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TRANSFORMATION: UNIFICATION FOR THE RIGHT REASONS

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ABSTRACT

With the implementation of CF Transformation there has been a renewed interest on unification with comparisons to The Canadian Armed Forces Reorganization Act in 1967. Both these initiatives sought to create a single unified national command and control structure for the CF. Motivation for unification with then Minister of National Defence Paul Hellyer was for administrative and economic efficiency, while CF Transformation through then Chief of Defence Staff General Rick Hillier, sought improved operational effectiveness to accomplish clear government direction towards military employment.

CF Transformation is distinct from unification by virtue of being a military command-led restructuring initiative to accomplish government policy in the contemporary environment. It does, however, risk suffering the same fate as unification by remaining an incomplete process, having at this time only reorganized the operational command HQs, leaving the force generation responsibility in the hands of the three Environmental Chiefs. As these three environments still see themselves as distinct entities, they will continue to foster the strong service idea within the military members. Consequently, the sought after unified culture required to operate as one cohesive single service in the CF will remain hard to achieve.

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INTRODUCTION

The twenty first century began with an uneasy optimism. The forecasted catastrophe of the Y2K bug proved to be overblown, and those who had suffered from the Dotcom crash saw signs of a recovery. The situation changed drastically however, following the events of September 11, 2001. The United States declared a war on terrorism. NATO announced its intent to fulfill the requirements of Article 5, and therefore was on a war footing along with the US. Towards a similar end, Australia evoked Article IV of the ANZUS treaty. Canada for its part faced some tough policy decisions with few resources being readily available following years of cutbacks during the last decade when the government was attempting to get control of deficit spending. It had to re-adjust from an almost exclusive focus on peace support operations and the shame of failure in Somalia and orient efforts towards an as-of-yet undefined enemy.

Accordingly, Canada had a military that was steadily cut in personnel and funding over the previous decade along with most other government departments. A focus on reduced spending, domestic issues and peacekeeping in the Balkans and Haiti, had left the government at large ill prepared for a coherent national contribution to the new threats now facing friends, allies and potentially for the Canadian population itself post 9/11. Canada was bound by treaty with the NATO alliance to respond to an enemy the public knew little about and was grasping to comprehend. A change of focus was in order for the CF and the government as a whole.

The Liberals under Paul Martin released their international policy statement titled *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World* in 2005. It is was a noteworthy document, for it not only directed specific internal changes to the CF, but also focused other government agencies towards a common effort within foreign policy. The attention to diplomacy, development and defence came to be known as the 3D approach which acknowledged that the complex and constantly evolving environment needed more than just a military application of force to contribute towards

global security and quality of life. This is in contrast to the Liberal Party's idealistic human security concepts of the 1990s which tended to result in an unfocused foreign policy effort, dispersing what little resources were available.

As a consequence, the CF embarked on a process of transformation under the leadership of a new Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Rick Hillier. Immediately after his appointment he would personally lead the CF Transformation process in order to increase the operational effectiveness of the CF. Transformation aimed at changing the structural internal workings of the CF, to an extent unprecedented since The Canadian Armed Forces Reorganization Act, which led to unification in 1968.

With the implementation of CF Transformation, there has been renewed interest in unification of the CF and discussion as to whether Hillier is attempting to finally accomplish what then Minister of National Defence (MND) Paul Hellyer was not able to do in 1968, notably a functional, unified CF in practice. While the gradual road towards unification was pushed through by Hellyer on the grounds of administrative and economic efficiencies from the perspective of a politician, CF Transformation represents an attempt at cultural and organizational change to improve operational effectiveness in the contemporary operating environment and well into the future. This more recent initiative is pushed from within the CF, by a military commander instituting change in order to accomplish the current government's strategic direction.

Much has been written on the general history of the CF, but perhaps due to the generally disinterested attitude of the public towards the military in peace-time, not much has been published specifically on the still contentious issue of unification outside of military personnel themselves. Paul Hellyer, in his book *Damn the Torpedoes*, explains his reasons for unification despite the anticipated resistance from within the military and from political opponents. As an

autobiography, it is obviously biased in his favour, however it does contain many arguments both for and against from those involved in the debate. While he anticipated improved effectiveness as a benefit of unification¹, his decision for pushing through change was ultimately an attempt to improve bureaucratic inefficiency resulting in government waste. For his opponents in the end, he claims there was no credible opposition to unification, merely an emotional one.²

Douglas Bland and Desmond Morton have written about unification and the CF in general. Bland approaches the subject from an administrative and organizational perspective, while Morton's books reflect a historian's popular perspective. In each case, they reach the same conclusion that while Hellyer's changes as MND from 1962-67 did have some positive impacts on the inner working of the Department of National Defence (DND), the focus was mainly administrative and towards organizational efficiency, and not one of increased operational effectiveness. In *Significant Incident*, David Bercuson, another frequent writer on Canadian defence matters, concurs with this assessment.³ Two government-sponsored reports, *Task Force on Review of Unification of the Canadian Forces* and *Report on Integration and Unification 1964-1968* both came to inconclusive findings as to the effectiveness of unification at the time of their writing in the early eighties. The former is also notable for recommendations that would undo much of what unification tried to achieve by introductions of distinct identities and uniforms. The latter publication concluded, "organizations drawn on charts in tidy lines can only be made to work if the personalities, skills and willingness to co-operate exist between people

¹ Paul Hellyer, "Canadian Defence Policy," *Air University Review* Vol. 19, no. 1 (November-December 1967) <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1967/nov-dec/hellyer.html>; Internet; accessed 30 March 2009.

² Paul Hellyer, *Damn the Torpedoes* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Inc, 1990), 147.

³ David Bercuson, *Significant Incident: Canada's Army, The Airborne, and the Murder in Somalia* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1996), 72.

within the organization.”⁴ This observation is key to understanding what is required for the CF to operate as a truly unified and effective force. While Hillier created some “tidy lines” at present through CF Transformation, ultimately the CF members themselves will have to be convinced in this cultural shift, through the leadership of their commanders and their own experience in the Contemporary Operational Environment (COE). This new generation of officer’s novel ideas, with inherent cultural and operational experience must compliment the organizational changes initiated by CF Transformation towards a more effective CF as an instrument of defence and foreign policy raised at the government’s discretion.

Any attempt to qualify the contemporary environment and that of the future, is always uncertain. Militaries necessarily study past experiences and attempt to institutionalize those towards future successes. In the *Transformation of War*, Martin van Creveld explains that, paradoxically, failures in the future will be *because* of past victories and the supposed lessons learned. In *The Black Swan*, Nassim Nicholas Taleb goes further to state that after experiencing an un-forecasted event in the past, organizations will attempt to categorize it to make it seem less random, thereby creating the conditions for failure once more in the future. Forces must obviously learn from the past, but must not become slaves to process and orthodoxy for its own sake.

Current military forces have begun to produce updated doctrinal publications at an accelerated rate, in an attempt to institutionalize the unique requirements of today’s battlespace with concepts that have lagged following the conventional military focus of the Cold War. Elinor Sloan asserts that US doctrinal development did not formally address the current buzz-word, asymmetry, until Joint Vision 2010 was published in 1996. Metz and Johnson, tasked by the US Army Strategic Studies Institute, attempted to define asymmetry from the strategic perspective,

⁴ R.L. Raymont, *Report on Integration and Unification 1964-1968*. (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1982), 291.

encompassing contemporary and future requirements. With the exception of Korea, most cases have shown large-scale conventional forces incapable of dealing with the threat, with irregulars and terrorists rising as likely foes. The US Marine Corps (USMC) for its part published *Small Wars* in 1940 as a war fighter's guide to the low-intensity conflicts they experienced in the turn of the last century until the Second World War. Its concepts of low-intensity, irregulars, and guerrillas, although written in the perspective of the time, remain applicable today and have become a retrospective basis for doctrinal development. Their lineage can be found in the current US Army Counter-Insurgency Manual FM 3-24 which shares the USMC designation MCWP 3-33.5.

Within DND itself, several publications and doctrinal manuals address the requirements of the COE in this era of CF Transformation. This Canadian military perspective tracks similar themes found in allied manuals and commercial publications alike. *Land Operations* defines the environment as fundamentally a human endeavour, complex and dynamic, characterized by uncertainty and chaos. The situation is worsened with the addition of irregulars, civilians and foreign cultures.⁵ Due to the CF being called upon to conduct significant and complex Counter-Insurgency (COIN) operations, the Chief of the Land Staff released the *Counter-Insurgency Operations* manual early in 2009. As a complementary strategic document, the Chief of Force Development (CFD) published the *CF Future Security Environment 2008-2030* in September 2008. It defines the current and future battlespace as one where asymmetric threats, non-state and rogue actors, social, economic, environmental and resource problems are likely to exist forcing the CF to align itself to the threat while working with allies and all institutions of Canadian government power.

⁵ Department of National Defence, B-GL-300-001/FP-001 *Land Operations* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2008), 2-17.

At the highest levels of command within the CF, the nostalgic longing for a single service construct and the hangover left by Hellyer's unification are rapidly being replaced by a renewed focus on operational effectiveness and unity of purpose. The Martin government's Defence Policy Statement (DPS) 2005 was the impetus for CF Transformation, while Harper's Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS) of 2008 maintained the focus. With a temporary reprieve from the typically ephemeral nature of government policy towards defence matters, the overly complex command and control structure for CF operations was replaced with a simple focused arrangement based on Operational Command HQs.

At the lower levels, however, there continues to be a mental and cultural hurdle to achieving true unification of the force in the same capacity that a force such as the USMC has enjoyed from its creation. In the CF, individual and collective capabilities are force-generated by the individual environments. This creates a comfort and familiarity with the capabilities of a segregated service. The single services do not exist legally, but through organizational inertia and convenience only. Low level commanders plan for, and react to, what they know from their training, which is an existence without the other services nor what they bring to the fight, forcing them to adjust when they happen to be present. From this respect, CF Transformation is still incomplete in many respects.

In order to influence this uniquely military culture, it is first necessary to understand what underpins the armed forces. Numerous works have been written that explore the subject through out history. Allan English; in *Understanding Military Culture: A Canadian Perspective* explains that our continual quest towards interoperability with the US, may lead to an Americanization of the CF. Those entities who the Canadian military will work with will ultimately influence ways of thinking, especially a force the size and dominance of the US military and its separate services. He also stresses the difficulty in changing an organization's culture and the leadership's

role in accomplishing it once these concepts become ingrained. Hew Strachan for his part, stresses that along with functional and formal command structures, informal structures with their unwritten rules that members will follow out of associations or common motivation contribute as much, if not more to the makeup of a military force.

The Pigeau-McCann model of command requires a creative or innovative expression of human will, lest individuals be relegated to continually treating new problems in the same way as old ones, successful or not.⁶ In the same way, CF members whether higher commanders, or members of the rank-and-file must not be hostage to an inconsistent notion of belonging to a former Canadian Army, Navy or Air Force and merely coming together occasionally when a mission requires joint effects. There needs to be dexterity of function and a unifying principle within the CF membership, namely a common ethos from indoctrination to deployment on the battlefield that binds all soldiers, sailors and airmen. The current government's apparently consistent commitment to defence within a whole-of-government approach, the current security environment with CF Transformation, can be the catalyst to obtain a rare clarity of purpose and effective change within the CF.

CF Transformation has been underway since early 2005, and has at times been compared to Hellyer's push for unification in 1968. The main objective of transformation from the outset was about accomplishing operational effectiveness, not administrative efficiency as was the case with unification. Transformation does however, have the opportunity to become a practical continuation of unification within the current climate of government focus on the military in the contemporary environment. Although like unification, it is currently at risk of remaining an unfulfilled development due to the cultural barriers remaining within the CF that continue to reinforce a multi-service mentality within its members.

⁶ Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann, "Re-conceptualizing Command and Control," Canadian Military Journal, (Spring 2002) <http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo3/no1/doc/53-64-eng.pdf>; Internet; accessed 30 March 2009.

Developments towards unification reveal that from the First World War, to the passing of Bill C-243 in Parliament unification was the vision of a politician. Paul Hellyer sought administrative and monetary efficiency without a clear understanding how it would impact the effectiveness of the organization. As a famously unpopular decision by the government among military members and the opposition conservatives, much of what was achieved by unification was reversed quietly within the CF as well as by some government policies over the next forty years. Hellyer attempted to realize his vision in an era that was characterized by a Canadian focus on peacekeeping, its NATO alliance and regional commitments with the US. Hillier's vision was to embark on his own initiative towards establishing what he refers to as a force "beyond joint," one that is not hindered by traditional thinking and works within a unified command system under clear government direction. His era is one characterized by the unstable post-Cold War globalized world with other nations influenced to transform their own armed forces to account for a newly identified, un-conventional enemy. Add to this the domestic focus of the current government with a renewed interest in the arctic, and the CF must have clarity of purpose with a capability across the full spectrum of operations.

The final barrier to achieving Hillier's complete vision of transformation is to recognize and effectively employ the unique skill sets inherent in the CF members, while eliminating the last remnants of the multi-service force. The continued existence of an Army, Navy and Air Force within the CF is the greatest hurdle towards finally achieving this aim. The elimination of the single services as force generators will allow service members to identify with the one service in the CF, achieving the common identity and mutual trust necessary to accomplish their mission within the contemporary environment.

CHAPTER 1 – THE ROAD TO UNIFICATION

We must greatly increase defence spending or reorganize our forces. The decision was to reorganize.

- Paul Hellyer, 1966.

In order to address the practicality of a single service CF in the contemporary context, it is necessary to examine the road leading to unification in the first place. Much has been written on the subject with emotional and objective arguments both for and against a single service. Administrative efficiency and economy of resources, more so than operational effectiveness rings true as a major consideration throughout the road to unification, finally implemented by then MND, Paul Hellyer. As fighting forces under Canadian command achieved their first successes and resulting reputation during the First World War, the period from WWI until the Canadian Armed Forces Reorganization Act of 1968, demonstrates the factors arguing both for and against a unified military force. The nation was taking its first step onto the international stage, arguably on the back of its military accomplishments during the war, while due to continual international crisis and resulting alliances, further military developments were based on models from those of our allies.

WORLD WAR I

Retrospective works have credited Canada's performance during the Great War as a defining moment for our country and where the road towards a national identity was forged on the battlefield, continued towards self-governance and more importantly self-defence that began early in the century.⁷ The individual service character of our armed forces and its organizational make-up, however, were borne out of the Imperial relationship.

⁷ Desmond Morton, *Ministers and Generals: Politics and the Canadian Militia*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), 196.

The Canadian Air Force got its start in the form of the Canadian Aviation Corps in 1914, which was then absorbed into the Royal Flying Corps during the war. Numerous individuals won laurels during the war, but as members of the British force. The Canadian Navy was formed in 1910 as a national navy for coastal defence, and at the start of hostilities had the barest capabilities of a fighting force with two obsolete cruisers. There was also constant bickering over whether control of the navy fell to the national leadership or that of the Royal Navy as part of the navies of the Empire. This was not resolved until 1918 with the enactment of the Dominion (Naval Forces) Act.⁸

Due to the anonymous contribution of airmen, and the lack of effective naval direction during the war, the army was prominent by its large contribution on the western front alongside other allies. They demonstrated creativity and innovation at all levels of leadership, with a confidence in their ability and that of their men. By the end of the war, they were arguably the most successful Corps on the Western Front as a result of their actions.⁹

When given the opportunity through circumstance, the Canadian Corps became more effective at comparable level combat actions than their British counterparts. By the end of the war, “the Canadian Divisions could be viewed as the rough equivalent of a small British corps formation...the Canadian Corps could be described as a ‘mini’ British Army, encompassing all of the necessary logistical and firepower resources...without the addition of another level of headquarters.”¹⁰ As McCulloch explains, “the Canadian Corps commander’s success lay in the fact that they insisted on maintaining...freedom of action and resisting orthodoxy if there was a

⁸ Ibid., 296.

⁹ Shane B. Schreiber, *Shock Army of the British Empire: The Canadian Corps in the Last 100 Days of the Great War*, (Westport: Westport, 1997), 141.

¹⁰ Ibid., 19.

better way.”¹¹ The hard realities of the battlefield forced Canadian commanders to challenge the conventional thinking of the time. The lessons garnered from their innovations during the war remained largely informal, as they could not be institutionalized while post-war governments set about normalizing their domestic agenda during the interwar years.

Following the war, governments in all nations were firmly preoccupied with a domestic focus for their populations who suffered through the hardships of war. The Canadian experience was no different, and little political interest was apparent in sustaining a significant fighting force.¹² Resources for the military were not a priority, and it was in this context that the first steps toward unification of the armed services occurred. The National Defence Act of 1922 created a single Minister of National Defence and Deputy Minister under a unified department. The rationale for this change was to *save money* and create a better environment for defence cooperation.¹³ There was very little immediate impact as a result of the organizational change other than inter-service rivalry because the government issued no defence policy statements; there was no new equipment; and the planning process remained in limbo.¹⁴ Below the service chiefs very little changed in the sense that service identities and command structure unique to them, were retained.¹⁵ The result was increased governmental control, at least on paper, with each of the services falling under one Minister of National Defence. Regardless of the internal changes to the department, Canada did not gain full control over foreign policy until the Statute

¹¹ Lieutenant Colonel Ian McCulloch, “Keeping One’s Freedom of Action: A Canadian Way of Waging War,” *The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin* Vol 4, no 2 (Summer 2001): 52.

¹² Terry Copp, “Canada’s National Army, Canada’s National Interest 1918, 2008” <http://www.jmss.org/2008/spring/articles/ellis2008-copp.pdf>; Internet; accessed 22 March 2009, 29.

¹³ B.D Hunt and R.G. Haycock, *Canada’s Defence: Perspectives on Policy in the Twentieth Century* (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1993), 72.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 73.

¹⁵ Dr. Chris Madsen, *Military Law and Operations* (Aurora: The Cartwright Group Limited, 2008), 1-15.

of Westminster in 1931,¹⁶ therefore use of the military was largely remained bound to the defence of the Empire.

The issue of a unified service in Canada surfaced again in 1937, when Colonel M.A. Pope wrote a *Memorandum on a Canadian Organization for the Higher Direction of National Defence: 8 March 1937*.¹⁷ While the National Defence Act of 1922, “was intended to promote a common approach and provide a channel by which the Canadian services interacted with each other,”¹⁸ Pope for his part, was very critical of the inefficiencies of the still fledgling armed forces and sought to rectify them for the coming war and well into the future. Three independent services based on the British model were luxuries that a small nation like Canada could ill-afford. Considering the year when it was written, “it is remarkable for its clarity and insight into the civil-military dimension inherent in the formulation of defence policies in liberal democracies.”¹⁹

Pope’s theories spanned from the tactical, “notably the constant and inescapable necessity for combining air action with that of the other services,”²⁰ to the national with, “what is required...is a single concentric policy of National Defence, embracing, not only the activities of all three services but...those of many civil Departments of State as well.”²¹ He is proposing both a unified military force for operational effectiveness and efficiency of resources while controlled by a unified inter-governmental focus on matters of defence. Obvious comparisons to the present

¹⁶ Ibid., 3.

¹⁷ M.A. Pope, Colonel, “Memorandum on a Canadian Organization for the Higher Direction of National Defence: 8 March 1937,” from *Canada’s National Defence Volume 2: Defence Organization*, ed. Douglas L. Bland, (Kingston: Queen’s University, School of Policy Studies, 1998), 7-20.

¹⁸ Madsen, *Military Law and Operations...*, 1-15.

¹⁹ Douglas L. Bland, *Canada’s National Defence Volume 2: Defence Organization*, (Kingston: Queen’s University, School of Policy Studies, 1998), 1.

²⁰ Pope, *Memorandum on a Canadian Organization...* 9.

²¹ Ibid.

day Whole-of-Government approach and CF Transformation are unavoidable. Here is an officer attempting to address his observed shortfalls in the government's direction of the military and a resulting less than optimized organizational structure within the department. Pope's suggestions were pre-empted by Canada's entry into the Second World War and its requirements within an allied command structure. Further attempts would not be made until much later, following the war.

WORLD WAR II

As the rumblings of war in Europe were again started in the mid-thirties, the establishment was torn between its British ties and those of their growing dependence (and influence) of the rapidly ascending US to the south. When the Canadian Parliament declared war on September 10, 1939, the nation which had enjoyed the fruits of the peace dividend following the First World War, found itself at war with Germany again, while lacking the resources in men and materiel immediately required for war. The continuing division in popular opinion necessitated careful manoeuvring on the government's part as well. Conscription again would surely be the most controversial of notions as it was during WWI, with the population of Quebec an especially arduous focus. Prime Minister King's Liberals faced a provincial Conservative/Nationalist coalition led by Duplissis, while, "influential opinion favored Mussolini if not necessarily Hitler."²² Domestic consensus was needed to focus the country's effort towards contributing to, what was thought at the time, to be another European war.

Canada's commitment of military forces under British command represented more a reflex action towards defence of the empire than a calculated decision. The potential Canadian force was so small that the British Admiralty wanted control over the Canadian Navy, while the RAF wanted Canada to commence a direct recruitment drive while promising an RCAF

²² Desmond Morton, *A Military History of Canada* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Inc., 1992), 178.

contingent once there were enough personnel to justify it.²³ The UK wanted support from the Canadian Army as well, although soon after commitment in September realized that no statement of policy on those lines was likely to be possible for the moment.²⁴

While Canadian naval vessels and pilots flying for the RAF were involved in the war almost immediately, the Army's 1st Canadian Division did not sail for England until December 1939, led by General Andrew McNaughton. While not expected on the continent until May, the German invasion of Norway quickly changed plans for its use. McNaughton agreed that his troops should be used as part of an amphibious attack force, and being one "who never lacked drive or enthusiasm in those early days, accepted the British plan without referring it to Ottawa for Cabinet approval."²⁵ Although the plan did not lead to the operation with any Canadian troops, it did give rise to negative sentiments in Ottawa.²⁶ This planned military action was the result of allied direction, as opposed to Canadian government direction to one of its officers. In spite of the changes implemented through the National Defence Act of 1922, control over the military continued to be a problem for the government, particularly in relations with Great Britain, the traditional dominant ally. There continued to be a perceived lack of civilian control and determination of policy towards its use.

By 1943, Canada had overcome the inertia caused by unpreparedness and lack of coherent government policy towards what it wished to accomplish with the military. Direct contribution on the ground in Europe was of course required, and the soldiers of the Canadian Army distinguished themselves throughout the Sicily, Italy and Normandy campaigns. The Air

²³ W.A.B. Douglas, *Out of the Shadows: Canada in the Second World War* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1977), 23.

²⁴ Douglas, *Out of the Shadows*...23.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 105.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 106.

Force never obtained the much sought after independent command, but on the home front, the government agreed to develop what became the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan. By war's end, it had trained one hundred and fifty-three thousand aircrew. This uniquely Canadian contribution was recognized as decisive to obtaining command of the air, without which victory would have taken much longer to achieve.²⁷ The Navy also featured prominently in final victory during the Battle of the Atlantic. Overall, this was a big contribution for a small country like Canada.

With the end of hostilities, the country was justifiably proud of accomplishments achieved, and confident as a prospering nation, now firmly planted on the international stage. Along with the large contributions in personnel and materiel, Canadian efforts during the war also had some tangible effects. A gradual shift towards the United States and away from the UK as Canada's primary ally and former Imperial master began. The Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD) was one such result, created between Canada and the US.²⁸ It continues to this day as, "a strategic-level military board charged with considering, in a broad sense, land, sea, air and space issues, including personnel and materiel dimensions involved in the defence of the northern half of the Western Hemisphere."²⁹ Canada found itself in a position of influence with the United States following the collapse of the Axis countries and the weakening of both the UK and France by the war. The country itself was physically untouched and had benefitted from the development of its industry and resources contributing to its rise relative to other nations.³⁰

²⁷ Douglas, *Out of the Shadows*...287.

²⁸ Danford William Middlemiss, *Canadian Defence: Decisions and Determinants* (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Canada Inc., 1989), 15.

²⁹ Department of National Defence, "The Permanent Joint Board on Defence" *National Defence and the Canadian Forces* <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/view-news-afficher-nouvelles-eng.asp?id=298>; Internet; accessed 14 February 2009.

³⁰ Middlemiss, *Canadian Defence*...16.

The ascendancy of the Canada on the international stage, came out of foreign policy decisions with National Defence as the department of choice. The United States, as the preeminent super power following the war, chose to deal with Canada, not only due to geographical considerations, but also the result of its northern neighbour's relative position (and potential) within the international community. This momentary existence within *realpolitik* for Canada would soon fade during demobilization, only to return to prominence as the West attempted to counter the Soviet threat, and the resulting closer alignment of Canadian and US interests.

THE COLD WAR

Canada experienced a rapid demobilization of its armed forces from 1945-1947, which indicated there was little government appetite for standing military forces following the war. Nonetheless, the global map of influence had been radically redrawn and Canadian officials did not wish to return to the ineffectual policies of the inter-war years that caught them short when war broke out for the second time. This burden should not have been theirs solely to bear as, "the responsibility also lay with the people of the nation as a whole, for it was in their name, by their elected officials, and for their benefit, that the soldiers of Canada were asked to kill and be killed in far-off foreign fields."³¹ Those who did remember felt there was a role for the military to contribute to the nation's international character and influence at a time when Canada hoped to play a constructive and leading role in world affairs. It was a time when our influence was high and our views were heeded.³² Clear government direction with respect to the military's role on the international stage was required, if the armed forces were to effectively organize themselves towards that end.

³¹ Schreiber, *Shock Army of the British Empire...*, 87

³² Arthur E. Blanchette, *Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-2000: Major Documents and Speeches* (Toronto: Golden Dog Press, 2000.), 1.

While inter-governmental committees with departments as members functioned well together during the war,³³ the country's armed forces on the other hand were quite distinct entities. They performed very well during the latest hostilities, but operated as three distinct services under a separate and distinct allied and coalition segregated command structure. This reality was understandable because both Canada's dominant allied superior command organizations at the time, the US and the UK, were segregated services themselves. Ironically, both top commanders of their respective armed forces, Eisenhower and Montgomery, were proponents of military unification as result of their experiences associated with vast inter-service operations during the war.³⁴ World War II had forced a more joint effort and consideration for higher strategic and operational issues on a common basis.

The next serious attempt at unification came in 1947 through Brooke Claxton who was then MND. In *Canada's Defence 1947*, he made reference to the military's achievements during the recent war, and its future requirements for the defence of Canada. As Bland explains, he was "determined to streamline its organization and to find *efficient* and *inexpensive* ways to meet Canada's defence needs."³⁵ Claxton espoused fourteen key long-term objectives for the department and the three services, the first of which was quite clear in what the white paper was attempting to achieve. Unification was a priority, up front in the 1947 White Paper. He directed, "Progressively closer coordination of the armed services and unification of the Department so as to form a single defence force in which the three armed services work together as a team."³⁶

³³ Robert B. Bryce, *Canada and the Cost of World War II: The International Operations of Canada's Department of Finance, 1939-1947* (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2005), 4.

³⁴ John Creswell, *Generals and Admirals: The Story of Amphibious Command* (London, England: Longmans, 1952), 161.

³⁵ Bland, *Administration of Defence Policy...*, 13.

³⁶ *Canada's Defence* as cited in Douglas Bland, ed., *Canada's National Defence: Volume 1 Defence Policy* (Kingston: School of Policy Studies, 1997), 24.

Perhaps unfortunately for proponents of unification, Claxton's concluding section stressed the importance of the effort based on the "utmost value for the defence dollar,"³⁷ and not operational effectiveness. From a politician's perspective, this goal made perfect sense, namely reduced complexity and cost savings. For military members whose main concern remained operational effectiveness, the desire was seen as meddling in their affairs and instituting change for the wrong reasons.

The government at this time took an activist stance on foreign policy. There was no retreat from the international scene as, "Ottawa's postwar foreign policy was predicated on Canada's taking an active role in global diplomacy and adopting international stability and order as its goals."³⁸ On January 13, 1947, Louis St. Laurent, Secretary of State for External Affairs for the King government, delivered a lecture which is widely regarded as a keystone of Canadian foreign policy. Known as the Gray Lecture, it forecasted a turning point in how Canada would establish itself within the international community. Through the release of *The Foundations of Canadian Policy in World Affairs*, St. Laurent detailed a framework and direction that would be cited by academics and government officials alike through Canada's so-called Golden Years of international relations during the two decades that followed the Second World War.³⁹ What it lacked however, was a clearly definable link to other government department's use within Canada's international agenda, in particular the military.

Canada was now on unfamiliar territory on the international stage. The country's two ancestral nations of Great Britain and France were left devastated by the conflict, and two emergent superpowers in the form of the United States and the Soviet Union assumed lead roles

³⁷ Ibid., 56.

³⁸ Middlemiss, *Canadian Defence*...16.

³⁹ Ibid., 459.

within their spheres of influence,⁴⁰ with Canada firmly in the US and Western camp. Due in large measure to its new economic and diplomatic capital, Canada would go on to assume a leadership position in establishing the Bretton Woods economic system, the United Nations (UN), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), all “hallmarks of a new world order.”⁴¹ Ottawa was also an active participant in creation of the UN’s economic and political system, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.⁴² As notable a foreign policy speech as the St. Laurent lecture was, it did not reveal exactly how its basic principles would be applied. Even within its section on practical application, the sentiment was more one of creating delegations and commissions than consideration towards how the use of government departments like national defence could achieve foreign policy objectives.

On 9 July 1947, Claxton addressed the House of Commons about the direction of the Canadian armed forces through his white paper on defence. Much like the Gray Lecture of the same year, it was a global, multinational approach,⁴³ but it did not directly link government policy to military employment. In fact, it stressed a more domestic agenda than one of an expeditionary nature, with the following objectives:

1. To defend Canada against aggression;
2. To assist civil power in maintaining law and order within the country; and

⁴⁰ Patrick James, Nelson Michaud, and Marc O’Reilly, *Handbook of Canadian Foreign Policy* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006), 2.

⁴¹ James, *Handbook of Canadian...*, 3.

⁴² Blanchette, *Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-2000...*1.

⁴³ Douglas Bland, *The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada 1947 to 1985*, (Kingston: Ronald P. Frye & Company, 1987), 1.

3. To carry out any undertaking which by our own voluntary act we may assume in cooperation with friendly nations or under any effective plan of collective action under the United Nations.⁴⁴

Claxton had a mandate from the Liberal government to reform and restructure. He soon became immersed in turning his department into a more efficient organization and one that was more in tune with the nation's government policies in the rapidly developing international landscape they now faced.⁴⁵ The period through which he pushed these reforms was truly one of upheaval on the international stage, but the military was not the instrument of choice. While the forces received little focus on the nation's international role and arguably lacked the desired resources, the military still managed to participate effectively at home receiving accolades for its efforts from the populace supporting emergencies such as the Fraser Valley and Red River Floods.⁴⁶ For the government, a domestic focus that costs less with tangible results for the population made more sense than selling some intangible benefits to adventures in far off lands.

In a few short years Canada witnessed the start of the Cold War, the Canada-US Mutual Defence Assistance Act, acted as a founding partner in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), participation in the Korean War, the failed Hungarian revolution against the Soviets, and forming of the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD)⁴⁷ with the US. All these events led to, "defence expenditures and demands in the 1950s to levels no one could have anticipated"⁴⁸ while closely aligning the defence of Canada with partnerships and internal structures of the US and more broadly within NATO. Regardless of the plans the government had for influencing the world stage, both the international environment and the unwillingness to

⁴⁴ The Honourable Brooke Claxton, *Canada's Defence*, (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1947), 7.

⁴⁵ Madsen, *Military Law and Operations...*, 1-22.

⁴⁶ Morton, *Canada and War...*, 228.

⁴⁷ Now known as North American Aerospace Defence Command.

⁴⁸ Bland, *The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada...*, 17.

commit large scale resources for the military, made Canada dependant on alliances for its security.⁴⁹ This would greatly shape the make-up of the armed forces to the present day.

In April 1949, Canada, the US and ten other European States formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It was founded as a collective defence organization against the perceived threat of the Soviet Union and communist expansion. While the concepts espoused by the Gray lecture strained to find a legitimate place, Claxton had listed the international climate as a particularly important among those factors that influence Canada's defence needs.⁵⁰ The government tried to shape NATO as a place to share political values and economic cooperation.⁵¹ As a result, this sentiment was included within Article II, "to the annoyance and embarrassment of the alliance partners."⁵² While the treaty was truly one of collective defence from aggression, the Canadian government appeared to use its military as a means for indirect influence within the member states and their combined weight in world affairs. Ironically, "NATO's real appeal for its members was that by pooling military resources, each partner could do less."⁵³ The significance of NATO must not be understated, as it formed the foundation of Canadian defence policy for the better part of the next fifty years. Canada was drawn in an ever increasing way to permanent stationing of forces in Western Europe as part of NATO commitments and integration into alliance defence plans.

Canada's integration into NATO resulted in an understandable complication towards Claxton's attempts at organizational reforms. Efforts associated with the Korean War and growing NATO commitment in Western Europe wore Claxton out late in his tenure as MND.

⁴⁹ Bland, *The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada...*, 17.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 16.

⁵¹ Middlemiss, *Canadian Defence...*, 19.

⁵² Morton, *Cold War Canada...*, 159.

⁵³ Morton, *A Military History of Canada...*, 233.

Canada closely aligned itself to a collective defensive alliance, while at the same time reorganized internally with the generals forced to adjust accordingly. An unprecedented amount of work was created for senior military planners. Within the NATO alliance, the military forces of member nations fell under three categories: military forces that are assigned to NATO, earmarked forces, and forces remaining under national command.




Figure 1: available from <http://www.nato.int/archives/1st5years/graphics/a-c-a54.gif>;

While there was very little direct threat domestically, Canada integrated into and prepared its forces to fight within permanent standing forces designed for a conventional war in Europe, with separate regional commands and more importantly for those concerned with unification, separate service commands as per **Figure 1**.

Canada's domestic borders were far from Europe and a direct Soviet threat. Under the protective umbrella of the US, NATO commitments became then a natural focus of military

attention in the context of a nuclear war with its expected short timelines. As various forces were generated by member nations, they would be segregated into Land, Air and Sea specific forces. Canadian air forces trained with allied and NATO air forces. Canadian naval forces trained with allied and NATO naval forces. The NATO-structure encouraged service identification. This time of preparations and spending against the Soviet threat was inopportune for complicating Canada's commitments to a massive re-organization of operational roles and functions caused by any further attempts towards unification. Furthermore, participation in the Korean War further stretched the military capacity for immediate change. Notwithstanding this, the amount of dollars spent on defence during this era was not sustainable over the long term.⁵⁴ The government came to terms with rising demand for social services at home, as the military promoted Canada's interests abroad. This context was not a good one for those opposed to military reforms. The pressing need for economy drove the unification agenda.

UNIFICATION

The decade prior to Diefenbaker's government had seen the panic of re-armament caused by the general Soviet threat and the Korean War. During this period, spending peaked at "more than twice as much money on national defence as on the total of health and welfare services for Canadians."⁵⁵ Diefenbaker had presented himself as hawkish on defence, and during an election speech to a predominantly East-European audience he had even hinted at rolling back the Iron Curtain.⁵⁶ However, he would preside over a series of events that would come to focus the final drive to unification of the next government.⁵⁷ The country's faith in how defence policy was

⁵⁴ Donald Story, and Russell Isinger, "The Origins of the Cancellation of Canada's Avro CF-105 Arrow Fighter Program: A Failure of Strategy," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* Vol. 30, No.6 (December 2007), 1029.

⁵⁵ Story, *The Origins of the Cancellation...*, 1029.

⁵⁶ Morton, *Canada and War...*, 177.

⁵⁷ Gosselin, *Unification and the Strong-Service Idea...*, 10.

being handled reached a low during a time with no coherent Conservative defence policy and an absentee, disinterested Prime Minister.⁵⁸ The road to unification experienced fits and starts throughout the Cold War years, with defence spending and government control becoming a focus within the Liberal's plan for a reorganized armed forces.

Interestingly, the Royal Commission on Government Organization was ordered by the conservative government in 1960 to study and rectify the wasteful liberal policies that came before them. In spite of some initial reforms, in 1963 the commission found in DND, "triplication of arrangements for pay, recruiting, public relations and intelligence...two hundred inter-service committees [that were] bottlenecks."⁵⁹ On the more tangible monetary side, there was "an administrative confusion that had contributed to the costly collapse of development programmes like the Arrow or the Army's Bobcat armoured personnel carrier."⁶⁰ There appears to be no evidence of the Diefenbaker government's attempt to rectify organizational problems or deliberately reinforce the status quo in contrast to the findings of their own commission.

The Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 further revealed very confused handling of the situation by the government hierarchy with respect to the military.⁶¹ More importantly there was evidence to suggest, the near collapse of civil-military relations in Canada when the control of the armed forces passed briefly out of the government's hands when, "commanders defied political authority and direction"⁶² responding to allied commitments. The three services had responded to their perceived escalation in military necessity as per their treaty obligations, without limits

⁵⁸ Bland, *The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada...*, 23.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 181.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ Morton, *Canada and War...*, 179.

⁶² Madsen, *Military Law and Operations...*, 1-29.

imposed by the national authority. Worse still was Diefenbaker, who showed a lack of attention to foreign affairs and was notably absent during critical times of the crisis.⁶³

With the Liberals returned to power in 1963, Paul Hellyer became the MND for the Pearson government. He acknowledged the three services requirement for new equipment but also stressed the need for reorganization so that these new costs could be rationalized within existing budgets.⁶⁴ General Guy Simonds suggested at the time that Canada needed a specialized force in the same mould as the USMC. Hellyer picked up on the idea, whereupon modern technology made distinctions between land, air and sea warriors redundant. Since Canada had a small military, separate services were held up as a luxury, competing with the rising costs and requirements for domestic social programmes. Furthermore, force generation of existing missions continued to be hindered by administrative inefficiencies. Morton concluded: “A demand for qualified signallers for the Congo peacekeeping operation in 1960 had been partially frustrated because neither the RCAF nor RCN communications technicians could be switched to an army task.”⁶⁵

The White Paper on Defence published in March 1964 set the final stage for unification of the Canadian Army, RCN and RCAF into the Canadian Armed Forces. The time involved significant US and Soviet tension, an increased demand for domestic social programmes, increased cost of a military which was in need of modern equipment, and an entrenched alliance system whose focus and potential action was across the Atlantic.⁶⁶ The document stands out as important with respect to civil-military relations in Canada. It was to reaffirm all the existing

⁶³Ibid.

⁶⁴ Morton, *Canada and War...*, 182.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 183.

⁶⁶ Lieutenant-Colonel Ross Fetterly, “The Influence of the Environment on the 1964 Defence White Paper,” *Canadian Military Journal* 5 no.4, <http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo5/no4/defence-defense-eng.asp>; Internet ; accessed 24 February 2009.

roles in NORAD and NATO, but sought ways to make a more identifiable and *economical* contribution by the armed forces.⁶⁷ Canada, with its proximity to the US, a country which would act unilaterally to defend itself with or without Canada's participation, enjoyed the fringe benefit of being largely defended itself due to the unique geography of the continent. Canada was also a founding member of NATO and thus enjoyed a collective defence arrangement, allowing its own individual contribution to wane as allies were obliged to respond. This afforded Ottawa the luxury of pursuing idealistic notions such diplomacy and peacekeeping while seeking a more economical approach to defence. Hellyer felt the time was right for starting his changes to the functioning structure of the military.

Shortly after the White Paper was published, Bill C-90 became law creating a "single Chief of Defence Staff and a functional structure for National Defence Headquarters."⁶⁸ This development effectively became known as *integration* and was a continuation of Claxton's vision of integration within the department. After little debate, the minister announced his solution for the actual command structure of the military. Hellyer's unification agenda was a break from what had come before, as he was effectively changing the inner-working of the armed forces. These changes would lead towards the creation of a truly unified force in theory, if not in practice.⁶⁹ Once Bill C-243 passed in Parliament, unification came into effect on February 1, 1968. The changes called for in the bill are comparable in scope to Hillier's command focused changes within CF Transformation; the primary difference is one of appearance from the perspective of the members of the CF. In the case of unification, a politician was imposing the changes on the armed forces not yet sold on the idea, while CF transformation was a military

⁶⁷ Middlemiss, *Canadian Defence...*, 27.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 184.

⁶⁹ Bland, *Chiefs of Defence...*, 76.

command led process, design for improved operational effectiveness within government direction.

In Raymond's very encompassing *Report on Integration and Unification*, a great deal of material covers the time leading up to and indeed following unification, which explains that regardless of the terms used, no one really understood what unification actually meant for the military. Commanders foresaw the resistance to a common uniform and impact on service culture, but not how it might translate into a functional organization in practice. Hellyer stressed the need for more direction at the national level toward a unified purpose and tasks if there was to be an effectively unified armed force addressing those same tasks. After much deliberation (and negotiation) the functional commands ended up as follows:

1. Mobile Command. Comprised of three brigades and tactical air forces.
2. Maritime Command. A single command of maritime forces on east and west coasts.
3. Air Transport Command. Essentially the same as the former Air Force Command.
4. Air Defence Command. Continue as previously but be more closely integrated with NORAD.
5. Training Command. Develop training and skills for all those aspects which are common to all elements up to the advanced level. Operational training would be carried out by the operational commands.
6. Materiel Command. Operation of the Navy, Army and Air Force logistical system.⁷⁰

While these functional commands appear to be similar as the current series of command HQs within CF Transformation, the difference is effectively one of force generation capability within the commands. The operational HQs in the contemporary CF are force employers only. They receive a capability generated by the service chiefs in isolation of their eventual operational commanders.

⁷⁰ Raymont, *Report on Integration and Unification*..., 98.

There still remained the question as to the actual effect unification would have on the soldiers, sailors and airmen with inherent differences in mode of operation and approach:

An Air Force officer decided for himself whether or not to attack the enemy. The decision for a junior naval officer was made for him by his captain. An infantry lieutenant had to persuade not only himself but a couple dozen others to share the hazards of an attack. There was logical reason for some services to stress technical or professional skill as a basis for promotion while others emphasized qualities of leadership. Common uniforms and ranks might be bureaucratically neat but they conceal real differences of role and responsibility.⁷¹

A distinct military task requires a distinct soldier trained to accomplish it. This has been a truism throughout the ages in professional militaries. However, it does not predispose what colour uniform or branch of service is best for the job at the outset. In the present context, it is simply a matter of generating the required skill set in an individual or collection of individuals based on a defined requirement.

To Hellyer, unification represented more than just an experiment. He felt it necessary to maintain the effectiveness of Canada's armed forces into the future.⁷² It received Royal Assent on May 8, 1967, and following amendments to the National Defence Act, Hellyer had his legacy. However, he would not himself ascend to the soon to be vacant liberal leadership position. The Liberal party had a new mandate and a new leader in Trudeau, whose focus was elsewhere. The actual implementation of the changes to the military that were required as a result of unification was left to the officials within DND.⁷³ Clarity of purpose and definite end state was lost in the shuffle of personnel, if there ever was one. As previously mentioned, a great deal of the opposition towards unification within the military was due to protectionist sentiments towards

⁷¹ Ibid., 185.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid.

their individual services⁷⁴ and lack of the government's ability to link specific policy to military tasks at the best of times regardless of this new experiment. What Hellyer failed to comprehend, as well as those in the Trudeau cabinet concerned with defence, was that loyalty to a service could not be assumed away from the equation. This kept the strong service idea alive for almost forty years following unification.⁷⁵

Hellyer had inadequately made the case to some members of the armed forces. While some soldiers and officers did back unification, a slow internal segregation would permeate throughout the organization over the next four decades. Administrative efficiency and cost savings are not motivating factors for members of an armed force to embrace a fundamental change to the institution for which they served. In pursuing any objective, military leaders are first required to orient themselves and their followers to the environment in order to be successful. It is in this context that the next chapter will examine the Contemporary Operational Environment (COE) towards achieving an effectively transformed CF.

⁷⁴ Vernon J. Kronenberg, *All Together Now: The Organization of the Department of National Defence in Canada 1964-1972* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1973), 79.

⁷⁵ Gosselin, *Unification and the Strong-Service Idea...*, 16.

CHAPTER 2 - CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Small wars are operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our Nation.

- USMC Small Wars Manual 1940

Most western militaries, including Canada, have adopted the process called *Joint Intelligence of the Battlespace*. It is a planning tool that allows commanders and their staffs to “visualize the full spectrum of adversary capabilities and potential courses of action across all dimensions of the battlespace.”⁷⁶ This process contains four steps: define the battlespace; describe the battlespace effects, evaluate the adversary; and determine adversary courses of action. The first step, defining the battlespace, is the most critical to a successful outcome with the remainder of the staff work. Similarly, addressing the Contemporary Operating Environment (COE) for the present and future needs of the CF is equally as critical.

The end of the Cold War did not bring the expected peace dividend assumed by many governments, namely the ability to divert funds away from expensive military preparations and towards much needed domestic initiatives. Without the stabilizing presence of the two super powers, smaller nations and trans-national organizations accustomed to being in one camp or the other, found themselves without their former masters, creating the potential for an unstable international community. With the relative powers attempting to reduce spending in their militaries and other instruments of foreign policy, matters only became worse. There are, however, more recent aspects such as globalization, non-state actors and a primary enemy that by-in-large does not operate in a conventional war fighting sense for a specific national cause.⁷⁷

⁷⁶ Department of Defense, JP 2-01.3 *Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparations of the Battlespace*, (Washington: DoD, 2000), vii.

⁷⁷ Chief of Force Development. “The Future Security Environment 2008-2030,” <http://cfd.mil.ca/sites/page-eng.asp?page=1869>; DWAN; accessed 1 February 2009, 80.

This does not allow for large militaries to prepare easily for this new threat, nor can governments rely on a purely military solution as a result. In contrast to the stability and predictability of the Cold War, the COE became vernacular to describe this new, or perhaps only newly perceived and defined, battlespace for military operations; perhaps an ambiguous term for an ambiguous situation. The US Joint Publication 1-02 gives the definition: “a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander.”⁷⁸ Cold War templates were replaced with, “instability, conflict and seemingly continual change.”⁷⁹ The current Canadian Chief of Force Development echoes these sentiments explaining: “Economic disparity, over-population, migration, urbanization, disease, poverty, and extremism can all have destabilizing effects; and globalization will ensure that these effects will be felt around the world.”⁸⁰ Countries discovered they were not prepared for this new environment with their singular focused conventional forces, now without their traditional foe to face on a linear battlefield. This harkens back to the British colonial experience policing their vast empire, without a conventional peer.

As recently as 2004, the west was still celebrating its (second) conventional force victory over Saddam’s army, and saw continual improvement in technology as the path to continued mastery of the environment. Experience with new technology and networking was going to change the nature of warfare and give western armies a competitive advantage.⁸¹ It was thought that rapid advances in communications protocols would result in battlefields that were

⁷⁸ Strategy Page, “Chapter 1: The Contemporary Operational Environment (COE),” <http://www.strategypage.com/articles/operationenduringfreedom/chap1.asp>; Internet; accessed 28 February 2009.

⁷⁹ Lieutenant Colonel Bernd Horn, and Regan G. Reshke, *Towards The Brave New World*, (Kingston: Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts), 8-1.

⁸⁰ Chief of Force Development, *The Future Security Environment...*,6.

⁸¹ Brigadier Lamont Kirkland, “Future Challenges for Land Forces,” *British Army Review* no.142, (Summer 2007), 10.

transparent, giving information superiority and allowing the side with the technology advantage to see first and act first.⁸² This period can be seen as the culmination of the concept known as the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).

With exponential development in computer technology, communications equipment, smart weapons and satellite technology, there seemed to be an unlimited source of high tech systems to find, fix and finish the enemy. Sloan similarly describes RMA as, “a major change in the nature of warfare brought about by the innovative application of new technologies which, combined with dramatic changes in military doctrine and operational and organizational concepts, fundamentally alter the character and conduct of military operations.”⁸³ The concept tends to be first associated with the US, although smaller nations were quick to embrace the concept as a way to bridge capability gaps through focused technology as opposed to numbers of forces. This is especially true in navies and air forces who have a doctrine and general focus heavily weighed towards technology, as opposed to a focus on the individual as is the case within ground forces.

There is understandable comfort in reliance on technology by western nations. It claims to provide a direct solution to a difficult problem. Technology is hoped to provide a tangible, measureable result, manifest in a physical object. It can also lead planners down the road of simple linear logic, namely buy more of the same technology and achieve greater results. This prediction, suffers the fate of a great deal of military plans, that of preparing to fight the last war. It leads policy makers and strategists down the road of reliance on technology required for the conventional battles expected during the Cold War and experienced in the two Gulf Wars. The world witnessed the weakness in this reliance of technology with the events of 9/11, with a foe

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Elinor Sloan, “DCI: Responding to the US-led Revolution in Military Affairs,” *NATO Review*, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2000/0001-02.htm>; Internet; accessed 3 April 2009.

that was willing to fly aircraft into buildings that symbolized the power of the west. The true RMA is now arguably the ability to harness the willpower of the individual in order to negate any technological advantage of the opposition.

Canada for its part generally saw RMA in the same terms as its traditional military partners in the US and UK. Documents such as *Shaping the Future of Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020* recognized the importance of the RMA towards the CF keeping pace with developing capabilities into the future. The issue as always with the CF, is the lack of resources to keep pace with a force the size of the US, or even the UK. Sloan recognized this reality and urged DND to select only those aspects of RMA that will deliver the most cost-effective systems yet still allow you to maintain credibility with traditional allies.⁸⁴ While Canada did concur with the prevailing belief in RMA, the CF generally did not enjoy a windfall of new advanced technology equipment, although this was due to a lack of government defence spending and not a conscious decision to favour the human aspects of combat. The success of Gulf War I had the effect of maintaining the reliance on large scale technologically advanced forces at the forefront of military strategy, at least until the stabilization phase of the next Gulf War.

As early as 1991, authors such as van Creveld had predicted the reliance on technology would quickly become ineffective in the modern shift towards low-intensity conflicts. He went further to predict: “As low-intensity conflict rises to dominance, much of what has passed for strategy during the last two centuries will be proven useless.”⁸⁵ Some of the many terms used to describe warfare in today’s environment are as follows: Hybrid Wars, Irregular Wars, Long Wars, Small Wars, Cold Wars Unconventional War, Wars Against Terrorism, 3 Block Wars,

⁸⁴ House of Commons, Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence* Thursday, March 2, 2000, 0900, <http://www.parl.gc.ca/committee/CommitteePublication.aspx?SourceId=53502>; Internet; accessed 3 April 2009.

⁸⁵ Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War*, (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 205.

Fourth Generation Warfare, Article 5 Operations, Chapter 6&7 Operations, Peacekeeping, Peace Making, Peace Enforcement, etc. Considering the sheer number of titles existing today for the various types of conflicts, this is a primary indicator that the establishment is having trouble effectively defining the battlespace. What should then become the focus in such an unconventional environment is the soldier or “the human dimension” of combat. The Australian Land Warfare Development Centre describes the human dimension within forces as one that requires “high quality personnel moulded by training into cohesive teams that have good collective morale (esprit de corps).”⁸⁶ At a fundamental level we depend on the abilities innovative and adaptive individuals who can react quickly to changing conditions.⁸⁷

As the coalition moved into post-combat operations in Iraq in Gulf War II and the coinciding post-invasion phase of Afghanistan, the descriptions of the battlespace included words such as asymmetric, irregular warfare, counter insurgency (COIN), non-state actors, capacity building, stabilization, etc. The enemy was not a well defined, easy target of effects. Great strides in technology that were designed to quicken the sensor-to-shooter link, and get inside the enemies decision cycle was not having the desired impact. The enemy was far from being easily overcome and proved to be an adaptive and thinking adversary not easily distinguished from his non-combatant host nation population.⁸⁸ More complex still was the requirement for operations along the entire spectrum of conflict, from constabulary task to traditional force-on-force battles. This environment relies on the abilities of the individual soldier and not technology as the key to success.

⁸⁶ Land Warfare Development Centre, “The Nature of Warfare,” *The Fundamentals of Land Warfare*, (Puckapunyal, Australia: Land Warfare Development Centre), 7.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Kirkland, *Future Challenges for Land Forces...*, 10.



Figure 2: Predominant Campaign Themes

COUNTER-INSURGENCY (COIN) AND ASYMETRIC THREATS

Counter-insurgency is a broadly descriptive term that attempts to encapsulate all those activities taken to *counter* those aspects of non-state actors and irregulars that can be found within an insurgency. The CF COIN Operations Manual defines Counter-insurgency: “Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken to defeat an insurgency.”⁸⁹ Insurgency is defined as a set of activities that threaten a secure and stable environment with “behaviour that attempts to effect or prevent change through the illegal use, or threat of violence, conducted by ideologically or criminally motivated non-regular forces, groups or individuals, as a challenge to authority.”⁹⁰ This will create an unfamiliar situation for conventional military forces where the solution to these problems will blur the lines between military and civilian jurisdictions. As illustrated in **Figure 2**, the environment is one that requires employment of a myriad of government resources applied towards a common goal.

One US solution to this issue is their Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME) approach to operations. This concept focuses all of a nation’s power into a common goal towards resolving a conflict. In much the same way, the current Canadian government embraces a whole-of-government approach within its foreign policy. This approach is an evolution of the former government’s concept of Defence, Diplomacy, Development and Trade (3D&T). In the

⁸⁹ Department of National Defence, B-GL-323-004/FP-003 *Land Force Counter-Insurgency Operations*, (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2008). The same definition can be found in US Army FM 3-24, USMC MCWP 3-33.5, and NATO AAP-6.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

military perspective, the key within all these cleverly worded concepts is the clearly articulated policy goals translated into action, in concert with other government departments, something that was lacking within Hellyer's vision of unification.

Generally, groups will use whatever means are necessary to achieve success and attain their political goals. Well-funded state actors employ conventional means, while irregulars will employ tactics designed to exploit the differences between large bureaucratic organizations and small nimbler ones. The term *asymmetric* is not intrinsically complex or military specific. Fundamentally it simply means *not symmetric*. Within discussion of warfare however, its meaning becomes less clear and generally less well understood. Metz and Johnson define it in contemporary terms as "acting, organizing, and thinking differently than opponents in order to maximize one's own advantages, exploit an opponent's weaknesses, attain the initiative, or gain greater freedom of action."⁹¹

Although, conventional forces have dealt with such asymmetric or irregular actors previously, widespread reference to asymmetric warfare as a term in doctrinal manuals has not appeared until the mid-nineties. As Sloan explains, "The term does not appear in the US military's 1990 Base Force, 1993 Bottom-up Review, or the 1995 Commission on Roles and Mission of the Armed Forces. But in 1996, Joint Vision 2010 referred directly to the risk of "asymmetrical encounters to US military strengths..."⁹² Metz and Johnson specify they first discovered its mention in JP 1-0 in 1995 and Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia in 1997.⁹³ With the US remaining as the sole superpower, it is surprising that more focus was not placed on addressing asymmetric and irregular threat. With the exception of potential reassertion of Russia or

⁹¹ Steven Metz and Douglas V. Johnson II, "Asymmetry and US military Strategy: Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts," *US Army War College*, (Strategic Studies Institute, January 2001), 5.

⁹² Elinor Sloan, *The Revolution in Military Affairs: Implications for Canada and NATO* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002), 109.

⁹³ Metz and Johnson, *Asymmetry and US military Strategy*..., 2.

development of regional powers such as China and India, an opportunity was presented for a change in focus of doctrinal development. Following the 9/11 attacks, however, the West quickly oriented towards the newly defined threat to our collective defence and security, that of Islamic extremism fermenting within failed and failing states in the Middle-East, South West Asia and Africa.

Another difficulty in a COIN or irregular environment for conventional forces is defining the actual conditions in order to achieve victory. In a traditional force-on-force model, how to achieve victory is easily defined, essentially mathematical from the tactical to the strategic. Once an opponent is rendered ineffective through reduction of his ability to project combat power with numbers of soldiers or weapons systems, he is usually forced to capitulate. An insurgent, however, does not draw strength through numbers or technology, but in fact the opposite. Therefore the means for victory are not clearly defined. As Gray explains, “the familiar connection between tactical...military excellence and strategic success is either absent or tenuous. You win military engagement by standard metrics...but can insurgents be beaten militarily? If they can not, just how can they be beaten?”⁹⁴ Perhaps the most famous example of this paradox is the US experience in Vietnam where American military forces were essentially unbeaten at the tactical level, but failed spectacularly at the strategic level. This is another example of where the failure to link the military requirements on the ground to government policy, in an already ambiguous environment contributed to failure.

In both the Iraq War of 2003 and the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the coalition achieved a stunning victory, through primarily conventional means, toppling an existing regime

⁹⁴ Colin S. Gray, “Irregular Warfare: One Nature, Many Characters,” *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, (Winter 2007), 46.

in less than ninety days.⁹⁵ In both cases however, initial successes were quickly replaced by long term insurgencies continuing to this day. Numerous examples of insurgencies through history as well as successful COIN campaigns demonstrate there are possible solutions and lessons to be applied in the current context. While not difficult to define, finding a solution to root causes proves difficult in practice because “Various situations may give rise to an insurgency, and a single insurgency may have several root and contributing causes.”⁹⁶ The implication is that no single label can be applied, and there is likely no technological solution. A concerted effort to develop a relationship with the population must be the focus of the political and military leadership alike. Both must be equally committed to a process that in some cases has taken generations.

History does not reveal any prospect of a successful conclusion to insurgencies in the short term. “An analysis of all insurgencies since 1945 shows that successful counterinsurgency campaigns last for an average of 14 years, and unsuccessful ones last for an average of 11 years.”⁹⁷ While the US predicts the end is near for their conflict in Iraq with their announced 2011 pullout⁹⁸, prospects are not so positive in Afghanistan. There have been public acknowledgements from all major NATO partners of the deteriorating situation, plus the insurgents are able to draw on a long tradition of battling unwanted foreign influence. Therefore the end of a primarily military effort does not necessarily translate to victory, but merely a prelude to a new chapter in the insurgency.

⁹⁵ Seth Jones, *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan*, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG595.pdf; Internet; accessed 28 February 2009, 21.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Jones, *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan...*, 10.

⁹⁸ Stephen Farrell, “Draft Accord With Iraq Sets Goal of 2011 Pullout,” *New York Times*, 21 August 2008, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/22/world/middleeast/22baghdad.html?ref=world>; Internet; accessed 28 February 2009.

Their history of invasion and occupation has made the Afghan people understandably wary of more outside militaries, which are seen to occupy their lands and impose their policies as previous occupying forces have in the past. Some outlying villages had not seen fully uniformed mechanized troops since the Soviets left in 1989, when their experience had not been a pleasant one as a whole. Complicating the environment even more, “Canada and its allies [are also] challenged by the activities of problematic non-state actors such as trans-national criminal organizations, terrorist groups, and violent religious extremists, among others.”⁹⁹ Indeed, a good portion of the current and forecasted troublesome security factors and trends can be found concentrated in the Afghan theatre which the Canadian government has continually reaffirmed its commitment to. The current end of mission date has been set for 2011, although it is unlikely Canada will completely abandon the mission, but will abandon a purely combat role. A more likely scenario is a focus towards the reconstruction and governance aspect of the campaign through the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) and the Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLT). In facing an unconventional foe, Canada, as well as other nations, have instituted unconventional tasks to be performed by the military. There is no doctrine for these activities, forcing leaders at all levels to be creative and develop solutions for a continuing flow of new problems that have no precedent, and can rarely be trained for.

While the Global Counterterrorism Task Force (GCTF) is focused on addressing the threat of terrorism at one of its primary sources in Afghanistan, there are other locations for such organizations to exist and even flourish. This will inevitably allow their people and philosophies to reach nations in the form of violent attacks and terrorist activities. Canada is not immune from such a threat. Indeed, the Defence Policy Statement of 2005 predicted: “Failed and failing states pose a dual challenge for Canada...they plant the seeds of threats to...global security...[and] the

⁹⁹ Chief of Force Development, *The Future Security Environment...*, 9.

impotence of their governing structures makes them potential breeding grounds or safe havens for terrorism and organized crime.”¹⁰⁰ The Canada First Defence Strategy of 2008 continues the sentiment and acknowledges: “Canada needs a modern, well-trained and well-equipped military with the core capabilities and flexibility required to successfully address both conventional and asymmetric threats, including terrorism, insurgencies and cyber attacks,”¹⁰¹ both in the international arena and domestically. The Americans for their part, through their experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have reinforced their need to remain a force effective across the full spectrum of operations and not become too focused on one type of warfare. These experiences reinforce the need for Canada to maintain a well trained, motivated force capable of developing innovative solutions to an elusive threat across the full spectrum of military operations, a daunting task for such a small resource constrained military.

It is arguable that Canada’s soldiers have been operating across this full spectrum environment with varying degrees of success since their creation. The Fenian Raids of 1870, the Northwest Rebellion of 1885, and the Canadian Siberian Expeditionary Force of 1918 were all examples of COIN and Stability Operations. During the Canadian-led UN Mission into Cyprus in 1964, forces were sent ostensibly to keep the peace between the Greek and Turkish sides of the conflict while participating in local initiatives to alleviate suffering of the population. This force had to be generated alongside the continuing preparations for a conventional battle in Western Europe. Missions in Somalia and Haiti also contained elements of varying degrees to support the full spectrum analogy. Experience in the Balkans during the mid-nineties aimed at

¹⁰⁰ Department of National Defence, *Canada’s International Policy Statement: Defence*, (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2005), 5.

¹⁰¹ Department of National Defence, *Canada First Defence Strategy*, (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2008), 7.

separating warring sides as well as humanitarian tasks became prominent. Occasional combat occurred, especially at the Battle for the Medak Pocket in September of 1993.¹⁰²

In the current context, the pressure placed on soldiers within this context is enormous. There are no longer well defined, uniformed soldiers of an enemy force to directly array against. Any and all people in the immediate vicinity are potential threats. Incidents, benign in a conventional battle, might lead to catastrophic consequences quickly. For example, a patrol could happen across what looks like a routine traffic accident which turns out to be an ambush site for an IED or suicide bomber. Soldiers will bare witness to firefights, military and civilian casualties, trying to accomplish the day's mission while weighing necessary risk. All the while, they will be under ever-present media attention and attempting to operate in a non-threatening fashion towards the population of the host nation. In this environment, all actions by the soldiers can have strategic consequences. It is therefore essential that government policy is clearly defined and understood through a well structure, unified chain-of-command in the CF.

NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY OPERATIONS

Notwithstanding threats to Canada from foreign persuasions, security and defence of Canada itself remains a primary concern to the current government. *Defence Policy Statement 2005* explains: "First and foremost, the Canadian Forces must ensure the security of our citizens and help exercise Canada's sovereignty."¹⁰³ Historically, the military contributed to domestic and constabulary roles in support of other government agencies in roles ranging from search and rescue, counter-drug, fisheries patrol, coastal surveillance, and support to civil authorities in times of natural disasters, but the world has changed since the events surrounding 9/11. As a very active member of the GCTF, the once distant foreign threats by non-state actors and terrorist

¹⁰² Lee A. Windsor, "The Medak Pocket," *Canadian Defence Associations Institute*, <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/library/medakpocket.htm>; Internet; accessed 28 February 2009.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

groups will inevitably seek out to strike Canada's homeland. Canada remains one of the last western nations to receive such an attack, while various anti-coalition armed groups have publically stated Canada is on their target list. The continued reception of high profile international events such as the G8 and 2010 Olympics makes the risk perhaps even more acute. More recently, a global focus on climate change with the possible ice-free access to Canada's North-west Passage and enormous potential arctic wealth in natural resources will require a constant presence to defend the nation's sovereignty, aid other government agencies and respond to any potential threats whether environmental based or otherwise.

On July 20, 2005, then Defence Minister Bill Graham visited a small chunk of rock known as Hans Island, roughly lying equidistant between Canada's Ellesmere Island and Greenland. What had been an unseen on-again-off-again issue between Canada and Greenland for the latter half of the twentieth century was now firmly planted in the minds of both country's citizens and their media.¹⁰⁴ The Defence Minister claimed his visit was just one of many routine visits to northern military posts and Canadian installations in the far north. Denmark for their part had claimed the island as their own, and filed an official protest with the Canadian Embassy in Copenhagen. Subsequently, there was a short period of time where an escalation including naval vessels was possible; however, the two principally friendly nations agreed to further cordial negotiations in the end.¹⁰⁵

The dispute over Hans Island will likely be handled in the halls of government and the international courts instead of resorting to military power. Granted, the issue may prove to be more an academic and political exercise, it raised the issue of physical security over the arctic

¹⁰⁴ Canadian Geographic, "Whose Hans?" <http://www.canadiangeographic.ca/hansIsland/default.asp>; Internet; accessed 10 March 2009.

¹⁰⁵ Lieutenant-Commander Guy Killaby, "Great Game in a Cold Climate: Canada's Arctic Sovereignty in Question." *Canadian Military Journal*, Vol 6, no. 4 (Winter 2005-2006), 31-40.

region. If Canada claims this vast area under its sovereign control, the issue will become a practical one with the result that not only intention is required, but actual capability to preside over and affect the whole of the land, air and sea environment. For the foreseeable future, DND (and to a lesser extent the Coast Guard) is the only government agency that possesses the means in equipment and personnel to operate in any the arctic for any extended periods.

The renewed presence of Russia on the world stage has brought with it the well known posturing in the air and sea that existed during the Cold War. Russian bombers have again started to appear on the fringes of Canadian (and American) airspace duly met by NORAD controlled interceptor aircraft.¹⁰⁶ Russian submarines have returned to patrol below the northern ice, and most recently an expedition planted a Russian flag inside a capsule close to the North Pole in an effort to extend territory and assert ownership over the potentially vast mineral and energy resources within its borders.¹⁰⁷ Accordingly, in much the same way as the Hans Island issue, this act is a direct challenge to similar claims made by Canada.

Notwithstanding the unlikely event of armed conflict, similarly positioned northern countries such as Norway, Denmark and the US have all made recent assertions of their perceived territorial boundaries and the resulting need to protect their sovereignty. All have demonstrated a willingness and actual hardware to enable their presence in various disputed areas. Canada for its part, has historically been content with rhetoric more so than actual deeds. The current government in contrast has chosen the CF as among the primary tools through which it will enforce its claims in the Arctic.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁶ CBC News, "Russia denies plane approached Canadian airspace," <http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2009/02/27/arctic-russia.html>; Internet; accessed 10 March 2009.

¹⁰⁷ CBC News, "Battle for Arctic heats up," <http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2009/02/27/f-arctic-sovereignty.html>; Internet; accessed 10 March 2009.

¹⁰⁸ Sharon Hobson and Casandra Newell, "Shrinking Ice Cover Creates Opportunities and Threats." *Jane's Navy International*. (January/February 2009): 16-21.

Along with the challenges presented by state actors, the constantly changing natural environment will also maintain focus on Canada's Arctic. With the recent trend of less permanent ice cover in the region, the likelihood "for increased shipping, tourism and resource exploration, and new transportation routes are being considered, including through the Northwest Passage."¹⁰⁹ Recognizing that this has the potential toward positive economic benefits, it will also allow for more possible illegal activity increasing the already daunting challenges of sovereignty and security.¹¹⁰ To stress the point, while commenting on Russia's intention to equip special military units to enforce their northern claims, Minister of Foreign Affairs Lawrence Cannon was quick to point out that Canada is an arctic nation and an arctic power, and will defend its sovereignty in the region.¹¹¹ He did not go into specifics as to how Canada would accomplish this, but with the recent government announcement of its intention to build a fleet of arctic patrol vessels for the Navy, it is safe to assume that Ottawa will look to the military as a part of this effort. The lead agency will depend on the situation with the CF usually in a supporting role, but with preponderance of available equipment and personnel.

Due to the increase focus on Canada's arctic from environmental and resource interests, there will be some new challenges for the CF to consider for deployment and presence, although traditional domestic roles will remain well into the future. Owing to the particular nature of the threat posed by terrorist and non-state actors and the enormous size of Canadian territory and coastline, an increased level of inter-agency integration is required for a whole-of-government approach domestically, as it is similarly mandated in foreign policy within the IPS 2005.

CURRENT CANADIAN FORCES MANDATE

¹⁰⁹ Department of National Defence, *Canada First Defence Strategy...*, 6.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Lawrence Cannon speech as reported by Philip Authier, "Ottawa 'will not be bullied' by Moscow," <http://www.nationalpost.com/todays-paper/story.html?id=1437423>; Internet; accessed 29 March 2009.

A Role of Pride and Influence in the World contained a section on defence that came to be known as the Defence Policy Statement 2005 (DPS 2005). It clearly indicated there was a new government with a new foreign policy statement, with defence as a major player. This was the first major national policy release on defence since the 1994 White Paper. Whereas the earlier White Paper was famous for its resulting reduction in spending and personnel cuts, yet increased utilization of the CF, the DPS 2005 signaled a complete reversal of the widely expressed opinion of neglect towards the military. From a national perspective, it was unusually comprehensive in that it included the military as a prime mover with the government's 3D (and sometimes T) concept of foreign policy, namely Diplomacy, Defence, Development and Trade, or what is now known as a whole-of-government approach. This policy goal quickly translated into practical application for the military, as the campaign plan for Operation Archer into Kandahar Province merged the strategic imperatives of 3D directly into the operational/tactical objectives with Governance, Security and Reconstruction. This well-defined government policy was easily understood in the military context. The way forward for the CF in this new environment was underway.

DPS 2005, "sets a new course for a more effective and relevant military in the coming years."¹¹² A focus on the defence of Canadians in the domestic context, work with the US towards the defence of North America and deployment world-wide in a multi-national context for positive contribution in troubled areas¹¹³ is reaffirming a CF capable across the full spectrum while maintaining an expeditionary nature. In what may be the most significant endorsement of this document, the more recent Conservative government released their own defence policy in the guise of the Canada First Defence Strategy in 2008 which stressed the importance of the

¹¹² Department of National Defence, *Canada's International Policy Statement: Defence...4*.

¹¹³ Ibid.

Arctic, while it retained all three of the same roles of DPS 2005, but with slightly different descriptions:

1. Defending Canada – Delivering Excellence at Home
2. Defending North America – A Strong and Reliable Partner
3. Contributing to International Peace and Security – Projecting Leadership Abroad¹¹⁴

Defending Canada – Excellence at Home has been amplified with three key military missions in the form of awareness, deterrence and response.¹¹⁵ As the name Canada First Defence Strategy implies the first role of the CF is to protect Canada and its citizen first and foremost. Canadians expect the military to be there in times of domestic crisis as it has done in the past. Recognizing that most situations will require the lead of another government agency, the CF must be able to plan for and work closely with other departments as needed.

This first role for the CF has been sub-divided into three further capacities of responsibility:

1. Provide surveillance of Canadian territory and air and maritime approaches;
2. Maintain search and rescue response capabilities that are able to reach those in distress anywhere in Canada on a 24/7 basis; and
3. Assist civil authorities in responding to a wide range of threats – from natural disasters to terrorist attacks.¹¹⁶

Any of these could be performed in coordination with, or subordinate to, agencies such as The RCMP, Canada Border Services Agency, Department of Fisheries and Oceans, the Coast Guard or any number of other provincial and municipal departments.

¹¹⁴ Department of National Defence, *Canada First Defence Strategy...*, 8.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 7.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 7.

Defending North America – A Strong and Reliable Partner acknowledges the unique and indivisible relationship Canada has with the US in matters of defence and security. NORAD remains an important element of the relationship and has evolved to include maritime surveillance. The newly formed CANADACOM will work with the US Northern Command for military cooperation and shared response to civilian emergencies. This civil-response agreement was in fact formalized on February 2008.¹¹⁷ Lastly, with perhaps the most recent severing of our military ties to the UK, the CF was directed to ensure that our doctrine and equipment remains compatible with those of the US.

Contributing to International Peace and Security – Projecting Leadership Abroad recognizes the highly integrated world and Canada's reliance on a secure and stable environment within it. Proving leadership abroad is essential to remaining a credible player, and requires the necessary capabilities to contribute with the full spectrum of operations. Not relying on a solely military response, the whole-of-government approach draws from a wide range of government agencies and their associated expertise. Finally, under various alliances within which Canada is a member, the government will continue to demonstrate its support for multi-national bodies and like minded nations in continually improving the international community.¹¹⁸

The current CF mandate has remained consistent from the DPS 2005 issued under the Martin government. The strategic environment, as defined, was essentially unchanged up to the release of the subsequent CFDS 2008 under the Harper government. Consequently, the CF and other government departments have benefitted from a stability and maturation of the concepts espoused in both documents. The COE remains complex and defies easy qualification; however,

¹¹⁷ David Pugliese, "Canada-US Pact Allows Cross-Border Military Activity," *The Vancouver Sun*, 23 February 2008, <http://www2.canada.com/vancouvernews/story.html?id=ba99826e-f9b7-42a4-9b0a-f82134b92e7e>; Internet; accessed 14 March 2009.

¹¹⁸ Department of National Defence, *Canada First Defence Strategy...*, 9.

DND profits from only having to react to the battlespace and not a constantly changing government focus as well. CF Transformation began within this context and is well underway with the former Chief of Transformation as the current CDS. As the lower levels of command within the CF become immersed and experienced within the new command structure, they will, it is hoped, enjoy the benefits of clear vision and commander's intent within the CF coinciding with clear government direction. The next chapter will examine what the CF Transformation process has accomplished with a view to establishing a way ahead for the CF.

CHAPTER 3- CURRENT AND FUTURE REQUIREMENTS

My next challenge will be to communicate effectively and reach Canadians so that they understand what CF transformation means concretely for them. I certainly can tell you that we will share our enthusiasm as this is an amazing time for the CF

CDS Gen Rick Hillier

CF TRANSFORMATION

It is interesting to note that the White Paper on Defence from March 1964 made reference to the practical unity of the military after all the reforms that had occurred up to that point. The White Paper explains: “Such unity as the Canadian Forces have been able to achieve has [been] on the unity of political direction which resulted from all three services being placed under the [MND]. Below...efforts have been concentrated on achieving co-ordination rather than integration of the three services.”¹¹⁹ The statement would be equally as true if the document as written was published in 2005. Note that this quotation was written in 1964, four years prior to unification. The evidence appears to show that the political direction to the military was simply *to unify* and not any meaningful change in how to apply government policy. This was a weakness that the current CF Transformation resulting from DPS 2005 sought to rectify.

Revisionist thinkers can easily point to any number of factors as the cause of a practical failure in unification. Considering the lack of actual (or perceived) higher direction within the newly unified force, the ever present bureaucratic and cultural resistance to change was certain to be effective opponents to a truly functionally unified military in Canada. The sixteen year time difference between the White Papers of 1971 and 1987 would indicate a continued lack of government concern for strategic military policy. In this context, an examination of the origins and current state of CF Transformation is in order before any discussion of the way ahead.

¹¹⁹ .Department of National Defence. *1964 White Paper on Defence*. (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, March 1964), 17.

Wilf Lund states what has become a widespread contemporary belief as major cause of the practical failure of unification: “The major flaws...were that both its rationale and means of implementation were obscure. [Hellyer], had not spelled out how unification would take place and left the defence portfolio...leaving the armed forces to muddle through in chaos.”¹²⁰ CF Transformation would not be the same. From the outset, Hillier took personal ownership of transformation and it quickly became evident this was his plan, his vision. He laid it out in four stages and initiated four CDS Action Teams to address C2, force generation, operational effectiveness, and institutional alignment.

The release of the Liberal Government’s *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Defence* in 2005 or what has come to be known as the Defence Policy Statement (DPS 2005), signaled a change in government policy towards the CF and essentially started the CF towards transformation. It addressed the end of the Cold War, the events surrounding 9/11 and the new environment containing threats from failed and failing states within the COE.¹²¹ As most policy documents are broad on concepts, and short on specifics, the new DPS 2005 appeared to be quite explicit in what the government expected of the military, including tasks it would undertake and internal changes to the organization itself. In order to become more effective, relevant and responsive, the CF would undertake seven key initiatives, the first of which was to “adopt a fully integrated and unified approach to operations by transforming their command structure; and establishing fully integrated units.”¹²² Where the 1964 White Paper on Defence seemed to avoid purposely addressing internal defence organizational matters with statements such as, “No attempt will be made to set up a theoretical establishment to replace the existing one, nor will the

¹²⁰ Wilf Lund, *Integration and Unification of the Canadian Forces*. Available at www.navalandmilitarymuseum.org/resource_pages/controversies/unification.html . Accessed 10 March 2009.

¹²¹ Department of National Defence, *Canada’s International Policy Statement: Defence...*,i.

¹²² *Ibid.*,11.

details be prescribed in advance,”¹²³ the government of 2005 stressed the matter of utmost importance. This is another marked practical difference between unification and transformation.

DPS 2005 was but one chapter in a more comprehensive government policy document titled, *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World* and came to be known as the International Policy Statement 2005. It framed the military contribution within the government’s desire to make a difference in the world, namely Defence, Diplomacy and Development, what quickly became known as Canada’s 3D Approach to world affairs.¹²⁴ The *what* had now been clearly delineated by the government, structural changes within the CF to ensure its effectiveness while operating as a primary component within the government’s plans both at home and abroad. *How* this was to be accomplished followed soon after with the appointment of General Rick Hillier to the post of CDS. His vision how to accomplish this was as follows:

 Vision to Mission Transformation Guiding Principles			
Vision An effective integrated military force valued by allies, partners and friends that stands ready to protect Canada and Canadians and through the conduct of its missions gives our country the strategic impact to shape and protect Canadian interests	Canadian Forces Identity Our first loyalty is to Canada. Beyond this fundamental imperative, all service personnel must look past environment, component or unit affiliations to most closely identify with the CF		Mission Defend Canada and Canadian interests and contribute to international peace and security
	Operational Focus Operations and operational support take primacy over all other activities and considerations. Transformation initiatives that increase CF operational focus should be given the highest consideration	Mission Command Continue to develop and exemplify mission command leadership. Mission command articulates the dynamic and decentralized execution of operations guided by the overriding commander's intent.	
	Command Centric Imperative Commanders provide commander's intent early. Clearly delineate line and staff functions and establish a distinct and unambiguous chain of command that coherently integrates strategic, operational and tactical HQ elements	Authorities, Responsibilities & Accountabilities Provide commanders a clear articulation of their assigned authorities, responsibilities and accountabilities	
	Integrated Regular, Reserve and Civilian Regular, reserve and civilian personnel will be more closely integrated into virtually every CF structure in order to ensure the best utilization of skills and experience at every level		
Canadian Forces Transformation	1	Transformation des Forces Canadiennes	

Figure 3: source <http://cds.mil.ca/cft-tfc/>; DWAN accessed 6 January 2009.

¹²³ Department of National Defence. *1964 White Paper on Defence...*, 19.

¹²⁴ Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “A Role of Price and Influence in the World,” http://www.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/documents/IPS-EPI/foreword-avant_propos.aspx?lang=eng; Internet; accessed 13 March 2009.

Almost forty years after unification, the CDS felt it necessary to direct CF members to be loyal to the institution of the CF first, and not their units nor now non-existent Army, Navy and Air Force branches. One can sense the desire for a rallying call similar to *Semper Fi*¹²⁵ of the USMC within the sole service of the CF.

The CDS Planning Guidance for CF Transformation states his intent as follows:

The CF will become more effective, relevant, and responsive, and its profile and ability to provide leadership at home and abroad will be increased. The CF will become more effective by better integrating maritime, land, air and special operations forces. It will become more relevant, both at home and abroad, by adapting its capabilities and force structure to deal with threats that arise from international instability, especially in fragile states. It will become more responsive by enhancing its ability to act quickly in the event of crises, whether in Canada or around the world. The transformation of the CF will focus on the establishment of new integrated (beyond joint) organizations and structures, including a unified national command and control system. These goals demand that the CF move beyond traditional thinking to adopt a fully integrated and unified approach to operations.¹²⁶

Of note was his expressed desire for integration, which he defines as *beyond joint* within a unified command and control system. The commander in charge of translating government direction and policy into military action is after one organization only, not three cooperating with each other. The CDS implemented his vision for transformation through four unique phases as the transition developed.

Phase One is described as, “the development of an unified CF vision that was developed concurrently and in tandem with the Defence Policy Statement (DPS), followed by the initiation and conduct of analysis directed along four very specific, but far-reaching, lines of operation –

¹²⁵ Short for *Semper Fidelis*, which is latin for *Always Faithful* and the official motto of the USMC. It represents the loyalty that Marines have for their Corps as a service, each other, and their country.

¹²⁶ General R.J. Hillier, “CDS Planning Guidance – CF Transformation,” November 2005, 3.

each assigned to a dedicated CDS Action Team.”¹²⁷ Due to the urgency of the changes required, this phase was completed even as the CDS Planning Guidance was released for implementation.

Phase Two saw creation of the operational commands of CEFCOM, CANADACOM, CANOSCOM and CANSOFCOM with a new strategic HQ in the form of the Strategic Joint Staff (SJS) along with a new office called the Chief of Force Development (CFD). This phase is also now complete with all organizations operational, albeit within a final operational capability that is still being defined.

Phase Three is defined as, “the process of aligning to our new structures, many of the organizations and functions that are strategic and operational enablers - that force generate specific military capabilities that directly support the execution of CF operations while providing broader service delivery functions to the CF as a whole.”¹²⁸ This phase is in progress and will not effectively be complete until each of the new organizations reach a steady state FOC with the newly transformed CF.

Phase Four will effectively remain in force indefinitely or until the CDS decrees CF Transformation to be complete. Its purpose is essentially a lessons learned process to conduct analysis and provide recommendations on potential CF evolution.¹²⁹ There are currently force structure reviews underway towards this end, within CFD.

A visual representation of an example the impact of CF Transformation will have on the CF is displayed below. **Figure 4** demonstrates an example of the unreasonably complex chain-of-command that used to reside in the Atlantic Region. **Figure 5** shows the command structure for all of the CF following Phase Two of transformation. There are now essentially two chains-

¹²⁷ Ibid., 4.

¹²⁸ Ibid., 5.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 5.

of-command only for a given formation, unit or individual. One for force generation from the service chiefs and one for force employment to the operational commands.




Figure 4: Example of former C2 structure for units based in the Atlantic Region

CF/DND Context




Figure 5: Current C2 structure within the CF.

With General Hillier's retirement and former Chief of Transformation, General Natynczk appointed as his replacement, the CF Transformation process has been partially implemented but remains far from complete. As the current CDS has recently stated, "We're probably in the early stages on our transformation journey. We've made significant changes to our organization, our doctrine, and our training...However, there's much work to be done to adapt our culture to be truly integrated to achieve strategic effect."¹³⁰

The bulk of the CF is still coming to terms with the immediate impact of the organizational changes at lower levels of command, while trying to force generate a combat effective pool of personnel for force employment within a new command structure from an ever dwindling supply of candidates. Although forced to adjust to new chains of command during high tempo operations, the result is a significantly simplified hierarchy with clearly defined lines-of-communication. What is now required is the ability to build upon the benefits of the current structural changes and allow for them to impact all CF members regardless of place in the organization. While operational level commanders have a more focused approach to enablers at their level, currently there is no apparent change in everyday life within the CF for the common soldier, sailor or airman at unit level. This is caused by the majority of their time spent force generating under an individual service structure which has little interaction with other components until time for pre-deployment training.

EVOLUTION OF OTHER ARMED FORCES

If the United Kingdom were today a recently created State organizing her fighting forces, it is inconceivable that they would be separated into three services.

- Field Marshall the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein

Canada is not alone in its attempts to transform due to the particular nature of the contemporary environment. As with most matters of defence, the tremendous size of the US

¹³⁰ Chief of Defence Staff, e-mail quotation through his Aide-de-camp dated 27 March 2009.

military budget and constant deployment schedule places them at the forefront of technological and force structure developments. Transformation is no exception. The UK, for its part, has been responding to changes with what it refers to as the *international security environment* since the end of the Cold War. These are professional militaries adjusting to their changed circumstances. Both forces are unique from Canada in that the nuclear deterrent accounts for a great deal of their focus, although there are organizational and operational aspects that are worthy of discussion.

The term *military transformation* has not generally been accepted as a known quantity in the UK as it has in Canada and the US. Nevertheless, their forces have started a transformation process, generally accepted to have begun with the release of the *Strategic Defence Review* of 1998. It was to change the focus on the structure of their conventional forces. Less emphasis was placed on a contribution to NATO, and more effort was placed on becoming an effective expeditionary force. Previously, NATO was designed to fight an air-land battle on the continent of Europe and naval battles in the North Atlantic. The British experience in Kosovo, Afghanistan and the War on Terror have shaped their approach to an improved force structure calling for a joint approach towards the full spectrum of operations.

Creation of the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) in large part resulted from the poorly coordinated efforts of the three service commands during the Balkans campaigns and other operations in the 1990s. It is expressly an operational HQ designed to bridge the gap from the Minister of Defence and HQ strategic direction, down to the Frontline Commands at the operational and tactical levels for deployed operations. The Home Office fills the same role for domestic operations. In this capacity, these organizations perform the same function as the so-called Dotcom HQs in Canada but from two organizations as opposed to four HQs in the Canadian context. While the Canadian HQs are still finding their place within the CF, it is a safe

assumption that for a small force the size of the CF, a reduced level of bureaucracy (and HQs) will benefit effectiveness.

Another organizational result of the UK transformation process was creation of a Joint Helicopter Command (JHC). The JHC brings together all combat helicopters force generated by the Army, Royal Navy, and Royal Air Force under one command. In this capacity, operational commanders request an effect through JHC and can be provided a myriad of airframes capable of the task. JHC, for its part can prioritize the numerous requests for resources from a fleet size that is always in short supply compared to the operational requirements. Canada does not have a comparable organization to this. All aircraft, whether rotary wing, fixed wing or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) are commanded (and usually controlled) through one HQ in the form of 1 Canadian Air Division. This arrangement has the effect of isolating the force employers outside Air Command, whether land-based or sea-based from the force generation process. For example, currently there is position each for the Ground Liaison Officer and Naval Liaison Officer capacity within the Air Division. It is not very realistic to expect these individual to account for all the requirements of the force generation process for their respective services.

Notwithstanding the difference in how rotary wing fleets are commanded, the UK, like Canada has initiated structure changes to their defence organization that is improving effectiveness at the operational level. Another interesting contrast is that the UK, with a military almost twice as large as Canada, combines all operational HQ functions of air, land, sea, SOF and Log into the PJHQ for deployed operations while the Home Office directs domestic operations. Canada meanwhile has the task divided between CANADACOM, CEFCOM, SOFCOM and CANOSCOM. Perhaps this is an indication that while the Dotcoms were an attempt to combine the numerous confusing operational chains-of-command within the CF to a simpler system, they did not go far enough. PJHQ was formed in 1996, and by all accounts is

very successful in its intended role. The CF must accept that the existence of the current Dotcoms are only a preliminary stage towards consolidation and rationalization.

The story of the US march towards transformation, much like its military, is large and complicated, although very well documented. The Joint History Office within the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, published *The History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1993* in 1995. It is a very comprehensive document highlighting all aspects from the role of the Joint Chiefs, the friction over creating commands based on combat function versus geographic regions, the resulting regional Commanders in Chief (CinC), and Goldwater-Nichols Act.

More recently, the US Joint Forces Command (USJFC) was formed in 1999, with the mandate to lead transformation of the US military into the 21st century. Among the keystone documents is *Joint Vision 2020*, published by the Joint Chiefs in 2000. It specifies that to build the most effective force necessary, the US must “be fully joint: intellectually, operationally, organizationally, doctrinally, and technically.”¹³¹ It does not define a specific mission or purpose for the force, but one containing a well trained and ready force with the necessary *human* talent.

The current release of the *Joint Operational Environment (JOE)* is the latest in a series of “living documents” issued by the J9 department within the USJFC. It provides a framework to consider the future operating environment and the resulting effects on joint operations. In this regard it fills the same information requirements as the CF Chief of Force Development publications *The Future Security Environment 2008-2030* and *Objective Force 2028*. Both nations recognize the importance of technology within the fight, although stress the capabilities of the individual for effectiveness in the COE/JOE are, “essential to innovation and creative

¹³¹ Department of Defense, *Joint Vision 2020*, http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/doctrine/genesis_and_evolution/source_materials/joint_vision_2020.pdf; Internet; accessed 5 April 2009.

thinking.”¹³² In the US context, the USMC is the best example of an existing military force that is joint by definition and works within a unified command structure. USMC members are also well known for identifying themselves as Marines first, and not as a pilot, rifleman, cook or members of the US Military which harkens back to Hellyer’s fondness for the concept of a *Royal Canadian Marine Corps*. In this regard, there is merit for a closer comparison to the organizational structure and culture of the two forces.

While the CF strives to find itself within the COE, mandates from the government, and within the constantly evolving CF Transformation, the USMC represents an example of a truly joint, task-oriented and unified force, which possesses a flexible and expeditionary capability. While exploring a way ahead for the CF to become an effectively unified force, it is beneficial to examine this existing force within their own context and unique culture, with a view to obtaining lessons that can be applied towards the evolution of CF Transformation.

Canadian military comparisons with the USMC are not a new phenomenon. LGen Guy Simmonds, one of Canada’s most well respected generals, testified to parliament that he envisioned a future CF organized much in the same way as the USMC back in 1963.¹³³ Superficially, comparisons between the two fighting forces reveal a measure of common ground in the current context. Both are small forces compared to the relative size of other armed forces from western nations. They each make do with military equipment that was specifically developed for another force, but modified and used to serve their own ends. In relative terms of what is expected of them, they are resource poor in men and equipment. Lastly, they both have examples throughout their histories in which they are credited in possessing capability exceeding

¹³² Department of Defense, *The Joint Operational Environment: The World Through 2030 and Beyond*, <http://www.policefuturists.org/pdf/1May07JOE.pdf>; Internet; accessed 5 April 2009.

¹³³ Lieutenant-General Guy Simmonds, quoted in *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 14, Special Committee on Defence*, The Honourable M. Sauve, Chairman, 17 October 1963, (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1963), 439.

their size, and cite the First World War as the time when their reputations were solidified in the minds of their allies and populations for which they serve.

In his *Guided Tour of a Marine Expeditionary Unit*, Clancy explains that although Marines have obtained a reputation for being simple-minded “jarheads” in popular culture, they are some of the most innovative soldiers in the world. They are in fact, responsible for at least three major tactical advances achieved in the twentieth century with amphibious assault, airmobile assault and close air support.¹³⁴ As a force known for innovation at levels from the formation down to the individual, there is ample reason to emulate those aspects of the USMC towards achieving an increased effectiveness within the armed forces of Canada. As with the CF, from the beginning the USMC had its ranks filled primarily with volunteers comprising a professional force, its own missions are joint by definition while able to operate with other nations and services of the US, while maintaining its expeditionary nature.¹³⁵

THE FUTURE WITHIN TRANSFORMATION

*That a role which is suited to a country of our size and having regard to the financial burdens possible to be borne over a lengthy term, would be a tri-service force whose main objective was peacekeeping. I believe its organization should be very much like that of the United States Marine Corps which is a mobile force complete with all its ancillaries and able to meet what are commonly called brushfire situations.*¹³⁶

Lieutenant General Guy Simonds

Some may argue that due to our continuing bi-lateral and multinational alliance commitments as during the time surrounding unification, an actual unified command structure similar to that within the USMC would be incompatible with any practical functioning multinational effort. Note here the so-called “Last 100 Days” stands as an example of why this

¹³⁴ Tom Clancy, *Marine: A Guided Tour of a Marine Expeditionary Unit*. (New York: The Berkley Publishing Group, 1996), xv.

¹³⁵ Ibid.,4.

¹³⁶ Simonds, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence...*, 439.

has historically not been the case. Here, the Canadian Corps stood out from the rest of the allies with its own unique method of C2. As McCulloch explains:

Canadian and British operating procedures were essentially the same until 1918, and had to be in order for the Canadian Corps to be able to plug into and be understood with the larger context of the BEF. But it was downwards, through the corps command hierarchy, which controlled its own firepower, mobility and protection resources, that a unique Canadian way of waging war became possible.¹³⁷

For the same period Schreiber suggests: “the Canadian Corps developed its own innovative and unique operational approach even further, despite the fact that much of the innovation was never formally articulated as written doctrine.”¹³⁸

In his summation of how the Canadian Corps performed so admirably in “The Last 100 Days” of the First World War, McCulloch explains that such success was the result of a mental change, or paradigm shift, in how such a new (for the time) technological war should be fought. Canadian doctrine, or “The Canadian Way of War” was the outcome and translated into tactical effectiveness for an elite and professional force that had a tangible esprit-de-corps.¹³⁹ The COE, along with the institutional changes imposed by CF Transformation present the military with a similar opportunity for a paradigm shift. The leadership of the CF must complete the drive to unification, not for administrative efficiency and cost savings, but for operational effectiveness and flexibility of purpose within Canada’s whole-of government approach. They are presented with possibility to find a uniquely Canadian solution to a (not uniquely Canadian) problem of defining the complex battlespace, and applying military solutions in an era of full spectrum operations and resource constraints.

The single biggest hurdle towards the CF completing the unification process and operating as one cohesive unit is the cultural differences created by the continual nostalgia for

¹³⁷ McCulloch, *Keeping One’s Freedom of Action...*, 54.

¹³⁸ Schreiber, *Shock Army of the British Empire...*, 81.

¹³⁹ McCulloch, *Keeping One’s Freedom of Action...*, 56.

the strong service idea. Note the first of the six principles of CF Transformation as per **Figure 3** is *Canadian Forces Identity*: “Our first loyalty is to Canada. Beyond this fundamental imperative, all service personnel must look beyond their environment and unit affiliations to identify more closely with the CF as a whole.” Unfortunately though from the individual’s perspective, the CF as an institution has set them up for failure with respect to this principle just as they are entering the recruiting process. Any prospective candidate can now start his or her road to being a member of the CF through a very comprehensive and user friendly online recruiting website. In order to start the search for available positions open to their particular case, the first thing required of them is to select Army, Navy or Air Force. This is the start of a long road towards identifying one’s self as a member of only the individual services, and not the CF as their parent force. This phenomenon will have wide spread consequences to the inner workings of an organization that desires one single focus.

Soldiers at all levels operating in contemporary environment not only have to be well trained and educated in order to adjust, but they also need to have a very clear understanding of their higher commander’s intent, their arcs-of-fire to accomplish the mission, and the strategic impact of their individual actions. Mission Command has become the defining principle and necessary practice in these chaotic surroundings for soldiers at all levels of leadership in combat. US Army Manual FM 6-0 describes Mission Command as, “decentralized execution based on mission orders...Successful mission command results from subordinate leaders at all echelons exercising disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent...an environment of trust and mutual understanding.”¹⁴⁰ In the Canadian context, members of various contingents have been led by Canadian Land Force commanders but manned to various degrees with Air Force and Navy personnel who did not train or operate with their Army counterparts as a rule, prior to

¹⁴⁰ Department of the Army, *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces*, (Washington: HQ Department of the Army, 2003), 1-17.

short-term pre-deployment training. The required mutual understanding and trust from the above definition generally does not extend across service lines at the lower levels until well into the mission or until the *augmentees* have proven themselves. The following is an example of how this lack of trust can also be found at even the highest levels within the CF, and one to reinforce the lack of common experiences within the different communities.

In the years leading up to the present deployment of CF helicopters (which are force generated by the Air Force) in the Afghan theatre, there were continuing statements within the CF hierarchy, and as a result, from the press, that the existing CH146 Griffons could not operate in theatre and were not what was needed in Afghanistan.¹⁴¹ An article from the time states: “Critics have been pressuring the Defence Department to send the Griffons, in part to get Canadian soldiers off Kandahar's bomb-strewn highways. But Hillier flatly rejected the argument, saying the CH-146 wasn't suited to operate at high elevations and in 55C degree heat.”¹⁴² Although no senior officers would put pen to paper on the matter, as a frequent high readiness planner, the author was verbally counseled on numerous occasions that due to the poor performance perceived during deployments in Bosnia, senior Land Force commanders did not feel the community was up to the task at hand for OP ARCHER and OP ATHENA in Afghanistan. A technical argument against the helicopters capability did not stand up at the time either, as the USMC had operated their UH-1N Twin Hueys, a helicopter with less power than the Griffon, in the same environment.

It is unclear what the actual impetus was for change of opinion, but there are now eight Griffons deployed to Kandahar Air Field (KAF) as part of the Joint Task Force Afghanistan

¹⁴¹ Murray Brewster, “Military Planned for Bigger Afghan Deployment,” *Canadian Press*, 6 January 2008.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*

(JTF-Afg) Air Wing¹⁴³ taking the tenuous first steps to integrate into the land force order of battle while decisively engaged on operations. While the helicopter force has adapted to their new role well up to this point, the particular structure of the CF and its separate force generation versus force employment hierarchy are in fact a practical as well as mental hurdle to creating a truly joint and unified capability.

Figure 5 illustrates the Chain-of-Command (CoC) for both the force generation within the individual services on the right and the force employment HQs on the left. Note that the link between each of the services is achieved at the highest level within the staffs of the chiefs themselves as defined by the functional and formal command structure. The USMC has a similar organizational structure as the CF, which demonstrates organization structure does not necessarily translate into a unique culture and effectiveness by itself.

The CF and USMC have both a service and operational CoC. On the service side, the USMC CoC flows from the President, to the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of the Navy to the Commandant of the Marine Corps. On the operational side, the CoC flows from the President, to the Secretary of Defense, directly to the Combatant Commands (NORTHCOM, CENTCOM, etc). **Figure 6** reveals just how their uniquely unified CoC structure fits effectively into a Joint Task Force separated into Air, Land, Sea and SOF component while on operations.

¹⁴³ Department of National Defence, "Griffon helicopter crews make history over Kandahar," http://www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/news_e.asp?cat=114&id=7695; Internet; accessed 3 March 2009.




Figure 6: USMC Command Relationships

Within the Marine Component, the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) is the principal organizational structure for all operations. It is characterized by, “balanced, combined-arms forces with organic ground, aviation, and sustainment elements.”¹⁴⁴ Within that construct, the principal war fighting formation is the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). The forward deployed extension of the MEFs is the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). They are smaller task-tailored units that have a limited scope and duration. In both cases the basic structure of the organization is as per **Figure 7** and **8** below.

¹⁴⁴ Department of the Navy, MCRP 5-12D *Organization of Marine Corps Forces*, (Washington: DoD US, 1998), 2-1.




Figure 7: An example of an MEF




Figure 8: An example of an MEU

In both cases, the Aviation Combat Element (ACE), Ground Combat Element (GCE), and Combat Service Support Element (CSSE) under the Command Element (CE), have almost a direct correlation with the existing Canadian Air Wing, Manoeuvre Unit(s), and National Support Element under the National Command Element as the current construct for force employment on CF operations.

The primary difference in the CF is that for force generation of capabilities in Canada, the individual service chiefs are responsible and continue to see themselves as distinct within the CF. The Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) generates functional air capability, Chief of the Land Staff (CLS) generates land capability, and the Chief of the Maritime Staff (CMS) generates naval capability. The USMC, for its part generates forces in the same manner in the structural sense only, albeit leaving the naval capability the US Navy. The Marine Divisions generate land combat while the Marine Air Wings generate air-based combat power. Again the difference lies in how each branch within the service see itself. Each soldier identifies himself as a Marine first, and specific trade second.

Therefore it is evident the USMC exists through a similar process of force generation and force employment through different organization and associated HQs as in the case with the CF, yet posses a unique sense of focus and culture that the CF does not. As with the UK and USJFC, the Marines see the operational environment as fundamentally characterized by *human* behaviour.¹⁴⁵ General Richard Myers, The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs has stated that the most important place required for transformation is “between our warfighter’s ears” in that a cultural

¹⁴⁵ Department of the Navy, MCDP 6 *USMC Command and Control*, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1996), 55.

change is required within the military¹⁴⁶. The same is fundamentally true for the CF, but has not translated into any policies to address it effectively at the lowest levels.

Leadership in the CF: Conceptual Foundations posits that within a reduced resource base the CF must, “strive for a common identity and teamwork within a more varied and complicated human resource landscape.”¹⁴⁷ Unfortunately, the current situation is one where the many capabilities and skill sets throughout the CF come together only for the purposes of an operation. Pre-deployment training will be the first time the majority of leadership and soldiers alike have experienced the different enablers and now must employ them effectively. Following a (normally) six month deployment, all these enablers will return to their individual bases with their respective individual services, cultures and force generation chains-of-command within the army, navy and air force. This causes the associated members to relate to the other arms by exception rather than the rule. As cited in *Cultural Intelligence and Leadership*, while investigated the socio-cultural aspects of the Airborne Regiment in Somalia, Donna Winslow found that loyalty and identity to one specific group can result in disrespect for, and isolation from, others with the potential to lose the ability to relate to them.¹⁴⁸ It is in this way the members of the army, navy and air force can not relate to each other as individuals, and more importantly what they each bring to the fight in capabilities.

It is a generally accepted military truism that regardless of the tool you bring to the fight, you must end up with soldiers on the ground to accomplish the mission. This would lead to land forces as the *supported* arm and naval and air forces as the *supporting* arm in most cases.

Inevitably, this leads to the familiar, although primarily emotional debates over the relative

¹⁴⁶ Jim Garamone, “Myers: Changing Military Culture Key to Transformation,” *Air Force Print News Today*, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/af/myers_chg_culture.htm; Internet: accessed 5 April 2009.

¹⁴⁷ Department of National Defence, *Leadership in the CF: Conceptual Foundations*, (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy, 2005), xv.

¹⁴⁸ Karen Davis, ed. *Cultural Intelligence and Leadership*, (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy, 2009), 49.

merits of each service. To be clear, there are missions charged to the CF that are accomplished with air and naval forces operating essentially independent of the land force. Two obvious examples concern the sovereignty piece that the USMC is not expected to accomplish in their context. Canada's air forces are required to defend the sovereignty of the nation's air space, plus contribute to that of North America through NORAD. Canada's naval assets must perform the same function within the sea approaches of the country's three coasts. This difference from the USMC is marked, and leaves a valid argument for a unique skill-set inherent in air and naval forces. While the requirement for these skill-sets and capabilities are valid, it does not necessitate the existence of individual services. The individuals performing the air sovereignty mission just happens to be employing an aircraft, and the naval patrol just happens to involve a crew aboard a ship. In both cases individuals trained to do a specific task with specific equipment. That in itself does not necessitate a separate service nor separate uniform from a central CF.

Culture is first and foremost fundamental to military effectiveness and a unifying concept. It will transcend technology, and whether soldiers develop the doctrine to use new equipment effectively or not, their culture will be determining factor.¹⁴⁹ A very good example of this is the use of rotary-wing aviation in direct support of ground forces. During the Second Gulf War, both the US Army and the USMC deployed with their own internal aviation support. In the USMC it was the venerable UH-1N Twin Huey, a design that was merely an evolution of the original Bell UH-1A from 1959. It was under powered, adapted to carry offensive weapons and not armoured, composed simply of an aluminum skin. The US Army deployed with its AH-64 Apaches, an airframe that was purpose built for the anti-tank battlefields of Europe during the Cold War. It was heavily armed with a pilot head-cuing 30mm chain-gun, rockets and Hellfire Missiles, and afforded the crew a great deal of protection with essential components designed to withstand direct hits from cannon blasts.

¹⁴⁹ Allan English, *Understanding Military Culture: A Canadian Perspective*, (Toronto: DCIEM, 2001), 2.

On paper, the Apache outclasses the Huey by a substantial margin. In reality, the Apache suffered substantially higher loss rate of the Huey during the early stages of the war. The reason for this was the way the USMC utilized their helicopter in support of ground troops. As previously mentioned, all Marines consider themselves Marines first, regardless of trade. UH-1Ns (and AH-1W) crews are an integral fighting component to the Marine MEF and MEU. They, along with other fixed wing platform are a self-contained Close-Air-Support (CAS) resource, well-know and trusted by the ground commanders. The US Army, although containing Apaches within their service, had prior to the war employed them as an individual manoeuvre arm of the ground forces with large formations of attack helicopters that struck deep into enemy territory. Now, due to the unique nature of the conflict, they were called to provide intimate support to ground forces in the same manner as the Marine Hueys, and were not prepared for the change.

Apache pilots found themselves in a new role while still clinging to their old doctrine, which included static OP and prepared battle position tactics as used in the large-scale conventional fight. The Marines for their part were constantly manoeuvring their machines, as much due to their limited power as for their unique tactics, and presented a very difficult target to engage, as compared to the stationary Apaches. Only after suffering heavy losses did the US Army recognize the need for a paradigm shift which translated into improved tactical effectiveness and their resultant concepts of close-combat-attack and enroute-combat-attack, essentially emulating the tactics of the USMC.

There above example illustrates a relative paradox of the military experience for leadership at all levels. While initial exposure to, and indoctrination within the armed forces contains a regimentation for any and all activities, the contemporary expectations on leadership dictates a flexible use of process and resources from all the services while executing their

mission. The CF is currently organized to maintain a narrow focus and stove-piping of its members from recruitment up through the highest ranks within their unique services. Further hindering an effective transformation of the CF into a truly unified force, is the method of promotion for officers and NCMs into higher positions of responsibility. As each service is responsible for evaluation criteria, individuals will inevitably advance as a result of their promoting the interests of their own services.¹⁵⁰ In this context it will be a difficult to expect a senior CF member to espouse dismantling the ways of an individual service which has promoted him to his current position as a reward for operating effectively within this service. Add to this the devolution of budgets to these same members within their services, and the segregated cultural becomes more pronounced over the fight for resources. A more unified or centralized focus is required in order for members to see themselves as CF members as opposed to member any of the individual services.

Like Hellyer, Hillier sought a loyalty to one service in the CF through his transformation process, but at this time there remains no central, officially approved basis, for this at the individual soldier level other than his stated desire for a *Canadian Forces Identity* in the CF Transformation guiding principles. Although there has been a change in structure of the operational commands on the force employment side of the CF, this does not create the impetus for the rank-and-file to change the way they identify themselves, especially with the force generation side firmly entrenched in its multi-service existence. Currently, the only true motivation for change is the operational environment, and in particular the mission in Afghanistan where member of all three services are forced to come together once in the field. Admirably, the CF tactical leadership has innovated while on operations there, as they have as far back as the First World War. Although, with the current government's end state of 2011 for the mission, like during "The Last 100 Days" their efforts will remain *informal* only until a

¹⁵⁰ Bland, *Chiefs of Defence...*,288.

central authority within the CF institutionalizes its member's activities and accounts for them during their time prior to employment in the field.

If a military fails to train its personnel to perform their eventual tasks integrated at the tactical level, their combined effectiveness will be reduced. This can happen when doctrine and training are managed by different bureaucracies with little intercommunication.¹⁵¹ In the present context, the CF operates in such a way. Only through their own tenacity and innovation, do individual leaders within each service deal with each other on an individual basis across service boundaries, creating informal arrangements to ensure all efforts prior to deployment are oriented towards a common goal. While this creativity and innovation is desirable within the CF leadership, the organization itself needs to create a centrally focused HQ structure which will enable the generating of operational effectiveness and one service culture prior to employment in the field. This is in contrast to the three service nature of the existing structure which acts as a bureaucratic hindrance towards this end.

The current Chief of Force Development, Major General Stuart Beare, refers to this notion in the form of an individual he calls the *Joint Guerrilla*. This is a commander and associated staff which focuses all efforts towards achieving the required operational effectiveness regardless of the environment for which they are designed to operate. While force structure reviews continue, few initiatives that create a single service culture and tie efforts on the force generation side of the CF have yet developed within CF Transformation.

One such initiative that has surfaced is the policy of *Universality of Service*. The majority of CF members will be surprised to learn that it is also known as the "soldier first" principle, the implication being that all CF members are members of the profession of arms first, before they

¹⁵¹ Allan Millet and Williamson Murray, *Military Effectiveness Volume 1: The First World War*, (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1988), 24.

are considered within their respective trades.¹⁵² While admittedly, the policy is focused on a common standard of physical fitness of the CF members, it does satisfy the first, and primary of the principles of transformation in that of a common CF identity taking precedence over environment or component. It is an initiative that can foster competitiveness among members, at the same time reinforcing the necessary loyalty within brigades, regiments, ships, and squadrons,¹⁵³ while stopping short of promoting the distinct army, navy and air forces.

There is also an example of a current organization within the CF that has achieved a level of unification of purpose and culture during its creation early into the transformation process, that of the units within the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM). There existing structure is illustrated in **Figure 9** below:




Figure 9: Current CANSOFCOM organizational structure.

¹⁵² Department of National Defence, *Fit to Serve: Universality of Service and Related Support Programs*, www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/view-news-afficher-nouvelles-eng.asp?id=2918; Internet: accessed 4 April 2009.

¹⁵³ Jack Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?* (Toronto: Harper Collins Publishing Ltd, 2004), 82.

The organization is unique in the CF as it performs the majority of both its own force generation and force employment. Each of the four units is comprised of members from each of the three services. In this community, soldiers of the Army, Navy and Air Force live, work and fight together within the culture of CANSOFCOM community, with little thought to their service origins.

While there has always been a certain mystic surrounding Special Forces, there is nothing inherently unique about them within the military context. Understanding that greater mental and physical stamina is generally required, they are simply soldiers performing jobs with their specifically trained skill sets, like any other soldiers. What this community does have however, is a common identity and culture that creates cohesiveness that is unique in the CF. In this respect, they share more in common with the USMC than simply sharing similar “tidy lines” on an organizational chart.

The organizational model that CANSOFCOM represents can be applied to the CF as whole in order to effectively address the requirement of the current operational environment while creating the conditions for a single culture within the CF. Much as in the same way the operational HQs have been rationalized, the force generating structure must be reduced to a command organization directing the efforts of all their associated components towards the needs of the operational commanders to meet the requirements of the contemporary environment

As there is undeniable expertise required from existing individual service hierarchies, they should remain, although as a technical oversight branch of NDHQ, and not as the primary body generating combat capability. The unique engineering and safety requirements within naval and aerospace equipment, as well as fleet management for all three service branches can be

centrally managed while not becoming the determinant to operational readiness in isolation of the requirements in the field.

With the model already established within CANSOFCOM, a single command structure on the force generation side of the CF would facilitate the creation of a single service mentality in its members, while at the same time developing a more effective force as a whole. Individuals with their unique skill-sets within each component would participate in their routine task along side those of their supporting arms, breeding a familiarity and mutual trust prior to action on operations not found in the current organization. The confidence in employing the complete range of CF capabilities will place leadership at all levels in a position of advantage when addressing the government's policies across the full spectrum of operations.

CONCLUSION

CF Transformation has accomplished a great deal since its inception following the government's release of Defence Policy Statement 2005. Creation of the Strategic Joint Staff, Chief of Force Development and the Dotcom HQs has gone a long way towards simplifying the operational chain-of-command and focused effort with the CF. Transformation is however, still in progress and arguably at a cross-roads that may lead to a similar fate as unification in 1968. That of an incomplete process that failed to realize the goal of an effectively unified command structure, able to meet the needs of the Government of Canada.

The long road towards unification was one of a constant struggle between governments attempting to minimize costs and improve administrative efficiency with military commanders attempting to account for the perceived needs of the armed forces. With the evolution of the CF driven predominantly through a functional association with its primary allies and their segregated services, the drive for combat effectiveness appeared at odds with government hopes for rationalization.

Ultimately passed into law, CF unification failed to achieve what Hellyer referred to as a band of brothers with one force, one name, with one uniform that would focus a sense of purpose and belonging to one service.¹⁵⁴ The failure to clearly articulate how a unified armed forces would participate in government policy, member loyalty to single services, and follow-on governments that had different priorities allowed for a slow regression away from what unification had tried to accomplish with the military during the decades that followed.

The particulars of the contemporary operational environment with its complex factors of globalization, failing states and transnational actors, contributed to a renewed government focus of security of the nation and armed forces in particular. The classic state-on-state balance of power through military might was replaced by government influence applied throughout the full

¹⁵⁴ Hellyer, as cited in Bland, *Canada's National Defence Volume 2*, ...,132.

spectrum of conflict against an asymmetric foe not easily defined nor overcome by force alone. In this environment, the Canadian government released their International Policy Statement 2005, and signaled there would be a focused effort applying resources towards creating a stable international environment with the resulting security for the Canadian population.

The military for its part responded to this government policy with CF Transformation. An evolutionary process with a similar goal of unification, although for reasons of operational effectiveness as opposed to efficiency of process. So far, it has stopped short of complete unification of the CF, having effectively reorganized the force employment HQs with its operational commands, although leaving the force generation capability in the hands of the unique services of the army, navy and the air force.

Some would argue that the uniqueness of the air, land and sea environments demand uniquely trained and equipped soldiers, sailors and airmen to fully exploit their environments. While true, this does not necessitate separate organizations, unique in name, uniform and culture with the resulting competition of resources and interpretation of government policy. It also does not account for the realities within a force as small as the CF, which draws in personnel and materiel from all services for employment on operations. Due to the continued existence of the multi-service mentality in the military, these CF-wide applications of resources on operations suffer from a reduced effectiveness due to their lack of mutual familiarity prior to deployment.

CF Transformation must continue to rationalize the CF command structure to include the organizations responsible for force generation under one commander with one focus, that of generating a truly unified capability able to meet the requirements of the operational commanders. While exposed to, and working with all arms of the CF from inception, soldiers will develop a familiarity with and trust of all the trades leading to an enhanced effectiveness while deployed, fulfilling the governments mandate on operations.

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