LOSS OF BALANCE:
MILITARY RELATIONS WITH NATO AND THE ASIA-PACIFIC

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Loss of Balance: Military Relations with NATO and the Asia-Pacific

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ABSTRACT

Although the primary aim of military relations is generally to improve security, they offer additional influence and rewards that can transcend defence. In the case of NATO, Canada has clearly benefitted from an umbrella of security that enabled social and economic prosperity for a relatively low investment of military commitment. The country has also leveraged NATO to ensure access and influence within Europe. Membership in NATO has led to rewards more far reaching than just security.

The global influence of Asia-Pacific states is rapidly increasing as the region gains economic strength and political clout. While prominent trading competitors such as the United States and the European Union are forging new economic and political ties within the Asia-Pacific, some scholars argue Canada has yet to apply any significant effort to the region. To avoid being left behind as the global balance shifts towards the Asia-Pacific, it is time for Canada to focus more effort on building the relationships in the region.

As demonstrated by the success of NATO, military relations offer an effective tool for conducting diplomacy beyond just security. Improving military relations can be a relatively low risk and low cost path to building a comprehensive framework of Asia-Pacific relationships. In a region governed by the principles of informal consensus building and influence, military relations offer an opportunity to be perceived as a regional actor with valid credentials to participate in the broader forums that discuss social and economic issues.
INTRODUCTION

The establishment of military relations between states is an ancient concept that dates to the earliest emergence of war amongst humans. Academic Robert O’Connell discussed the emergence of war in ancient Mesopotamia in *Ride of the Second Horseman: The Birth and Death of War*. He highlighted that battles amongst ancient states were plentiful and bloody. Military advantage, however, was “quickly countered through alliance and opportunism.”

Likewise, in his book *Warriors of the Steppe: A Military History of Central Asia, 500 B.C. to 1700 A.D.*, historian Erik Hildinger writes that Mongol “tribes willingly joined one another as the leading men sought successful chiefs to follow, even differences of language being no obstacle.” In both the case of ancient Mesopotamia and the Mongols, the aim of military relations was often to negotiate alliances that served primarily a security aim – protecting populations from a more powerful enemy and setting the conditions to enable a society to prosper. Such a definition aligns with the contemporary view of alliances amongst nations.

In broad terms, academia defines alliances in terms of nation states reaching agreements for the purpose of mutual security. Harvard professor Stephen Walt defines an alliance as a “commitment for security cooperation between two or more states, intended to augment each member’s power, security, and/or influence.” Implicit in the definition of an alliance is the concept that membership will exact a specific cost in return for providing member states with tangible rewards. Political scientist Daniel Chiu sums up the research of several academics in stating that “states will form or join alliances if

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they expect the payoffs from this decision to be greater than the payoffs from not forming such an alliance.”

While such a definition may seem simplistic, it is important to note that the word ‘payoff’ is generic in nature and can apply not only to security payoffs, but also social or economic payoffs. In the Canadian sense, an enduring example of alliance is Canada’s membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Canada has clearly benefitted from enduring military relations within the NATO alliance. The organization provided an umbrella of security that enabled social and economic prosperity for a relatively low investment of military commitment. The actual scope of Canada’s contribution is much debated. Economist Todd Sandler suggests Canada is essentially a free rider on the United States, but that “the long common border between the two allies makes their alliance mutually beneficial despite lopsided burden sharing.”

Benjamin Zyla, on the other hand, argues that the practise of judging NATO contributions primarily in relation to a measure of gross domestic product and defence spending is faulty. Updated indicators such as contribution levels to non-United Nation (UN) Peacekeeping, NATO’s rapid reaction forces, and infrastructure improvement, would show that “Canada actually contributed to NATO’s collective responsibility at a level that was consistent with its relative economic performance and the size of its population.”

Regardless of size of Canada’s contribution to NATO, however, there is little doubt that the country received considerable gain from the relationship. Academics Joseph Jockel and Joel Sokolsky highlight that aside from security, NATO was also

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5 Todd Sandler, "Alliance Formation, Alliance Expansion, and the Core," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 43, no. 6 (Dec, 1999), 741.

6 B. Zyla, "NATO and Post-Cold War Burden-Sharing: Canada "the Laggard?"," *International Journal* 64, no. 2 (Spring, 2009), 359.
important to Canada because “involvement in the alliance meant that Ottawa was “in.” It had a seat at the most important allied table in the world.”7 Thus, while the primary aim of an alliance is to improve security, military relations offer additional political influence that can transcend defence.

As early as 1968, author Robert Rothstein suggested that nations sought out alliances not only for increased security, but also to advance separate socio-economic priorities.8 Volker Krause and J. David Singer support this notion and highlight “empirical evidence that an important non-military alliance benefit is increased trade among allies.”9 Krause and Singer further suggest that many of the states that joined NATO after the Cold War may have done so primarily to further both democratic and economic agendas.10 In the case of Canada, the potential for benefits beyond security played a role in the decision to join NATO. Jockel and Sokolsky espouse that in joining NATO Ottawa aimed to substitute trade with NATO Europeans for a shrinking trade balance with post World War II Britain.11 With the end of the Cold War, however, the NATO alliance was forced to find a new path to relevance. Do military relations within NATO still provide Canada with benefits beyond the promise of mutual security? As world regions such as the Asia-Pacific rise in significance, should Canada continue to focus primarily on the NATO alliance or is there a need to rebalance priorities to reflect a new world order?

7 J. Jockel and J. Sokolsky, “Canada and NATO: Keeping Ottawa in, Expenses Down, Criticism Out...and the Country Secure,” International Journal 64, no. 2 (Spring, 2009), 316.
10 Ibid., 19
11 Jockel and Sokolsky, Canada and NATO: Keeping Ottawa in, Expenses Down, Criticism Out...and the Country Secure, 317.
The global influence of Asia-Pacific states is rapidly increasing as the region gains economic strength and political clout. While prominent NATO allies such as the United States and Great Britain are forging new economic and political ties within the Asia-Pacific, some scholars argue Canada has yet to apply any significant effort to the region. In order to ensure the country remains relevant on the world stage of tomorrow, Canada must evaluate the effort applied to maintaining traditional links with NATO. Reallocating just a small amount of that effort towards establishing new military relations that address even minor areas of mutual security interest in the Asia-Pacific may reap huge dividends.

This paper will examine the socio-economic aspects of Canada’s participation in NATO and whether Canada may benefit from a minor shift in foreign policy to seek out more substantial military relations with Asia-Pacific states. The first section of the paper delves into NATO with a view to determining Canadian expectations on joining the alliance and dividends the alliance has paid. The second section will chronicle the rise of the Asia-Pacific, discuss what influence the region will exert in the years to come, and review foreign policy changes in Canada and other states looking to gain influence in the area. Finally, the paper will discuss Canada’s future roles in both NATO and the Asia-Pacific and the extent to which military relations may improve our engagement in the Asia-Pacific. Ultimately the essay will argue that the socio-economic perks associated

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13 James Boutilier, Email James Boutilier/Rob Gillis March 1, 2011, Asia-Pacific motivation for closer relations with Canada, (accessed March 1, 2011).
with NATO are significant and provide a useful example of how military relations can help forge influence in other areas of foreign policy. Current Canadian policy largely ignores the rising importance of the Asia-Pacific. Seeking improved military relations in the region, albeit not on the scale of NATO, offers an effective avenue to open dialogue with Asia-Pacific states and gain greater influence in this rapidly growing region of the world.
Chapter One: Canada and NATO

With the close of the Second World War in 1945 the world was filled with hope for a future full of peace and prosperity. Many believed that the establishment of the UN in April of 1945 would set the necessary world conditions to enable growth in an environment of security and peace. These same sentiments echoed in Canada with Liberal Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King winning the 1945 general election on a platform of security. Historian Robert Bothwell writes that Canadians of the day realized that the economic security they craved at home, must be closely “associated with security abroad, and security abroad must involve a common effort – in other words, collective security.”14 Unfortunately, the naked aggression of Joseph Stalin’s Soviet Union soon uncovered the weaknesses of collective security within the UN context.

Unlike the western powers, the Soviet Union did not demilitarize in the years following World War II. Instead they annexed or politically dominated most East European nations. In a 1948 speech to the UN General Assembly, M. Paul-Henri Spaak, the Belgian Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign affairs maintained that “there is but one Great Power that emerged from the war having conquered other territories, and that Power is the USSR.”15 During the course of 1947 and 1948, Soviet actions would spur the west into action. Speaking to the UN in September 1947, Louis St. Laurent, then Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, expressed the rising fear of Soviet expansion and the inability of the Security Council to defend peaceful states. In words that foreshadowed the creation of NATO, he stated that “if forced, these nations may seek

greater safety in an association of democratic and peace-loving states willing to accept more specific international obligations in return for a greater measure of national security.” In early 1948 the Brussels Treaty bound Great Britain, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg into a collective self-defence agreement. Based on the threat that the Soviet Union posed to world, not just European, security, St. Laurent, now Canadian Prime Minister, called for a broader Pact which included North America. Russian expansion was fuelling similar fears in the United States and led President Harry Truman to initiate talks which culminated in the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) in April 1949. Given the boldness of Stalin’s post war efforts to spread Soviet influence, it is clear that the primary motivator for the creation of NATO was to ensure the collective security of member states including Canada. Canada, however, entered the new alliance with more than just security in mind.

This section will examine the various motivators that led Canadian leaders to enter the NATO alliance. It will also measure the rewards of membership in NATO. Ultimately, this section will show that Canada has benefitted immensely from NATO membership, and that the nation achieved great success in applying the concept of an alliance beyond the traditional military sense.

The primary architect nations of the NAT were Britain, the United States, and Canada. Historian Anne Deighton writes that the initial framework of NAT was drafted by representatives of the three states between March and September of 1948. The initial framework “mentioned mutual defence against an armed attack. It also touched upon

16 Ibid.
18 Ibid., 29-30
economic and social cooperation, self-help and mutual aid.”19 The unity of vision suggested by initial skeleton of NAT cloaks the fact that although each state had the common goal of securing democratic Europe from Soviet aggression, each also had distinct views on what NAT should be. In “Three Ministers and that World They Made,” Deighton describes expectations of the American, French, and British foreign ministers during final NAT discussion March, 1949. She writes that Dean Acheson, American Secretary of State, viewed the treaty “as part of a wider European project to deal with the major question of Germany’s future in the face of the Soviet menace...and that the USA had to use the NAT as a carrot to elicit France’s cooperation to bring a West Germany into a West European community.”20 French minister Robert Schuman, on the other hand, fully recognized the need to ally with the United States and entered negotiations “with the intention of seeking progress in Germany, but also with a clear agenda about the ways in which the treaty could benefit France’s own European, geostrategic and economic interests.”21 Finally, Deighton describes the objectives of British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin. “He sought actively to promote the role of the UK as a third world force; to lead continental Europe, and to re-animate imperial commonwealth connections through development, strategic bases, and financial links.”22 Deighton’s research highlights the variety of objectives which shaped national interest in the formation of the NAT. Likewise, Canada entered negotiations with distinct interests that would ensure the NAT satisfied long term goals of the country.

20 Ibid., 5
21 Ibid., 5
22 Ibid., 6
Canada emerged from World War II uniquely positioned to influence international affairs. While the war had devastated much of Europe and left that region struggling to rebuild infrastructure and economic prosperity, the Canadian economy was completely intact and booming as industry converted from a war footing to supporting the rebuilding of Europe. In addition, Canada’s military had grown substantially to support the war effort and in the early post war years remained a force of significance. In his 2007 Ross Ellis Memorial Lectures in Military and Strategic Studies, the Honourable David Pratt considered Canadian grand strategy following the war. He stated that,

the confluence of economic and military power and the serious foreign policy responsibilities that flowed from it required the Canadian Government to carefully rethink its external relations. This meant a more activist foreign policy that would have been unthinkable only a few short years before.\(^\text{23}\)

In 1947 St. Laurent enshrined the new found sense of international responsibility in the five basic principles of Canadian foreign affairs. Two of the principles would be prime motivators in guiding Canada’s discussions regarding NATO. The second principle dealt with the concept of political liberty, and seeking friends amongst like minded states, and the fifth discussed the nation’s willingness to accept international responsibilities.\(^\text{24}\)

Speaking of Canadian goals for NATO, Pratt states the “extent to which Canadian interests, values, needs and aspirations were captured in the treaty was an important litmus test for the success or failure of Canadian grand strategy.”\(^\text{25}\)

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\(^\text{23}\) David Pratt, *2007 Ross Ellis Memorial Lectures in Military and Strategic Studies: Is there a Grand Strategy in Canadian Foreign Policy?* (Calgary, AB: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2008), 22.


Canada’s new sense of international importance was the inclusion in the NAT of Article 2 – the western community building clause.

Article 2 is a non military aspect of the NAT and was included at the insistence of Canada. It represents the Canadian ideal that peace and security can only be maintained if alliance members work towards common democratic aims and encourage economic relationships. The text of Article 2 states:

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.26

In his memoirs, former Prime Minister Lester Pearson suggests that part of the motivation for Article 2 was to satisfy domestic concerns regarding unity, which corresponds to St. Laurent’s first principle of foreign affairs. Pearson insists, however, that Article 2 was still very much driven by a firm commitment “to the grand design of a developing Atlantic community, something which could never be realized through military commitments for security alone, urgent and important as these were at the time.”27 From an idealistic standpoint, Article 2 fit well with the principles Canada wished to project as a nation with new found international influence. Just as important to Canadian politicians, however, were the immediate gains the country would realize from NATO membership.

In addition to security, membership in NATO satisfied several important aspects of Canadian foreign policy. In the pre-World War II years Canada was a sovereign state

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27 Lester B. Pearson, Mike, the Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), 55-56.
but still very much a subordinate entity in the British Empire. At the same time Canada’s proximity to the United States ensured a growing relationship, largely economic in nature, between the two nations. After the war, Canada wished to exert its independence but still very much relied on relations with both Britain and the United States. In the 1945 book *The North Atlantic Triangle: The Interplay of Canada, the United States, and Great Britain*, author John Bartlett Brebner described Canada’s desire to remain relevant to both of the other larger states.28 Bothwell writes, Canadians “liked the British and Americans to understand that Canada was close to them politically, perhaps even that Canada was their best friend.”29 Canada’s presence as a founding nation of NATO ensured the country remained firmly fixed in both the American and British spheres of influence. Closely related to the concept of the North Atlantic Triangle is the desire by Canada to be considered part of the “in” crowd.

Having emerged from World War II as an economic powerhouse and respected military ally, NATO membership offered Canada the opportunity to be a leader amongst like minded states. In describing NATO negotiations, Escott Reid, Canadian assistant undersecretary of state for external affairs during the period, wrote that the “link across the North Atlantic seems to me to be such a providential solution to so many of our problems that I feel we should go to great length and even incur considerable risk in order to consolidate our good fortune and ensure our proper place in this new partnership.”30 In

joining NATO Canada secured “a seat at the most important allied table in the world.”

As an important player in the new alliance Canadian leaders hoped that influence would translate directly to continued prosperity.

The desire for long term economic peace and prosperity was a calculated dimension of Canada’s desire to join the NATO alliance. This was overtly demonstrated in the pursuit of Article 2’s inclusion. Bothwell writes that Lester Pearson believed that the promise of economic prosperity was vital messaging for NATO to effectively counterbalance Communism’s appeal of an equal and prosperous future for all.

“Coordinating economic policy made sense. Mitigating nationalistic or exclusionary economic policies...would reinforce, not weaken, the alliance.”

Although Article 2 was ultimately accepted into the NAT, it was resisted by both the United States and Britain. Both nations felt it “would complicate and slow down the implementation of the military treaty.” The Americans also feared “that if the treaty tried to do too much and interfered in jealously guarded domestic jurisdiction, it would collapse.”

While Canadian negotiators succeeded with Article 2’s adoption, the country hoped to benefit economically even Article 2 had been excluded. Prior to World War II, Britain and the United States had been Canada’s most significant trading partners. Jockel and Sokolsky speculate that Britain’s decline, particularly following the Great Wars, had left Canada in an “unequal relationship with the United States. Maybe there could be a new North

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31 Jockel and Sokolsky, *Canada and NATO: Keeping Ottawa in, Expenses Down, Criticism Out...and the Country Secure*, 316.
Atlantic triangle. Maybe western Europe could be the new counterweight to the US.”

Although the promise of future security cannot be denied as the primary reason Canada sought NATO membership, it is clear that the hope for broader influence and improved trade were also important motivators. Now, more than sixty years after the foundation of NATO, Canada continues to prosper as a leading western nation. How much of that success can be attributed to NATO?

In assessing the impact of NATO membership on Canada’s economic success in Europe it is necessary to look at three distinct aspects. First, it may be argued that Canada prospered only because NATO counterbalanced the threat of Soviet aggression and prevented another world war. Although the Cold War witnessed many small conflicts, the presence of NATO fostered a stable world peace that enabled socio-economic growth. Second, was Article 2 of the NAT responsible for setting conditions for the international cooperation that resulted in the shared wealth of Europe and North America? Finally, was NATO membership the cornerstone that ensured a voice in world matters and led to Canadian access to markets and resources in both Europe and the United States?

Political scientist Stephen Walt maintains that the “primary purpose of most alliances is to combine members’ capabilities in a way that furthers their respective interests, especially their security goals.” This assertion well describes the situation with the NATO states. Working together for collective security provided the peace umbrella that allowed members to recover from the ravages of war and rebuild essential elements of national and international prosperity. Recounting the successes of NATO in

35 Jockel and Sokolsky, Canada and NATO: Keeping Ottawa in, Expenses Down, Criticism Out...and the Country Secure, 318.
a 1997 speech to the North Atlantic Council, American Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said that NATO “has always been more than a defensive shield. It was the roof over our heads when we rebuilt post-war Europe. It was the floor upon which the first structures of European unity were laid. It was the door through which one time adversaries were welcomed into our family of democracies.” In 1974, the same thoughts were echoed by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Andrew Goodpaster. He expressed that for “almost a quarter of a century now it has been the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, above all else, that has preserved the peace and safeguarded the freedom and prosperity of Western Europe and North America.”

A prosperous security for Europe impacted directly on Canada’s success and prosperity. One empirical indicator of the link between Canada and a stable Europe is the growth of trade between 1949 and 1965. In that period the percentage of exports from Canada to Western Europe rose from 8.1 to 16.7 per cent of global exports. Of interest is that the proportional trade to Britain reduced significantly compared to other West European states.

Broadly speaking, NATO assured peace and stability in Europe was good for Canada. As stated in a 2001 speech by Art Eggleton, Canada’s Minister of Defence, “Through two world wars, throughout the Cold War, in peace keeping and peace enforcement, Canada has been a stakeholder of European security. Our policy is simple:

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the stability of Europe is a central concern for Canada.”40 In addition to the overarching benefits of collective security, alliance membership also allowed nations to defray defence costs.

The shared responsibility of NATO afforded European members and Canada the opportunity to minimize defence costs and focus spending on other aspects of building national prosperity. Academic Erich Reiter states that “with regard to NATO, all European countries feel that, with respect to costs, their own military expenditure was lower due to membership in the alliance than it would have been otherwise.”41 In Canada’s case, Jockel and Sokolsky support this view. They write that because of NATO’s “wider membership, its political acceptance of any level of contribution on the part of those members, and its reliance on nuclear deterrence, Ottawa was able to keep its defence costs down for most, albeit not all, of the history of NATO.”42 Jockel and Sokolsky further contend that “NATO allowed Canada’s leaders to keep out criticism of its defence policy...”43 As we have seen, the security umbrella of NATO played an indirect role in setting favourable conditions for economic growth in Europe by Canada and the other NATO countries. While the positive growth in European trade was undoubtedly welcomed by all, NATO architects from Canada had envisioned such growth stemming from Article 2 of the NAT.

Article 2, or the “Canadian Article” as it became known as, represents both success and failure. Inspired by St. Laurent’s principles of foreign affairs, both

42 Jockel and Sokolsky, Canada and NATO: Keeping Ottawa in, Expenses Down, Criticism Out...and the Country Secure, 316.
43 Ibid., 316
Mackenzie King and Pearson saw greater purpose in the new Atlantic alliance than merely military security. They believed that a “shared defence might be insufficient to cement and enduring association. Some broader and more inspiring purposes, it has been felt, would be necessary to command…continued loyalty and support…” During negotiations, however, the Canadian sponsored article received only lukewarm support from the Netherlands, Belgium and France. Dean Acheson from the United States considered the article a distraction that threatened to “dilute” and “weaken” the requirements of collective security. After considerable persistence, Article 2 was accepted for inclusion in the treaty. Inclusion, however, would mark the pinnacle for the clause. Jockel and Sokolsky write that the Americans and British considered the article “essentially meaningless,” and “were willing to bestow public praise on it and to give Pearson the chairmanship of a committee entrusted with the task of trying to give it meaning.”

As the instigators of Article 2, the task of converting the intent to practise was passed to Canada. For Pearson, who would lead this effort, the job proved frustrating and ultimately unobtainable. In a 1956 book published under the auspices of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Economist Ronald Ritchie remarked that “no commitment in the treaty has had more frequent and universal verbal support than this one [Article 2], and no provision in the treaty has yet had less concrete translation into action.” Pearson would lead two separate charges to gain member support for a

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46 Jockel and Sokolsky, *Canada and NATO: Keeping Ottawa in, Expenses Down, Criticism Out...and the Country Secure*, 321.
47 Ritchie, *NATO: The Economics of an Alliance*, 3.
mechanism to implement Article 2. Both attempts garnered some idealistic backing, but little more.\textsuperscript{48} In his memoirs, Pearson would later reflect that “the reality is that the spirit to implement the economic aspects of Article 2 was never there and that an economic basis for realization of its larger political goal was never created. And, perhaps, it simply took me too long to realize this.”\textsuperscript{49} Although Article 2 has never been formally implemented, the ideals behind it did achieve some measure of success and continue to thrive within the alliance.

Despite Article 2’s apparent failure, the concept that the NATO alliance must encompass more than just security endured. In a 1962 speech to West Point students, Acheson, who had supported Article 2 primarily to ensure Canadian support for NATO, spoke of the importance of strong economic ties amongst alliance members. He stated that to “supply their own growing needs, to supply a capital market for developing countries, to furnish the needs of an increasingly costly defence, the allied countries – by far the greatest productive area in the world – need common and integrated financial, economic, and trade policies.”\textsuperscript{50} The spirit of Article 2 was also proclaimed in a 1975 by United States President Gerald Ford in a speech to the NATO Council in Brussels. He asserted that the alliance must pledge itself to six primary tasks, which included that:

\begin{quote}
We should rededicate ourselves to the alliance as a great joint enterprise, as a commitment to follow common approaches to shared aspirations. We must build on the contribution our alliance already makes through the committee on the challenges of modern society...We must find ways to strengthen the world trading and monetary system and to meet imperatives of energy development and conservation. With the wealth and technological skills which are the products of
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., 3-5; Jockel and Sokolsky, \textit{Canada and NATO: Keeping Ottawa in, Expenses Down, Criticism Out...and the Country Secure}, 321.

\textsuperscript{49} Pearson, \textit{Mike, the Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson}, 66-67.

\textsuperscript{50} Dean Acheson, "Our Atlantic Alliance," \textit{Vital Speeches of the Day} 29, no. 6 (1, 1963), 163.
our free systems, we can make progress toward a better standard of life in all our
countries if we work together.”

The language of Article 2 is again found in a 1998 speech by Madeleine Albright to the
NATO Council. She proclaimed the requirement to “strengthen and modernize the
partnership between Europe and North America. This is partly an economic challenge –
it requires moving step by step toward truly open trade across the Atlantic.”

More recently, in 2007, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer espoused that,
economic instruments are becoming an increasingly important part of a
comprehensive security policy. Indeed, our future security will largely depend on
how well we manage to combine political, military, financial, economic and
development cooperation instruments in addressing global challenges.

Reviewing NATO’s history it is clear that although there has never been progress on
Article 2 per se, the spirit of that clause has been ever present. Reflecting on the success
of Article 2, in his memoirs Pearson stated that “progress was made in NATO over the
years in developing practices and procedures for wide consultation between all the
members...Our failure to do more under Article 2 should not obscure this fact.”

Canada’s efforts with Article 2, and the corresponding belief by NATO members through
the years that the Alliance was about more than just military security, highlight that much
of Canada’s success from NATO has resulted from simply being in NATO.

As a founding member of NATO, Canada found itself aligned with the very
nations necessary to achieve success in terms of international influence and economic

(06/15, 1975), 515.
(03/15, 1997), 519.
53 Jaap De Hoop Scheffer, "Speech by NATO Secretary General, Jaap De Hoop Scheffer at the Conférence
54 Pearson, Mike, the Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, 69-70.
prosperity. Britain and the United States were both particularly important to both Canada’s past and future. In addition, the remaining NATO members from Western Europe offered new prospects in which Canada could increase trade and influence. Jockel and Sokolsky suggest that in the wake of waning British strength in the 20th Century, Canada may have hoped to “make NATO Europeans into a substitute for Britain.” Canada remained at the forefront of NATO during the formative years and achieved considerable success in building a positive reputation that allowed for increased influence and status. Canadian political scientist Peyton Lyon writes that the country’s early contributions to the alliance “brought Canada exceptional goodwill. In many respects, we were regarded as a model member of the alliance; “generous,” “reliable,” “cooperative” – such were the adjectives usually employed to describe our performance...” Influence within NATO led to important inroads in other aspects of a multifaceted foreign policy.

Active membership in NATO was a critical, but not isolated aspect of a Canadian foreign policy that stressed engagement in multiple international forums. The country had acted swiftly to assist in the foundation of the United Nations and the modern Commonwealth. The willingness to seek out leadership roles in international organizations, along with its advocacy to make more than a strictly military alliance, further enhanced Canada’s reputation as builder of the world community. Active membership in NATO was responsible for Canada being closely associated with the

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55 Jockel and Sokolsky, *Canada and NATO: Keeping Ottawa in, Expenses Down, Criticism Out...and the Country Secure*, 317.
57 Peyton V. Lyon and Brian W. Tomlin, eds., *Canada as an International Actor* (Toronto, ON: Macmillan of Canada, 1979), 3.
Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). The OEEC eventually evolved into the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development with Canada as a founding member of the new organization.  

58 The extent of Canada’s commitment to NATO also became a bargaining chip as it was, at times, closely linked to the amount of influence the country was able to exert. In 1972, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, who was not a strong proponent of Canadian troops serving in Europe with NATO, sought to counter growing American dominance of Canada’s economy through a “third option” initiative with the European Economic Community (EEC). Jockel and Sokolsky write that “as negotiations between Ottawa and Brussels got underway, the Europeans (especially the Germans) were keen to emphasize to Ottawa that a relationship existed between economic ties and what Canada did militarily in the alliance.” 59 Ultimately, Canada did succeed in reaching closer ties with the EEC, but in a growing trend, the agreement led to minimal growth of trade. 60

The influence afforded Canada because of NATO membership remains an important aspect of relations in that region. As the European Union (EU) and other European organizations grow and mature they are moderating the extent to which Canada can rely on the goodwill of NATO membership to open doors. Ongoing efforts to forge a Canada-EU trade agreement highlight that Canada is an important but not vital partner. When the EU commenced efforts to establish a transatlantic marketplace in 2006, the United States was the centre of focus. Academic Stormy-Annika Mildner writes that


59 Jockel and Sokolsky, Canada and NATO: Keeping Ottawa in, Expenses Down, Criticism Out...and the Country Secure, 326.

60 The accord between Canada and the EEC was signed in 1976. Ibid., 326.
“EU-Canadian economic integration was not a serious priority for Germany [then EU president] – or for that matter the EU. The EU-Canada economic partnership project remained vague in design and scope.”\textsuperscript{61} That being said, the influence of Canada’s NATO role persists within the EU. A 1990 declaration on relations between Canada and the European Community, which was the progenitor of the EU, noted the “firm commitment of Canada and the EC member states concerned to the North Atlantic Alliance and to its principles and purposes.”\textsuperscript{62} Likewise, a recent joint study on a potential EU-Canada economic partnership refers to a number of organizations, including NATO, which form common links between Canada and the EU members. Specifically the report recognizes that “both parties share a common membership of a number of broader multilateral organisations, where a history of collaboration and like-mindedness has enabled them to work together to overcome obstacles and assist others.”\textsuperscript{63} Looking strictly at trade numbers, it is also apparent that Canada retains considerable importance to the EU. Between 1995 and 2004 the value of trade exports to the EU grew at annual rate of 3.5% and imports at 7.6%.\textsuperscript{64} Between 2005 and 2010 exports to the EU grew from 6.2% of total world exports, to 9%.\textsuperscript{65} Statistics and the continuing efforts of Canadian and EU officials to improve trade relations demonstrate that Canada remains

\textsuperscript{61} S. Mildner, "Junior Partner Canada: Transatlantic Trade Relations Under Germany's EU Presidency," \textit{International Journal} 63, no. 3 (Summer, 2008), 646.


\textsuperscript{63} European Commission and Government of Canada, \textit{Assessing the Costs and Benefits of a Closer EU - Canada Economic Partnership} European Commission and Government of Canada,[2007]).


relevant in European thinking. In part, that relevance continues to be influenced by Canada’s long lasting commitment to military relations within NATO.

Canada’s bond with NATO has endured for more than sixty years. Alliance membership has brought Canada many rewards, not all of which would have been apparent in a purely military definition of alliance. That NATO provided an overarching security umbrella for both Europe and North America cannot be denied. That umbrella set the environment that allowed Canada and Western Europe to prosper. As an active member of the alliance, Canada used military relations within NATO to open doors to other avenues of discussion, primarily trade related, with post-war Europe. Canada also capitalized on the influence afforded as a NATO member to negotiate entry in, or relations with, European organizations that have formed over the past 60 years. Indeed, the model of Canada’s participation in NATO demonstrates that military relations can achieve much more than security.
Chapter Two: Canada and the Asia-Pacific

Broadly speaking, the Asia-Pacific encompasses the countries of East and Southeast Asia and the Pacific Rim. The area is vast and contains a population of well over three billion people in up to fifty-six different countries.66 The Asia-Pacific includes several of the rising economic and political powers of the modern global community. Japan and South Korea have already achieved great success and others such as China, India, and Indonesia are all rapidly emerging with the economic and political muscle to shape the face of the new Asia-Pacific. As the region rises in stature, the rest of the world is being forced to rethink traditional views and investigate policy objectives that account for the increasingly influential Asia-Pacific.

This section will focus on three aspects of the Asia-Pacific region’s status. First it will examine the growth of regional influence and look at organizations shaping both relations amongst Asia-Pacific states and relations with the world. Second it will look at what steps key international players are taking to increase their influence in the region. Finally, it will look at the Canadian record of engagement and where current foreign policy is taking the country. The discussion will show that Canada’s record of Asia-Pacific relations has been inconsistent through the years. The Canadian plan for regional engagement has not benefited from an enduring long term strategy. Instead, specific areas of focus, diplomatic priorities and senior level engagement plans have all varied

significantly depending on the government of the day. The sporadic nature of Canadian interest has resulted in missed opportunities to gain influence in the area. As a consequence, Canada is being left behind as political allies and economic competitors such as the United States and EU implement their own plans for future success. To ensure future relevance in the region Canada must seek new long term Asia-Pacific engagement that can restore and build upon lost influence.

The establishment of a long lasting regional entity in the Asia-Pacific differs greatly from other successful world regions such as Europe or North America. The nations of those regions share a common, though not necessarily peaceful, history and the regions are relatively well defined by geography and economic interest. Regional definition is more complex in the Asia-Pacific with the area broken into diverse sub regions such as Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia or simply East Asia. Deepak Nair, from the Institute of Southeast Asia Studies, discussed the complexities of regionalism in terms of three theories. The theories are closely linked to geographic markers or political, economic and cultural interest or human political and economic practices. Attempts in the Asia-Pacific to balance the regional definition has, he argues, resulted in either large diluted organizations unable to progress a consistent agenda, or narrow scope organizations that failed to reflect the region’s complexity.67 Ultimately, the task of those charged with creating new organizations is to choose who is included and who is excluded. In the case of the Asia-Pacific, the complexity of the landscape has limited the scope and acceptance of early regional organizations and of those trying to unify the region today.

67 D. Nair, "Regionalism in the Asia Pacific/East Asia: A Frustrated Regionalism?" *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 31, no. 1 (Apr, 2009), 115-117.
The emergence of a regional identity is a relatively recent concept for Asia-Pacific states. Prior to World War II the region was dominated by European colonial empires which linked regional interests primarily to the greater good of their respective empires. Following the war, a wave of decolonization swept through the region as former colonies gained independence. That independence, however, was limited by the onset of the Cold War and the subsequent domination of the region by super power interests. In 1954 the United States led the formation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Although created in a similar timeframe as NATO, SEATO was a much weaker attempt to address security amongst member states that included the United States, Australia, France, Great Britain, New Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines. Unlike NATO, SEATO was not founded on a strong foundation of collective defence. The organization received minimal support from members and ultimately was dissolved in 1977. Scholars Christopher Hemmer and Peter Katzenstein identify two factors that led to SEATO’s demise. First, little military emphasis was placed on the organization. Although SEATO members feared communist influence in the region, they did not expect an attack. Second, and perhaps most important, Americans did not identify culturally with the Asia-Pacific and did not view the region as equal partners in world affairs. In its short history, SEATO received no significant priority and the organization did little to build regional identity. With SEATO achieving minimal regional effect, the first regional organization of consequence was formed when several Southeast nations came together to ward off pressures of the Cold War.

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Established in 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) would prove effective within the region. Its global influence, however, was limited for many years due to the overarching pressures of the United States, the Soviet Union, and China.

ASEAN was founded with five member states – Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. At the time, all were non-communist states and all but Indonesia were aligned with the United States or Britain. With Soviet and Chinese funding communist movements throughout the region, ASEAN was formed to help protect the sovereignty of each. Unlike NATO’s promise of collective security, ASEAN did not establish a military alliance. Rather, ASEAN intended to enhance regional security by creating a mechanism to peacefully resolve differences that existed between members. It also offered the opportunity for the smaller states to align with Indonesia, which had been an instigator of regional friction until a military led coup in 1966. At the formal signing of the ASEAN Declaration, Malaysia’s Minister of Defence Tun Abdul Razak highlighted that,

the countries of the region should recognize that unless they assumed their common responsibility to shape their own destiny and to prevent external intervention and interference, Southeast Asia would remain fraught with danger and tension. And unless they took decisive and collective action to prevent the eruption of intra-regional conflicts, the nations of Southeast Asia would remain susceptible to manipulation, one against another.71

The founders of ASEAN hoped that strengthening regional bonds would be sufficient to stave off external influences. Instead of a military focus, ASEAN regarded financial and social prosperity as the path to security. The Bangkok Declaration stated that:

that the countries of SouthEast Asia share a primary responsibility for strengthening the economic and social stability of the region and ensuring their peaceful and progressive national development, and that they are determined to ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their national identities in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples.\textsuperscript{72}

ASEAN founding members did not share common ideological beliefs and there was considerable tension between the states. As a result, reliance on each other for collective defence, and the legal formalities such a framework would entail, was an unwelcome concept. Instead, as ASEAN scholar Amitav Achary writes, ASEAN was based on the idea of cooperative security. “Cooperative security relies on confidence-building, preventive diplomacy, and conflict resolution to achieve intra-group understanding and stability. Finally, cooperative security...is generally a less legalistic mechanism than...collective security...”\textsuperscript{73} Although limited in scope and action in early years, ASEAN acted as a stabilizing force in the region throughout the Cold War. In part, ASEAN’s success in achieving regional balance was its unique application of the diplomacy now known as the ‘ASEAN Way’.

The approach to regional discourse and agreement in ASEAN differs significantly from that of the west. Stubbs and Williams argue that the ASEAN Way stems from the “region’s colonial and Cold War experiences, during which...their sovereignty was consistently violated by western powers and their interests compromised as they were induced into strategic alignments that precipitated increases in regional tensions.”\textsuperscript{74}

\textsuperscript{74} R. Stubbs and M. Williams, "The Poor Cousin?: Canada-ASEAN Relations," \textit{International Journal} 64, no. 4 (Autumn, 2009), 933.
Academic Hiro Katsumata summarized four central themes of the ASEAN Way as the “principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of other members, quiet diplomacy, the non-use of force, and decision-making through consensus.”\(^{75}\) Tobias Ingo Nischalke adds that “the process is characterized by informality, and it serves to forge a general consensus that accommodates the different viewpoints of all.”\(^{76}\) In 1976 the spirit of the ASEAN Way was formalized in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). Nischalke writes that the TAC became,

> a blueprint for the conduct of regional relations as envisioned by ASEAN. It encompassed seemingly unspectacular norms of conduct: peaceful resolution of conflict and non-use of force, respect of sovereignty, and non-interference in internal affairs. Those rules for state interaction have become beacons for the conduct of ASEAN’s internal and external relations.\(^{77}\)

The ASEAN Way and the TAC became the fundamental framework for conducting diplomacy. That framework served to maintain stability throughout the Cold War and has continues to as the guiding principle for diplomacy in the region. With the collapse of Soviet communism and the shift to a unipolar world dominated by the United States, ASEAN entered a new era of expanding influence that moved beyond the Southeast Asian sphere.

From humble Cold War beginnings, ASEAN expanded to exert considerable influence in the region. Asia-Pacific scholar Michael Leifer noted that ASEAN had,

> developed over the years into a working diplomatic community and has concurrently grown in international stature becoming in the process a factor of some significance in the calculations of both regional and extra-regional states. To that extent, despite intra-mural differences, it has been able to assume a

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75 Hiro Katsumata, "Reconstruction of Diplomatic Norms in Southeast Asia: The Case for Strict Adherence to the "ASEAN Way"," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 25, no. 1 (Apr, 2003), 105.
76 Tobias Ingo Nischalke, "Insights from ASEAN's Foreign Policy Co-Operation: The "ASEAN Way", a Real Spirit Or Phantom?" *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 22, no. 1 (Apr, 2000), 90.
77 Ibid., 92
The core of ASEAN expanded to its current membership of ten throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The expansion, however, was not without controversy as world opinion frowned on the organization’s inaction in the face of human rights abuses by three of its newest members. Such apparent inaction was driven by the principle of non-interference which is ingrained in ASEAN’s charter. The ASEAN Way demanded such issues be resolved through informal discussions and long term consensus building. To the west, however, the inability of ASEAN to significantly impact the abusive domestic politics of Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia highlighted the organization’s weaknesses in settling internecine affairs. Although ASEAN ultimately proved unwilling to act directly against these states, they did engage in unsuccessful efforts to informally curb the behaviour. In a sign of ASEAN’s expanding interests, a key factor in attempting to curb the human rights abuses was to prevent the erosion of international status, particularly with the United States and Europe.\(^{79}\)

Whilst ASEAN remains a core of Southeast Asia states, the organization has achieved increased relevance throughout the Asia-Pacific by reaching out with several offspring. Established in 1994, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was established based on the assumption that “if the Association was to remain relevant in the post Cold War security environment, it should ensure that its procedures would dominate Asia-Pacific security discourse.”\(^{80}\) Originally envisioned as a means to engage great powers such as the United States, Japan and China, the ARF now includes Canada and 26 other

\(^{78}\) Cited in Simon, *ASEAN and Multilateralism: The Long, Bumpy Road to Community*, 268-269.
\(^{79}\) Ibid., 269
\(^{80}\) Ibid., 278
member states plus the EU. Academic Sheldon Simon highlights that the ARF “is not meant to be a collective security arrangement. Nor is it designed to resolve specific regional disputes.” It is “aimed at bringing about long-term peace by fostering a sense of mutual trust.”

A 1995 ARF concept paper outlined a grand strategy that would see ARF member states working towards greater Asia-Pacific stability in three distinct stages – confidence building measures, development of preventative diplomacy mechanisms, and development of conflict resolution measures. Unfortunately the need for group consensus has slowed the measurable progress of the ARF. Since its inception it has succeeded in conducting only one simulated maritime anti-terrorism exercise with military and security representatives of 21 countries.

In addition to the ARF, ASEAN has also promoted expanded relations with the ASEAN Plus Three (APT).

Just as the ARF was established to assist ASEAN in setting the security agenda for the Asia-Pacific, the APT was an effort by the organization to maintain primary influence in regional economic matters. Specifically, the APT brings together ASEAN members and the three power economies of Northeast Asia – China, Japan and South Korea. The APT process was formally established in 1997, but it was the culmination of several years of effort by ASEAN leaders to develop a credible regional counterweight to growing EU and United States regionalism.

Richard Stubbs, Professor of Political Science at McMaster University, believes APT has achieved early success in establishing

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82 Simon, ASEAN and Multilateralism: The Long, Bumpy Road to Community, 278.
a regional economic identity. He notes that the APT process has sparked a series of cross
APT meetings between finance ministers and subordinate government officials, young
leaders, patent office chiefs, science and technology representatives and various civilian
experts. He also credits the association with sparking significant increases in regional
trade. Finally, he writes that “regular meetings of East Asian government officials and
politicians have helped build a sense of common purpose and identity. Certainly, these
trends have led to the idea of East Asia becoming firmly embedded in the thinking and
discourse of governments and opinion leaders around the region.”
APT continues to
progress regional economic issues with great success. APT has also expanded into non-
economic discussion areas including food and energy security, disaster management,
narrowing the development gap, rural development and poverty alleviation, human
trafficking, labour movement, communicable diseases, and environment.
Both the ARF
and APT have largely succeeded in spreading the principles of the ASEAN Way
throughout the Asia-Pacific. The next step towards building an Asia-Pacific community
was the establishment of the East Asia Summit (EAS).

The most recent venue for cementing regional governance is the EAS. The
inaugural EAS held in 2005 included all APT states plus India, Australia and New
Zealand, making it a truly Asia-Pacific body. According to the summit’s declaration, the
primary focus is to establish “a forum for dialogue on broad strategic, political and
economic issues of common interest and concern with the aim of promoting peace,

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86 Ibid., 443-444, 454
87 ASEAN, "ASEANWEB - Overview ASEAN Plus Three Relations," http://www.aseansec.org/16580.htm
stability and economic prosperity in East Asia.”  

Nair believes the EAS is a significant step for regional dialogue. Not only does it include non-Asians for the first time, it also serves as a “dialogue mechanism, a body where political and security matters could be discussed. It emerged as a morph between the APT and ARF, as an attempt at addressing economic and security regionalism, and as yet another attempt at finding balance...”

The influence of EAS will again grow in 2011 when both Russia and the United States join as regular participants. Speaking as an observer at the 2010 EAS, United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that America shares “ASEAN’s vision of EAS as a forum where leaders can have intimate and informal discussions on important political and strategic issues. As I said earlier this week, we view ASEAN as a fulcrum for the region’s emerging regional architecture.”

The endorsement by Clinton highlighted the importance of the Asia-Pacific. Such views echo American sentiment expressed via the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), a non-ASEAN organization promoting Asia-Pacific interests.

Like the ASEAN Plus Three, APEC was conceived primarily as an Asia-Pacific response to increasing economic regionalism in other parts of the world, specifically the EU and the North American Free Trade Agreement. Although created with similar intent as APT, APEC was founded upon a different concept of regionalism that brought together major Asia-Pacific economies as well partners from across the Pacific. Hence, the first meeting in 1989 of the Australian led body included ten Asia-Pacific states plus Canada and the United States. The APEC model did not receive a warm welcome by all

89 Nair, *Regionalism in the Asia Pacific/East Asia: A Frustrated Regionalism?*, 120.
within ASEAN circles as there was still a preference towards a strictly regional pact. Despite some misgivings, however, there was also strong support from Singapore and ultimately six of ten ASEAN states chose inclusion in APEC.91 Economic scholars Jeong Yeon Lee and Sung-Hoon Park identify APEC goals as “trade liberalization in line with GATT principles... facilitating trade and investment, promoting the exchange of information and enhancing mutual economic trust, and finding ways to stimulate economic and technical cooperation among member economies.”92 APEC achieved early success in establishing its agenda and progressing global trade negotiations relating to the Uruguay round of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.93 By 1998 an additional nine states had joined APEC. The breakdown of the states speaks to the perceived strength of APEC as a regional body through the 1990s. In 1991, APEC succeeded brokering the accession of the three Chinas – China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Also notable is the organization’s expansion to include Russia, Mexico, Peru and Chile. APEC achieved some early successes in trade liberalization, but the slow pace of progress and APEC’s inability to temper the effects of the 1997 Asian financial crisis revealed weaknesses growing within.

APEC’s lack of progress in the 21st Century has fuelled the impression that its effectiveness has severely waned. Park and Lee suggest that APEC is suffering from combined crises of identity and credibility. They cite the identity crisis as originating in APEC’s inability to prioritize focus between liberalizing trade and stimulating economic and technical cooperation. The path for a given a year is chosen not by group consensus,

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93 Ibid., 99
but by the host nation for the meeting. This lack of direction was exacerbated by the 1997 financial crisis.\textsuperscript{94} Closely linked to the crisis of identity is that of credibility. Despite promises to liberalize regional trade, “there has been hardly any evidence of tangible contributions to the multilateral trading system that APEC can claim as its own.”\textsuperscript{95} APEC’s inability to identify and implement any progressive agenda can be linked to the dichotomy of Asia-Pacific regionalism that is discussed by both Nair and academic Nick Bisley. While the size and diversity of APEC would seem to suggest ample regional representation to move towards greater regional alignment. In fact, the “ASEAN way of consensus, think institutionalization and non-interference...clashed with the outcome oriented approaches of Anglo-American actors.”\textsuperscript{96} Bisley suggests ASEAN felt threatened by APEC and purposefully lobbied to ensure members adopted the “ASEAN Way” of diplomacy. The need for consensus decision making and “the lack of leadership and effective bureaucratic support, has made integration under APEC a very slow, if not stationary, process.”\textsuperscript{97} APEC’s situation provides warning that within the Asia-Pacific “any efforts to build a community are susceptible not only to the interests of major powers, such as China, Japan or India, but also to the spoiling power of ASEAN.”\textsuperscript{98} As countries outside the Asia-Pacific increase efforts to make regional inroads, the lessons of APEC must be understood. Success in the Asia-Pacific requires respect for the ASEAN Way. The ongoing efforts of organizations and forums such as APEC, the ARF and the EAS demonstrate that Asia-Pacific nations are seeking influence

\textsuperscript{94} Ibid., 106
\textsuperscript{95} Ibid., 107
\textsuperscript{96} Nair, \textit{Regionalism in the Asia Pacific/East Asia: A Frustrated Regionalism?}, 117.
\textsuperscript{97} N. Bisley, “East Asia's Changing Regional Architecture: Towards an East Asian Economic Community?” \textit{Pacific Affairs} 80, no. 4 (Winter, 2007), 619.
\textsuperscript{98} Ibid., 619
outside the region, but in a manner governed by ASEAN ideals. Likewise, respect for the ASEAN Way can be seen in the new engagement strategies being pursued by major international actors such as the United States and EU.

As the world’s largest economy and dominant military power, the United States is the predominant outside player seeking to confirm its influence in the Asia-Pacific. Since taking office in 2009, President Barack Obama has signalled the intent to fully engage in the Asia-Pacific. While the previous administration of George Bush was active in the region, the Bush approach and effect varied differently from that of Obama. Early in Bush’s term he made broad overtures throughout the region with agencies such as ASEAN and APEC, but his primary focus, particularly after September 11, 2001, was security. That focus resulted in an emphasis on bilateral relations with existing alliance members and confrontational diplomacy with North Korea. Broadly speaking, the Bush administration explored expanded socio-economic ties in the region but made little progress. The notable exception was Bush’s success in achieving much improved relations with China. Obama would chart a more multilateral approach. Mark Schiffer, the American Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for East Asia policy, discussed the importance of the Asia-Pacific prior to Secretary of Defence Robert Gates visiting China in January, 2011. He stated that the rise of Asia was the “salient and central geostrategic fact of the 21st Century. Indeed by most measures the Asia-Pacific region is the most important and most dynamic region in the world today and likely to become more so as

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this still young century continues to unfold.” True to the perceived importance of the Asia-Pacific, the Obama administration has pressed American interest in the region using multiple strategies.

In November 2009 Obama visited Japan, Singapore and China to firmly indicate his interest in the region. In Japan he announced support for a new trade initiative termed the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which includes the United States, Peru, Chile, Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Vietnam. TPP aims to negotiate a trade agreement to address 21st Century challenges. Specifically, the aim is to build towards free trade agreements that will eventually coalesce into a regional trade pact. At the 2009 APEC forum in Singapore Obama reinvigorated the organization with promises of active American participation, including duties as host for the 2011 forum. Finally, his visit to China offered an initial opportunity to engage China on several trade issues and regional security. In addition to APEC, the United States has also recently engaged with ASEAN. Obama hosted ASEAN leaders for a September 2010 meeting in New York. Welcoming the foreign leaders, he stated that “ASEAN countries are increasingly playing a leadership role in the region, and ASEAN itself has the potential to be a very positive force in global affairs. That is why the United States has accepted ASEAN’s invitation to join the East Asia Summit, which will help us meet

102 Kirk, Pursuing Economic Growth and Opportunity | the White House Blog. November 18, 2009
regional and global challenges together.” The broad diplomatic approach of the United States shows that they are cognizant of the requirement to engage in the ASEAN Way, but also that they will continue to aggressively support their interests in more direct means such as APEC and bilateral discussions. While the United States has signalled new regional focus with diplomatic overtures concerning regional trade and cooperation, the country is also drawing on its long standing military presence in the region to reinforce its presence and interests.

Despite an enduring presence in the region since World War II, American military and security presence is still considered by some Asia-Pacific nations such as Japan and Australia to be an important asset that must be preserved. Hitoshi Tanaka, Senior Fellow of the Japan Center for International Exchange, discussed concerns regarding American presence in the region. He stated that,

the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the global financial crisis have called into question the limitations of US power. Furthermore, the rise of China has hastened a relative decline in US power in East Asia, allowing China to grow in confidence and accelerating perceptions of China as a great power in the region. This has triggered anxiety among some US allies and friends and requires careful management to preserve the stability of the region.  

An important aspect of Obama’s campaign in East Asia has been to reconfirm existing alliances and work towards new military and security arrangements. During his visit to Japan in November 2009, Obama stated that the United States,

looks to strengthen old alliances and build new partnerships with the nations of this region. To do this, we look to America's treaty alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand and the Philippines -- alliances that are not historical

103 Obama, Remarks by President Obama and President Triet of Vietnam at Opening of U.S.-ASEAN Leaders Meeting | the White House
documents from a bygone era, but abiding commitments to each other that are fundamental to our shared security.\textsuperscript{105}

Secretary of Defence Robert Gates would reinforce Obama’s words with several strategic visits aimed at securing existing ties and forging new links. Of particular note, Gates visited China to re-open military to military dialogue between the two states. He also participated in the first meeting of defence ministers from ASEAN Plus Eight nations, which included ASEAN states and Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and Russia. The widespread intensity of American efforts in the Asia-Pacific leaves little room to question their commitment to being a regional actor with influence. Although few can match the diversity of American efforts within the Asia-Pacific, they are by no means the only external entity seeking greater influence in the area.

European Union (EU) leaders have also recognized the rising potential of the Asia-Pacific. Indeed the EU’s predecessor, the European Economic Community, formally established dialogue relations with ASEAN in 1977. While not as pervasive as American connections in the region, the EU has certainly worked to broaden connections and influence. Building on thirty years of dialogue, the 2007 Nuremberg Declaration solidified relations between the EU and ASEAN. It also established commitments to promote a variety of items such as security throughout the Asia-Pacific, economic cooperation, energy security and climate change, cultural cooperation, and development cooperation.\textsuperscript{106} The EU is also actively involved in regional security as a member of the ARF. Lacking a geographic connection to the Asia-Pacific, the EU is applying its


\textsuperscript{106} \textit{Nuremberg Declaration on an EU-ASEAN Enhanced Partnership}, (2007): .
primary focus to ensuring sound economic relations with ASEAN and building bilateral trade agreements with members of ASEAN and other Asia-Pacific states. Membership in the ARF is also being leveraged to enhance EU influence and effectiveness throughout the region. With both the United States and the EU engaged in building a framework of Asia-Pacific influence, it seems natural that Canada would do so as well.

The record of Canadian engagement in the Asia-Pacific is lengthy, but not necessarily consistent or focused. In a 2009 panel discussion regarding Canada-Asia relations, Jack Austin, a retired Canadian senator and past president of the Canada China Business Council, succinctly summarized Canada’s record. He stated that,

If you go back historically and look at Canada’s view of Asia, it was to dismiss the region, at least in comparison with the Euro-American world. Canada sent a few missionaries over there. In their view, Asians weren’t really civilized and had a corrupt economy. Canada’s focus was on domestic nation-building, and its relationship with the US and the British Empire. Asia was of no consequence.  

Austin’s view reflects the reality of Canada’s traditional role in the Asia-Pacific. The broad Asia-Pacific policy approaches of Canadian governments have included some forays into the diplomatic, security and economic realm, but it was the sector of international assistance that underpinned interest in the region.

Canada’s post World War II approach to the Asia-Pacific was distinctly different from its approach to the United States and Europe. Whereas the west was a region that held the balance of power and promised future prosperity if engaged successfully, the

Asia-Pacific was a struggling area that needed assistance to gain access to the modern world. Hence, Ottawa’s engagement with the Asia-Pacific was founded on the precepts of providing development aid. To be clear, however, the provision of aid was part of an orchestrated plan to win influence within the region. Political science academic Gregory Chin writes that the “makers of Canadian aid policy have traditionally held that the objectives of Canadian development assistance and other components of Canadian foreign aid policy – international security and diplomatic and commercial – are complimentary for the Asian region.”

Canada’s aid strategy in the Asia-Pacific commenced in 1950 as an original participant in Commonwealth sponsored Colombo Plan. Under that plan, Canada focused development aid in Malaysia and Singapore until the 1970s. Following the establishment of ASEAN in 1967, Canada worked through that organization to target aid packages in member nations. The linking of development aid with diplomacy would lead to measurable success when Canada and ASEAN entered into an agreement as formal dialogue partners in 1977. Richard Stubbs writes that the dialogue initiative “not only regularized relations between ASEAN members and the Canadian government, but also gave Canada a crucial place at the table when meetings on ASEAN regional and international relations were held.”

The strategy of development continued into the new millennium, albeit with some disruptions as the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and International Development Research Centre (IDRC) were forced to change development focus to suit the aims of

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109 Stubbs and Williams, *The Poor Cousin?: Canada-ASEAN Relations*, 929.
different governments.\textsuperscript{110} Taken as a whole, Canada’s development programs in Southeast Asia fostered good relations as CIDA and IDRC programs were “in tune with regional foreign ministries and think tanks as they grappled with the new realities of the post-Cold War.”\textsuperscript{111} In the new millennium, the rapid rise of developing countries, particularly in Asia, and the growing disparity between the world’s rich and poor, forced major shifts in the delivery of CIDA assistance from broad development to focused poverty reduction. The new CIDA focus vastly reduced the effectiveness of the only Canadian foreign policy tool which had achieved consistency in the Asia-Pacific region. To remain engaged in trade and security issues Canada would now have to revert to diplomacy, which had no sustained record or plan.

Canadian diplomatic efforts in the Asia-Pacific have generally received little priority by governments through the years. The bulk of Canada’s effort has been expended in shoring relations with the United States and Europe. As a result, Canadian Asia-Pacific policy has been driven by the occasional spurts of attention rather than a strategic plan for long term engagement. Formal diplomatic relations within the region started with the aforementioned opening of official dialogue between Canada and ASEAN in 1975.

Engagement with ASEAN has secured a modest level of influence for Canada within the region. Building on successful dialogue, Canada and ASEAN signed an economic cooperation agreement in 1981 and Canada attends annual ASEAN post-

\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., 929 Over the years development priority shifted between several states including Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, and to some extent India and China.\textsuperscript{111} Brian Job, "Revitalizing Canada-Southeast Asia Relations: The TAC Gives Us a Ticket...but do we have a Destination?" \textit{Canada-Asia Agenda}, no. 11 (August 25, 2010, 2010).
ministerial conferences. The post-ministerial conferences are viewed as important engagement opportunities between ASEAN and foreign ministers of other dialogue partners. Canada was also invited to join the ARF as a founding member in 1994, thereby gaining a voice into regional security affairs. One of Canada’s notable achievements was the CIDA funded talks concerning the disputed South China Seas. Sponsored by Canada between 1990 and 2001 these talks were formally hosted by Indonesia and served as an excellent relationship builder for Canada in the region.\textsuperscript{112} Despite enjoying some success from ASEAN influence, ties to the organization remain relatively weak, in part due to inconsistent Canadian attention. As academics Richard Stubbs and Mark Williams point out, “ASEAN and its member states have been seen by the Canadian government as poor cousins to the dynamic Asian economies of Japan, South Korea, China, and now India.”\textsuperscript{113} After several years of inaction, however, there are signs of a re-engagement in the region. Just as the United States is now fully engaged in fostering Asia-Pacific growth, so too are there signs that Canada under Stephen Harper is increasing attention to the area. In 2009 Canada and ASEAN signed a joint declaration for enhanced partnership. Canada has also recently acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, a fundamental building block to greater engagement in the area. Speaking at the signing of the treaty, Foreign Affairs Minister Lawrence Cannon stated that the treaty gesture “is a strong demonstration of Canada’s engagement in Southeast Asia and its commitment to peace, security and cooperation in the region. Accession to the Treaty will better position Canada to advance its commercial, security and human rights interests

\textsuperscript{112} Leszek Buszynski, "Rising Tensions in the South China Sea: Prospects for a Resolution of the Issue," Security Challenges 6, no. 2 (Winter 2010) (2010), 98.; Job, Revitalizing Canada-Southeast Asia Relations: The TAC Gives Us a Ticket...but do we have a Destination?, 2.

\textsuperscript{113} Stubbs and Williams, The Poor Cousin?: Canada-ASEAN Relations, 931.
in Southeast Asia.” Notably, however, Canada remains excluded from what is emerging as the preeminent ASEAN and Asia-Pacific forum, the East Asia Summit. Exclusion from that body is a visible sign of Canada’s reduced importance in the region. In order to increase credibility in the region Canada will need to boost efforts to become relevant. However, the path to relevance is not clear as we have no substantial involvement with ASEAN and the influence of APEC is waning.

Canada’s current government claims an active policy in the Asia-Pacific but has not attached significant resources or effort to achieving that claim. One of the key engagement pieces is APEC, but it appears TPP, to which Canada is not a party, may soon overshadow APEC. In the case of APEC, Canada was a founding member and continues to firmly support the organization and its goals. The Department of Foreign Affairs official website maintains that “APEC allows Canada to further engage in bilateral and multilateral discussions and negotiations in one of the world's largest economic zones, where many of our key trade partners are also members.” However, given the rise of other regional initiatives such as the EAS or TTP, it is uncertain whether APEC will continue to thrive as a force of regional relevance. Journalist Carl Meyer speculated that Canada may lose some regional influence as APEC is overshadowed by groups to which Canada is not a party, most notably the TPP. He also quotes Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong as saying TPP sideline talks were actually the "most

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significant" outcome of the APEC summit.\textsuperscript{117} Given the perceived importance of TPP, it appears Canada is once again at risk of missing the boat in the Asia-Pacific. Globe and Mail economic journalist John Weeks notes that food sector trade policies are preventing the government from negotiating a place in TPP, but believes Canadian business interests in the Asia-Pacific will be harmed as other APEC nations sign on. With APEC’s future relevance in question and Canada unwilling to partake in TPP, there is no clear vehicle to ensure forward progression of Canadian interests in the Asia-Pacific.

What steps are necessary to protect Canadian interests in the Asia-Pacific and promote future growth? In an article regarding Canada’s grand strategy from a security standpoint, academic Tsuyoshi Kawasaki highlights the difficulty of Canada’s position. He states that,

Canada’s physical remoteness, negligible military capability, and relatively minor stake in the region (compared with that of virtually everyone else), mean that other Pacific Basin states naturally have difficulty thinking of Canada as a player. Canada aggravates this situation by using the language of liberal internationalism to describe its interests in Asian security affairs, which merely reinforces the existing Asian view that Canada does not have true (that is, geostrategic) reasons to be involved in Asian security affairs.\textsuperscript{118}

Although speaking primarily of security concerns, the sentiments espoused by Kawasaki can easily apply to the full spectrum of Canadian affairs in the Asia-Pacific. As Canada’s record with ASEAN indicates, influence in the region must be established using a long term, consistent plan that proves Canada respects the ASEAN Way and belongs as a prominent regional actor. Under the Obama administration the United States, who

\textsuperscript{117} Meyer, \textit{Foothold in Asia-Pacific Set to be Lost?}
already enjoys significant influence by virtue of size and power, is targeting all aspects of relations with the Asia-Pacific. Canada must be equally diverse in implementing a widespread plan to engage the Asia-Pacific. The next section will examine Canada’s experience with NATO and determine whether a reallocation of diplomatic and military effort from NATO to the Asia-Pacific may be part of the solution to achieve a greater global balance for Canada.

Chapter Three: Future Balance, the Merits of Military Relations With NATO and the Asia-Pacific

Defining a state’s foreign policy is an inexact art. Unlike domestic policy, governments have much less precision in achieving desired aims. In the book *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, scholar Kim Nossal devotes several pages to discussing the complexities of foreign policy. From that discussion there are several salient points to be considered when assessing the merits of Canada’s NATO and Asia-Pacific policies. First, “objectives and the means of achieving them must be crafted to fit what is attainable.” Second, foreign policy, particularly that of a small state, are “destined to be forever reactive, responding to the rivalries of the dominant powers, to the periodic pressures for a revision of the status quo, to the persistent threats to systemic peace.” Third, “most states without either the desire or the capacity to use the uglier tools of statecraft [force, non-violent sanctions, coercion and inducement] have to rely on persuasion – or diplomacy – to achieve their goals.” Finally, although “the environment, economic and trade questions, energy, culture…” may be on the foreign policy agenda,
“such items rarely displace for long the centrality of the problems of war and peace.”\textsuperscript{119}

When considered in the light of Nossal’s discussion, Canada’s foreign policy options following World War II were quite limited.

Whereas pre-World War II Canada was not concerned with a focus on building influence through international activism, the global nature of the Second World War clearly demonstrated the need to be engaged in the world. Only by building a world of peace and security would future prosperity be enabled. Following the war, both Canadian leaders and citizens accepted that sovereignty by itself offered no assurance of safety from the impacts of global affairs. Rather, as Pearson writes in his memoirs, that “far more important is to use your sovereignty to protect and advance your own legitimate interests by establishing relations of friendship, good-will, and agreement with other countries…”\textsuperscript{120} Given the aggressive rise of Stalin’s Soviet Union, the economic potential in both Europe and the United States, and the cultural links to both Britain and France, it was natural that Canadian foreign affairs focused on building the Atlantic community. Pearson wrote that while it was hoped the UN would be the ideal platform to implement Canada’s foreign policy, “NATO became a more effective, if more restricted, international political agency.”\textsuperscript{121} Now, as NATO celebrates more than sixty years of stability and success, the face of the world has drastically changed. Despite this change, relations with the United States and Europe remain central to Canadian policy, primarily built on the framework of NATO. Is it time to rethink that framework?

\textsuperscript{119} Kim Richard Nossal, \textit{The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy} (Scarborough, ON: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., 1985), xi-xiii.
\textsuperscript{120} Pearson, Mike, \textit{the Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson}, 32.
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid., 32
This section will look at influence factors that make both NATO and military relations in the Asia-Pacific important to Canada’s future. Next, it will examine the balance of effort applied to NATO and determine if some of that effort should be diverted to the Asia-Pacific. In completing this analysis, it will be shown that whilst NATO remains critical to Canada, the country is neither sufficiently focused on the rising conventional and unconventional threats in the Asia-Pacific, nor on the growing socio-economic influence of the region. The lack of Asia-Pacific focus risks leaving the country exposed to the impacts of security issues such as terrorism and piracy that continue to thrive in the region. The country also risks loss of political influence and economic prosperity by not having an accepted voice in the region. Just as NATO helped secure Canada’s foothold in Europe, so to can movement towards improved military relations in the Asia-Pacific help secure a regional voice for the nation.

Governments have limited resources to expend on any chosen areas of interest, which in turns leads to prioritization along lines that offer measurable success compared to effort applied. Author Steven Holloway offers five general principles which can be applied to compare the worth of applying foreign policy capital to a given area. In short, the five principles are security from attack, maintaining state capacity for autonomous action, maintaining domestic unity, the potential for international prestige, and ensuring economic prosperity.\footnote{Steven Kendall Holloway, \textit{Canadian Foreign Policy: Defining the National Interest} (Toronto, ON: Broadview Press, 2006), 14.} Applying these principles to military relations within NATO and the Asia-Pacific will reveal that although NATO remains critical to Canada’s future, Asia-Pacific growth and potential also make it an area of vital importance for the future.
A foreign policy based on leveraging Canada’s military relationship with NATO and its members has served Canada well through the years. Not only has the nation prospered in an environment of peace and security, it has done so in a manner that has maintained unity and provided opportunities for the country to stand out as a nation with influence. The question to be asked is whether post-Cold War NATO still serves Canadian objectives and, if so, whether the 21st Century NATO should maintain the level of commitment applied by Canada over the past sixty years. Applying Holloway’s five principles to Canada’s NATO commitment will provide an indication of its continued importance and provide a gauge against which improved military relations in the Asia-Pacific can be assessed.

Holloway’s first principle for determining the worth of a foreign policy action is its capacity to secure the nation from attack. Accepting that NATO succeeded in providing an umbrella of security for Canada during the Cold War, it remains to determine if NATO will continue to secure the nation from attack in the new century. Since the London Declaration of 1990 declared an end to the Cold War, NATO leadership and academics have been discussing whether the alliance remains relevant. Indeed, academic Ellen Hallams writes that political realists “continued to argue during the 1990s that the glue holding NATO together had disappeared, and that in the absence of a unifying threat alliance cohesion was likely to diminish.”123 To be sure, alliance discord during NATO action in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s, and divisions concerning America’s coalition of the willing in 2003, threatened to splinter NATO.124

123 E. Hallams, "NATO at 60: Going Global?" *International Journal* 64, no. 2 (Spring, 2009), 435.
124 Ibid., 436–437
Ultimately, however, NATO has successfully maneuvered through the post-Cold War uncertainty and emerged with a mission that ensures relevancy in the 21st Century. Much of NATO’s new vision can be linked to persistent American pressure to redefine NATO. That pressure led to the acceptance of a new NATO Strategic Concept in 2010. Formally adopted in Lisbon in November 2010, the new concept confirms NATO’s traditional commitment to collective security amongst alliance members. It also codifies the necessary measures to ensure NATO continues to meet security challenges in the 21st Century.

Establishing an acceptable way ahead for NATO was a struggle that unfolded over many years. With no single threat to bind the alliance, three key factors have served to broaden NATO’s relevance to the new century – expansion and cooperation within Europe, willingness to enforce security outside traditional NATO boundaries, and fostering relationships with global partners. Each of these factors is addressed within the new Strategic Concept.

In the case of the expansion and cooperation within Europe, many steps have been taken to ensure NATO remains relevant in the post Cold War framework. The alliance now includes many East European states and has offered to work closely with Russia on key issues such as missile defence and nuclear disarmament. In 1989, President George H.W. Bush utilized NATO as a means “to reach out to the former Warsaw Pact nations to extend that zone of security and stability.” By forging “partnerships with Central and Eastern European militaries, and later by holding out the prospect for membership in the alliance, NATO became essential to fostering political, economic, and military
Regarding Russia, the NATO-Russia Council was founded in 2002. In February 2010, Hillary Clinton remarked that NATO continues to “have real differences with Russia on several issues. And we intend to use the NATO-Russia Council as a forum for frank discussions about areas where we disagree.” The Strategic Concept highlights that NATO and Russia have “committed themselves to developing their relations on the basis of common interest, reciprocity and transparency to achieve a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area based on the principles of democracy and co-operative security.” In terms of building European cooperation, the Strategic Concept recognizes the importance of existing frameworks such as the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and Partnership for Peace programme. It also highlights the importance of ongoing dialogue with non-NATO states including Russia, Ukraine and several Mediterranean nations. With respect to future enlargement in NATO, the Strategic Concept makes clear that the alliance expects to extend invitations of membership to other like minded states within Europe and that NATO will assist with the preparation of aspiring members. In addition to maintaining a Euro-Atlantic focus, the Strategic Concept identifies the requirement to maintain the willingness and capacity to act globally.

The second major factor driving NATO relevance in the 21st Century is the potential requirement to project force globally in order to assure collective security.

Based on NATO’s experience in the Balkans, academic James Goldgeier writes that the United States “tried to gain allied support for the notion that NATO would now as a matter of course need to go out of area to combat threats. But most of the … European allies were reluctant to see Kosovo as anything but an exception to the rule that NATO was designed for collective defence rather than for missions abroad.”\(^{128}\) The terrorist strikes of September 11, 2001 acted as the catalyst for a revitalized NATO with world scope. In August 2003 NATO demonstrated its willingness to act outside its traditional boundaries by formally accepting leadership of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. At a ceremony formally marking NATO’s assumption of leadership, NATO Deputy Secretary General Alessandro Minuto Rizzo stated that the “new mission is a reflection of NATO's ongoing transformation, and resolve, to meet the security challenges of the 21st century.”\(^ {129}\) The mission in Afghanistan continues as a mainstay of NATO policy and served as a catalyst for further discussions regarding NATO’s global role. In a 2008 speech in Berlin, then-presidential candidate Obama highlighted that the 21\(^{st}\) Century brought new threats from all corners of the globe and that “partnership and cooperation among nations is not a choice, it is the one way, the only way, to protect our common security and advance our common humanity.”\(^ {130}\) The global theme was reiterated in a February 2010 speech to the Atlantic Council by Hilary Clinton. She stated that in “an interconnected world, we cannot defend our people by crouching behind the geographic boundaries of the Alliance. Reality has redefined the


area in which we operate.”131 The 2010 Strategic Concept specifically states that “Alliance security must also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be affected by…terrorism, sabotage and organized crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources.”132 In recognition of 21st Century threats, the Strategic Concept clearly acknowledges that NATO’s continued relevance includes possible enforcement of collective security by conducting operations globally.

Closely linked to willingness to fight threats globally, and a third key factor of future alliance relevance, is the concept that NATO should foster partnerships with states outside traditional NATO boundaries who share common values and goals. The case for global partners is summarized by Hallams:

> While nations such as Australia, Japan, or South Korea might not share the transatlantic history that has helped bind NATO members together, in an era of new and emerging global challenges, they do share a common commitment to democratic values and ideals, as well as the common goal of meeting the challenge of global terrorism and failed states.133

The 2008 Bucharest Declaration indicated NATO’s willingness to work with like minded states around the globe. That declaration specifically targeted Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, and South Korea. These states have all been contributors to the NATO led mission in Afghanistan and are viewed as global partners. The Bucharest Declaration states that NATO’s objectives with these global partners “include support for

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131 Clinton, Remarks on the Future of NATO at the Washington Strategic Concept Seminar February 22, 2010
133 Hallams, NATO at 60: Going Global?, 425.
operations, security cooperation, and enhanced common understanding to advance shared security interests and democratic values.”

In a visit with Australia’s Prime Minister the month prior to formal adoption of the new Strategic Concept, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen remarked that,

A key element of this concept will be a refreshed approach to NATO's partners and it's my hope that the Strategic Concept will open the door more widely to partnership between NATO and countries around the globe, and I hope that Australia, if it so chooses, will have the opportunity to deepen its relationship with NATO in the future.

With a willingness to work with non-NATO partners, project force globally if required, and continue cooperation and expansion within Europe, NATO has successfully rebranded itself to face the 21st Century. In terms of Holloway’s five principles for foreign policy worthiness, it is clear that NATO continues to satisfy the first principle of providing security from attack. “Maintaining state capacity for autonomous action” is the next principle to be examined in light of NATO.

Holloway’s second principle of autonomous action reflects his belief that small states will need to sacrifice some degree of sovereignty in order to gain security within a larger organization. In a unique twist, Canada’s membership in NATO served as an avenue for the country to attain some measure of autonomy from the much larger and

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136 Holloway, Canadian Foreign Policy: Defining the National Interest, 14.
137 Ibid., 15
more powerful United States. Jockel and Sokolsky state that the United States was the
“ally whose overwhelming influence membership in the multilateral NATO was said to
counterbalance.”¹³⁸ Indeed Canada has largely complied with NATO direction and rarely
sought to prove its independence within the organization. There are some notable
exceptions such as the debate concerning the stationing of nuclear weapons in Canada
through the 1950s and 1960s¹³⁹ and the gradual withdrawal of Canadian troops from
Europe, but Canada has generally sought autonomy by challenging the United States
outside NATO. Although generally conformist within NATO, Canada has often adopted
distinctly different opinions and policies than its greatest NATO ally. Examples of such
distinct Canadian views include wars in Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq. In each of these wars
Canadian foreign opinion differed from that of the United States. In the case of Korea,
Canada participated in the action but strongly opposed the use of atomic weapons and,
along with Britain, convinced the United States to publicly rule out their use in Korea.¹⁴⁰
Canada also showed considerable autonomy from its American neighbor by pursuing the
international ban on landmines and strongly supporting the International Criminal Court.
Broadly speaking, membership in NATO has not reduced the country’s capacity to form
opinions and policies that differ from allies. Such autonomy has been an important factor
maintaining domestic support for NATO, thereby reducing the impact on national unity.

Military relations within NATO have rarely proven to be a divisive issue amongst
Canadians, the third criteria for success in accordance with Holloway’s principles. The
1949 formal ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty was nearly unanimous, with only 2

¹³⁸ Jockel and Sokolsky, Canada and NATO: Keeping Ottawa in, Expenses Down, Criticism Out...and the
Country Secure, 331.
¹³⁹ Holloway, Canadian Foreign Policy: Defining the National Interest, 139-146.
¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 134-151
members of Parliament voting against it. Satisfied that Canada spoke with one voice concerning NATO membership, Pearson wrote that “whenever possible in matters of foreign affairs party politics should end at the water’s edge or at the national border. That was certainly the case with the policy which culminated in the North Atlantic Treaty.”

National acceptance of NATO was easy in the post World War II years. Academic David Haglund highlights two factors that greatly contributed to easy Canadian acceptance of NATO. First he believes NATO to be “a continuation of the country’s longstanding relationship with Europe, and in the first instance of its historic relationship with Great Britain.” The close bond to Europe was naturally ingrained in all Canadians. In the 1951 census, 47.9% of the population claimed British heritage, 30.8% claimed French, and 18.3% claimed other European states. The second factor espoused by Haglund was that having just witnessed the devastating effects of global war, Canada now believed their security “was inseparable from that of the Western Europeans. Whereas the watchword had been ‘no commitments,’ [prior to World War II] now it became ‘commitment’ – to a military alliance with the Europeans, and to the grander vision of an Atlantic community of shared values and interests.”

Although specific actions such as Canada’s mission in Afghanistan, have not necessarily been fully supported by Canadians, commitment to NATO has been generally consistent within Canada. For instance, 79% of Canadians fully endorsed the intervention of NATO in

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141 Pearson, Mike, the Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, 59.
144 Haglund, Canada and the Atlantic Alliance: An Introduction and Overview, 5.
Kosovo in 1999. France’s break with the Alliance in the late 1960s did raise some concerns as it acted as a potential catalyst for a Quebec population who felt that Canada’s foreign policy was dominated purely by Anglo-Saxon issues. While the political unrest in Quebec may have served as impetus for reductions in Canada’s military contribution to NATO, the underlying commitment was never in doubt. In a 2010 poll concerning defence priorities, Nanos Research found that 75.2% of Canadians felt the NATO commitment in Europe was of moderate to very high importance. The results in Quebec were similar with 75.1% in the same range – albeit somewhat more moderate in their stance. In a nation focused on unity issues, Canada’s involvement in NATO has rarely detracted from national unity. Instead, Alliance membership has often served as a point of national prestige that helped assure Canada’s position as an international actor.

Holloway’s fourth principle concerns the capacity for a foreign affairs policy to result in international prestige. In the case of NATO, one of the most important aspects of alliance membership was the prestige it was able to draw on for other political objectives. As Jockel and Sokolsky highlighted, joining NATO ensured Canada was part of the post World War II “in” crowd. Prestige within that group manifested itself in many ways throughout the years. In the early 1950s, Haglund cites an American General in Europe as stating that “Canada [was] responsible for the biggest contribution…to the expansion of West European air defence.” Indeed, at the time, Canada maintained a very significant military land and air presence in NATO and earmarked up to 8% of GDP.

147 Nik Nanos, Globe and Mail/Nanos Poll - Defense PolicyNanos Research, 2010), 10.
148 Jockel and Sokolsky, Canada and NATO: Keeping Ottawa in, Expenses Down, Criticism Out...and the Country Secure, 316.
towards defense spending. In an address to the Canadian Parliament in 1953, American President Dwight D. Eisenhower stated that,

Within the framework of NATO, in the construction of new patterns for an international security, in the lengthy and often toilsome exploration of a regional alliance, they have been patient and wise devisors of a stout defence for the western world. Canada…has earned the gratitude and the affectionate respect of all who cherish freedom and seek peace.\(^\text{149}\)

Later, after a relative decline in Canada’s commitment to NATO during the 1970s and early 1980s, President Ronald Reagan praised Canada’s role in NATO. He stated that “For more than 35 years, we and our European friends have joined together in history's most successful alliance -- the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The world will not forget that Canada was in the forefront of the nations that formed and armed NATO.”\(^\text{150}\) More recently, Obama lauded Canada’s role in Afghanistan his first visit to Canada in 2009. Of the NATO mission in Afghanistan, he stated that the “people of Canada have an enormous burden there that they have borne…You've put at risk your most precious resource: your brave men and women in uniform. And so we are very grateful for that.”\(^\text{151}\) In 2006, NATO Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer echoed these remarks in saying Canada “has a long history of defending values, including, when necessary, through the use of the armed forces. Canada also has a firm record as a country that pulls


its weight when it comes to security.” There can be little doubt that although Canada’s participation in NATO has varied over the years, membership has provided many opportunities for the nation to shine internationally. Commitment to NATO ensured Canada was seen as an active international actor supporting the cause of freedom and democracy. It also opened economic doors for Canada that helped ensure prosperity.

NATO has been a key enabler in ensuring Canadian access to economic markets in Europe. Now, as Europe becomes increasingly regionalized under the European Union, Alliance membership is a critical element to maintaining a voice in what remains a vital region of economic and political interest for Canada, thereby satisfying Holloway’s fifth principle concerning the potential for prosperity. Canada’s role has positioned the country well within NATO. Jockel and Sokolsky write that in “NATO headquarters and allied capitals, especially in Washington, there is no dearth of public recognition and praise on the part of NATO’s leaders for Canada’s willingness to assume a major combat role in Kandahar and for the outstanding performance of the Canadian Forces.”153 The link between NATO security and other aspects of European policy is reinforced in the new Strategic Concept. The Concept specifically speaks of continued strategic cooperation between the NATO and the EU. While the link is primarily aimed at security concerns, the official linkage will assist Canadian influence into other areas EU concern. In particular, Canada is currently negotiating to liberalize trade with the EU. In January 2011, Peter Van Loan, Canadian Minister of International Trade, stated

153 Jockel and Sokolsky, Canada and NATO: Keeping Ottawa in, Expenses Down, Criticism Out...and the Country Secure, 333.
that EU trade negotiations “represent our most significant trade initiative since the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement. This agreement will boost two-way trade between Canada and the European Union, while creating jobs on both sides of the Atlantic.” In March 2011 Prime Minister Stephen Harper set a timeline to conclude a free trade agreement with the EU by 2012. Clearly Europe remains an important aspect of Canada’s foreign policy. Active membership in NATO is vital to maintaining Canada’s reputation and influence in the face of EU’s increasing regionalization.

Applying Holloway’s five principles of assessing foreign policy clearly demonstrates the continued relevance of military relations with NATO in the 21st Century. The alliance has evolved to face new global threats and will continue to fill an important security niche in the years to come. The alliance also remains important as an avenue for asserting Canadian political and economic influence in Europe. While the continued relevance of NATO membership may not be in doubt, the rising power and influence of other global regions does challenge the balance of resources applied to NATO versus emerging regions.

As discussed previously, the Asia-Pacific region has seen enormous growth in economic and political clout. Canadian efforts in the region have been sporadic though the years, leaving Canada as nation of relatively minor importance to most in the region.

In keeping with Canada’s inconsistent approach to the Asia-Pacific, Prime Minster Harper’s government has espoused a policy of greater cooperation within the region, but achieved little. The consequence of Canada’s lack of focus is that the country is not seen as an important player within the region. Boutilier writes that “by way of sweeping generalization, many Asians see us as a pleasant but inconsequential people; less charged in term of baggage than the Americans but not particularly important in the great scheme of things.” To turn the tide in the Asia-Pacific, Canada must engage the region on multiple levels. Drawing on the NATO example, one prong of a successful engagement in the Asia-Pacific may be through the common ground of security.

As with the previous example of NATO, the merits of improved military relations within the Asia-Pacific will be assessed using Holloway’s five principles. The first factor to be considered is whether such relations can offer security from attack. Assessing security from attack in the modern Asia-Pacific sense, however, differs significantly from that of NATO.

NATO was formed in response to the well defined security threat posed by the aggression of the communist Soviet Union. Although some countries, like Canada, saw potential economic and political spin offs from the new alliance, it was clear to all the founding members that NATO was primarily a collective security pact of like minded states intent on protecting against conventional and atomic threats posed by the Soviets. While the Asia-Pacific region was certainly embroiled in aspects of the Cold War, the region does not share a common ideology and has traditionally not shared a single

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156 Boutilier, Email James Boutilier/Rob Gillis March 1, 2011, Asia-Pacific Motivation for Closer Relations with Canada
dominant threat that polarized the region. There have, and continue to be, dominant powers such as Japan and China, but the threat posed by those nations has not forced the remaining Asia-Pacific states into a collective security arrangement. A complex security environment and diverse political cultures and ideologies as led to regional security agreements that are largely bilateral and/or broad and general in nature.

The earliest regional attempt at collective security was ASEAN which sought to “alleviate intra-ASEAN tensions, to reduce the regional influence of external actors, and to promote the socioeconomic development of its members states as a further hedge against Communist insurgency.”\(^{157}\) In a 2003 interview, former ASEAN Secretary-General Rodolfo Certeza Severino confirmed that although the world had changed greatly since the inception of ASEAN, the fundamental security objective remained unchanged. He reaffirmed that “ASEAN was founded for a political purpose: to provide a framework to deal with potential conflicts in a peaceful way. This is still the function of ASEAN. I do not think ASEAN is about to organize an armed force…”\(^{158}\) Although ASEAN has not moved towards collective military action, they have recognized the importance of military relations throughout the region with the foundation of the ASEAN Regional Forum.

Like ASEAN, the ARF is primarily a forum of diplomatic exchange, but with a much broader regional focus. As outlined in its first formal meeting in 1994, ARF objectives are to “foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security


issues of common interest and concern and to make significant contributions to efforts
towards confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region.”159
While ARF does not include any active military component for mutual defence, it
continues to provide opportunities for military leaders to meet and discuss areas of
mutual concern. From a military standpoint, the most significant force in regional
security in the Asia-Pacific is the United States.

United States security interests in the Asia-Pacific are most visible in several
bilateral defence arrangements commonly referred to as the ‘San Francisco system.’ The
term refers to bilateral security agreements signed beginning in 1951 between the United
States and Australia, New Zealand, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, Thailand, and to
some degree Singapore. Based on the bilateral agreements the American forces maintain
a footprint of approximately 100,000 soldiers, airmen and sailors throughout the Asia-
Pacific.160 Academic William Tow cites three strategic goals of maintaining bilateral
agreements in the region:

First…the United States, as the world’s foremost maritime power,
must maintain control of Southeast Asia’s maritime routes. These are vital to the
flow of Middle East oil and are central lifelines between the great industrial
powers of Northeast Asia and the Indian Ocean littorals. Bilateral
alliances…provide the U.S. Seventh Fleet and other components of PACOM with
friendly way stations to sustain a regional naval presence. Second, it is not in the
interests of any state…to strive for regional strategic dominance or
hegemony…[T]he bilateral alliances in Southeast Asia provide an effective
balancing mechanism against the possibility of such dominance. In particular,

159 ASEAN Regional Forum, The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper
160 William T. Tow, "Assessing Bilateral Security Alliances in the Asia Pacific's
"Southern Rim": Why the San Francisco System Endures," Shorenstein APARC,
http://aparc.stanford.edu/publications/assessing_bilateral_security_alliances_in_the_asia_pacifcs_southern
_rim_why_the_san_francisco_system_endures/ (accessed 4/8, 2011). Note that New Zealand is no longer
party to existing bilateral agreements. The relationship with Singapore approaches that of the other nations
but no formal bilateral agreement is in place.
these alliances are viewed as a way to deter China from converting Southeast Asia into its own strategic buffer zone. Third, each “southern rim” ally facilitates U.S. strategic operations in ways that reinforce U.S. access to and influence within the growing economies and markets of Southeast Asia and throughout the entire Asian region.  

Since initiating the San Francisco system sixty years ago, the nature and extent of several have evolved. Most notably, New Zealand was excluded as a member of the Australia, New Zealand, United States (ANZUS) Security Treaty after refusing entry to an American Navy ship based on the potential that it might be carrying nuclear weapons. As former United States Secretary of State George Shultz stated, “when New Zealand decided to reject the Buchanan, it also decided, in effect, that the basic operational elements of the ANZUS treaty would not apply to it. In a sense, New Zealand walked off the job – the job of working with each other to defend our common security.” Despite changes within the Asia-Pacific bilateral agreements and the introduction of regional forums such as the ARF, however, the San Francisco system endures. Current Australian ambassador to the United States Kim Beazley has written that this is true partly because none of the “participant states have found other regional and bilateral relationships sufficiently attractive to eschew the benefits of this older security framework.” He further states that the United States is “trying to replicate the character of those treaty based relationships without the implicit guarantee with a wide variety of additional states in the area…” and that they are “not just interested in projecting dominance over the Asia-Pacific region, but is equally interested in pursuing effective interoperability and

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161 Ibid.
163 Kim Beazley, "Whither the San Francisco Alliance System?" *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 57, no. 2 (Jul, 2003), 326.
burden sharing with its military allies in the region.”¹⁶⁴ The ongoing efforts of ARF and the continued military interest of the United States in the Asia-Pacific suggest the region has significant security impact. What is the threat to Canada and can improved military relations meet the challenge of Holloway’s first principle to help keep Canada safe from attack?

The Asia-Pacific region holds few, if any, direct threats to Canadian national security. The region’s superpower, China, has significant military forces but is unlikely to attack Canadian territory and interests. That being said, the region is home to many security issues that may impact Canada’s way of life. The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade website notes that “Southeast Asia is home to serious regional and international security challenges – including terrorism, health, small arms trafficking, human trafficking, illicit drugs trade and piracy, which affect Canada.”¹⁶⁵ Likewise, the 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy states that:

Unequal access to resources and uneven economic distribution are proving to be increasing sources of regional tension even as existing low-intensity or frozen conflicts in Africa, South Asia, the Middle East and the Balkans remain largely unresolved. The proliferation of advanced weapons and the potential emergence of new, nuclear-capable adversarial states headed by unpredictable regimes are particularly worrisome, as is the pernicious influence of Islamist militants in key regions. The ongoing buildup of conventional forces in Asia Pacific countries is another trend that may have a significant impact on international stability in coming years.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., 336
¹⁶⁶ Department of National Defence, Canada First Defence Strategy (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2008), 6.
Whereas, the Asia-Pacific may not pose as clear a threat as the Soviet Union of 1949, there is little doubt that Canada has security interests in the area. The United States has recognized the changing global security dynamic. With respect to military forces, American “forward deployed forces are reduced in Europe but increased in the West Pacific. The US Navy shifts vessels from the Atlantic to the Pacific fleet, and deploys its most modern surface and sub-surface combatants in Asia.”\(^\text{167}\) Just as NATO provided an avenue to control European based threats, so to can greater participation in Asia-Pacific security provide some measure of assistance in countering threats from the region.

In a 2010 address concerning the regional architectures of Asia, Hilary Clinton stated that “half of diplomacy is being there.”\(^\text{168}\) For Canada to truly benefit from security relations in the Asia-Pacific we must become a committed partner in the region. While Canada is a founding member of the ARF, the country has committed very little in terms of military and security relations in the region. Asia-Pacific expert Brian Job highlights Canada’s lack of visibility in the region. “A telling example is Canada’s apparent indifference regarding the Shangri-la Dialogue – only once in nine years has the Canadian Minister of Defence joined his counterparts in what has become the region’s most prominent track 1.5 security forum.”\(^\text{169}\) Canada’s ongoing absence will ultimately limit the country’s ability to leverage relationships to enhance national security. One need only look back to August, 2010 to see the potential benefits of increased influence in the Asia-Pacific. On 13 August, Canadian officials intercepted the ship MV Sun Sea

\(^{167}\) S. Frühling and B. Schreer, "Nato’s New Strategic Concept and Us Commitments in the Asia-Pacific," \textit{RUSI Journal} 154, no. 5 (Oct, 2009), 99-100.


\(^{169}\) Job, \textit{Revitalizing Canada-Southeast Asia Relations: The TAC Gives Us a Ticket...but do we have a Destination?}, 5.
which was carrying 490 Sri Lankan migrants, potentially including several terrorists associated with the Tamil Tigers, seeking illegal entry into Canada. The advance cuing for that interception stemmed from security connections between the Sri Lankan government and Canada.\textsuperscript{170} As Canada attempts to counter the many unconventional threats of the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century, a consistent presence in the Asia-Pacific will prove vital. A new emphasis on building military ties can play an important role in building the security relationship.

A long history of military cooperation was one of the key building blocks of Canada’s acceptance within NATO. Similarly, the forging of enduring military relations will help achieve long term influence in the Asia-Pacific. American Pacific Command Commander Admiral Robert Willard believes that “throughout the Asia-Pacific region, military leaders are regarded as important, influential national leaders and often leave the service to help govern their countries. Consequently, the benefits of continuous mil-to-mil relationship often extend beyond of the service-life of the military leaders themselves.”\textsuperscript{171} Indeed the United States has long recognized the importance of military influence throughout the Asia-Pacific and, despite an already significant presence, is pushing for greater military integration. Academic Daniel Twining writes that at NATO’s 2006 Riga Summit, “the United States secured the alliance’s agreement to enhance military interoperability and joint planning with Japan, Australia, South Korea, and New Zealand. This was part of a larger U.S. design to encourage Asian partners to


\textsuperscript{171} Forum Staff, "Questions and Answer with the U.S. PACOM Commander Admiral Robert Willard," \textit{Asia Pacific Defense FORUM} 35, no. 3 (2010), 13.
assume global security responsibilities.” Given Canada’s ever increasing political and economic interests in the Asia-Pacific and the presence of threats such as terrorism, piracy and illegal migration, it is clear that the stability of the region will impact Canada’s domestic security. Forging improved military relations in the region will be an important step towards task of securing Canada’s domestic security and will satisfy Holloway’s first principle of keeping the country safe from attack.

Holloway’s second criterion for assessing a foreign policy action is the extent to which it restricts a state’s ability to act internationally. There is little risk that closer relations within the Asia-Pacific will unduly restrict Canada. Existing structures in the region are strongly based on the ASEAN principle of protecting state individuality and achieving change through group consensus. Steps towards improved military relations in the Asia-Pacific will require years of sustained attention. Job points to Canada’s recent signing of the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) as an important step in building Asia-Pacific relations. The primary purpose of the treaty is to bind signatories to peaceful resolution of disputes. Minister of Foreign Affairs Cannon stated that “accession to the Treaty is a strong demonstration of Canada’s engagement in Southeast Asia and its commitment to peace, security and cooperation in the region.” Accession to the Treaty is indicative of steps towards closer relations in the area. It commits Canada to very little but is highly significant to those in the region. Building strong military ties will take a long term commitment by the government. Given the nature of

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173 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Minister Cannon Concludes Productive ASEAN Meetings in Vietnam, July 23, 2010
relations in the region, there is minimal risk that agreements will unduly restrict Canada’s ability to act autonomously on the international stage.

Increased presence and improved military relations pose minimal risk to national unity, Holloway’s third tenet of a good foreign affairs policy. As discussed earlier, Canada’s large commitment to NATO has rarely impacted the national unity discussion. The largest impact was seen in the 1960s when France withdrew from the alliance and there were some in the growing Quebec sovereignty community who viewed NATO as aligning Canada too closely with Anglo concerns. The only other times that NATO has affected unity has been in the levels of support to military action such as Afghanistan. In the case of Afghanistan there was strong national support initially from all areas, although Quebec was slightly below the national average. By 2010 support for Canada’s mission had eroded nationally with only a third of Canadians in general, and 22 per cent of Quebecers, supporting continued presence. Returning to the Asia-Pacific, it is unlikely that increasing military relations in the region will affect unity. Increasing presence in the area will not be viewed as a reflection of solely Anglo concerns. Indeed, Canada’s ethnic makeup and political/economic interests have shifted significantly since the nation joined NATO in 1949. In an interview concerning Canada-EU relations, academic Frederic Merand remarked that:

174 J. Massie, "Regional Strategic Subcultures: Canadians and the use of Force in Afghanistan and Iraq," Canadian Foreign Policy 14, no. 2 (Spring, 2008), 33. Support for Canada’s role in Afghanistan stood at 79 percent or higher in all provinces is October 2001. Quebec support hovered between 49 and 60 percent between 2002 and 2005, and then plunged below 40 percent.

European influence on Canadian foreign policy is probably no longer what it used to be. It must be remembered that for the generation of 50 years ago, Canada’s leaders were often of first- or second-generation European origin. Often they had been educated in England or France, and were still very close to the Old World. That is no longer the case today. Canadians come from all over the world. Canada has also become what could be called an Asian power, a power in the Americas—a modest one, true, but a power all the same—with interests much more varied than in the old days.\textsuperscript{176}

When Canada joined NATO the 97 per cent of the country claimed European heritage.\textsuperscript{177} In the 2006 census, in a reflection of Canada’s increasingly mixed population, individuals were able to select more than one ethnic background. Only 35.6 per cent claimed some British background and 31.5 claimed some European ancestry. A sign of massive immigration from the Asia-Pacific region and the new social dynamic is that 11.4 per cent claimed Chinese, East Asian, or Southeast Asian origins.\textsuperscript{178} In terms of immigration, the region is consistently Canada’s largest source of new immigrants. Over the past ten years 50.2 per cent of all new permanent residents have come from the Asia Pacific region.\textsuperscript{179} Given the influx of new citizens from the Asia-Pacific, the relatively slow pace of building new relations amongst Asian nations, and the non-confrontational nature of the ASEAN Way, it is very unlikely that seeking improved military relations will cause concerns with national unity. Indeed, instead of risking unity, the changing demographics of Canada make it likely that increased Asia-Pacific relations will help

\textsuperscript{177} Statistics Canada, \textit{Distribution of the Population, by Ethnic Group, Census Years 1941, 1951 and 1961}
bond a new generation of Canadians. It will also help ensure that increased Canadian presence in the Asia-Pacific is not only prestigious, but economically prosperous.

Increased military relations within the Asia-Pacific offer opportunities to achieve international prestige, the fourth of Holloway’s principles. The examples of both Australia and the United States are indicative of the significance attached to military relations. In a March 2010 statement following ASEAN-Australia discussions, Australia’s positive participation and leadership in regional security affairs was highlighted.\(^{180}\) Likewise, a statement from the first ASEAN-US leaders meeting in November 2009 stressed the importance of active role of the United States in regional security forums like the ARF.\(^{181}\) In the keeping with the tenets of the ASEAN Way, prestige through high level military relations has assisted both Australia and the United States in achieving more comprehensive regional influence. Canada has already received praise from ASEAN for efforts to improve regional security, including the 2006 ASEAN-Canada Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism.\(^{182}\) Military relations need not be grandiose to warrant recognition within the Asia-Pacific region. Prestige in the region will be earned through active participation in both low and high level military forums. Military assistance during any future disaster relief or humanitarian assistance missions will also reap significant recognition. Broadly speaking, taking a more active role in security and pursuing military relations will serve


as markers of Canadian interest in the region, thereby leading to increased prestige and willingness to include Canada in economic discourse.

The increased prestige and acceptance offered by military relations will also help achieve success in Holloway’s final principle – economic prosperity. As has been seen with the exclusion of Canada from both the East Asian Summits and the Trans Pacific Partnership, Canada is not viewed as important regional player. Job writes that the country’s lack of presence has led to a situation in which “Canada no longer appears on radar screens as an attentive and relevant participant in regional affairs.”

Evans believes that “despite the economic focus and absolute growth in the levels of trade, in relative terms Canada’s significance in Asia continues to slide.”

In a 2010 opinion poll for the Asia-Pacific Foundation of Canada, “62% of poll respondents believe Asian economies are vital to the well-being of Canada and 63% feel the relative strength of Asian economies during the recession underscores the importance of Canadian companies being involved in the region.”

Ensuring economic success in the Asia-Pacific will require Canada to become accepted as a regional player. With the growing influence of China, Twining writes that “most Asian states prefer a form of open regionalism that includes the United States and friendly powers like India and Australia. Smaller Asian states want to avoid the construction of ‘closed,’ Sinocentral regional institutions…”

Hence, as Canadian Asia-Pacific experts Boutilier and Evans both

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183 Job, Revitalizing Canada-Southeast Asia Relations: The TAC Gives Us a Ticket...but do we have a Destination?, 1.
184 P. Evans, "Canada and Asia Pacific's Track-Two Diplomacy," International Journal 64, no. 4 (Autumn, 2009), 1028.
185 Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, National Opinion Poll: Canadian Views on Asia, Final ReportAsia Pacific Foundation of Canada,(2010)).
186 Twining, Democratic Partnership in Asia, 65.
believe, there is an opportunity for Canada to increase influence in the region with an invigorated, proactive foreign policy. Taking a more active role in security and pursuing military relations will serve as markers of Canadian interest in the region, thereby leading to increased prestige and willingness to include Canada in economic discourse.

Applying Holloway’s criteria for a successful foreign policy action demonstrates that Canada has much to gain by improving military relations in the Asia-Pacific. While NATO will remain the preeminent focus of Canadian military relations for the foreseeable future, the rise of non-conventional threats will make the Asia-Pacific a vital aspect of Canada’s security. Concentrated efforts to forge military relations in the region will pay rich dividends in security. Equally important is that such relations would signify Canadian respect for the region’s rising influence. In doing so, Canada will gradually be accepted as a regional player to be included in the full spectrum of political, economic and security discussions. Hence, establishing improved military relations will offer significant rewards to Canada in the 21st Century. In light of changing Canadian demographics to include an increasing percentage with Asia-Pacific heritage, and the fact that improved military relations would likely be focused on discussion and peaceful exchange vice combat, seeking military relations will pose minimal risk to national unity and autonomy. There is little doubt that Canada should increase efforts to build military relations in the Asia-Pacific. The remaining aspect to investigate is how Canada can start building those relations.

187 Boutilier, Email James Boutilier/Rob Gillis March 1, 2011, Asia-Pacific Motivation for Closer Relations with Canada; Paul Evans, Email Paul Evans/Rob Gillis March 12, 2011, Asia-Pacific motivation for closer relations with Canada, (accessed March 12, 2011).
As a NATO partner, Canada currently devotes a great deal of resources to the alliance. The Canadian Forces (CF) has 527 permanent positions within NATO around the world. By contrast, the CF has an Asia-Pacific footprint of 21 in Australia and 14 throughout various embassies.\(^{188}\) Within the CF, Maritime Forces Pacific (MARPAC) has been urging increased military liaison with the Asia-Pacific. MARPAC has successfully argued for the creation of a billet at the Singapore Navy’s Information Fusion Center, which opened in 2009 and includes partners from throughout the Asia-Pacific. Having created the billet, however, the Navy has not been able to fill the billet due to other priorities. MARPAC has likewise recommended an exchange position within United States naval forces based in Japan, but the current priorities within the CF do not support such an initiative, despite apparent American interest.\(^{189}\) Given the size of Canada’s personnel commitment to NATO, it would seem reasonable to reassign a small fraction of billets and people to commence building military relations throughout the Asia-Pacific. In addition to seeking permanent representation within the military establishments of the region, the other key area for Canadian improvement is participation in regional military forums.

As witnessed by the plethora of organizations and discussion forums such as ASEAN, the ARF, APEC and the EAS, diplomatic influence in the Asia-Pacific is strongly linked to participation. From a military standpoint, there exist a few critical forums for increasing visibility, primarily the ARF, the Shangri-la Dialogue and the ASEAN Defence Ministers plus Eight meetings (ADMM +8). Canada is a member of

\(^{188}\) Department of National Defence, *Extract of CF Foreign Postings from Career Management Website 27 January 2011*, 2011

\(^{189}\) Richard Harrison, *Asia-Pacific Initiatives Brief to Cmdre M.R. Lloyd, A/Comd MARPAC 26 November, 2009*
the ARF and sends representatives to the Shangri-la Dialogue, but in both cases we rarely send high ranking officials such as the Defence Minister or Chief of Defence Staff. Instead, Canada consistently sends lower ranking officials which serves to devalue Canada’s perceived interest in the region. With respect to the ADMM +8, whose members include ASEAN states plus China, South Korea, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, India, Russia and the United States, Job states that “Canada has never been mentioned as a participant – its record at the Shangri-la Dialogue very probably being taken as a signal of disinterest.”190 By not prioritizing official dialogue in the Asia-Pacific higher Canada is missing out on a relatively simple and risk free avenue to improved relations.

Comparing the benefits of NATO with those of military relations in the Asia-Pacific reveals several key points. First, it must be acknowledged that NATO has achieved purpose in the post-Cold War era. To maintain security and relevance in the 21st Century Canada must remain an active member of NATO. Second, it must also be acknowledge that the Asia-Pacific is a region of growing importance and influence. Canada has significant economic and security interests in the region. To ignore the Asia-Pacific is to risk becoming irrelevant in a region that will lead the globe in the new century. Finally, Canada devotes huge military resources to NATO but essentially none to the Asia-Pacific. Such an imbalance is counterproductive to Canadian foreign policy interests in the region and can be addressed easily with the gradual allocation of

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190 Job, Revitalizing Canada-Southeast Asia Relations: The TAC Gives Us a Ticket...but do we have a Destination?, 6.
resources, proactively seeking military engagement opportunities and active membership in regional forums.

With personnel resources already stretched, Canada has limited capacity to achieve a significant permanent increase in military presence in the Asia-Pacific. However, in view of the region’s propensity to seek long term gradual change in the ASEAN Way, Canada needs only be creative in seeking engagement opportunities to gain acceptance and influence over the long term. Given the breadth of the Asia-Pacific, it is important that any Canadian efforts be focused at specific countries and/or organizations and within niche areas that will allow high return in terms of prestige and professional exchange, for relatively modest personnel and resource commitment. The first step towards such a commitment must be strategic guidance by the Canadian government. In July 2007 Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced a detailed plan to increase all facets of engagement in the Americas.\(^\text{191}\) No such strategic guidance has been promulgated for the Asia-Pacific, making it difficult for departments such as defence to attach any significant priority to the region. Should strategic guidance be forthcoming, there are several niche of military relations that could build influence in the Asia-Pacific.

Aside from existing bilateral agreements with the United States, Asia-Pacific states are reluctant to accept external assistance with security. Such beliefs are deeply entrenched in the non-interference principles of the TAC and the ASEAN Way in general. That being said, countries in the region are generally open to building relations

through exchanges, discussion forums, military education and low level exercises such as humanitarian assistance or disaster relief. Canada already has significant experience in each of these areas as part of the Partnership for Peace programme that aims to use military cooperation and education to build relations amongst many non-NATO states, particularly former Warsaw Pact states. In addition to direct military relations, Partnership for Peace focuses on academic research, dialogue and cooperation in security areas.\footnote{Partnership for Peace Consortium, "Historical Background | Partnership for Peace Consortium (PfPC) of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes," \url{http://www.pfpconsortium.org/about-us/historical-background} (accessed 4/18/2011, 2011).} Indeed, the Canadian Navy has already made some inroads into military dialogue in the Asia-Pacific. In October 2010, Canada was accepted as a full member of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), which now has 20 member states with interests in the Asia-Pacific. “WPNS is a Navy-to-Navy structure which aims to increase cooperation as well as to build trust and confidence between navies by providing a framework to enable the discussion of maritime issues of mutual interest, the exchange of information, the practice and demonstration of capabilities and the exchange of personnel.”\footnote{Department of National Defence, "Canada Awarded Full Member Status in the Western Pacific Naval Symposium October 26, 2010," \url{http://www.marketwire.com/press-release/Canada-Awarded-Full-Member-Status-in-the-Western-Pacific-Naval-Symposium-1341759.htm} (accessed 4/18/2011, 2011).} WPNS offers an excellent opportunity to build long term military relations and build confidence amongst regional partners. Likewise, Canada is already leveraging relationships with the United States to work with Asia-Pacific states. The biannual Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) brings together military units from throughout the region to build military relationships and interoperability. In 2010 the exercise had representation from 14 countries including South Korea, Japan, Indonesia, Singapore,
Malaysia and Thailand. Building upon its experience with Partnership for Peace and the relations gained in WPNS and exercises like RIMPAC, Canada has the opportunity to expand military engagement opportunities throughout the Asia-Pacific. In 2006, Australia commenced an initiative to train Philippine troops in tactics to counter military extremists. The training cost little to Australia in terms of personnel and money, but proved effective at both relation building and promoting regional stability. Such an example would be an excellent model for Canada. There are many niche roles such as training in maritime coastal defence, disaster relief, or terrorist interdiction which Canada could export for relatively small resource expenditures. The key is to identify the niche role and target country to maximize the mutual rewards. Such small steps towards greater military relations will eventually lead to substantial reward in terms of greater regional trust and acceptance.

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Conclusion

Since World War II, Canada has engaged in a multi-lateral foreign policy that sought influence and economic prosperity through a multitude of international initiatives. One of the Canada’s most successful achievements was being involved as a founding member of NATO. NATO placed Canada in a partnership of like minded states seeking common aims and goals. From its inception, NATO offered Canada security from attack and allowed the nation to prosper in an environment of peace. NATO also offered Canadian leaders entry into the decision making processes that shaped the modern world. The influence gained from alliance membership was, and continues to be, critical in shaping economic and political success within Europe. While NATO is primarily a collective security alliance, Canadian leaders have always viewed the military relations with NATO as a means to gain influence and importance in other areas of foreign policy.

As Canada enters the 21st Century, leaders are increasingly recognizing the requirement to establish political, economic and security influence within the Asia-Pacific. In 2010 President Obama again highlighted American interest in the Asia-Pacific. He stated that as President, he has “made it clear that the United States intends to play a leadership role in Asia. So we’ve strengthened old alliances; we've deepened new partnerships, as we are doing with China; and we’ve reengaged with regional organizations, including ASEAN.” 196 The United States and others have recognized the growing significance of being an active participant in Asia-Pacific affairs. Although Canada has a long history of relations throughout the region, there has been no consistent

196 Obama, Remarks by President Obama and President Triet of Vietnam at Opening of U.S.-ASEAN Leaders Meeting | the White House
long term engagement plan. With the recent accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, Canada’s government has opened the door to new influence opportunities. Fearful that failure to fully engage in the region will adversely affect Canadian acceptance and ability to influence decisions, Job writes that “it would be disastrous to leave early again. Already viewed by regional players as disinterested and minimally committed, if we find ourselves relegated to observer status in the next generation of Asia Pacific institutions, the promotion of Canadian interests and values will have little, if any, chance of success.” To ensure future relevance Canada must engage in a proactive Asia-Pacific policy.

As was the example with NATO, military relations offer benefits beyond simply security. Forging greater military relations throughout the Asia-Pacific will offer the benefits of greater security, greater acceptance, and greater influence over regional political and economic decisions. While Canada cannot significantly reduce its commitment to NATO, it is vital that the rising importance of the Asia-Pacific be recognized. Allocating even minor numbers of personnel resources towards military exchanges and exercises will begin fostering relations that transcend security. Also, Canada must recognize that key security forums such as ARF and the Shangri-la Dialogue require representation at the highest levels. Military leaders are influential throughout the Asia-Pacific and engaging them is a simple path to greater acceptance of Canada in all aspects of foreign policy. Canada can no longer afford to ignore the rising Asia-Pacific. The country must engage with a full spectrum of foreign policy measures

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197 Job, Revitalizing Canada-Southeast Asia Relations: The TAC Gives Us a Ticket...but do we have a Destination?, 6.
including greater military relations. In a region governed by the principles of informal consensus building and influence, military relations offer an opportunity to be perceived as a regional actor with valid credentials to participate in the broader forums that discuss social and economic issues.
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