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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES  
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EXERCISE/EXERCICE NEW HORIZONS

**Non-Traditional Military Training for Peace Support Operations: Content and Structure for Pre-Deployment**

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## **ABSTRACT**

This paper discusses the significant strides made by the Canadian Forces (CF) in pre-deployment training in terms of content and delivery. The central question presented is whether the pre-deployment training content and structure is still appropriate and sufficiently flexible to meet the exigencies of future, given the changing nature of peace support operations.

In terms of content, the identification and incorporation of non-traditional military training subjects in preparation for expeditionary missions is discussed. Following this, the development of a pre-deployment training structure which eventually led to the creation of the Peace Support Training Centre is described. In the wake of Canada's involvement in Afghanistan, individual pre-deployment training approach is beginning to change. This paper will show that the successful delivery of both general military and enduring non-traditional training is a result of the CF adapting training to fit need. The requirement for enhanced interoperability with civilian agencies, which constitutes the next iteration of non-traditional military training, is presented as one in which content and structure must cater to in order to remain relevant.

In view of the successful identification of training content as well as evidence of a responsive structure, it is concluded that CF pre-deployment training content and structure is still appropriate and sufficiently flexible to meet the exigencies of future overseas missions within the wider peace support operations spectrum.

## INTRODUCTION

Canada's military has long been renowned for its previous support and commitment to peacekeeping conducted under the auspices of the United Nations. These earlier deployments were perceived as a particular Canadian niche and one in which Canada was seen to have developed notable expertise. In less than two decades, the Canadian Forces have made significant strides in pre-deployment training, both in terms of content and delivery.

Today's global war against terrorism has significantly changed the manner in which the Canadian Forces have been employed since the fateful events of September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001. Indeed, the lion's share of training and preparations for expeditionary operations has shifted towards Canada's commitment to the Afghan theatre. Canada's current involvement in combat operations within a coalition context is bemoaned by some as a radical departure from our previous support for peacekeeping.<sup>1</sup> This shift away from the more "traditional" forms of peacekeeping has had an impact on the relatively recent pre-deployment training system that has been developed.

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that, notwithstanding the change in the form of oversea commitments, current CF pre-deployment training content and structure are still appropriate and sufficiently flexible to meet the exigencies of future overseas missions within the wider peace support operations spectrum.

In order to illustrate this, a review of the historical debate on the relative importance of *non-traditional* vice *conventional* military training in preparation for peace

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<sup>1</sup> Walter A. Dorn. "Canadian Peacekeeping: Proud Tradition, Strong Future?" *Canadian Foreign Policy*. Vol.12, No. 2 (Fall 2005): 26.

support operations (PSO) will be offered. It will show that the integration of non-traditional military training with conventional preparation for expeditionary operations is a relatively recent phenomenon in the CF and that little in terms of such formalized content and structure existed in the past.

The formalization of pre-deployment training both in terms of content and structure will then follow with a description of how the CF undertook to identify and incorporate non-traditional military training subjects in preparation for expeditionary missions. The paper will then illustrate the reasoning behind the development of a pre-deployment training structure which eventually led to the creation of the Peace Support Training Centre.


Canada's transition to complex peace support in Afghanistan and its impact on its pre-deployment training approach will be undertaken in order to demonstrate that established content has stood the test of time and that the structure for PSO preparations has demonstrated the requisite flexibility to be adaptive.

Finally, this paper will posit that the requirement for enhanced interoperability with civilian agencies will likely become the next iteration of non-traditional military training to prove necessary in today's modern peacekeeping context. This will be a future area for which content and structure of PSO preparation must be in a position to provide.

In the end, this paper's aim will be to show that the CF pre-deployment training content and structure is sound and responsive. By continuing to demonstrate its ability to adapt and include other emerging "non-traditional" training will ensure that the preparation of our service personnel remains relevant and effective.

## PREPARING FOR PSO VERSUS COMBAT: HISTORICAL DEBATE

There is no internationally recognized definition of what peacekeeping is. Indeed the term is nowhere to be found within the UN Charter. Current Canadian doctrine for PSO covers a wide breadth of operations in an attempt to address and recognize the changing nature of modern peace missions. For clarity and to limit scope, the term *peace support operations* will include all those historically requiring non-traditional military training circled in the figure below.



**Figure 1 – Peace Support and Related Operations**

Source: B-GL-005-307/FP-030 Peace Support Operations, 2-4.

The deployment of military personnel from Canada has involved two broad forms of commitments: individuals and formed units. Individual deployments are selected augmentation to a particular mission, normally in the form of Military Observers, Staff

Officers and specialists for the purposes of reinforcement, replacement or rotation.<sup>2</sup> Similarly, formed units, existing or composite, are deployed as a whole to a particular area and normally with specific tasks and objectives. Both forms of commitments have occurred concurrently throughout Canada's involvement in PSO either under the auspices of the UN, under the terms of multinational agreements or within coalition/Allied operations.

Interestingly, the involvement of these two types of commitment in PSO far outdates any efforts to formalize preparatory training and harmonize curriculum content. Indeed, the deliberate, focused and standardized training of members of the Canadian Forces for PSO is a relatively recent endeavor which came about in the years following the Cold War. Canada's level of enthusiasm for this form of military intervention has ranged from committing itself to *every* UN mission to being substantially less at the fore of troop contributions, if one is to discount Canada's current commitment to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

Some have been critical of what they considered as a retrenchment from a more useful, less aggressive, and less *American* form of expeditionary operations.<sup>3</sup> Interestingly however, a review of Canadian defence policy, even through the years where participation was at its zenith reveals that a "...consistent theme...has been that participation in peacekeeping operations is not a primary role of the Canadian Forces but

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<sup>2</sup> The Senate of Canada. Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Meeting New Challenges: Canada's Response to a New Generation of Peacekeeping*. n.p.( February 1993), 71.

<sup>3</sup> Dorn. "Canadian Peacekeeping: Proud Tradition, Strong Future?", 26.

a derived task.”<sup>4</sup> Military analyst and historian, Sean Maloney even argues that peacekeeping altruism, for which many Canadians feel a particular and defining attachment, is actually a myth and “was never meant to be the basis for future policy.”<sup>5</sup> He describes Canada’s activities in this domain as having more to do with supporting stabilization operations as a result of national interests rather than promoting peace for the sake of peace. Consequently, he downplays the contributions made by the CF in this form of expeditionary involvement, repeating the oft-quoted adage that there “...is no such thing as a Canadian peacekeeper...” only “Canadian soldiers on peacekeeping duty.”<sup>6</sup>

This contention is largely reflected in the recurring debate as to whether training for PSO is necessary as a *sine qua non* for success. Ever since the 1950s, with Canada’s participation as military observers in the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in 1954 and the deployment of the Canadian-inspired United Nations Emergency Force two years later,<sup>7</sup> questions as to what comprises appropriate preparations for such operations have surfaced. At issue is whether basic military training is, in and of itself, sufficient to prepare soldiers for such tasks. The polarization of perspectives spans the entire range. At one end is the belief that, by and large, CF members properly trained as a combat-capable force and appropriately equipped are best positioned to undertake the

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<sup>4</sup> The Senate of Canada. Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Meeting New Challenges...*, 10.

<sup>5</sup> Sean M. Maloney, “Reassessing Peacekeeping”, Article on-line; available from <http://www.seanmmaloney.com/pdfs/PK.pdf> ; Internet; accessed 5 January 2009.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.* 3.

<sup>7</sup> Col John Gardam. *The Canadian Peacekeeper*. (Burnstown: General Store Publishing House Inc., 1992), 13, 21.



wide-variety of tasks demanded of them during a PSO. Other's argue that the duties performed by peacekeepers are fundamentally different from true combat missions. As a result, specific and additional training is called for in order to reinforce and highlight the difference in this operating environment.<sup>8</sup> The latter, according to this author, is more compelling and is validated in the eventual recognition that specific training content is required for PSO. The following section will describe how this came to be.

## **IDENTIFYING CONTENT**

In testimony before the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs (SCONDVA) in 1993, the overall view by senior military leaders reflected the slight compromise that basic military training, supplemented by the provision of some topics unique to peacekeeping as well as mission-specific theatre information, would suffice. It was somewhat naively maintained that such training would be “all that is necessary to carry out a peacekeeping operation effectively and safely.”<sup>9</sup> This view was echoed in a report by the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, released earlier that same year, which agreed that success in peacekeeping rested on training that focused on general-purpose combat capabilities.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> House of Commons. Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs. *The Dilemmas of a Committed Peacekeeper: Canada and the Renewal of Peacekeeping*. No. 49, Tuesday, June 1, 1993, 23

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid*, 21.

<sup>10</sup> The Senate of Canada. Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Meeting New Challenges...*, 11.

Of note, however, is the fact that both the reports of the SCONDVA and the Senate Committee still advanced key recommendations aimed at enlarging the training curriculum for pre-deployment. These are summarized in Table 1.

**Table 1 – Key Curriculum Content Recommendations**

Senate Sub-Committee	SCONDVA
Dispute settlement and conflict management.	Conflict resolution, mediation and negotiation.
History, tradition, and culture.	Cultures, customs and practices.
Peacekeeping history and practices.	

Source: *Meeting New Challenges*, 11 and *The Dilemmas of a Committed Peacekeeper*, 25.

While acceptance for such topics to be included in pre-deployment training grew, their inclusion in any formal and standardized manner lagged behind. The release of the long-awaited 1994 Defence White Paper did little to expedite the adoption of these subjects into a deliberate training regimen. As military academic Norman Hillmer noted:

...the government's 1994 Defence White Paper came down definitively on the side of a combat-capable, multipurpose armed force as the best foundation... It was precisely the kind of flexible force, equipped and trained for battle, that National Defence Headquarters had always said provided the best peacekeepers.<sup>11</sup>

A turning point, which forced the CF to re-examine what constituted necessary integrants of pre-deployment training, came as a result of the ill-fated mission in Somalia. This mission "...perhaps was the most telling example of the failure of the traditional

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<sup>11</sup> Norman Hillmer. "Canadian Peacekeeping: New and Old". *Proceedings of the 21<sup>st</sup> Colloquium of the International Commission of Military History: Peacekeeping 1815 to Today*. (Quebec: Canadian Commission of Military History, 1995). 542.

approach to peacekeeping.”<sup>12</sup> In its wake, the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia was convened and concluded that, in terms of training, “...on almost every count the Somalia mission must rate as a significant failure.”<sup>13</sup>

In support of the work undertaken by the Commission, a study into Non-Traditional Military Training was conducted which, building on the work of SCNDVA and the Senate Committee, further delved into the issue as to the right balance between training for peacekeeping and training for combat. From the outset this study clearly maintained that general combat readiness is “the fundamental strength of the Canadian Military and that peacekeeping training extrapolates from, and builds upon, such general-purpose combat training.”<sup>14</sup> That having been said, the study team quickly noticed the *ad hoc* and disparate nature of pre-deployment training which existed in the CF up until that point. It noted that, although some of the training given included some UN and mission-specific topics, it was inadequate by virtue of a lack of “a traditional, structured sequence of concept/doctrine/standards/training in existence for peacekeeping.”<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Paul LaRose-Edwards, Jack Dangerfield, and Randy Weekes. *Non-Traditional Military Training for Canadian Peacekeepers: a study prepared for the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia*. (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997), 2.

<sup>13</sup> Department of National Defence. “Report of the Somalia Commission Inquiry”. <http://www.dnd.ca/somalia/somaliae.htm>; Internet; accessed 6 December 2008. Training was but one area for which the commission noted serious failings. Others related areas included Leadership, Accountability, Chain of Command, Discipline, Mission Planning, Suitability, Rules of Engagement and Operational Readiness.

<sup>14</sup> LaRose-Edwards, Dangerfield, and Weekes. *Non-Traditional Military Training for Canadian Peacekeepers...*, 3.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.* 29.

In fact, due to the absence of a national and institutionalized approach to pre-deployment training, immense variation existed within the Land Forces in terms of standards and foci.<sup>16</sup> As for collective training, brigades and even individual units were left to their own devices. For individuals, such as military observers and staff officers, training varied from of a series of briefings over the course of eight days to, in many cases, individuals deploying without the benefit of any preparation at all.<sup>17</sup>

In its effort to identify a better training approach, both in terms of content and delivery, the study noted the manner in which “[s]ome countries, such as those in Scandinavia, have been more enthusiastic in embracing peacekeeping-specific training.”<sup>18</sup> Indeed, a look at the Scandinavian model of peacekeeping preparation is warranted since its very premise is that training for such missions is distinct from that required for general combat operations.

As early as 1965, the Scandinavian model has underlined that peacekeeping is “far more like armed police work than like combat...”<sup>19</sup> It is acknowledged that this model was (and still is) based on only one type of operation within the spectrum of peace support. However it provided nonetheless a framework for consideration in terms of subject matter and structure which guided initial Canadian efforts to find a balanced

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<sup>16</sup> The Land Force was the principal focus for PSO pre-deployment training since this the vast majority of service personnel deployed on these operations came from this element.

<sup>17</sup> Department of National Defence. “From the Peace Support Training Centre, Canada’s Centre of Excellence for Peace Support Operations Training”, *The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin*, Vol.2. No. 4 (Winter 1999), 21.

<sup>18</sup> LaRose-Edwards, Dangerfield, and Weekes. *Non-Traditional Military Training for Canadian Peacekeepers...*,5.

<sup>19</sup> Richard N. Swift, “United Nations Military Training for Peace.” *International Organization*, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Spring 1974): 267; available from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706397>; Internet; accessed 14 January 2009.

solution.<sup>20</sup> The Scandinavian model, with its dedicated training establishments was principally aimed at preparing UN military observers and staff officer. The topics covered are summarized in Table 2.

**Table 2 - UN Staff Officers and Military Observer Course - Subject Matter**

<b>Subjects</b>	<b>Topics Covered</b>
General Orientation	UN History, objectives and organization Foreign policy problems Legal and medical issues of UN Service
UN Peacekeeping Operations	Political conditions Economic, racial, religious and security issues Relations between UN Forces and local authorities and population Account of operations Tactical use of UN units
Staff Duties (Staff Officers only)	Administrative principles and procedures UN Command arrangements <i>UN Administrative Handbook</i>
Observer Duties	Basic matters of 'survival' Negotiation Operation room duties Practical exercises in the above
Communication	Radio procedure Incident report
Transport	Cross-country driving

Source: Swift, *United Nations Military Training for Peace*, 271

Taken together with the recommended curriculum content promulgated by both the SCONDVA and Senate Committee reports, clear trends in what should form the unique training content for peacekeeping operations began to emerge. A few years later, a partnership of academics and experts would lend support to these common training

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<sup>20</sup> Furthermore, the model was instrumental in the eventual promulgation of United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. *United Nations Military Observers Handbook*, First Draft. (Turin: International Training Centre of the ILO, 1995) which forms the basis for practically all international Military Observer training, including Canada.

themes with its determination of the constituents of “Common Basic Content” in peacekeeping training.<sup>21</sup> They are listed at Table 3.

**Table 3 – Common Basic Content Identified by the Challenge Project**

<b>Common Basic Content</b>
Language
SOPs
CIMIC
UN Background and Doctrinal Principles
Negotiations Techniques
Public Information (Public Affairs)
Combat/Survival Skills
International Law
Gender
Safety and Security
Medical
Attitude

Source: The Challenges Project, *Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21<sup>st</sup> Century – Concluding report 1997-2002*, 238.

Increasingly, the leadership of the CF accepted that peacekeeping-specific topics should be taught. However, the precise manner in which this training would be conducted became the issue, particularly under the challenges of decreasing military budget and smaller force size which existed at the time. In fairness, it must be mentioned that the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (DCDS), in response to the SCONDVA and Senate Committee reports, initiated a survey to determine how CF training compared to UN standards. This led to a DCDS Directive which delineated training requirements for both deploying individual and formed units. Due to a lack of a national practical authority to see to the execution of the directive however, there was little evidence of

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<sup>21</sup> The Challenges Project, *Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21<sup>st</sup> Century – Concluding report 1997-2002*, (Stockholm: Elanders Gotab, 2002), 238

response.<sup>22</sup> Having developed some sort of consensus on what should be taught, there was no CF entity designed or tasked with overseeing any aspect training content and delivery. A general extension of both logic and practicality pointed, not surprisingly, to the need for some form of structure. The following section will delineate how this structure was developed.

## SEEKING STRUCTURE

Discussions related to the establishment of a permanent peacekeeping training centre for the CF were raised and seriously considered during the preparation of both reports as a way to improve training delivery. In fact, a formal proposal for a national peacekeeping training centre had been submitted to then Prime Minister Mulroney in September 1991.<sup>23</sup> In the end, only the SCONDVA report actually put forward the recommendation to create such an entity. The Senate report, while acknowledging its potential value, determined that it was not feasible given the fiscal limitations of the Department of Defence at that time.<sup>24</sup> Still, the idea of such an organization remained convincing. As would be later remarked by a partnership of peacekeeping experts and academics, “Without such systemization, training represents little more than ad hoc

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<sup>22</sup> LaRose-Edwards, Dangerfield, and Weekes. *Non-Traditional Military Training for Canadian Peacekeepers...*, 21

<sup>23</sup> CFB Cornwallis: Canada’s Peacekeeping Training Centre. *A Proposal Submitted to: The Right Honourable Brian Mulroney Prime Minister of Canada*. (Annapolis Royal: Common Security Consultants, 1991), 6. This was the first proposal put forth for what was to later become known as the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre. However, at no time did the CF consider conducting pre-deployment training other than “in-house”, nor was the PPC ever intended to fulfill the requirement for comprehensive CF in-house trg.

<sup>24</sup> The Senate of Canada. Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Meeting New Challenges...*, 73.

responses to mission needs, driven by the 'gifted amateurism' that has no doubt been successful in some areas..."<sup>25</sup>

Indications that the CF was beginning to seriously consider the creation of a peacekeeping training centre was demonstrated by a briefing note sent to the Vice Chief of Defence Staff (VCDS) in late 1994. In it a proposal was made to establish a centre which would train individuals deploying on operations, assist commands and units, develop policy and standards, and initiate foreign training assistance. After lengthy communications between the VCDS, DCDS and Land Forces Command (LFC), mostly related to issues of command and control, identification of tasks, location, and funding, the VCDS approved the concept of a training centre in May 1995. The release of the Report of the Somalia Commission Inquiry in December of that year renewed the sense of urgency for the establishment of a peacekeeping training centre. By March 1996, an activation order from National Defence Headquarters officially created the Peace Support Training Centre.<sup>26</sup>

The Peace Support Training Centre opened its doors on 29 July 1996. It was given the following mission: "To provide a nucleus of expertise within the CF responsible for the development of peace support techniques based on lessons learned, training methodology, training standards and the provision of training and training support."<sup>27</sup>

Its initial tasks were to:

- "train CF and other individuals selected for peace support positions;

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<sup>25</sup> The Challenges Project, *Challenges of Peace Operations...*, 234.

<sup>26</sup> Maj B.G. Jackson, *PSTC Working Group*, (Canadian Forces Base Kingston: Powerpoint Presentation) 30 April 1998. 8.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.* 14.



- provide training assistance to Commands, NDHQ, other departments and other countries;
- conduct validation and evaluation of peace support training conducted by PSTC and Commands;
- coordinate the development of peace support trg standards, SOPs and instructional material; and
- conduct liaison with Pearson Peacekeeping Center and other centres of expertise.”<sup>28</sup>


The PSTC began to fulfil some of its tasks almost immediately, conducting the first pre-deployment training on 19 August 1996 for the 49<sup>th</sup> rotation of CF members departing for service with the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). All other training followed on 1 September 1996.<sup>29</sup> From the outset, it was clear that the initial establishment of just five CF members dedicated to these responsibilities would present some challenges to the organization, a fact that was recognized in the study conducted for the Somalia Commission Inquiry.<sup>30</sup> Figure 2 below depicts the initial organisation upon stand-up.

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<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.* 15.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.* 8.

<sup>30</sup> LaRose-Edwards, Dangerfield, and Weekes. *Non-Traditional Military Training for Canadian Peacekeepers...*, 40.




**Figure 2- PSTC Initial Organization 1996**

True to the predictions, manning did prove to be insufficient to keep up with the workload to fulfil its tasks. Coupled with “mission creep” which saw additional expectations placed on the under-staffed unit, the PSTC soon determined that it needed to reorganize its structure to fulfil its attributed tasks. The Centre subsequently set out to hire a number of Reserve Force members, with limited success, to fill the positions while concurrently making the case to the Chain of Command for greater resource apportionment.<sup>31</sup> Figure 3 illustrates the reorganized structure.

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<sup>31</sup> Jackson, *PSTC Working Group...*, 33.



**Figure 3 – PSTC Organisation Chart - Fall 1997**

Source: Capt S.M. Plourde, *PSTC General Briefing - Training Delivery*.

Resultantly, within three years, the size of the PSTC grew from five to thirty-one members. They were organized into three teams for in-house training delivery, a training assistance team to support contingent pre-deployment training, a skeletal standards cell to begin work on training evaluation and validation, as well as a limited training resources cell.<sup>32</sup> The initial PSTC training offerings consisted of a Peace Support Operations – Basic, as well as a Military Observer course. Both courses included the following scope of material found at Table 4.

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<sup>32</sup> Department of National Defence. “From the Peace Support Training Centre, Canada’s Centre of Excellence for Peace Support Operations Training”, *The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin*, Vol.2. No. 4 (Winter 1999), 21.

**Table 4 – PSTC: Initial Scope of Material**

Peace Support Operations - General
Mission and Mission Area Information
Peace Support Duties
Mine Awareness
Hostage Survival Skills
Preventive Medicine
Media Awareness
Equipment Recognition
Stress Management
Application of Force
Administration, Benefits & Allowances

Source: Maj B.G. Jackson, *PSTC Working Group*,

The scope of material covered in the training provided by the PSTC reflected the various recommendations made to incorporate non-traditional military training topics to provide mission specific knowledge and skills. They were also aimed at increasing confidence and reducing stress and risk from all perils normally associated with peacekeeping duty.

Prior to the establishment of the PSTC, there was a lack of any systematic measurement concerning the validity of certain topics within pre-deployment training. One 2002 study conducted in conjunction with the PSTC was able to address certain aspects of quantitative validity analysis.<sup>33</sup> By utilizing the data collected as part of the ongoing validation of training conducted by the standards cell at the PSTC, the researcher was able to employ the results of 119 sample surveys and interviews conducted by PSTC staff in actual peace support theatres. Analysis of the data revealed that members were using the majority of the training given and that at least half the members were using all the training topics to varying degrees. The study concluded that the topics covered

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<sup>33</sup> Megan M. Thompson, "CF Augmentees In-theatre Assessments of Peace Support Operations Predeployment Training", Technical Report TR 202-187, (Toronto: Defence Research and Development Canada. November 2002).

during the pre-deployment training were appropriate and actually used by the members during their tours.<sup>34</sup>

Through the next decade, the PSTC established itself as a relevant organization for training individuals for deployment as well as assisting units to do the same. Even by 1998, the PSTC was providing additional assistance over and above the standard pre-deployment topics. For example, it provided for the first time, a tactical psychological operations (PSYOPS) course to selected members of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment deploying to the former Yugoslavia under the NATO Stabilization Forces.<sup>35</sup> In its role as Centre of Expertise, the PSTC produced training guidelines as well as course training plans.

Liaison with other centres of expertise was enhanced by its membership to the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres, founded by the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre. Through this body, the CF was afforded direct linkages into the Integrated Training Services of the UN Department of peacekeeping Operations, as well as an international network of peer organisations.<sup>36</sup> Of equal importance, it began to garner credibility and praise within the army and amongst trainees.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.* iv.

<sup>35</sup> Capt S.M. Plourde, *Military Information Support Team – Introductory Training Package and End-course Review*, (Canadian Forces Base Kingston: file 4640-20/9721), 28 May 1998.

<sup>36</sup> International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres, “Newsletter 208, No. 1.” <http://www.iaptc.org/index.html>; Internet; accessed 7 December, 2008.

<sup>37</sup> Department of National Defence. “PSTC is Not for Everyone”, *Army News*, 19 September 2007. [http://www.army.gc.ca/lf/english/6\\_1\\_1.asp?id=2255](http://www.army.gc.ca/lf/english/6_1_1.asp?id=2255); Internet; accessed 9 December 2008.

As seemingly successful as it may have seemed, proof of organizational flexibility can only be shown by its responsiveness to change. In the following section, the PSTC's ability to adapt will be discussed.

## **CONTENT AND STRUCTURE UNDER CHANGE**

Appreciatively, 11 September 2001 changed the global security dynamic and there is little argument that the nature of CF expeditionary operations in the years that followed had been refocused. This would soon force the PSTC and indeed the CF to re-examine once again the manner in which it would need to position itself for future operations.

Throughout contemporary Canadian history, numerous CF overseas missions came and went with many being of short duration. Still, a few long-standing commitments which had been previously large consumers of pre-deployment training services offered by the PSTC came to a close during the last five years. These included the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) which ended in December 2004 and the UNDOF for which Canada ceased its contribution in March 2006.<sup>38</sup> During that same period, the PSTC saw the number of its Basic Peace Support Operations course, which comprised 88 percent of the training calendar in 2002-03, drop to 45 percent five years later.<sup>39</sup>

Still, the PSTC continued to provide training and diversify the courses offered. The provision of training included a variety of Information Operations (IO) based

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<sup>38</sup>Department of National Defence. "Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command - Past Operations", <http://www.comfec-cefcom.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/pastops-eng.asp>; Internet; accessed 20 January 2009.

<sup>39</sup>M.A. Rudderham, "Canada and United Nations peace operations: Challenges, opportunities, and Canada's response", *International Journal*, Vol. 63, No. 2 (Spring 2008): 381.

training such as the Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Operators Course, as well as PSYOPS Analyst, PSYOPS Disseminator and PSYOPS Officer courses. Along with the Directors of PSYOPS and CIMIC,<sup>40</sup> staff at PSTC are engaged in to the development of these emerging capabilities as well as planning for the release of an IO Staff Officer course.<sup>41</sup>


In January 2007, Land Forces Doctrine and Training Systems (LFDTS) higher commander's intent signaled that focus was to be placed on maintaining a training system aimed at producing military members ready for combat. Under this direction, the Commandant of the PSTC recognized that "[o]ur initial mandate of pre-deployment training for essentially UN missions is increasingly a minor part of what we do."<sup>42</sup> The nature of CF commitments therefore necessitated some internal reorganization within the PSTC in order to refocus efforts and resources to the increasing demands created by combat operations in the Afghan theatre. As a result, the structure evolved to respond to this requirement. Its most current iteration is shown in figure 4.

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<sup>40</sup> Both are strategic staff within the PSTC's parent organization, the Land Forces Doctrine and Training System.

<sup>41</sup> LCol R.T. Steward, *Peace Support Training Centre Operations and Resource Plan 2007-08*, (Canadian Forces Base Kingston: file 7000-3 (Cmdt)), 15 January 2007. 5/8

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.* 1/8.



**Figure 4 – PSTC Current Structure 2008**

Source, 1326-1 (Adj) Annex B, PSTC Annual Historic Report 31 Mar 2008

The manner in which the PSTC’s organizational structure alone has evolved over the course of the last decade demonstrates how the unit (and ultimately the CF) has adapted to meet its expeditionary mission requirements. This change cannot be seen as being entirely unpredictable. Renewed focus on combat capability in complex operations is clearly emphasized in Canada’s International Policy Statement (2005) with its call, among other things, that forces be prepared for 3-block war in the context of failed and failing states.<sup>43</sup> Indeed, this policy statement specifically points out that;

With a few exceptions, most of the Canadian Forces’ major operations have borne no resemblance to the traditional peacekeeping model of

<sup>43</sup> Department of National Defence *Canada’s International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World*, (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 2005), 5.



lightly armed observers supervising a negotiated ceasefire. Missions are now far more complex and dangerous, with our troops frequently deployed to failed and failing states such as Haiti and Afghanistan where there is little if any peace to keep.<sup>44</sup>

Hence, it can be said that ‘the writing was on the wall’ and explains the PSTC’s current vision which sees the unit establishing and maintaining itself as a mission-specific, relevant and required trainer of individuals (CF and Whole of Government) in the context of Foreign Service Operations. (FSO) It seeks to achieve this by: maintaining, but moving *beyond a UN focused mindset*<sup>45</sup>; adopting an all encompassed approach to FSO training with emphasis on IO and other war winning enablers; exploiting IO support to operations; and embracing and exploiting the comprehensive Whole of Government approach to operations.<sup>46</sup>

In late summer 2008, a notice of intent was released by Commander LFDTs signaling a significant redirection in the manner in which pre-deployment training would henceforth be delivered by the PSTC. Entitled the *Individual Pre-Deployment Training Modernization Initiative*, the notice explained that the Individual Pre-deployment course (formerly known as the basic PSO course, mentioned earlier) did not “fully train personnel for deployment with respect to our current theatre of operations...”<sup>47</sup> This

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<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.* 8.

<sup>45</sup> Italics added.

<sup>46</sup> Peace Support Training Centre, “Mission Statement.” [http://armyapp.dnd.ca/pstc-cfsp/mission\\_e.asp](http://armyapp.dnd.ca/pstc-cfsp/mission_e.asp); Internet; accessed 22 November 2008.

<sup>47</sup> MGen J.M.M Hainse, Individual Pre-Deployment Training Modernization Initiative (Land Forces Doctrine and Training System Kingston: file3500-1 (G3)), 31 August 2008. 1/2.

redirection aimed to “create a modernized, exportable, and comprehensive training package that will generate trained personnel for select expeditionary operations.”<sup>48</sup>

The Commander’s guidance to the PSTC followed shortly thereafter. It directed that a substantial revamping of pre-deployment training content take place, placing increased emphasis on providing “...the enhanced skill sets and knowledge requisite to fight and survive as a member of the CF on current expeditionary operations.”<sup>49</sup> As such, pre-deployment training would now be formulated into a package that incorporated both Individual Battle Task Standards (IBTS) as well as Theatre Mission Specific Training (TMST). This revamping however, did not result in the removal of the non-traditional military training components. If anything, their retention (though some subjects were essentially renamed or expanded) serves as a further validation. Table 5 below provides a comparison to earlier course content.

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<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.* 2/2.

<sup>49</sup> MGen J.M.M Hainse, *Pre-Deployment Training Commander’s Guidance* (Land Forces Doctrine and Training System Kingston: file3500-1 (G3)), 5 September 2008. 3/9.

**Table 5 – Comparison of Content New/Old Individual Pre-deployment course**

<b>New Individual Pre-deployment course (Combined IBTS/TMST )<sup>50</sup></b>	<b>Previous Individual Pre-deployment course (Formerly Basic PSO Crse)<sup>51</sup></b>
Fire the Service Rifle – Personal Weapon Test	<b>Not covered (home unit responsibility)</b>
Throw grenades	
Fire the 9mm service pistol	
Fire the C-6 GPMG	
Perform Individual Field Craft	
Navigate	
Perform CBNR Defence	
Convoy Drills	
All Arms Call for Fire	
Military First Aid	
Fitness	
Conduct After Capture	Hostage Survival Skills
Explosive Threat and Hazard Awareness	Mine Awareness
Initial Operational Brief	Peace Support Operations – General Mission and Mission Area Information
Apply the Law of Armed Conflict/Code of Conduct	Application of Force
Principles of Use of Force	
Apply Rules of Engagement	
AFV Recognition	Equipment Recognition
Stress Management	
Preventative Medicine	
Information Security	
Cultural and language Awareness	
Media Awareness	
Not Covered	Peace Support Duties
	Administration, Benefits & Allowances

The comparison table above indicates substantially greater combat related training than that which was given previously. Yet, it is important to understand that the IBTS portions were by and large the responsibilities of home units and those individuals attending former iterations of the course were expected to have completed them. It was the experience of this author that this was often not the case, due to time constraints or

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<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.* 5/9.

<sup>51</sup> Jackson, *PSTC Working Group...*, 17.

the inability of the home units to provide such training due to lack of resources and/or training areas.<sup>52</sup> As such, although seemingly indicative of increased emphasis being placed on combat skills over traditional “peacekeeping” activities, the renewed IPC is more of a transfer of responsibility. Table 5 demonstrates that, for the most part, non-traditional military training content remains solidly embedded.

In the wake of change in terms of training focus, PSO training content has revealed itself to be enduring and appropriate. In terms of structure, the PSTC has demonstrated that it could respond effectively to a changing global environment by adapting itself and providing value added training. In the following section, continued efforts to catering to future needs will further demonstrate the CF pre-deployment training approach validity.

## **ASSESSMENT AND FUTURE**

The most recent Canadian PSO doctrine maintains that “the best core training to meet the diverse demands of PSO is general-purpose military training with emphasis on basic combat and occupational skills.”<sup>53</sup> This is not a statement of preference. Rather, it is one borne from experience in PSO of which Canada can certainly boast. Even during the 1990s when Canada contributed substantially to the UN in terms of numbers, it was recognized that missions in places such as Somalia and the former Yugoslavia “have

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<sup>52</sup> This was often the case where CF members came from Naval , Air Force or smaller bases that either did not have sufficient qualified personnel to conduct the training, suitable infrastructure or proper equipment.

<sup>53</sup> Department of National Defence. B-GJ-005-307/FP-030 *Peace Support Operations*, (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2002), 9-1.

emphasized the absolute need for combat readiness for peacekeeping.”<sup>54</sup> The current level of CF commitment to operations in Afghanistan, shouldered predominantly by the army, has had a not-so-surprising effect on its training philosophy and the management of its training resources. Yet, the inclusion of non-traditional military training that has been formally built into the pre-deployment regimen since 1996 demonstrates no likelihood of decreasing even in light of the type of PSO the CF has undertaken in recent years. The modernization efforts initiated recently by the CF are a natural evolution of content and structure following need. The ability of the PSTC to evolve in accordance with training requirements is a testament of its purpose. An organization that invigilates training requirements for overseas operations acts as a deliberate focal point to ensure consistency and structure.

In order to remain viable, training must be relevant and adaptable while maintaining core attributes which have been based on experience and lessons learned. As one researcher summarized;

The complexity of operations and of the context in which military, police, and civilians are being deployed also underscores the fact that there are no – and nor should there be – “one-size-fits-all” models of peace operations...In order to be effective peace operations must portray a balance between flexibility and coherence.<sup>55</sup>

Canada First Defence Strategy does not mention support to PSO as one of the CF core missions. Instead it mentions as future focus, the ability to “Lead and/or conduct a

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<sup>54</sup> LaRose-Edwards, Dangerfield, Weekes. *Non-Traditional Military Training for Canadian Peacekeepers...*, 2

<sup>55</sup> Kristine St-Pierre, *Then & Now: Understanding the Spectrum of Complex Peace Operations*, (Ottawa: Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 2008), 1; available from [http://www.peaceoperations.org/\\_CMS/Files/Paper\\_ComplexPeaceOps\\_no%20locks.pdf](http://www.peaceoperations.org/_CMS/Files/Paper_ComplexPeaceOps_no%20locks.pdf); Internet; accessed 2 December 2008.

major international operation for an extended period...<sup>56</sup> Future missions are likely to take place in failed or failing states, regardless of sponsoring agency. These operations will certainly entail a greater *team* approach, meaning the model will incorporate greater multi-agency participants. The current and likely future operating environment is well illustrated by the comment below;

Afghanistan represents today's quintessential peace support operation. And not only do peace support operations involve joint army, navy and air force responses, they also demand a pan-Government of Canada (GoC) approach. In Afghanistan, the GoC strategy is called the '3D' approach as it combines diplomatic, developmental and defence efforts. Canadian diplomats are assisting the Afghan people rebuild their country's institutions; Canadian aid workers are undertaking numerous humanitarian and long-term development projects, and CF troops are contributing to the stability needed for the other two groups to succeed in their work.<sup>57</sup>

The entire philosophy behind the 3-block war entails the potential for combat, humanitarian and reconstructions occurring simultaneously and in proximity. Pre-deployment training, it follows, must cater to all these scenarios. Hence, divergence away from the need for non-traditional military training is not likely since its requirement seems stronger than ever before. What the current operating environment demonstrates however is that non-traditional military training today needs to be expanded to incorporate new areas of focus.

A specific concept which further underscores this point is that of the *Provincial Reconstruction Teams*. This joint military and civilian structure, introduced as a method of transition from combat to stabilization operations, falls squarely in the post-conflict

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<sup>56</sup> Department of National Defence. *Canada First Defence Strategy*. (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 2008), 10.

<sup>57</sup> Lane Anker. "Peacekeeping and Public Opinion." *Canadian Military Journal*. Vol. 6, No. 2 (Summer 2005): 26.

phase of current CF PSO doctrine. As seen in the Afghan theatre, it is a concept favoured by the CF, but one where training for it (and any other team approach) has been seen as an area for improvement. One study concluded that;

There remains considerable difficulty in getting the “Whole of Government” team together for early and extended training in preparation for field employment. Everyone agrees that once deployed, the teams are committed to “making it work” and they generally do. However, most of those involved stated that this often took up to two months as people grappled with different “operational” philosophies, procedures and organizational cultures. Continued efforts to bring the right team together in a timely manner for the appropriate training remains necessary.<sup>58</sup>

As has been seen, the PSTC has expanded its non-kinetic training repertoire to include CIMIC. Yet, there is work in this area that can be pursued in order to enhance understanding and cooperation, both in terms of content and structure. The contemporary reality for military forces is increasingly the necessity for effective interoperability with civilian components. Military and civilian partners training as teams will therefore subsume greater importance and contribute to enhanced understanding of one another’s strength and limitations. This will form the *new* non-traditional military training subjects requiring further development.

As such, pre-deployment training will likely mature to include this new component as it continues to evolve and is an area which the CF must pursue. As it stands, current content has been expanded and structure adapted to cater to these evolving requirements thereby supporting its appropriateness.

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<sup>58</sup> Department of National Defence. “Broadsword or Rapier: The Canadian Forces’ Involvement in 21<sup>st</sup> Century Coalition Operations”. *CDS Critical Topic Number 6 Project Report*, CFLI TR 2008-01. (Kingston: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute. April 2008), 43.

## Conclusion

This paper has examined the debate as to the relative importance of *non-traditional* vice *conventional* military training in preparation for PSO. It has shown that while conventional military training has and will always form the fundamentals of the CF's ability to conduct PSO, there has been a realization and acceptance that non-traditional military training needs to be integrated in the preparation for these operations. Further, it has been demonstrated that non-traditional military training requires formalized content and structure in order to be properly delivered.

Various UN-inspired, mission-specific subjects have been delineated in order to demonstrate that these recurring themes form the basis of non-traditional military training which the CF has incorporated into its pre-deployment regimen. The validity of these subjects has been demonstrated by their continued use in pre-deployment training, regardless of mission. In the end, the aim has been achieved in that non-traditional military training has been embedded in preparations for expeditionary ops. While UN-specific training has waned recently, it is only a reflection of the current focus of operations. It is still possible, and easy, to return to the more traditional peacekeeping since the underlying enhanced tenets remain in place.

In terms of structure, it has been argued that the creation of the PSTC was a key milestone in Canada's approach to pre-deployment training, affording the services a central body to formally invigilate PSO training in a consistent and standardized fashion. Demonstrated by its ability to adjust and expand its training curriculum, the PSTC has shown itself to be relevant to CF pre-deployment methodology.



Finally, the operating environment of complex peacekeeping is increasingly being seen as involving the concept of the 3-block war. Hence component such as Provincial Reconstructions Teams and multiple agencies under a Whole of Government approach will likely continue to be present. The future realm of non-traditional military training will therefore require the CF (and other participating militaries) to place greater practical emphasis on enhancing interoperability with the variety of agencies that now function within the operational landscape. This new training requirement will likely form the next iteration of non-traditional military training.

The number of UN operations taking place today is greater than any time in the UN's history.<sup>59</sup> With a likely change in global dynamics brought about by a new US administration, international cooperation in the resolution of inter and intra-state conflict may increase.<sup>60</sup> As a result, invitations for Canadian participation in future PSO are almost assured, either under the aegis of the UN, or in a multinational coalition or alliance context.

The CF has a bounden duty to prepare its member to be valued and effective components of the larger team approach to stabilizing and steering inter and intra state conflict towards normalcy. As it stands, it is concluded that the current individual pre-deployment training approach is appropriate and sufficiently flexible to meet the exigencies of future overseas missions within the wider peace support operations spectrum.

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<sup>59</sup> Center on International Cooperation, *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2008 - Briefing Paper*. New York: New York University, 12 March 2008, 2; available from <http://www.cic.nyu.edu/internationalsecurity/docs/Final2008briefingreport.pdf>; accessed 6 January 2009.

<sup>60</sup> United States of America, "The Whitehouse Agenda: Foreign Policy", [http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/foreign\\_policy/](http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/foreign_policy/); Internet; accessed 2 March 2009.

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