/AP-004 *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*.
 (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy – Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2005), 19.

Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations. . . , 18.

operations, despite the risks to its members and the potential costs in resources, money and materiel. “The primacy of operations that drives collective planning and action, and the unlimited liability that applies to military service, are direct consequences of the overriding importance accorded mission success as an institutional value.”²⁹ *Conceptual Foundations*, however, does go on to caution that military operations that do not involve the nation’s existential survival may not necessarily place paramount importance on mission success. “Consequently, the ordering of values represented by concern for the mission . . . should be viewed as a flexible hierarchy of *prima facie* obligations, with mission success occasionally being assigned no more than equal weight relative to the other values.”³⁰

Member Well-Being and Commitment

The member well-being and commitment domain represents all the initiatives undertaken to ensure CF members and their families enjoy an equitable QOL and conditions of service. It encompasses personnel policies, career management, professional development, job satisfaction, work place safety, and other tangible and intangible benefits. “The prudential rationale for valuing [this domain] is that serious or chronic dissatisfaction with conditions of military service may not only have an adverse effect on [individual] performance, but is known to erode morale and commitment to serve.”³¹ These considerations are linked to mission and institutional success, however, due to the nature of military service and its inherent risks, the CF has an ethical and

²⁹*Ibid.*, 20.

³⁰*Ibid.*

³¹*Ibid.*

indeed a legal obligation to provide for its members. The notion of the social contract will be discussed in the next chapter.

Military Ethos

Military ethos is positioned at the centre of the CF Effectiveness Model because conduct values must pervade everything that the CF and its members do. CF ethos is rooted in “Canadian civic, legal, and ethical values, . . . the imperatives of military professionalism and the requirements of operations.”³² *Duty with Honour*, describes the CF’s uniquely Canadian military ethos as being the result of:

- [b]eliefs and expectations about military service; Canadian military values; and Canadian values. Specifically, ethos is intended to:
- establish the trust that must exist between the CF and Canadian society;
 - guide the development of military leaders who must exemplify the military ethos in their everyday lives;
 - create and shape the desired military culture of the CF;
 - establish the basis for personnel policy and doctrine;
 - enable professional self-regulation within the CF; and
 - assist in identifying and resolving ethical challenges.³³

Beliefs and Expectations of Military Service

General (retired) Rick Hillier once said of the CF that “[w]e’re not the public service of Canada. We’re not just another department. We are the Canadian Forces, and our job is to be able to kill people.”³⁴ As the manager of state sanctioned violence, members of the armed forces are subject to the unparalleled professional requirements of

³²*Ibid.*, 21.

³³Department of National Defence, A-PA-005-000/AP-001 *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada* (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy – Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2003), 25.

³⁴CTV News, “The Essential Rick Hillier: Facts and Quotes,” http://www.ctv.ca/CTVNews/Specials/20080415/hillier_in_brief_080415/; Internet; accessed 5 January 2011.

unlimited liability, fighting spirit, discipline and teamwork. Sir John W. Hackett, in his book *The Profession of Arms*, wrote that,

[the e]ssential basis of military life is the ordered application of force under an unlimited liability. It is the unlimited liability which sets the man who embraces this life somewhat apart. He will be (or should be) a citizen. So long as he serves he will never be a civilian.³⁵

The concept of unlimited liability fused with the requirements for a martial spirit are crucial for mission success in combat. It “lies at the heart of the military professional’s understanding of duty [and] service before self.”³⁶ Furthermore, military professionalism and operational effectiveness demands extreme personal and institutional discipline, and the cohesion brought about by intense teamwork.

Military Values

Duty with Honour, which borrows heavily from Hackett, lists duty, loyalty, integrity and courage as the military values embodied in the CF ethos.³⁷ As the guardian of the nation’s freedom and the manager of state sanctioned violence, the military enjoys a unique and special place within society. These military values are essential, because as Hackett observed “they acquire a functional as well as a moral significance in the military context. . . [I]n the profession of arms they are functionally indispensable because they contribute to military efficiency.”³⁸

Canadian Values

³⁵General Sir John Hackett, *The Profession of Arms* (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1983), 202.

³⁶DND, *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*. . . , 26.

³⁷*Ibid.*, 30.

³⁸Hackett, *The Profession of Arms*. . . , 45-46.

Drawn from Huntington's delineation of societal and functional imperatives, "[t]he legitimacy of the profession of arms requires that it embodies the same values and beliefs as the society it defends, limited only by the functional requirements of the military."³⁹ Canadian civic, legal and ethical values fundamentally influence the activities undertaken by the CF. Civic values include the ideals of liberal democracy and civic nationalism. Legal values embrace the notion of the rule of law. Ethical values are grounded in the Law of Armed Conflict.⁴⁰

Inter-relation of the CF Effectiveness Domains

Conceptual Foundations devotes a sub-chapter to the inter-relation of the domains and the daunting leadership challenge associated with balancing competing values or contradictory pressures. The author states that, "integrity is the essential link between the value domains. [Integrity provides the means for] effective leaders to reconcile the pressures to achieve the desired military outcomes with their legal, moral, and professional obligations."⁴¹ Specifically related to the value domains considered in this paper, *Conceptual Foundations* has this to say:

There is an unavoidable tension between the values of accomplishing the mission and assuring the well-being of CF members. This becomes obvious in operational settings where people's health, safety, and sometimes lives must be risked to carry out a critical task. But it is not always the case that mission accomplishment must be given automatic priority - notwithstanding the primacy of operations and the unlimited liability of members. Certainly, members are legally and ethically obligated to perform their duties, but it is both unreasonable and imprudent to expect them to perform supererogatory acts for any and every operational rationale. . . Good leaders and commanders consider and weigh these kinds of risks before putting service members in harm's way. . . Finding the right balance

³⁹DND, *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*. . ., 29.

⁴⁰DND, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*. . ., 22.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, 24.

of risk is not an exact science and is, therefore, difficult to achieve when mission demands either stretch or exceed human capacities.”⁴²

In summary, effective leadership requires unquestionable integrity, an appreciation for the need to deftly manage risk and the the ability to take a holistic approach when reconciling the competing demands of military service.



Figure 5: CF Effectiveness Model - Elements of values based leadership
Source: Department of National Defence. A-PA-005-000/AP-004 *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*. (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy – Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2005), 24.

Linking Clausewitz, Huntington and the CF Effectiveness Model together has provided the theoretical basis for this paper. Adding the two remaining models completes the integrated framework. The specific external factors particular to the CF that influence its policies will be discussed in Chapter 2. The representation of the non-linear relationship between member well-being initiatives and mission success will be demonstrated in Chapter 5.

⁴²*Ibid.*

CHAPTER 2: EXTERNAL FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE CF POLICY

Transposing Huntington's imperatives onto Clausewitz's trinity, with a view to conceptualizing the range (zero to infinity) of CF policy choices, yields Figure 6 on the next page. This chapter summarizes the major external factors that influence CF policy but also demonstrates that there is discretion in the formulation and application of these policies. The government and the people inject a set of societal imperatives respectively, with the global security environment providing the impetus for the functional imperatives. The CF must comply with governmental mandates. It can either fully or partially conform with societal changes or resist them. Finally, out of necessity, and often using its own initiative, the CF must adopt certain policies to remain relevant as a military force within the global security environment. The remaining policy space is discretionary, permitting the CF to pursue initiatives that it deems important or necessary for historical, cultural or professional reasons.

Ordering these factors into neat groupings belies reality and the causal relationship between the them. For example, government mandated military capabilities should result from an understanding of the threats faced by the nation within the global security environment. This paper has separated that particular pair of factors because government defence policy, for political, economic, financial or other reasons, may or may not completely address those threat based functional imperatives from a military perspective.




Figure 6: Representation of the conceptual limits of CF Policies in general

THE GOVERNMENT

In all democracies, the armed forces are subordinate to the elected government with all persons and organizations, including that government, subject to the laws of the land. Therefore, armed forces are “prohibited from operating outside the boundaries that the [government] sets.”⁴³ Accordingly, the CF must comply with governmental direction in terms of mandated capabilities and with its domestic and international legal obligations. Reciprocally, these obligations include the government’s unwritten social contract with the CF and its members.

⁴³DND, *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*. . . , 9.

Mandated Capabilities

The Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS) is the Government of Canada's direction to DND, which outlines its expectations in terms of military capabilities. CFDS declares that, based on a threat and risk analysis, the government will ensure that a "fully integrated, flexible, multi-role and combat capable [CF is] trained and equipped to take on the challenges of the 21st century . . . with clearly defined roles and levels of ambition."⁴⁴ The six core mission tasks are to:

Conduct routine operations in defence of North America; provide support to major events; respond to terrorist attacks; provide support to domestic authorities during a natural disaster; be prepared to lead a major sustained international military operation; and deploy forces to assist in a smaller and short duration military operation.⁴⁵

CFDS goes on to state that the CF will require "the necessary capabilities to make a meaningful contribution across the full spectrum of international operations, from humanitarian assistance to stabilization operations to combat."⁴⁶ It is inherent in such stated expectations of the CF and a key deduction that in order for the CF to engage in combat operations it needs to maintain its martial spirit, which in large part is tied to its traditional military ethos. In that regard, there are limits to which it can conform to societal imperatives despite the desire that CF personnel "reflect the face of Canada."⁴⁷

Domestic Legal Obligations

Duty with Honour, Conceptual Foundations and *CFJP 1.0 Military Personnel Management Doctrine* all clearly lay out the legal, regulatory and societal frameworks that govern the CF. The *National Defence Act* (NDA) represents the overarching and

⁴⁴*DND, Canada First Defence Strategy. . .*, 3.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, 9.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, 16.

guiding legislation from which all military law and regulations emanate. The *Canadian Human Rights Act* (CHRA), which applies to the CF, “is to ensure equality of opportunity and freedom from discrimination in federal jurisdiction.”⁴⁸ Of particular importance for this paper, section 33(1) of the NDA and subsection 15(9) of the CHRA deals with the Universality of Service, the details of which will be discussed in subsequent chapters. Other significant federal legislation, such as the *Official Languages Act*, *Privacy Act*, *Access to Information Act*, *Employment Equity Act* and *Financial Administration Act* “reflect the fundamental values and concepts that are important to Canadians. CF [policies are] compliant with and supportive of these acts and the fundamental values they enshrine.”⁴⁹ With the implementation of the Charter, “the CF have often been the lead agency for the implementation of Government sponsored social change.”⁵⁰

International Legal Obligations

In conjunction with domestic civil and military law, CF members must also comply with certain international obligations because they are either “customary laws or the government has signed and ratified the relevant treaties and conventions.” The most prominent example is the law of armed conflict, “which is derived from both customary international law and from treaties and conventions (such as the Hague and Geneva

⁴⁸Canadian Human Rights Commission, “Canadian Human Rights Act,” http://www.chrc-ccdp.ca/about/human_rights_act-eng.aspx; Internet; accessed 11 January 2011.

⁴⁹DND, *CFJP 1.0 Military Personnel Management Doctrine*. . . , 2-3.

⁵⁰Milner lists the social need to develop a cadre of francophone officers as but one example. Marc Milner, *A Proposal for a new Social Contract for the Canadian Armed Forces* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1998), 19.

Conventions, and Additional Protocols I and II) reflect standards of conduct” applicable to the CF.⁵¹

Social Contract

The conduct of the 1997 SCONDVA hearings spawned several papers that delve into if the CF requires a social contract with the Canadian government.⁵² Ultimately, a formal contract was not produced but rather a “moral commitment” to the CF was articulated. This paper’s purpose is not to re-open the debate. An enumeration of those principles is as follows:

- That the members of the CF are fairly and equitably compensated for the services they perform and the skills they exercise in performance of their duties. And that such compensation take into account the unique nature of military service.
- That all members and their families are provided with ready access to suitable and affordable accommodation. Accommodation provided must conform to modern standards and the reasonable expectations of those living in today’s society.
- That military families be provided with access to full and adequate range of support services, offered in both official languages, that will ensure their financial, physical and spiritual well-being.
- That suitable recognition, care and compensation be provided to veterans and those injured in the service of Canada. Here the guiding principle must always be compassion.
- That members be assured reasonable career progression and that in their service they be treated with dignity and respect. In addition, they must be provided with the appropriate equipment and kit commensurate with their tasking.⁵³

While not enshrined in law or a formal social contract, the principles articulated in the SCONDVA report form the basis for the “unbreakable common bond of identity,

⁵¹DND, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*. . . , 39.

⁵²Dr Marc Milner, Donald Savage, Dr Terry Copp and Dr Charles Cotton were all commissioned to write proposals for the SCONDVA Committee as to the nature and substance of a military social contract.

⁵³DND, *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*. . . , 44-45.

loyalty and responsibility . . . between the nation and its military personnel”⁵⁴ and underpin CF personnel management doctrine. Bullets one and four are directly related to concepts investigated by this paper.

SOCIETAL PRESSURES

The face of Canada is ever changing. An aging population and immigration from non-European countries continues to transform the demographic make-up of the nation. In addition to such factors, evolving societal norms and an explosion of conventional and social media have altered the traditional environment in which the CF operates. These factors and pressures are putting significant strain on the CF as it attempts to cope with these new realities. How does an armed force reconcile its traditional, conservative and collective ideals with those of a contemporary, liberal and individualistic society? To paraphrase Huntington, can the military survive, as “a bit of Sparta in the midst of Babylon[?]”⁵⁵ *Duty with Honour* is clear on those counts stating that, “[t]he legitimacy of the profession of arms requires that it embodies the same values and beliefs as the society it defends, limited only by the functional requirements of the military.”⁵⁶ As David Broadbent noted, the key is “being able to differentiate between traditional necessities and necessary traditions.”⁵⁷ CF doctrine implies that the societal and functional imperatives are not mutually exclusive. This author believes the same, however as

⁵⁴DND, *CFJP 1.0 Military Personnel Management Doctrine*. . . , 2-5.

⁵⁵Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*. . . , 465.

⁵⁶DND, *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*. . . , 28.

⁵⁷Allen D. English, *Understanding Military Culture: A Canadian Perspective* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill and Queen’s University Press, 2004), 53.

Huntington opined, there is no harm with the “military institution form[ing] a repository of moral resource that should always be a source of strength within the state.”⁵⁸

Evolving Societal Norms

The evolution of Canadian societal norms is a result of many factors, including the implementation of the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, the pervasiveness of the media, the impact of globalization and the effects of immigration. The *Charter*, which is predominantly concerned with individual protections, “guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”⁵⁹ Curiously, there is no mention of citizen’s responsibilities⁶⁰ in the Charter. This background sets the stage for Huntington’s definition of liberalism, with the military as its foil. Huntington wrote that,

[t]he heart of liberalism is individualism. It emphasizes the reason and moral dignity of the individual and opposes political, economic, and social restraints upon individual liberty. In contrast, the military ethic holds that man is evil, weak, and irrational and that he must be subordinated to the group. . . . The liberal glorifies self-expression; the military man obedience. The military man emphasizes the importance of power in human relations; liberalism normally either denies the existence of power, minimizes its importance, or castigates it as inherently evil.⁶¹

⁵⁸Capt(N) Dan Murphy, “Military Ethics, Ethos and Professionalism: Can the Martial Spirit be Accommodated by Modern Canadian Society?” (Toronto: Canadian Forces College National Securities Studies Course Research Essay, 1999), 5.

⁵⁹Department of Justice, “Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,” <http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/charter/1.html>; Internet; accessed 5 January 2011.

⁶⁰The Citizen and Immigration Canada booklet entitled *Discover Canada: The Rights and Responsibilities of Citizenship* lists the following responsibilities of citizenship: “Obeying the law; taking responsibility for oneself and one’s family; serving on a jury, voting in elections; helping others in the community; protecting and enjoying our heritage and environment.” Of note only serving on a jury when called is mandatory by law. Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “Study Guide: Discover Canada, the Rights and Responsibilities of Citizenship,” <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pdf/pub/discover.pdf>; Internet; accessed 8 February 2011.

⁶¹Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*. . . , 90.

This passage synthesizes many of the existing conflicts within Canada's Clausewitzian trinity. In it, Huntington addresses the tension between individual rights and collective requirements. CF doctrine describes it as the "balanc[ing] of individual interests with the common good."⁶²

The issues raised by the more recently held view of the profession of arms as an occupation, vice the traditionally held view that it is a vocation, is an extension of this trend towards individualization. Dr Charles Moskos, the preeminent American military sociologist, wrote "[w]here military service as a 'calling' is replaced with military service as a 'job', it implies a priority of self-interest rather than that of the employing organization."⁶³ The quest to unionize militaries are a manifestation of this self-interest. While the CF has managed to avoid any unionization, recent polling of CF Army personnel indicates an increasing occupational attitude towards military service among its officer corps.⁶⁴

Another hallmark of society's impact on the military is the persistent civilianization and bureaucratization of DND and the CF. Whether this fits into 'governmental factors' or in this section is debatable. The unification of the armed forces in 1968 is often cited as the beginning of this trend, wherein the management of resources was prized over leadership and martial spirit. According to historian Desmond Morton, this process coercively forced the CF "to accept recipes currently hallowed by the

⁶²DND, *CFJP 1.0 Military Personnel Management Doctrine*. . . , 2.

⁶³C. Moskos and F. Wood, "Institutional and Occupational Trends in Armed Forces." In *The Military, More than Just a Job?* (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1998), 17.

⁶⁴The details of that study, along with ones from the US Army will be presented in Chapter 5. Department of National Defence, *Canada's Soldiers: Military Ethos and Canadian Values in the 21st Century* (Ottawa: Director General - Land Capability Development, 2005), 29.

corporate world: flatter hierarchies, more consultation with subordinates, more involvement with women and minorities and, above all, roles congruent to peacetime expectations.”⁶⁵ In reflecting on a similar American dilemma, Huntington summarized the issue by stating that “liberalism’s injunction to the military has been: conform or die. [Ultimately, liberalism’s] goal [is] the subordination of the functional military imperative and the professional military viewpoint.”⁶⁶ The perceptions held by some CF members that the military is “too civilianized” remains a concern.⁶⁷

These increasingly liberal tendencies have played a role in shaping the attitudes of the current generation. According to Claire Raines, a US expert on generational matters, those born between 1980 and 2000 are termed to be a ‘Millennial’ or belonging to ‘Generation Y’.⁶⁸ Raised by “active parents”, the children of Generation Y were doted upon and raised as the centre of the family. Consequently, they have a strong sense of entitlement. They are described as “high maintenance . . . blunt and expressive. They prefer directness over subtlety, action over observation, [and] self expression is favoured over self control . . . making their point is most important.”⁶⁹ On the positive side Generation Y is comfortable with technology, racial diversity and possesses a love of

⁶⁵Desmond Morton, “A Military Ethic and the CF,” *Ethics and Canadian Defence Policy*, eds. David R. Jones, Fred W. Crickard and Todd R. Yates (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, June, 1992) 58-59.

⁶⁶Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*. . ., 155.

⁶⁷Department of National Defence, *Attrition and Leadership* (Ottawa: Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis - Chief of Military Personnel, 2009), 12.

⁶⁸LtCol Rhonda D. Smillie, “Suitability of Millennials to lead the Profession of Arms” (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Strategy Research Project, 2010), 8.

⁶⁹LtCol Jill M. Newman, “Leading Generation Y” (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Strategy Research Project, 2008): 9, quoted in National Academy of Sciences, *Generation Y: The Millennials... Ready or not, here they come*, NAS Insights (Washington, D.C.:National Academy of Sciences, 2006), 6.

learning.⁷⁰ An Ipsos Reid poll presented to the Chief of the Land Staff in January of this year described “New Canada as: more urban and multicultural; globally connected; tolerant, opinionated, demanding and difficult; post-ideological libertarian; less engaged with traditional institutions; and aggressively Canadian.”⁷¹

With seemingly incongruent values, militaries may have difficulty successfully incorporating Generation Y recruits. Colonel Andre Wiley (US Army) tackles this issue, in a paper entitled *Generational Challenges for Army Transformation*, stating:

The Generation Y internal focus on comfort and personal concerns versus adopting Army values of selfless service will have to be dealt with upfront. The Army will need to determine if making concessions on several fundamental and important issues will require a major shift in the current military ethos. . . Army leadership will need to state whether negotiating and potentially adjusting long held Army core values is an option.⁷²

Morton, in his *Report to the Minister*, strongly affirms that ethos can indeed change over time and that, “[h]istory has an implacable lesson: successful military forces are part of their society, not at odds with it. . . [R]eflecting the whole [of] society is not a source of weakness but a strength.”⁷³ The CF’s *Military HR Strategy 2020* is sanguine about this relationship as well stating that, “[a] military ethos that is relevant to both the military imperative and Canadian society and is accountable to that society in the conduct of military operations provides the vision for the CF.”⁷⁴ Ultimately, the CF needs a constant

⁷⁰Newman, “Leading Generation Y”. . . , 5, 13.

⁷¹Darrell Bricker and John Wright, *Chief of the Land Staff Presentation*[Powerpoint presentation] (Ottawa: Ipsos Reid Public Affairs Worldwide, 2001), 6.

⁷²Col Andre L. Wiley, “Generation Challenges for Army Transformation” (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Strategy Research Project, 2008), 19.

⁷³Donald C. Savage, *A Social Contract for the Military?* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1997): 7, quoted in Desmond Morton, *Morton Report: What to Tell the Minister*. (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1997).

⁷⁴DND, *Military HR Strategy 2020: Facing the People Challenges of the Future*. . . , 15.

and steady intake of new recruits to remain operational. Finding the balance that achieves those recruiting and retention targets while keeping the essential elements of its military ethos and martial spirit will require a high level of leadership and creativity.

Society's Expectations of its Military

CFDS provides that, “[f]irst and foremost, the CF must ensure the security of our citizens and help exercise Canada’s sovereignty. Canadians rightly expect their military to be there for them in a domestic crisis.”⁷⁵ What Canadians think about their military in terms of fighting wars is more complex. The Ipsos Reid poll bears this out with a majority of Canadians indicating that the CF’s top priorities are domestically oriented (ex. disaster relief, search and rescue, patrolling Canadian territory, counter terrorism, etc.). The CF’s second tier of priorities (approximately 40% support) relate to international disaster relief and peacekeeping. The third tier (approximately 30% support) relate to international armed interventions, combat operations and bolstering security at large domestic events.⁷⁶

A 1997 report to the Prime Minister on *Ethos and Values in the CF* describes the essence of Canada in its armed forces. The report lists three fundamental factors that shape the “purpose and character of the CF. Firstly, Canada is not, nor has ever been, a military power. Secondly, Canadians are not a militaristic people. Thirdly, when Canada acts in the world, it usually acts in concert with others.”⁷⁷ Jack Granatstein, the Canadian political and military historian once said that, “[i]t was ever thus. The Canadian people

⁷⁵DND, *Canada First Defence Strategy*. . . , 7.

⁷⁶Bricker and Wright, *Chief of the Land Staff Presentation*. . . , 61.

⁷⁷Department of National Defence, *Ethos and Values in the Canadian Forces* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence - Canadian Forces Group on Ethos and Values, 1997), 4.

historically have scorned their military as brutal, licentious soldiers - except in time of war.”⁷⁸

The Canadian public’s current relationship with the CF is striking in contrast, with 81% of polled Canadians being “proud of the men and women who serve in the [CF].”⁷⁹ The question remains, how long will that last? The report to the Prime Minister is more optimistic than Granatstein’s when it states that, “Canadians expect that their servicemen and women will be trained and led by officers of integrity who are committed to excellence. Canadians want [the CF] to be good at what [it] does . . . [and] properly equipped for the tasks which [it is] given.”⁸⁰ On a cautionary note 72% of Canadians believe that the CF have integrity; only 55% believe that senior CF leaders provide excellent leadership; a mere 42% believe that the CF cares for and looks after its members and their families; and alarmingly, only 33% believe that the CF does a good job of providing care to those who have been injured.⁸¹

Huntington adds fodder for discussion with his theory on liberalism’s view of armed force.

Liberalism tends to assume the existence of national security which the military man considers to be continually threatened. Liberal thinking has been largely concerned with economics and economic welfare and has opposed large military forces. . . Liberalism has many pacifist tendencies, but the liberal will normally support war waged to further liberal ideals. War as an instrument of national policy is immoral; war on behalf of universal principles is not.⁸²

⁷⁸Memory and Remembrance address by Jack Granatstein quoted in *Albert Legault, Bringing the Canadian Armed Forces into the 21st Century* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1997), 30.

⁷⁹*Bricker and Wright, Chief of the Land Staff Presentation. . .*, 34.

⁸⁰DND, *Ethos and Values in the Canadian Forces. . .*, 5.

⁸¹*Bricker and Wright, Chief of the Land Staff Presentation. . .*, 39, 40, 49, 50.

⁸²Huntington, *The Soldier and the State. . .*, 91.

The degree to which Western democratic societies see value in their militaries is in direct correlation to the degree of perceived threat and how they view their military as being appropriate to address security challenges. Furthermore, in their estimation, the waging of war is only justifiable for humanitarian reasons or to spread liberal ideals. Expressing similar views, Rupert Smith, a retired UK Army General, wrote that, “[t]he ends for which we fight are changing from the hard objectives that decide a political outcome to . . . softer, more malleable, complex, sub-strategic objectives. . . [Also,] we fight to preserve the force rather than risking all to gain the objective.”⁸³

Conventional and Social Media

Around the clock media coverage of events occurring around the globe has changed the way people view the world. According to Rupert Smith, “it has become the medium that connects the people, government and the army, the three sides of the Clausewitzian triangle.”⁸⁴ There can be no mistaking the power of the media to influence Canadian public and world opinion. The recent explosion of social networking media has revolutionized the way people communicate. Jim Taylor, an author and futurist, “estimates that Generation Y spends 72 hours a week connected by phone or instant messaging. This connection fosters peer input and advice into the smallest of decisions”⁸⁵ These new realities, especially the one concerning social media, will require the CF to reassess how it communicates with the media itself, the Canadian public, and its own members.

⁸³Rupert Smith, “Trends: Our Modern Operations,” in *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World* (London: Penguin, 2005), 269-270.

⁸⁴Ibid., 286.

⁸⁵Newman, “Leading Generation Y” . . . , 7.

Changing Canadian Demographics

Due to an aging population, in 2026 the estimated projected recruitable cohort will be 16.6% of the population compared to 20.0% today.⁸⁶ During the same time frame 80% of the population will live in cities and 30% will be a visible minority. A shrinking workforce, along with increased urbanization and a changing racial makeup will challenge the CF's current recruiting practices as traditional internal labour pools are reduced. CFD's assessment of these impacts is as follows:

The CF will be competing with the private sector and other government departments, as well as other countries, to attract recruits from a dwindling labour pool. Consequently, the CF will have to devise recruitment and retention strategies to reach men and women from every ethnic group in Canadian society, people who are not only interested in serving Canada in uniform but also willing to accept the ethos of the profession of arms. . . Human Resources (Civilian) will need to expand its capacity in order to accommodate more civilians on international operations, which will become the norm. This will mean a forward looking review of legislation, policies, and compensation.⁸⁷

Selling the profession of arms to all Canadians, and explaining in real terms the roles of the CF and how it fits into society at large, has never been more important.

Competition With The Labour Market

Military HR Strategy states that the CF must increase its “branding . . . as an employer of choice.”⁸⁸ It goes on to declare that the CF needs to “[d]evelop flexible terms of service and employ contemporary work practices to meet a broader range of organizational and personal needs and to attract and retain skilled workers based on

⁸⁶The recruitable cohort is defined by the ages of 15 to 29. DND, *Military HR Strategy 2020: Facing the People Challenges of the Future*. . ., 11.

⁸⁷DND, *The Future Security Environment*. . ., 34.

⁸⁸DND, *Military HR Strategy 2020: Facing the People Challenges of the Future*. . ., 22

Canadian demographic trends.”⁸⁹ The specific recruiting and retention strategies employ a mix of tangible and intangible benefits to achieve their ends. This is accomplished while attempting to remain true to the HR vital ground, which “resides within the relationship between Canadian National Values, Defence Ethics and critically, the Canadian Military Ethos.”⁹⁰

While in theory, the strategy addresses the requirement to balance the societal and functional imperatives, in reality a study of actual conditions points to a different conclusion. As R.J. Hooker Jr. wrote, in *The Impact of Transformation on the Army Professional Ethic*, “[i]ncreasingly the military employs marketplace incentives to attract and retain . . . talent, to the detriment of the ethic of selfless service that is the foundation of the [military] value system.”⁹¹ Dan Pink, in his book *Drive: The Surprising Truth About What Motivates Us*, argues that for tasks that involve cognitive skills (even starting at the most rudimentary levels), an increase to monetary incentives was found to lead to a decrease in performance. He further posits that the “best use of money is to pay people enough to take the issue of money off the table so that they aren’t thinking about their salary but about their work.”⁹² Several questions from this paper’s survey were designed to identify the extent to which CF military ethos has been affected by the focus on providing tangible benefits.

⁸⁹*Ibid.*, 21.

⁹⁰*Ibid.*, 1.

⁹¹Lloyd J. Mathews, *The Future of the Army Profession* (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2005), 431.

⁹²Dan Pink, “Drive: The Surprising Truth About What Motivates Us,” *RSA Animate*; <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u6XAPnuFjJc>; Internet; accessed 21 April 2011.

THREAT BASED FUNCTIONAL IMPERATIVES

This sub-chapter could be viewed as a microcosm of the whole societal imperative *versus* the functional imperative debate within a Clausewitzian framework. Each side of the triad has its own perceptions of the threats that face Canada and therefore, has a different point of view with respect to what the functional imperatives are. The military complies with government direction, which must to some degree reflect the desires of the people. However, where the CF has discretion, out of perceived necessity, and using its own initiative, the CF adopts or maintains certain policies that it views as functionally imperative.

Lord Salisbury once observed, “[i]f you believe the doctors, nothing is wholesome; if you believe the theologians, nothing is innocent; if you believe the soldier, nothing is safe.”⁹³ It is important to keep that observation in mind as this paper investigates how each of the parties views the state of the global security environment. Where the military sees the requirement for a threat based capability, the government may see massive and politically unpalatable costs. Where the military sees the requirement to limit its members’ freedoms as a functional imperative, the public or the courts or the government may perceive an unacceptable infringement on an individual’s rights. Considering this reality, a truly threats-based assessment is difficult and prone to interest-based outcomes, however it provides a starting point for discussion within this paper. Obviously, there is some overlap between information presented previously, i.e. the government’s mandated capabilities and society’s expectations of the CF.

⁹³Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*. . . , 66.

The Threat - According to the Canadian People

The same Ipsos Reid poll is used to illustrate the Canadian public's current perception of the risks facing the country. This data is also used to compare the Canadian public's perception of the threat to the global average, which, not surprisingly, is lower across all measured categories. When comparing Canada to the US, the gap is significantly lower as Canadians often see security challenges instead of direct military threats to the country. In descending order: 59% of Canadians believe that their personal information will be comprised online; 43% believe that a major natural disaster will occur in Canada; 39% believe that a nuclear, biological or chemical attack will occur somewhere in the world; 34% believe that a major health epidemic will affect Canada; 32% believe that Canada will be involved in an armed conflict with another country; 30% believe that Canada will suffer a terrorist attack; 28% believe that their or their family's personal safety will be violated; and 24% believe violent civil strife will occur in Canada. With the exception of protecting them from cyber dangers, the Canadian public has confidence that the government can protect them from the above mentioned perceived levels of threat.⁹⁴

The Threat - According to the Canadian Government

The Canadian government, as articulated in CFDS, is of the view that "Canadians live in a world characterized by volatility and unpredictability . . . [where] the security challenges facing Canada are real."⁹⁵ The document lists globalization, failed and failing states, regional instability, economic and resource disparities, international terrorism, weapons proliferation, radical islamism, and conventional arms races between rising

⁹⁴Bricker and Wright, *Chief of the Land Staff Presentation*. . . , 24.

⁹⁵DND, *Canada First Defence Strategy*. . . , 6.

powers as potential global flash points. It goes on to enumerate climate change induced natural disasters, crime and outbreaks of infectious disease as possible threats within Canada, situations with which the CF may have to assist their emergency management partners.

A review of the Government's priorities for defence as laid out in CFDS reflects closely the trends in the Ipsos Reid poll. Arguably, and as it should, it also takes a longer and more comprehensive view of the threat and Canada's role within the global security environment. To quote Prime Minister Harper, the government will "keep our citizens safe and secure, defend our sovereignty, and ensure that Canada can return to the international stage as a credible and influential country, ready to do its part . . . [as] a positive force in the world, both today and in the years to come"⁹⁶ Defence Minister McKay summarized that ". . . the CF [will] support the Government's broader national security and foreign policy objectives by maintaining the ability to deliver excellence at home, be a strong and reliable partner in the defence of North America and project leadership abroad. . ."⁹⁷

The Threat - According to the CF

The threats, as enumerated in CFD's *The Future Security Environment 2008-2030*, are congruent with those that are listed in CFDS. The capabilities required to counter the known and yet unspecified threats (conventional and asymmetric) are also in line. *Prima facie* it appears as though the government of the day and the CF's view of the threat that faces the nation are consistent.

⁹⁶*Ibid.*, 1.

⁹⁷*Ibid.*, 2.

The CF stance is that “the future security environment . . . will demand a comprehensive, integrated, adaptive, and networked focus in the application of government policy . . . [often with] other government departments taking the lead.”⁹⁸ As Canada’s ‘whole of government’ approach in Kandahar has demonstrated, inter-departmental integration has yet to fully mature. Perhaps any dissonance in how the government or the other Canadian governmental departments view the threat has more to do with the external factors that apply to them specifically and their own institutional cultures. It certainly appears that Lord Salisbury’s observations, with respect to individuals’ perceived realities, were correct.

In the final analysis, the CF is but one of many departments in the government. However it is unique in its role and capabilities. As the manager of violence on behalf of the state and the ultimate protector of the citizens’ rights, the CF retains a unique status among the people. The Supreme Court of Canada, limiting its remarks in this case to the Military Justice System, upheld the distinctiveness of the CF as a Canadian institution when it wrote:

The safety and well-being of Canadians depends considerably on the willingness and readiness of a force of men and women to defend against threats to the nation’s security. To maintain the Armed Force in a state of readiness, the military must be in a position to enforce internal discipline effectively and efficiently. Breaches of military discipline must be dealt with speedily and, frequently punished more severely than would be the case if a civilian engaged in such conduct.⁹⁹

If the CF is to remain both societally and functionally relevant then it must, as an institution, wisely use the discretion that it is given to walk that fine line. One day the nation’s survival may depend on it. The next chapter investigates four specific CF

⁹⁸DND, *The Future Security Environment*. . . , 9.

⁹⁹DND, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*. . . ,41.

policies (or groups of policy) that are germane to the 'societal versus functional imperative' and 'discretionary' debate.

CHAPTER 3: SPECIFIC CF POLICIES STUDIED

Four distinct groups of CF policies were chosen for study because each one represents an aspect of this paper's overall thesis. Many more policies could have been studied (Imposed Restriction, Integrated Relocation Program, Parental Leave, Post Living Differential, etc.) however, a comprehensive review exceeding the four that were chosen would be beyond the scope of this project. Firstly, the debate on what constitutes the ideal mission tour length (six versus eight months, with leave) emphasizes the struggle to balance member well-being and mission success requirements. Secondly, a review of CF members' expectations concerning force bed-down and deployed personnel support standards exposes for consideration, the existence and the extent of any entrenched sense of entitlement. Thirdly, environmental duty allowances have become for some a strong career motivating factor (postings and professional development), demonstrating how certain tangible benefits can have unintended consequences and adversely affect ethos. Finally, the investigation of the highly emotive topic of universality of service affords a discussion on the social contract, CF member care, operational effectiveness and the sustainability of certain CF practices. The information presented in this chapter is intended to provide the specific policy background so that the survey results can be properly understood and contextualized.




Figure 7: Specific CF Policies studied

TOUR LENGTH AND HOME LEAVE TRAVEL ASSISTANCE (HLTA)

Tour length is a chain of command decision that is based on operational requirements. Historically, the vast majority of tours have been six months in duration, with certain headquarters' positions lasting nine or 12 months. For the CF's current mission in Afghanistan, HLTA is calculated at three days/30 continuous days in theatre with two travel days on each end.¹⁰⁰

FORCE BED-DOWN AND SUPPORT TO DEPLOYED OPERATIONS

The standards for force bed-down are mission, location and resource dependent, however the CF uses the *Engineer Field Manual: Accommodations, Installations and Engineering Services* as its guide. Morale, welfare and recreation initiatives are supported by Personnel Support Programs (PSP) and include: convenience stores, barber services, CF radio and TV, and fitness facilities. PSP also administers the HLTA program and

¹⁰⁰ In accordance with the The CF Leave Policy Manual, the actual terminology is "Mission Leave", however most CF members know it as HLTA.

runs the 'Canada House,' where possible. Personal internet and telephone access are services delivered via a Task Force Signals Cell delivered contract.¹⁰¹

ENVIRONMENTAL DUTY ALLOWANCES

CF Compensation and Benefit Instructions (CBI) contain the regulations that pertain to environmental allowances. Land, aircrew and sea duty allowances are a sub-set of these environmental allowances.

Land Duty Allowance (LDA)

CBI 205.33 states that a CF member "posted to a field unit . . . is entitled to Land Duty Allowance at the monthly rate set out . . . for the member's accumulated eligible service." A 'field unit' is defined as ". . . a unit, whose primary function is combat manoeuvre . . . or combat support or combat service support. CF personnel in these units can expect, as part of their normal duties, to be exposed to [frequent] austere environmental conditions."¹⁰² By this definition, personnel posted to an Army training establishment do not qualify for LDA, even though they may spend a substantial amount of time deployed in the field.

Aircrew Allowance

¹⁰¹Department of National Defence *An Exploratory Examination of Personnel Support to Operations* (Ottawa: Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis - Chief of Military Personnel, 2009), 25.

¹⁰²Department of National Defence, "Compensation and Benefit Instruction: Chapter 205," <http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dgcb-dgras/pub/cbi-dra/205-eng.asp>; Internet; accessed 15 December 2010.

CBI 205.32 states that CF members are entitled to Aircrew Allowance “at the appropriate monthly rate [if they] are a pilot or qualified in the operation of aircraft or airborne equipment . . . and [are] employed in a flying position.”¹⁰³

Sea Duty Allowance (SDA)

CBI 205.35 states that a CF member “posted to a ship, . . ., or serving in a sea-going position . . . is entitled to SDA at the appropriate monthly rate . . . for the member’s accumulated eligible service.”

UNIVERSALITY OF SERVICE

Defence Administration Order and Directive (DAOD) 5023-0 and 5023-1 relate to the CF’s universality of service policy and its associated minimum operational standards respectively. The statutory foundation for these policies are section 33 of the NDA and subsection 15(2) and 15(9) of the CHRA. The NDA states that “. . . all officers and non-commissioned members . . . are at all times liable to perform any lawful duty.”¹⁰⁴ This applies to both regular and reserve force members, however under different conditions. Therefore, in its essence, the principle of universality of service means that all CF members “are soldiers first [and therefore, must be] physically fit, employable and deployable.”¹⁰⁵

Subsection 15(2) of the CHRA decrees that discriminatory employment practices are permitted only if an employer can demonstrate a “*bona fide* operational requirement.”

¹⁰³*Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴Section 33 of the NDA. Department of Justice, “National Defence Act,” <http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/N-5/>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2011.

¹⁰⁵Department of National Defence, “DAOD 5023-0 Universality of Service,” http://admfincs.mil.ca/admfincs/subjects/doad/5023/0_e.asp; Internet; accessed 20 January 2011.

Subsection 15(9) gives explicit authorization to the CF by stating: “Subsection 15(2) is subject to the principle of universality of service under which members of the CF must at all times and under any circumstances perform any functions that they may be required to perform.”¹⁰⁶ DAOD 5023-0 adds that, “[t]he open-ended nature of military service is one of the features that distinguish it from the civilian notion of employment governed by a contract, which obliges employees to perform only those duties specified in their job description or contract.”¹⁰⁷

A CF member in breach of universality of service may be retained in the military, “subject to employment limitations only on a temporary, transitional basis if there is a critical shortfall in the CF member’s occupation or a requirement for a specific skill set.” ‘Temporary’ is defined as the lesser of: “the period of the shortage . . .; the end of the [member’s] current term of service; or a period of three years.”¹⁰⁸

CHAPTER 4: SURVEY RESULTS

A survey was conducted to gather opinions from the more senior ranks of the CF. Three different rank groupings were used: Master and Chief Warrant Officers; Majors and Lieutenant-Colonels; and Colonels and above. Only those ranks were selected because, generally speaking, it is senior personnel who must attempt to reconcile the societal and functional imperatives, and balance the requirements for mission success with member well-being. Students from JCSP 37 were polled in order to give the survey

¹⁰⁶Sub-Section 15(2) and 15(9) of the Canadian Human Rights Act. Canadian Human Rights Commission, “Canadian Human Rights Act,” http://www.chrc-ccdp.ca/about/human_rights_act-eng.aspx; Internet; accessed 11 January 2011.




¹⁰⁷DND, “DAOD 5023-0 Universality of Service”. . . , 1.

¹⁰⁸Department of National Defence, “DAOD 5023-1 Minimum Operational Standards Related to Universality of Service,” http://admfincs.mil.ca/admfincs/subjects/doad/5023/1_e.asp; Internet; accessed 20 January 2011, 5-6.

a tri-service representation. The majority of the current Army senior chain of command (Brigade, Area and Land Staff), along with many unit command teams agreed to participate, giving the study the benefit of their experience and authoritative opinions on these pressing matters. Therefore, the Maser - Chief Warrant Officer and Colonel and above rank groupings are exclusively comprised of Army personnel.

In total, 205 personnel were invited to participate with 127 completing the survey. The survey did not force a response, therefore some questions have a total that is less than 127. The breakdown by service and rank, in addition to several other distinguishing experiential characteristics can be found in Figures 8-13 below. Because it was completely anonymous, even to the author, there is no way of ascertaining who completed the survey. What is known however, is that of the 12 Colonels and above (referred to as Senior Officers in this paper) that were asked, 10 completed the survey. From a purely statistical perspective this number is insignificant, however due to the targeted nature of the survey such effectively represents over two-thirds of the Army's current chain of command at formation level or higher. The CF has 8101 members in the survey's three rank groupings.¹⁰⁹ With a sample population of 127, statistically, the results (when referring to the overall distribution only) are accurate to +/- 10%.¹¹⁰

Service

Response	Chart	Percentage	Count
Army		70%	89
Navy		11%	14
Airforce		19%	24
Total Responses			127

¹⁰⁹ Information provided by the Army G1 cell based on a download from the CF Monitor Mass HR management system on 28 October 2010.

¹¹⁰ A confidence level of 95% was used to calculate the precision. University of Florida, <http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/pd006>; Internet; accessed 11 January 2011.

Figure 8: Survey breakdown by Service¹¹¹

Rank




Response	Chart	Percentage	Count
MWO/CPO2 - CWO/CPO1		13%	16
Maj/LCdr - LCol/Cdr		80%	101
Col/Capt(N) and above		8%	10
Total Responses			127

Figure 9: Survey breakdown by rank grouping

Highest level of command (command team for NCOs).





Response	Chart	Percentage	Count
Sub-unit		50%	64
Unit		35%	45
Formation		8%	10
Institutional		6%	8
Total Responses			127

Figure 10: Survey breakdown by highest level of command

Are you an operator within your respective service?



Response	Chart	Percentage	Count
Yes		70%	89
No		30%	38
Total Responses			127

Figure 11: Survey breakdown by operator/non-operator status

¹¹¹Unless otherwise stated, all “Survey” figures were created using *Fluidsurvey.com*'s online report tools and generated from the anonymous data collected from the 127 respondents.

Number of operational tours.

Response	Chart	Percentage	Count
0		5%	6
1		12%	15
2		20%	25
3		29%	37
4		21%	27
5 or more		13%	16
Total Responses			126

Figure 12: Survey breakdown by number of operational tours

Of those deployments, did any involve combat operations?

Response	Chart	Percentage	Count
Yes		54%	69
No		46%	58
Total Responses			127

Figure 13: Survey breakdown of members who had at least one operational tour that involved combat

How familiar are you with the following?

	No knowl edge	Little knowl edge	Famil iar	Worki ng knowle dge	In-dep th knowl edge	Tot al	Mea n	Vari ance
The concept of Military Ethos as defined in A-PA-005-000/AP-001 Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada.	0 (0%)	2 (2%)	20 (16%)	65 (51%)	40 (31%)	127	4.1	0.5
The CF Effectiveness Framework (A-PA-005-000/AP-004 Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations).	1 (1%)	10 (8%)	18 (14%)	64 (50%)	34 (27%)	127	3.9	0.8
The Canada First Defence Strategy.	0 (0%)	4 (3%)	21 (17%)	66 (52%)	36 (28%)	127	4.1	0.6
The CMP document entitled HR 2020 Vision.	18 (14%)	44 (35%)	37 (29%)	23 (18%)	4 (3%)	126	2.6	1.1

Figure 14: Participant familiarity with the CF doctrinal concepts and publications pertaining to this paper

How familiar are you with the following CF policies?

	No knowled ge	Little knowled ge	Familia r	Working knowledge	In-depth knowledg e	Total	Mean	Varianc e
Tour length and HLTA.	0 (0%)	3 (2%)	20 (16%)	65 (51%)	39 (31%)	127	4.1	0.6
Personnel services on deployed operations.	0 (0%)	10 (8%)	24 (19%)	61 (48%)	31 (25%)	126	3.9	0.7
Environmental Allowances (Land/Aircrew/Sea).	0 (0%)	5 (4%)	33 (26%)	66 (52%)	23 (18%)	127	3.8	0.6
Universality of Service.	0 (0%)	4 (3%)	19 (15%)	69 (54%)	35 (28%)	127	4.1	0.6

Figure 15: Participant familiarity with the CF policies pertaining to this paper

These various differentiators allow for the highlighting of any marked divergence from the average based on specific service, rank grouping or operational experience. For the purposes of this study, a 10% or greater variance from the average qualified as significant. Participants were also asked to indicate their level of familiarity with the various CF publications, doctrinal concepts and policies germane to this paper.

TOUR LENGTH AND HLTA

In 2009, the Director General Military Personnel Research & Analysis (DGMPPRA) authored a report entitled *The Ideal Length of Tour: Perceptions of CF Members Returning from Deployment*. A total of 935 CF members took part in the survey, which asked the respondents to indicate their deployment preference with the options being: 4 months without HLTA; 6 months with HLTA; 6 months without HLTA; or 8 months with HLTA. The participant breakdown by rank was: 677 Junior Non-Commissioned Members (NCM); 151 Senior NCMs; 61 Junior Officers and 39 Senior Officers. The percentage of each preferred option is displayed below in Figure 16.




Figure 16: Overall Deployment Preference

Source: Department of National Defence. *The Ideal Length of Tour*. (Ottawa: Director General Military Personnel - Chief of Military Personnel, 2009), 4.

The report summarized the statistics and the major themes underpinning the results as follows:

Respondents in favour of six month deployments with HLTA, in effect the status quo, were of the opinion that the current model was working well. In addition, they felt that deployments in excess of six months would be detrimental to soldiers' and their families' well-being. The small cohort in favour of six month deployments without HLTA felt that leave in the midst of operations weakened unit effectiveness and soldier focus prior to, and post HLTA. . . One of the main motives expressed by those who preferred eight month deployments was to increase operational effectiveness through increased expertise and unit rhythm.¹¹²

The report represents a striking presentation of a self-contained case study of the inherent tension between what is perceived as the requirement for well-being on the one hand and mission success on the other. The analysis then proceeds to recommend, as if CF policies were chosen by majority vote, that the current approach of 6 month tours with one HLTA

¹¹²Department of National Defence, *The Ideal Length of Tour*, (Ottawa: Director General Military Personnel - Chief of Military Personnel, 2009), iii.

be maintained as it “will continue to promote a general level of satisfaction among deploying personnel.”¹¹³

Two aspects of the DGMPRA report influenced the crafting of this paper’s survey questions pertaining to Tour Length and HLTA: 1) the small number of Senior Officers (those charged with balancing member well-being and mission success) who participated and; 2) the recommendations were based on the preference of the majority of those polled; the preponderance (72.4%) being Junior NCMs.

Survey Results - Tour Length and HLTA

In total, 46% indicated that the current tour length of 6 months with one HLTA poorly or very poorly addresses the requirements for operational effectiveness. Just over one-third (35%) thought the duration adequate, while only 19% considered the *status quo* as addressing effectiveness well or very well. When filtered for Senior Officers, 70% rated the *status quo* as poor or very poor. Similarly, 61% of Combat Arms personnel judged it as deficient. Conversely, only 18% of non-Army participants had a negative opinion of the current practice.

The majority (61%) believe that the current deployment timeframe amply addresses the requirements for member and family well-being. Again, just over one-third (34%) thought it adequate, while only a very small minority (5%) considered it unsatisfactory. When filtered for non-Army personnel, the number of those who consider that the current tour length of 6 months with one HLTA positively addresses member and family well-being drops to 47%.

¹¹³*Ibid.*, iv.

The current deployment tour length of 6 months with one HLTA addresses

	Very poorly	Poorly	Adequately	Well	Very well	Total	Mean	Variance
the requirements for operational effectiveness.	15 (12%)	43 (34%)	44 (35%)	17 (13%)	8 (6%)	127	2.7	1.1
the requirements for member and family well-being.	0 (0%)	6 (5%)	43 (34%)	52 (41%)	26 (20%)	127	3.8	0.7

Figure 17: Distribution of how the current tour length of 6 months with one HLTA addresses the requirements for operational effectiveness and member well-being

Figure 18 below, illustrates that two-thirds of respondents believe that 6 months tours with one HLTA is in tilted in favour of member well-being. Exactly one-quarter consider the *status quo* to balance the requirements for member well-being with operational effectiveness, while a small minority (9%) deem it to favour mission success. When adjusted for Non-Army personnel, 50% believe that the current deployment construct favours member well-being and 39% think it to be balanced.

Generally speaking, for 6 month tours with one HLTA, the balance between operational effectiveness and member well-being is

Response	Chart	Percentage	Count
substantially in favour of operational effectiveness. (1.0)		3%	4
slightly in favour of operational effectiveness. (2.0)		6%	7
balanced. (3.0)		25%	31
slightly in favour of member well-being. (4.0)		48%	60
substantially in favour of member well-being. (5.0)		18%	23
Total Responses			125
Mean			3.7
Variance			0.9

Figure 18: Distribution of the balance between operational effectiveness and member well-being for a 6 month tour with one HLTA

When the hypothetical question of extending the tour length to 8 months with one HLTA was posed, an overwhelming majority (81%) agreed or strongly agreed that unit effectiveness would increase. This figure grows to 90% when filtered for Senior Officers. A sizable number (53%) believe, however, that such an increase in tour length would negatively affect members and their families' well-being. Only 30% of the Senior Officers polled thought extending the tour to 8 months would negatively affect members while 76% of non-Army personnel indicated that it would.

Extending the tours to 8-months (with one HLTA) would

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Total	Mean	Variance
increase unit effectiveness on operations.	25 (20%)	78 (61%)	9 (7%)	13 (10%)	2 (2%)	127	3.9	0.8
negatively affect members and their families' well-being.	13 (10%)	54 (43%)	30 (24%)	23 (18%)	7 (6%)	127	3.3	1.1

Figure 19: Distribution of how extending tour length to 8 months with one HLTA would influence operational effectiveness and member well-being.

Review of Sample Comments on Tour Length and HLTA

In addition to answering the specific questions posed, participants were invited to provide general comments on tour length and HLTA. A total of 76 respondents provided comments. The comments are divided into five themes.

Longer Tours are Required to Increase Unit Effectiveness (22 Comments)

For the majority of those whose answers pertained to increasing tour length to improve unit effectiveness, they cited the requirements to build trust with the locals and develop appropriate and in-depth situational awareness of their area of operations.

“In order to maintain the initiative in combat operations, tour lengths must be longer to enable the commander to more effectively shape, control and dominate the battle space.”

“[A Counter Insurgency] environment would benefit from longer tours for our soldiers. The US Army 15 month deployments might be extreme but an eight to nine month tour would be beneficial for our operational effectiveness, [however,] not our family.”

“I spent over six years working with operational naval platforms. Deployments ranged from three to six months. The shorter deployments were better from a personal perspective, but detrimental from a continuity perspective.”

“Longer tours are required for operational effectiveness due to the need for situational understanding. HLTA is a nicety, . . ., with little bearing on the realities of combat. Put HLTA at the end of tour and provide for 72 hour R&R. We have a war to win.”

Six Month Tours Negatively Impact on Mission Success (14 Comments)

Closely tied to the theme above, these comments honed in on the adverse effects of HLTA on the mission.

“Operational effectiveness is severely hampered by the impact of HLTA. Plans are driven by leave plans.”

“On Op ATHENA, for the majority of their tour (not including the first and last months) units and mission elements were at 80% combat effectiveness due to HLTA. During the fighting season and periods of high operational tempo, this had a significant impact on operational effectiveness and sustaining combat power. . .”

“This is a Canadianism that has created a culture of entitlement within the ranks. We run into this problem with the UN where they conduct 12 month tours and Canada conducts six month tours (for the most part). Canada goes so far as to foot the bill for having to rotate a team in and out within that 12 month period. Further, lip service is paid to member well being with regards integration post-tour as this does not occur during HLTA. Although an 'off line' break is absolutely required, it can be done without including HLTA. . .”

“I believe the current structure places too much emphasis on the soldier over the mission. The HLTA is important but too many soldiers view this as a right that, if necessary, takes priority over the mission. In terms of the tour, the HLTA takes too much time out and leaves units short during the most productive period of the tour - the middle third.”

Difficulties Managing HLTA (15 Comments)

Two sub-themes emerged in the comments. Many participants noted the difficulty in properly implementing HLTA, while a few others focused on the dangers of unassisted mid-tour reintegration with family.

“I think the current approach is somewhat ineffective in that we send some members on HLTA on month 2 of their deployment in order to meet the 25% numbers. I do not see any benefit to the soldier who leaves on HLTA after 4 weeks and returns to his unit that is now fully integrated and he/she feels they are behind the power curve.”

“From the perspective of a Naval officer, it is very difficult to adequately line up HLTA planning with pre-scheduled port visits that are of a length conducive to meet the member’s well-being / family objectives.”

“As I understand it, the tour length of 6 months originates from the first UN peacekeeping force deployed to the Suez crisis (UNEF 1), which was expected to only be a six month mission. Rotations ensued on a six month basis and the CF adopted the rotation period and applied it as a template to most missions thereafter. The fact that the CF has maintained this arbitrary rotational custom demonstrates that the CF is not a learning organization focussed on operational effectiveness; rather, it suggests that the CF adheres rigidly to archaic policies, particularly if adaptation may result in member discontentment. In combat operations HLTA is a dangerous policy. Not only does it hamstring the operational effectiveness of forces on the ground, but it subjects the member and his family to sudden and dramatic changes in their environments that can be very difficult to manage.”

Six Month Tours with One HLTA Balance the Requirements for Member Well-Being with Operational Effectiveness (7 Comments)

Those who advocated for the *status quo* argue that the current system is sound and that CF members and their families prefer it. Studies indicate that individual performance, especially in combat, decreases after 6 months.

“In the end, it seems to me that both at the individual and organizational levels, we are in the right balance on the question of tour duration.”

“For full out combat operations in the face of the enemy, six months is ideal for combat effectiveness and the well-being of the soldier.”

“The current six month tour for combat operations is balanced with member well-being. Extending the tour might increase operational effectiveness since the same

troops will be on the ground for a slightly longer timer period, but during intense periods of combat (such as in 2006), this will increase the risk of stress casualties. The British Army has continued to expose their troops to combat operations for only 6 month tours as a result of careful consideration.”

“After five tours, I am sure that six month tours with one HLTA is the best for the mission and the family. We all know that we lose a lot of our members after five months because they become tired and less focused on the mission.”

Increasing Tour Length a Benefit to Both Member Well-Being and Mission Success

(6 Comments)

These comments reinforce the notion that longer tours translate into a better understanding of the theatre of operations but also that such a construct would reduce the overall training burden and lengthen the time between deployments.

“It is my opinion that increasing the tour length and maintaining the HLTA policy would be better for both the military and the families. For the military operation, it has the benefit of maintaining continuity of key players and cultural knowledge. For the families, it can be seen as reducing the strain on the families as even though tours will be lengthened, the time between tours will be greatly increased. The off shoot is that while a formation is in the reconstitution phase, there will be additional time available to commanders to train and for individuals to achieve the necessary career progression courses.”

SUPPORT TO DEPLOYED OPERATIONS

For the purposes of this paper two broad categories of support to deployed operations were analyzed. The first category deals with force bed-down, which includes accommodations and feeding standards. The second category pertains to personnel support, which includes morale, welfare and recreation.

Survey Results - Support to Deployed Operations

Generally speaking, the vast majority of respondents rated each element of support to deployed operations as good or very good.

In general, CF deployed

	Very poor	Poor	Adequate	Good	Very good	Total	Mean	Variance
accommodation standards are	0 (0%)	1 (1%)	23 (18%)	49 (39%)	52 (42%)	125	4.2	0.6
feeding standards are	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	13 (10%)	53 (42%)	60 (48%)	126	4.4	0.4
member's ability to communicate with home is	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	7 (6%)	35 (28%)	84 (67%)	126	4.6	0.4
Personnel Support Services (PSP) are	0 (0%)	3 (2%)	23 (18%)	42 (33%)	58 (46%)	126	4.2	0.7

Figure 20: Standards of support to deployed operations statistics

Op HESTIA, the CF's humanitarian assistance / relief mission in response to the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, involved all three services, and lasted for less than three months. Upon his return, during a post operation brief, the Commander of Joint Task Force Haiti lamented that the "CF has lost the ability to go in austere." The CF uses the term "Initial Standard" for deployments of less than six months which is "characterized

by austere facilities requiring minimal engineer effort.”¹¹⁴ 61% of those polled agreed or strongly agreed with his assessment. That number increases to 73% for Army personnel and drops to 32% for non-Army personnel.

During the Joint Task Force Haiti Commander's (Op HESTIA, 2010) backbrief to the CLS, it was remarked that the “CF has lost the ability to go in austere.” Do you concur with the JTF Commander’s assessment?






Response	Chart	Percentage	Count
Strongly Agree (5.0)		21%	27
Agree (4.0)		40%	51
Neutral (3.0)		18%	23
Disagree (2.0)		17%	22
Strongly Disagree (1.0)		3%	4
Total Responses			127
Mean			3.6
Variance			1.2

Figure 21: Distribution of participants with opinions on the CF’s ability to deploy ‘austere’

Having established that CF members highly rate the support given to deployed operations, the following data indicates that a strong expectation (82% agreed or strongly agreed) has been created but, more troubling, that mission success suffers (51% agreed or strongly agreed) as a result of the material resources and manpower dedicated to achieving and maintaining such a high standard. These numbers drop to 68% and 37% respectively when filtered for non-Army personnel.

¹¹⁴Initial construction standard includes the following: tents, tactical generators, water points, and pit / burnout latrines. Department of National Defence, “Engineer Field Manual Volume 12,” <http://armyapp.dnd.ca/acl/pubs/B-GL-361-012-FP-001.pdf>; Internet; accessed 12 January 2011.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Total	Mean	Variance
Mission success suffers because material resources and manpower are being expended to achieve high standards for force bed-down and personnel support.	13 (10%)	52 (41%)	33 (26%)	26 (20%)	3 (2%)	127	3.4	1.0
CF members have become accustomed to and therefore expect a high standard for force bed-down and personnel support.	43 (34%)	61 (48%)	15 (12%)	8 (6%)	0 (0%)	127	4.1	0.7

Figure 22: Distribution of CF members' expectations and the impact that force bed-down standards have on mission success

Examination of Comments on Support to Deployed Operations

In addition to answering the specific questions posed, participants were invited to provide general comments on support to deployed operations. An oversight during the formulation of the survey grouped questions of operational allowances with those to support to deployed operations. Therefore, the questions and comments pertaining to operational allowances will not be included in this section. A total of 19 comments were provided pertaining to support to deployed operations and are grouped into three themes.

High Expectations for PSP and Creature Comforts (7 Comments)

These comments summarize the belief that some, or in some cases many, CF members are more interested in their individual comforts at the expense of mission success. Furthermore, many comments call attention to a sense of entitlement widely held by CF members and seen in some cases to have been created or perpetuated by the CF.

“Personal experience led me to believe that some members were treating their operational deployment as a 9-5 job. Moreover, these same members expected the same benefits/privileges that they received when garrisoned in Canada. Mission success took a back seat to their individual comforts.”

“I believe we have created a level of expectation and a sense of entitlement to a high standard of living on deployed operations. It is no longer "acceptable" for a mission's comfort level to evolve gradually over successive rotations - the "gold standard" is expected from theatre activation. The only exception is perhaps the DART, which is designed to enter and operate in austere conditions (partially out of respect for the people in the affected nation, not to create a visible have / have not situation).”

“We get paid extremely well for deployments but live too fat behind Forward Operating Bases.”

High Expectations for Force Bed-down (6 Comments)

Closely related to the theme above, the following comments refer to CF member's unreasonable expectations for force bed-down.

“I believe soldiers are willing and capable of going into austere conditions yet the chain of command has failed. The leadership believe they must provide comfortable conditions, yet if soldiers are informed in advance of what they are to expect upon arrival they will accept those conditions and persevere.”

“I concur that expectations for force bed-down are too high for short deployments. At the same time, the CF's ability to plan and execute the bed-down of a brigade(+) force that will be *in situ* for more than 6 months is lacking. Combat arms soldiers can live with austerity when they understand the mission is only 6-8 months, however, they do not understand why the CF is unable to provide the same standards as their coalition partners in theatres of more than 6 months.”

“I only partially agree with [Commander Joint Task Force Haiti] on this issue. The Air Force flew in, against priority loads, the equipment and amenities to set up an Internet cafe and the likes, while 3e R22eR lived under tarps, with no showers, dug latrines and ROWPU water for the greater part of the deployment. Most line units had no problems with the level of austerity (tarps, four-man tents, hard rations, limited/no showers). Elements from national HQs, Navy and Air Force did not fare as well.”

High Expectations for Communication Services (4 Comments)

In line with the other themes, these comments address the insatiable appetite that CF members have for communications bandwidth to remain connected to friends and family no matter where they are in the world or what they are doing on operations.

“We provide massive amounts of bandwidth to realtime, high capacity internet connections for welfare purposes and yet have difficulty providing adequate bandwidth for moving imagery and other intelligence and operational information.”

“The demand to re-create life "back home" has placed a tremendous burden on the CF and has created an air of entitlement with the troops. Any suggestion to go without air conditioners, video games, and unlimited access to communicate back to Canada is met with anger. Unfortunately, the same outrage is seldom seen if there are not enough sandbags, razor wire, or shovels.”

ENVIRONMENTAL DUTY ALLOWANCES

Each service within the CF has their own distinctive policy on environmental duty allowances. The Navy and the Airforce have had these policies in effect for some time, while the Army implemented LDA in 2008.

Survey Results - Support to Deployed Operations

Nearly two-thirds of respondents (64%) agreed or strongly agreed that CF members are now refusing posting out of designated units/positions if that means losing an environmental duty allowance. The number jumps to 81% when filtered for Senior NCOs, and drops to 47% for non-Army personnel.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Total	Mean	Variance
Soldiers/Aircrew/Sailors are now refusing postings outside of a field unit/flying position/sea going position in order to maintain this allowance.	23 (18%)	57 (46%)	28 (22%)	17 (14%)	0 (0%)	125	3.7	0.9

Figure 23: The impact of Environmental Duty Allowance on posting statistics

Those polled and answering ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ in Figure 23, were then asked to qualify their response by indicating to what degree CF members are modulating their behaviour based on earning these allowances. A total of 79 responses were collected with the distribution indicated below in Figure 24.

How many CF members are modulating their behaviour due to environmental allowance considerations?

Response	Chart	Percentage	Count
Very Few		1%	1
Few		5%	4
Some		39%	31
Many		47%	37
Most		8%	6
N/A		0%	0
Total Responses			79

Figure 24: Behaviour modulation based on Environmental Duty Allowance consideration statistics

Review of Sample Comments on Environmental Duty Allowances

In addition to answering the specific questions posed, participants were invited to provide general comments on environmental duty allowances. A total of 77 comments were provided and are grouped into five themes.

Land Duty Allowance (21 Comments)

Most of the LDA comments relate to its poor implementation, how it has influenced soldiers’ career decisions by refusing postings to non-LDA entitled units (mainly schools) and how it has negatively affected morale by creating a two-tier system within the Army.

“Discrepancies in how LDA is allocated causes problems between units. While some units that rarely go to the field receive the allowance, others (like CMTC) that spend more time in the field do not. This creates posting and morale issues.”

“Units need a constant rotation of personal in order to keep fresh and current. The institutional army is suffering because members do not want to give up LDA to be

posted to the school house. This hurts the unit as these people who never leave the unit will eventually get burned out and it also effects the schools because they do not get a regular influx of new members with operational experience. There is also a tendency on the part of unit leadership and career managers to grant the wishes of the top performers and retain them in the units while posting lesser performing soldiers to the schools. Note: This is not a rule and there are some top performers at the schools but they either go there out of a sense of duty or unwillingly.”

“It is not having a problem on effectiveness specifically but it sure is a moral factor. The Gagetown schools are affected because soldiers that are getting the benefit and do not want to go there and lose this benefit. A guy in 2 RCR could be getting \$650 a month and then a posting across the street and end up losing that amount has a serious effect on the soldiers life! It was a great initiative on the Army's part but poorly administered.”

Individual and Unit Stagnation (10 Comments)

Closely related to the theme above, these comments refer to impacts on the organization and the individual when CF members stagnate in the same unit.

“Members are becoming stagnant in single locations and holding up career progression opportunities for others. They are in fact diminishing their overall individual effectiveness which over time will reduce individual Branch and Army effectiveness.”

“It is harder to maintain a healthy rotation between units that earn allowances and those that do not. This is not the only factor but it is another that contributes to a trend of limited mobility of CF members.”

Monetary Factors and a Sense of Entitlement (21 Comments)

Three sub-themes emerged from the comments. Many observed that CF members come to view their allowances as part of their base pay. It follows that loss of those allowances can then cause moderate to severe financial impacts. Finally, some participants decried a sense of entitlement that is undermining the CF ethos.

“Many soldiers, particularly the younger ages and junior ranks, live paycheck to paycheck regardless of what they or anyone else will argue. Now that they receive a monthly allowance, for them it is just part of the paycheck and their lifestyle has changed to accommodate the extra money. As soon as that soldier is notified of being posted to position that does not receive LDA, they see it as a pay-cut and realize it as a pay-cut. So, when the army needs to send qualified soldiers with

recent tour experience to the training institutions, to reinvest their hard-earned experience into the professional development of the army, but they're penalized with a pay-cut in order to go there, many/most soldiers will attempt to refuse the move on purely financial grounds. Remember, for them, the environmental allowance isn't viewed as a 'temporary allowance.' No, it's part of their monthly income and their lifestyle has shifted to accommodate and need that allowance. Now, with the allowance, these same soldiers still live paycheck to paycheck because it's in their nature to do so."

"It impacts the skill sets and experience sets that our personnel have. The financial impacts can be considerable and force members to choose between their professional obligations (ethos) and their financial commitments to their families."

"I belong to an element/classification that receives no additional benefits. I am disgusted by the sense of entitlement by those who benefit from such entitlements - they seem to have forgotten that the conditions from which they gain additional benefit have already been factored in to their basic pay scales, and are why CF pay/benefits greatly exceed the national average. This sense of entitlement becomes the focus for many and is detrimental to the military ethos overall."

"There is an attitude of entitlement and financial remuneration. However, I do believe the vast majority undertake their task with professionalism and great skill, focused on mission success."

Not an Issue or Only a Minor One (17 Comments)

A large number of respondents commented that environmental duty allowances either did not alter CF members' behaviour and therefore had no effect on the institution, or that the impact was minor in nature.

"Most soldiers are interested in operational unit employment, otherwise they would have chosen a more sedate career, so the financial incentive is not the main motivator."

"I don't necessarily disagree with this motive [staying in a field unit] providing they are performing to standard. It would be a much worse situation if we were trying to get people to accept postings to operational units vice trying to get them out. Money will always motivate people whether we like it or not."

"The impact has been minor, but given the continuing rising costs associated with having a family and establishing oneself financially it is possible that this practice will increase into the future."

Sea Duty and Aircrew Allowances (9 Comments)

These comments were very similar to those relating to LDA, however they pertained specifically to the Navy or the Airforce.

“Pilots do not want postings to non-flying units. Why? Loss of environmental pay, has an impact on quality of life (less pay, and HQ positions are typically in higher cost of living areas). Incentive to go to HQs is not there - you stop doing a job you enjoy, and you get paid less to do it.”

“This question is answered from a Naval Perspective - and is likely not the same on both coasts. West coast standard of living is quite high, and sea duty allowance, though it is not supposed to be considered as such, plays an important factor in the finances of many sailors.”

UNIVERSALITY OF SERVICE

Universality of Service is an emotionally, legally, ethically and politically charged subject, especially when the debate revolves around CF members with combat related injuries. It is a complex subject that must be treated with respect but also with honesty. Readers are therefore cautioned not to judge the statistics listed below until they have read the comments in their entirety.

Survey Results - Universality of Service

The three questions in Figure 25 on page 70 were specifically sequenced to determine respondents' thoughts on the concept of national continuity of care for injured soldiers and how it is linked to universality of service. The vast majority (90%) felt strongly or very strongly that the Canadian Government is responsible to provide 'indefinite' care to injured soldiers who can no longer serve in the military. The term 'indefinite' was not defined but left up to the respondents to determine exactly what it meant to them. When asked if the CF had the same responsibility, the number dropped to 48% and when filtered for Senior Officers to 30%. Finally, 81% of those polled (90% for

Senior Officers) indicated that injured CF members who permanently breach the universality of service should, in due course, be released and supported by Veterans Affairs or another continuity of care provider. The distribution for questions 3 and 1 seem to correlate - those who feel strongly that the CF should medically release members who permanently breach universality of service also believe that the Canadian government then assumes responsibility for their care. The distribution for question 2 does not correlate to the other questions and further study would be required to determine why. Two comments may offer an insight:

“I indicated that I was neutral on the last two statements [questions 2 and 3 from Figure 25] because I feel that the CF has a commitment during the transition phase from the service to a new career/life. How long the transition phase takes and what services are required will depend on each case. I believe that the units have an operational mandate and that must not be put at jeopardy. If a person can be still retained for a few years and not affect the operational effectiveness of a unit, then great. I do feel that the three year maximum for retention has to be reviewed. It should perhaps vary due to the time served by the member. For an example, a soldier who receives a [Permanent Category] with 16 years in should maybe receive a 4 year retention so they can get a 40% pension.”

“There are various reasons why a member would breach the universality of service. Injured and sick members should be retained and employed in roles they are able to fulfill. Letting go this trained asset is just bad business. Each case needs to be reviewed individually. If the breach is one that is self-generated, the consequences should be adapted to reflect the rules. If capacities remains within the individual to serve in a limited capacity, that individual should be retained until such a time as the ability to provide a service degenerates to a level preventing meaningful contribution. Either way, you may have to pay this individual, might as well have him/her provide a service. Providing the individual a "purpose" is also part of the rehabilitation process.”

The delta between the overall distribution and Senior Officer numbers could be attributed to the fact that the latter have a better policy and legal understanding of the issue (60% working knowledge and 40% in-depth knowledge) as opposed to entire survey population (49% working knowledge and 24% in-depth knowledge).

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Total	Mean	Variance
The Canadian Government has a responsibility to provide indefinite care to its injured soldiers who can no longer serve in the military.	70 (55%)	45 (35%)	2 (2%)	8 (6%)	2 (2%)	127	4.4	0.8
The CF has a responsibility to provide indefinite care to its injured soldiers who can no longer serve in the military.	23 (18%)	38 (30%)	17 (13%)	40 (31%)	9 (7%)	127	3.2	1.6
Once an injured CF military member permanently breaches universality of service, in due course, they should be medically released and supported by Veteran's Affairs or another continuity of care provider.	49 (39%)	53 (42%)	11 (9%)	9 (7%)	5 (4%)	127	4.0	1.1

Figure 25: Responsibility for care and universality of service statistics

Examination of Comments on Universality of Service

In addition to answering the specific questions posed, participants were invited to provide general comments on universality of service. A total of 63 comments were provided, however some comments addressed more than one theme. As a result 73 comments were coded and are grouped into three themes.

Universality of Service - Treated on a Case-by-Case Basis (30 Comments)

Many respondents argued that breaches of universality of service, especially for CF members injured in combat, must be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. In addition to this general desire, three sub-themes emerged. Firstly, that injured members be allowed to serve with limitations. Secondly, that the injured members themselves be able to choose when they are released from the CF. Thirdly, the CF's decision to treat breaches on a case-by-case basis had created a noticeable double standard.

“Injured soldiers need to be supported by the Government of Canada. If they no longer meet universality of service, they should be reviewed on a case-by-case basis. If they can still make a contribution to the CF, they should be retained. If not, they should be considered priority hires in the public service.”

“These opinions are caveated by the requirement for the injury to be service related and to be graduated based on severity. For example, a member who is injured and never trade qualified who is released for breach of universality of service presents a different case than a soldier incapacitated by a combat injury.”

“I generally agree that once an injured CF military member permanently breaches universality of service they should be medically released. However, given personnel shortages and the wide variety of positions in the CF, there could be gainful employment for some of these members in specific, non-deployable positions.”

“The Government and by extension, all Canadians, must look after its wounded warriors regardless of the cost (which in the big picture isn't that much). Soldiers who can contribute to the CF mission after being injured should be retained as much as possible and should they wish to stay in. This must be considered on a case by case basis.”

“A difficult scenario. However, to maintain the Sea:Shore / Home:Away ratio we need to ensure we do not disadvantage those that meet universality of service. I have observed a negative impact on moral when those on accommodation etc. are advantaged over those who meet universality of service.”

“This is a touchy issue. There are members out there that have breached Universality of Service [many years ago] and are still serving, in a capacity unknown in the CF. . . . Because of this, there is a two tier system that separates the injured Because [some of] these individuals are very vocal in the media, it seems that their medical files are protected and not handled properly. If a soldier does not meet Universality of Service, then he/she is given a opportunity to transition out of the CF on a retention period of 3 years. It seems that the vocal ones, are treated differently and the others are not making any statements about it. It is not the soldiers' fault in my opinion, we all want to be part of the machine, it is the Chain of Command's responsibility to treat every individual equally on a case-by-case basis and use the same rules for every one. This is a very touchy subject.”¹¹⁵

Continuity of Care (27 Comments)

A significant number of respondents commented on the Government and the CF's responsibility to provide a continuity of care. Some were explicit in grounding this

¹¹⁵Portions of the original comment were removed that inferentially might identify an individual being alluded to by the respondent. The comment was included since it synthesizes many of the issues regarding universality of service and highlights its emotive nature.

responsibility in the social contract. Others honed in on the CF's duty to ensure an injured member's proper transition to civilian life.

“The CF does not have the capacity to continue life long care to an injured member once they are no longer in uniform, however the Government of Canada has a duty and responsibility to see that that member is adequately cared for for the rest of their lives.”

“The defence budget must be focussed on defence output, not residual governmental obligations. Therefore, administering those who cannot serve should not be at the CF's cost. The people of Canada and their democratic government must continue to care for the citizen soldiers who have sacrificed their own well-being to contribute to governmental aims. Therefore, the government has a moral obligation to support the released soldiers.”

“Universality of Service is a valuable policy, but it must be balanced with the need to care for our people. Personnel that breach Universality of Service due to injuries sustained during operational missions, particularly due to enemy action, should be released from the CF, but should be employed elsewhere with preferential hiring, or otherwise cared for.”

“The balance is too much on the organizational side here. When soldiers do get injured in the performance of their duties to the Canada, they should have the possibility to continue their service up to 25 YOS when employable. Right now, they are released if they are not deployable without consideration to the fact that they can be employable in Canada. The expeditionary concept is far too much strongly applied which creates an imbalance in the social contract between the soldier and the state. If the soldier ethos imposes unlimited liability then the state has the same obligations towards the soldier who gets injured due to the service.”

“[A]s long as we have properly helped them adapt to leaving the Forces, then they should be transferred to another care provider. The key is helping them with the transition. It is difficult to leave the Forces even when someone is able-bodied, let alone wounded in action.”

Universality of Service - Sacrosanct Foundation of Military Ethos (16 Comments)

These comments reinforce the CF's absolute functional imperative to articulate a universality of service policy and to delineate how it relates to operational effectiveness, unlimited liability and military ethos.

“Universality of service must remain a sacrosanct cornerstone of our personnel policy. There must always be a spot for soldiers to have a chance for

convalescence but once you have reached a point where universality of service cannot be met then the soldier must be released as operational effectiveness must be paramount and the CF cannot be an alternate form of welfare.”

“Universality of service is a fundamental tenet of military operations. Once universality of service is breached, the duties and responsibilities are increasingly concentrated on those soldiers who meet universality of service. This is a simple truth. This unfairly increases the likelihood of injury to those who meet universality of service. It is a dangerous downward spiral.”

“Given the high personnel tempo necessary to achieve CF missions and tasks, we cannot afford to carry 15-20% of our personnel as ‘Left Out of Battle’. It may seem harsh, but if an individual in [the] CF is non-deployable, regardless of the reason, they should be released from the CF within 24 months. Ultimately, this should be the underlying premise of Universality of Service. For those injured due to military service, every attempt [should be made] to accommodate them within the CF to a period of up to 36 months and significant resources should be dedicated to assisting them transition to civilian life. Where necessary, long-term, high-quality medical care should be made more readily available. The 'health insurance mentality' at Veterans Affairs Canada does not help in this regard.”

“Universality of Service represents an objective standard for ability that every CF member must possess; it is not an unduly high standard. If a CF member can't meet this standard, other members must take up the slack and the CF loses operational capability. Compassion is often cited as a reason for retaining CF members who don't meet this standard in the CF. It is possible to demonstrate compassion for injured or sick CF members without retaining them against CF strength and thereby putting a greater burden on other CF members or reducing operational capability.”

“The concept withstands scrutiny, but requires societal and government buy in. Universality of Service is the single most important aspect of our ethos.”

“The Government of Canada owes an injured soldier a level of care respectful of the injury. This is not the responsibility of the CF. Is indefinite care unlimited? Universality of Service is essential for a military that defends and protects a country with unlimited liability. It is part of being a team of individuals all equally prepared and capable of soldiering for Canada.”

THEMATIC SURVEY QUESTIONS

The concluding survey questions mirrored the major themes presented in this paper. Conceptual in nature, they could be interpreted differently depending on the respondents' opinions and backgrounds.

Results - Thematic Questions

One-half of the respondents believe that CF personnel policies have achieved the necessary balance between member well-being and mission success. When filtered for Senior NCOs the figure jumps to 81%. Nearly one third (31%) disagree or strongly disagree with that assessment, with that number rising to 50% for Senior Officers.

Of those polled, 58% thought that the CF has some discretion to pursue personnel policies of its own choosing. A similar number (52%) believe that the CF's current policies simply represent the 'cost of doing business' in the modern Canadian context.

A substantial majority (93%) agreed or strongly agreed that CF members and their families have grown accustomed to the current levels of benefits and support and that any attempts to change or reduce those benefits would be met with resistance.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Total	Mean	Variance
CF Personnel Policies are properly balanced between providing for the individual member's well-being and the institutional needs for mission success.	3 (2%)	60 (48%)	23 (18%)	37 (29%)	3 (2%)	126	3.2	0.9
Notwithstanding the governmental, legal and societal mandated obligations, the CF has the discretion to pursue personnel policies of its own choosing.	6 (5%)	67 (53%)	23 (18%)	29 (23%)	1 (1%)	126	3.4	0.8
The current CF Personnel Policies simply reflect "the cost of doing business" in the modern Canadian context.	4 (3%)	64 (50%)	28 (22%)	29 (23%)	2 (2%)	127	3.3	0.8
CF members and their families have become accustomed to the current levels of compensation, benefits and personnel support (pay, allowances, benefits, and force bed-down standards) and will be resistant to any attempts to modify or moderate these benefits even for reasons of operational effectiveness.	49 (39%)	68 (54%)	2 (2%)	8 (6%)	0 (0%)	127	4.2	0.6

Figure 26: Thematic questions (1/2) statistics

Just over one-half of those polled (51%) are of the opinion that the CF is overly focused on providing tangible rewards to its members at the expense of intangible ones. In total, 29% disagree or strongly disagree with that assessment, with 50% of Senior Officers opposing that view.

The question of whether or not the CF's focus on member well-being and commitment initiatives has usurped the primacy of mission success divided the group almost evenly, with 39% believing such to be the case versus the 40% who did not. When filtered for Senior Officers, 60% disagreed with that statement.

Over two-thirds (69%) of respondents indicated that CF personnel policies' focus on the individual member has cultivated the notion of the member as an individual.

	Stron gly Agree	Agree	Neutr al	Disag ree	Stron ly Disag ree	Tot al	Mea n	Vari ance
The CF is overly focused on providing tangible rewards (pay, allowances, leave, etc...) to its members at the expense of intangible ones (autonomy, professional development, job satisfaction, etc...).	17 (13%)	48 (38%)	26 (20%)	34 (27%)	2 (2%)	127	3.3	1.1
The CF's focus on member well being and commitment initiatives has usurped the primacy of mission success.	8 (6%)	42 (33%)	26 (20%)	47 (37%)	4 (3%)	127	3.0	1.1
CF personnel policies' focus on the individual member has cultivated the notion of the member as an individual.	21 (17%)	65 (52%)	16 (13%)	21 (17%)	2 (2%)	125	3.7	1.0

Figure 27: Thematic questions (2/2) statistics

The survey's last question explored how sustainable CF policies are across four domains: financial, emotional, operational, and material. Overall, two distinct camps were identified. Also, there was a marked difference in beliefs among the various sub-groups polled. 44% agreed or strongly agreed that the policies were financially sustainable vice 40% who did not. As to the ranking of emotional sustainability, 40% agreed or strongly agreed, while 30% did not. When filtered, 69% of Senior NCOs but only 10% of Senior Officers concurred with the assessment, while 44% of Army operators who had experienced combat did not. The question of operational sustainability also produced a wide range of scores. In total, 31% strongly agreed or agreed compared to 41% who did not. When filtered, 56% of Senior NCOs concurred with the assessment, while 52% of Army operators who had experienced combat and 19% of non-Army personnel did not. Lastly, only 30% agreed or strongly agreed that the policies are materially sustainable with 49% disagreeing or strongly disagreeing. When filtered, 49% of Senior NCOs and 10% of Senior Officers were in agreement while 39% of non-Army personnel were not.

The evolution of CF personnel policies since deploying to Afghanistan are sustainable

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Total	Mean	Variance
financially.	6 (5%)	49 (39%)	21 (17%)	44 (35%)	6 (5%)	126	3.0	1.1
emotionally.	3 (2%)	48 (38%)	37 (29%)	35 (28%)	3 (2%)	126	3.1	0.8
operationally.	3 (2%)	37 (29%)	34 (27%)	43 (34%)	9 (7%)	126	2.9	1.0
materially.	2 (2%)	35 (28%)	27 (21%)	52 (41%)	10 (8%)	126	2.7	1.0

Figure 28: CF Policy sustainability statistics

Review of Sample Comments to Thematic Questions

A final free text box was inserted into the survey for respondents to add any concluding or summary remarks. A total of 61 comments were made. A representative overview of the comments can be found in Annex A.

CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS

It is the objective of this fifth and final chapter to answer the series of questions posed at the outset of the paper ultimately leading to the demonstration of the thesis. This is accomplished by building on the theory provided in the previous chapters; analyzing the survey data; referencing literature that focuses on intangible benefits; and citing recent CF policy announcements. Synthesis of elements from each of the four specific CF policies (tour length and HLTA; support to deployed operations; environmental duty allowances; and universality of service) will provide the context.

The questions under review are: 1) What imperatives, external to the institution, influence its policies?¹¹⁶ 2) How much discretion does the CF have to shape those policies? 3) How sustainable are those policies, not just at present but in an uncertain future? 4) In an effort to take care of its people, the CF has attempted to do the right things, but has it done them correctly? 5) Does a focus on tangible benefits indulge, and therefore perpetuate, a generational sense of entitlement or, are these member well-being initiatives simply the ‘cost of doing business’ in the current Canadian context? 6) Is there a point at which an increase to benefits, especially tangible ones, actually produces a decline in individual and collective performance and negatively impacts military ethos?

The consideration of the above questions ultimately leads to the thesis statement - that the accumulation of discrete benefits over the last 15 years, which were designed and implemented to increase member well-being and commitment, has inadvertently and negatively impacted on operational effectiveness (by threatening to usurp the primacy of mission success) and has undermined military ethos / martial spirit.

¹¹⁶This question was addressed in Chapter 2.

CF POLICY DISCRETION

Of the four CF Policies chosen for study, only the universality of service is codified in law. The other three are internal CF policies. While they were chosen to demonstrate in different ways the links between member well-being and mission success, they also represent policies over which the CF can exercise discretion. In the case of universality of service, as we shall see, the CF has exercised some discretion in the selective application of that policy, the results of which may become problematic in the long term.

The survey reveals that 58% of those polled believe that the CF has the discretion to pursue policies of its own choosing, with only 24% disagreeing. The CF's latitude to adopt or adapt many of its own policies is demonstrated by the following decisions that have been recently made: 1) For reasons of operational effectiveness, the CLS has endorsed a change of tour length to eight months.¹¹⁷ 2) The Land Staff is also reviewing the affordability and appropriateness of LDA in its current form.¹¹⁸

As discussed in Chapter 2, there are certain societal imperatives with which the CF must comply. Therefore, where the CF has discretionary scope, yet chooses to factor in additional societal imperatives at the expense of functional ones, it amounts to a levying a self-imposed tax on operational effectiveness.

¹¹⁷Department of National Defence, *New Army Managed Readiness Plan Model: Decision Brief to CLS* [Powerpoint presentation] (Ottawa: Army G3 and Director Army Training, 2010).

¹¹⁸Department of National Defence, 7125-1(G1 Pers) *CLS Planning Directive - Comprehensive Review - Land Duty Allowance and Casual Land Duty Allowance* (Ottawa: Chief of the Land Staff, 2010).

SUSTAINABILITY AND APPROPRIATENESS

The survey asked respondents to rate the sustainability of CF personnel policies since deploying to Afghanistan. Two significant themes emerged. Firstly, there are two distinct points of view positioned on either side of a substantial minority of ‘neutrals.’¹¹⁹ Secondly, there are vastly different perceptions based on rank, service and combat experience. Regardless of how one examines the statistics, overall there were a marked number of participants who judged CF policies to be unsustainable across the four domains. When filtered for Army operators with combat experience, i.e. those who have borne the brunt of the fighting in Afghanistan, approximately one-half felt that the current policies are unsustainable emotionally, operationally and materially, a rather striking revelation. In the words of one Senior NCO at the institutional level:

The cost of the Personnel pillar of CFDS is supposed to be 51% of overall costs. It has now risen to about 61% and with shrinking budgets and continually rising costs it is predicted that by 2015 the Personnel pillar will cost 75%. This is clearly unsustainable. The money can only come from the Readiness, Equipment and Infrastructure pillars. As the other three pillars get squeezed then so does operational effectiveness. I think that the pendulum has swung too far in one direction and a correction is needed. Clearly the current model is unaffordable and unsustainable.

Ultimately, any one individual, group, institution or nation has at its disposal a finite amount of energy or capital (financial, material, intellectual, emotional or otherwise) to expend. At a certain point, the expenditure of such capital can approach a zero sum game.¹²⁰ While societal and functional imperatives are not necessarily mutually

¹¹⁹See Figure 28 on page 77 for the breakdown of the data.

¹²⁰(in game theory) a contest in which one person's loss is equal to the other person's gain. Collins English Dictionary - Complete & Unabridged 10th Edition. HarperCollins Publishers. http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/zero-sum_game; Internet; accessed: 18 April 2011.

exclusive, there is a juncture at which what is expended on societal imperatives comes at the cost of functional ones.

Caring for injured soldiers provides a poignant example of such competing values, one that has great personal meaning for the author.¹²¹ If a particular commander, unit or the entire CF devote substantial amounts of their energy providing care to veterans of current and past conflicts, with such expenditures resulting in the significant degradation of operational capability to deal with ensuing threats, then the CF will have mortgaged its future as a combat capable force. The institutional resiliency of the CF would also be called into question if the residual effects of a limited war, such as Afghanistan, threatened the organization's sustainability.

In the case of the universality of service policy, where government and the law favour the functional imperative but where the CF, in the exercise of its discretion, does not apply the policy universally, the imperative is undermined in two ways. Firstly, there are potential legal ramifications. This policy is explicitly grounded in federal legislation. To date, the legal challenges have only been based on the application of the policy and not the policy itself.¹²² However, should the CF create a precedent by not consistently following the principle of universality of service then the policy becomes susceptible to

¹²¹“[After the tour in Kandahar,] I struggled on a personal level as how to best assist the individual soldiers while still providing the requisite leadership to the Squadron as a whole. Ultimately, I was completely overwhelmed by the situation and as the [Officer Commanding] had to adopt a utilitarian approach that provided the greatest good for the greatest number. This meant that I had to balance the needs of the collective with a certain individual's requirements for help.” Mark Gasparotto, *Clearing the Way: Combat Engineers in Kandahar* (London, ON: Ardith, 2010), 145.

¹²²Canada (Canadian Armed Forces) v. Irvine, 2005 FCA 432 and Best v. Canada (Attorney General), 2011 FC 71, http://onlinedb.lancasterhouse.com/images/up-Irvine_v_CanadaCAF.pdf and <http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fct/doc/2011/2011fc71/2011fc71.html>; Internet; accessed 20 February 2011.

legal challenge. Several articles in the Canadian media claim that the former CDS personally told injured CF members that “no disabled [soldier who was wounded in action] would be released before they are ready to transition”¹²³ with a clear order that “no soldier wounded in Afghanistan will be released unless the file has crossed his desk first.”¹²⁴ The very real danger of such an approach is that it could become legally indefensible for the CF to bar would-be recruits who do not meet the minimum military guidelines (medically, mentally or physically) should the CF create a double-standard within its own ranks based on the circumstances that give rise to the breach of the universality of service policy. Secondly, creating two tiers of injured has the potential to negatively impact upon operational effectiveness, morale and ethos. Many of the survey comments address those issues and the survey results speak for themselves. In total, 81% of respondents (90% for Senior Officers) believe that the policy should be universally applied. The following excerpt, from an interview given by Rear Admiral Smith (Chief of Military Personnel), seems to re-affirm the institution’s commitment to the principle:

Those who are wounded in action represent a special set of people who have gone out there and done the business and merit the full compassion of the institution and the country. [T]he Canadian Forces still adheres to the principle of universality of service, which dictates that all members must be fit and capable of deploying on operations. General Walter Natynchyk, has put a priority on doing as much as possible to take care of the wounded, [explaining that] those people who don’t want to leave the CF, [are] not going to release[ed] . . . until we work with them to transition their way out of the forces. As long as they are employable, if they don’t want to leave the CF we are going to look to provide them options to stay in

¹²³David Pugliese, “Is it Right that Afghan War Amputees Are to be Released from the CF While Overweight Soldiers Continue to Serve?” *Ottawa Citizen*, <http://communities.canada.com/ottawacitizen/blogs/defencewatch/archive/2011/02/02/is-it-right-that-afghan-war-amputees-are-to-be-released-from-the-canadian-forces-while-overweight-soldiers-continue-to-serve.aspx>; Internet; accessed 20 January 2011.

¹²⁴Michael Friscolanti, “Fighting to Serve,” *Maclean’s Magazine*, http://www.macleans.ca/canada/national/article.jsp?content=20080312_2721_2721; Internet; accessed 20 January 2011.

the forces in areas where the overlying principle of universality of service doesn't apply.¹²⁵

Universality of service is an issue where the CF's leadership intended to take an honourable and compassionate approach but it is debatable whether the proper course of action has been undertaken. Similarly, though not related to the universality of service, a recent Treasury Board review has questioned the validity and appropriateness of several CF policy interpretations with respect to compensation and benefits for injured members and next of kin.¹²⁶ Although a final determination has not yet been made, this is a prime example of the CF attempting to do the right thing, but doing so incorrectly.

PERPETUATING A SENSE OF ENTITLEMENT OR SIMPLY THE COST OF DOING BUSINESS?

The CF must compete for new recruits and retain its personnel while maintaining a consistent ethos with core values that will allow it to prevail as a combat capable force, operating within a complex and often violent global security environment. The extreme difficulty in balancing these paradigms lies in the fact that the internal and external environments are drastically different, each with dissimilar and sometimes conflicting rules and realities. Internally, the labour pool is shrinking, drawn from a generation that

¹²⁵David Pugliese, "CF Will Examine Whether to Release Afghan Wounded from the Ranks: Up to 50 Files to be Reviewed," *Ottawa Citizen*, <http://communities.canada.com/ottawacitizen/blogs/defencewatch/archive/2011/02/02/canadian-forces-will-examine-whether-to-release-afghan-wounded-from-the-ranks-up-to-50-files-to-be-reviewed.aspx>; Internet; accessed 20 January 2011.

¹²⁶CANFORGEN 022/11 states that "[a] review of compensation and benefits has identified areas where the CF have deviated from the Treasury Board (TB) approved compensation and benefit framework for certain CF personnel and next of kin. Accordingly, as near term expenditure authority confirmation is sought, and to ensure that payments are properly authorized by TB, the payment of some benefits must be suspended. Investigative actions have been initiated. The primary concern is to avoid financial hardship to our members and their families. . ." Department of National Defence, "CFSU Ottawa," <http://forums.army.ca/forums/index.php?topic=99003.25>; Internet; accessed 10 March 2011.

is increasingly liberal, individualistic and with an innate sense of entitlement. Don Snider, of the US Military Academy, underscores the paradox when he states that in order to be competent in combat a military must be imbued with an ethic that is “cooperative and cohesive in spirit, selfless but meritocratic, and fundamentally anti-individualistic and anti-careerist.”¹²⁷

Military HR Strategy 2020 attempted to address that dichotomy, at least superficially, by stating:

The CF HR strategy seeks the active inclusion of all Canadians through respect for the dignity and rights of individuals. A military ethos that is relevant to both the military imperative and Canadian society and is accountable to that society in the conduct of military operations provides the foundation and vision for the CF. Leadership in the CF accepts accountability for developing and fostering an open and positive culture that is responsive to relevant change within Canadian society.¹²⁸

Colonel Wiley, quoted earlier in this paper, is not as sanguine as the CF HR document’s described level of accommodation. His view that the US Army needs to address the nature of incongruent values highlights his belief that meaningful inclusion of Generation Y soldiers may require a re-assessment and an altering of the traditional US Army ethos. He states: “The Army will need to determine if making concessions on several fundamental issues will require a major shift in the current military ethos. . . [and] state whether negotiating and potentially adjusting long held Army core values is an option.”¹²⁹

Slightly more than one-half of survey respondents indicated that current CF personnel policies simply reflect the ‘cost of doing business’ in the modern Canadian context, with one quarter respectively disagreeing and remaining neutral. In the best case

¹²⁷Mathews, *The Future of the Army Profession*. . . , 25.

¹²⁸DND, *Military HR Strategy 2020: Facing the People Challenges of the Future*. . . , 15.

¹²⁹Wiley, “Generation Challenges for Army Transformation”. . . , 19.

scenario, the military will be able to acculturate new members with some compromise. In the worst case, the military will either have to accept less than its full manning or significantly alter its ethos - with potentially negative effects on its martial spirit.

This paper focused on two of the many tangible benefits granted to CF members: support to deployed operations; and environmental duty allowances. It is difficult to determine whether those particular policies were created as part of a larger scheme to attract new recruits or to retain already serving members. However, they do offer some insight into the level of support CF members have now come to expect and how financial incentives can adversely modulate behaviour. The survey posed a series of questions related to each of the policies, as well as asking three thematic questions pertaining to: the use of tangible rewards; CF members expectations; and the cost of doing business in the current Canadian context.

A large majority¹³⁰ of those polled rate the support given to deployed operations as good or very good. A similar number (82%) also concurred with the statement that “CF members have become accustomed to, and therefore expect a high standard for force bed-down and personnel support.” The results indicate that a noteworthy sense of entitlement exists within the CF with respect to support to deployed operations.

Environmental duty allowances represent a distinctive tangible benefit intended to reward CF members, above their base pay, for serving in operational units or positions. Nearly two-thirds (64%)¹³¹ of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that CF members are now refusing posting out of designated units/positions that results in the loss of an

¹³⁰Good or Very good: Accommodations rated 80%, feeding rated 88%, communications with home rated 94% and PSP rated 80%. See Figure 14.

¹³¹The number jumps to 81% when filtered for Senior NCOs (which in this survey all of whom are Army), and drops to 47% for non-Army personnel.

environmental duty allowance. Of those respondents, when asked to quantify how many CF members are modulating their behaviour because of this benefit, 47% specified 'many' and 8% indicated 'most.'¹³² The conclusion that might be drawn is that the provision of certain tangible benefits can adversely affect ethos and operational effectiveness, since many CF members appear to be making career choices based on financial considerations over their own professional development or the institution's common good.

Lastly, with respect to the proposition that the CF personnel policies' focus on the individual member has cultivated and nurtured the notion of the member as an individual, 69% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed. If the purpose of CF personnel policies is to reinforce the CF ethos, and if the CF ethos is based on service before self, cohesion and teamwork, all collective ideals which are anti-individualistic, then it follows that the CF should undertake a re-alignment of its policies to be consistent with its stated ethos.

Three articles in particular helped to inform the articulation of the tangible versus intangible benefits debate in this paper: the chapter by Elizabeth A. Stanley-Mitchell entitled *The Military Profession and Intangible Rewards for Service* in the book *Filling the Ranks: Transforming the US Military Personnel System*; Timothy P. McGonigle *et al's* article that appeared in *Military Psychology* entitled *The Relationship Between Personnel Support Programs and Readiness: A Model to Guide Future Research*; and a technical report produced by Sanela Dursen at Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC), entitled *Human Dimensions of Military Operations: The Construct of Personnel Tempo and its Relationship with Individual and Organizational Well-being*.

¹³²See Figure 19 on page 55.

Stanley-Mitchell suggests that the modern battlefield and the bureaucratization of the military have “affected the relationship between the profession [of arms] and the reward of service.” This altered relationship is more apt to shift the focus onto tangible rewards as opposed to intangible ones. Consequently, the greater the emphasis on tangible benefits, the more probable that those members who are motivated by the intangible aspects of military service will depart the armed forces. Such departures then perpetuate a negative reinforcing cycle that promotes bureaucracy over professionalism. Stanley-Mitchell goes on to underscore the great importance of maintaining the profession of arms since it is primarily “professions [that] inculcate in individuals the ability to function in ambiguous, chaotic circumstances, of which war is a prime example. Monetary rewards and other tangible compensation cannot duplicate this kind of social control.”¹³³ Other psychological research “argues that greater tangible compensation will decrease interest in internally-motivated (professional) work.”¹³⁴

The same research suggests that while tangible rewards on their own lower intrinsic motivation, “the military profession [would] benefit most *as a profession* from tangible rewards that can indirectly enhance intangible [ones] that fulfill the two basic professional needs, for autonomy and for competence.”¹³⁵ Stanley-Mitchell offers two types of tangible rewards that do not negatively affect intrinsic motivation, ‘unexpected rewards’ and ‘rewards that are not linked to the task at all.’

An example of a reward that is de-linked from the task is provided by McGonigle *et al's* research into the relationship between personnel support programs and members’

¹³³ Stanley-Mitchell, “The Military Profession and Intangible Rewards for Service” . . . , 94.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 99.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 114.

readiness. Initial findings support the notion that certain tangible benefits (PSP) can reinforce intangible ones (Mediators) which then positively impact upon member well-being and commitment, mission success and ethos (Readiness Components).¹³⁶ Their conceptual framework is depicted below as Figure 29. Referencing McGonigle *et al.*'s research, the DRDC paper puts many of the same issues into a CF context and connects member, spouse and family QOL initiatives (tangible and intangible) to member well-being and commitment, which is linked to recruiting, retention and overall mission success.¹³⁷




Figure 29: The relationship between personnel support programs and readiness.
Source: McGonigle *et al.* "The Relationship Between Personnel Support Programs and Readiness: A Model to Guide Future Research" (*Military Psychology* 17:1, 2005), 26.

Just over one-half of those polled (51%) are of the opinion that the CF is overly focused on providing tangible rewards (pay, allowances, leave, etc.) to its members at the

¹³⁶Timothy P. McGonigle, *et al.*, "The Relationship Between Personnel Support Programs and Readiness: A Model to Guide Future Research," *Military Psychology*, 17:1: 29-33.

¹³⁷Department of National Defence, *Human Dimensions of Military Operations: The Construct of Personnel Tempo and its Relationship with Individual and Organizational Well-being* (Ottawa: Centre for Operational Research and Analysis - Defence Research and Development Canada, 2008), 1, 15-16, 19.

expense of intangible ones (autonomy, professional development, job satisfaction, etc.), with 29% disagreeing and 20% remaining neutral. These findings indicate that the CF will need to reflect upon and adjust its approach in these areas as this issue will likely become even more pronounced in the future.

IMPACTS ON THE CF'S ETHOS AND OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS

Duty with Honour devotes an entire section to the issue of managing the evolution of the profession of arms and how the profession's attributes (missions and roles, responsibility, expertise, identity, and ethos) will need to adapt to changes in Canadian society. Furthermore, "the principles of relevance, openness, consistency and reciprocity will guide the evolution of each of the attributes of military professionalism."¹³⁸ As it pertains specifically to ethos, and echoing many of the issues contained in this paper, it has this to say:

The military ethos must respond to the evolution of all the other attributes. To do so effectively, all the principles will come to bear: reciprocity, to ensure the well-being of members; relevance, to maintain the link with Canadian society; consistency, to retain the core military values crucial to a fighting force; and openness, to allow for necessary adaptation.

The military ethos must always perform its role as the unifying spirit, guiding the profession of arms and the military professional in an uncertain world — effectiveness and legitimacy demand it. Although the Canadian military ethos will remain the cornerstone of military professionalism, and resist change that could undermine professional effectiveness, it will need to adjust appropriately. Socio-cultural changes, for example, are ongoing in Canadian society, and the ethos must remain aligned with fundamental Canadian values while ensuring the profession's ability to perform its function.

The core military values will remain at the centre of the ethos, as will the concepts of unlimited liability, service before self and fighting spirit. Discipline and teamwork remain vital, and how these are achieved in the three Environments may develop with evolving leadership theory and professional concepts. These latter

¹³⁸DND, *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*. . . , 68.

developments will likely alter the way that this culture is aligned with the military ethos.¹³⁹

While there is inherent tension within the theory, the concept is sound. However, the question of balance remains. Specifically related to this paper, at what point does an increase to member well-being initiatives produce a decrease in individual performance, thus negatively impacting on military ethos with resulting decreased operational effectiveness? As the survey data indicates, this is not simply an academic question for the CF. Figure 30 below is a representation of the non-linear relationship between member well-being initiatives and individual performance, linked with the CF Effectiveness Model. In essence, it is a conceptualization of this paper's thesis. The issues surrounding tour length, support to deployed operations and environmental duty allowances¹⁴⁰ corroborate aspects of this framework.




Figure 30: Representation of the non-linear relationship between member well-being initiatives and individual performance, linked with the CF Effectiveness Model

¹³⁹*Ibid.*, 72-73.

¹⁴⁰The negative consequences relating to environmental duty allowance were detailed in the previous section and will not be reviewed in this one.

Two-thirds of those polled believe that six-month tours favour (slightly or substantially) member well-being over operational effectiveness. An even greater number (81%) are of the opinion that extending tours to eight months would increase unit effectiveness on operations. The CLS's decision to extend tour lengths to eight months will address this issue. What remains a concern is the fact that half of the respondents believe that mission success suffers because material resources and manpower are being expended to achieve high standards for force bed-down and personnel support.

Furthermore, 60% are of the opinion that the CF has lost the ability to deploy in an austere manner. These high standards are to a large degree based on the demands and expectations of CF personnel who have become accustomed to them. A review of the amount of money spent on CF infrastructure (ESFP) in Kandahar versus the amount spent on 'outside the wire' reconstruction projects (CCF) that benefit Afghans and contribute to the counter-insurgency battle helps to illustrate the problem. Data for the following table was provided by CEFCOM.

Fiscal Year	ESFP	CCF	Ratio
2010/11	\$46.9M	\$24.8M	1.89
2009/10	\$80.9M	\$23.9M	3.38
2008/09	\$60.0M	\$16.1M	3.72
2007/08	\$27.5M	\$7.9M	3.48
2006/07	\$32.5M	\$5.4M	6.02

Table 1: Task Force Afghanistan Engineer Support Financial Plan (ESFP) versus Commander CEFCOM Contingency Fund (CCF) expenditures by fiscal year
Source: CEFCOM Joint Engineer Cell / J8 Financial Coordination Centre

Since 2006, the CF has spent on average 3.17 times more on its own infrastructure than what it spent on reconstruction. This statistic further reinforces the survey numbers,

whereby 40% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed¹⁴¹ that the CF's focus on member well-being and commitment initiatives has or threatens to usurp the primacy of mission success. However, when asked in a different way, only 31% disagreed or strongly disagreed that CF policies are properly balanced between providing for the individual and the institution. Further research is required to explain this discrepancy, nevertheless almost one third of respondents view this as an issue.

The notion of service before self is embedded in the unlimited liability that all CF members assume when voluntarily joining the military.¹⁴² The underlying premise of a “volunteer armed force is based on the premise that Canadians will be willing to serve their country in combat, and that the benefits of voluntary service will be seen in the professionalism and skill of CF personnel.”¹⁴³ Viewing one's service in the military as a vocation rather than an occupation is an extension of this concept.

Dr. Charles A. Cotton, who produced a study on Canadian Army values in 1979, posited that within the Army, and indeed within the same units, there existed “conflict, cleavage and controversy [with respect to] occupational and vocational models of military service.”¹⁴⁴ A study, conducted a quarter of a century later, entitled *Canada's Soldiers: Military Ethos and Canadian Values in the 21st Century*, used Cotton's Military Ethos

¹⁴¹40% disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement with 20% remaining neutral.

¹⁴²DND, *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*. . . , 26.

¹⁴³DND, *Ethos and Values in the Canadian Forces*. . . , 5.

¹⁴⁴Charles A. Cotton, *The Divided Army: Role Orientations Among Canada's Peacetime Soldiers* (Ottawa: Carleton University, 1980), 350.

scale (0-30) to measure “the degree to which personnel believed military service was occupational or vocational.”¹⁴⁵

	1979	2004
Senior Officer	24.07	21.64
Junior Officer	20.9	19.94
Senior NCM	19.33	19.4
Junior NCM	14.15	15.75

Table 2: Average Military Ethos Ratings by Rank Group 1979-2004

Source: Department of National Defence. *Canada’s Soldiers: Military Ethos and Canadian Values in the 21st Century*. (Ottawa: Director General Land Capability Development, 2005), 29.

Two general observations emerged from the study and that particular data set: firstly, that “this may indicate that some traditional views of what is really important to the military ethos have moderated in step with the post-modernizing trends in Canadian society at large;”¹⁴⁶ and secondly, that the “data indicates that a vocational attitude, in

¹⁴⁵“A score of 18 is neither occupational nor vocational, while scores above 18 denote a vocational attitude. A score above 24 would denote a clear vocational attitude.” Department of National Defence, *Canada’s Soldiers: Military Ethos and Canadian Values in the 21st Century* (Ottawa: Director General - Land Capability Development, 2005), 29.

¹⁴⁶“In 1979, senior officers disagreed or strongly disagreed with statements such as: no one should be compelled to take a posting he/she does not want; what a member of the Army does in his/her off duty hours in none of the military’s business; and differences in rank should not be important after working hours. By 2004, senior officers and to a lesser extent junior officers, had softened in these issues to the point many expressed neutral views. . . Junior NCMs continued to report a decidedly occupational attitude, although not as occupational as in 1979, while senior NCMs remained about the same. *Ibid.*, 30.

comparison to the larger society, is still present in the Army. . . [Soldiers] express vocational values even if they do not always behave in a vocational manner.”¹⁴⁷

Research conducted for the US Army has produced similar observations. R.J.

Hooker, quoted earlier herein, summarized the matter thusly:

The officer ethic of selfless service to the nation has . . . been weakened in practice as the traditional, more insular patterns of Army life have changed. Officer skills and attributes are much in demand in the private sector. High standards of personal conduct are increasingly questioned in an affluent society that extends the boundaries of personal freedom and expression more than ever before. Such factors as access to graduate education and the civilian job skills it imparts, much freer flow of information via the internet, an exacting and pressure-filled Army work environment, and the requirement to move frequently and to deploy overseas for extended periods of time encourage officers to explore their many options and look outside the profession. While the military institution is highly valued by society, the officer occupies only a middling place on the social and economic scale, well below the doctor, lawyer, engineer, and even the most successful business person. Increasingly, the military employs marketplace incentives to attract and retain officer talent, to the detriment of the ethic of selfless service that is the foundation of our value system.¹⁴⁸

Hooker’s point is well taken. While the CF does not and cannot control most of the forces that act upon it, the military does have the choice of which tools to employ in order to compete in the market for personnel. What seems clear is that any heavy reliance on tangible or ‘marketplace’ incentives detrimentally affects the military’s ethos. A considerable body of evidence indicates that there is a threshold at which regression of individual, and thus collective performance, can occur by pandering to members’ generationally inspired sense of entitlement. It is this author’s opinion that in this regard, the CF has not only passed the point of diminishing returns but into a state of regression. More refined research is required however, to determine the CF’s exact coordinates along that curve.

¹⁴⁷*Ibid.*

¹⁴⁸Mathews, *The Future of the Army Profession*. . . , 431.

CONCLUSION

The release of the 1997 SCONDVA report and subsequent implementation of its recommendations was a notable turning point for the CF with respect to many of its personnel policies. The object was to reverse the significant QOL deficit and it appears that the CF has succeeded in addressing many of those member well-being and commitment challenges. The proposition of this paper, that the accumulation of discrete benefits since the SCONDVA report has inadvertently and negatively impacted operational effectiveness and undermined military ethos, is evidenced by the results of the targeted survey of 127 senior members of the CF (NCO and officer), focused on four specific CF policies. The observations become more pronounced when the data is filtered for Army personnel.

Broadly speaking, three external actors influence the CF across the spectrum of societal to functional imperatives: the Canadian government; the Canadian people; and the global security environment. The government and the people demand the inclusion of certain societal imperatives respectively. The increasingly complex and chaotic global security environment imposes the functional imperatives. The CF must comply with governmental mandates. It can fully or partially conform to progressively liberal and individualistic societal changes or to resist them. An altered and changing demographic landscape is an additional factor to be considered. Out of military necessity, and often using its own initiative, the CF must adopt certain policies to remain relevant and credible as an armed force within the global security environment.

Four specific policies, over which the CF has some or complete authority were chosen for study, having first identified the outside influences on the CF and the resulting

discretionary policy space. The said policies comprise: tour length and HLTA; support to deployed operations; environmental duty allowances; and universality of service. The survey results indicate that in their current form, a substantial segment of the CF's leadership are of the opinion that, CF personnel policies taken as a whole are unsustainable financially, emotionally, operationally, and materially. In the case of universality of service, selective and therefore questionable, application of the policy could threaten the legal standing of the policy itself.

Some of these policy expenses are simply the cost of doing business in the modern Canadian and global context. They epitomize the timeless leadership challenges associated with balancing competing values and contradictory pressures. However, much of such expenditure can be attributed to the CF's efforts to satisfy its members' expectations stemming from their generationally inherent sense of entitlement. In the words of one respondent “. . . [there is an] insatiable desire of Senior Leadership to please . . . the unpleasable.”

Consistent with other referenced research, the survey data demonstrates a needed correction to, and re-alignment of, CF personnel policies to make them more congruent with the requirements for operational effectiveness and the stated military ethos. In the absence of corrective action the CF will need to determine its willingness to further compromise its traditional ethos in order to more easily attract a new generation of Canadians. It is acknowledged that the CF must value member well-being and commitment initiatives so as to maintain member recruitment, performance, morale, dedication and retention. However, the evidence indicates that the pendulum has swung too far in favour of member well-being with the accumulation of discrete benefits causing

a regression in individual and collective performance - indeed, no good deed goes unpunished.

The tension within the CF Effectiveness Model between balancing the requirements for mission success and member well-being is illustrated by the debate concerning the lengthening of operational tours. With respect to operational effectiveness, the typical deployment cycle of six months was rated as poor by almost one-half of the respondents, with that number rising to 61% and 70% for combat arms personnel and senior officers respectively. In terms of the *status quo* addressing the need for member and family well-being, very few survey participants expressed an unsatisfactory opinion. In summary, to quote one respondent, “. . . the current structure places too much emphasis on the soldier over the mission.”

The survey posed a set of hypothetical questions pertaining to the extension of tours to eight months with one HLTA. The CLS has since decided to confront aspects of the operational effectiveness deficit (better military and cultural situational awareness; increased continuity; and more time between deployments for rest and career courses) by adopting such a deployment model. Keeping HLTA will help to address the need for member and family well-being however, the negative consequences (reduced manning and unit combat effectiveness over the course of the HLTA program; HLTA taken at the beginning of the tour; and a lack of formal reintegration during the HLTA process) will nonetheless require management and further consideration.

A review of support to deployed operations (force bed-down and PSP) highlights the proposition that CF members have unreasonable expectations stemming from their generationally inherent sense of entitlement. With virtual unanimity, those polled rated

support to deployed operations as ranging from adequate to very good. In addition, a strong majority agreed that CF members have come to expect high standards of support. More troubling, however, one-half responded that mission success suffers as a consequence of the materiel resources and manpower dedicated to achieving and maintaining such comforts.

As one senior officer commented, “[the CF has] created a level of expectation and a sense of entitlement to a high standard of living on deployed operations. It is no longer acceptable for a mission’s comfort level to evolve gradually over [time] - the gold standard is expected from theatre activation.” Another lamented that, “any suggestions to go without air conditioners, video games and unlimited [communications] is met with anger [within the troops]. Unfortunately, the same outrage is seldom seen if there are not enough sandbags, razor wire, or shovels.” This ‘butter over guns’ mindset is a major contributor to the fact that since 2006, the CF has spent on average 3.17 times more on its own infrastructure than on reconstruction in its Afghan area of operations. Once the combat mission in Kandahar is terminated, the CF will have an opportunity to overhaul and simplify its support to deployed operations with a view to reinvigorate its ability to deploy in an austere manner. It follows that, the CF should also impose a crucial re-alignment of member expectations to something more sustainable and operationally oriented, to ensure that an undue focus on member well-being does not threaten to usurp mission success.

Environmental duty allowances demonstrate how tangible benefits can adversely affect ethos - CF members are making career choices based on financial considerations instead of their own professional development or for the institution’s common good.

Nearly two-thirds of survey participants indicated that, anywhere from ‘some’ to ‘most,’¹⁴⁹ CF members are modulating their behaviour based on this allowance and in all likelihood are factoring their allowances into their base pay. Those members are now refusing postings that result in the loss of extra money, given that their lifestyles have expanded to match their incentivized total pay envelope. In the words of another respondent, “those who benefit from such entitlements [i.e. duty allowances] seem to have forgotten that the conditions from which they gain additional benefit have already been factored into their base pay. . .” This situation has led to individuals stagnating in field units and severe difficulty in posting soldiers willingly to training institutions. It is primarily for these reasons that LDA is currently being reviewed by the CLS.

Environmental duty allowances are but one tangible benefit that the CF employs to motivate its members. A substantial body of evidence from both the military and corporate domains indicates that an over reliance on tangible incentives decreases intrinsic motivation, professionalism, performance and military ethos, especially if the focus on monetary rewards comes at the expense of intangible benefits of service - namely autonomy, competence, sense of purpose and *esprit de corps*. Accordingly, all other tangible benefits should be evaluated to determine whether they are achieving their intended effect. The CF must redirect its energy to strengthening the intangible benefits of military service - the very ones that attracted most of its members at the outset to choose a career in the military. It is by focusing on the intangible benefits that the CF can fortify the vocational model of duty and cement the institution as an employer of

¹⁴⁹64% agreed or strongly agreed that CF members are now refusing postings to retain their environmental duty allowance. When asked to qualify their responses, 39% answered ‘some’ CF members are engaging in that behaviour, while 47% and 8% indicated ‘many’ and ‘most’ respectively.

choice among a new generation of Canadians who want to serve their country.

Furthermore, the net benefit of the refinement and re-alignment of CF personnel policies would need to be effectively communicated to serving CF members so that the process of institutional adaptation does not come at the expense of widespread member discontentment.

The issue of universality of service underscores the immense challenge of balancing societal and functional imperatives within the CF. It is a complex topic encompassing the concepts of unlimited liability, operational effectiveness, the military social contract, and the continuity of care. The survey data and the comments bear witness to the highly emotive nature of the issue, one that may not be properly or fully understood by all concerned. The vast majority of those polled believe that the Canadian government is responsible to provide indefinite care to injured CF members who can no longer serve in the military. A slightly lesser number congruently surmised that injured CF members who permanently breach universality of service should, in due course, be released and supported by Veterans Affairs or another continuity of care provider. However, nearly one-half also stated that the CF is responsible for that same indefinite care. Some cited the CF's duty to ensure a proper transition, while others reasoned that it was the military's reciprocal obligation for the member having assumed unlimited liability. The prevailing opinions of those survey participants who had a more comprehensive understanding of the policy and its legal and institutional ramifications are reflected in the following statement: "The CF does not have the capacity to continue life long care to an injured member once they are no longer in uniform, however the

Government of Canada has a duty and responsibility to see that that member is adequately cared for for the rest of their lives.”

Universality of service is rooted in the concept of unlimited liability, which sits at the core of the CF’s ethos. It is not an unduly high physical standard to attain. If a CF member can no longer permanently perform to that standard, no matter the reason, then it unfairly shifts the operational burden to members who can. The CF’s ultimate role is to generate forces that can deploy on missions at home and abroad. To effectively do so, the CF must neither engender a culture of dependency nor risk becoming engaged in “an alternate form of welfare.” To address this issue, senior CF flag and general officers have recently re-affirmed the universality of service as “a sacrosanct cornerstone of the CF’s personnel policies.”¹⁵⁰

By doing the right things but not necessarily doing them correctly, the CF has levied a self imposed tax on its operational effectiveness undercutting the primacy of mission success. However, within the context of this paper, a crucial question remains to be answered - how far has CF passed the point of regression? A considered and balanced determination of the extent of the problem will allow for nuanced and refined corrective measures rather than drastic cuts to benefits with the potential to trigger yet another QOL decade of darkness. It is unknown whether the domestic demographic, social and legal trends, and global security trends will continue at their same pace or whether they will normalize. These outcomes could exert additional pressures on the remaining discretionary policy space that the CF currently enjoys. What seems very likely however, is that these new realities will not be reversed. Accordingly, for the CF to endure as a

¹⁵⁰Quotes provided by two survey respondents.

relevant and credible combat capable force, both societally and functionally, it is imperative that it make use of the discretionary space afforded to it wisely, and that it face and deal with these singular challenges proactively.

ANNEX A - OVERVIEW OF FINAL FREE TEXT BOX COMMENTS

“Finding the balance between operational needs and individual needs is a significant challenge for the CF. Right now, the balance is tipped in favour of the individual.”

“The current challenge stems from the "we are a reflection of society" approach to operations. Unfortunately, this approach will undermine the CF's ability to meet new challenges and achieve mission success. This mentality has also bred a new generation of "individuals" that place themselves before the team and the mission. Some are now serving in order to gain benefits for themselves, vice the institution and nation. The solution is simple. First, the institution, supported by the government, needs to recognize that this new trend risks long-term viability. I highly doubt that we would be able to continue supporting our current personnel support policies. Second, we need to advertise a promote the CF as a team that places mission above all else. We need to be truthful and stop trying to accommodate each and every individual want/need.”

“I don't believe our policies are the problem, but rather lazy leaders who cower away from discipline and corrective action as it requires a modicum of effort and they are accountable for the punishments they dole out. Fear of grievances, harassment complaints, etc make those ‘leaders’ create a permissive environment for uber-individuals. They continue to prefer Performance Evaluation Review assassinations, and other means of affecting an individual that doesn't bring them into direct conflict with the member, but rather allows them to cower in the shadows. ‘There are no bad Regiments, just bad Colonels’ - Napoleon.”

“Army Culture Surveys indicated that there is a schism between the soldier and the senior leadership of the CF. Soldiers believe that General/Flag officers are more concerned with their career progression and success than the good of the Army. It is also evident that based on survey results that only Non-Commissioned Members display a set of values congruent with the military ethos which related to Social Success, Materialism and Pride. NCOs are clearly display a set values in line with Autonomy and Well Being while Junior and Senior Officers are displaying a set of values congruent with Personal Development. The Army Culture is not really all cohesive and varies depending either on the rank or age (needs). So, this leads to my conception that the CF must maintain personnel policies which will maximize the retention of diverse individuals who are all able to serve exceptionally well even if their needs are all different.”

“The cost of the Personnel pillar of CFDS is supposed to be 51% of overall costs. it has now risen to about 61% and with shrinking budgets and continually rising costs it is predicted that by 2015 the Personnel pillar will cost 75%. This is clearly unsustainable. The money can only come from the Readiness, Equipment and Infrastructure pillars. As the other three pillars get squeezed then so does

operational effectiveness. I think that the pendulum has swung too far in one direction and a correction is needed. Clearly the current model is unaffordable and unsustainable. Environmental allowances need to be examined along with Post Living Differential, Imposed Restriction benefits to name a few. Money cannot/should not be the only motivator. One would have to believe that if you join the Navy, you joined to go to sea and therefore sea pay is redundant. The same would go for Land Duty Allowance. I would also submit that the high rates of allowances paid to Special Operations Forces operators are not required. Although there may be some movement I do not believe that there would be large numbers of Special Operations Force operators leaving the service or asking to be posted back to line units if their allowances were reduced. A Private with a grade 10 education can make anywhere from \$31.5k to \$46.9k, and a Corporal with very limited responsibilities can make up to \$56.8k a year. These pay rates are very competitive with the private sector and shouldn't need other allowances and benefits added on. Allowances for operations are required however they need to be examined along with other allowances that are paid to service personnel. The comment from the Commander of the Haiti operation is very telling. We have created an expectation amongst our soldiers that is not realistic. We have soldiers now who put internet and phone connections along with electricity for their video games on the same level of importance as food, water and ammunition. As painful as it is priorities need to be examined and reorientated. Operations and operational effectiveness must take priority over all else. If operational effectiveness is being sacrificed to support personnel programs and personnel welfare then we have the tail wagging the dog."

"It is very difficult to separate the individual from the team when you are discussing these issues. They are linked so closely in a time when societal values are irreversibly changing. We can not create a strong team without strong individuals and we can not value the team or the mission without caring for and valuing the individuals that comprise the team or execute the mission. There is more concern about how the soldiers are cared for and whether or not the mission is worth the price of blood than there is about mission success without those aspects. Until the threat to Canadian values is more substantial to the bulk of Canadians and to the individual soldiers, mission success will play a smaller part in the greater good equation. Losing national interests is a concern of politicians but losing soldiers concerns the masses. The balance will not be easy to strike."

"The more things change, the more they stay the same. Extraordinary leaders and soldiers will continue to advance on their merits and internally driven goals and feelings. Mediocre performers now have broader safety nets and methods to clog the system. We do not take proper account of innovative ways to apply our own policies for the 'greater good.' An example is retention. Even in the worst periods of retention, keeping 100% of contracts only perpetuates the bloat caused by poor performers. We also do not adequately communicate the reasonings behind personnel policies and sometimes do not properly prosecute those actually caught going against them."

“While I believe there is a certain growing sense of entitlement in the CF I believe that this is just a reflection this growing sentiment in society as a whole. The CF as part of society typically lags society in social changes. What we are currently experiencing is a resistance to the changes in society. It does impact the funds available for "operations" but that is a cost of doing business.”

“In my opinion, our soldiers have become accustomed to the good life while on operations and in a field unit by the allowances they earn. Many of the 21st century soldiers do not know what it is truly like to live in austere conditions. Even the Forward Operating Bases in Afghanistan as of late have great food, air conditioned [sleeping quarters], a way to communicate home every night and a small mess tent that has satellite connections to view their TV of choice. There is no shortage of care packages arriving into Theatre for every soldier. If the CF is drawn into a conflict that does not afford all these creature comforts, it will only be a matter of time before the morale starts dropping as the time overseas wears on. It is expected that HLTA and short tours is the norm. There are many soldiers in the CF that have the mentality of what is in it for me and not how can I serve the CF. I feel that we have to toughen up our soldiers more and quite spoon feeding them. By long exercises such as the RVs of the past and tours like Somalia and the early years of Croatia will toughen our soldiers and get them out of the mind set that all these current comfortable provisions they see and partake in overseas will not always be in place due to the nature of the conflict.”

“As a minimum, training institutions (like the Combat Training Centre, etc.) need to receive the same environmental allowances as soldiers in the line units, or the CF is going to suffer significant problems with getting experienced and appropriate soldiers to leave the line units and reinvest their knowledge back into the training system. Soldiers cannot receive or perceive a pay-cut for being posted to a training institution.”

“What is the "cost of doing business" when contrasting policies cultivating individual entitlements against operational effectiveness? If a nation's war machine - not just the CF but industry, civil service, the Other Government Departments etc. - must commit to combat a threat to its vital interest, how long could we sustain the current policies before bankrupting ourselves? Would complex operations like Afghanistan be anywhere closer to resolution if our policies were more operationally focussed? What would the cost savings be if rotations were longer and distractions such as HLTA foregone? Would we have more operationally focussed units committed for longer, yielding greater continuity on the ground, better understanding of the environment, and a greater commitment to mission success? Would the resultant teams have greater cohesion and be more cost effective in employment over the long term (less requirement for force generation and Relief in Place)? I believe so, but have no tangible proof of concept. But I sure am glad the Battle of Britain came during a "no leave" block.

“CF strategic leadership is not being honest about the impact of sustained high pers tempo and the work-life imbalance in the CF. They are unwilling/unable to

admit publicly that the CF cannot sustain the Government of Canada level of ambition for international engagement and national security requirements. . . They fear the public backlash should Canadians be told that the CF actually needs 100,000 uniformed pers and \$30B in order to do everything the Government of Canada has asked of us (figures used as an example); realizing that Canadians would likely never agree to such a sustained hike in defence spending. As a result, small, superficial QOL-type personnel policies are introduced without recognizing the risk of institutional burnout and personal / family impact on our members (i.e. Operational Stress Injuries, marital breakdowns, attempted suicides, etc.) . . . We should not be surprised that our soldiers start approaching their commitment to serve Canada in a more mercenary manner if that is the way they are being treated by the CF and Government of Canada.”

“No one ever joined the Army to get rich - a saying that still rings true to this day regardless of the incentives that may be added to those particular aspects of military life - deployments, high tempo units, high operational units. However, there is certainly a perception that a culture of entitlement exists in segments of the Canadian Forces. I have seen some of this first hand - even in the Army, though I would never consider it to have reached the level of compromising mission success. It may, however, be in competition with our proclaimed military ethos. On a separate note, there is a real danger when the Policy Writer Holder (Chief of Military Personnel) becomes the Policy Enforcer and Executive - as is now becoming the case, where even alcohol has been raised to the level of Drug Use, with Chief of Military Personnel controlling career action, etc. . . [The CF created] a rash of bizarre policies [that were] meant to please and silence the growing number of veterans (healthy and broken) or families of fallen. That is the unsustainable part - insatiable desire of Senior Leadership to please and silence the unsilenceable and unpleaseable.”

“We are in an uphill battle against the Support the Troops campaign because of a reflection of modern society that support must be in a materiel form. The pursuit of initiatives such as societal respect, job transition programs, job protection (for the reserves), post-service care, etc are viable interests that truly support the troops. We are a very well paid military where the benefits are enabling a have/have not culture, precipitating hard feelings between units and lower/higher HQ. This level of financial/materiel support will cause us to be operationally ineffective as our budget reduces; it will cut into our operations and training budgets as a means by which to balance our books. Overall, it is unsustainable - we have public guilt over the mission in Afghanistan - both civilian and military - that we believe can be solved by money. Of course we like it - who wouldn't, but when it becomes a decision maker to risk one's life we've missed the boat on its purpose.”

“I agree that this may now be the cost of doing business, but I disagree that it is acceptable. The fact is that we have spoiled our soldiers and we may not be able to go back. I disagree that we (the CF) have created self-minded individuals, I believe that the current soldier is a reflection of society - where everyone asks "what's in it for me?". The CF is simply adapting to this new reality because it

must adapt to maintain a sustained workforce. Employees are no longer interested in intangible benefits. Bottom line - we gave them all XBoxes in their Forward Operating Bases and I don't know that they are mature enough to give them back.”

“I believe that some of the CF personnel policies have diverted the member's belief that they are part of a family/organization/team to being an individual. I agree that with these increased benefits, it has made the CF a more attractable vocation but these same policies have degraded its core value as a way of life. Not all policies are bad and should be done away with but a finer application of the policies at the unit level and trust in the Commanding Officers (and formation Commanders) to do what they are chosen to do, make the decisions.”

I have no insight on how to make this mess better, we are hemorrhaging personnel and experience and promoting soldiers well before they have the required foundation and maturity. Said it before, you can only go to well so many times. SCNDVA, just after the Somali leadership debacle, (mission success, leadership failure), set a great many initiatives in motion, It appeared that they focused on the monetary solution more than anything else. This had some merit in that we had just suffered a wage freeze for about 3 years, which did require correction, but every problem or issue now seems to be answered by throwing cash at it. Granted once you give someone something, try getting it back. Changes to the Department of Veterans Affairs are showing its faults and bring into question how dedicated is the Government to its soldiers, sailors and airmen. Recruiting is good but, now we are dealing with a generation of entitlement and instant gratification and I believe a number of soldiers that are only in for the thrill of operations, which I doubt will still be there after operations end. Money alone will not correct the present course and plays against what military ethos is about, it only buys mercenaries. From an Army Combat Service Support perspective, we are spoiled. Too many soldiers and junior officers think that deploying means living in weatherhavens/trailers and having DWAN/Internet connections at all times. We've lost the ability to deploy tactically which is the foundation on which all other deployments build. The cost of sustaining the high standard to which we've become accustomed is too high (dollars, man hours, equipment). The current system is enabling individualistic behaviour and creating an environment that fosters a sense of entitlement.”

“Military Ethos is not at risk as long as incentives are expressed in an appropriate manner. Benefits are all too often seen as part of a member's base pay - they are not. Instead, they are rewards for maintaining themselves physically fit, mentally fit and operationally ready. As long as this is clearly understood by the members and emphasized by the chain of command, these benefits will be productive and operationally relevant.”

“Many of our policies have made our force weak and too self-focused, or focused on "everyone is the same". For example, soldiers fighting an armed enemy receive the same recognition and pay (i.e. General Campaign Star - ISAF) as their counterparts who prepare and serve meals in a FOB, issue clothing and equipment or send Emails in KAF. There is rarely a "service before self" attitude inherent in

much of the CF. As a result, many of our best soldiers leave the CF in order to pursue careers in law enforcement or other realms where they view that performance, action and deeds are adequately recognized and rewarded. We are in the process of creating a soft, money-oriented force, with policies that sap a supervisor's ability to properly motivate and discipline soldiers and achieve an operational imperative with focus on mission success.”

“Member well being is key to gaining commitment to the CF. People are motivated by cash and quality of life. Serving Canada before self will only work in the short term, or following a crisis. If the goal is to have members serving long term, for most members there needs to be financial reward and a sustained quality of life that enables a healthy lifestyle outside of the military.”

“As society becomes more individualistic, there will be seepage into the CF. Trying to fight or push against this culture shift will inevitably be a losing battle for the CF, so its policies will need to reflect - to a degree - the desires, wants and wishes of the members (i.e. personnel support programs, allowances, etc). Not doing so will inevitably create a backlash and people will leave when greener pastures beckon, and the CF will become a small, albeit highly dedicated and ethically sound, old boys club.”

“I generally agree that the emphasis on individual rewards is affecting our military ethos. However, for good or bad, this reflects very much our society and the generation of soldiers we are currently recruiting. I do believe that the CF is the last institution in Canada which places the group ahead of the individual and when push comes to shove this will always be the case. A general comment on pay/allowances: it is my opinion that we are generally overpaid while in garrison and underpaid when on operations. If nearly every soldier, sailor and airmen/women is getting some kind of allowance or spec pay then what is the point of anyone getting them. Clearly the incentive they used to provide is no longer effective and it is simply considered a part of the remuneration package. To remove them would feel like a pay cut.”

“There are many ways of demonstrating support to the member that will enhance operational effectiveness that do not involve throwing money in the form of financial benefits to the individual. These include our Military Family Resource Centres, enhanced medical support for families to negate the impact of frequent moves, spousal employment support, and a Societal-Government contract that in the event of injury or death while serving the country, his/her family will be well taken care. When a soldier knows his family is going to be well looked after, his commitment to the institution will be enhanced.”

“Enormous efforts are being placed on member well being, especially for injured soldiers, fallen and their families. This does take away from our overall effectiveness as personnel are tasked to look after these soldiers. That said, it is difficult to find a way around this as less soldiers will commit to the mission if the rear support is non existent. For the establishment of new missions and setting the

right conditions, the CF does expend a lot of resources. Not sure what happened to real soldiering and getting the job done regardless. Once you set a standard, it is difficult to go back. Especially now. Now, it is difficult to deploy force packages because staffs can not find a way to provide all the level of support provided on well established rotations. Based on staff advice, commanders are reluctant to make hard decision, or the unpopular one's like telling their soldiers they will need to suck it up, or words to that effect.”

A couple of observations: * while soldiers may not modify their behaviour according to the benefits/allowances, they will resist very strongly any change to these once they have been receiving it. The LDA review is such an example. It is an unaffordable, unsustainable and inadequate allowance that is breaking the Army's bank and that is not justified. Yet, the simple discussion of reviewing it is creating unbelievable angst in the junior ranks. The Army created that monster with an ill-conceived plan, that could not be sustained and that created divisions. COs are also lacking the morale courage to remove the allowance when unit members do not meet the criteria for LDA (wounded soldiers, etc.). They will even go as far as retaining the wounded soldiers in unit line instead of posting them to the "Unité intégrée de soins au personnel", so that they can retain their LDA, and at great cost to the member in terms of assistance and rehabilitation.

* Austere: I only partially agree with [Commander Joint Task Force Haiti] on this issue. The Air Force flew in, against priority loads, the equipment and amenities to set up an Internet cafe and the likes, while 3e R22eR lived under tarps, with no showers, dug latrines and ROWPU water for the greater part of the deployment. Most line units had no problems with the level of austerity (tarps, 4 man tent, hard rations, limited/no showers). Elements from national HQs, Navy and Air Force did not fare as well. * The Army soldier is remarkably adaptable to just about any level and intensity of operations. The most significant issue, as mentioned earlier, is pers tempo, and mostly with the support units (armoured, engineer, Combat Service Support, medical, artillery). These units are constantly in a High Readiness mode, support successive rotations of Infantry Battle Groups, and their member Professional Development training is usually longer and more demanding than that of the infantry, especially engineers. The resulting effect are long and repeated absences from home. . . . As no one will cut training, then the only variable is perceived as tour length and HLTA.”

“The crux of the issue is balance. Today we have moved a little too far towards member well being versus unit spirit and mission success. We need to emphasize the requirement for independence and respect for our members and their families.”

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bartle, Richard and Lindy Heinecken. *Military Unionism in the Post-Cold War Era*. London: Routledge, 2006.
- Bricker, Darrell and John Wright. *Chief of the Land Staff Presentation*. [Powerpoint presentation]. Ottawa: Ipsos Reid Public Affairs Worldwide, 2001.
- Canada. Department of Justice. "National Defence Act," <http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/N-5/>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2011.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. *5050-1(J1 C&B) Review of Compensation and Benefit Administration*. Toronto: Land Force Central Area, 2011.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. *7125-1(G1 Pers) CLS Planning Directive - Comprehensive Review - Land Duty Allowance and Casual Land Duty Allowance*. Ottawa: Chief of the Land Staff, 2010.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. A-PA-005-000/AP-001 *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*. Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy – Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2003.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. A-PA-005-000/AP-003 *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Doctrine*. Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy – Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2005.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. A-PA-005-000/AP-004 *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*. Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy – Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2005.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. A-PA-005-000/AP-006 *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading the Institution*. Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy – Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2007.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. A-PP-005-LVE-AG-001 *CF Leave Policy Manual*. Ottawa: Chief Military Personnel, 2008.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. *An Exploratory Examination of Personnel Support to Operations*. Ottawa: Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis - Chief of Military Personnel, 2009.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. *Attrition and Leadership*. Ottawa: Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis - Chief of Military Personnel, 2009.

- Canada. Department of National Defence. B-GL-005-100/FP-001 *CFJP 1.0 Military Personnel Management Doctrine*. Ottawa: Director General Military Personnel - Chief of Military Personnel, 2008.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. B-GL-361-012/FP-001 *Engineer Field Manual: Accommodations, Installations and Engineering Services*. Kingston: Land Forces Doctrine & Training System - Director Army Doctrine, 2005.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. *Canada First Defence Strategy*. Ottawa: Minister of National Defence, 2008.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. *Canada's Soldiers: Military Ethos and Canadian Values in the 21st Century*. Ottawa: Director General - Land Capability Development, 2005.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. "CANLANDGEN 003/09 Replacement of LFCO 11-60 LDA and CLDA"
http://barker/Admin/Canlandgen/2009/clg09003_e.pdf; Internet; accessed 20 January 2011.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. "Chapter 205: Allowances for Officers and Non-Commissioned Members." Ottawa: Director Compensation and Benefits Orders, 2009.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. "Compensation and Benefit Instruction: Chapter 205." <http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dgcb-dgras/pub/cbi-dra/205-eng.asp>; Internet; accessed 15 December 2010.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. "DAOD 5023-0 Universality of Service."
http://admfincs.mil.ca/admfincs/subjects/doad/5023/0_e.asp; Internet; accessed 20 January 2011.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. "DAOD 5023-1 Minimum Operational Standards Related to Universality of Service."
http://admfincs.mil.ca/admfincs/subjects/doad/5023/1_e.asp; Internet; accessed 20 January 2011.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. "DAOD 5023-2 Physical Fitness Program."
http://admfincs.mil.ca/admfincs/subjects/doad/5023/2_e.asp; Internet; accessed 20 January 2011.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. *Effects of Perstempo on Morale in the Canadian Forces*. Ottawa: Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis - Chief of Military Personnel, 2008.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. *Ethos and Values in the Canadian Forces*. Ottawa: Department of National Defence - Canadian Forces Group on Ethos and

Values, 1997.

- Canada. Department of National Defence. *Human Dimensions of Military Operations: The Construct of Personnel Tempo and its Relationship with Individual and Organizational Well-being*. Ottawa: Centre for Operational Research and Analysis - Defence Research and Development Canada, 2008.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. *Military HR Strategy 2020: Facing the People Challenges of the Future*. Ottawa: ADM(HR-Mil), 2002.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. *New Army Managed Readiness Plan Model: Decision Brief to CLS*. [Powerpoint presentation]. Ottawa: Army G3 and Director Army Training, 2010.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. *Quality of Life among Military Families: Results from the 2008/09 Survey of Canadian Forces Spouses*. Ottawa: Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis - Chief of Military Personnel, 2008.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. *The Ideal Length of Tour*. Ottawa: Director General Military Personnel - Chief of Military Personnel, 2009.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. *The Future Security Environment 2008-2030*. Ottawa: Chief of Force Development, 2009.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. *Your Say: Fall 2008 Results and a Comparison of Results across Administrations from 2004-2008*. Ottawa: Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis - Chief of Military Personnel, 2010.
- Canada. Somalia Commission. *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of the Canadian Forces to Somalia: Executive Summary*. Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 1997.
- Canadian Legal Information Institute. "Best v. Canada (Attorney General)." <http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fct/doc/2011/2011fc71/2011fc71.html>; Internet; accessed 20 February 2011.
- Compensation and Benefits Review. "Currents in Compensation and Benefits 2010." <http://cdr.sagepub.com/content/42/3/131.citation>; Internet, accessed 28 November 2010.
- Compensation and Benefits Review. "Currents in Compensation and Benefits 2008." <http://cdr.sagepub.com/content/40/1/5.citation>; Internet, accessed 28 November 2010.
- Cotton, Dr. Charles A. *The Divided Army: Role Orientations Among Canada's Peacetime Soldiers*. Ottawa: Carleton University, 1980.

- Cotton, Dr. Charles A. *Toward a Charter of Military Service in Canada*. Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1997.
- Copp, Terry. *A Social Contract for the Canadian Forces*. Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1997.
- English, Allen D. *Understanding Military Culture: A Canadian Perspective*. Montreal and Kingston: McGill and Queen's University Press, 2004.
- Francisco, Major R.N. "Canadian Military and Social Values: The Reasons for the Difference." Toronto: Canadian Forces College Command and Staff Course New Horizons Paper, 2002.
- Friscolanti, Michael. "Fighting to Serve." *Maclean's Magazine*, http://www.macleans.ca/canada/national/article.jsp?content=20080312_2721_2721; Internet; accessed 20 January 2011.
- Gabriel, Richard A. *The Warrior's Way: A Treatise on Military Ethics*, Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy, 2007.
- Hackett, General Sir John. *The Profession of Arms*. London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1983.
- Handel, Michael I. *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought*. 3rd ed. London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001.
- Huntington, Samuel. *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. New York: Random House, 1957.
- Lancaster House - Labour Law On-line. "Canada (Canadian Armed Forces) v. Irvine." http://onlinedb.lancasterhouse.com/images/up-Irvine_v_CanadaCAF.pdf; Internet; accessed 20 February 2011.
- Legault, Albert. *Bringing the Canadian Armed Forces in the 21st Century*. Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1997.
- Legault, Albert and Joel Sokolsky. *The Soldier and the State in the Post Cold War Era*. Kingston: Quarterly Commission of Queen's University, 2002.
- Major, LCol Jason. "Air Force Recruiting and Retention: The Effect of Generation X and Y." Toronto: Canadian Forces College Command and Staff Course New Horizons Paper, 2008.
- Mathews, Lloyd, J. *The Future of the Army Profession*. Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2005.
- McGonigle, Timothy P., Casper, Wendy J., Meiman, Edward P., Cronin, Candice Blair, Cronin, Brian E. and Harris, Rebecca R. "The Relationship Between Personnel

Support Programs and Readiness: A Model to Guide Future Research.” *Military Psychology*, 17:1: 25-39.

- Milner, Marc. *A Proposal for a new Social Contract for the Canadian Armed Forces*. Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1998.
- Morton, Desmond. “A Military Ethic and the CF.” *Ethics and Canadian Defence Policy*, edited by David R. Jones, Fred W. Crickard and Todd R. Yates. Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, June, 1992, 58-59.
- Moskos, C. and F. Wood. “Institutional and Occupational Trends in Armed Forces.” In *The Military, More than Just a Job?* Washington: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1998.
- Murphy, Capt(N) Dan. “Military Ethics, Ethos and Professionalism: Can the Martial Spirit be Accommodated by Modern Canadian Society?” Toronto: Canadian Forces College National Securities Studies Course Research Essay, 1999.
- Newman, LtCol Jill M. “Leading Generation Y.” Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Strategy Research Project, 2008.
- Pink, Dan, “Drive: The Surprising Truth About What Motivates Us,” *RSA Animate*; <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u6XAPnuFjJc>; Internet; accessed 21 April 2011.
- Pugliese, David. “CF Will Examine Whether to Release Afghan Wounded from the Ranks: Up to 50 Files to be Reviewed.” *Ottawa Citizen*, <http://communities.canada.com/ottawacitizen/blogs/defencewatch/archive/2011/02/02/canadian-forces-will-examine-whether-to-release-afghan-wounded-from-the-ranks-up-to-50-files-to-be-reviewed.aspx>; Internet; accessed 20 January 2011.
- Pugliese, David. “Is it Right that Afghan War Amputees Are to be Released from the CF While Overweight Soldiers Continue to Serve?” *Ottawa Citizen*, <http://communities.canada.com/ottawacitizen/blogs/defencewatch/archive/2011/02/02/is-it-right-that-afghan-war-amputees-are-to-be-released-from-the-canadian-forces-while-overweight-soldiers-continue-to-serve.aspx>; Internet; accessed 20 January 2011.
- Savage, Donald C. *A Social Contract for the Military?* Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1997.
- Smillie, LtCol Rhonda D. “Suitability of Millennials to lead the Profession of Arms.” Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Strategy Research Project, 2010.
- Smith, Rupert. “Trends: Our Modern Operations.” Chapter 7 from *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*, London: Penguin, 2005.
- Snider, Don, M. “Intrepidity and Character Development within the Army Profession.” *Strategic Studies Institute* (January 2008): 1-4.

- Stanley-Mitchell, Elizabeth, A. "The Military Profession and Intangible Rewards for Service." Chapter 5 in *Filling the Ranks: Transforming the US Military Personnel System*. Cambridge, MA: The Belfour Center for Science and International Affairs, JFK School of Government, Harvard University, 2004.
- Taylor, Col James C. "Whither March the Cohorts: The Validity of Generational Theory as a Determinant of the Sociocultural Values of Canadian Forces Personnel." Toronto: Canadian Forces College National Security Studies Program, 2008.
- Twenge, Jean M., Campbell, Stacey M., Hoffman, Brian J. and Lance, Charles E. "Generational Differences in Work Values." *Journal of Management* 2010 36: 1117 <http://jom.sagepub.com/content/36/5/1117>; Internet; accessed 28 November 2010.
- von Clausewitz, Carl. *On War*. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.
- Wiley, Col Andre L. "Generation Challenges for Army Transformation." Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Strategy Research Project, 2008.
- Wood, David. "In the 10th Year of War, a Harder Army, a More Distant America." *Politics Daily*. <http://www.politicsdaily.com/2010/09/09/in-the-10th-year-of-war-a-harder-army-a-more-distant-america>; Internet; accessed 31 January 2011.