COMPLEXITIES IN NON-COMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS

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JCSP 37
Master of Defence Studies

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<td>Australian Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>Assembly Point</td>
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<td>AN</td>
<td>Affected Nation</td>
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<td>CBC</td>
<td>Canadian Broadcasting Company</td>
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<td>CBSA</td>
<td>Canada Border Services Agency</td>
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<td>CEFCOM</td>
<td>Canadian Expeditionary Force Command</td>
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<td>CEP</td>
<td>Consular Evacuation Plan</td>
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<td>CF</td>
<td>Canadian Forces</td>
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<td>CIC</td>
<td>Citizenship and Immigration Canada</td>
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<td>CONPLAN</td>
<td>Contingency Plan</td>
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<td>CPAT</td>
<td>Contingency Planning Assistance Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSIS</td>
<td>Canadian Security Intelligence Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFAIT</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade</td>
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<td>DFAT</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Australia)</td>
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<td>DND</td>
<td>Department of National Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>DS</td>
<td>Disembarkation Site</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>Evacuation Centre</td>
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<td>EM DAT</td>
<td>Epidemiology of Disasters Database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>Embarkation Site</td>
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<tr>
<td>FMB</td>
<td>Forward Mounting Base</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOB</td>
<td>Forward Operating Base</td>
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<tr>
<td>GoC</td>
<td>Government of Canada</td>
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<tr>
<td>HN</td>
<td>Host Nation</td>
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<td>HOM</td>
<td>Head of Mission</td>
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<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<td>ICS</td>
<td>Incident Command System</td>
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<td>IDEF</td>
<td>Interdepartmental Emergency Task Force (Australia)</td>
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<td>JDMNEO</td>
<td>CF Joint Doctrine Manual - NEO</td>
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<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Force</td>
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<td>MEP</td>
<td>Mission Emergency Plan</td>
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<td>MNF</td>
<td>Multinational Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NEO</td>
<td>Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OGD</td>
<td>Other Governmental Departments</td>
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<td>PCO</td>
<td>Privy Council Office</td>
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<td>POE</td>
<td>Point of Entry</td>
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<td>ROCA</td>
<td>Registration of Canadians Abroad</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
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<td>TC</td>
<td>Transport Canada</td>
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ABSTRACT

The Government of Canada (GoC) bears the responsibility for the safety and protection of Canadian citizens at home and abroad. In many areas, instability due to natural disaster, internal conflict, regionalized disease and terrorism dictates that the GoC ensures that a sound evacuation plan is in place should the need arise. This evacuation plan is typically termed as a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO), a complex highly political and media centric event that is frequently executed with short notice. By understanding the complexities of such a mission beforehand, diplomatic and military leaders can better plan, prepare and execute NEOs to the benefit of their citizens.

Many nations including Canada, the U.S., Australia, United Kingdom and coalitions such as NATO publicise doctrine in the overall conduct of non-combatant evacuation operations. Although this direction may vary in their specific details, there is a generalized consensus within NEO doctrine common to all these documents.

This paper highlights the generalized doctrine using the 2006 Lebanon evacuation as a case study and compares the Canadian and Australian responses to the crisis. Key lessons are drawn and recommendations offered that may provide improvements for future NEOs that are sure to occur in a complex and dangerous world. This paper argues that the Government of Canada in consultation with the Canadian Forces needs to consider and address deficiencies in NEOs.
INTRODUCTION

Whatever the conclusions, it was clear to all involved that NEOs are extremely complex and time-consuming operations.1
- Jane’s Defence Weekly

The NEO Issue

The Government of Canada (GoC) bears the responsibility for the safety and protection of Canadian citizens at home and abroad. With many Canadians living, working and travelling abroad in a world of accelerating globalization, this responsibility extends to all parts of the globe. Instability and disaster that surfaces throughout the world behoves the GoC to ensure that a viable evacuation plan is available in short notice to support Canadians. This evacuation plan is typically termed a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO), which is defined in Canada as “[a] military operation conducted to assist the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in evacuating Canadians and selected non-Canadians from threatening circumstances in a foreign host nation and moving them to a Safe Haven.”2 NEOs can be extremely complex in that they are highly political, media centric and frequently executed with short notice.

Canadian Government policy extends the responsibility for NEO to the region specific Canadian Diplomatic Mission abroad which must monitor potentially threatening situations and coordinate a NEO if required. As the


resources in many locations where these missions are located are scarce, the Canadian Forces (CF) may be called upon to execute a large portion of a NEO. The CF offers an ability to quickly engage with a variety of resources while inherently being able to provide security at the same time.

Since 2000, there have been three significant occasions when the GoC has employed the use of CF personnel, equipment and operational guidance in the conduct of NEO.\(^3\) In 2004, instability in the Cote d’Ivoire required the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) to utilize CF assistance to evacuate over 120 Canadians from the hostilities in that region.\(^4\) In 2006, over 14000 Canadians were evacuated from Lebanon due to the Israeli – Hezbollah conflict occurring in that region - the largest NEO ever conducted by Canada.\(^5\) More recently, the devastating earthquake in Haiti on 12 January 2010 demanded the GoC respond with both a NEO and humanitarian assistance operation. In the former, the CF was the lead agency supporting the GoC with the evacuation of over 4600 Canadians and permanent residents from the destruction in Haiti.\(^6\)

\(^3\) Gillies, P. E-Mail to Maj Eyre. J5 Limited Intervention Plans, Department of National Defence. 10 January 2011.


In each of the above cases, Canada did not act independently in its efforts to evacuate their citizens but acted in concert with other nations and organizations. Although these three NEOs were successful in safely extracting Canadians abroad, there were numerous deficiencies in the planning, resource allocation and inter-agency cooperation that subsequently impacted upon their overall efficiency. By understanding the complexities with such missions, diplomatic and military leaders could better plan, prepare and execute NEOs to the benefit of their citizens.

**Thesis Statement**

This paper will argue that the Government of Canada in consultation with the Canadian Forces needs to consider and address deficiencies in NEOs. By examining doctrine and providing a comparative analysis, five recommendations will be given that would enhance governmental responses to NEO. These recommendations are presented as follows:

1. Focused Emphasis on the Registration and Warden System;
2. Concentrated Effort on Emergency Communication Capabilities;
3. Pre-Arranged Multinational Coordination and Contracted Support;
4. Other Governmental Department NEO Policy Formation; and
5. Ensuring Adequate Diplomatic Mission Staff in Volatile Regions.

Method

Many nations, including Canada, the U.S., Australia and the United Kingdom, as well as coalitions such as NATO, publicise doctrine in the overall conduct of non-combatant evacuation operations. Although this direction may vary in specific details, there is a generalized consensus within NEO doctrine common to all these documents, which will be analyzed using historic examples. Australia and Canada have entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) which allows Canadian Missions to cooperate with Australian authorities when developing contingency plans for a variety of situations, including NEOs. As this cooperation is dependent on the process each nation uses in the conduct of NEO, an analysis will be made of the 2006 Lebanon evacuation where both Canada and Australia participated in the crisis. This paper will draw comparisons to the generalized doctrine using the 2006 Lebanon evacuation as a case study and provide recommendations for improvements to the NEO practices of each nation, to assist in operations that each may be responsible for in the future.

This paper is divided into four chapters. The first will provide a critical analysis of NEO doctrine, identifying international publications and documents which make key contributions to the current GoC doctrine. Their strengths and weaknesses will be noted and relevant points on how they relate to the thesis will

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be highlighted. The second chapter will provide insight into the specific Canadian process of NEO examining current contingency plans and joint planning doctrinal publications. The third chapter will compare the Canadian and Australian governmental responses to the 2006 Lebanon evacuation crisis highlighting some anomalies found in their respective executions. In this comparison analysis, some recent NEOs will be highlighted to determine if any lessons learned from Lebanon have been subsequently used. In Chapter Four, recommendations will be made on how both countries’ governments can enhance their responses to NEO in future crisis.

**Literature Review**

The critical analysis of Canadian doctrine within this paper concentrated on policy documentation from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and the CF. Literature which includes the Mission Emergency Plans and Consular Evacuation Plans from DFAIT provided a broad overview of coordination that would need to be done in a NEO scenario, although lacked specific guidance for DFAIT personnel to use when conducting this type of operation. The CF documentation examined included CF specific NEO doctrine within the B-GJ-005-307/FP-050, *Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations Manual*, and the *Canadian Forces Operations Manual*. These documents provide substantive NEO planning and coordination guidance although require additional updating and review to address more current whole of government interagency cooperation. CONPLAN ANGLE, the CF’s
contingency plan for NEO, is also examined and provides specific strategic and operational guidance for CF NEO coordination.

NEO doctrine manuals from the U.S. are referenced as they contain the most information and guidance relating to the subject matter. Other NEO doctrine from the U.K. and Australia are used in the comparative analysis and provide relevant policy specifically on handling evacuees throughout the NEO process. Governmental lessons learned documents are examined within the comparative analysis which provides personal views on the NEO processes used during the Lebanon Evacuation.
CHAPTER 1

NON-COMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS OVERVIEW

National definitions of a NEO vary within various government publications, although, in general, a NEO can be described as a diplomatic initiative which has a primary focus on the collection, processing and movement of civilians out of an actual or potential danger zone. This broad description of a NEO covers a wide spectrum of situations and scenarios, which is important when understanding the complexities that the planning staffs of national governments face while engaging in contingency planning for the evacuation of their citizens from any part of the world.

This chapter will discuss a generalized overview of non-combatant evacuations highlighting doctrine from Canada, Australia, the United States, United Kingdom and various other coalition publications including NATO resources. Though each nation or coalition may have specific terms, operational plans and terminology, the basic aim and structure of NEO remains essentially the same.

This overview will cover four specific points. A discussion detailing the reason that a NEO is a diplomatic initiative wherein the military remains subordinate in its support operations will provide the foundation for this review. Second, the categorized threat environments that are encountered during a NEO will be examined. Planning for NEO conduct is impacted based on the specific threat environment category and warrants assessment. Next, the composition of

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the generic force structure for a non-combatant evacuation operation will be considered. Finally, the diplomatic and military cooperation requirements in the conduct of NEO will be reviewed in order to identify the synergy needed to conduct a successful evacuation mission.

1.1 – NEO: A Diplomatic Initiative

NEOs, first and foremost, are diplomatic operations that are supported by military assets.⁹

-Chris Blanchard, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations.

As the above quote implies, it is essential for planners at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of government to understand that any and all military involvement tied to their national government’s decision to initiate NEO planning falls under diplomatic direction. Political sensitivities of this type of operation must be heavily weighed and taken into account as the support of other governmental organizations, including the military, fall under national diplomatic control of the operation. Maj Chris Blanchard of the U.S. Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell reinforced this political sensitivity when he wrote “[e]ven preparations preceding a NEO, including a precautionary drawdown of U.S. personnel, may have some serious diplomatic and political consequences.”¹⁰ Signalling an evacuation to the affected nation (AN) may instigate a myriad of secondary effects. First and foremost it may undermine current relief efforts if the evacuating nation had been providing


¹⁰Ibid, 57.
assistance such as humanitarian support. The AN may perceive the move as a vote of non-confidence and that they are not being entrusted with the security of another nation’s citizens, or they may see the evacuating nation as “dropping” their commitment to assist them in a time of need. Additionally, a country’s decision to initiate an evacuation may have a ‘knock-on’ effect, causing other nations and embedded non-governmental organizations to react, which may further complicate the AN situation and exacerbate the crisis.11

The Canadian Expeditionary Force Command (CEFCOM) Contingency Plan 20852/07 (CONPLAN ANGLE), the operational direction for CF assistance to evacuation operations, details specific intended and unintended effects under the ‘Commander’s Intent’. These effects are defined as “the cumulative physical, psychological or functional consequence across a systematic environment of one or more actions taken by any instrument of government power.”12 These effects include the political ramifications of conducting non-combatant evacuation operations in an affected nation. Some unintended effects detailed within CONPLAN ANGLE include any activities that could cause further violence in the AN, perceptions of involvement in the internal issues of a country, and perceptions of providing assistance to any one side of an internal conflict. Actions that could draw unwanted attention or other factions into the

11Ibid, 57.
12Department of National Defence, CEFCOM CONPLAN 20852/07 ANGLE (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2007), 13.
AN would increase the crisis in the region are also listed under these unintended effects.¹³

It is critical that planners be aware of these effects when developing the specific operational and tactical plans for NEO, and be aware of any political sensitivities involved with the operation. In 1988, the Canadian Department of External Affairs in Canada worked with the Department of National Defence (DND) in developing a plan to evacuate approximately 800 Canadians from widespread post-election violence in Haiti, called Operation BANDIT.¹⁴ Deficiencies in maintaining a small footprint for deception during this NEO coordination and operational security failures during planning “promoted an outcry in Haiti which, in turn, increased the potential threat to Canadian nationals while the BANDIT force was deploying.”¹⁵ This is but one example of an undesired effect that can exacerbate political crisis and promote violent outcomes in an affected nation.

Within a coalition context, the NATO Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (AJP-3.4.2) reasserts the requirement for diplomatic oversight of NEO. The AJP-3.4.2 states “[t]he diplomatic mission, whose purpose is to promote national interests, will wish to remain diplomatically engaged for as long as possible to avoid inadvertent political

¹³Ibid, 14.


signals.” Military entities involved with NEO tend to typically desire early planning and promoting preventative actions in order to maximize operational efficiency. As military action is often viewed as a last resort when diplomacy fails, this can create tension between the military and diplomats in the timely decision to deploy NEO forces into the AN. As the diplomatic chain ultimately retains this final decision, the potential frustrations and complexities that can arise from the planning of NEO become evident. Military commanders often criticize the postponement of an evacuation by diplomatic missions, asserting that they are placing both military forces and evacuees at risk.

Political sensitivities as described earlier weigh heavily on a diplomatic mission’s decision to commence an evacuation. As Blanchard states, “[i]t is not simply ambassadorial whim or poor planning that causes a disinclination to conduct a NEO.” It is this tension which can lead to a breakdown of cooperation between the diplomatic and military channels when conducting these types of operations. The sensitive nature of NEO and its political effects are what drive its control and coordination from the very highest levels of government.

1.2. – NEO Threat Environments

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18 *Ibid*, 57.
Simply stated, a NEO is a military enabled operation supporting a nation’s diplomatic initiative to evacuate its citizens from a threatening situation in an AN and move them to a safe location. It is important to note that a NEO will only be launched when there is a direct threat to the nation’s citizens in the AN, and this threat assessment is normally made by that nation’s diplomatic mission in conjunction with their national political hierarchy.

International law does not provide an unequivocal answer as to whether the consent of local authorities is required for the evacuation of citizens abroad. Many nations, including Canada, maintain the right to protect their citizens using military means once diplomatic initiatives have failed, or when their situational awareness for a region reveals an actual threat to their nationals. The diplomatic mission relies on their situational awareness by continuously monitoring relevant sources of information regarding actual incidents and developing hazards to build their risk assessment. Factors utilized in building a comprehensive situational awareness include reviewing and analyzing information from various sources, maintaining robust communications with both AN and national senior decision makers, and liaising with various contacts in the affected nation including the security community and private sector. Once the decision to start the planning process for a NEO is made, the military typically

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will characterize the tentative evacuation into one of three general categories: *permissive; uncertain; or hostile*.\(^{21}\)

In a permissive environment, there is no apparent threat to either evacuees or evacuation support personnel. In this category, the affected nation’s government still maintains control over the general security of the country, including its law and order and is expected to maintain this posture over the period of the evacuation. A permissive environment includes varied support from the affected nation in the evacuation and the AN will not oppose either the departure of the foreign country’s citizens or foreign military support to the NEO.\(^{22}\) Affected nation support may vary from administrative allowances such as aircraft landing clearances to dedicated security personnel supporting the NEO. An example of a NEO permissive environment is in the case of a natural disaster, such as occurred in Haiti on 12 January 2010. The catastrophic earthquake measuring 7.0 on the Richter scale struck Haiti causing widespread devastation in the Port au Prince area. The Canadian government, in cooperation with many other nations including the Haitian government, evacuated over 4600 Canadian citizens back to Canada. This operation was carried out with full Haitian government support and was unopposed by the Haitian population, characterizing this NEO as a permissive environment.\(^{23}\)

\(^{21}\) *Ibid*, 22.

\(^{22}\) Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-307/FP-050, 1-1.

The uncertain environment within a NEO context describes a heightened level of hazard to both evacuees and those supporting the evacuation, including military personnel. In this category, the affected nation’s government no longer maintains total control over security, territory or population. The concerned country citizen’s safety is called into question and the AN is unable to ensure their safety. The AN may or may not be supportive of the evacuation, and even if they were supportive, the AN government would not have material or administrative resources available to offer due to their specific circumstances. In an uncertain environment, the potential for opposition to a NEO exists. This might manifest itself in the form of an opposing AN population in the AN, organized resistance or aggressive external foreign government interventions. This type of environment usually entails a subsequent increase in the evacuation force due to potential opposition, security requirements and required reserve stand-by forces. In such an operating environment, military planners will develop contingency plans that address the potential for the situation to elevate to a hostile environment, while ensuring appropriate rules of engagement (ROE) are distributed.

A NEO uncertain environment can occur during civil unrest. In January 1991, Operation EASTERN EXIT was initiated after the U.S. ambassador to Somalia requested military assistance to evacuate the American embassy. Civil war in the Mogadishu region had escalated to the point where U.S. citizens were


no longer under the protection of the Somali government and were unable to freely move around the country due to violent clan mobs. The U.S. tasked special operations personnel, tactical airlift, naval warships and a marine brigade to support the evacuation of 281 American citizens from the unstable region.\textsuperscript{26} This operation certainly did not have the support of the AN government and had the potential of placing civilians in harm’s way, which defines the NEO uncertain environment.

In a hostile environment, the affected nation’s government or other forces take an aggressive posture and are directly opposed to the conduct of NEO. The AN, or other hostile force which has seized control, have the intent to “. . . effectively obstruct and interfere with a NEO for the purpose of embarrassing the [government], or to prevent a successful evacuation.”\textsuperscript{27} In this case, military planners will construct plans in which evacuees will be removed under a full spectrum of military options ranging from anti-terrorist intervention to full scale combat operations. A large force is typically required to ensure security, reactionary support and potential opposed entry operations.\textsuperscript{28} Well defined ROE are critical as this environment is the most complex in combining civilian-orientated mission objectives with potential combat operations. If the opposing forces are robust and well organized, a NEO may not be the most


\textsuperscript{27}Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-307/FP-050, 1-1

\textsuperscript{28}Department of the Army, FM 90-29, 1-3.
suitable operation. The government may decide upon an alternate operation in this case, such as a rescue operation which is beyond the scope this paper.

An organized internal threat to a nation’s citizens in an affected nation is an example of a NEO hostile environment. In 1990, a rebel group in Liberia threatened that they would take U.S. citizens hostage in that country in a move to force intervention in a civil dispute between rebels and the president at the time. Operation Sharp Edge deployed four warships and 2300 marines in order to commence the evacuation of 2600 civilians under a high threat situation.\textsuperscript{29} As there were opposing forces and a significant potential for civilian casualties during this non-combatant evacuation, it was classified as a NEO hostile environment.\textsuperscript{30}

The distinction between the three types of generic threat environments for non-combatant operations must be understood by planners to effectively determine logistical support, ROE development and military force structure. Governments must be prepared for both an escalation or reduction between these various threat environments based on the AN crisis situation. Defining a specific threat environment, however, gives planners a starting point in the planning process where timely action is always demanded.

\textbf{1.3 – NEO Conduct and Force Structure}


\textsuperscript{30} Department of the Army, FM 90-29, 1-3.
A NEO from a military perspective involves objectives, rapid response and securing an evacuation location using the minimal forces required just long enough to evacuate a nation’s citizens.\(^{31}\) In order to appreciate the full spectrum of activities that are concurrently conducted in the NEO process, a basic knowledge of the components, phases and task force structure must be understood. This understanding is important to ensure that a NEO, which is always time compressed, will be planned in the most efficient manner.

The basic doctrinal components of a non-combatant evacuation operation are similar within the international community. These components provide insight into how operations are conducted. There are four specific phases in the conduct of a NEO. These phases are dependent on the nation’s air, land and sea assets and will be examined on the assumption that all three resources would be made available for the operation. Considerations when planning for a NEO force structure will also be examined as each specific circumstance, including the threat environment, will dictate the composition of forces.

There are multiple components within the evacuation chain in the conduct of a NEO. In order to maintain consistency throughout this paper, the nomenclature used will be referenced from CF Joint Doctrine.\(^{32}\) The Forward Mounting Base (FMB) is a secure mounting area in which an operation can be launched and supported. The selection of the FMB will set the basis for the concept of operations for deployment, sustainment and redeployment of the


\(^{32}\) Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-307/FP-050, 1-4.
NEO. The Forward Operating Base (FOB) is established within the evacuation area of operations to extend tactical reach of the force.

The Warden System is a group of volunteers who are widely known within the community who act as a point of contact between the senior government representative, Head of Mission (HOM), and evacuees to pass on critical information and instructions. The Warden System must have a capability to track down its citizens abroad within an AN quickly in the event of an evacuation. In general, a Warden is responsible for no more than twenty families in order to ensure they can efficiently pass information to a reasonable scope of the citizens abroad population.

The Point of Entry (POE) is the entry point for the task force into the affected nation prior to deploying to the evacuation area. Assembly Points (AP) are points where the Wardens direct the evacuees to be received by their national representatives. The Evacuation Centre (EC) is the area where evacuees will be processed for evacuation. The Embarkation Site (ES) is the port or airfield where evacuees depart to the Safe Haven. The Disembarkation Site (DS) is located in the Safe Haven where evacuees report to their national authorities. Finally, the Safe Haven is the safe area away from the crisis area where evacuees complete their final administration before being released from their national authority. In many cases, the Safe Haven is in the citizen’s home country. The NEO components are depicted in the following Fig 1-1.
In the planning of any NEO, there are four basic phases that are carried out, which, if successful, achieve the end state of the operation which is defined in Canadian doctrine when “... all [entitled personnel] who wish to be evacuated arrive at the Safe Haven and the [task force] has withdrawn from the host nation.”\textsuperscript{33} The phases consist of the preparatory phase, the deployment phase, the evacuation phase and the redeployment phase.

In the preparatory phase, government officials gather as much information as possible on the political, social and security situation in the affected nation. Lessons learned from previous NEOs are reviewed, an initial warning is given to potential supporting government and non-governmental agencies and administrative preparations are commenced in order to coordinate the evacuation. The preparatory phase will consist of the bulk of the planning.

\textsuperscript{33}Ibid, 11-1.
for military operations that have been requested and may also include the deployment of an advance party to assess the situation in the affected nation.\textsuperscript{34} Based on the planning in this stage, the basic components as previously described (Fig 1.1) will be assigned.

In Canadian and U.S. NEO doctrine, the preparatory phase is divided into two phases that separate these activities. An important part of this phase is to acquire as much intelligence information as possible in order to develop a plan that is able to identify and mitigate risks. Failure to properly coordinate and update information on the affected nation can delay the NEO, and has the potential to endanger lives.

In 1991, when the U.S. was developing its plan to evacuate its citizens from Mogadishu, Somalia, a critical map of the region that was provided to the planners had not been updated since 1969. When the plan was carried out, helicopters spent an additional 20 minutes over hostile territory as they tried to locate the embassy on the outdated chart.\textsuperscript{35} This delay had the potential to lose both aircraft and personnel, and was caused by poor intelligence gathering in the planning stage.

The deployment phase identifies and secures many of the locations within the components of a NEO. This phase includes moving the generated NEO task force from the home country to the FMB to complete any final

\textsuperscript{34} NATO Standardization Agency, \textit{AJP-3.4.2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations}, 5-1.

training and acclimatization to the region. Further reconnaissance of the NEO component locations will be done to ensure information and situational awareness is accurate prior to the commencement of the evacuation. A combined civilian and military headquarters (HQ) will be established within the region in order to command the NEO in all phases. The structure of the HQ may include entities such as legal advisors, interpreters, the military chain of command, diplomatic mission and AN representatives.

Depending on the NEO environment, forces may be deployed to create an opening for the evacuation force to enter the AN, such as in a hostile environment. Security measures for both evacuees and supporting elements will be established in the region to secure evacuation routes, airfields or seaports and any infrastructure being used in the NEO process. Evacuation assembly points and handling centres will be established in the deployment phase to process the evacuees. Once the HOM and military command are satisfied that all security measures and evacuation processes are in place, the evacuation phase commences.

In many cases there are multiple nations conducting simultaneous NEOs within the same region. As this type of operation is almost always time critical, there may not have been opportunity in the planning phase to coordinate the evacuation effort with these other nations. It is essential that during the deployment phase national authorities from all participating nations promptly

36 Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-307/FP-050, 3-5.

coordinate the use of airfields, seaports and usable infrastructure in order to ensure both promptness and order in the evacuation phase.

During the aftermath of the earthquake in Haiti in 2010, there was a significant need for airspace management due to the hundreds of different nation’s aircraft attempting to gain access to the Port au Prince airport, many supporting their own national NEOs. Coordinating this management took place early in the deployment phase with the United States assuming control of the airspace and administering prioritized landing slot times to the nations. Coordination between arriving aircraft and the limited ground handling equipment ensured timely movement of these mission critical flights.

The diplomatic mission maintains the overall responsibility for the evacuation, including the movement of the evacuees from the assembly points to the evacuation centre. Once processed at the EC, the evacuees are then transported from the affected nation to the Safe Haven. Once all the evacuees have departed the AN, the diplomatic mission is closed and the NEO task force leaves the affected region, unless otherwise tasked for other ongoing initiatives such as humanitarian operations. This overall coordination and movement is the evacuation phase.

The evacuation phase is the most complex phase to action as there will be multiple uncertainties, especially if there is a large body of civilians to be evacuated. There are three guiding principles which are considered to be

overarching in the evacuation phase: accuracy; security; and speed.\textsuperscript{39} Accuracy ensures that everyone is accounted for. Security ensures that the evacuees and evacuating forces are protected from threats and speed ensures the timely processing of evacuees in order to transport them to safety. There will be a degree of uncertainty and potential chaos where the NEO task force must not only provide security measures, but as the Australian NEO doctrine describes “. . . basic comfort and reassurance to the evacuees.”\textsuperscript{40}

Depending on the capabilities of the evacuation centre, the processing of the evacuees can take significant time. The evacuees will be under significant stress and those personnel working at both the APs and EC need to be aware of this dynamic situation when dealing with the evacuees, which can quickly turn to violence. Lt Gen Ken Keen of the U.S. Southern Command noted that the people’s desperation deteriorated the security situation in Haiti as NEO and humanitarian operations were ongoing after the earthquake in 2010. This desperation, that increased as time moved forward after the earthquake, he described “. . . impeded [U.S. task force’s] ability to support the government of Haiti and answer the challenges that the country faces.”\textsuperscript{41} Australian NEO doctrine directly addresses the handling of evacuees providing guidance for those in the evacuation force. Firm, fair and polite control, clear instructions


\textsuperscript{40}Australian Defence Force, ADDP 3.10, 5-10.

with minimal use of military jargon, equal treatment, comfort and medical accessibility are some of the points emphasized in the doctrine for the treatment of evacuees.\footnote{42}{Australian Defence Force, ADDP 3.10, 5-12.}

An important aspect in the evacuation phase is the determination of those individuals who are eligible to be evacuated. This process will encompass three basic screening criteria.\footnote{43}{Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-307/FP-050, 2B-1.} Identification as an ‘entitled’ person is confirmed by the diplomatic mission as to confirm or deny eligibility for evacuation. If eligible, the evacuee will then be prioritized for transportation outside the affected nation. There is a security screening process that will identify individuals who may pose a danger to evacuees or supporting personnel. The AN authorities may be involved in this security screening process as they may have information relating to an individual, such as a criminal record or a prison escapee. The need for such measures is highlighted by an example after the earthquake in Haiti in 2010. Approximately 4000 prisoners escaped confinement and were able to mingle within the local population as the NEO was being conducted.\footnote{44}{CBC News, “Haiti Earthquake News: Main Prison Destroyed, 4,000 Prisoners Escape,” http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-6100169-504083.html; Internet; accessed 20 January 2011.} The third screening process is a medical screening that identifies individuals who may pose a health threat to other evacuees and supporting personnel, such as an individual with a highly contagious illness.

As the evacuation phase is where the majority of personnel movement and interaction takes place, the specified rules of engagement must be clear,
flexible and may need to be modified as the operation unfolds. Limits to the use of military force for self-protection and non-combatant protection may restrict military members from intervening in local disputes, even when they believe they have a requirement or obligation. The ROE may also vary between participant nations executing their respective NEOs within the same region. This also can cause confusion within the affected nation populace. Open dialogue with the AN and communication with the population during the conduct of a NEO will ensure that a nation’s approach to the operation is clear, and may reduce tension and negative media coverage that could jeopardize the national strategic effects of an evacuation.45 One example where strict adherence to ROE specific to a non-combatant evacuation operation was successful occurred during Operation EASTERN EXIT in Mogadishu, Somalia. During this NEO, two U.S. Marines were directly targeted with small arms fire while keeping watch on a water tower. The specific ROE dictated that only the U.S. Ambassador to Somalia could authorize return fire, and never authorized use of force throughout the event. The marines were specifically ordered not to return fire and to leave the water tower, even though they were being fired upon. Adam Seigel noted in his Operation EASTERN EXIT lessons learned memorandum the importance of specific ROE for NEO where “[e]ven in a situation that fulfilled all reasonable rules of engagement [self-defence] . . . no shots were fired.”46

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45 NATO Standardization Agency, AJP-3.4.2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations, 1-4.
Although fully planned, the execution of the evacuation phase will present many challenges which require the HOM, diplomatic mission and supporting forces to maintain flexibility throughout its progression. As this phase ends when the evacuees are moved from the affected nation onward, the deployed forces and diplomatic mission will then prepare to leave the region. This commences the final phase of a NEO, the redeployment phase.

The redeployment phase includes the closure of the entire evacuation chain and withdrawal from the affected nation. All components of the NEO are closed and the NEO task force returns to their home nation. In cases where there is an interest in preserving the diplomatic relationship with the AN, an evacuation force may attempt to repair any damage that was caused in the conduct of the NEO, although this may be tasked as a separate operation with different orders. Lessons learned will also be noted within this phase for use on future non-combatant evacuation operation missions. During the redeployment phase for OP HESTIA as the Canadian Forces were returning home from Haiti after the evacuation, a lessons learned cell was opened at Canadian Forces 8 Wing Trenton to collect information, post-action reports and overall lessons learned for the airlift portion of the Haiti NEO.

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47 Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-307/FP-050, 3-5.

48 Author participated in OP HESTIA and provided feedback to 8 Wing Trenton lessons learned cell following CC-150 evacuation support flights.
The force structure in the conduct of a NEO “. . . may first and foremost depend on the operating environment in which it will be conducted.”49 In a permissive environment, diplomatic mission personnel and minimal military support personnel could conduct a NEO using readily available contracted resources, such as commercial airlines. Once the threat environment is elevated to uncertain or hostile, there is a requirement to develop specific military joint force capability, a Joint Task Force (JTF). The affected nation’s support capabilities will play a major role in determining the size and structure of the JTF, depending if AN support is even available.50 The JTF should take into account NEO situations where the threat environment could rapidly change, requiring a flexible JTF capable of meeting challenges associated with heightened threats, while conducting the evacuee extraction process.

Throughout the planning phase, force structure will always be constructed under the premise that “. . . evacuating forces entering foreign territory should be kept to the minimum number required for self defence and for extraction and protection of evacuees.”51 This principle of maintaining as small of a footprint as possible is important in order to minimise exposure to potential adversaries.

A multinational force arrangement can also be used as there is typically more than one nation conducting NEO in the same region, such as in the case of a natural disaster. Although the coordination for a multinational force (MNF) 

49 NATO Standardization Agency, AJP-3.4.2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations, 1-6.


51 Ibid, I-4.
could increase the planning time, the available resources may enhance the NEO overall. It may be politically and militarily expedient to work with other nations when conducting NEO.  

During the conduct of Operation EASTERN EXIT, the U.S. Ambassador to Somalia had conducted prior coordination with foreign diplomats to study their emergency evacuation plans. Once the crisis developed, he forwarded a request to the U.S. asking for a coordinated NEO which would entail a multinational force from three separate countries who had military capability and forces in the Somali region. The U.S. denied the request and the operation was conducted by U.S. forces independent of other participating nations. A review of the Somalia NEO concluded that the evacuation could have been completed more expediently if the MNF concept was approved by the U.S. government.  

1.4 – NEO Diplomatic and Military Cooperation

The successful coordination of a non-combatant evacuation operation requires that military forces and the diplomatic mission work together as a team. As previously stated, the HOM is in charge of a NEO overall, and ultimately responsible for both the successful extraction and safety of the evacuees. With the military as a supporting element in the operation’s conduct, cooperation at

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52 Ibid, 1-5.


the political, military strategic, operational and tactical levels is extremely important and must be recognized by both the diplomatic and military figures.

While the protection of evacuees remains paramount in the conduct of a NEO, situations which require this type of operation generally occur where political concerns and constraints will be key considerations. In the case of a hostile environment for example, a political constraint may be the restriction of direct engagement by military forces against the militants who are presenting a threat to the evacuees. In the planning phases for many NEOs, military planners are restricted from an early entrance into the affected nation due to political sensitivities, thus hampering preparation initiatives. These constraints can at times introduce tensions between the political players and military personnel. It remains essential that the military elements remain fully supportive to the diplomatic mission’s plans and cooperate at all levels while providing support to the NEO.

It is also important that mutual respect between the JTF Commander and the Head of Mission is maintained throughout all phases of the NEO. During planning and execution of the evacuation, the HOM must be able to accept professional guidance from military experts while understanding that he maintains overall responsibility. As time is usually of the essence in a NEO, common understanding of the mission and objectives is essential for the political and military actors, including freely sharing information that could help each entity in the execution of their duties.

55 U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-68, II-1.
It is imperative that the necessary direction and orders that flow in a NEO scenario do so through the respective chains of command. For example, Embassy officials should not be issuing orders to military personnel at the tactical level. Direction must be articulated clearly in orders issued for NEO to emphasize the importance of this diplomatic-military cooperation. The U.S. Department of Defence Noncombatant Evacuation Operations Directive 3025.14 provides such direction which states commanders shall “[c]ooperate with the Chief(s) of Diplomatic Missions in the preparation of consular and/or embassy emergency action and evacuation plans.”

Any existing NEO related relationships that the diplomatic mission has established in the affected nation should be shared amongst the military entities. This can include relationships with local security forces, airport authorities, port authorities, commercial agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). These relationships may need to be exploited for an expedient evacuation execution.

The coordination required by all actors in the NEO environment is complex, and will be done in a time compressed, stressful environment. Recognition and clear communication of mutual aims will enhance the NEO process, and provide security to the evacuees who fall under the responsibility of both the political and military figures.

56 Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-307/FP-050, 4-10.


58 Ibid, 4-11.
CHAPTER 2

CANADIAN NEO COORDINATION

In order to understand and identify deficiencies in a country’s NEO doctrine, a review and analysis of the current authorities, procedures and doctrinal publications for that specific state should be conducted. In order to assess current doctrine, it must be analyzed by application against a real-life scenario or event that led to the execution of the NEO process. This chapter will examine all relevant agencies in Canada that contribute to the evacuation of citizens abroad when a crisis occurs. This doctrine will then be compared to the generalized doctrine presented in the previous chapter, and insights drawn as to inherent strengths and weakness of the Canadian Government’s approach to non-combatant evacuation operations. This chapter will be presented in three parts: DFAIT policy; DND doctrine; and Other Governmental Department (OGD) policy and Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) roles in NEO.

The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) in Canada maintains emergency management capabilities that utilize a ‘whole of government’ approach to respond to international emergency events.\(^59\) In the event of a crisis that requires evacuation, the GoC’s policy “. . . is to provide transportation to Canadian travelers to the nearest Safe Haven.”\(^60\) The coordinating policy for DFAIT in a NEO context is contained in the Mission


Emergency Plan and the Consular Evacuation Plan which will be examined in this chapter and compared to generalized NEO doctrine.

DFAIT may encounter situations where they are unable to ensure the safe evacuation of Canadians abroad, in which case they will request assistance from the Department of National Defence. DND has developed policy and doctrine to cover NEO contingencies including CONPLAN ANGLE, the DND Joint Doctrine Manual of Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (B-GJ-005-307/FP-050) and the Canadian Forces Operations Manual (B-GJ-005-300/FP-000). These documents will also be examined as to where they fit into the GoC’s NEO response.

Other Governmental Departments (OGDs) including the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Privy Council Office, Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) and others may play a role in a NEO scenario. Additionally, NGOs may also play a part in supporting Canadians abroad during an evacuation crisis. These OGD and NGO inputs and policies will be examined as they contribute to the Canadian whole of government approach to NEO.

2.1 – DFAIT NEO Policy

One of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade’s main priorities is to achieve enhanced security for Canada and Canadians at home and abroad. The overarching document that provides guidance for DFAIT

\[61\] Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-307/FP-050, 1-1.

representatives is the Mission Emergency Plan (MEP) which will be the primary resource used for this examination. This document consists of a basic plan that “incorporates planning and emergency response policies and best practices that have been used by DFAIT and missions in responding to emergency events.”

One of the primary functions of the MEP is to provide a planning and execution tool for DFAIT representatives in an evacuation situation. The MEP specifically describes the Canadian mission’s response requirements and coordination mechanisms with DFAIT headquarters, local authorities and external agencies. It defines the roles, responsibilities and processes for Canadian diplomatic representatives who are involved in an emergency situation, as in the case of a NEO. The MEP defines its authority as the lead department for an emergency event that occurs outside Canada taking responsibility for “... ensuring a timely, coherent and coordinated federal government interdepartmental response. . .”

Enforcing the concept that a NEO remains a diplomatic initiative, the MEP is prepared by a DFAIT team under the authority of the Head of Mission for the specific region. The HOM in turn remains responsible for the planning, training, NEO exercises, MEP improvement and MEP updating. This policy document directs the Warden System for diplomatic missions, ensuring that a registration service for all Canadians travelling or living abroad is available so they can be accounted for. Although this registration is voluntary, the Canadian

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63 Ibid, 8.
64 Ibid, 10.
65 Ibid, 10.
Privacy Act protects all information that is submitted through this system, which provides some encouragement of its use. Unfortunately, there is usually a significantly higher number of Canadians in an affected nation than the mission is aware of due to the lack of registration. The Warden System, although in place, needs to ensure maximum participation from Canadian nationals to be effective in a NEO scenario.

The MEP assists in addressing the issue of assessing the NEO threat environment. A ‘hazard vulnerability assessment’ is the first step DFAIT uses in determining if a situation poses a “... threat to life, health, property or environment.”67 that may trigger a NEO. The MEP uses four categories derived from the Epidemiology of Disasters Database68 (EM DAT) of emergencies which, if becomes active, can trigger an evacuation: natural; public health; technological; and human induced.69 Natural emergencies can either be hydro-meteorological such as drought, famines and forest fires or they can be geophysical such as earthquakes, tsunamis and volcanic eruptions. Public health crises include biological threats such as infectious disease outbreaks and pandemic influenza. Technological emergencies include transportation and


67 DFAIT Canada, Mission Emergency Plan – An All-Hazards Emergency Response Plan (Draft), 16.


69 DFAIT Canada, Mission Emergency Plan – An All-Hazards Emergency Response Plan (Draft), 16.
industrial accidents such as chemical spills, gas leaks and poisoning from radiation. Human induced crisis encompass civil unrest and insurrections as in the case of Lebanon in 2006. Once an emergency is identified within a category, a risk assessment is completed and is fed into the planning response function that drives the NEO contingency plan.\textsuperscript{70} This process allows the GoC to identify the NEO environment as permissive, uncertain or hostile.

The conduct and structure of a potential NEO is identified within the MEP as the ‘Incident Command System (ICS)’. This system can be used to “. . . organize both near-term and long-term operations for [emergencies], from small to complex incidents, both natural and manmade.”\textsuperscript{71} The ICS is structured to organize activities for command, operations, planning and logistics. One of its key components is the identification of ‘triggers’ which activate specific planning initiatives at various levels. For example, if an incident is identified that would exceed the capabilities of a diplomatic mission in a region; the ICS triggers specific OGDs to assist in the crisis.

In the case of an incident requiring a NEO, the ICS would trigger consultation with DND for contingency planning support.\textsuperscript{72} Activation levels are identified in the MEP which follow the basic phases of NEO, including Notification, Initiation, Execution (Evacuation), and Shutdown.\textsuperscript{73} The MEP contains specific direction for all designated DFAIT representatives within a

\textsuperscript{70}Ibid, 23.
\textsuperscript{71}Ibid, 19.
\textsuperscript{72}Ibid, 27.
\textsuperscript{73}Ibid, 29.
Canadian mission at each activation level, providing robust guidance in the
conduct of a NEO.

Although some guidance is provided in the MEP regarding both formal
and informal mutual assistance agreements, it provides little direction for DFAIT
representatives in developing these agreements. The MEP simply states that
“[m]issions are encouraged to meet regularly with other foreign missions in
country to discuss mutual support arrangements during [emergencies].”74 The
NGOs operating in the region may have access to important contacts and
resource capabilities for NEO support, although very little is provided in the
MEP regarding direction on how to formalize this type of agreement. The MEP
provides a solid basis for NEO planning on a strategic level, although requires
further guidance in obtaining accessibility to all available resources in a region
when executing an evacuation.

One subset of the MEP which details the important diplomatic-military
relationship is the MEP Tab K – Canadian Forces Support to Mission
Emergency Plan and Operations. In order to ensure a close planning
arrangement between DND and DFAIT in a NEO scenario, this document
provides for a ‘Contingency Planning Assistance Team (CPAT)’ which includes
members from the CF who are specifically trained in NEO planning, logistics
and security. The CF members would work with members from the DFAIT

74Ibid, 25.
Emergency Management Bureau\textsuperscript{75} to ensure collaborative efforts are exercised in all phases of a NEO scenario.

Providing further specific guidance for non-combatant evacuation operations is the DFAIT ‘Consular Evacuation Plan (CEP)’ which acts as a sub-plan to the MEP. It provides “guidelines for the emergency movement of large numbers of Canadian citizens and other persons for whom the GoC may have a responsibility.”\textsuperscript{76} The CEP expands into the operational and tactical requirements for DFAIT representatives in the conduct of an evacuation, specifically addressing who is covered under the CEP and the specific activation levels and triggers for an evacuation. The CEP also includes certain assumptions that will be used in the development of the contingency plan for NEO.

Chapter One emphasized the importance of determining who is entitled to be evacuated in the event of a NEO. The CEP provides this guidance and criteria to DFAIT personnel in the event of an evacuation. This doctrine defines entitlement as “. . . all Canadians in each country of accreditation who choose to be included, and their dependants.”\textsuperscript{77} It emphasizes that the CEP is voluntary and it is each Canadian’s responsibility to decide if they want to accept advice and direction in the event of an evacuation. The CEP also provides specific principles in determining entitled Canadians. No distinction is to be made


\textsuperscript{76}Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) Canada. \textit{Consular Evacuation Plan – A Sub Plan to the Mission Emergency Plan} (Ottawa: DFAIT Canada, 2009), 5.

\textsuperscript{77}Ibid, 5.
between Canadian Government employees and private citizens. There is to be no distinction made between Canadians who hold dual citizenship, and all efforts are to be made to avoid splitting up family members in the conduct of NEO.\textsuperscript{78}

The CEP also provides direction regarding cooperative agreements with other countries in that as long as there is no detriment to Canadian citizens, and those nationals may be included in the Canadian NEO extraction. Table 2.1 details the CEP’s guidance on prioritizing individuals during a NEO:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority 1</th>
<th>Canadian Citizens (and Australian Citizens under the Canada-Australia Consular Services Sharing Agreement)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Priority 2</td>
<td>Dependant non-Canadian family members of Canadian citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority 3</td>
<td>Permanent residents of Canada (including adopted children)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority 4</td>
<td>Locally engaged employees and dependants of the mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority 5</td>
<td>Others, who through their work have established a close association with Canada (i.e. humanitarian workers)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.1 – Consular Emergency Plan Evacuation Priority List
Source: DFAIT Canada, Consular Emergency Plan (April 2009)

The specific duties of all DFAIT personnel involved in an evacuation scenario are detailed within the CEP for each activation level. There are specific actions for the Canadian mission’s team members, friendly host nation representatives, Canadian community members and DFAIT headquarters.\textsuperscript{79} The CEP guidance provides a complete list of responsibilities for these individuals, which will not be listed in this paper, but fully falls within the generalized doctrine for NEO conduct and inter-agency cooperation.

\textsuperscript{78}\textit{Ibid}, 5.

\textsuperscript{79}\textit{Ibid}, 10-15.
Planning assumptions are provided in the CEP for use by DFAIT planners when coordinating a NEO. An evacuation plan is not solely based on the number of people affected, but also on the threat, possibility of escalation and consultation with other experts in the NEO field, such as DND. It is assumed that Canadian mission’s methods for information distribution within a region will ensure that the Canadian population will receive and understand official evacuation information. The CEP assumes that there will be little to no notice of an evacuation requirement, and that it could be initiated day or night. Local staffing support is assumed as not available, although some private transportation means could be used in a NEO.80

DFAIT guidance and policy for evacuation does provide the necessary tools for Canadian diplomatic missions when facing a crisis requiring a NEO. The authorities, determining situational awareness, planning, conduct and military coordination aspects are covered in the related publications. Further direction on the integration of NGOs into the process may need to be added in future iterations of this policy.

2.2 – DND NEO Doctrine

The Department of National Defence has identified non-combatant operations as one of its primary duties in the Canadian Forces Operations manual stating “[t]he CF military operation conducted in support of the

80 Ibid, 7.
Canadian Mission’s evacuation is called a [NEO].”81 This statement identifies that the CF acts in a supporting role under DFAIT, establishing the NEO as a diplomatic initiative. This manual provides the overarching principles for the NEO concept, but does not provide specific operational and tactical direction for NEO conduct. An important aspect of this doctrine is that it addresses a command and control structure for both an independent NEO and a combined NEO with another nation.82 This parallels the general doctrine pertaining to NEO force structure, which is further expanded upon in the CF Joint Doctrine Manual – Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (JDMNEO).

The JDMNEO succinctly outlines the Canadian specific approach to conducting NEO and is directed at commanders and staffs at the strategic and operational levels, the joint staff within NDHQ and for task forces established for conducting NEO.83 The manual also outlines the roles of the Canadian diplomatic mission, details task force structure and NEO conduct, planning considerations and coalition issues.

The JDMNEO reinforces the operating concept of DFAIT’s authority for NEO conduct by stating “[a]s the lead department for evacuation operations, DFAIT in conjunction with its diplomatic missions, develops and maintains contingency plans for all countries.”84 The general planning responsibilities

81Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 Canadian Forces Operations (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2005), 11-1.

82Ibid, 11-5.

83Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-307/FP-050, ii.

84Ibid, 2-3.
outlined in the manual for DFAIT are in line with the MEP and CEP previously examined. An important aspect of the JDMNEO is the inclusion of direction for the Canadian Defence Attaché to synchronize DFAIT evacuation planning with CF doctrine and contingency plans.\textsuperscript{85} This coordination is essential to the diplomatic-military cooperation that is required in NEO.

Specific direction is outlined regarding evacuee management, an essential element to the conduct of an evacuation. Falling in-line with the generalized evacuee handling doctrine presented in Chapter one, the JDMNEO provides detailed instructions regarding the processing of evacuees. It divides the evacuee handling into two functions, the physical services and the psychological services. The physical services include transfer of evacuees, accommodation, feeding, amenities and recreation. The psychological services include those that aid the Canadian evacuees in coping with the crisis and evacuation, such as counseling and chaplaincy support. Although these resources may not be readily available or in limited supply, this guidance ensures that the CF, at a minimum, has considered them in the planning phase.

In preparing for the NEO task force structure, the JDMNEO follows the principle that the “scale and scope of the task force will depend on the NEO environment . . . and whether the NEO will be conducted as a coalition.”\textsuperscript{86} This doctrine also establishes criteria that give military planners a tool when

\textsuperscript{85}Ibid, 2-5.

\textsuperscript{86}Ibid, 3-1.
constructing the JTF. The basis for the Canadian force design is based on two criteria: unitary vs. dispersed employment and prepared vs. re-directed forces.\textsuperscript{87}

In an independent operation, the CF will generally send a JTF which operates under one commander if in one geographical region, defined as unitary employment. If there is a requirement for separate components, such as in a coalition JTF, the configuration of the forces may be dispersed and work under multiple chains of command, or dispersed employment. This may occur in a multi-location NEO where there are separate forces assigned to separate evacuation points. In a prepared task force, the components have both the training and resources to specifically conduct a NEO, and assume some level of readiness for deployment when required. A re-directed force is one that is already in a deployed operation and can be re-tasked to conduct a NEO. This re-directed force will generally not have the same capabilities and training as the prepared force, but may be able to provide a quicker response.

One difference from the generalized doctrine is that the JDMNEO divides a Canadian NEO into five phases, splitting the generalized preparatory phase into two. The warning phase involves the construct and distribution of the operation order that initiates the initial movement of forces. The preparatory phase then covers the reconnaissance activities, planning, liaison, training and deployment of the advance party.\textsuperscript{88} These two phases break down the

\textsuperscript{87}Ibid, 3-2.

\textsuperscript{88}Ibid, 3-5.
preparatory phase into specific components which are detailed within the manual.

The JDMNEO establishes doctrine that allows for clear coordination between the elements conducting a non-combatant evacuation operation. It outlines suggestions for inter-agency cooperation arrangements, checklists for all involved with the NEO to follow, and an outline for a command and control structure within a coalition force. In comparing it to the overall generalized doctrine, it meets all criteria for diplomatic control, assessing the threat environment, NEO force structure and conduct and diplomatic and military cooperation.

The final DND document to be examined is the CEFCOM CONPLAN ANGLE which provides direction for the assistance to evacuation operations. This document provides a bridge between the operational level JDMNEO document and tactical requirements. It describes the CF contribution as “an appropriately scaled [JTF] capable of providing security and other types of support so the DFAIT-lead evacuation can proceed with minimum risk.”89 From the onset, this document again reinforces the operating concept that the CF is acting in a supporting role to the DFAIT lead event. CONPLAN ANGLE is tailored in order to minimize the personnel and equipment footprint necessary to execute the NEO as rapidly and effectively as possible. This concept is directly in line with reducing any diplomatic or population tensions than can be caused by inserting large forces into an affected nation. Avoiding operational conflicts

89 Department of National Defence, CEFCOM CONPLAN 20852/07 ANGLE (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2007), 1.
that can occur with multiple nations that may be conducting a NEO is also addressed in ANGLE. The document directs planners to avoid competing with other nations for the same support and resources within the same region.\textsuperscript{90}

In terms of preparedness, CONPLAN ANGLE provides for a ‘core JTF’ that is trained and ready to deploy on short notice to assist in evacuation support to DFAIT. This core JTF is able to operate in all threat environments, but is unable to conduct full spectrum operations.\textsuperscript{91} Preparatory actions are evident throughout the document to cover much of the contingency planning requirements for NEO. The CPAT individuals are directed, for example, to develop multiple country specific military plans in the event of a crisis evacuation situation.

Coordination with NGOs is evident within CONPLAN ANGLE, which directs planners to coordinate with these organizations to synchronize their evacuation plans with those of the GoC. This document provides the most direction when compared to all other government policy regarding NGO coordination.

CONPLAN ANGLE also provides tactical guidance for all phases of a NEO, successfully bridging the operational guidance from the JDMNEO doctrine. It directs high level coordination with various entities in the conduct of NEO, including DFAIT, OGDs, NGOs, coalition nations and the affected nation.

\textsuperscript{90}Ibid, 4.
\textsuperscript{91}Ibid, 4.
The document encompasses all components of a NEO JTF and clearly identifies their responsibilities.

The Department of National Defence maintains the most rigorous and current planning doctrine for NEO. The policy, doctrine and direction available are able to ensure that the strategic, operational and tactical levels of the CF are able to quickly respond to a DFAIT request for an evacuation contingency plan. Most importantly, the CF guidance ensures there is a clear understanding of authorities and encourages cooperation with OGDs and NGOs throughout the process. Although specific doctrine may not be published with these other departments, they are key players in the Canadian context of conducting NEO.

2.3 – Other Governmental Department’s Roles in NEO

The complexities involved with a non-combatant evacuation operation include sourcing expertise from the whole of government, in such areas as immigration, visas, evacuee security screening, strategic political input and emergency services support. Additionally, NGOs will be able to provide potential additional resources and information for a specific region, especially if they have already been operating in the affected nation. Many of these organizations do not publish specific policy on the conduct of NEO. Rather, they act in response to the needs of DFAIT and the CF in their respective expertise. Some examples will be provided to show how these OGDs and NGOs integrate into the overall support to an evacuation scenario.

One role of the Canadian Intelligence Security Service (CSIS) is to “prevent non-Canadians who pose security concerns from entering Canada or
receiving permanent resident status or citizenship.”92 Identifying a need to ensure proper security screening in 2006 when Canadians were evacuating from Lebanon, CSIS sent teams to Cyprus and Turkey (Safe Havens for that operation). CSIS members facilitated visas for family members of Canadians who did not possess the proper documents to enter Canada. For their cooperation in the overall GoC effort, CSIS was awarded the Public Service Award of Excellence for greatly contributing to the whole of government response.93

One of the primary missions of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) is to “facilitate the arrival of people and their integration into Canada . . . while protecting the health, safety and security of Canadians.”94 CIC supported the GoC in the Lebanon evacuation by expediting applications for permanent residence for those directly affected by the crisis. CIC implemented temporary immigration policy initiatives to ensure that the immigration process maintained its integrity while thousands of Canadians and family members were repatriated.95 Again, CIC does not publish specific policy on NEO response, but its services were integral to the overall evacuation process.


Other departments that were deployed to Lebanon in 2006 to support the evacuation included officials from the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), Transport Canada and the Privy Council Office (PCO).96 Additionally, NGOs were also involved including the Canadian Red Cross. Approximately 450 Canadian Red Cross volunteers assisted over 5100 Canadians returning from Lebanon by providing shelter, food, and psycho-social help to the evacuees.97 These OGDs and NGOs thus provided specific assistance to the overall evacuation in the Lebanon NEO, although by reaction rather than a planned response using any existing specific NEO policy. OGD contingency planning for NEO would enhance the government’s efficiency for evacuating Canadians when required. This point was emphasized by The Clerk of the Privy Council in 2009 recounting the government’s ad-hoc response to the Lebanon evacuation as “public policy making in a crisis.”98


CHAPTER 3

CANADA & AUSTRALIA: THE 2006 LEBANON EVACUATION

In order to assess the validity of policy and doctrine that a country develops in responding to a crisis, in this case a NEO, lessons identified and learned from previous events must be evaluated against current practises. On 12 July 2006, the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah conducted a raid into Israel that killed and captured Israeli soldiers. Israel responded with extensive military operations that included ground operations and air raids over Lebanese territory. The security situation in Lebanon deteriorated very quickly and citizens from foreign nations who were living in or visiting Lebanon at the time began requesting evacuation assistance. Within a few days of the attacks, normal travel routes including the Beirut Airport, 80 percent of the road infrastructure, 95 percent of bridges and many shipping ports were destroyed.99 Thousands of citizens abroad were effectively trapped within this war zone and needed their home nation’s immediate support to assist them in evacuating Lebanon.

The Lebanon case study presents the full spectrum of complexities that can be encountered when conducting NEO. Approximately 50 countries were involved in evacuating their citizens from the conflict region. They encountered complicating issues including resource availability, inter-agency cooperation and communications. Figure 3.1 highlights the magnitude of the international

response to this crisis and shows the number of citizens actually evacuated, as well as the number actually registered in Lebanon at the time.

![Figure 3.1- 2006 Lebanon Evacuation Data by Country](source: WorldReach Market Research Series (2007))

The Lebanon crisis invoked the largest NEO that either Canada or Australia had ever mounted. Although both countries follow the generalized NEO doctrine as detailed in Chapter One, they were both criticized for their delay in commencing evacuation operations from Lebanon. Encountering similar challenges such as a lack of military assets readily available in the region and coordinating the evacuation from a significant distance, a comparison between these two similar nations is practical when examining their processes. Canada’s Memorandum of Understanding with Australia allows coordination between their diplomatic missions in times of crisis. As each nation may be

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dependent on the other for assistance in NEO, it highlights the need to ensure that best practices are followed during a crisis, to the benefit of each country.

This chapter will analyze both country’s response to the Lebanon crisis, using governmental lessons learned references and the event. Canada’s response to the evacuation, codename Operation LION\(^\text{102}\), will first be presented followed by the Australian response, codename Operation RAMP\(^\text{103}\). Some comparisons will be made from the Lebanon evacuation lessons identified to more recent evacuations in order to establish common NEO lessons identified between the two that can be applied to recommendations in Chapter Four.

### 3.1 – Canada’s Evacuation Response

As you all know, an evacuation of thousands of citizens from a distant land is a challenging undertaking. A challenge being faced by many nations at the same time.\(^\text{104}\)

-Prime Minister Stephen Harper Statement on the Lebanon Evacuation

On 16 July 2006, four days after Israel commenced launching air strikes within Lebanese territory, the Canadian Foreign Minister Peter MacKay announced that the GoC would commence the DFAIT led and CF supported Op

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LION to evacuate Canadian citizens from the conflict region.\textsuperscript{105} At the time, the estimated number of Canadians who were either visiting or living in Lebanon was between 40,000 to 50,000 citizens. Unfortunately, at the start of the crisis only 11,000 people had registered with the Canadian embassy in Beirut although at the peak of the conflict, that number had grown to 39,000 people. This lack of registration by Canadian citizens created difficulties in assessing the actual number of people that would potentially need evacuation, and eventually, only approximately 15,000 were repatriated. Canada would have been put to the test to accommodate the potentially much higher number of evacuees in this crisis.\textsuperscript{106}

The NEO flow evacuated Canadians from seaports in Beirut and Tyre, Lebanon, on 34 ship departures to the Canadian identified Safe Havens of Cyprus and Turkey. The evacuees were then flown from these locations home to Canada aboard 61 chartered flights and four Canadian Forces flights.\textsuperscript{107}

A 24/7 DFAIT Crisis Operations Center was created in Ottawa, drawing its members from multiple government departments including DND, Transport Canada (TC), CIC, CBSA and CSIS and acted as a centralized command structure for the evacuation. In terms of personnel, DFAIT deployed approximately 200 members from their headquarters in Ottawa and surrounding diplomatic missions into the region to support the NEO. Additionally, 151 DND personnel, two TC members, 34 CIC/CBSA and 8 CSIS members were deployed


\textsuperscript{106}The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affair and International Trade, The Evacuation of Canadians from Lebanon in July 2006: Implications for the Government of Canada, 1.

\textsuperscript{107}\textit{Ibid}, 1.
into the Lebanon area.\textsuperscript{108} Prior to this increase in personnel support, the
Canadian posture in the Canadian embassy in Beirut was nine Canadian
representatives and 17 local national employees. Compared to the 78 staff in the
Canadian embassy in Damascus, the Beirut Embassy was unequipped to handle
such an emergency.\textsuperscript{109} The Standing Senate Committee’s review of the GoC’s
response to the crisis concluded that “. . . the Canadian public servants and
members of the [CF] . . . worked very hard to accomplish a difficult task under
trying circumstances...”\textsuperscript{110} In the course of their evaluation, there were specific
observations made to the overall whole of government response.

As previously detailed in Chapter Two (2.1), one of the mechanisms to
identify and coordinate Canadians in a foreign country is the Warden System
that requires the registration of those who are either living or visiting that
country. This system, known as the Registration of Canadians Abroad
(ROCA)\textsuperscript{111}, is voluntary and in the case of Lebanon, was not widely used. This
led to uncertainty over the number of Canadians in Lebanon at the time of the
crisis, and required planners to estimate the required response needed to
evacuate. Additionally, only those Canadians who were registered with the
Canadian embassy in Beirut received the warning messages which contained

\textsuperscript{108}Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, \textit{Israeli-Lebanese Crisis 2006 – Lessons
Identified}. (Ottawa: DFAIT Canada, 2006), 1.

\textsuperscript{109}The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, \textit{The Evacuation of

\textsuperscript{110}\textit{Ibid}, 2.

\textsuperscript{111}Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, “Registration of Canadians Abroad,”
\url{http://www.voyage.gc.ca/faq/roca-eng.asp#1}; Internet; accessed 31 January 2011.
information on departure options. \textsuperscript{112} Remarks made by the Standing Senate Committee stressed that Canadians must “... focus on their responsibilities”\textsuperscript{113} when either living or travelling abroad. Registration with the embassy is imperative in areas of heightened concern and it is their responsibility to do so if expecting timely and effective evacuation assistance from the GoC.

The methods used by DFAIT in their communication of information to Canadians remains an essential tool for effective coordination of NEO. Although it is not known how many Canadians were able to access information regarding the Lebanon Evacuation, there is evidence that suggests a lack of ability and website knowledge for evacuees to get information during a crisis. The 2004 Review of Consular Affairs stated “[w]ith Canadians who were planning to travel, government travel information services are not well known by Canadian travelers or prospective travelers.”\textsuperscript{114} During the evacuation in Lebanon, the primary method to pass information to Canadian citizens was via the internet, and did not include mediums such as television, radio or newspaper.\textsuperscript{115} Countries such as Sweden effectively utilized communication media such as text messaging during the Lebanon crisis which greatly expanded...


\textsuperscript{113} The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affair and International Trade, \textit{The Evacuation of Canadians from Lebanon in July 2006: Implications for the Government of Canada}, 13.


the target audience when passing information.\textsuperscript{116} At the time of this paper, the ability of DFAIT to effectively communicate to Canadian evacuees is still lacking, as shown by the Egyptian crisis of January-February 2011. The Egyptian government shut down the internet service throughout the entire country, and many Canadians were unable to receive an answer from the Canadian embassy in Cairo when calling the information hotline established for the evacuation coordination.\textsuperscript{117} This current example illustrates the requirement for DFAIT to pursue expanded communication methods for evacuation management.

Contingency planning for NEO is essential, especially in regions where a significant number of a country’s citizens either live or travel. Chapter Two (2.1) of this paper described the importance of a Consular Evacuation Plan. During the Lebanon crisis, the CEP had not been updated and there was no active Warden System in place for Lebanon.\textsuperscript{118} Minister MacKay highlighted this deficiency during the evidence meeting on the Lebanon evacuation when he stated “There was no folder sitting in . . . the Pearson building that outlined the evacuation of 15000 Canadians from Lebanon. It did not exist.”\textsuperscript{119} The


\textsuperscript{118} The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affair and International Trade, The Evacuation of Canadians from Lebanon in July 2006: Implications for the Government of Canada, 15.
Canadian Forces were able to provide a robust contingency plan ‘Operation LION’ which involved a CPAT made up of CF personnel who were deployed to Lebanon to provide planning assistance to DFAIT.\textsuperscript{120} Subsequently, CONPLAN ANGLE has evolved, and DFAIT has since been able to ensure that Canadian Embassies around the world maintain an updated CEP. This is evident in the 2011 Egyptian evacuation where the GoC initiated the existing evacuation plan.\textsuperscript{121}

A challenge that the GoC encountered during the Lebanon crisis was gaining access to resources that other nations also needed in their efforts to conduct NEO. Minister MacKay stated that one of the considerable challenges was the “. . . high international demand for the limited commercial maritime and airlift capabilities capable for immediate use.”\textsuperscript{122} In areas where there is a relatively small population of Canadian citizens, contracting assets for NEO support may be sufficient to conduct the operation. In the case of Lebanon, with up to 50,000 potential evacuees, the capabilities of the GoC at that time to support such a NEO was beyond the scope of the CF assets, and would need a


large amount of contracted support. Unless this support is established by the Canadian Embassy in its contingency planning within the scope of the CEP, delays will occur if contracts are only sought after a crisis occurs.

The Canadian Embassy in Beirut did not have these prior contracts in place at the time and DFAIT only commenced the process to contract four days after the initial attacks on Lebanon. Minister MacKay, in explaining the delay in the commencement of the Lebanon evacuation, stated that “[b]y July 16th [attacks started 12 July], officials began locating and chartering aircraft and shipping vessels in the region.” In one example of the delays in obtaining sealift for the Lebanon evacuation, media reports indicate that the GoC thought they had secured seven ships for the NEO support, when later it was reduced to three due to other competing nations. MacKay responded to the overall delay of the NEO by stating “[t]he short answer is that we were not able to evacuate until we secured the assets.” Without a solid expectation of contingency contracts in place, the GoC did not have the identified resources it needed to independently provide an expedient NEO.


The practice of unilateral acquisition of resources in times of crisis by multiple nations creates competition for these resources and introduces delays when time is critical. Countries including the U.S. and the U.K. were able to commence their evacuation initiatives much quicker than Canada due to the significant military resources available in the region, including an aircraft carrier and regional bases. In Chapter One (1.3) the proposal for a coalition NEO within the generalized doctrine was presented. Emphasizing that it may be politically and militarily expedient to work with other nations for evacuations, close coordination with Canada’s allies may have reduced the competition for the assets in the Lebanon crisis. One example of the inefficient use of a contracted ship by Canada was highlighted by Senator Hugh Segal during the Standing Senate Committee Hearings on the Lebanon evacuation. In describing one of the ship’s journeys from Tyre to a Safe Haven, he stated that “. . . only 20 percent of the boat was occupied, and a small percentage of those occupants were Canadians.”

In the 2011 Egyptian evacuation, Canada was able to quickly secure contracted air transport and coordinate an effective use of the airlift assets with other nations. In a January 2011 press release, Foreign Affairs Minister Lawrence Cannon highlighted the NEO coordination with the United States and

\[\text{References:}\]


Britain stating, “Any empty seats on the planes dispatched by those countries can be occupied by other westerners who are trying to flee.”\(^{128}\) This coordination is essential to resource access and swift response in a time of crisis.

Instrumental to the effectiveness of NEO is sound interdepartmental cooperation throughout the entire process. Initial coordination within the Crisis Response Centre was a focal point for lessons learned in the final phase of the Lebanon evacuation. The roles and responsibilities of each department involved were not made clear from the beginning, for those engaged within the centre and deployed into the Lebanon region. In particular, the lessons identified within the evacuation scenario, planning and decision making responsibilities among the CF, CIC, DFAIT and CBSA were not clarified at the beginning of the crisis.\(^{129}\) DFAIT and DND did not exchange formal communication that identified specific relationships for finance and command and control, clearly stating the role of the HOM and coordination of public affairs correspondence.\(^{130}\)

Susan Ormiston, a Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) senior correspondent who was located in Cyprus during the early stages of the evacuation described the coordination between the Canadian Forces and DFAIT early in the crisis at a Senate Hearing reviewing the Lebanon evacuation. She recalled that the CF, “. . . set up a command centre at a hotel . . . [t]hey started to


\(^{130}\) *Ibid*, 7.
move people around, as they are trained to do. DFAIT had help at that point, which it badly needed.\textsuperscript{131} The support that the CF brought to the crisis five days into the event was beneficial to DFAIT, although elements of interdepartmental coordination were lacking.

Lessons learned in the whole of government response to a crisis were subsequently applied in the 2009 Haiti earthquake evacuation of Canadian citizens. Maclean’s Magazine compared the Haiti response to previous events including the Lebanon crisis writing, \textquoteleft[t]he [GoC’s] capacity to coordinate operations after a major disaster abroad has been systematically overhauled in recent years, precisely because it was previously found wanting.\textquoteright\textsuperscript{132}

The final aspect of the Canadian response to the Lebanon crisis to be highlighted is the government’s treatment of evacuees during the crisis. In Chapter One (1.3), it was highlighted that the NEO process and the events surrounding an evacuation will introduce significant stress for the evacuees. This stress can hamper the overall operation and potentially turn to violence. The first sealift evacuation that Canadians took from Lebanon was described as \textquoteleft‘hellish’.\textquoteright\textsuperscript{133} Due to Israeli sea blockades, the cruise was significantly delayed and the water supply onboard the ship was insufficient. Evacuees became


\textsuperscript{132} Macleans.ca, \textquoteleft“Yes, We Have a Plan,” \textsuperscript{http://www2.macleans.ca/2010/02/08/yes-we-have-a-plan}; Internet; accessed 1 February 2011.

\textsuperscript{133} Redorbit.com, \textquoteleft“First Cdn Evacuees From Lebanon Go From Hellish Boat Trip”\textsuperscript{http://www.redorbit.com/news/business/581703/first_cdn_evacuees_from_lebanon_go_from_hellish_boat_trip/index.html}; Internet; accessed 2 February 2011.
seasick, dehydrated and endured sunstroke. Susan Ormiston described the reactions of the evacuees following the long boat trip to the Lebanon evacuation to the Senate Hearing Committee:

People at home were shocked to see how angry some of the people were, but to put it into some context, these people had travelled from very tense situations. They had travelled to Beirut the day before, hoping to get on that boat, and having been told to show up, were probably exhausted and very stressed and hot. You cannot minimize that. They had been waiting at the port of Beirut for so long before they got on the boat, and then that voyage took an extra two hours.134

Once the evacuees arrived in Cyprus (Safe Haven), authorities ensured the evacuees were given water, medical treatment and were processed quickly for onward travel. Ormiston praised the GoC’s handling of the evacuees in this crisis stating that, “[t]here was room for the children to run around; there was space, water, food and shelter. This seemed like a good, safe place for these people to recuperate from their experience.”135 This situation shows the extreme stress that can be inherent in a NEO and the importance of ensuring proper reception and processing plans are in place from the start of the operation.

During the Egyptian evacuation in January-February 2011, the GoC was criticized for their lack of communication to Canadian citizens in Egypt. Many did not receive evacuation instructions and were unable to make contact with the Canadian Embassy in Cairo or with DFAIT in Canada. This lack of communication decreased the efficiency of the evacuation as the Globe and Mail


135 Ibid, 1.
criticized, “. . . the [Canadian] government wasn’t providing information or assistance to people who felt trapped amid reports and scenes of violence.”136 Improvements to the evacuee processing, including the passage of information by authorities, will be needed in future Canadian NEOs.

The Lebanon NEO demonstrated that the GoC was able to safely move a large number of people from a dangerous situation to safety. Policy and doctrine was in place at the time of this evacuation, and for the most part was followed in its execution. There were lessons learned from Lebanon which have subsequently been used in the recent NEOs, and some lessons that have not. There is merit in comparing Canada’s response to Australia’s Operation RAMP as Australia encountered similar challenges in their NEO execution during the Lebanon crisis.

3.2 – Australia’s Evacuation Comparison

They did bungle the evacuation plan at the start but eventually they got it right.137

- Keysar Trad, Islamic Friendship Association of Australia

The Australian Defence Force (ADF) executed Operation RAMP in 2006 conducting a NEO of Australian Nationals and other approved foreign nationals from Lebanon under the authority of Prime Minister John Howard. Op RAMP was the ADF’s support to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT)


as part of a whole of government reaction to evacuate Australian nationals during the hostilities surrounding Lebanon.138

This evacuation was the largest that the Australian Government had ever faced in a region where there were an estimated 25,000 potential evacuees in a conflict area 15,000km from the Australian continent. In total, 5,164 Australians and their immediate dependants were evacuated by road and sea, and 4,651 were repatriated back to Australia.139 Ron Walker, a former Australian ambassador underscored the complexity of the Australian NEO stating “[i] don’t think that any Australian diplomatic mission has ever had to face a situation in which we had some 20,000 citizens at risk in a country.”140

The overall mechanics for the operation involved using an existing crisis contingency plan already developed for Lebanon and standing emergency management procedures in Canberra, the Australian national capital. The Australian Government centrally coordinated the NEO from the DFAT Crisis Centre in Canberra, the heart of the whole of government planning for the operation. An Australian Evacuation Handling Centre was established in Beirut and the Evacuation Point (or Embarkation Site as detailed in Chapter One) at the Beirut Port. The Safe Havens were established in the same locations used by Canada, in both Turkey and Cyprus where those who wanted to be repatriated


back to Australia departed by air. This mass NEO “involved seventeen
Australian chartered ship movements, over 470 bus movements, and twenty-two
Australian aircraft and C-130 movements.” 141 Approximately 28 days after
initiating the evacuation, the Australian Government declared the operation
complete, and brought the evacuation support personnel home.

Although the operation was deemed a success by the Australian
Government, there was much criticism in the length of time that Australian
nationals felt they were trapped in Lebanon before their government reacted. In
particular, Australia’s Lebanese community heavily criticized DFAT’s slow
reaction. This was highlighted in an article published by the Lebanon Wire
which wrote, “[p]eople have the impression that the evacuation is a farce and the
government does not care.” 142 In 2006, the Australian Prime Minister defended
his government’s response explaining that the Australian effort was,
“unfavourably compared with those of the United States, Britain, Canada, Italy,
France and Sweden which have embarked upon large scale evacuations.” 143
These criticisms whether founded or not, merit an examination of the processes
used in planning and executing this NEO.

Australia’s crisis management capabilities were more established than
Canada’s during the time of this evacuation. The centralized control structure

142 Lebanon Wire, “Australia’s Lebanese community demands action as evacuation falters,”
143 The Canberra Times, “Australia Working on Rescue – PM Defends Evacuation Efforts,”
that took the lead in the planning and coordinating the NEO was established using an Interdepartmental Emergency Task Force (IDETF) with a supporting Crisis Centre, both with DFAT assuming the lead. The IDETF monitored and managed the Lebanon events with a focus on consular and operational responses meeting several times daily. The IDETF included members from the multiple governmental departments involved with the evacuation, demonstrating a strong whole of government collaboration. The Crisis Centre acted as the operations room that managed and coordinated the contingency plan on a 24/7 basis. The Crisis Centre was located within DFAT’s headquarters and had direct access to all other departments, including important database information such as passport, immigration and citizenship records. This capability to share interdepartmental information greatly enhanced the efficiency of the Australian NEO efforts from Lebanon.

The specific ADF-DFAT interface was also well established during the Lebanon crisis. Members from DFAT were represented on the IDETF and fully integrated into the Crisis Centre. For expedient access to high level approval requirements and resources, a Joint Operations Command branch was given specific access to the Defence Minister. A Defence Supplementary Staff that included specialist planners, logisticians and medical personnel were offered to DFAT for consular assistance to the Lebanon NEO. These interfaces were


145 Ibid, 23.

146 Ibid, 23.
well established prior to the crisis and enhanced the effectiveness of the operation.

Chapter One (1.4) highlighted a requirement for specific interagency cooperation doctrine, which specifies a ‘checklist’ format for personnel at all levels within all agencies to follow when working a crisis such as the Lebanon NEO. Although Australia has invested in policy and plans for a whole of government response, this basic level of coordination guidance still requires effort. Colonel Andrew Condon, the Commander of Task Force 629 deployed on Op RAMP, criticized in his writings of the NEO that, “the development and maintenance of procedural-level doctrine is required if best practice is to be achieved.”

One of the key planning issues that Australia was forced to deal with was determining the number of potential evacuees that required repatriation. Similar to Canada, questions immediately arose as to how many Australians there were in Lebanon, who they were, where they lived and how to contact them. Initial estimates placed the number of Australian nationals between 20,000 and 25,000, 3,000 of those on vacation to Lebanon, and the majority of dual citizenship. On day one of the Lebanon war, there were approximately 2,500 Australians registered with the Australian Embassy in Beirut, and by day five there were over 12,000. Ian Dudgeon, a former DFAT representative highlighted this

147 Condon, *Australian Army Journal* 4, 73.


planning challenge stating, “[m]ost were not registered with the Beirut embassy, had not made contact with the Embassy, and for many their Australian passports had long expired.” 150 Again, similar to Canada, the Australian Government does not require its citizens to register with their embassies worldwide, although encourages this registration via their travel website. 151 If Australian nationals expect an expedient response to crisis by their government, they must understand their responsibility to provide updated information when abroad.

The Australian Embassy in Beirut was described as having, “... only a small number of representatives in the area of conflict” 152, which was composed of two staff members when the crisis began, and inhibited the Australian Government’s ability to obtain critical planning information. The lack of communication back to Australia was also prevalent in DFAT’s ability to provide information to the potential evacuees from Lebanon. Incidents that were attributed to this lack of communication included missed evacuations of individuals due to a lack of understanding in timings and assembly points. 153 Early during the crisis, the Australian Government received “complaints from Australian passport-holders that they did not know about the evacuation plans.” 154 The Australian Embassy used press releases, ministerial statements


152 Yael Shwartz and Allan McConnell, Australian Journal of International Affairs Vol. 63, 239.

153 Ian Dudgeon, Defender, 25.
via the internet and radio announcements to distribute information on the evacuation plans, including the use of Lebanese based media outlets.\textsuperscript{155}

The issues of communication in a NEO have recently proven to be an ongoing problem. In the Egyptian crisis of January-February 2011, the Australian Government conceded that their methods of information distribution for an evacuation were still, at times, ineffective. Australian Foreign Affairs Minister Kevin Rudd highlighted the communications challenges for the Egyptian NEO stating the following to news media:

The operational challenge the embassy has had on the ground is that Egyptian authorities at various times have cancelled or shut down the mobile telephone system, they've shut down the internet, and therefore landlines into the embassy have been difficult to access. That's just the reality on the ground.\textsuperscript{156}

A key component to obtaining critical information was DFAT’s use of NGOs during the Lebanon evacuation. Referring to the generalized doctrine in Chapter One (1.4) utilizing existing relationships between the diplomatic mission and other local organizations, including NGOs, can improve the efficiency of NEOs. The Australian Government maintained close contact with the leaders of Lebanese and Islamic organisations during the crisis, including the formation of a committee that included members from DFAT, the Prime Minister, the Islamic Council of New South Wales and Lebanese women’s


\textsuperscript{155}Yael Shwartz and Allan McConnell, \textit{Australian Journal of International Affairs} Vol. 63, 241.

groups. This committee allowed the Australian Government and the other NGOs to gather information that could be distributed by informal channels to evacuees who needed critical instructions.\footnote{Yael Shwartz and Allan McConnell, \textit{Australian Journal of International Affairs Vol. 63}, 241.}

Australia, like Canada, faced the challenges of competition for evacuation resources with other affected nations. Australia did not have warships or other assets that could assist in evacuating near the conflicted region. The closest Australian vessel that could reach Lebanon took over two weeks to arrive\footnote{\textit{Ibid}, 244.}, so the alternative was to acquire limited contracted sealift to support the NEO. Problems were encountered in contracting, for example, when a Turkish ship that was contracted by Australia left Australian evacuees stranded on the Beirut Harbour because it was double-booked. The Foreign Affairs Minister at the time conceded to contractual problems stating, “[t]he ship we originally thought we had chartered, that we were gazumped on, hasn’t even come to Beirut in the end.”\footnote{Herald Sun, “Rescue Ship Double Booked,” \url{http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/special-reports/rescue-ship-double-booked/story-e6frf7r6-1111112137245}; Internet; accessed 8 February 2011.}

Many of the same challenges that Canada faced in the 2006 Lebanon evacuation were also encountered by Australia. Similar issues of handling evacuees in distress, language barriers, under staffed embassy support and contracting resources were encountered, to name a few. The challenges of coordinating the largest NEO that either country has ever encountered were exasperated by conducting the operation half way around the globe. With
minimal or no military assets in the region, both countries were dependant on other nations and contractors to support their efforts in securing their respective citizens. With more recent NEOs, such as the Egyptian evacuation, some of the issues encountered in Lebanon have been dealt with to improve each country’s response to an evacuation. Alternatively, some issues continue to surface which are repetitive from the Lebanon experience and recent non-combatant evacuation operations. Chapter Four will evaluate some of these ongoing issues, and provide recommendations which may enhance the efficiency of these countries’ evacuation process.
CHAPTER 4

LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This paper has examined and articulated a generalized doctrine for NEO that has encompassed procedures and processes from multiple nations which have the capability to conduct evacuation operations. The Canadian process has been examined in detail and evaluated against the 2006 Lebanon evacuation case study using Australia as a contrasting example. From this entire examination of the NEO process, specific lessons learned have been identified, which will now be highlighted in this chapter. Recommendations for corrective action to the lessons identified will be offered in an attempt to make these lessons learned and employed in future non-combatant evacuation operations.

Five specific lessons learned will be presented that have been derived from past NEO engagements, highlighted in the examples presented in previous chapters.

Focused Emphasis on the Registration and Warden System

One of the first critical planning information requirements for government when coordinating a NEO is a reasonable estimate of the number of its citizens that are in the affected nation. The primary method of accurately determining this number is the government registration service, such as that in place in Canada and Australia. Based on the significant variation between the number of registered nationals before and after a crisis has occurred, as was highlighted in the Lebanon analysis, it may be concluded that the system is not
widely used, known or considered a priority by many individuals abroad. If these nationals expect a quick response to a crisis by the Warden System in place within a foreign country, then they must understand that their presence must be known and participate in the registration system.

The Warden System is coordinated such that a fixed number of citizens abroad fall under a single Warden, in order to ensure timely information passage within a reasonable scope of responsibility.\textsuperscript{160} If there is a large populous of nationals in a specific area that have not registered, this may place significant pressures on a Warden in that area when critical information must be distributed and the number of registrants rises significantly due to a crisis.

The recommendation is for government to place a much higher emphasis on individuals who are living or traveling abroad to use the registrations system. Public awareness and clear instruction on this system can be transmitted by a variety of media sources, encouraging its use, to the benefit of accurate estimates and an efficient Warden System.

\textbf{Concentrated Effort on Emergency Communication Capabilities}

A reoccurring deficiency in the execution of NEO is the government’s capability and capacity to pass critical information to those who need it in a crisis region. Diplomatic missions must ensure that they are cognisant of the most efficient means of communicating in their specific region of responsibility. Within unstable regions, the primary use of the internet may not suffice to ensure

\textsuperscript{160} Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-307/FP-050, 1-3.
the widest distribution of information as was highlighted during the Egyptian crisis where the internet was shut down.\textsuperscript{161} Governments are recommended to use all available resources including television, radio, internet and phone to ensure the widest possible dissemination of information, although other mediums need to be explored. Diplomatic missions which incorporate cell phone contact information into their registration system may be able to utilize both the voice and messaging systems that this technology offers. Diplomatic missions should explore innovative methods to distribute information to the citizens they are responsible for in a foreign nation, which may include coordinated efforts with specific community groups as was used in Australia with the Lebanese community. NGOs may also have alternate lines of communication which could be utilized by missions in a crisis as long as prior coordination has been done. These avenues must be explored by the individual diplomatic missions, and procedures must be put in place to ensure they are used when needed.

\textbf{Pre-Arranged Multinational Coordination and Contracted Support}

During an event or situation that dictates a NEO, it is highly unlikely that a government will be acting alone to evacuate its citizens from an affected region. As was highlighted in Lebanon, competition for major contracted requirements such as sealift and airlift becomes prevalent. A lack of pre-

negotiation for and coordination of these assets with contractors and other
countries results in an inefficient use of these potentially lifesaving resources.
Governments are recommended to ensure diplomatic missions pre-negotiate
prioritized use of specific resources in line with the number of citizens that they
are responsible for. This contracted capability should be included in a mission’s
emergency plan and be easily activated when required. Diplomatic missions
should also endeavour to coordinate these contracts in partnership with other
foreign nations in that country, to ensure the best use of these important assets in
a time of crisis.

Other Governmental Department NEO Policy Formation

As was shown in Lebanon and more current NEOs, the concept of a
whole of government approach to NEO is evident. A government’s military
may assume a significant role in an evacuation or it may not be called upon by
the diplomatic chain. As was highlighted in Chapter 2 (2.3), OGDs may play a
large role in an evacuation when called upon by government. As many of these
ODGs do not have specific policy or procedures documented for NEO, an ad-
hoc approach will be taken when providing assistance. This approach does not
allow for an expedient process and does not have the ability to document lessons
learned. With personnel constantly changing within a department, the corporate
knowledge obtained when participating in an evacuation can quickly be lost
without proper documentation. Procedures that are published clearly and
updated regularly have been proven to be successful, such as in the case of
DFAIT’s MEP and the CF’s CONPLAN ANGLE. Governments are
recommended to ensure that departments who have a probable chance of supporting a NEO develop specific policies and procedures which can be employed when needed.

**Ensuring Adequate Diplomatic Mission Staff in Volatile Regions**

One key deficiency highlighted in the Lebanon crisis by both Canada and Australia was the lack of diplomatic mission staff to contend with the crisis and coordinate a NEO. Although supporting staff can be inserted into a region after a crisis occurs to support the mission, it may be difficult to allow them access depending on the situation. Airports may close, transportation routes may be disrupted or the affected nation may deny entry. Mechanisms that may trigger the need to increase this support staff must be in place in areas that are unstable. Where there are a significant number of citizens in an affected nation, a reasonable ratio of diplomatic mission staff should be assigned to cope with emergency measures. Governments are recommended to review their processes of determining diplomatic mission staff, their capability to support the groups of citizens in the region and measures to ensure timely increases of these staff when required.
CONCLUSION

Non-combatant evacuation operations are complex undertakings that involve multiple entities. Governments must not only tackle the sensitive diplomatic issues that arise in NEO, but also ensure the safety of their citizens who are under extreme pressure in an unstable situation. The array of actors who must cooperate and assist in the greater effort, while always under the watchful eye of the media, highlights the complexities when carrying out such an important undertaking.

This paper has examined policy, doctrine and other documentation from a variety of international sources that have been involved with the NEO process. In general, military doctrine has proven to be the most developed and detailed of these individual countries’ and coalition documentation. In recent publications, the inclusion of a whole of government approach has widened the spectrum of those who provide input into the NEO process. As these other players continue to provide assistance to the overall evacuation effort, their procedures and policies should develop into usable documentation.

The Lebanon case study has shown that following pre-determined procedures and doctrine will expedite the NEO process, but there will always be room for improvement. Canada has been able to successfully employ its governmental procedures in NEO to the benefit of its citizens. Multinational cooperation and ongoing diplomatic initiatives will continually enhance Canada’s future NEO crisis management and may act as an example to other nations by leading the way in national evacuation procedures.
With an estimated 2.8 million Canadians living abroad\textsuperscript{162}, the GoC maintains a significant burden to ensure their continued safety. Canadians must be responsible by following their government’s procedures when traveling outside of their own borders. This paper has argued that the Government of Canada in consultation with the Canadian Forces needs to consider and address deficiencies in NEOs. The lessons learned and recommendations provided may assist specific governmental departments to reassess their policy for NEO, and address the security needs of Canadians who live and visit abroad.

Further study on the liability that the GoC maintains for people who have lived outside Canada for an extended period while maintaining a Canadian passport is warranted. The cost and effort involved to support these persons in a crisis may need to be measured against their extended absence from Canada.

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