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ABSTRACT

Few places are as threatening to global security as the Pashtun-dominated tribal belt along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. This region serves as a sanctuary for a confluence of indigenous insurgents, internationally networked terrorists, foreign fighters, and multiple criminal organizations. Largely immune to NATO-led counterinsurgency efforts within Afghanistan, these groups are able to recruit, train and plan for operations from safe havens inside Pakistan, preparing militants for deadly hit-and-run and suicide attacks against security forces and civilians on both sides of the border. With the leadership of al Qaeda also firmly entrenched along the border, it is not inconceivable that another 9/11-type attack against the United States or her allies could be spawned from this area if current trends are not reversed.

NATO counterinsurgency strategies aimed solely at winning the ‘heart and minds’ of the Afghan populace, although important, can have no hope of succeeding without first checking the influx of fighters from Pakistan. The purpose of this paper is to reveal the pressing need to move sanctuary interdiction to the centre of any counterinsurgency strategy contemplated for the region, and to offer recommendations on how to marginalize this jihadist nursery. Clearly, a major diplomatic and development effort that respects the harsh lessons of history and the key tenets of Pashtun culture is needed to resolve the vast array of regional issues and obstacles defined in this report. Further, acknowledging that any regional comprehensive approach will be a generational challenge and that Islamabad does not have the capacity or will to implement all of these sweeping changes in the immediate term, this report also recommends that NATO forces develop immediately an aggressive containment strategy along the border. Such an approach is the only way to effectively interdict militant lines of communication now while giving Pakistan and Afghanistan the time needed to implement longer-term internal reforms.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The Pakistan-Afghanistan border area is merciless. Lined with massive snow-covered mountain peaks, canalizing valleys, and desolate wastelands, the boundary demarcated by Sir Henry Mortimer Durand in 1893 separating the two countries is virtually unidentifiable. The Pakistan side of the 2400-kilometer border area includes the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan Province. On the other side of the border, nearly half of Afghanistan’s provinces are wedged between Badakshan in the northeast and Nimroz in the southwest. Of the dozens of ethnic groups that inhabit the area, the largest and most influential are the Pashtun and Baluchi tribes. Divided unnaturally by the Durand Line, neither group recognizes the imposed border nor do they appreciate foreign meddling in the region.

Despite the forbidding geography and hostility of the tribal populace, the border region has long been of great geostrategic significance to world powers. Early in the nineteenth century, the British Empire expanded its influence in the area to block what it perceived to be Russian expansionism into Central Asia. In the ‘Great Game’ that ensued, British forces engaged tribal groups in combat sporadically for nearly a century along the northwestern boundary of India. Since British India was partitioned in 1947, the region has been no less tumultuous: it has been used by multiple tribal groups to settle ethnic and territorial disputes; it has fuelled countless indigenous insurgencies that have plagued the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan; and it provided unfettered sanctuary to the Mujahideen throughout the 1980s,

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2 The ‘Great Game’ was the term used to describe the nineteenth-century British-Russian rivalry for supremacy in Central Asia. See Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia (New York: Kodansha International, 1992), 1.
ultimately forcing the capitulation of the Soviet Union after a decade of bloodshed. All states attempting to influence events in the region have come to realize that combat along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border is “a savage, cruel, and peculiar kind of mountain warfare, frequently driven by religious zealotry on the tribal side, and…singularly unforgiving of tactical error, momentary inattention, or cultural ignorance.”³

This notion still rings true. The Pakistan-Afghanistan border now serves as a safe haven for a confluence of insurgents, internationally networked terrorists, foreign fighters, and multiple criminal organizations. Largely immune to American-led counterinsurgency efforts within Afghanistan, these groups have allegedly benefitted from the moral, resource and sanctuary support extended to them by individuals within Pakistani government institutions, such as the Frontier Corps and the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), and sympathetic tribal leaders.⁴ Initially confined to the FATA, insurgents are currently able to recruit fighters from all Pakistani provinces, and prepare them for deadly hit-and-run and suicide attacks against coalition forces operating in Afghanistan. Now believed to be the home of al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and nearly the entire Taliban senior leadership shura, the border frontier has become an incubator for global jihad.

There are positive signs that key players in the region including the United States, Pakistan, and Afghanistan are finally coming to terms with the extent of the challenges in the tribal belt. A Tripartite Commission has been established by these stakeholders to facilitate

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⁴ Under great pressure from the United States to cooperate fully on the 'Global War on Terror', President Pervez Musharraf established tighter control over the ISI, replacing the Director General a month after the 9/11 strikes and transferring out several senior officers believed to be loyal to the Taliban. Still, it is believed a number of ISI officials still provide tacit support to the ultra-conservative movement out of fear of Indian encirclement. See Shaun Gregory, “The ISI and the War on Terrorism,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 30, No. 12 (2007): 1022-1024.
dialogue and unity of effort in cross-border operations, the United States is attempting to broker a regional diplomatic engagement to resolve major issues in the area, and the capacity of the Afghan Border Police has slowly but steadily improved in recent months.\(^5\) Developments in Pakistan are also guardedly hopeful. Under pressure from the United States to deny sanctuary to the insurgency, Pakistani soldiers have killed scores of foreign fighters and sympathetic tribesmen harbouring them.\(^6\) Meanwhile, President Pervez Musharraf resigned in August 2008, making way for a democratically elected civilian government that acknowledges military means alone will never pacify the border region, but that a sustained comprehensive approach that synchronizes security, governance and development reforms is needed.\(^7\)

The Taliban and al Qaeda are feeling the pressure of these reforms. It is plausible, for example, that the increased violence in the interior of Pakistan has been a calculated effort on the part of the Taliban to divert attention from the frontier region.\(^8\) Further, it is likely that the al Qaeda attack on Mumbai, India was conceived in part to relieve strain on insurgents along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.\(^9\) By stoking the flames of the long-standing regional crisis,


\(^7\) See Karin von Hippel, “Musharraf Resigns as President of Pakistan,” Washington Post (18 August 2008); Internet; http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/discussion/2008/08/18/DI2008081801095.html; accessed 7 February 2009.

\(^8\) Dean Nelson and Ghulam Hasnain, “Bin Laden’s Deputy Behind the Red Mosque Bloodbath,” Internet; http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article2076013.ece; accessed 3 February 2009.

militants accurately anticipated that Pakistani troops would be re-assigned to the Indian border, leaving space for the Taliban and al Qaeda to continue their operations.  

Despite this progress, the situation along the border frontier remains extremely volatile and fragile. Islamabad’s long-standing support for jihadist groups within its borders as a means to block Indian influence in Afghanistan and interdict Pashtun nationalism has fostered the uncontrollable spread of ‘Talibanization’ in the region. Thus, even if the Pakistani government now has the will to exorcize from its security institutions all Taliban sympathizers, it no longer has the capacity to suppress the growing inferno of extremism alone. NATO and the United States have done little to address the spiraling situation. They have failed to convince regional stakeholders that American objectives are friendly and that NATO has the stomach for the protracted commitment that will be required to implement enduring change. Further, NATO counterinsurgency strategies have aimed solely at winning the ‘heart and minds’ of the Afghan populace – a strategy that can have no hope of succeeding without first checking the influx of fighters from Pakistan. 

Failure to grip this turmoil will be catastrophic. In fact, few places are as important to global security as the Pashtun-dominated tribal belt along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. At

\[10\] This is exactly what happened. Amidst fears of an Indian ground offensive in the aftermath of the Mumbai terrorist attacks, Pakistan re-positioned troops along the Pakistan-India border as a precaution. See Zein Basravi, “Pakistan Moves Troops to India Border,” CNN (26 December 2008); Internet; http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/12/26/india.pakistan.tensions/index.html; accessed 27 March 2009.

\[11\] ‘Talibanization’ refers to the expanding influence of Islamic law and extremism in daily Pakistani life. This issue will be discussed in greater depth later in the paper. See Christine Fair, “Pakistan Loses Swat to Local Taliban,” Terrorism Focus, Vol. 4, No. 37 (13 November 2007); Internet; http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=4537; accessed 8 February 2009.

\[12\] The authority of many tribal elders in the border region has been supplanted by younger, more radicalized extremists. When Pakistani efforts to crush Taliban safe havens through heavy-handed tactics and conventional military force were stillborn, Islamabad attempted in vain to appease the insurgents through negotiation and offers of amnesty. See International Crisis Group, “Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants,” Asia Report No. 125 (Islamabad and Brussels: International Crisis Group, 11 December 2006).
stake is not just the future of the fledgling Afghan government and an improved quality of life for the Afghan people. Rather, the harmony of the forty plus states attempting to bring stability to Afghanistan is also threatened. More ominously, failure to suppress the growing insurgency in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area could leave Pakistani nuclear stockpiles exposed, it will exacerbate tensions between regional powers and it will facilitate at a minimum the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan. It is not inconceivable that another 9/11-type attack against the United States or her allies could be spawned from this area if current trends are not reversed.

What can be done to eliminate or at least mitigate the impact of insurgent safe havens in Pakistan? The purpose of this paper is to reveal the pressing need to move sanctuary interdiction to the centre of any counterinsurgency strategy contemplated for the region, and to offer recommendations on how to marginalize these jihadist nurseries. Before remedies to this issue can be prescribed, however, it is necessary first to take the time needed to truly understand the origins and complexity of the problem. What factors created the existing challenges of the Pakistan-Afghanistan tribal belt? Chapter II answers this question with a brief overview of the current situation along the Durand Line, followed by an abbreviated study of the key geographical, cultural and political obstacles that have, to date, facilitated the unmitigated growth of insurgent networks in Pakistan. A rudimentary understanding of the tribal framework of the border and the involvement of external states is crucial to subsequent discussion on dealing with insurgent sanctuaries.

In an effort to distil lessons learned that might be applied to present-day counterinsurgency operations along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, Chapter III examines the historical efforts of the British, Soviets and Pakistanis to pacify resistance along the Durand

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13 Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia (New York: Viking Penguin, 2008), XXXIX.
Line. These case studies provide invaluable insight into the complexities of bringing the Pashtuns under external rule, but their greatest utility is in demonstrating that the harsh lessons of this region are enduring. Indeed, by disregarding the customs and values of the local populace, each of these three nations was inevitably forced to abandon the tribal belt in defeat. Further ignorance and conceit will come at great cost to any other regime seeking to extend its influence in the region.

Chapter IV reviews the military doctrine of various nations in an effort to identify sanctuary interdiction methods. Although scholars and military professionals alike now widely agree the Achilles Heel to counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan is the freedom of insurgents to cross the border at will, it is troubling that not one of the 40-plus countries with troops deployed to the region has comprehensive sanctuary or border interdiction doctrine. In the absence of rigorous academic study on this vital subject, Chapter V reviews a variety of methods attempted throughout recent history to interdict insurgent safe havens in an effort to identify ‘best practices’ that might be applied today. Possible solutions to this problem include conventional military assaults on neighboring countries; targeted killing of key insurgent leaders; military containment strategies; and population resettlement.

The report concludes in Chapter VI with strategic and operational policy recommendations to dismantle insurgent safe havens and abate the growing Talibanization of the region. First, it must be acknowledged that the burgeoning insurgency is a regional problem that is exacerbated by long standing tensions between Pakistan and its neighbours India and Afghanistan. Thus, focusing on a ‘hearts and minds’ campaign inside Afghanistan alone will solve nothing. Rather, a major political and development effort must seek to resolve the vast
array of regional issues and obstacles that are defined in this report. Most importantly, any strategy attempted must respect the harsh lessons of history and the key tenets of Pashtun culture.

Further, it would be unrealistic to think that Pakistan and Afghanistan have the capacity, or even the will, to implement all of these sweeping changes in the immediate term. Thus, this report also recommends that NATO forces develop an aggressive containment strategy to mitigate the impact of the insurgent sanctuary in Pakistan. Operations should focus on a significantly improved intelligence network, an active border defence and aggressive information and influence operations campaigns that seek to mobilize the support of the populace against radical jihadists. The case studies explored in this report suggest that the ideal system to interdict militants along the Durand Line should not endeavour to seal the border altogether. Doing so would exacerbate tribal tensions and would be prohibitively costly in terms of material, money and personnel. An increased presence along the border, however, is absolutely vital to securing the additional time needed for the capacity building of indigenous security forces.
CHAPTER II
UNDERSTANDING THE CHALLENGES OF THE BORDER REGION

The Problem: Taliban Welcome in Pakistan

Militant groups are increasingly using the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region as a staging base from which to launch global terrorist strikes. The Pashtun tribal belt in particular has become home to a diverse confluence of militant forces including the transnational terrorist group al Qaeda led by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, Mullah Mohammad Omar’s Afghan Taliban, Baitullah Mehsud’s rapidly expanding Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (Pakistan Taliban), the Hezb-i-Islami (HIG) militia led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the jihadi network of Maulawi Jalaluddin Haqqani (known as the Haqqani Network), the Tora Bora Front, as well as a vast array of other foreign and domestic militant forces (See Annex A – Threat Groups).

Estimates of insurgents inhabiting the border region are believed to be in the tens of thousands.

These militant groups each have different incentives, tactics and command structures. On one end of the spectrum, the Arab-led al Qaeda is waging a global jihad to eliminate American influence from the Middle East and all Islamic nations. Groups such as the Afghan Taliban and

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17 See J. Michael McConnell, Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (5 February 2008); Internet;
Haqqani Network are primarily concerned with the dismantling of the Karzai government and consolidation of power in Afghanistan, while Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan is waging a ‘defensive jihad’ to counter Pakistani government influence in its tribal lands. Other elements, such as the indigenous Baluchi insurgency and various narcotics-based criminal groups, have even more narrow intentions.

Unfortunately, counterinsurgency planners have failed to understand the different causes, ideologies and cultural backgrounds of each of these militant groups. Rather than seek to pacify the least extremist of these groups, exploit inter-tribal rivalries, or engage in a campaign to target only the specific terrorist networks that threaten American interests, the United States instead declared a ‘Global War on Terror.’ This pronouncement galvanized the vast conglomeration of militants massing in the Pakistan-Afghanistan tribal areas, effectively rendering the Taliban and al Qaeda insurgencies extraordinarily difficult to isolate and defeat. Unified against a common

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20 During an address to a joint session of congress on 20 September 2001, United States President George W. Bush declared, "Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.” A transcript of this speech is available at http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/; Internet; accessed 24 February 2009.
enemy these groups now routinely stage shuras in the tribal frontier to collaborate on a number of operational issues.\(^{22}\)

In the immediate aftermath of the American-led occupation of Afghanistan in November 2001, the FATA of Pakistan proved to be particularly suitable for the growth of this fledgling insurgent network. Taliban and al Qaeda militants first retreated to and regrouped in South Waziristan, one of seven agencies in the FATA. Insurgents employed widespread political assassinations, intimidation, terrorist bombings and a sophisticated information operations campaign to purge hesitant pro-government Waziri tribal leaders and challenge customary tribal governance structures. These tactics were extremely effective. In fact, hundreds of tribal elders who defied Taliban domination in the FATA have been murdered, paving the way for complete ‘Talibanization’ and extremist control of the region.\(^{23}\)

This radicalization has not been restricted to the Pashtun tribal areas. It has spread far beyond the FATA into Pakistan’s NWFP, Baluchistan, the Punjab, and even the Sind. Most recently, the Swat District of the NWFP, formerly an international tourist retreat known as the “Switzerland of Asia” and situated only 150 km from the Pakistani capital of Islamabad, fell to Maulana Qazi Fazlullah, a charismatic Pakistan Taliban commander with strong ties to al Qaeda.\(^{24}\) His forces have destroyed hundreds of girls’ schools, murdered scores of policemen,


\(^{22}\) Various insurgent groups are increasingly sharing resources and collaborating on intelligence and training initiatives. See Barnett R. Rubin, Afghanistan and the International Community: Implementing the Afghanistan Compact (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2006).

\(^{23}\) Indicative of the gravity of the situation, retired Pakistani Lieutenant-General Talat Masood’s declared publically in September 2007 that “…the state has lost its authority and is in full retreat especially in Waziristan and Bajaur.” See Carlotta Gall and Ismail Khan, “Taliban and Allies Tighten Grip in North of Pakistan,” New York Times (11 December 2006); and Islambard Wilkinson, “Pakistani Troops Lose Faith in War on Terror,” Daily Telegraph (19 September 2007); Internet; http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1563600/Pakistan-troops-lose-faith-in-war-on-terror.html; accessed 27 February 2009.
instituted Sharia courts and created shadow governments.\textsuperscript{25} Fighting in the area has resulted in the deaths of over 1000 civilians and the exodus of nearly 350,000 residents. Ominously, Fazlullah’s actions have been mirrored in countless other Pakistani districts since 2006, where Islamic extremists have aggressively challenged and undermined government authority. The dramatic increase in suicide attacks throughout the country; the Red Mosque episode of July 2007; the assassination of Benazir Bhutto later that year by extremists in the country’s military capital, Rawalpindi; and the devastating attack on the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad are all unassailable indications of the expanding influence of the Taliban and their ability to infiltrate Pakistani security institutions.\textsuperscript{26}

The Taliban-al Qaeda sanctuary in the border region has also contributed extensively to a deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan. It provides a resilient base for the command and control, funding, recruitment, training and sustainment of military operations launched across the border.\textsuperscript{27} Further, with the assistance of sympathetic militants and tribal groups, the Taliban has also established a “…lethal cottage country industry along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border – the manufacture of improvised explosive devices (IEDs).”\textsuperscript{28} The components of these deadly

\textsuperscript{24} Ahmed Rashid, “Pakistan’s Extremist Triumph,” \textit{Los Angeles Times} (24 February 2009).

\textsuperscript{25} \textit{Ibid}.


roadside bombs are routinely manufactured on the Pakistani side and then smuggled into Afghanistan, where they are assembled at safe houses.\textsuperscript{29} Even the conventional fighting ability of the Taliban has been emboldened by their ability to find refuge in Pakistan. In the aftermath of a major combat operation conducted in the early-fall of 2006 to dislodge insurgents from well entrenched defensive positions in Panjwai District of Kandahar Province, a NATO after action report concluded that insurgents had acquired in excess of four hundred thousand rounds of ammunition and advanced medical treatment from safe havens near Quetta, Baluchistan.\textsuperscript{30}

Insurgent sanctuaries along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border have been devastating to regional security since the Taliban was overthrown in late-2001.\textsuperscript{31} More worryingly, left unchecked, these safe havens will increasingly threaten global security. The operational headquarters for al Qaeda is now fully entrenched in Pakistan, enabling the leaders of this transnational terrorist group to plan, recruit and train for attacks on the United States and other countries.\textsuperscript{32}


\textsuperscript{30} Rashid, \textit{Decent Into Chaos}, 364.


Challenges to Securing the Tribal Belt

Despite the deployment of nearly 60,000 NATO soldiers to Afghanistan and a commitment that has already spanned most of the past decade, several barriers have obstructed the international community’s efforts to defeat insurgent forces along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border: harsh terrain and climate; a failure to understand and respect the customs of the tribal region; Pakistani tensions with India and Afghanistan; the corruption and incapacity of the Pakistani security establishment and its enduring links to militant groups; ineffective and premature peace agreements between the government of Pakistan and the Taliban; and the unpopularity of the American-led ‘Global War on Terror.’ While the nature of these obstacles has been well documented in mainstream media and acknowledged by all stakeholders, very little has been done by the international community to remedy them. As Dr. David Kilcullen suggested at the 2007 Counterinsurgency Seminar in Quantico, Virginia, “getting it is not enough.”33 Until these issues can be thoroughly understood and counterinsurgency planners distil from them key deductions to inform an effective border strategy, mission success in Afghanistan and Pakistan will remain elusive.

Harsh Terrain and Porous Borders

The Pakistan-Afghanistan border region is “a tangle of difficult mountains intersected by long narrow valleys, innumerable gorges and torrent beds interspersed with patches of cultivable land.”34 Understanding the impact of this harsh terrain on military and sustainment operations is a vital pre-condition to finding and isolating insurgent safe havens in the area.

The northern portion of the Durand Line is delineated by the Pamir Mountain range pass in the Wakham Corridor of Afghanistan’s Badakshan Province, and it extends south 1000 kilometers to the Gomal River, which traverses the international boundary. This section includes the impassable and sparsely populated terrain of the Hindu Kush, a western sub-range of the Himalayas.35 South of the Hindu Kush lies the Khyber Pass, a critical lifeline that slices through the forbidding mountain range separating Peshawar, Pakistan from Jalalabad in the Nangarhar Province of Afghanistan. From the Khyber, the border then follows the Safed Koh, which summits near the Afghan border town of Torkham. Although mountainous, this area is scarred with hundreds of foot and goat paths commonly used to move supplies and fighters into Afghanistan. The northern section of the border includes the Afghan provinces of Badakshan, Khost, Kunar, Nangarhar, Nuristan, Paktia, and Paktika; all of Pakistan’s FATA agencies; and a segment of the NWFP.

Below South Waziristan, the border veers west for nearly 1200 kilometers over the Toba Kakar mountain range to the Pakistan-Iran border at Robat. This section of the border includes Pakistan’s largest province, Baluchistan; and the Afghan provinces of Zabul, Kandahar, Helmand, and Nimruz. The vast open terrain of the Kandahar-Baluchistan area largely consists of desert basins and arid hills. This territory is home to the Registan Desert, a vast ocean of red

34 Noor ul Haq, Rashid Ahmed Khan, and Maqsudul Hassan Nuri, Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan (Islamabad: Asia Printers, 2005), 1.

sand etched with ‘rat lines’ that facilitate the movement of supplies and personnel.\textsuperscript{36} While militants have found it less difficult to traverse this area, their movement is far less concealed from NATO surveillance assets and indigenous border troops.

Legal cross-border traffic is restricted largely to two crossing sites only: Torkham in the north; and Chaman/Spin Boldak in the south. While both sites, and twenty other less frequented crossings, are manned by Pakistani customs officials, there are hundreds of other illegal and unmanned routes suitable for movement by foot, pack animal and even small vehicles in some cases.\textsuperscript{37} Insurgents, narcotics smugglers and locals seasonally cross the border along these paths that are marked by neither fences nor border posts. In fact, most of these crossings are unmapped and unknown to Islamabad and Kabul.\textsuperscript{38}

This harsh terrain has always posed significant challenges for any force contemplating operations along the border. In 1919, for example, British soldiers campaigning in the Waziristan region routinely found themselves cut off and isolated by tribal militants occupying fighting positions in the terrain dominating narrow defiles.\textsuperscript{39} The situation is no different today for NATO and indigenous security forces. Many of the passes in the area can only be traveled on foot and in single file. The mountainous areas not only preclude most vehicle movement, they also limit the use of helicopters, which struggle to achieve lift at higher elevations in the

\textsuperscript{36} These resupply lines run north-south through the Registan Desert. They provide insurgents direct access to the Panjwai, Zharey and Maywand Districts of Kandahar Province from their safe havens in Baluchistan. The author has observed these lines of communication during an aerial reconnaissance of the region.

\textsuperscript{37} Johnson and Mason, “No Sign Until the Burst of Fire,” 44.

\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Ibid}.

roasting summer air. Acclimatized to the altitude and familiar with the terrain, locals clearly enjoy a distinct tactical advantage in the border region.40

This severe geography and climate are realities that cannot be ignored by counterinsurgency planners contemplating methods to interdict the movement of insurgents over the porous border. Rather, they must carefully inform all military plans and sustainment concepts.

**Misunderstanding the People of the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Region**

Despite the brutal conditions, millions of people are able to establish a living along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Of the dozens of ethnic groups that inhabit the area, the Pashtuns and Baluchis are of greatest concern to Islamabad, Kabul and the NATO-led counterinsurgency. These tribes both fuel indigenous insurgencies, they provide sanctuary and resource support to transnational terrorists, and they facilitate the movement of militants into Afghanistan from contiguous parts of Baluchistan and FATA. The Pashtun in particular have demonstrated sympathy to Taliban objectives.41 Unfortunately, the international community has failed to understand and respect the cultural dynamics of the region, resulting in a string of myopic and ineffective strategies to deal with the problems along the border (See Annex B – Pakistan’s Tribal Belt).

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40 Weather also dictates the ability to fight along the Durand Line. In fact, many of the mountain routes in the Hindu Kush and Safi Koh become impassable in the winter months, severely restricting all combat activity. With the arrival of spring, flooding and mudslides continue to plague ground movement. Thus, the campaign season in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region traditionally runs from late March through to October. Even then, the heat in the summer months in the lower-lying districts and valleys is often unbearable for sustained operations. See Brian Robson, *Crisis on the Frontier: The Third Afghan War and the Campaign in Waziristan, 1919-1920* (Staplehurst: Spellmount Limited, 2004), 150.

The Baluchis

The Baluchis are the dominant tribal group from west of Quetta, Baluchistan through to the Iranian border. While the Baluch people are divided into seventeen groups and hundreds more sub-groupings, they are united by a distinct cultural identity and code of honour, known as Ryvaj. Fierce and courageous warriors, the Baluchi guard their independence ruthlessly. They revolted in 1973, for example, when the Punjabi-dominated central government of Pakistan revoked the authority of the Sardars – the tribal chiefs – in an effort to control the abundant natural gas reserves and precious mineral deposits that had recently been discovered beneath Baluchi lands. While Islamabad was able to quell the 55,000-man insurgency after four years of brutal fighting and heavy handed tactics that included tribal resettlement and group punishment, peace came at a tremendous cost. By 1977, 5300 Baluch and 3000 Pakistani soldiers lie dead, the causes that fueled the insurgency had not been addressed, and the Baluchi were left with a deep and enduring resentment of their “Punjabi colonizers.” Since December 2005, the insurgency has again flared up, with militants aggressively targeting oil pipelines, security officials and Pakistani government authorities.

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43 Similar to the Pashtun code of honour, Pashtunwali, Ryvaj is grounded in the tenets of revenge, sanctuary, hospitality and resistance to foreign meddling. See Henry Pottinger, Travels in Beloochistan and Sinde (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 57.

44 The Baluchi recognize and pledge their allegiance to tribal chiefs, called Sardars, who are responsible for social justice and maintaining tribal integrity. See Mansoor Akbar Kundi, “Tribalism in Balochistan: A Comparative Study” in Tribal Areas of Pakistan: Challenges and Responses, edited by Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Maqsoodul Hasan Nuri (Islamabad, Pakistan: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2005), 20.


46 The indigenous insurgency in Baluchistan today seeks primarily to achieve greater independence from the central government of Pakistan and to secure a greater cut of the oil and mineral revenues generated from the area. See Frédéric Grare, “Pakistan: The Resurgence of Baluch Nationalism,” Carnegie Papers 65 (January
Baluchistan is also home to a second insurgency that is significantly impacting events in Afghanistan’s Kandahar, Helmand and Zabul Provinces, where Canadian, American, British and Dutch troops form the nucleus of the NATO-led counterinsurgency. Since the Taliban and al Qaeda were ejected from Afghanistan in early 2002, the province has served as a refuge for the top leadership of both organizations and an important logistical centre for the insurgents operating in southern Afghanistan.47

While Baluchi support to the Afghan Taliban poses the greater threat to counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan and perhaps even to regional stability, proof that Islamabad is primarily focused on the Baluchi nationalist threat is not hard to find.48 Specifically, while Islamabad has proven reluctant to target Taliban leaders, it has not shown the same restraint against Baluchi leaders. On 26 August 2006, Nawab Akbar Bugti, a respected politician and former governor of Baluchistan, was killed in a raid by Pakistani troops, drawing condemnation from the international community and increased violence in the region.49 The pre-occupation of Pakistani security forces on the Baluch insurgency might actually facilitate Taliban freedom of movement in the region, and hamper even more counterinsurgency efforts across the border.


47 Even former-President Pervez Musharraf conceded his country had provided sanctuary to the ‘Quetta Shura’ when he declared, “There is no doubt Afghan militants are supported from Pakistan soil.” See Taimoor Shah and Carlotta Gall, “Afghan Rebels Find Aid in Pakistan, Musharraf Admits,” The New York Times (13 August 2007).

48 By targeting oil and mineral production and conducing militant operations in the Gwadar region, this indigenous insurgency has the greatest capacity to weaken Pakistan’s economy and strategic interests. See Kellett et al, “The Involvement of Key States in Afghanistan: A Strategic Assessment,” 32.

The Pashtuns

While the Baluchi are increasingly collaborating with the Taliban and al Qaeda, it is the Pashtuns who show the greatest sympathy to the objectives of these militant groups. With more than 40 million members living along and on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, the Pashtuns form one of the largest ethnic groups in the world without a separate internationally recognized homeland.\(^5\) They are generally assembled into five major groupings that are further subdivided along kinship and cultural-linguistic lines into many smaller tribal clans: the Sarbani; the Ghurghusht; the Karlanri; and the two main tribal confederations - the Durrani and the Ghilzai.\(^5\) Among these tribes, there is an obvious difference between those who occupy the lowlands, and the hill tribes who inhabit the mountains.\(^5\) The latter are alleged to be the most warlike and conservative, and they normally seek to dominate their neighbours while intensely guarding their own autonomy.\(^5\) When threatened by foreign powers, they make perfect insurgents.

Highly segmentary, Pashtuns identify themselves primarily with their familial and ancestral ties, and then to the clan or tribe.\(^5\) Relationships between the major tribal groups are

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\(^{50}\) For more on the ethnic groups of Pakistan and Afghanistan, see CIA World Fact Book, Internet; [https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html](https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html); accessed 3 March 2009.


\(^{53}\) In fact, no foreign entity seeking to extend influence into the region, including the British, the Soviets, the Afghans, or the Pakistanis, has ever been able to bring the hill tribes under control. See Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan*, 2nd Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980).

complicated and often volatile, only to be assuaged periodically in times of mutual threat.\textsuperscript{55} Perhaps the most recognized feud is the centuries-old conflict between the Ghilzai and Durrani. In fact, the leadership of the Taliban movement emerged from the Hotaki tribe of the Ghilzai confederation, a group of rural Pashtuns concentrated in the southeast of Afghanistan. The Ghilzai have competed for power for over 300 years with the Durrani, the confederation from which President Hamid Karzai originates.\textsuperscript{56} It is vital counterinsurgency planners understand this and other inter-tribal points of friction. The geographic and tribal origins of the Taliban movement explain why the Karzai Administration will never achieve legitimacy in the eyes of all Afghans and why the insurgency is not bent on driving towards Kabul, but rather destabilizing Durrani influence in Kandahar and Helmand provinces.\textsuperscript{57}

Many Westerners view the fragmented nature of Pashtun society as a major source of regional instability. The absence of central government control in the Pashtun tribal belt, they argue, has facilitated the migration and growth of transnational terrorist organizations in the region.\textsuperscript{58} Regrettably, the solution offered by the international community – that Islamabad and Kabul exert increased central government authority and impose a Western-style rule of law in the tribal areas – ignores an ancient tribal code known as Pashtunwali.

\textsuperscript{55} Caroe, 395.


\textsuperscript{57} \textit{Ibid}.

Pashtunwali

Understanding the key tenets of Pashtunwali – “the way of the Pashtun” – is critical to diagnosing why Pashtuns have provided sanctuary to the Taliban and al Qaeda, and subsequently addressing the challenges of the tribal areas. Pashtunwali is an unwritten code of behavior and legal framework that seeks to maintain the social balance of the tribe. While several variations of Pashtunwali exist throughout Pakistan and Afghanistan, the core principles of this ideology are universally understood by tribal members and they shape the actions of all Pashtuns from birth.

This social code has resolved disputes amongst Pashtuns for more than a millennium, yet it remains poorly understood in the West, where a more formal judicial system exists. According to the self-enforcing code of Pashtunwali, verdicts of importance are arrived at through community councils, referred to as ‘jirgas.’ Jirgas are comprised of ‘Marakchi’ – men of honour who hold the respect of all citizens and who show a sincere desire to resolve conflicts. Respecting the equality of all tribal members, a jirga does not designate a leader or chairman. Rather, verdicts are arrived at through consensus and after careful deliberation.


64 Once a decision is reached at a jirga, it is issued orally and it is considered binding, unless a ‘Takhm’ (appeal) finds otherwise. See Khurram, 9.
Of the five key personal values that comprise the Pashtunwali code of behavior, *nang* (honour); *badal* (revenge); and *melmastia/nanawati* (hospitality/asylum) are most relevant when trying to understand why Pashtuns support militant groups in the border region. First, Pashtunwali demands that all Pashtuns possess a high sense of personal honour or *nang*. This honour, which is gained primarily through the demonstration of competence and bravery in combat, partially explains why Pashtun men routinely take up arms in support of insurgencies in the region. A second and related tenet of Pashtunwali is *badal*, which demands that a Pashtun man must seek revenge for any slight against his “gold, women, and land.” Thus, it is prudent for counterinsurgency planners to understand that collateral damage caused by coalition aerial bombardment, for example, will only fuel an insurgency that subscribes to the adage “an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.” Finally, the Pashtunwali tenets of *melmastia* and *nanawatey* oblige Pashtuns to provide food, protection and sanctuary to all who request it, including an enemy, even at the cost of their own lives if necessary. This partially explains why the Taliban hosted Osama bin Laden and refused to turn him over to the United States in 2001, and why Pashtuns continue to provide safe haven to militant groups in the border region today.

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65 Although some authors prefer to combine various elements of Pashtunwali, most agree it is made up of the following basic tenets: *badal* (revenge), *ghayrat/nang* (self-respect, chivalry or bravery), *melmastia/nanawati* (hospitality/asylum), *purdah* (gender separation), *namus* (pride or defence of honour) and *jirga* (council). See Strickland, 47.

66 Further, states attempting to exert control in the Pashtun corridor must also realize that Pashtuns will take any action necessary to preserve their honour, even if it means breaking the laws of the state. See Charles Allen, *Soldier Sahibs* (New York: Carrol & Graf Publishers, Inc., 2000), 119.

67 Margolis, 11.


While Pakistan, at the behest of the international community, seeks to impose on this social code an alien system of centralized government, the Taliban and al Qaeda have embraced Pashtunwali. In fact, they have successfully employed this system to recruit insurgents, it has guaranteed them sanctuary for over seven years, and it is increasingly mobilizing the support of millions of Pakistanis.

**Pakistan-India Tensions**

The failure to understand and respect the people of the border region is not the only thing threatening to capsize counterinsurgency efforts. Long-standing regional tensions between Pakistan and its neighbours India and Afghanistan, left unaddressed, will preclude any chance of eliminating militant sanctuaries inside the tribal areas.

Pakistan feels particularly threatened by India. Rivalry and deep suspicion between the two countries has characterized their relationship since the 1947 partition of British India that spawned a Muslim majority in Pakistan and mostly Hindu India.\(^{70}\) Claims by both nations to the formerly independent state of Jammu and Kashmir have resulted in over sixty years of tension that has included open warfare in 1947, 1965 and 1971. Moreover, skirmishes along the Line of Control that was negotiated in the aftermath of the third India-Pakistan war threatened to boil over several times again throughout the late 1980s and 1990s, and they have even periodically escalated into a far more precarious state of affairs with both New Delhi and Islamabad threatening nuclear attack (See Annex C – Pakistan-India Disputed Territory).\(^{71}\)


Pakistan’s apprehension of India drives most of its economic and military policies. Seven of its nine army corps and two armoured ‘strike corps,’ for example, have been held close to the Indian border almost continuously for decades. Further, Pakistan’s lingering suspicion of India has led it to devote considerable energy to the maintenance of a large conventional capability, the acquisition of nuclear and ballistic missile weapons, and the covert support of militant groups for activities in Kashmir and Afghanistan. Despite billions of dollars in American aid intended to re-equip and re-train the Pakistani army to combat the growing insurgency along its border with Afghanistan, Pakistan has instead remained focused mostly on India, purchasing weapons and training to counter that threat.

Despite efforts made by New Delhi and Islamabad to reduce tensions, the situation between the two nations remains fragile. India has accused Pakistan of numerous border violations since the summer of 2008 and suggested Pakistani support was behind the Mumbai terrorist strike early in the year. India’s growing diplomatic and economic ties to Afghanistan, on the other hand, fuel long-standing concerns amongst Pakistanis of an Indian encirclement.

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72 Kellett et al, “The Involvement of Key States in Afghanistan: A Strategic Assessment,” 12.


74 Efforts made to de-escalate tensions between Pakistan and India include the signing of the Islamabad Declaration of Peace, the establishment between the two countries of a direct hotline to diminish the risk of nuclear escalation, an agreed moratorium on further nuclear tests except in “extraordinary” circumstances, and the pledge of both governments to create closer ties improve cross border trade. See Wadhams et al, “Partnership for Progress: Advancing a New Strategy for Prosperity and Stability in Pakistan and the Region,” 17.

75 These allegations are not unsubstantiated. India has contributed more than $1 billion to reconstruction and development efforts in Afghanistan, it has opened four consulates in Afghanistan, and it has even deployed a company of infantry soldiers to provide force protection for Indian road construction crews. See Jayshree Bajoria, “India-Afghanistan Relations,” Council on Foreign Relations (23 October 2008); Internet; http://www.cfr.org/publication/17474/indiaafghanistan_relations.html; accessed 7 March 2009; Sudha Ramachandran, “In Afghanistan, Pakistan’s Loss is India’s Gain,” Asia Times Online (1 February 2002); Internet;
Pakistan-Afghanistan Tensions

Until the acrimony between New Delhi and Islamabad is addressed through enduring diplomatic action, it is highly unlikely Pakistan will have the incentive to improve already-strained relations with Afghanistan. Pakistan has attempted for decades to maintain a foothold in Afghanistan for strategic depth – a buffer that could be calibrated to offset Indian influence in the region.\(^7^6\) Thus, Islamabad has always attempted as a default to establish a pro-Pakistan government in Kabul. Whenever that is not possible, it opts instead to stoke the cauldron of radical Islam to act as a counter-balance in the area. During the 1980s, for example, Pakistan provided support to Islamic militant groups against the Soviets, and a decade later, ISI and military officials actively aided the Taliban in seizing control over the Afghan government.\(^7^7\) Former Pakistani dictator General Zia-ul Haq once articulated the policy of using militant groups to calibrate hostilities across the border when he declared “the water [in Afghanistan] must boil at the right temperature.”\(^7^8\)

There are other fissures in the Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship independent of the feud with India. The Durand Line in particular, negotiated and signed in 1893 by Sir Henry Mortimer Durand and Emir Abdul Rahman, has been a persistent source of tension between Kabul and Islamabad. The border agreed upon initially followed the contours of prominent geographical features and areas of existing British control. It ignored greater Pashtun tribal integrity and thus

\(^{76}\) Rubin and Siddique, 9.


partitioned the native lands of this group nearly equally between Afghanistan and Pakistan.79 The Baluchis were affected similarly, albeit to a lesser degree. Not surprisingly, this imposed boundary has been viewed since its inception with contempt by Pashtuns and Baluchis on both sides of the line. In protest, Kabul posted the sole dissenting vote against Pakistan’s entry into the United Nations in 1947, arguing that the treaty demarcating their international boundary was signed under duress and was no longer valid following the partition of British India.80

Tensions between the two countries have been further exacerbated by the interrelated issue of Pashtun nationalism emanating from Afghanistan. Specifically, successive Afghan governments have demanded the creation of ‘Pashtunistan,’ an ethnic Pashtun state straddling the disputed border. The area demanded extends well beyond the contested boundary with Pakistan to the Indus River, and it includes the whole of Baluchistan and parts of the FATA and NWFP (See Annex D – Pakistan-Afghanistan Disputed Territory).81 Proponents of Pashtun self determination note that these regions of Pakistan belong under Afghan control as they were part of the former Durrani Empire and that residents of the frontier have always crossed it freely without restriction.82 Preoccupied since the 1971 secession of West Bengal by fears of internal


81 Interestingly, successive governments in Kabul have not been clear on intended governance structures for Pashtunistan. Options include the creation of an independent country to an autonomous province in Afghanistan. See Tariq Mahmood, “The Durand Line: South Asia’s Next Trouble Spot,” (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School Course Paper, 2005), 33; Internet; http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/research/theses/Mahmood05.pdf; accessed 9 March 2009.

disintegration, Pakistan has had little incentive to extinguish Islamic radicalism along its border with Afghanistan, nor will it as long as there a need to keep Pashtun nationalism in check.\(^8^3\)

Under significant pressure by the international community, and especially the United States, the two countries have sought to improve relations through various bilateral developments. At an August 2007 “peace jirga” attended by 700 delegates from both Pakistan and Afghanistan, President Musharraf took the extraordinary step of acknowledging insurgent safe havens inside Pakistan and he agreed to further dialogue with President Karzai. Further, a Tripartite Commission (TPC), consisting of senior military and political officials from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the NATO-led coalition was established in June 2003 to discuss issues related to the border.\(^8^4\)

While these initiatives represent positive steps towards regional stability, much work remains to be done. Following an April 2008 attempt on President Karzai’s life and the terrorist strike on an Indian embassy in Afghanistan three months later, Kabul blamed the Pakistani military for these attacks and temporarily suspended bilateral and regional meetings.\(^8^5\) Further, in spite of compelling evidence that the Durand Line is both legal under international law and recognized by the international community, Afghan President Karzai threatens to open old

\(^8^3\) Ibid., 6.

\(^8^4\) Various sub-committees of the TPC, such as the Border Security Sub-Committee Meeting (BSSM), have been implemented to collaborate on issues such as cross border violence and intelligence sharing. Meanwhile, tactical commanders from all signatories to the TPC meet periodically at Border Flag Meetings to ensure decisions made at the BSSM are implemented on the ground. See “Report to Congress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181), June 2008; Internet; http://www.defenseLink.mil/pubs/Report_on_Progress_toward_Security_and_Stability_in_Afghanistan_1230.pdf; accessed 9 March 2009.

\(^8^5\) Carlotta Gall, “Police and Army Officers Tied to Attempt on Karzai’s Life,” The New York Times (5 May 2008); Internet; http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/05/world/asia/05afghan.html; accessed 9 March 2009.
wounds by refusing to publicly recognize the boundary and by continually pushing for an independent Pashtunistan.86

**The Pakistani Security Response**

The support provided by various arms of the Pakistani security forces to militant groups along the border frontier has been briefly discussed already.87 Indeed, from the mid-1990s onwards, it seems Islamabad and its intelligence services not only sustained Taliban operations, they also tolerated the activities of Osama bin Laden while furnishing his organization with intelligence of pending CIA and Afghan operations in the region.88 In addition, elements of the Frontier Corps – Pakistan’s chief paramilitary force in the tribal areas whose remit is border monitoring and counter-smuggling – were used periodically to train and even coordinate the combat activities of insurgent groups.89 Worryingly, it is not certain that all of these ties have been severed.90

Successive governments in Islamabad have been pressured by Washington and the international community to transform Pakistani security forces and do more to secure their borders. In 2002, President Musharraf responded to these demands by deploying a division into

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87 For an overview of the various layers of security in Pakistan’s tribal areas – to include levies, Khassadars, local police, the Frontier Constabulary, the Frontier Corps, and regular Pakistani forces see Markey, 7-10.


89 For an excellent summary of financial and military support provided by Islamabad to insurgent forces in the lead up to 9/11 based on de-classified United States Department of State documents, see Barbara Elias, “Pakistan: The Taliban’s Godfather?” *National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book* No. 227; Internet; http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB227/index.htm; accessed 10 March 2009.

90 In particular, evidence suggests that the ISI, still focused on the potential threat of Indian encirclement and hedging that the United States will eventually lose interest in the region, has had a heavy hand in the resurgence of the Taliban and al Qaeda in the border region. See Gregory, “The ISI and the War on Terrorism,” 1022-1025.
Khyber and Kurram agencies. Two years later, the Pakistani army launched major offensive operations in the FATA under the erroneous assumption that it could defeat the insurgency with a surgical strike. Unfortunately, the deployment of 80,000 troops not only failed to interdict key al Qaeda and Taliban leadership, it was also deeply unpopular with the tribal populace.91 Specifically, this invasion was interpreted as an affront to the freedom espoused by Pashtunwali, and tactics used by the Pakistani army were seen as heavy handed. When innocent civilians were killed, many locals – whose Pakistani roots are a distant second to their Pashtun identity – turned their backs on the central government and took up arms in support of the insurgency.92

Since 2004, the security situation has deteriorated further and the capacity of Pakistani forces to restore order is questionable at best. The effectiveness of the Frontier Corps, which is shouldering the burden of security operations in the region, has been plagued by low morale and a questionable stomach for Pashtun-on-Pashtun conflict.93 Most units lack specific training in counterinsurgency operations and their equipment is wholly inadequate for the task at hand: “many are said to be equipped with sandals and bolt-action rifles against fighters armed with assault rifles and grenade launchers.”94 Mediocre pay and inaccessible medical treatment exacerbate an already desperate situation, leaving many troops no option but to desert or surrender when confronted by a superior trained and equipped enemy. Although more capable, the regular army faces comparable problems. Not only is it not trained in counterinsurgency, the

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92 Rather than employing jirgas and consulting maliks to identify and surrender militant leaders, the military launched a search-and-destroy campaign in North Waziristan and South Waziristan that included the aggressive use of artillery and helicopter gunships. See Iqbal Khattak, “32 Killed in Wana Shootout,” *Daily Times*; Internet; http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_17-3-2004_pg1_1; accessed 7 March 2009.


94 Kellett et al, “The Involvement of Key States in Afghanistan: A Strategic Assessment,” 27.
army’s XI Corps, responsible for operations in NWFP and along the border with Afghanistan, is largely Punjabi and does not share the language or culture of the tribal areas.95

Pakistan has lost nearly all remaining capacity to calibrate the insurgency on its borders.96 In fact, at the writing of this paper, Pakistani security forces had largely been forced into a defensive posture.97 They have all but lost complete control of significant swathes of the FATA, NWFP and Baluchistan, and recent events suggest Talibanization is about to rage beyond these areas as well.

**Premature Negotiations with the Taliban**

Cognizant that conventional military operations threatened to further alienate tribal populations, then-President Musharraf and his senior military advisors committed to extinguishing “…the fire that has engulfed the entire Waziristan” by negotiating a series of contentious accords with militants and tribal elders.98 Under the terms of the February 2005 ‘Shakai’ Agreement of South Waziristan and the September 2006 ‘Miranshah’ Agreement of North Waziristan, Islamabad not only agreed to dismantle army checkpoints and cease disruption patrols, it also released dozens of insurgents previously captured in fighting (along with their weapons) and reimbursed all damages caused by the Pakistani military.99 In exchange, local

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95 Eric Schmitt argues that, given their knowledge of the language and local customs, the Frontier Corps is the most suitable force to combat insurgency along the border. See Eric Schmitt, “Officer Leads Old Corps in New Role in Pakistan,” *The New York Times* (6 March 2009); Internet; http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/07/world/asia/07frontier.html; accessed 10 March 2009.


tribal leaders committed not to shelter foreign militants and they pledged not to conduct cross-border movement except “for trade and business and for meeting with relatives…in accordance with the traditions and the prevailing laws.”

The logic of appeasing tribal leaders might at first glance seem rational. After all, no government has ever been able to exert authority in the tribal region without being confronted by insurgency. Unfortunately, Pakistan’s strategy of appeasement was predicated on the flawed belief that tribal elders still maintained control of their respective territories and that they could expel militants at will. In reality, the battle against Islamic extremism had already been lost in a number of areas, where insurgents had grabbed the power of tribal leaders through assassinations and violent coercion. Lacking any credible enforcement mechanisms, the Waziristan accords were doomed to failure from the start.

Thus, by negotiating from a position of weakness, the Pakistani government not only legitimatized the authority of insurgent leaders in the FATA, it also afforded Taliban leaders the tactical pauses they needed to recruit, equip and train fresh militants for renewed combat operations. NATO commanders serving in Afghanistan conceded that cross-border militant activity had actually increased by as much as 300 percent in the wake of the failed Waziristan accords. More ominously, insurgents were able to use this time to expand their influence.

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99 For background information on each of the accords, see Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Bill Roggio, “Pakistan Surrenders: The Taliban Control the Border with Afghanistan,” The Weekly Standard, Vol. 12, No. 3; Internet; http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000%5C000%5C012%5C738ijawx.asp; accessed 10 March 2009; and Syed Saleem Shahzad, “The Knife at Pakistan’s Throat,” Asia Times (2 September 2006); Internet; http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/H102Df02.html; accessed 10 March 2009.

100 International Crisis Group, “Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants,” 19.


beyond FATA into settled parts of the NWFP.\textsuperscript{104} As Western policymakers contemplate the way ahead in the region, they would be well advised to consider the pitfalls encountered already in attempting to negotiate with and reconcile Taliban fighters.

**The “Global War on Terror” and the Dangers of Anti-Americanism**

Morale problems in the Pakistan army have been exacerbated by the growing unpopularity of the U.S.-led “Global War on Terror.”\textsuperscript{105} Not only do many Pakistani army and ISI leaders believe counterinsurgency operations distract the Army from its primary mission of containing Indian expansion in the region, the Army has sustained a disproportionate number of casualties since the U.S. invaded Afghanistan in late-2001.\textsuperscript{106}

More alarming is the mounting anti-Americanism amongst Pakistani civilians. This mistrust emerged in the late-1980s, when Pakistan facilitated American efforts to expel the Soviets from Afghanistan. Instead of rewarding Pakistan for its stalwart loyalty throughout this conflict, President George H.W. Bush imposed crippling sanctions against Islamabad because of

\textsuperscript{103} Ismail Khan, “Why the Waziristan Deal is a Hard Sell,” *Dawn* (14 October 2006); Internet; http://www.dawn.com/2006/10/14/top7.htm; accessed 10 March 2009.

\textsuperscript{104} On 19 February 2009, for example, the Awami National Party (ANP) of NWFP concluded another peace accord with a Sunni extremist group based in the Swat District. This accord concedes even more to the insurgency and it will almost certainly cement Taliban and al Qaeda influence in the area. Soon after the peace accord was ratified by the federal government, a Taliban spokesman confirmed al Qaeda and other militant groups were welcome in the area. See Kathy Gannon, “Taliban in Ex-Pakistani Resort: Welcome Osama!” *The Washington Post* (20 April 2009); Internet; http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/20/AR2009042002161.html; accessed 20 April 2009; and Waseem A. Shah, “Sharia-based System Tied to Peace in Swat,” *Dawn* (17 February 2009); Internet; http://www.paperarticles.com/2009/02/sharia-based-system-tied-to-peace-in.html; accessed 10 March 2009.


\textsuperscript{106} It is believed more than 1400 Pakistani troops have been killed in fighting against insurgents along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, while the U.S. has sustained less than half that number in the region during the same period. See United States Government Accountability Office, “Combating Terrorism,” 1. For current U.S. casualty figures in Afghanistan, see “Coalition Casualties by Year,” Internet; http://icasualties.org/oef/; accessed 10 March 2009.
its nuclear weapons program. Thus, it should come as little surprise that most Pakistanis do not trust American intentions in the current global environment. Unless the U.S. can convince Pakistanis that they have a vested interest in eliminating extremism from their homeland, anti-American Islamic political parties such as the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) will continue to gain traction in Pakistan, rendering the insurgency particularly difficult to defeat.

Unfortunately, the growing disillusionment with the American-led Global War on Terror is also weakening the resolve of the international community to deal with instability in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Initially, Afghanistan was perceived to be a worthy cause. Following the horrific attacks of 9/11 and the rapid defeat of the Taliban in 2002, troop contributing nations had little difficulty garnering public support for what was perceived to be a simple reconstruction and development effort. Since then, however, support for the mission has deteriorated rapidly. A well-publicized debate is now playing out in the media that suggests the NATO commitment to Afghanistan lacks unity of effort and that it does not possess the joint mechanisms required to plan and synchronize operations. United States Defense Secretary Robert Gates, in a public display of frustration, declared “...the alliance is evolving into a two-

107 Albright, 234.


tiered alliance in which you have some allies willing to fight and die to protect people's security
and others who are not.”\textsuperscript{112} If these fissures cannot be healed, the integrity of the NATO alliance
could be threatened and the United States will most certainly be left holding the bag in the
region, reinforcing even more the perception that this is ‘Washington’s War.’

\textbf{Summary}

Clearly, the obstacles to regional stability presented in this chapter are extremely
complex. Some challenges, such as the harsh geography of the Pakistan-Afghanistan frontier
and the irascibility of the tribal peoples, are enduring truisms that no empire has ever been able
to ignore without incurring great peril. Other issues, such as Pakistani tensions with India and
Afghanistan, the incapacity of the Pakistani security establishment, and growing anti-
Americanism have simmered for decades. Certainly, none of these difficulties expose
themselves to quick-fix solutions.

Given the severity and persistence of many of the obstacles impeding regional stability,
one might be inclined to think the battle has already been lost, and that efforts to eliminate
insurgent sanctuary along the border will only result in the waste of additional time, personnel
and resources. Fortunately, United States President Barack Obama understands that the
abandonment of Pakistan and Afghanistan would be catastrophic to global stability.
Recognizing that long-term stability in Afghanistan will be impossible to achieve without first

\textsuperscript{112} Indeed, his comments are not without merit. Many of the European troop-contributing-nations have
paid lip service to their military commitment in the region. France, Spain, Turkey, Germany and Italy, for example,
have stayed out of the fight due to resource constraints and frustrating political operating caveats. United States
Defense Secretary Robert Gates suggested this divide could ‘put a cloud over the alliance…or worse.’ See Kristin
Roberts, “Afghan row may make NATO two-tiered alliance: Gates,” Internet;
http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSN0617050920080206; accessed 11 March 2009; Ahto Lobjakas,
“Afghanistan: Southern Insurgency Tests Resolve of ISAF Allies,” Internet;
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/09/61e474ae-26de-43e2-8a7a-1d6c04b56f02.html; accessed 9 March
2009; and “Canada’s Harper Doubts Afghan Insurgency Can Be Defeated,” CNN (2 March 2009); Internet;
addressing long-standing regional issues and until Pakistanis feel less threatened by their 
neighbours, he recently ordered 17,000 additional U.S. troops be deployed to shore up border 
defenses and he has demanded a broad review of American strategy in the region be conducted 
immediately.\textsuperscript{113} Indeed, any strategy that ignores these complex challenges will almost certainly 
be doomed to failure.

\textsuperscript{113} Susan Page and Tom Vanden Brook, “Obama’s War: Deploying 17,000 Raises Stakes in Afghanistan,” 
\textit{USA Today} (18 February 2009); Internet; \url{http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2009-02-17-afghanistan- 
forces_N.htm}; accessed 15 March 2009.
CHAPTER III
LEARNING FROM THE BRITISH, PAKISTANI AND SOVIET EXPERIENCES

The Pakistan-Afghanistan border region has long been of great geo-strategic importance to world powers. In fact, many nations have struggled at immense cost to secure a strategic buffer in the region in an effort to protect resources from the attention of other regional powers. Achieving influence in the region has often tempted foreigners to exert control over the local Pashtuns through tactics ranging from genocidal suppression to partial accommodation of tribal practices. With the exception of fleeting interludes of stability, all efforts to bring the Pashtuns to heel failed miserably.

What lessons can be gleaned from the history of this turbulent region that might be applied to eliminate insurgent sanctuary along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border today? This chapter seeks to answer this question by examining the efforts of three different regimes – Great Britain; Pakistan; and the Soviet Union – to submit the Pashtuns to external rule. Each of the three case studies will be introduced with a brief historical review followed by a cursory examination of the policies attempted by each power to establish state authority over the Pashtun. The chapter will conclude with a summary of successes and failures, from which a list of best practices will be identified for possible application today.

The British Experience (1849-1947)

Great Britain sought in the nineteenth century to control the Indian sub-continent to protect its resources and create a buffer from the advancing Russians, who had also become aware of the riches of Central and South Asia.¹¹⁴ When it appeared the Russians had secretly established diplomatic relations with the Afghan Emir, Dost Muhammad, the British moved

¹¹⁴ For more on the British-Russian rivalry that became known as the ‘Great Game,’ see Martin Ewans, Afghanistan: A Short History of Its People and Politics (UK: HarperCollins Publishers, 2001).
aggressively to replace him with a government sympathetic to the interests of the empire. In 1839, the British-led Indian Army seized Kandahar and Kabul in what has become known as the First Anglo-Afghan War. Despite the brutal slaughter of 16,000 British soldiers and their families during this campaign, the British were determined to exert authority over the North West Frontier (NWF) in order to protect their interests in India. Over the century that followed, various administrative experiments were conducted to reconcile the Pashtun under British control.

Close Border Policy (The Policy of Masterly Inactivity)

The British learned quickly that European concepts of justice resonated little with the inhabitants of the NWF and that they did not have the resources to enforce them. By 1849, the British resorted to a ‘Policy of Masterly Inactivity,’ also referred to as the ‘Close Border Policy,’ that sought to minimize British involvement in the NWF and Afghanistan. Under this policy, the NWF was divided into the ‘settled’ areas of the plains – which had greater economic and strategic value – from the Pashtun communities found in the surrounding hills. This strategy delegated the task of settling disputes to the tribe itself and used tribal customs to inflict punitive measures on dissenting Pashtuns. Rather than attempting to assimilate the Pashtuns, “…they

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116 For a more detailed account of each of these case studies and the policies attempted by the British, Pakistanis and Soviets along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area, see Ty L. Groh, “Ungoverned Spaces: The Challenges of Governing Tribal Societies” (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School Course Paper, 2006).

117 Early attempts to impose the Indian Penal Code, for example, enraged Pashtuns of the tribal areas where Pashtunwali represented the legitimate law of the land. See Caroe, 352.

were heftily bribed, spied on and set against one another. In return, the tribes were ordered not to raid territory under formal British rule, a stricture they repeatedly ignored.”119

The Forward Policy and the Maliki System

Following Russian advances in Central Asia in the late 1870s, Great Britain sought once again to exert its influence in the NWF through the establishment of a ‘Forward Policy.’120 Inspired largely by the system successfully employed by Sir Robert Sandeman, Chief Commissioner of Baluchistan Province (1877-1892), the Forward Policy aimed to co-opt the tribes within designated settlement areas.121 Working closely with Baluchi chiefs and Maliks, Sandeman offered payment for tribal assistance in securing the border, for the protection of key British lines of communication and for denying sanctuary to tribal members hostile to British objectives.122 In return for their support, he allowed Baluchi leaders limited self-rule in accordance with the newly established Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR). Designated British political agents organized jirgas with local tribesmen to settle disputes and address issues of mutual concern.123

Unfortunately, the British did not adequately consider the reasons for Sandeman’s success in Baluchistan when applying his system to the NWF. First, while the terrain of

119 Ben Macintyre, “Why the Pakistan Badlands Must be Tamed,” *The Times* (5 March 2009); Internet; http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/ben_macintyre/article5847686.ece; accessed 15 March 2009.


121 Groh, 33.


Baluchistan allowed British forces to establish a reliable road network that was vital to the rapid deployment of security forces, the same could not be accomplished in many parts of the NWF, where the geography was much more forbidding. Further, while the British were able to co-opt Baluchi chiefs, the acephalous Pashtuns could not be influenced through an identifiable leader. In fact, fuelled by their strong distrust of foreigners and their fierce commitment to independence, the hill tribes viewed British efforts to exert authority in the tribal regions with contempt.

The growing violence along the frontier concerned British India’s new viceroy, Lord Curzon. After touring the NWF, he became quickly convinced that maintaining a robust British military presence in the area was both a drain on British resources and a catalyst for Pashtun rebellion. Rather than creating additional military garrisons, Curzon withdrew British troops and replaced them with locally recruited tribal militias. Commanded by British officers, these carefully selected ‘levies’ or Khassadors were tasked to police the frontier. In 1901, Curzon also altered the political configuration of the frontier by granting the NWF the status of a separate province, dividing it into ‘settled’ areas (districts) where government authority was relatively strong and ‘tribal’ areas (agencies) where the pugnacious nature of the tribesmen rendered governance too difficult to achieve.

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124 Groh, 36.
125 Another product of the Forward Policy, the establishment of the Durand Line, was also greeted with militancy by the Pashtuns as it again threatened their coveted autonomy. See Hugh Beattie, Imperial Frontier: Tribe and State in Waziristan (London: Curzon Press, 2002), 155.
128 Major Andrew Roe (British Army), “British Governance of the North-West Frontier (1919 to 1947): A Blueprint for Afghanistan?” (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: US Army Command and General Staff College Course
Although the Khassadors were used successfully during the rebellions of 1919-1923 to suppress violence in the settled areas, the emergence of charismatic tribal leaders, such as Mirza Ali Khan (The Faqir of Ipi), exacerbated the strain on British administrators. Eventually, the British were able to temporarily pacify tribal resistance and diminish the Faqir’s influence, but it came at the tremendous cost of deploying 50,000 regular troops along with air force and artillery assets to the FATA. More importantly and relevant to today, the tactics used by the British, which included economic sanctions against Pashtuns who refused to cooperate, the indiscriminate bombardment of troublesome villages, and destruction of crops and infrastructure, only alienated the local population further.

Summary

Although the British never were able to pacify the Pashtuns before their departure in 1947, their balanced application of persuasion, bribery and the threat of armed intervention maintained a tenuous peace for the better part of a century with the exception of the three Anglo-Afghan wars. British agents who possessed a strong awareness of Pashtun customs and displayed the warrior ethos espoused by the local people resonated with influential tribal elders. These leaders, many of whom spent their entire careers in the NWF, were ably assisted by locally recruited Khassadors, which were instrumental to the provision of tactical intelligence and the completion of basic security tasks. Most importantly, by respecting the key

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129 A tactical genius with a remarkable ability to evade British forces, Khan and his tribal militias raided prominent urban areas and effectively disrupted British lines of communication. See Ishaan Tharoor, “History: The Original Insurgent,” *Time* (19 April 2007); Internet; http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1612380,00.html?iid=chix-sphere; accessed 15 March 2009.

130 Ibid.

tenets of Pashtunwali in the design of legal frameworks, the British were able to achieve some legitimacy and compliance amongst the Pashtun.

The Pakistani Experience

In August 1947, Pakistan inherited from the British the tremendous responsibility of administering the tribal frontier. Under Pakistani rule, the tribal areas took on a whole new meaning as administrative, economic and military policies in the region were calibrated in response to the threat posed by India on its eastern border, Afghan territorial and ethnic claims to the west, and budding Pashtun nationalism along the Durand Line.

The Continuation of the Maliki System

The birth of Pakistan brought little immediate change to the people of the tribal areas. Sensitive to the menace of growing Pashtun nationalism, the fledgling Pakistani government sought to preserve the British Maliki system and pursued a policy of accommodation with the tribes of the frontier. In November 1947, the Maliks of Khyber, Kurram, South Waziristan and North Waziristan signed Instruments of Accession with Governor General Mohammed Ali Jinnah, promising to aid Pakistan in times of need. In exchange for the continued allegiance of the tribal agencies, Jinnah withdrew Pakistani forces from the NWF, he pledged to respect tribal independence and he committed to sustaining the British program of allowances and subsidies. Soon Pakistan was able to mobilize a lashkar of ten thousand Pashtun tribesmen to fight for control of Kashmir, a Muslim majority state bordering India. Thus, not unlike the

132 Sammon, 39.
British Close Border Policy, Pakistan was able to maintain tenuous control over the settled areas of the NWFP and Baluchistan from a distance by respecting the tenets of Pashtunwali. The One Unit Plan

In spite of continued efforts in the 1950s to quell Pashtun nationalism through tribal accommodation, the Pakistani government was forced by internal divisiveness to fundamentally alter administrative policies in the tribal areas. In 1955, the government announced the ‘One Unit Plan,’ a policy that integrated the NWFP, Baluchistan, Sindh, and the tribal areas into one province, West Pakistan. This policy sought to reinforce Pakistani unity by creating a Punjabi dominated central government while concurrently appeasing the people of East Pakistan who called for a more balanced representation in government.135

Plagued by marked linguistic and ethnic divisions, the West Pakistan concept did bolster Punjabi influence but it failed to promote unity amongst the other affected provinces. The policy was greeted with even less enthusiasm in the tribal areas, where Pashtun identity was once again challenged. In March 1955, following renewed calls for an independent Pashtunistan, the Pakistani government responded by violently suppressing all Pashtun resistance. This action deepened the resentment of Pashtuns not only in Pakistan, but across the border in Afghanistan as well, where mobs in Kabul, Jalalabad and Kandahar sacked Pakistani embassies and consulates.137 In fact, the ‘One Unit Plan’ did galvanize the various ethnic groups of West

134 Groh, 54.
Pakistan and the Pashtuns on both sides of the border, but not in the way the Pakistani authorities had intended.\textsuperscript{138}

The Creation of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas

After scrapping the One Unit Plan in July 1970, the Pakistani government again re-engineered administrative policies in the tribal areas in an effort to suppress Pashtun nationalism and expel the threat of Afghan encroachment. Many of the changes made at this time remain in effect today. From the ashes of the West Pakistan project, the FATA were formed, comprising seven tribal agencies and six frontier regions. Although Pakistan’s 1973 constitution gave the president executive authority over the FATA, the area was, and still is, ruled from Peshawar, where the governor of NWFP was entrusted with governing responsibilities.\textsuperscript{139} Governance of each tribal agency was further delegated to a political agent (PA), who served as the territorial “...judge, jury, police chief, jail warden, district magistrate, and public prosecutor.”\textsuperscript{140} Backed by Khassadors and, in extreme cases, the Frontier Corps or Pakistani Army, PAs were responsible both for the synchronization of development activities and the maintenance of law and order in the community.

The PA governed through the FCR, a legal system first enacted by the British in 1901 and later adopted by Pakistan at independence. Under these regulations, disputes between tribes and the central government were resolved through the interaction of PAs and the tribal


\textsuperscript{140} Rubin and Siddique, “Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stalemate,” 12.
representatives they selected known as Maliks or Lungis. The FCR gave PAs incredible power over the border tribes. The more severe aspects of the FCR allowed agents to dole out group punishment for the actions of individual members. It also empowered them through large sums of money to coerce tribesmen and elders through bribes.

Although the FCR-system granted the central government tremendous coercive power, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in the 1970s opted instead for a policy of accommodation in the tribal areas. Bhutto established the FATA Development Corporation, a federal organization charged with improving the delivery of water services, electricity, transportation infrastructure and agricultural development. Thus, between 1972 and 1977, the standard of living in the FATA increased significantly, bringing it closer to the rest of Pakistan. The Pashtuns responded favorably to these initiatives by silencing calls for an independent nation, especially since they were not forced to abandon their way of life or the social code that governed it.

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141 PAs are assisted by Maliks and Lungi. Maliks work as a medium between administrators and the (Qaum) or tribe. Maliki appointments are hereditary, “for which regular benefits and subsidies are sanctioned from time to time.” Lungi, on the other hand, is a lower form of official privilege and recognition granted by the political administration. Lungi appointments are not hereditary. For more information, see the official website of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas; Internet; http://www.fata.gov.pk/subpages/admsystem.php; accessed 16 March 2009.

142 PAs maintain these powers to this day. See Declan Walsh, “Demolished by the Pakistan Army: The Frontier Village Punished for Harbouring the Taliban,” The Guardian (20 May 2008); Internet; http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/may/20/pakistan; accessed 16 March 2009.

143 In addition, the Bhutto administration established a quota system in academic institutions throughout Pakistan to ensure FATA residents could receive a modern education and subsequently compete for coveted professions. See Khan, “Challenges Facing Development in Pakistan’s FATA,” 16.

The Use of Islamic Insurgencies as a State Tool

Unfortunately, Bhutto’s improvement policies were short-lived. When the Soviet Union invaded Kabul in 1979, the Pakistani government abandoned regional development in anticipation of a show down with Afghanistan. Backed by the United States and other affluent international stakeholders, Pakistani security forces funneled weapons and money to the Pashtun warriors of the tribal belt, encouraging them to cross the border and fight the Soviets. The fallout from this protracted struggle continues to plague Pakistan today. First, because the central government no longer had the capacity to deliver essential services and welfare assistance to the tribal areas, the Pashtun were less inclined to look to the state for support.145 Further, an alternate economy flourishing in the illicit trade of arms and narcotics became the main livelihood of the local populace. With Pashtuns no longer reliant on government stipends, Islamabad’s influence in the FATA eroded considerably in the aftermath of the Afghan-Soviet War.146

By 1996, Pakistan had finally established a friendly regime in Kabul by creating and installing the Taliban regime, but the policy of fueling Islamic extremism to calibrate Pakistani interests in the region would come at tremendous cost.147 The Taliban and the transnational terrorist organization it would soon host “would not play the role of puppet.”148 Thus, in the absence of a regulated border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, extremist groups have since

145 Groh, 64.
147 Determined to retain a strategic buffer in Afghanistan following the expulsion of Soviet forces, Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and her Interior Minister, retired General Naseerullah Babar facilitated the ascendancy of the ultra-conservative Taliban movement by providing it with sanctuary and resource support. See Robert Kaplan, “The Lawless Frontier,” The Atlantic (September 2000); Internet; http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200009/kaplan-border; accessed 16 March 2009.
148 Ibid.
been able to expand their networks of support and increase their influence among the Pashtun without fear of government reprisal.

Summary

Not dissimilar from the British experience in the region, Pakistan’s greatest success in pacifying the Pashtun came when policies of accommodation were implemented. Governor-General Jinnah’s efforts to reduce the Pakistani military presence along the frontier and his offer to the tribes of self-determination, for example, were extremely well received by the local populace. Further, Prime Minister Bhutto’s development initiatives of the 1970s also silenced Pashtun nationalist movements and reduced militancy along the border.

Obviously, Pakistani policies that ignored the tenets of Pashtunwali generally failed miserably. The patronage system perpetuated by the PAs and their assistants, for instance, stood in stark contrast to the egalitarian nature of the Pashtun. Enshrined in the FCR, the Maliki arrangement “…created new modes of deviant behavior that were abhorrent under the Pashtun social code but became permissible given the new incentives.”149 Despite periodic calls for reform, those who benefitted from the FCR and its lavish incentives have effectively been able to avert change.

Finally, the Pakistani policy of fuelling insurgencies as a calibrating tool for strategic objectives has not only created an uncontrollable menace to global security, it has also devastated the economy of the FATA and NWFP.150 Once based on subsistence agriculture and nomadic pastoralism, the FATA economy after decades of conflict is now dependant on the

149 Sammon, 52.

unregulated, cross-border trade of weapons and narcotics. Tribesmen lacking viable and legitimate economic opportunities, as we have also seen, make ideal insurgents.

The Soviet Experience

On 27 December 1979, Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan. Their mission was to eliminate Afghan Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin and replace him with someone more willing to follow Moscow’s orders. The initial assault was executed brilliantly. With only a handful of friendly troops killed in the attack, the Soviets had successfully seized Afghanistan’s major cities and infrastructure. The overwhelming success of this operation in no way served as a sign of things to come. Within months, the Soviets would become engaged in a bloody counterinsurgency campaign that would endure the better part of a decade.

Sovietization: ‘Hearts and Minds’ the Cruel Way

On the heels of their early military successes, the Soviet occupation force attempted to co-opt Afghans through a process of ‘Sovietization.’ The aim of this policy was to create in Afghanistan a compliant state that could be manipulated as required to facilitate Soviet strategic influence in the region. To this end, the Soviets invested a great deal of capital to eradicate Afghan customs. Pursued along multiple axes, Sovietization concurrently restructured the Afghan government and education systems, it attempted to bring Islamic religious leaders under state control, and it included significant land distribution reforms.


153 Children, college students and government officials were also forcibly dispatched to the Soviet Union, where they received additional training. To ensure the success of this program, the Soviet Union controlled all messages emanating from Afghan media outlets. See Thomas Hammond, Red Flag Over Afghanistan: The Communist Coup, the Soviet Invasion, and the Consequences (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), 152.
Not surprisingly, Sovietization was met with hostility by the Afghan people. The policy of confiscating land holdings that exceeded authorized per-family limits and redistributing it to peasant farmers, for instance, violated the tribal custom of *nikat*, which regulated the distribution of tribal assets according to hereditary rights. Moreover, by seeking to destroy Afghan culture, Sovietization was widely held as an affront to the independence and honour guarded so fiercely by the people of the tribal lands. Thus, the Soviet-installed government not only lost all hope of achieving legitimacy, it also inadvertently mended long-standing inter-tribal fissures and gave the people of Afghanistan a common enemy.

Scorched Earth Policy

Rather than gaining the support of the local populace by ensuring its security, the communists opted instead for a ‘scorched earth policy’ that sought to coerce civilians through intimidation and the violent use of military force. Soviet tanks and helicopter gunships routinely visited areas where Mujahideen collaborators were believed to be operating. Crops, livestock, irrigation systems, and even entire villages were razed. Mines were dumped by the crate-load to create no-go areas, while thousands of booby traps were left indiscriminately in villages where they were often found by unsuspecting children. All infrastructure and vegetation within 300 meters of main supply routes was cleared to reduce the threat of enemy ambush.

154 Groh, 90.


156 Hammond, 161-162.

The destruction was colossal. With villagers fleeing by the thousands, entire communities vanished.\textsuperscript{158}

Although Soviet techniques made it very difficult for militants to conduct operations inside Afghanistan, they ultimately proved counter-productive. Militants quickly learned to adapt to Soviet tactics. Understanding that undisciplined attacks on the \textit{infidels} would illicit a massive and overwhelming military response, for example, the Mujahideen more selectively identified targets and they struck only when the chance of success was high.\textsuperscript{159} Insurgents also quickly established screening mechanisms to block Soviet attempts to infiltrate militants units with pro-Soviet assassins and spies. Most importantly, however, brutal Soviet actions themselves resulted in mission failure by further galvanizing an angry populace obliged to fulfill the obligations of \textit{badal} and it mobilizing international support for the Afghan resistance.

Crossing the Line: Attacking Insurgent Sanctuaries in Pakistan

By the end of 1984, it had become clear to the Soviets that their counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan would continue to falter unless they could interdict the endless stream of rebel supply caravans emanating from Pakistan. They conducted large-scale conventional military operations through the frontier regions, severing supply routes and destroying militant base camps along the way. Meanwhile, Soviet air power carpet-bombed large swathes of agricultural

\textsuperscript{158} The Soviets augmented conventional military activities with the targeted application of a pervasive psychological operations campaign. In addition to using subversion, bribery and the threat of force to coerce locals, the Soviets routinely attempted to destabilize rebel unity of effort by inciting inter-tribal violence. One tactic used, for example, was to provide a particular clan the money and weapons it would need to defeat long-standing rivals. The Soviets also conducted covert operations inside Pakistan, attempting to penetrate refugee camps and militant groups with locally recruited informants. See Thomas A. Bruscino, “Out of Bounds: Transnational Sanctuary in Irregular Warfare,” \textit{Global War on Terrorism Occasion Paper 17} (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006), 60; Internet; \url{http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/bruscino.pdf}; accessed 7 February 2009; Vladimir Kuzichkin, \textit{Inside the KGB: My Life in Soviet Espionage} (New York: Pantheon Books, 1990), 349; and Amstutz, 146.

\textsuperscript{159} For a detailed account of Mujahideen tactics, see Ali Ahmad Jalali and Lester Grau, \textit{The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War} (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: USMC Studies and Analysis Division, 1995), 402-404.
land and villages alike to create a buffer along the Durand Line.\textsuperscript{160} This massive and unrelenting assault did impact Mujahideen operations.\textsuperscript{161} The militants “…who had once stopped at relatively comfortable teahouses on the paths into Afghanistan,” were now plagued by food and ammunition shortages and significantly reduced freedom of movement.\textsuperscript{162}

To further mitigate cross-border movement, the Soviets even contemplated the construction of a barrier along the frontier that was to include fences, an extensive minefield belt, and guard towers with interlocking areas of responsibility.\textsuperscript{163} The construction of a fence was scrapped when it appeared that the project would be excessively costly in terms of time and personnel, but the Soviets did deploy hundreds of thousands of mines along insurgent supply lines and they manned forts along the border with some degree of success.\textsuperscript{164} By 1987, the Soviets had gained some control over the Durand Line, but the progress was too little, too late.

Summary

Despite their long-standing presence in Central and South Asia, the Soviets completely ignored the hard lessons learned by the British and Pakistanis who attempted for decades to bring the tribal regions of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border under control. Instead, the communists deployed in 1979 an Army that was built to fight a conventional war.\textsuperscript{165} It did not have the

\textsuperscript{160} Ahmed Rashid, “Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Gulf,” \textit{MERIP Middle East Report No. 141} (September-October 1987): 37.


\textsuperscript{162} Bruscino, 62.

\textsuperscript{163} Amstutz, 144.

\textsuperscript{164} Although Soviet forts situated close to Pakistan had no hope of sealing the border completely, they threatened key militant supply lines and tied down large numbers of Mujahideen who attempted to lay siege on the posts. See Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf and Major Mark Adkin, \textit{The Bear Trap: Afghanistan’s Untold Story} (London: Leo Cooper, 1992), 159.
equipment, doctrine, or training to fight a protracted counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. Most importantly, the communists entered Afghanistan as ‘cultural amateurs’ and they remained that way for the entire decade.

The Soviet experience, if anything, reinforces the notion that “you cannot kill your way out of a counterinsurgency.” Indeed, the Red Army did achieve tactical military successes. The annihilation of Afghan communities and agricultural lands, while morally revolting by all modern standards, did impede Mujahideen freedom of movement and sustainment efforts. The communist army adapted to militant tactics, and they occasionally infiltrated refugee camps and insurgent groups to great effect. Whatever their successes were, however, the Soviets lost the support of the populace through extremely short-sighted policies that obliged Afghans to seek out revenge for atrocities against their honour and possessions.

Summary: Identifying Best Practices

There are clear and unassailable differences between the challenges faced by the British, Pakistanis and Soviets and those which confront the NATO-led counterinsurgency and indigenous forces along the border today. The occupation of the frontier region by transnational terrorists is a recent trend, as is the dominance of ultraconservative radical mullahs over tribal leaders. Why then should we seek to apply lessons from the past to today’s challenges? In reality, conflict in the region has been shaped by many truisms that are as applicable now as they were to the British army in 1849. Harsh geography, complex tribal dynamics and long-standing


regional disputes have always heavily influenced operations along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Understanding and confronting these complex issues is the only way to resolve the current dilemma.

Clearly, counterinsurgency planners must attempt to extract from these case studies as many relevant lessons learned as possible for application today. The lives of many soldiers and innocent Afghans depend on it. Although no power has ever been able to placate the Pashtuns permanently, various policies achieved limited success in suppressing tribal resistance. These efforts should be emulated as much as possible. Other initiatives, however, were dismal failures and should be avoided at all costs. The following five themes have had enduring relevance to the region:

**Central Government Control Equals Militancy.** As Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason convincingly argue, the Pashtun people have always rejected central government efforts to exert control over the tribal belt. Lacking unitary leadership and subscribing to the unbending nature of Pashtunwali, “…this uniquely segmentary, acephalous, and inherently conservative society yields to religious zealotry whenever weakened from the inside or pressured excessively from the outside.” 168 Without exception, government policies that ignored or offended tribal social norms and organization such as the ‘One Unit Policy’ and the ‘Sovietization’ experiment were greeted with hostility. Today, as the Pakistani government and the international community supporting it seek to impose on the tribal areas a modern democratic system of governance, they would be well advised to remember this truism.

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168 Johnson and Mason, “No Sign Until Burst of Fire,” 73.
Winning Hearts and Minds: The Carrot.  If the ‘population is the prize,’¹⁶⁹ as most theorists now agree, then the solution to defeating an insurgency obviously lies in winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the people.  When considering the harsh tribesmen of the border frontier, however, this does not mean “be nice to the people, meet their needs and they will feel grateful and stop supporting the insurgents.”¹⁷⁰ This approach, as these case studies and current efforts illustrate, has never worked along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.  Rather, it has always been necessary to compel people living there to support government initiatives over other militant objectives.¹⁷¹

How has this ever been achieved with the Pashtuns, a group that has always resented central authority?  The British in particular achieved control over the frontier for over a century through the use of persuasion and bribery.  This empire understood that Pashtun tribesmen can be fickle and self serving, and that they have a propensity to change sides when the situation suits them best.¹⁷² Take, for example, the British use of the Maliki system.  By accepting the


¹⁷⁰ Support based on popularity alone does not survive when the enemy applies intimidation.  For example, while NATO PSYOPS teams distribute leaflets promising humanitarian assistance and a better way of life that rarely materializes, Taliban mullahs travel rural areas and communicate a message of intimidation: not only will they outlast the foreign presence, they assert, but everyone seen to collaborate with the Karzai government and NATO troops will eventually be punished.  This language resonates with the populace.  See Kalev I. Sepp, “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” Military Review (May-June 2005), 21; and Thomas H. Johnson and Chris Mason, “Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan” Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs, Vol. 51, No. 1 (2007).


¹⁷² Consider, for example, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar – the leader of Hezb-i-Islami Afghanistan.  Once a favorite of the ISI, he has a notorious reputation for changing loyalties.  Throughout the 1980s, he fought against the Soviets, but he constantly feuded with other warlords concurrently.  Further, although he initially fled from the Taliban following their rise to power in the mid-1990s, he has since emerged as a key ally in the fight against the Karzai government.  See Muhammad Tahir, “Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Return to the Afghan Insurgency,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 6, No. 11 (May 2008); Internet;
adage that “Afghan loyalty can never be bought, only rented,” this strategy offered financial and territorial incentives in exchange for temporary compliance to established laws. Westerners, who publicly embrace notions of honesty and fair play while promoting the idealistic notion that we can modernize the Pashtuns, will most certainly take exception to this Machiavellian approach. In reality, however, this ‘carrot and stick’ philosophy resonated with Pashtuns, whose exaggerated sense of honour and influence amongst the tribe is assessed largely against their personal possessions and martial capabilities.

**Pashtun Rule of Law: The Stick.** How should Islamabad deal with Pashtuns who choose to ignore incentives-based initiatives designed to bolster support for the government? Obviously, the answer to this question does not lie in the excessive and undisciplined use of military force that characterized the Soviet approach in the 1980s. The scorched earth policy worked better as a Mujahideen recruiting tool than it did as a credible deterrent to militant attacks. The British and Pakistanis learned this lesson as well when they sought to manhandle Pashtun clans through violent coercion and other harsh methods such as population resettlement. It became clear to these regimes that, although Pashtuns responded to power, prohibited behavior could only be discouraged through a system that respected the key tenets of Pashtunwali. Thus, designated political agents found that settling disputes with tribesmen through ‘jirgas’ worked much more efficiently than any Western-style legal system comprising courthouses, judges, lawyers and prisons ever could. Backed by Khassadors and the Pakistani army, PAs effectively maintained rule of law in their respective communities for decades.

http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=4951&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=167&no_cache=1; accessed 30 March 2009.

**Deploying Cultural Warriors.** Pashtun cultural norms are completely alien to Western values. How then can we expect our soldiers to understand and address the challenges of this region? British control in India relied heavily on the deployment of highly trained officers who embraced the opportunity to serve in the tribal areas. These officers were well educated and they demonstrated exceptional leadership, combat and administrative capabilities. Most importantly, often having served the majority of their adult lives in British India, these frontier officers developed over time a strong appreciation for Pashtun customs.\(^{174}\) Displaying the warrior ethos espoused by the local populace, they were deeply respected by influential tribal elders.

Today, deployed for only six-month rotations, NATO leaders have little opportunity to forge *enduring* relationships with local military and civilian leaders, let alone to understand the nature and complexity of the Pashtun culture before they are returned to their home nation and replaced by fresh troops.\(^{175}\) Extended deployments might not be popular with Western nations but sending culturally ignorant soldiers and leaders to Afghanistan is a sure way to lose the counterinsurgency. The Soviet experience taught us this already.

**Border Control.** Finally, while it might seem intuitive, it is worth enforcing that the British, Pakistanis and Soviets all failed to achieve long-term regional strategic objectives because they could not interdict militant sanctuaries along the frontier, nor could they control insurgent movement across the porous border. Unless the NATO-led counterinsurgency augments its internally focussed ‘hearts and minds’ campaign with a concerted effort to stem the

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\(^{174}\) Roe, 23.

\(^{175}\) Some NATO command elements remain in theatre for up to nine months. Knowing the extent of an individual officer’s commitment to the region and that his successor might have completely different views on the counterinsurgency, many Afghans understandably remain guarded about establishing personal relationships with foreigners. Soldiers serving in mentoring roles establish through combat and shared hardship tremendous bonds with their Afghan counterparts. Again, however, they are rotated home after six months in theatre.
flow of new recruits from Pakistan, it too will join the ranks of nations that left the region
bloodied and badly defeated.
CHAPTER IV
SANCTUARY DOCTRINE

This paper has already established the importance of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region to the growing network of insurgents, transnational terrorists and multiple criminal organizations that seek to threaten global stability. Not surprisingly, the use of safe havens by insurgencies is not unprecedented. In fact, throughout the twentieth century, in Algeria, El Salvador, Vietnam, Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan, among others, insurgencies facing numerically and technologically superior forces have not only survived, they have often achieved victory by “…reaping the benefits of sanctuary, diaspora-based funding and recruiting, and porous borders.”176

Clearly, the ability to secure and maintain external support always has been, and continues to be a deciding factor in the success or failure of an insurgency. Given the magnitude and enduring importance of this challenge, one might be inclined to think that American and Canadian military doctrine would be a good place to find solutions this problem. The purpose of this chapter is to examine current military doctrine and academia for possible options to dealing with Taliban border safe havens.

Doctrine

Unfortunately, in the failed aftermath of the American expedition to Vietnam in the 1970s, the United States military purged from its institutional memory many of the lessons it learned combating guerrilla forces. Focused almost exclusively on the conventional ‘big-war’

176 Paul Staniland, “Defeating Transnational Insurgencies: The Best Offence is a Good Fence,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Winter 2005-06): 22. According to Seth Jones in a recently released RAND study of 90 different insurgencies, the ability of militant groups to gain external support is directly correlated to their success. Those insurgencies that received support from external states, he found, were able to convert operations into victory more than 50 percent of the time. Insurgencies lacking external support, on the other hand, won only 17 percent of the time. See Seth Jones, “Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan,” RAND Counterinsurgency Study, Vol. 4 (2008): 21; Internet; http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG595.pdf; accessed 17 March 2009.
paradigm of major tank-on-tank battles, military professional dialogue in the 1990s gave scant
attention to dealing with insurgent safe havens.\footnote{Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Cassidy (US Army), “Winning the War of the Flea: Lessons Learned from Guerrilla Warfare,” \textit{Military Review} (September-October 2004), 2.}

American doctrinal publications such as FM 3-07 \textit{Stability Operations} and FMFRP 12-15 \textit{United States Marine Corps Small Wars Manual}, both comprehensive handbooks replete with information on the equipment and planning required for protracted irregular warfare, hardly mentioned the problem of transnational sanctuary.\footnote{See United States Department of the Army, FM 3-07, \textit{Support and Stability Operations} (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 2003); and United States Department of the Navy, FMFRP 12-15, \textit{Small Wars Manual} (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 1990).} Meanwhile, instead of contemplating the use of physical blockades to control borders, the 1968 manual on \textit{Denial Operations and Barriers} focused almost solely on barrier planning in conventional operations.\footnote{Bruscino, 82.}

The 1986 United States Army manual on \textit{Counterguerrilla Operations} provided the most complete coverage of the subject.\footnote{United States Department of the Army, FM 90-8, \textit{Counterguerrilla Operations} (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1986), 3-58.} In the one small section devoted to ‘Border Operations,’ the counterguerrilla manual offered two operational concepts for the control of land borders: first, under the \textit{Restricted Zone} concept, designated areas along the border were to be transformed into buffer zones by clearing vegetation and other obstacles using heavy engineering equipment.\footnote{Ibid.} The manual also offered the \textit{Friendly Population Buffer} as an alternative. This method promoted the complete physical relocation of communities as necessary “to ensure that all civilians residing near the border are sympathetic to the host country government.”\footnote{Ibid.}
Sensitive to the legal and political implications of such an approach, the manual reminded its readers that American military personnel remained subject to the Geneva Conventions and that they should not get involved in this type of operation. Instead, the dirty work of cleaving populations from their homelands, the publication implied, should be left to indigenous governments.

It is highly unlikely that either of these strategies could be applied by the NATO-led counterinsurgency without incurring serious difficulty. The harsh terrain of the frontier alone, which includes some of the world’s highest and most rugged mountain peaks, would preclude the physical re-arrangement of real estate along the border envisioned by the Restricted Zone concept. Moreover, the Friendly Population Buffer concept would almost certainly fail moral muster today and it would surely be greeted with increased militancy by the Pashtun people. The British, Pakistanis and Soviets, all of whom attempted to isolate the Pashtuns, learned this lesson the hard way.

More recent attempts at counterinsurgency doctrine wisely reject the long-standing notion that ‘nice guys finish last,’ but they offer little useful guidance to operational commanders seeking to interdict insurgent safe havens. Take, for example, the much-anticipated United States Army and Marine Corps *Counterinsurgency Field Manual*. Released in 2007, this publication clearly understands that “access to external resources and sanctuaries has always influenced the effectiveness of insurrections.”183 While the publication asserts “effective COIN operations work to eliminate all sanctuaries,” it offers surprisingly little in the way of concrete recommendations that can be applied on the ground.184 Instead, the *Counterinsurgency Field Manual*...
Manual largely marginalizes the threat of transnational sanctuaries by asserting that they have become increasingly vulnerable to modern target acquisition and intelligence gathering technology. The contention that this technology has forced contemporary insurgencies to “develop in urban environments” ignores the realities of the rural nature of the Taliban insurgency confronting NATO troops now.  

Although it borrows heavily from its American counterpart, the recently-released Canadian manual on Counter-Insurgency Operations shows an enhanced understanding of the challenges posed by insurgent sanctuaries. Declaring that insurgents must be “separated from their physical support, which includes recruits, finances and material resources that may be originating...from external sources,” this publication offers broad recommendations on interdicting insurgent support networks and safe havens. Possible methods offered by Counter-Insurgency Operations to physically separate insurgents from their support base include the establishment of curfews and personnel searches; patrols, ambushes and vehicle checkpoints; interdiction operations against the entry of external supplies; closing national borders or imposing control measures over them; and international diplomacy to staunch the flow of external fiscal, human and material support for the insurgency. While providing a useful point of departure for operational commanders contemplating the daunting task of sanctuary interdiction, this manual still does not provide a more detailed explanation of the tactics and procedures to be used to achieve these broad objectives.

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184 Ibid., 29.
185 Ibid.
187 Ibid., 3-11.
Literature Review

If military doctrine offers little in the way of detailed options to deal with insurgent sanctuaries, what then can be gleaned from mainstream military journals and the broader academic community? Until recently, there was little to draw from. Early theorists, such as David Galula, a French Army officer with extensive counterinsurgency experience in China, Greece, Indochina and Algeria, understood clearly the importance of ‘outside support’ to an insurgency, but he surprisingly downplayed measures used by the French in Algeria to interdict rebel safe havens.188 Similarly, Sir Robert Thompson, a retired Royal Air Force officer and harsh critic of American policies during the Vietnam War, largely steered clear of the subject in his book, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam.189

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, when the United States and her allies increasingly found themselves fighting complex insurgencies fuelled by transnational support networks, military experts increasingly offered more concrete solutions to deal with the problem of external support. Of all studies conducted on the subject, few summarize the multi-faceted nature of insurgent support as well as the RAND study, “Trends in Outside Movement for Insurgent Movements.”190 Published in 2001, the report assesses the mechanisms used by “states, diasporas, refugees, and other non-state actors to back guerrilla movements.”191 Similarly, Bard O’Neill, a professor of international affairs at the United States National War


191 Ibid.
College and counterinsurgency expert, provides an excellent historical examination of the problem along with a summary of critical vulnerabilities that can be exploited by counterinsurgency forces.\textsuperscript{192} In addition to assessing military options to sever the external support of rebel groups, O’Neill considers other instruments of statecraft to include diplomacy, information operations and economic considerations.\textsuperscript{193}

**Summary**

Current doctrine, although representing a step in the right direction, offers little useful information on how to eliminate transnational sanctuaries. This is particularly troubling since the likelihood of returning to a conventional war paradigm anytime soon is remote at best.\textsuperscript{194} Thus, it behooves staffs at military doctrine institutions to more thoroughly examine and communicate methods to eliminate the external support and safe havens provided to insurgencies. To be useful to deployed operational commanders, doctrine should be rewritten to consider sanctuary vulnerabilities, planning considerations, enabler and logistics support to border operations and the integration of military, civilian and indigenous security forces working towards a common border strategy.\textsuperscript{195}

\textsuperscript{192} O’Neill also subdivides external support into four basic types: moral; political; material; and sanctuary. See Bard O’Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse* (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2005), 139-145.

\textsuperscript{193} *Ibid*, 183-185. Other academics have provided even more detailed proposals. Some, such as Paul Staniland, Lester Grau and Geoffrey Demarest, propose the use of physical barrier systems such as fences and fortifications. But not all proposals focus on military solutions alone. In fact, in response to the growing instability of the Pakistan-Afghanistan region, numerous academics and journalists have argued strongly for a comprehensive approach that would apply governance, economic and security initiatives along the border concurrently. See Staniland, 22; and Lieutenant-Colonel Geoffrey Demarest (US Army Retired) and Lieutenant-Colonel Lester Grau (US Army Retired), “Maginot Line or Fort Apache? Using Forts to Shape the Counterinsurgency Battlefield,” *Military Review*, Vol. 85, No. 6 (November-December 2005): 35-40.

\textsuperscript{194} Robert Tomes, “Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare,” *Parameters* (Spring 2004).

\textsuperscript{195} Bairstow, 84.
Fortunately, the academic community is not as short on innovative ideas. Very few attempts to find a solution to Afghanistan’s woes, however, consider all perspectives and often their recommendations are intended for universal application. The key to finding a solution to the Pakistan-Afghanistan border problem is to scrutinize each of these theories and scrub from them specific recommendations that respect the history and complexities of the region. The final two chapters of this paper will attempt to do exactly that.

When this problem is eventually resolved, governments of the future will hopefully have many more resources to draw from when contemplating military action abroad against an insurgency. They might best be served by first reviewing the US Government Counterinsurgency Guide released in 2009. An acknowledgement of the immense challenges of the Pashtun tribal belt, this report concludes with a stark warning: “Assisting an affected country without an effective strategy for border security, reduction of ungoverned spaces and denial of cross-border insurgent sanctuaries is highly unlikely to succeed over the long term.”196

CHAPTER V
SANCTUARY INTERDICTION METHODS

In the absence of useful sanctuary doctrine, this chapter will review the hard learned lessons and methods employed by other nations throughout recent history to interdict insurgent safe havens. Possible solutions to this problem include conventional military assaults on neighboring countries; targeted killing of key insurgent leaders; military containment strategies that incorporate physical barriers, forward mobile defences and the use of indigenous forces to secure threatened borders; and population resettlement. While it is acknowledged there is no such thing as a ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution to this problem, an analysis of sanctuary interdiction methods tried over time might reveal ‘best practices’ that can be applied to the distinctive geography, history and culture of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region.

Cross-Border Military Operations

The most forceful course of action available to a government seeking to eliminate a militant sanctuary along its border is to invade the neighboring country when the host nation does not have the capacity or the will to reject insurgent safe havens. This technique requires conventional military forces to identify and destroy insurgent strong-holds, disrupt enemy lines of communication and interdict the flow of external support to militant groups.


198 This paper does not address the array of diplomatic options available to resolve transnational sanctuaries, as political initiatives will accompany all strategies contemplated for the border. In fact, the United States and the international community have attempted to engage Pakistan in dialogue incessantly since 9/11. While Islamabad has yet to show the capacity or resolve to make enduring reforms in the region, the United States in particular has maintained steady pressure on successive Pakistani governments to adopt more pro-active measures in the tribal frontier. This chapter will focus instead on more direct methods to eliminate transnational sanctuaries.
While intended to be rapid and decisive actions, cross-border invasions routinely morph into costly long-term occupations. Take, for example, Israel’s invasion of southern Lebanon in June 1982. Although designed initially to only drive the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from its northern border, ‘Operation Peace for Galilee’ soon expanded to attempt the forced withdrawal of Syria from Lebanon and the establishment of a pro-Israeli government in the region. The operation, initially planned to last three days, stretched into two months of sustained combat and a bloody three-year occupation of Lebanon. By the time the Israeli Defence Force pulled out of Lebanon in January 1985, the PLO, though displaced, remained unbroken. Further, Israel’s reputation amongst the international community suffered, while previously friendly Lebanese Shi’as had turned against the occupation force.

More limited raids might diminish the requirement for long-term occupation of an area, but they are equally unlikely to succeed. Insurgents typically avoid decisive engagement when confronting technologically and numerically superior forces. Unless their strikes have a high probability of success, they normally preserve combat power and critical supplies by dispersing until conventional military forces re-deploy from an area. American efforts to interdict North Vietnamese sanctuaries throughout the 1960s and 1970s are illustrative of this point. During this

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199 Staniland, 26.


201 Of the 76,000 Israeli soldiers deployed, over 3000 were killed or wounded. See Richard Gabriel, *Operation Peace for Galilee: The Israeli-PLO War in Lebanon* (New York, NY: Hill and Wang, 1984), 176.


203 Early practitioners of guerrilla warfare, such as Mao Tse-tung, encouraged insurgents to avoid enemy strengths relying instead on their stealth and speed to launch surprise attacks and ambushes. These tactics formed the essence of guerrilla warfare and they persist today. See Mao Tse-tung, *Basic Tactics* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), 56.
time, the communists moved personnel and tremendous volumes of supplies into South Vietnam via the Ho Chi Minh and Sinahouk Trails, a complex web of delivery routes originating from militant strongholds in Laos and Cambodia.\textsuperscript{204} In April 1970, over 50,000 American and South Vietnamese soldiers crossed the Cambodian border in an effort to interdict these safe havens. Less than three months later, with monsoon season approaching, the Americans re-deployed to South Vietnam. While the attacks impeded North Vietnamese efforts for months by killing thousands of Vietcong and destroying their weapons and supplies, they did not permanently eliminate insurgent sanctuary in the region.\textsuperscript{205}

The use of cross-border invasions and more limited incursions has been attempted with similar results by many other nations seeking to minimize the impact of transnational sanctuaries.\textsuperscript{206} Such operations might temporarily interdict insurgent operations, but they are costly and they routinely alienate the local populace, resulting in heightened regional tension and even an emboldened insurgency. When conventional military operations are required to dislodge insurgent safe havens – and they often are – they should ideally be conducted by the host nation.

**Targeted Killing**

Given the many pitfalls of ground offensives, states have increasingly sought out more limited options to deal with transnational sanctuaries. Bombing insurgent leaders with precision guided munitions and missiles in their safe havens is one such alternative. Rather than attempting to eliminate insurgent sanctuaries completely, targeted killings instead seek to trigger


\textsuperscript{205} Indeed, in spite of subsequent cross-border conventional military attacks into both countries, the struggle over sanctuary would drag on through the entire war. See Norman Hannah, *The Key to Failure: Laos and the Vietnam War* (Lanham, MD: Madison Books, 1987), 277.

\textsuperscript{206} See Staniland, 25-26.
disarray amongst militants by decapitating insurgent leadership and killing highly-specialized technical experts. Indeed, the accuracy of aerial delivered munitions has improved markedly in recent years, making this option more and more attractive to counterinsurgency forces.\(^\text{207}\)

Israel in particular has relied heavily on a policy of targeted killing to eliminate terrorist leaders in hiding. Since the 1970s, Israeli security forces have successfully targeted hundreds of Palestinian terrorists.\(^\text{208}\) In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the United States adopted a similar policy. It was first tested in November 2002, when a Central Intelligence Agency-operated Predator unmanned aerial vehicle launched a lethal missile strike, killing Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi, a high ranking al-Qaeda member and suspected architect of the USS Cole bombing, in an isolated and sparsely populated region within Yemen.\(^\text{209}\) U.S. officials have since acknowledged dozens of other Hellfire missile strikes on insurgent leaders in transnational sanctuaries, mostly along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.\(^\text{210}\)

The advantages of this strategy are obvious. Targeted killings satisfy domestic requirements for a decisive response to terrorism and they clearly erode the capacity of insurgent groups to plan and conduct effective operations.\(^\text{211}\) Not only are militant leaders taken out,

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\(^{207}\) Staniland, 27.

\(^{208}\) Although Israel initially aimed at key operational leaders who were thought to be orchestrating militant activities, Hamas’ political leadership came into Israeli sights in 2004 as well. Most notably, the wheelchair-bound Hamas founder Sheikh Ahmed Yassin was killed in March 2004, following two weeks later by his successor, Abdel Aziz Rantisi. See Gal Luft, “The Logic of Israel’s Targeted Killing,” *Middle East Quarterly*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Winter 2003); Internet; http://www.meforum.org/515/the-logic-of-israels-targeted-killing; accessed 27 March 2009; and Khaled Abu Toameh, “No Tears for Hamas Leader in Ramallah,” *The Jerusalem Post* (1 January 2009); Internet; http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull&cid=1230733134624; accessed 27 March 2009.

\(^{209}\) Tony Karon, “Yemen Strike Opens New Chapter in War on Terror,” *Time* (5 November 2002); Internet; http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,387571,00.html; accessed 27 March 2009.

highly skilled bomb makers who require years of training are also eliminated. Moreover, insurgent leaders are forced into hiding, knowing they can be targeted at any time. This absence of charismatic face-to-face leadership makes it extremely difficult for a militant group to inspire followers to wage ‘jihad’ against their enemies.  

In spite of the stated advantages of this policy, the killing of insurgent leaders in their safe havens has been highly controversial. First, the legality of this strategy has been heavily disputed by proponents of international human rights law. They allege this policy condones the ‘extrajudicial execution’ or ‘assassination’ of civilians that is forbidden under international and U.S. domestic laws. Further, critics of targeted killing charge the death of innocent civilians caused by collateral damage violates ethical norms that can easily result in retaliatory strikes and a loss of international support for counterinsurgency objectives.

There are also more pragmatic disadvantages to this strategy. The policy of targeted killing has been less effective against insurgent groups that rely on a decentralized command

211 The National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT), for example, reports that the death of Israeli civilians and soldiers at the hands of Hamas has declined annually since 2001, the year Israeli security forces ratcheted up targeted leadership attacks. See Daniel Byman, “Do Targeted Killings Work?” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 2 (March/April 2006).

212 Ibid.


structure. Organizations such as al Qaeda and the Taliban are able to quickly replace commanders while maintaining militant operations. Further strategic complications arise when martyrs are created out of deceased leaders. Hezbollah, for example, now idolizes Abbas al-Musawi, an influential Muslim cleric killed by Israeli forces in 1992.

In summary, targeted killing offers no panacea in defeating transnational sanctuaries. Applied indiscriminately, aerial bombardment can lead to collateral damage and the tragic loss of innocent lives, which might in turn invite retaliatory strikes and a prolonging of the conflict. “Just because one has a hammer does not mean every problem should be treated like a nail.”

Yet, just as there are inherent disadvantages to the application of targeted killing, there are also risks of ignoring this option. In the case of the many insurgent leaders hiding in Pakistan’s tribal areas and plotting attacks against Afghan citizens and members of the international community, the danger of delaying the use of force could very well outweigh the unlikely prospect of apprehending them for prosecution in a criminal court.

**Defensive Barriers**

The use of cross-border ground offensives and targeted killing to interdict transnational sanctuaries require counterinsurgency forces either to seek host nation approval or launch the attack without it and violate the sovereignty of the affected nation in the process. The use of defensive barriers and highly mobile quick reaction forces, on the other hand, often restricts

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insurgent freedom of movement while avoiding a number of the diplomatic, legal and tactical pitfalls of the other options. The purpose of a barrier strategy is to render the cross-border movement of insurgents and their supplies difficult, effectively separating them from the indigenous population they seek to influence.

Further, by tying up large numbers of insurgents in a fight against border troops and their fortifications, the strategy seeks to contain militants along the border region, making them easier targets for host nation conventional forces.

The use of a defensive barrier system was perhaps most successfully employed by France in the late 1950s against Algerian insurgents who relied heavily on transnational sanctuary in neighbouring Morocco and Tunisia. In the fall of 1957, the French army completed the ‘Morice Line,’ a formidable obstacle belt that included 300 kilometres of electrified fence and an extensive mine belt. The French manned the line, which separated Algeria and Tunisia, with thirty thousand troops. When incursions along the fence were detected by radars and electronic sensors, quick reaction forces supported by artillery and close air support were vectored on to insurgent groups with devastating results.

By April 1958, over six thousand members of the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), the Algerian resistance, had been killed attempting to cross the border.

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218 Staniland, 31.


221 An additional twenty thousand FLN fighters comprising up to 50 percent of the FLN’s fighting force outside Algeria were also forced to sit out of the war when the dangers of crossing the border became evident. See Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace Algeria, 1954-1962 (New York, NY: Viking Press, 1977), 266.
The defensive barrier system established by France has been used by many other countries to successfully interdict transnational sanctuaries. India, for example, constructed a security barrier in 1989 to halt the flow of militants from Pakistan.\textsuperscript{222} When insurgent infiltration from Punjab province subsided considerably, New Delhi extended the barrier an additional 800 kilometers into Jammu and Kashmir. Similarly, Israeli security fences have been used for decades to block terrorist movement from Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, the Gaza Strip and West Bank. Since employing a barrier system and complementing it with their policy of targeted killing, the number of Israelis killed by terrorists has plummeted.\textsuperscript{223} Thus, there is little doubt that defensive security barriers offer an attractive and affordable solution to interdicting militant safe havens.\textsuperscript{224}

As with all of the other methods discussed, defensive barriers offer no magical cure to the problem of transnational sanctuaries. The United States failed, for example, to execute the concept in the late 1960s when it set out to construct the ‘McNamara Line’ in Vietnam. The initial plan included an extensive barrier system comprised of acoustic and seismic sensors supported by highly agile ground and air-based quick reaction forces.\textsuperscript{225} When the Americans


\textsuperscript{223} The Israeli border fence, referred to as the ‘separation fence’ or ‘anti-terrorist fence,’ contains a wire fence with electronic sensors, an anti-vehicular ditch, an extensive surveillance system, and high speed road ways that can be used by security forces to respond to attempted incursions. For an excellent description of the Israeli barrier system, see Mitchell Bard, “Israel’s Security Fence,” Internet; http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/fence.html; accessed 27 March 2009.

\textsuperscript{224} In fact, Turkey maintains a high fence along the length of its border with Syria to counter Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan terrorists, Morocco blocks the movement of Polisario Front rebels with an impressive barrier spanning nearly 2000 kilometers along the Western Sahara, and even the United States is in the process of constructing a massive barrier along its border with Mexico to check the flow of narcotics and weapons. See David McDowall, \textit{A Modern History of the Kurds}, 3\textsuperscript{rd} ed. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 428-429; Michael Bhatia, "The Western Sahara Under Polisario Control," \textit{Review of African Political Economy}, Vol. 28, No. 88 (June 2001); and Daniel Wood, “Where U.S.-Mexico Border Fence is Tall, Border Crossings Fall,” \textit{The Christian Science Monitor} (1 April 2008); Internet; http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0401/p01s05-usgn.html; accessed 27 March 2009.
abandoned this approach in favour of a more loosely connected series of fortifications, insurgents continued to enjoy freedom of movement from Laos. Indeed, the successful execution of a barrier plan requires an unrelenting dedication of resources to build and repair fences, the commitment of large numbers of rapidly deployable troops to observe and interdict insurgent activity, and close collaboration between indigenous border security forces and pursuit forces.226

Population Resettlement

A frequently employed alternative to defensive barrier systems has been the resettlement of non-combatant populations away from border regions. Population resettlement seeks to separate insurgents from the indigenous populace – a potential source of intelligence, sustainment, protection and recruiting. In modern times, this strategy has been used widely with only mixed success.

As argued convincingly by Kelly M. Greenhill, the successful implementation of population resettlement is rare.227 Historically, relocation schemes have only worked when they met long-term promises of an improved quality of life, as was the case with the Malaya Emergency in 1948, or when they were completed rapidly through the use of extreme coercion.228 The British suppression of the Kikuyu-led Mau Mau Revolt in Kenya is illustrative of the potential effectiveness of the latter avenue of approach.229 In June 1954, British colonial
authorities in Kenya aggressively relocated over one million people in nearly 900 villages.

Dehumanized and stripped of essential services, starving villagers were reluctant to share scarce resources with the Kikuyu rebels, who themselves became so desperate that they began to attack their own people for food.\(^{230}\) Thus, by severing the rebels from their base of supply and turning them against the local populace, the resettlement effort in Kenya brought some stability to the region.

It should be noted, however, that tactical gains achieved through brutal resettlement methods are generally short-lived. In fact, all population relocation strategies – coercive and otherwise – fail more often than not. The Soviet policy of attacking villages adjacent to insurgent safe havens incited additional militancy in Afghanistan,\(^{231}\) while the *agroville* and strategic hamlet programs in Vietnam were doomed by corrupt administration and the emotional stress of being separated from ancestral homes.\(^{232}\) Militants successfully exploited this chaos to their benefit, ultimately galvanizing support for their cause.

**Summary**

While this brief study of historical attempts to interdict transnational sanctuaries has not produced a miraculous cure to the problems of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region, it has facilitated a better understanding of the origins and continuities of similar challenges over time and in various strategic, cultural and geographic environments. At a minimum, the sum of these

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experiences should alert counterinsurgency planners to some of the pitfalls that rendered previous campaigns unsuccessful.

When attempting to assess the feasibility of applying these methods to the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area, it is perhaps easiest to first eliminate strategies that are most likely to fail. A course of action fraught with most risk is one that contemplates the resettlement of the tribal populace in its scheme of manoeuvre. As suggested by Kelly Greenhill, nomadic pastoralists – such as the Pashtun hill tribesmen – “…are simply ill suited to static, densely populated living arrangements. As such, it can be virtually impossible to satisfy the grievances…of these segments of the population by forcing them into collective villages.”

Given the fiercely independent nature of the Pashtuns, it is highly unlikely that efforts to relocate them would be greeted with anything but coldblooded militancy. The Soviets have already learned this lesson the hard way for NATO forces.

Each of the other three methods presented – cross border invasion; targeted killing of insurgent leaders; and the use of barriers reinforced by quick reaction forces – are more appealing, but they too are burdened with hazards that must be navigated carefully. First, although conventional military force will need to be applied to insurgent safe havens inside Pakistan, the difficult work of closing with and destroying militants must be left to Pakistani security forces unless Islamabad requests assistance, it proves unwilling to do its part for regional stability or its nuclear stockpiles become threatened by terrorists. A cross-border ground attack under any other conditions by conventional NATO troops would not only violate Pakistani sovereignty and international law, it would most certainly fuel burgeoning anti-

233 Greenhill, 11.
Americanism in the region and it would stretch beyond capacity the military resources of the international community.

Second, counterinsurgency planners will need to consider carefully the continued application of a policy of targeted killing in the frontier areas. While the elimination of high-level militant leaders and their technical experts can impair militant operations, targeted killings, when conducted indiscriminately, can draw condemnation from the international community, they can exacerbate hatred towards the United States, and they can actually galvanize support for the insurgency.

Finally, though there are clear advantages to sealing borders with physical defensive barriers, obstacles such as those used by the French in Algeria are prohibitively expensive in terms of material and manpower. Not only does a barricade system require forces to provide constant surveillance on potential crossing points, ground and air based strike forces must be kept in close proximity to the border at all times. Pursuing such a strategy in Afghanistan would require NATO to allocate considerably more troops and resources to the border area than are currently.

Most people will now agree that the interdiction of militant sanctuaries inside Pakistan is vital to winning the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and ensuring long-term stability in the region. Yet, it seems the challenges of this region are nearly insurmountable. Indeed, nearly all previous efforts on the part of the British, Pakistanis and Soviets to control the Pashtuns of the tribal frontier failed miserably, and all military options previously used to interdict transnational sanctuaries elsewhere in the world seemingly cannot be applied to the challenges of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region without incurring considerable risk.
Is there anything that can be done? Fortunately, this problem is solvable. Despite the bleak prognosis assigned to the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region by the mainstream media, the next chapter will offer strategic and operational recommendations to marginalize the impact of transnational sanctuaries inside Pakistan.
CHAPTER VI
THE WAY AHEAD

Counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan are currently based on a strategy of “clear, hold, and build”: clear a selected area of insurgents through military action; hold it to prevent the return of anti-government militants; and build the essential services, indigenous security capacity and governance structures required for long-term stability.\(^{234}\) While NATO forces have demonstrated a highly lethal and effective capacity to clear designated areas of militants, they have nowhere near the resources needed to hold ground for an extended period, making it extremely difficult to get to the build phase of the strategy.\(^{235}\) Thus, with minor exceptions, counterinsurgent and indigenous security forces have either been restricted to holding insignificantly small patches of real estate or they have engaged the Taliban in a frustrating game of ‘Whack-a-Mole,’ hitting insurgent strongholds in one area only to have others appear elsewhere.\(^{236}\)

Not surprisingly, the same resource constraints have hamstrung NATO operational commanders from paying anything more than lip service to the transnational element of the insurgency. With very few boots on the ground, counterinsurgents have understandably focussed their efforts instead on protecting as much of the indigenous population as possible by attacking


\(^{236}\) Canadian soldiers, having cleared the volatile Panjwayi District of Kandahar Province numerous times since 2006, have also compared the strategy to ‘mowing the lawn.’ See Tom Simpson, “Iraq, Afghanistan and the War on Terror,” *The Globalist* (15 February 2008); Internet; [http://www.theglobalist.co.uk/international/politics/2008/02/iraq-afghanistan-and-the-war-on-terror/](http://www.theglobalist.co.uk/international/politics/2008/02/iraq-afghanistan-and-the-war-on-terror/); accessed 21 March 2009.
insurgent nodes inside Afghanistan.237 This internal focus has allowed insurgents to move
unmolested back and forth across the border to treat the wounded, conduct resupply operations
and recruit fresh militants for follow-on operations. They only re-enter Afghanistan for a period
of days or months, “…after which they kill themselves or flee back across the border.”238

The purpose of this chapter is to offer a realistic and achievable strategy for targeting
insurgent safe havens in Pakistan and interdicting militant cross-border supply routes. First, this
chapter briefly introduces the comprehensive approach that will be needed to resolve the vast
array of regional issues defined earlier in the report. Further, acknowledging the current
incapacity of the Pakistan government to implement these sweeping changes, this report also
recommends an aggressive containment strategy that must be implemented immediately inside
Afghanistan to marginalize the impact of Taliban safe havens across the border.

This paper does not naively presume a fresh border strategy can be drawn on a clean
slate. Clearly, any campaign plan that ignores or attempts to sanitize the resource challenges
confronting NATO forces, the complexity of the regional challenges, and the harsh lessons
taught to other regimes seeking to extend influence in the region will most certainly be doomed
to failure. Rather, contemplated approaches must assume in the absence of compelling
contradictory evidence that Pakistan’s willingness and ability to interdict insurgent safe havens
will be constrained in the short to medium-term and that NATO ISAF forces will continue to be
plagued by manning and enabler deficiencies.

237 Matthew Fisher, “Afghanistan Needs More Help: Senior Soldier,” (2 April 2009); Internet;

238 Unless this trend is reversed, the local populace will continue to lose confidence in the government and
its ability to resist the home-grown Pashtun insurgency. See Staniland, 22.
The Long Road Ahead: A Comprehensive Regional Approach

How then can regional powers and the NATO-led counterinsurgency achieve their desired end state of eliminating terrorist sanctuary in Pakistan, establishing in Afghanistan a legitimate government backed by credible security forces and preventing a regional meltdown? Nearly everyone studying this issue now agrees that tactical military gains in the tribal areas will be meaningless unless accompanied by a ‘comprehensive approach’ that includes sweeping security, political and economic reforms.239 First, acknowledging the continued importance of maintaining military pressure on insurgent safe havens inside Pakistan, experts agree that Pakistani security forces must be purged of Taliban sympathizers and that the Pakistani Army and Frontier Corps in particular must be trained and equipped to conduct counterinsurgency operations rather than focusing solely on the perceived conventional threat posed by India.240 Further, many regional experts argue that stabilizing the border region will eventually require the incorporation of the tribal agencies into modern, democratic institutions and the abolishment of the FCR.241 Finally, it is also clear that extensive long-term economic development is needed in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area, where over 60 percent of the population lives in abject poverty. Lacking viable money-making opportunities, young Pashtun men are driven to a life of

239 This approach was effectively employed in Iraq, and it has been attempted inside Afghanistan since 2003. See Major-General Peter Chiarelli (US Army) and Major Patrick Michaelis (US Army), “Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full Spectrum Operations,” Military Review (July-August 2005); and Lieutenant-General David Barno, “Fighting ‘The Other War’: Counterinsurgency Strategy in Afghanistan, 2003-2005,” Military Review (September-October 2007).


241 Recommended amendments to the FCR – last overhauled in 1901 – include the application of modern human rights standards, the abolition of collective punishment, and the transfer to parliament of all legislative and administrative powers over the tribal areas. See Barnett R. Rubin and Abubakar Siddique, “Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stalemate,” United Institute of Peace Special Report; Internet; http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/srl76.html; accessed 3 January 2009: 17.
cross-border arms and narcotics smuggling or they are forced to join militant groups who offer a decent pay check to anyone willing to fire rocket propelled grenades at NATO and Afghan soldiers.  

Experts are also increasingly calling for a much broader regional engagement to shut-down insurgent safe havens in Pakistan. In an article published in the *Foreign Affairs* journal, Barnett Rubin and Pakistani analyst Ahmed Rashid urge Washington and its allies to pursue a “…high-level diplomatic initiative designed to build a genuine consensus on the goal of achieving Afghan stability by addressing the legitimate sources of Pakistan's insecurity while increasing the opposition to its disruptive actions.” They call for the United Nations Security Council to establish a ‘contact group’ consisting of its five permanent members, NATO and Saudi Arabia to “…promote dialogue between India and Pakistan about their respective interests in Afghanistan and about finding a solution to the Kashmir dispute.” Further, in addition to moving Pakistan and Afghanistan toward discussions on the Durand Land and Pashtunistan issues, the group would also assure Russia, Iran and China that United States and NATO intentions are designed solely to bring long-term stability and economic viability to the region.

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244 *Ibid.*

Highly respected in Washington, nearly all the recommendations advanced by Rubin and Rashid have featured prominently in the recently released “White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group’s Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan.” Declaring that the “core goal of the United States must be to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan,” the report encourages “…a wide ranging diplomatic strategy to build support for our efforts, enhanced engagements with the publics in the region and at home, and a realization that all elements of international power – diplomatic, informational, military and economic – must be brought to bear.” To this end, the United States has indicated its intent to establish a ‘contact group’ to engage regional stakeholders and it has committed to overcoming the ‘trust deficit’ that has undermined American efforts in the region to date.

Obama’s plan, if implemented and properly resourced, will address many of the obstacles to regional stability identified earlier in this report. Specifically, the civilian surge proposed in the White Paper will strengthen significantly the capacity of the Afghan government and border officials to monitor cross-border movement and it will help eliminate some of the desperate economic conditions that have emboldened the Taliban’s cause. Further, the United States has promisingly committed economic and military resources to reinforce Afghan counter-narcotics operations along the border. Until now, NATO ISAF troops were prohibited from targeting the


247 Ibid, 1.

248 It is anticipated the new civilian force in Afghanistan will include a number of diplomats, specialists from federal departments such as Agriculture and Justice, civilian police mentors, and U.S. embassy and PRT staffs. See Karen DeYoung, “Civilians to Join Afghan Buildup,” The Washington Post (19 March 2009); Internet; http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/18/AR2009031802313.html; accessed 9 April 2009.
nexus of drug traders, traffickers, narco-leaders and corrupt government officials that provide a major source of funding for the insurgency.\textsuperscript{249} Finally, the American commitment to engage regional stakeholders in dialogue is a critical step towards establishing long-term stability along the border.

Despite its clear advantages, the White Paper is not the silver bullet counterinsurgency planners have been looking for. In fact, by ignoring some key truisms of the region, this policy paper has little hope of permanently resolving the bloody stalemate between NATO ISAF forces and the array of militant groups operating out of Pakistan. While the Obama administration’s recent attempt to disaggregate the insurgency by declaring an end to the ‘Global War on Terror’ is laudable,\textsuperscript{250} the timing of this gesture and parallel efforts to bring ‘moderate’ Taliban to the bargaining table could be construed as an American admission of defeat. Is it actually possible to speak to the Taliban, especially if the insurgency believes it can exhaust the West’s remaining will to fight on? As Islamabad’s repeated efforts to appease the Taliban have shown, negotiation with militant jihadists from a position of weakness will actually empower violent insurgent groups by giving them time to rebuild and recruit.\textsuperscript{251}


\textsuperscript{251} In fact, Pakistan’s efforts to end bloodshed in the Swat Valley of NWFP by allowing Islamic law – an initiative that was tacitly supported by the United States – recently backfired. On 20 April 2009, a Taliban spokesman indicated Osama bin Laden and other militants were welcome in the region. See Gannon, “Taliban in Pakistani Ex-Resort: Welcome Osama;” and International Crisis Group, “Afghanistan: New U.S. Administration, New Directions,” \textit{Asia Briefing No. 89} (13 March 2009); Internet; http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6007; accessed 9 April 2009.
Moreover, the long-term reintegration of the Taliban will only be achieved at the expense of other Western-driven initiatives such as the recognition of gender equality and universal human rights for all Afghans.252 Both of these concepts fundamentally oppose core Taliban values and beliefs that have been forged in ultra-conservative madrassas along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border for decades. To suggest that these Islamic extremists – who pour acid on little girls, ban women from showing their faces in public and burn children’s schools – will suddenly play fairly and embrace women’s equality following the inevitable departure of NATO and American forces from the region is dangerously and tragically naïve.253

Similarly, the White Paper further ambushes any notion of integrating reconcilable insurgents by continuing to push for the extension of strong central government authority to the tribal areas. The British, Pakistanis and Soviets spilled a great deal of blood in the mountains of the tribal frontier by trying to exert control over the Pashtuns, the tribe that now supplies the rank-and-file of the insurgency. While legitimate federal governments on both sides of the border will be critical to resolving the vast diplomatic challenges of the region, attempts to reign in an insurgency that fiercely guards its independence through a Western-style justice system and political apparatus will only further galvanize enemy cohesiveness.

252 While the White Paper declares, “Practical integration must not become a mechanism for instituting medieval social policies that give up the quest for gender equality and human rights,” it offers no explanation as to how the Taliban will be stripped of their ultra-conservative ideology, nor does it suggest how these initiatives will be monitored following the eventual withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan. See United States, “White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group’s Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan,” 4.

253 President Karzai’s support of a controversial law that legalizes marital rape and rolls back women’s rights did little to shore up already dwindling international support for the mission in Afghanistan and it was further proof that including Taliban in the future of Afghan governance could only be achieved at the expense of women’s rights. See Rahim Faiez and Heidi Vogt, “Afghan Cleric Defends Contentious Marriage Law,” The Globe and Mail (11 April 2009); Internet; http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20090411.wcleric0411/BNStory/International/home; accessed 11 April 2009.
As suggested by counterinsurgency experts Nathaniel Fick and John Nagl, the presence of insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan should not reinforce the myth that the border region is ungovernable when under Pashtun control.254 The Pashtuns developed long ago highly advanced social and governance structures, and effective methods of resolving disputes. “Today’s instability is not the continuation of some ancient condition,” they assert, “it is the direct result of decades of intentional dismantling of those traditional structures, leaving extremist groups to fill the vacuum.”255 Pushing for increased central government control will not achieve greater regional stability. Instead, local leaders must be empowered to resurrect tribal social and legal structures of the past that respected Pashtunwali and were accepted by the local populace.

In reality, any attempt to alter the current balance of power in the tribal frontier – whether through the political integration of the frontier provinces into Pakistan or, as this paper argues, by reinvigorating traditional Pashtun social customs backed by strong economic incentives – will most certainly be met with fierce resistance by transnational terrorist groups and radical mullahs who stand to lose the most by relinquishing power to more moderate forces. Thus, while this insurgency will not be defeated through military means alone, more use of the stick will first be required to dislodge extremists from the tribal areas before nonmilitary tools can be used. This will require the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan to maintain a persistent and robust military presence along the border region. Until it is clear to Taliban leaders that their position is militarily untenable, negotiation should not be contemplated.256


255 Ibid.
Once extremist leaders are either killed or forced into submission, traditional governance structures that respect the tenets of Pashtunwali can be reintroduced gradually to the region. Amendments to the colonial-era Maliki system still in place along the frontier might be considered, but the remodeling of governance structures must proceed deliberately in order to avoid violent backlash from an already skeptical local populace. Thus, until tribesmen can be fully consulted and a roadmap for political reform is agreed upon, political agents backed by local militias and the Pakistani army should remain a focal point for governance for the foreseeable future.\textsuperscript{257} Tribal Liaison Offices (TLO), such as those being used with some success in the Afghan border provinces of Paktia, Khost and Paktika, should be established to facilitate dialogue and coordination between political agents and elders from tribal, district, and provincial jirgas.\textsuperscript{258} Internationally-backed development assistance should be siphoned through Islamabad to those districts that work with the TLOs, reject extremist militant groups and show support for the federal government. This incentives-based program that harkens back to the carrot and stick philosophy employed successfully by colonial Britain would empower moderate tribal leaders while making communities understand that they are responsible for the security of projects arranged by the TLO.\textsuperscript{259}

Pakistan is not alone in dealing with these problems, but it must take the lead on implementing the extensive institutional, political and economic reforms inside its own borders.


\textsuperscript{257} Markey, 44.


\textsuperscript{259} \textit{Ibid}, 66.
while continuing to maintain persistent military pressure on insurgent groups throughout the
region. NATO and the UN, for their part, must insist that Afghanistan and India do all in their
power to reduce regional insecurity by addressing long-standing diplomatic and territorial
disputes with Islamabad.\textsuperscript{260} This will require the international community to stop handling
President Hamid Karzai with kid gloves. Since assuming power in Afghanistan nearly seven
years ago with the assistance of the Northern Alliance and the United States military, Karzai has
done little to quell the rampant corruption of his administration, he has revived the Pashtunistan
debate and he has failed to acknowledge the legality of the Durand Line, a legitimate
international frontier that is recognized by nearly all major world powers and international
organizations.\textsuperscript{261} More troubling, his comments have actually exacerbated anti-Americanism in
the region, making it even more difficult for NATO forces to bring stability to his troubled
nation.\textsuperscript{262}

Finally, any comprehensive approach contemplated for the region must display a
reasonable chance for long-term success before being attempted. Any initiative that does not
lead to sustainable development – such as cash-for-work programs that do not last or taking
ground militarily that cannot be held – will frustrate the ambitions of the people it is intended to
serve, ultimately facilitating Taliban recruiting efforts.\textsuperscript{263}

\textsuperscript{260} Rubin and Siddique, “Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stalemate,” 2.

\textsuperscript{261} Qassem, “Afghanistan-Pakistan Relations,” 69.

\textsuperscript{262} When President Obama announced he would deploy 17,000 more troops to Afghanistan, President
Karzai responded by saying they were “seven years too late.” See “Further into Taliban Country,” \textit{The Economist},

\textsuperscript{263} Markey, 35.
Immediate Requirements: NATO Containment Strategy

Until some of the regional pressures are diffused and Pakistanis feel less vulnerable to enemy encirclement, Islamabad will not have the capacity or incentive to tackle militant sanctuaries inside its borders. In fact, while Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari pledged in September 2008 “to defeat the domestic Taliban insurgency and to ensure that Pakistani territory is not used to launch terrorist attacks on [Pakistan’s] neighbours or on NATO forces in Afghanistan,” the security situation in many parts of Pakistan has actually gone from bad to worse. Clearly, any comprehensive approach being considered to eliminate insurgent safe havens inside Pakistan will truly be a generational challenge.

Yet, maintaining the status quo while Pakistan transforms its political and military institutions is not an option. No matter how effective counterinsurgency efforts are inside Afghanistan, victory simply will not be achieved as long as insurgents are able to recruit and train forces abroad and funnel combat supplies across the border. Thus, NATO forces must adopt immediately an aggressive containment strategy inside Afghanistan to marginalize the impact of insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan. This strategy would seek to limit the reach of militant groups beyond Pakistan’s borders by shoring up Afghanistan’s border defences.


266 Islamabad exerts only tenuous control over the military it has yet to transform; members of the ISI and Frontier Corps are believed again to be collaborating with militant tribal groups such as the Mehsuds of South Waziristan; a peace agreement between the government of NWFP and Tehrik-e-Nifaz Shariat Muhammedi – an ultra conservative Islamic group with close ties to Pakistan Taliban and al Qaeda – is threatening to unravel; and acts of terrorism throughout Pakistan continue unabated. On 3 March 2009, for example, gunmen in Pakistan’s Punjab province opened fire on the Sri Lankan National Cricket Team, killing six. See Pamela Constable and Emily Wax, “A Strike at the Soul of South Asia,” Washington Post (4 March 2009); Internet; http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2009/03/03/ST2009030300863.html; accessed 12 March 2009.
The Close Fight: Defensive Requirements

Insurgent safe havens and lines of communication must first be located before they can be targeted. This will require coalition forces to conduct a detailed terrain analysis of the border region using all available surveillance assets. Satellite imagery, high resolution photography and 3D terrain analysis tools will identify to coalition intelligence officials major obstacles that could impede ground movement, potential lines of communication, and staging areas on both sides of the border that could be used as logistical nodes or bases. Reconnaissance and intelligence assets should be vectored on to suspicious areas to gauge local sentiment, assess pattern of life and confirm the presence of insurgent or illegal smuggling activity.267 The product of this herculean intelligence and surveillance effort would be the charting of all known cross-border routes and insurgent safe havens. An accompanying database would reveal the size and condition of all routes, their use over a continuum, and their linkages to insurgent bases, refugee camps, tribal clans and madrassas. From this information a targeting list and common operating picture would emerge.

While maintaining current and actionable intelligence on enemy lines of communication will require the continuous presence of reconnaissance and surveillance assets in the region, such an endeavor will be relatively affordable and sustainable thanks to recent technological advances. Armed with Hellfire missiles and guided munitions, the United States Army’s soon-to-be fielded GA-ASI MQ-1C Sky Warrior Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, for example, has a maximum operating range of 400 km and a loiter time in excess of thirty hours.268 This and


268 For more information on this unmanned aerial vehicle, see the General Atomics Aeronautical website; Internet; http://www.ga-asi.com/products/er-mp-uas.php; accessed 11 April 2009.
other aerial platforms can maintain an unblinking eye on militants as they attempt to traverse the harsh border region.\textsuperscript{269}

Of course, developing a better picture of the border area will require the commitment of adequate hi-tech intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance assets, coveted resources that are still subject to competing demands from the United States-led mission in Iraq.\textsuperscript{270} While the existing mix of ISAF surveillance and reconnaissance platforms is imposing – including an array of unmanned aerial vehicles, fast-jets equipped with reconnaissance systems and targeting pods, and ground-based platforms – insufficient resources exist in theatre currently for an operating area spanning tens of thousands of miles and split by an international frontier.\textsuperscript{271}

Once insurgent safe havens and supply lines are identified, they can then be interdicted. The case studies explored in this report suggest that the ideal system to interdict militants along the Durand Line should not endeavour to seal the border altogether. First, with the Durand Line and Pashtunistan issues unresolved, President Karzai is unlikely to cooperate with Islamabad on the construction of a fence spanning the entire border.\textsuperscript{272} Further, attempting to line 2400 km of some of the harshest terrain in the world with fences, counter-mobility fields and interlocking

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{269} Other inexpensive options in the NATO inventory include forward looking infrared optics, ground-based radar systems, and unattended ground-based sensors that track and classify personnel and vehicle movement through seismic, acoustic and electro-optical means.


\textsuperscript{272} In fact, President Musharraf proposed in December 2006 mining and building a fence the length of the Durand Line to keep militants from crossing in and out of the tribal zone outside of authorized checkpoints. Kabul responded angrily to the suggestion, declaring “The border is not where the problem lies.” See David Montero, “Pakistan Proposes Fence to Rein in Taliban,” \textit{The Christian Science Monitor} (28 December 2006); Internet; http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/1228/p07s02-wosc.html; accessed 11 April 2009.
\end{footnotesize}
defensive positions is not only impractical, such a prospect would be prohibitively costly in terms of material, money and personnel.  

Yet, despite the disadvantages and constraints of a barrier system, such a strategy should not be ruled out altogether in Afghanistan. By forcing militants to breach complex obstacles and attempt to evade highly mobile quick reaction forces, border defensive systems make infiltration an extremely difficult and dangerous prospect for insurgent groups. Further, as the Soviets found when emplacing forts close to the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, key militant supply lines were successfully interdicted and large numbers of insurgents were tied down attempting to lay siege on the posts.  

While a barrier spanning the entire Durand Line clearly is not possible, a concrete partition reinforced by an extensive wire obstacle and anti-tamper sensors should be emplaced in areas where smugglers and insurgents are known to travel frequently, where they most frequently receive sanctuary support from the local populace and where highly valuable targets are located in the immediate vicinity of the border. Barriers should be augmented by fortifications, from which quick reaction forces monitoring surveillance optics and movement sensors can be vectored rapidly by ground or air to intercept and kill insurgents who attempt to infiltrate the border. The mobility of quick reaction forces can be improved by building roads throughout

\textsuperscript{273} Spanning only 250 km, the Morice Line took one year to build, it required 40,000 troops to man and it cost approximately $50 million (USD). See Bairstow, 32.

\textsuperscript{274} Yousaf and Adkin, \textit{The Bear Trap: Afghanistan’s Untold Story}, 159

\textsuperscript{275} Staniland, 31-32.

\textsuperscript{276} Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) personnel, provincial reconstruction teams and intelligence personnel should also be co-located at border fortifications. They would play an instrumental role in minimizing collateral damage caused by military operations along the border, while at the same time advancing the objectives of any comprehensive approach contemplated for the region.
the interdiction area. A barrier would not be required in areas of reduced vulnerability for the counterinsurgency or in locations where enemy movement is less concealed from coalition surveillance sensors, such as the Registan Desert south of Kandahar City. Rather, these areas should be monitored through continuous air surveillance and aggressive unpredictable patrolling (See Annex E – Physical Barrier Concept).

The Morice Line constructed by the French in the 1950s separating Algeria and Tunisia relied heavily on the use of an electrified fence straddled by an extensive anti-personnel minefield. Clearly, any system that cannot discriminate between friend and foe would not be supported by international humanitarian laws today, nor would it pass moral muster with the populaces of Western nations contributing to the NATO effort. Fortunately, such a system is not critical to the success of a defensive barrier system. The key to the effectiveness of any barrier system is being able to detect enemy movement and vectoring pursuit forces on to infiltrations in a timely manner. Equipped with highly advanced ground-based movement sensors, superb thermal and infrared optics and unmanned aerial vehicles, the NATO-led counterinsurgency is perhaps better prepared than any force in history for the surveillance effort required along the Durand Line.

A barrier system along portions of the Durand Line will not be erected overnight, but mapping and surveillance efforts can happen now. In fact, whether or not a barrier system is attempted, NATO and Afghan forces should still flood the most vulnerable areas of the border with fortifications and disruptive patrolling by mobile strike forces. Maintaining a military presence along the border is the only hope in the short-term of impeding insurgent freedom of movement.

277 Celeski, 55.
Population Control

Insurgents rely heavily on the local population for concealment, sustenance and recruiting. Thus, in order for a containment strategy to be successful, insurgents must be separated from their support base along the border as much as possible. As this paper has already established, the creation of a buffer zone on either side of the Durand Line through population resettlement is not an option. Indeed, attempts by the British and Soviets to relocate tribesmen away from the border were always met with cold blooded militancy and tactical gains were only short-lived.

How then can insurgents be separated from their physical support base, while allowing legal cross-border traffic to continue unimpeded? First, Afghanistan and Pakistan must collaborate to increase significantly the number of established border crossing sites. With only two established crossing sites – in Torkham and Chaman/Spin Boldak – to handle the vast majority of legal cross-border traffic, it is not surprising that the vast majority of tribesmen and entrepreneurs choose to ignore the border altogether. Instead, they naturally cross the expansive frontier at sites most convenient to them. Border crossing sites must be jointly manned by Pakistani and Afghan customs officials and security forces.

In order to facilitate better control of the populace, all adult inhabitants of the tribal region should be issued a national biometric identification card that includes a photo and thumbprint of the affected individual.278 Identification cards should be electronically validated every time an individual crosses the border. Similarly, all vehicles should first be registered with border authorities before cross-border traffic is authorized. Additional control measures should

278 United States Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 180.
include curfews that prohibit locals from moving in the border area after nightfall, and snap checkpoints that facilitate the inspection of suspicious persons or vehicles.\textsuperscript{279}

The governments on both sides of the border must explain to the local populace the importance of the control measures in ensuring their protection against insurgent intimidation and coercion. An enforceable system of punishments including fines and detainment should be established for offenses related to illegal cross-border movement or failing to provide vehicle or personal identification when required.\textsuperscript{280} Similarly, communities should be rewarded with increased development assistance for complying with established control measures.

### Shaping the Battle Space: Targeted Killing

While the legal and ethical challenges of targeted killing cannot be ignored, neither can Islamabad’s refusal or incapacity to target key extremist leaders who continue to plan with impunity regional and global terrorist strikes from Pakistani soil. Thus, despite its potential pitfalls, a policy of targeted killing must augment containment efforts and be maintained as a tool in the NATO-led coalition’s arsenal for the foreseeable future. In order to reduce the possibility of collateral damage while ensuring the lethality of strikes on intended targets, NATO must invest heavily in the deployment to the border region of surveillance and intelligence mechanisms that will make rapid precision-strike possible.\textsuperscript{281} Further, as suggested by Georgetown University Professor Daniel Byman, “Washington needs to develop clear, transparent, and legitimate procedures for deciding when targeted killings are appropriate.”\textsuperscript{282}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{279} Department of National Defence, \textit{Counter-Insurgency Operations}, 3-11.

\textsuperscript{280} United States Department of the Army, \textit{Counterinsurgency Field Manual}, 181.


\textsuperscript{282} Byman, “Do Targeted Killings Work?”
\end{flushright}
Ambiguous and secretive strike procedures risk alienating the indigenous population further and they could prevent coalition partners from sharing actionable intelligence.

Targeted killing should not be limited to insurgent commanders. Given the lethality and indiscriminate use of improvised explosive devices on both sides of the border, NATO forces should continue to track and kill militant explosives experts whenever possible.\textsuperscript{283} Further, NATO should also include radical mullahs, drug traffickers and insurgent financiers on the hit list. While these non-state actors might not be directly involved in armed conflict with coalition soldiers, their efforts are vital to insurgent operations and thus present themselves as critical vulnerabilities that should be targeted.

Getting Serious about the Border: Restructuring for Containment

The implementation of a containment strategy does not mean the international community can turn its back on Pakistan while it transforms its military and political institutions. Islamabad has authorized remote parts of Baluchistan province to be used as a staging base for American unmanned aerial vehicles and the overwhelming majority of supplies required for NATO-led counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan flow through Pakistan.\textsuperscript{284} Thus, while NATO troops attempt to limit insurgent freedom of movement across the porous border, every effort must be made to increase collaboration between Pakistan and Afghanistan on issues such as intelligence sharing, cross-border communications and the synchronization of counterinsurgency operations in the region.

\textsuperscript{283} While successors will always be waiting in the wings to take over from eliminated insurgent commanders, explosives experts, with their high level of training and years of experience, are considerably more difficult to replace.

\textsuperscript{284} For more on Pakistani support to NATO operations, see Milton Bearden, “Obama’s War,” \textit{Foreign Affairs} (9 April 2009); Internet; http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64925/milton-bearden/obamas-war; accessed 11 April 2009; and Jeremy Page, “Google Earth Reveals Secret History of US Base in Pakistan,” \textit{The Times} (19 February 2009); Internet; http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article5762371.ece; accessed 12 April 2009.
NATO ISAF command and control structures should be altered to facilitate the increased cross-border collaboration that will be required to interdict insurgent lines of communication and safe havens. Currently, NATO ISAF is divided into five separate regional commands, of which Regional Command – East and Regional Command – South are each tasked to conduct operations along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. These regional commands are further subdivided into provincial task forces, whose commanders have been delegated responsibility to establish liaison with local Afghan National Army commanders and flanking Pakistani security forces on the other side of the border. The problem with this approach is two-fold: first, assigned extraordinarily large areas of operation inside Afghanistan with only a fraction of the troops required to get the job done, many of the NATO ISAF task force commanders simply do not have the time or incentive to meet routinely with their counter-parts along the border. Secondly, already-established communication and liaison mechanisms have had mixed success. Several Tripartite Commission Meetings have been cancelled, while Border Flag Meetings – designed to coordinate tactical level engagement between NATO ISAF, Pakistani and Afghan security forces – have been conducted sporadically in many areas.\(^{285}\)

Command and span of control problems are only likely to get worse as thousands of troops are positioned along the border to generate highly mobile pursuit and disruption forces and man static fortifications and defensive positions. Accordingly, NATO ISAF should either generate a distinct Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Command or regional commands must establish

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\(^{285}\) Recently returned from Afghanistan, Commander of the 4th Brigade Combat Team 101st Airborne Division, Colonel John P. Johnson, reported to a press conference in March 2009 that he had conducted over 20 Border Flag Meetings in the course of his twelve-month tour. His task force, as part of Regional Command – East, was responsible for the Afghan provinces of Ghazni, Wardak, Lowgar, Paktia, Paktika, and Khost. During the same timeframe, Colonel Johnson’s counterparts operating in the adjacent Regional Command – South had significantly fewer opportunities to connect with Pakistani security forces along the border. See United States Department of Defense, “DoD News Briefing with Colonel Johnson at the Pentagon Briefing room via Teleconference from Afghanistan,” (6 March 2009); Internet; [http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4367; accessed 12 April 2009.](http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4367)
at a minimum robust Border Coordination Cells to control all NATO ISAF military operations along the frontier. This new headquarters would standardize and increase cross-border collaboration and it would be actively engaged in the delivery of the multi-year Security Development Plan that includes the development of Border Coordination Centers along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.286

Sadly, it is not unreasonable to speculate whether a Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Command would have the resources needed to conduct its critical mission. While President Obama recently pledged to deploy 17,000 additional troops to the region, with the promise of many more to follow in the coming two years, other countries have started to waver on their commitment to the region. Given these resource constraints, how can insurgent safe havens and lines of communication be marginalized? Simply put, without a commitment of significantly more troops along the border, the mission in Afghanistan will fail. Thus, unless the international community can be persuaded to ante-up additional soldiers for combat operations in Afghanistan, thousands of the fresh American troops about to be deployed to the region should be earmarked specifically to take the fight to the Taliban along the Durand Line. Concurrently, Kabul must be urged to enhance Afghan National Army and Afghan Border Police numbers, while NATO ISAF operational mentoring and liaison teams continue to build the capacity of these forces to carry out effective border manning. Pakistan should be encouraged to do the same on the other side of the border.

286 Manned by liaison officers from NATO ISAF, the Pakistan Army and Afghan National Security Force, these Border Coordination Centers are to be augmented with state-of-the-art communications and surveillance technology in order to facilitate a common operating picture along the border and facilitate timely interdiction operations against insurgent groups and narcotics smugglers. At the time this paper was written, only one Border Coordination Centre of six had been established. See Candace Rondeaux, “US-Funded Intelligence Center Struggled in Khyber Region,” The Washington Post (12 January 2009); Internet: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/11/AR2009011102236.html?wprss=rss_world; accessed 11 April 2009.
Conclusion

Insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan’s tribal areas threaten regional and global stability. Able to recruit, train and plan for militant operations from these safe havens, insurgents have enjoyed increasing success since the Taliban was forced to relocate in 2002. In fact, 2008 was a windfall year for the insurgency. Increasing their attacks by over 700 percent since 2005, insurgents have killed scores of NATO troops and thousands of civilians on both sides of the border. More worryingly, it is now also clear that al Qaeda enjoys refuge in the tribal areas. Linked to Sunni militant jihadi groups operating throughout Pakistan, this transnational terrorist organization scored tremendous victories by assassinating Benazir Bhutto in the country’s military capital, Rawalpindi, and by crossing the border into India to launch a spectacular attack on the citizens of Mumbai. While these and other strikes have been confined to regional targets, no one should doubt that al Qaeda is also planning another 9-11 style attack from its Pakistani retreat.

Clearly, the only way out of this predicament is to address the root causes of the insurgency. To this end, Islamabad must take the lead on implementing a comprehensive approach that will better prepare Pakistani security forces to conduct counterinsurgency operations along the border, implement political reforms that make the government more responsive to the needs of the tribal areas, and mend the bleak economic situation that has left Pashtun men no other choice but to turn to the insurgency. Regional stakeholders must backstop the Zardari government as it moves ahead with this strategy, but they must not forget the acute lessons taught to the British, Pakistanis and Soviets when advancing proposals to remodel the tribal areas. Unfortunately, the Obama administration’s engagement strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan has done exactly that by recommending reconciliation with ‘moderate’ extremists,
extending central government authority over the tribal areas, and radically altering local governance structures. By further dismantling traditional tribal structures, such strategies will most certainly be met with increased resistance by a local populace that covets its independence and is already skeptical of American motives in the region.

Acknowledging that large swathes of the tribal areas have already been lost to unbendable extremist groups, an alternate strategy proposed by this paper first requires a massive military surge to dislodge extremists from the region. Once extremist leaders are either killed or forced into submission by Pakistani security forces, traditional governance structures that respect the tenets of Pashtunwali can be reintroduced gradually. Concurrently, tribal leaders can be empowered to reject extremist militant groups by once again working with political agents – backed by generous and sustained humanitarian assistance programs (the carrot) and Pakistani security forces (the stick) – to address the long-term needs of the clan.

The transformation of Pakistani military, political and economic institutions will be a generational challenge. In the meantime, unless insurgent safe havens are marginalized, many more civilians and soldiers will be killed on both sides of the border and the patience of already-skittish nations contributing to the NATO effort will be strained further. In the absence of obvious progress inside Pakistan, increasingly impatient stakeholders might be inclined to call for coercive sanctions to pressure Islamabad to act or to address specific security threats unilaterally through overwhelming military force. In reality, such approaches would only fuel anti-American sentiment in the region and they most certainly would not address the root causes of the insurgency. Thus, the only viable option available to NATO and Afghan security forces currently is to implement a containment strategy along the Durand Line. Such an approach is the only one that has any hope of effectively balancing the conflicting requirements of interdicting
militant lines of communication now and giving Islamabad the time it needs to implement long-
term internal reforms.

These are tremendously ambitious objectives that will require continued sacrifice and patience on the part of the international community. But if the coalition is truly serious about delivering stability to the region and eliminating the conditions that enabled the horrific attacks of 9/11, then the external support and sanctuary provided to the Taliban and transnational terrorists in Pakistan must be addressed. This is not a problem that can be ignored any longer or simply wished away.
# ANNEX A

## THREAT GROUPS IN THE PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN BORDER REGION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat Group</th>
<th>Area of Operations</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al Qaeda</td>
<td>Sanctuary: FATA, Pakistan Area of Operations: Global</td>
<td>It is believed the leadership of this group, Osama bin Laden and his chief lieutenant, Ayman al-Zawahiri are inhabiting the border region. Technically proficient and well resourced, this group continues to pose the greatest threat to the continental United States and her allies. Al Qaeda’s primary objective is to eliminate American influence from the Middle East and Islamic countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Taliban</td>
<td>Sanctuary: Quetta, Baluchistan Province, Pakistan; and Kandahar Province, Afghanistan Area of Operations: Afghanistan</td>
<td>Led by Mullah Omar, who is believed to issue direction from the ‘Quetta Shura,’ this group consists primarily of Pashtun tribesmen. It seeks to replace the Afghan government and to expel international forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (Pakistan Taliban)</td>
<td>Sanctuary: South Waziristan, FATA, Pakistan Area of Operations: Primarily FATA and NWFP, but increasingly moving into all Pakistani provinces</td>
<td>Led by Baitullah Mehsud, Pakistan Taliban is waging a defensive jihad against the Pakistani military along the tribal frontier. Increasingly, however, this group is also seeking to destabilize the Pakistani government by launching attacks throughout the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haqqani Network</td>
<td>Sanctuary: North Waziristan, FATA, Pakistan Area of Operations: Pakistan-Afghanistan border, and throughout Afghanistan</td>
<td>Led by Jalaluddin Haqqani, a former Taliban Minister, the Haqqani Network has previously collaborated with the ISI to coordinate militant activity inside Afghanistan. Haqqani maintains close links to a vast array of foreign militants inhabiting the FATA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG)</td>
<td>Sanctuary: NWFP, Pakistan Area of Operations: Kabul, Afghanistan</td>
<td>Led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a former Mujahideen commander who fought the Soviets throughout the 1980s, HIG has also been known to collaborate with the ISI. Prone to changing loyalties, Hekmatyar’s current focus is on destabilizing the legitimacy of President Hamid Karzai and the international forces supporting him.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tehrik Nafaz-e-Shariat Muhammad (TNSM)</td>
<td>Sanctuary: Swat District, NWFP,</td>
<td>Although founded by Sufi Mohammed, an Islamic extremist who supported the Taliban following the American invasion of</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Pakistan

**Area of Operations:** Swat District, NWFP, Pakistan

Afghanistan, the TNSM is now controlled by his son-in-law Maulana Fazlullah. Fazlullah recently seized control of the Swat District of NWFP, where is has brokered a peace accord with the provincial government. In exchange for the release of imprisoned militants and the establishment of Islamic law, Fazlullah has committed to peace in the region.

### Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)

**Sanctuary:** Punjab Province, Pakistan

**Area of Operations:** These groups conduct attacks throughout Pakistan and India

SSP and LJ are Punjab-based radical Deobandi groups that provide weapons, recruits and funding to the nexus of Pakistan Taliban groups. Today, these groups are vital to the alignment of al Qaeda, the Pakistan Taliban and affiliated sectarian groups because of their vast network of madrassas throughout Pakistan that provide a steady flow of recruits and operating bases. Their attacks, which have resulted in the deaths of hundreds of people, have demonstrated an extremely high level of sophistication.

### Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ)

**Sanctuary:** Punjab Province, Pakistan

**Area of Operations:** These groups conduct attacks throughout Pakistan and India

### Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM)

**Sanctuary:** Kashmir

**Area of Operations:** Jammu and Kashmir; Punjab Province, Pakistan; and India

JEM and LeT are recent signatories to al Qaeda’s global jihad against the West. Although initially focused on regional militancy, the reach of both groups now extends well beyond the Kashmir jihad. Backed by Pakistani security forces, for example, the LeT has been implicated in the 2008 Mumbai terrorist strike.

### Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT) renamed Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JD)

**Sanctuary:** Kashmir

**Area of Operations:** Jammu and Kashmir; Punjab Province, Pakistan; and India

### Foreign Fighters

**Sanctuary:** FATA, Pakistan

**Area of Operations:** Pakistan-Afghanistan border region; and Kandahar and Helmand provinces of Afghanistan

A vast array of foreign fighters has converged upon the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region to join in the fight against the United States and NATO-led coalition. These groups include Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Islamic Jihad Union (IJJ), the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), and Chechen rebels.

### Narcotics-based Criminal Groups

**Sanctuary:** Pakistan-Afghanistan Border region

**Area of Operations:** Pakistan-Afghanistan Border region

Various narcotics groups operating along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border serve as a steady source of funding for the insurgency. They threaten the legitimacy of the Afghan government and its indigenous security forces.
ANNEX B
PAKISTAN'S TRIBAL BELT

Source: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Map_showing_NWFP_and_FATA.png
ANNEX D
PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN DISPUTED TERRITORY

Source:
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/afghan_paki_border_rel88.jpg
Colonel Joseph Celeski effectively portrays in this diagram the key components of an active border defence to include a physical barrier, surveillance screen, and inter-locking defensive positions or forts connected by high-speed mobility routes. See Celeski, “Attacking Insurgent Space,” 54.
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