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CANADA’S NATIONAL SECURITY FRAMEWORK:
Fragile Fortress on a Formidable Foundation?

Lieutenant-Colonel Peter Allan

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ABSTRACT

It is now nearly five years since Canada tabled its first-ever national security policy, *Securing an Open Society*, which established an ambitious all hazards approach to national security that required extensive integration among organizations involved in national security efforts. This paper will seek to determine how well Canada has done in establishing an integrated national security framework, focusing on the integration of national security activities within the federal government sector.

Beginning with an examination of the elements of the national security framework, the paper will argue that a broadly-based and well-aligned framework has been created that includes mutually reinforcing policy statements, up-to-date and relevant legislation, and a substantial number of departments and agencies engaged in both operational security and oversight activities. The paper will then apply ‘whole of government’ theory and an analysis of the operations of constituent departments to assess the level of integration achieved.

The paper will show that Canada has established a comprehensive national security framework that is tenuously integrated across federal departments and agencies.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

As the global economy has precipitously weakened, sending many large economies, including Canada’s, into deep recession, the overt focus of the Canadian government has fixed itself firmly on economic matters. Stimulus spending, management of expanding unemployment, and soothing the growing anxiety of Canadians have become top priorities for a government responding to the concerns of its electorate. In this context, the word security seems most often in public dialogue to be modified by ‘economic’ rather than ‘national’.

Yet, looking back at the 2008 Speech from the Throne that opened the current (40th) Parliament, it is clear that national security was firmly on the government agenda. In concert with other law and order initiatives, the government expressed an intention to refine Canada’s national security framework:

National security is the most fundamental duty of any national government to its citizens. Our Government will table a national security statement to explain how we intend to balance the new threats and challenges to national security that we face with the need for oversight, accountability and the protection of civil liberties.1

It is now nearly five years since Canada tabled its first-ever national security policy, Securing an Open Society. Influenced strongly by the Canadian experience of events including the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the March 2003 Sudden Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic and the electrical power outage that spread across

much of southern Ontario and the north-eastern United States on August 14, 2003, the policy adopted a novel all hazards approach to national security. This approach was consistent with the direction that had been established through the departmental reorganization, which had been completed months earlier. That reorganization concentrated much of the responsibility for public safety and security matters in the newly formed Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (PSEPC), which has since been given the revised moniker, Public Safety Canada (PS).

Since the new policy was adopted, there has been a stream of analysis of the success of the implementation of the policy. The Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence has reported on many aspects of the policy ranging from emergency preparedness, through point of entry security to military preparedness. Other agencies including the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute and the Conference Board of Canada have examined aspects of the policy. For the most part, these studies have considered individual components of the policy, for example, port security or emergency preparedness. While some papers have sought to evaluate interoperability, these have tended


3 The department was rebranded as Public Safety Canada (PS) in 2007. For clarity this paper will use the new title throughout regardless of the timeframe under consideration. Any references to the department in quoted material will not be revised to reflect this usage but will reflect the original writer’s usage.

to focus at the incident response level, addressing technical and training issues for first responders and their managers.\(^5\) The overall success of the integrated approach would seem to be an aspect in need of further consideration.

To that end, this paper will seek to answer the question: to what extent has Canada succeeded in establishing an integrated national security framework? In pursing the examination, the paper will focus exclusively on the integration of national security activities within the federal government sector. While the importance of provincial, territorial, community and private sector actors in achieving good national security outcomes cannot be overstated, the influence of the federal government in the broader spectrum of national security activities is significant. Weak or ineffective integration and coordination at the federal level would have the potential to seriously impair the ability of other levels of government, private sector partners and first responders to act effectively.

The paper will show that Canada has established a comprehensive national security framework that is tenuously integrated across federal departments and agencies. The analysis is presented in five chapters. The remainder of the first chapter will focus on the meaning of national security in Canada. Building on this theme, chapter two will describe the framework that has been established in Canada to deliver national security. The framework will be shown to include a range of policies, legislation, the departments and agencies responsible for the execution of the activities mandated in the policies, and mechanisms for oversight and review of national security activities. In chapter three, the

\(^5\) See for example, Andrew Archibald and Trefor Munn-Venn, *Building Resilience: Leadership and Accountability* (Ottawa: Conference Board of Canada, 2008).
meaning and problems of integration within the Canadian federal government will be examined, including the concepts of the whole of government approach and horizontal management in the public sector. Insights from this review will then be applied to the national security framework in chapters four and five to determine the level of success achieved in integration. The strength of integration will be assessed both from a structural perspective, determining what measures have been implemented to support the whole of government approach, and from a functional perspective, examining how the integrated approach is reflected in departmental activities.

Interestingly, the statement of the government’s intention to refine the national security framework noted above references many of the elements under consideration. ‘Oversight, accountability and protection of civil liberties’ must be components of the framework in a free and democratic society. ‘Threats and challenges to national security’ are the genesis of the need to undertake activities to maintain security and must shape those activities. And the concept of national security as a fundamental duty of government goes to the core of the need to get it right. It is with a discussion of the notion of this fundamental duty that the analysis begins.

NATIONAL SECURITY IN CANADA

The concept of national security is fluid, evolving with the context in which a nation exists, the demands of the people, and the ideologies of governments. There are, however, enduring themes that broadly inform conceptions of security in western liberal societies such as Canada.
In the 17th century, Thomas Hobbes characterized the existence of a state as resulting from an act of the free will of man to ensure his own security: “. . . men agree amongst themselves, to submit to some man, or assembly of men, voluntarily, on confidence to be protected by him against all others.”6 This act of consent is done in order for man to escape the state of nature wherein all men are completely equal and free to pursue their own needs without regard for any other man. In this state, equality leads to diffidence, and diffidence to perpetual war resulting in “continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”7 In order to escape this condition, men must give up some of their freedoms to institutions empowered to enforce rules of conduct and thus prevent war.8

That man gives up some of his freedom to the state in exchange for security implies that the state carries an obligation to ensure the security of its citizens. This imperative for the state to protect its citizens forms the nucleus of the concept of national security. Hobbes also suggests that the continued existence of the state can be jeopardized, not only by the actions of other warring states, but as a result of failure to protect its citizens: “The obligation of subjects to the sovereign, is understood to last as long, and no longer, than the power


7 *Ibid.*, 100

lasteth, by which he is able to protect them.”9 In this sense, the security of the citizens is the security of the state and thus in providing security to its citizens, the state also provides for its own survival.

Whether or not Hobbes’s political philosophy is accepted as a valid basis of the Canadian state, it is a useful conception of the imperative for national security that is accepted in modern states. In the 21st century, as much as in the 17th, states create and enforce rules to allow their people to live without constant fear of each other and they engage in activities to minimize threats to their citizens from outside the state. Variability in approaches to national security arises from how states define threats and how they choose to mitigate those threats.

Like any other state, Canada’s approach to national security has varied over time, responding to changes in the perceived threats. While it is not the intent of this paper to present an exhaustive historical review of Canadian approaches to and policies regarding national security, it is instructive to sample the field to show the evolution that underpins Canada’s current approach to national security.

In the aftermath of World War II, Canadian security attitudes were fed by two insecurity fears: “the economic insecurity of those who remembered only too well the Great Depression . . . and the international insecurity that led to the frantic search for armed

9 Hobbes, Leviathan: Or the Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil,
strength and the uneasy stalemate of the Cold War.”

The emergence of the Cold War was a significant turning point in Canada’s conception of national security, in part due to the effects on the national psyche of the 1946 Gouzenko affair. When the Soviet cipher clerk Igor Gouzenko defected in Ottawa, he revealed that Canadian civil servants were supplying secret information to the Soviets. The proven existence of subversive activities in Canada required that measures be taken to ensure domestic security.

Canada’s response to these insecurity fears was to pursue a fairly broad spectrum of security initiatives. Though there was not an articulated national security policy, the flavour of Canada’s national security policy is evident in the security-related initiatives it pursued. The increasing concern for internal security was addressed through the adoption of “controls to screen out ‘security risks’ among civil servants and immigrants; the elaboration of internal surveillance techniques to keep watch over dissident political activities; [and] the dissemination of propaganda warning citizens of the dangers of Communism and celebrating the benefits of the Free World.”

In view of lingering economic insecurity fears, there was a move towards a form of economic security through the adoption of Keynesian economic policies and the related government attempt to maintain full employment. There was also a

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11 *Ibid.*, 27

12 The security initiatives identified here are as discussed in *Ibid.*, 22

13 *Ibid.*, 22
popular demand for social security which moved the federal political agenda to the left. Military security was pursued through rearmament and new technology. The emergence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and evolving participation in the United Nations were aimed at achieving collective security.

In 1977, in response to allegations of unlawful activity, the government of Canada launched an inquiry, the McDonald Commission, into certain national security activities undertaken by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). To pursue its mandate, the commission needed to define the phrase ‘the security of Canada’, which it did in terms of two basic needs:

[F]irst, the need to protect Canadians and their governments against attempts by foreign powers to use coercive or clandestine means to advance their own interests in Canada, and second, the need to protect the essential elements of Canadian democracy against attempts to destroy or subvert them.  

This definition was based on three categories of perceived threat: “activities of foreign intelligence agencies, political terrorism, and subversion of democratic institutions.” Given that the McDonald Commission was mandated to investigate activities of the RCMP, it is not surprising that their definition of security of Canada focused narrowly on activities that would be the subject of RCMP investigation, rather than including broader economic and social themes. Nonetheless, in referring to the ‘essential elements of Canadian democracy’ there is at least an oblique reference to social aspects of security. The notion of


15 Ibid.
social security, by the late 1970’s, was firmly entrenched as an element of Canadian democracy.

The report of the McDonald commission had a significant impact on the way that the Canadian government delivered national security. It brought a renewed emphasis on the need for control of security activities to ensure that such activities would be conducted in accordance with the law. In response to the report, the government created a new civilian security service, the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS), and provided for significant oversight of that service; oversight that had been found to be lacking under the old arrangement wherein the RCMP were responsible for national security and intelligence activities. The changes were intended to ensure that, in addition to being effective, “our security system also meet the requirements of democracy”, which the McDonald Commission had defined as including responsible government, the rule of law, freedom of legitimate political dissent, individual privacy, and certain norms of procedural justice.16

With the end of the Cold War, Canada found itself again in a position to re-evaluate the meaning of national security. The 1995 foreign policy white paper, Canada in the World, addressed the issue of security, acknowledging plainly that “Assuring Canada's security remains a fundamental responsibility of government”.17 Faced with a world in which the relative stability of the Cold War era had been replaced with a new volatility fuelled in ethnic nationalism, threats underpinning the new definition of security included “terrorism, crime, 

16 Ibid.

smuggling, drugs, pollution, disease, overpopulation, and refugees.”\textsuperscript{18} The paper identified the protection of Canadian security as one of its three key objectives citing “[t]he promotion of global peace as the key to protecting our security.”\textsuperscript{19}

In \textit{Canada in the World}, there is clear evidence that the changing perception of threats guided the approach to security. To achieve security objectives against the increasingly broad array of threats, the white paper identified the need “to address security issues in an integrated fashion”.\textsuperscript{20} In addition, it would seem that the context of the period influenced the conception of national interests. As Andrew Cohen points out in a review of \textit{Canada in the World}, the national interest is consistently defined within the policy “at least in part, in economic terms” including economic growth and job creation.\textsuperscript{21} This is not a new theme: it reflects the economic security concerns identified in the early Cold War period – but it would seem to represent an elevation of economics from security concern to vital national interest.

In the three periods considered, the shock of the opening of the Cold War, the relative stability of the late 1970’s period of détente, and the emerging instability of the post-Cold War era, there have been both shifts and consistencies in Canadian conceptions of national

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\textsuperscript{18} Andrew Cohen, "Canada in the World: The Return of the National Interest," \textit{Behind the Headlines} 52, no. 4 (Summer, 1995), 7.
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\textsuperscript{19} Canada. Department of Foreign Affairs, \textit{Canada in the World}, Chap 2
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\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Ibid.}, Chap 2
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\textsuperscript{21} Cohen, \textit{Canada in the World: The Return of the National Interest}, 8
\end{flushright}
security. Security activity has shifted in response to perception of threats and events. A strong emphasis on counter-espionage measures came on the heels revelations of espionage in Ottawa while at the same time, new approaches were adopted to address economic and social security concerns. At the dawn of the 1980’s, significant reform to national security-related surveillance and investigation resulted from public concerns about violation of civil liberties and democratic rights. As Cold War threats evaporated, international stabilization activities to combat the social threats arising from weak states became the focus of national security. Behind all of these conceptions of national security, lurks the Hobbsian imperative for the state to respond to the security needs of its citizens.

Canada’s current definition of national security remains consistent with the themes discussed above. “National security deals with threats that have the potential to undermine the security of the state or society”.22 While the statement is short, it can be read very broadly to include all of the security concerns expressed in previous conceptions of Canadian national security.

Armed with an understanding of how Canada conceives of national security, the paper will now turn to an analysis of the framework Canada has adopted to protect its national security. The most basic element of frameworks that underpin government activity in Canada is policy. Expressly written in issue specific papers or gleaned from multiple portfolios, policy provides a statement of government intentions and priorities and serves as a basis for planning. Legislation adds to the framework a statutory basis for action and, in many cases, places constraints on government action that policy cannot transcend. Drawing from both legislation and policy, federal departments and agencies implement government plans. All of these elements contribute to the Canadian national security framework.

NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

Canada’s current National Security Policy is articulated in the 2004 policy document entitled *Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy* (NSP). In keeping with Hobbsian tradition, the executive summary of this document opens with the assertion that “There can be no greater role, no more important obligation for a government, than the protection and safety of its citizens”. In amplifying what it means by security of Canadians, the document invokes the guarantee of rights to life, liberty, and security of the person enshrined in the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, acknowledging a link between

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23 *Ibid.*, vii
security and Canada’s fundamental societal values.\textsuperscript{24} Inherently this policy embraces the idea that national security is about far more than just the physical safety of a group of people, it is about protecting the way of life of those people.

The concept of protecting the physical security and values of Canadians forms the basis of the first of three enduring national security interests articulated in the NSP. Entitled “Protecting Canada and the safety and security of Canadians at home and abroad”, this interest also encompasses the protection of key national institutions and ultimately defence of Canadian sovereignty.\textsuperscript{25} This protection, it is emphasized, must also be provided to citizens and Canadian institutions abroad.

The second national security interest is defined as “Ensuring that Canada is not a base for threats to our allies”.\textsuperscript{26} This principle reflects the reciprocal nature of relations with our allies: Canada expects to receive similar protections from allies. It is primarily aimed at maintaining good relations with the United States (U.S.) and acknowledges that any threat to the U.S. arising from Canada could damage the relationship between the two countries and imperil the advantages that derive from that good relationship. Given that any significant disruption in trade or other aspects of the Canada – U.S. relationship could seriously undermine the economic security of Canadians, this interest is a natural outflow from the


\textsuperscript{25} Canada. Privy Council Office, Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy, 5

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 5
first. In ensuring that our allies are not threatened by activities projected from Canada, the government is protecting the security of Canadians.

Expanding beyond the North American sphere, the third interest is articulated as “Contributing to international security”. This principle recognizes that one of the consequences of the increased mobility of people and capital that characterizes the current world order is that the number of distant threats that can easily impact Canada is growing. Through multi-lateral relationships, participation in international organizations and deployment of military forces, Canada has a long tradition of global activism. Characterizing the continuation of that tradition as a security interest provides a focus for the nation’s efforts in international affairs.

If national security is about the protection of the citizens, values and institutions of the nation, then a natural question is: protection from what? While the NSP is clear in acknowledging that the threats to national security do change over time, it identifies eight types of threats that were deemed to be the most pressing in 2004 when the policy was written. Not surprisingly, these threats reflect very much the experience of Canada and the Western World in the years leading up to the release of the policy.

First among the threats identified is terrorism. Drawing lessons from the attacks against the US on September 11, 2001 (hereafter referred to as 9-11), the 2002 Bali bombing and the 2004 Madrid commuter train bombings, the policy concludes that Canadian society is vulnerable to similar attacks and efforts must be made to counter such threats.

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27 Ibid., 5
Three of the remaining threats are explicitly linked to terrorism. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the preponderance of failed and failing states are both identified as enablers, magnifiers or contributors to the threat of terrorism. The vulnerability of critical infrastructure to attack is also identified, signalling the potential debilitating effects should such infrastructure become the target of terrorist attack. The electrical system failure of August 2003 that brought the economic activity of much of Southern Ontario and eight American states to a standstill is cited to illustrate the magnitude of the effect that an attack against integrated and vulnerable infrastructure could have.

Continuing to follow the economic thread, foreign espionage, particularly industrial espionage, is identified as an ongoing activity that needs to be countered. Should other countries successfully acquire protected Canadian industrial and technical secrets, Canada’s economic competitiveness could be injured with an impact on overall prosperity.

The remaining human activity seen to pose a threat to Canada’s security is organized crime. This threat is linked to terrorism, in this case as a funding mechanism, but is also considered a significant threat in its own right. The international nature of organized crime, the negative societal effects of narcotics trafficking, migrant smuggling, and the illegal trade in weapons associated with organized crime are all corrosive to Canadian society and values.

The remaining specified threats originate, not directly from human activity, but from the environment. Natural disasters and pandemics are identified as events that pose serious risk to life and prosperity. Events such as the March 2003 SARS epidemic and the 1998 ice storm in Eastern Ontario and Western Quebec demonstrated clearly the human and economic toll that nature can impose as well as the expectation of Canadians for responsive government action.
To respond to the array of security threats, the NSP identifies six key security activities to be undertaken by the various national security actors: intelligence, emergency planning and management, public health emergencies, transportation security, border security, and international security.\footnote{Ibid., 13} In grouping these activities together as national security activities, the NSP recognizes the inter-related nature of both the security threats it has identified and the activities designed to counter those threats.

Intelligence is considered to be “the foundation of our ability to take effective measures to provide for the security of Canada and Canadians.”\footnote{Ibid., 15} This activity aims to assemble the best possible assessed information about all possible threats, including criminal and terrorist activity, the spread of infectious disease, weapons proliferation, and potential vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure.

The inclusion of emergency planning and management and public health emergencies as national security activities reflects an approach not previously taken in Canada. This approach recognizes that public emergencies can arise as a consequence of any of the identified national security threats and that the same emergency management system will need to respond whether a crisis arises due to a natural disaster or a terrorist act. Likewise, management of a public health emergency will be rooted in the same system whether caused by a natural outbreak of disease or a biological weapon. Inclusion of these activities in the

\footnote{Ibid., 13}

\footnote{Ibid., 15}
national security framework also recognizes the need for strategic co-ordination in response to increasingly complex and dynamic threats.\textsuperscript{30}

Transportation security aims to mitigate vulnerabilities in the transportation network, including roads, railways, pipelines, shipping and airlines. Given the extensive interconnection between the Canadian, continental and international transportation networks, transportation security is both a national and an international concern that requires coordination with international partners to determine and ensure compliance with regulatory standards.\textsuperscript{31}

Ensuring border security seeks to balance “the need to facilitate trade and travel, while preventing high-risk travelers and cargo from entering Canada through air, land, and marine ports.”\textsuperscript{32} Border security also speaks directly to the national interest of ensuring that Canada is not a base for threats to allies, notably the U.S. Thus this issue is another which demands a significant level of coordination with American agencies.

The last national security activity identified in the NSP, international security, focuses on efforts to counter international terrorism, prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and reduce conflicts within and between states.\textsuperscript{33} This is to be achieved through coordinated effort in international development assistance, diplomacy and, where necessary,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{30} \textit{Ibid.}, 24
\item \textsuperscript{31} \textit{Ibid.}, 35
\item \textsuperscript{32} \textit{Ibid.}, 41
\item \textsuperscript{33} \textit{Ibid.}, 47
\end{itemize}
armed assistance. Like transportation and border security, this activity also requires a high level of engagement with bilateral and multilateral international organizations to ensure that international efforts are well coordinated.

The NSP forms the conceptual basis of a coherent national security framework through its logical approach of clearly relating security activities to defined threats to national security, all based on enduring national security interests.

INTERNATIONAL POLICY STATEMENT

While the NSP remains the definitive statement of Canada’s national security policy, subsequent policy statements also touch on the approach to national security. The 2005 International Policy Statement (IPS): *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World* contributes to the national security framework by articulating a foreign policy that seeks to enhance the security of Canada. The IPS defines Canada’s fundamental national interests as “ensuring continued prosperity and security for Canadians”.  

34 The first major theme in the IPS, “Revitalizing our North American Partnership”, identifies major initiatives aimed at enhancing continental, and hence Canadian, security including: strengthening counter terrorism and border management cooperation; building a trilateral emergency response capability; strengthening maritime and land defence cooperation with the United States; and

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improving Canada’s maritime, land, air and space surveillance capabilities.\textsuperscript{35} Also included in the North America section is a commitment to implement the NSP.\textsuperscript{36}

In its second major section, “Making a Difference Globally”, the IPS identifies the nature of the international security threat: “Globalization facilitated both the spread of deadly disease and access to deadly weapons. It also means that the collapse of state capacity in one region can make all of us more vulnerable to transnational terrorist and criminal groups.”\textsuperscript{37} The IPS seeks to address this challenge through countering terrorism, stabilizing failing states and, controlling proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In order to achieve those objectives, the policy calls for a comprehensive or “3D”, approach in Canada’s international engagements, “undertaking Defence efforts to strengthen security and stability, pursuing Diplomacy to enhance prospects for nation-building and reconstruction, and making certain that Development contributions are brought to bear in a coordinated and effective way.”\textsuperscript{38}

**CANADA FIRST DEFENCE STRATEGY**

The third major policy element of the national security framework is the 2008 *Canada First Defence Strategy* (CFDS). This policy very clearly expresses the three roles of

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., 6

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., 8

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 11

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., NP. Forward from PM
the Canadian Forces (CF): defending Canada, defending North America, and contributing to international peace and security. Each of these roles contributes to national security and is consistent with the NSP.

In further defining “defending Canada” the CFDS summarizes that “Delivering excellence at home requires the Forces to be aware of anything going on in or approaching our territory, deter threats to our security before they reach our shores, and respond to contingencies anywhere in the country” (emphasis in original). These roles support the security activities defined in the NSP: to be aware implies an intelligence activity; to deter threats implies activities related to international, border and transportation security; and response to contingencies includes emergency planning and management, public health emergencies, as well as transportation, border and international security.

The role of providing for defence of North America continues the same themes as the defence of Canada role, emphasizing interoperability with the U.S. This is one of the mechanisms through which the NSP goal of enhancing co-operation with our allies is sustained. Through the expanded North American Aerospace Defence (NORAD) agreement there is increased coordination in monitoring and gathering intelligence regarding maritime activities while aerospace surveillance and defence activities have been sustained. These activities play an important role in contributing to national security intelligence and border security.


40 *Ibid.*, 7
The third role of the CF, contributing to international peace and security, expands on the NSP’s sixth security activity, also international security. Recognizing that “Canada’s prosperity and security rely on stability abroad”, the CFDS seeks to position the CF with the capability to respond to a list of threats very similar to those identified in both the NSP and the IPS including failed and fragile states, proliferation of advanced weapons, and terrorist activities. To be able to address these threats and to position Canada to assume a leadership role in doing so, the CFDS mandates that the CF have a full spectrum capability “from humanitarian assistance to stabilization operations to combat”.42

Together these three major policy documents, NSP, IPS and CFDS, form a coherent policy base for the Canadian national security framework. Each identifies similar threats to Canadian national security and each identifies complimentary and mutually supporting activities necessary to protect against those threats.

**SUPPORTING STRATEGIES**

The major policy documents are supported by a number of more narrowly-focused strategy documents published by PS. One such document, *An Emergency Management Framework for Canada* defines a common set of principles to guide all partner governments and agencies in developing their emergency management strategies. It confirms that the Canadian approach to emergency management “adopts an all-hazards approach that

41 *Ibid.*, 7,8

42 *Ibid.*, 9
addresses both natural and human-induced hazards and disasters.43 It defines components of emergency management as “prevention and mitigation”, “preparedness”, “response”, and “recovery” thus establishing a common frame of reference for planning.44 As a cooperative effort of the Federal, Provincial and Territorial governments, led by PS, the framework “guides and strengthens the way governments work together to protect the safety and security of all Canadians.”45

The Critical Infrastructure Protection Strategy (CIPS) is another document for which PS has responsibility. Currently in draft form, this document seeks to identify the critical infrastructure that needs to be protected, the threats to that infrastructure and the organization(s) responsible for ensuring its protection. This is done with the overall aim to “to strengthen the resiliency of critical infrastructure in Canada.”46 The strategy recognizes that, due to the extensively interconnected nature of much of Canada’s critical infrastructure, the task will require significant cooperation between governments and the private sector


44 Ibid.

45 Ibid.

which owns much of the infrastructure.\footnote{Ibid., 2} The strategy identifies ten critical infrastructure sectors, and proposes the establishment of sector networks, comprised of private sector and government representatives, for each sector. These networks would work to share information, set priorities, and direct work plans for the protection of critical infrastructure, all assisted by the responsible federal departments and agencies. In addition, “Public Safety Canada will establish the National Cross-Sector Forum to promote collaboration across the sector networks, address interdependencies and promote information sharing across sectors.”\footnote{Ibid., 16}

A related strategy document is the National Cyber-Security Strategy. Though the NSP mandated development of a strategy to protect cyber-infrastructure, work to do so is still ongoing. Like the CIPS, this strategy will need to bring together all levels of government and the private sector as many of the critical systems “are owned by corporations that operate vital infrastructure, such as banks, utilities, energy firms, hospitals, airlines and broadcasters.”\footnote{Andrew Duffy, "Ottawa Focused on New Cyber-Security Strategy," \textit{National Post} April 08, 2009, \url{http://www.nationalpost.com/news/canada/story.html?id=1479272} (accessed April 17, 2009).} The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness has also indicated that PS will coordinate extensively with the U.S. in developing the strategy due to the extensive interconnectedness of critical cyber-infrastructure.\footnote{Ibid.}
Detailed strategies such as these, and there are others, serve to add detail to the intentions declared in larger policy documents. They are an important link that can help to define issues, give additional direction and planning guidance to policy and form a basis for cooperative effort among the agencies that must ultimately turn policy into action. Policy and strategy alone, however, are not enough to give departments and agencies the tools they need to deliver national security. A legislative component is required in the national security framework to enable organizations to act and to define the boundaries of their action.

LEGISLATION

With respect to national security, legislation serves three primary functions: it sets out the mandates of departments and agencies, it helps to define national security by identifying specific offenses, and it places limits on what departments and agencies can do to protect national security. In effect, legislation places boundaries around national security activities and enables prosecution of offences while ensuring that security-oriented activities remain consistent with Canadian laws and values.

The definition of mandates and limitations surrounding those mandates is often accomplished in the same legislation. For example, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act defines the duties and functions of the service and places a number of limitations on those functions. In this way, the activities of the agency are focused on their primary functions and it is made more difficult for the agency to be employed in duties beyond its intended purpose. Examples of other legislation that assigns national security-related mandates to organizations include: the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Act, the National Defence Act, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act.
Mandates delivered in these acts will be examined more closely in the following section, which addresses the roles played by various departments and agencies in delivering national security.

Another body of legislation defines national security offences, thus enabling investigation and prosecution of activities that could be injurious to national security. The Criminal Code of Canada, for example defines such crimes as treason\(^{51}\) and terrorism\(^{52}\), both of which could potentially constitute threats to national security. The Security Offences Act, the Anti-Terrorism Act and the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Acts are other examples of acts that have defined offences related to national security.

Because national security involves a large number of departments and agencies, the Privacy Act, which defines how government and other agencies may use any personal information they collect and sets limits on sharing that information, is a key component of the national security framework. Achieving truly integrated efforts in pursuit of national security requires that a certain amount of information, quite often personal information regarding Canadians, be shared between departments. At the same time, individual privacy must be respected. Thus the Privacy Act is the tool that must be employed to reconcile these competing interests in a manner consistent with Canadian laws and values.


\(^{52}\) \textit{Ibid.}, Part II
In a society based on the rule of law, as Canada is, legislation must inevitably play an important role in shaping national security activities. Though much of the relevant legislation is not specifically directed at national security, the laws of Canada affect virtually every aspect of the effort to ensure national security. As the national security framework has evolved, legislation has been amended to keep pace and enable the activities proposed in policy. The Anti-Terrorism act, for example, was for the most part, an act to amend other acts. As a result, the national security framework has a solid legislative foundation that enables the activities of the departments and agencies involved. The next section will explore the roles of those departments and agencies.

DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

The NSP is explicit in calling for an integrated security system that is “fully connected to key partners – provinces, territories, communities, first line responders, the private sector and Canadians.”53 Among the key partners are a number of federal departments and agencies including: PS, CSIS, the RCMP, the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), Foreign Affairs, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO), the Canadian Coast Guard, Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), the Department of National Defence (DND), and the CF. In some cases, the NSP assigns tasks to a given organization, but on balance, the policy outlines generalities.

In broad terms, the NSP identifies two categories of organizations with responsibilities for the national security agenda: those that exercise operational functions, and

53 Canada. Privy Council Office, Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy, 9
those that exercise coordinating and oversight functions. These operational organizations, including, among others, PS, DFO, the Department of Transport (DOT), and DND, as well as their subordinate agencies, are assigned explicit tasks in the policy and carry out other national security tasks by virtue of their primary mandates. Coordination and oversight organizations identified in the NSP include elements of the Privy Council Office (PCO), the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC), and the Commissioner of the Communications Security Establishment among others. The responsibilities and roles of each of these organizations will be examined, beginning with the operational agencies.

PS is the department most centrally highlighted in the NSP. It was created in 2003, replacing the former Department of the Solicitor General, and was intended to assemble into a single department primary responsibilities for “security and intelligence, policing and enforcement, corrections and crime prevention, border services, immigration enforcement, and emergency management.”

To execute these duties, the Minister was assigned responsibility to coordinate the activities of “the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Canada Border Services Agency, the Canadian Firearms Centre, the Correctional Service of Canada and the National Parole Board.”

In

54 Ibid., 9

essence, the Minister is assigned responsibility for all matters related to public security and emergency preparedness in Canada.\textsuperscript{56}

Though there is no explicit mention of national security in the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Act, some of the core functions of the department have been incorporated into the national security framework by the NSP. Responsibility for emergency preparedness, which includes emergency planning and management as identified in the NSP, is assigned to the Minister in the Act:

The powers, duties and functions of the Minister extend to and include all matters over which Parliament has jurisdiction — and that have not been assigned by law to another department, board or agency of the Government of Canada — relating to public safety and emergency preparedness.\textsuperscript{57}

Two of the key security activities identified in the NSP, intelligence and border security, fall directly within the mandate of PS by virtue of the statutory mandates of agencies for which the Minister is responsible. National security intelligence is the primary responsibility of CSIS. According to the establishing legislation, “The Service shall collect, . . . analyse and retain information and intelligence respecting activities that may on reasonable grounds be suspected of constituting threats to the security of Canada . . .”\textsuperscript{58} Through responsibility for the CBSA, whose mandate includes responsibility “for providing

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., Sect 4

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., Sect 4

integrated border services that support national security and public safety priorities”, the Minister also has implicit responsibilities for border security.59

Further responsibilities assigned to the Minister of Public Safety by the NSP include the integration of the watch list information across government, responsibility for the operation of the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC) which is housed within CSIS, and operation of the Government Operations Centre.

DFO is given a mandate in the NSP to increase its aerial surveillance over Canada’s ocean waters.60 DFO contributes to both emergency management and transportation security through its responsibility for the operation of the Canadian Coast Guard. As outlined in the Oceans Act, the Coast Guard is mandated to provide marine search and rescue and “services for the safe, economical and efficient movement of ships in Canadian waters”.61

While the Coast Guard provides a range of marine services, it is the Department of Transport (DOT) that is assigned responsibility for marine safety and security policy coordination.62 DOT further contributes to transportation security through its management of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority (CATSA) which has the mission “to protect Canadians by making sure critical elements of the air transportation system are


60 Canada. Privy Council Office, Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy, 39


The primary activity undertaken in support of this mission is the screening of passengers at Canada’s airports.

The Department of National Defence (DND) is recognized in the NSP as another key contributor to national security. Through the Canadian Forces (CF), DND directly and indirectly supports all six of the key security activities. Given that “[t]he primary obligation of the Canadian Forces is to defend Canada and Canadians, particularly from external military threats”, the CFs activities are heavily focused in the area of international security, though this is not to the exclusion of domestic roles. The NSP assigns the CF to support emergency preparedness and to protect Canadians from “accidental and intentional internal threats.” Further contributing to domestic security, the CF operates Marine Security Operations Centres (MSOC), also staffed by CBSA, Transport Canada, the RCMP and the Canadian Coast Guard to “detect, assess, and respond to a marine security threat”. Contributing to the intelligence activity, DND also carries responsibility for the operations of


64 Canada. Privy Council Office, Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy, 47

65 Ibid., 47

66 Ibid., 39
the Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) which is responsible for “provision of foreign signals intelligence in support of defence and foreign policy.”

The operations of two relatively new specialized agencies are noted in the NSP as supporting the intelligence function. The Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC) is a financial intelligence unit created in 2000 “to collect, analyze and disclose financial information and intelligence on suspected money laundering and terrorist activities financing.” By identifying and reporting suspicious financial activity, FINTRAC contributes to the overall security intelligence picture. The Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC), established in 2004, brings a different kind of information to that intelligence picture by tracking the spread of infectious disease and advising on measures to contain outbreaks. In addition to supporting intelligence, PHAC is charged with ensuring national readiness to respond to public health threats and assisting in such response.

REVIEW AGENCIES

As important to the preservation of national security as the execution of security-related tasks is the oversight of the agencies performing those tasks. As Mr Justice O’Connor emphasized in his report from the Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of


69 Canada. Privy Council Office, Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy, 31
Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, “The purpose of national security in a democracy is to preserve democracy, including respect for the rule of law and the right of dissent”. Appropriate review mechanisms must be in place to ensure that the activities of security agencies do not compromise this principle.

Though the role of review agencies is not centrally highlighted in the NSP, it is acknowledged: “It is therefore fundamentally important that safeguards be in place to ensure that the exercise of authorities and the activities of our agencies are completely appropriate and are in compliance with Canadian law and policy.” The agencies identified in the NSP as having a review role include SIRC, the Inspector General for CSIS, the Commissioner of CSEC, and the Commission for Public Complaints against the RCMP (CPC).

CSIS is subject to review by two bodies. The functions of the Inspector General for CSIS are found in the CSIS Act and include “to monitor the compliance by the Service with its operational policies” and “to review the operational activities of the Service”. The Inspector General is independent of CSIS and reports directly to the Minister of Public


71 Canada. Privy Council Office, Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy, 19

72 Canada, Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, Sect 30
SIRC “is an independent, external review body which reports to the Parliament of Canada on the operations of [CSIS]”. The CSIS Act establishes that SIRC shall be comprised of members of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada who are not serving in Parliament. The committee examines past operations of CSIS to ensure compliance with legislation and makes recommendations to Parliament in an annual report. SIRC is also mandated to investigate any complaints registered against CSIS including complaints about any activities undertaken by CSIS, complaints regarding denial of security clearances, national security-related referrals from the Canadian Human Rights Commission, and reports from the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration regarding denial of citizenship for national security reasons.

Like the Inspector General for CSIS, the Commissioner for CSEC is mandated to provide independent review of the lawfulness of the activities of CSEC and to report to both the Minister of National Defence and the Attorney General for Canada any CESC activity.

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75 Canada, *Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act*, Sect 34

found not to be in compliance with the law.\textsuperscript{77} The Commissioner undertakes investigations in response to complaints about CSEC. Annual reports from the Commissioner are submitted to the Minister of National Defence and tabled in Parliament.

Review of the RCMP’s activities is carried out by the Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP (CPC). This is an independent agency whose mission is “To provide civilian oversight of RCMP members' conduct in performing their policing duties so as to hold the RCMP accountable to the public.”\textsuperscript{78} The CPC is limited in its oversight in that it initiates investigations only in response to complaints from the public.

To expand the degree of oversight of the RCMP’s activities, the NSP proposed the creation of an arm’s-length review mechanism for the RCMP’s activities relating to national security and asked Mr. Justice O’Connor to provide advice on the matter as part of his inquiry into the Arar affair. The recommendation supported the need for improved oversight of the RCMP, particularly in view of the integration of its activities with those of CBSA, CIC, FINTRAC, DFAIT and CSIS:

\ldots effective review of RCMP national security activities that are integrated with those of the five entities requires that the latter’s activities be subject to a similar type of review. Otherwise, there is a serious potential for gaps in accountability for


integrated national security activities and inconsistent or incoherent results in the review of the same activities.\textsuperscript{79}

The government has not yet acted to revise the scope and authority of review of the RCMP’s national security activities. In commenting on the recommendations made by Justice O’Connor, the current Chair of the CPC, Paul Kennedy, has agreed that the CPC does not have enough authority to provide adequate review of the RCMP’s national security activities.\textsuperscript{80} He argues that the covert nature of national security investigations makes it unlikely that subjects would be aware of the investigations and would thus be unable to file a complaint to trigger a CPC review. Further, when reviews are triggered, the RCMP is not obliged to disclose all available information to the CPC. As Mr. Kennedy notes:

\begin{quote}
. . . the current legislative mandate does not give the CPC access as of right to all information in the possession of the RCMP. The RCMP may refuse, and have, to disclose confidential or privileged information. That would include classified information pertaining to RCMP national security investigations.\textsuperscript{81}
\end{quote}

While there may need to be some adjustment to the currently established mechanisms of review, there is generally some degree of review in place to ensure that national security activities do not erode the rights Canadians and the principles of Canadian democracy. That the Chair of the CPC was making a presentation to the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security would seem to indicate that the government is examining the issue of

\textsuperscript{79} Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, \textit{A New Review Mechanism for the RCMP's National Security Activities}, 21


\textsuperscript{81} \textit{Ibid.}
review, and that adjustments may be forthcoming. At the least, it is clear that appropriate review is well enshrined as a fundamental component of the national security framework.

COORDINATION & OVERSIGHT MECHANISMS

While review provides a certain level of retrospective oversight, the review agencies do not serve any directing or coordinating function. They examine only activities from the past. For direction of present and future activity, another group of organizations are established within the national security framework. Unlike the review agencies discussed above, these organizations do not focus on verifying the lawfulness of past activities of security organizations, but rather focus on setting direction and coordination for present and future activities.

The first of these coordinating organizations was, at the time of the release of the NSP, the Cabinet Committee on Security, Public Health and Emergencies. Because the establishment of Cabinet committees is at the discretion of the Prime Minister, the number, composition and mandate of committees changes with the government. The responsible Cabinet committee today is the Cabinet Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security which “[c]onsiders foreign affairs, international development, public and national security, and defence policy issues.”82 Regardless of the name and exact mandate of the Cabinet committee, national security is one of the policy areas wherein a committee structure is used to coordinate the efforts of Ministers and consolidate advice to the Prime Minister.

One of the new mechanisms introduced in the NSP was the establishment of a National Security Advisor (NSA) to the Prime Minister. The NSA works within the PCO with the mandate to “improve co-ordination and integration of security efforts among government departments”. Within PCO, the NSA is supported by the Security and Intelligence Secretariat (cited as the Intelligence Assessment Secretariat in the NSP) and the International Assessment Staff.

The Security and Intelligence Secretariat works with federal departments and agencies to improve coordination of national security efforts. The advice of the secretariat supports Cabinet, the NSA and departments in consideration of national security and intelligence issues. In addition, the secretariat provides leadership in coordinating government-wide responses to national emergencies.

The NSA also draws support from the International Assessment Staff, which “provides the Privy Council Office and other senior government clients original, policy-neutral assessments of foreign developments and trends that may affect Canadian interests”. Like the Security and Intelligence Secretariat, the International Assessment Staff assists in coordinating activities among departments.

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83 Canada. Privy Council Office, Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy, 9


85 Ibid.
A second new oversight mechanism recommended in the NSP was the establishment of a National Security Committee of Parliamentarians.\textsuperscript{86} In a separate study on the issue released by PS, it was suggested that the role of such a committee would be to improve the effectiveness of Canada’s security framework and to ensure accountability in the operation of that framework.\textsuperscript{87} The mandate proposed in the study was centered on general review enabling improved accountability to Parliament. In April 2006, fulfilling this intention, the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security was established by severing the national security mandate from the former Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness.\textsuperscript{88}

The organizations that exercise the coordinating and oversight functions discussed above complete the national security framework. In total, the national security framework is broadly based and well aligned. Policy, including the NSP, the IPS and CFDS, is mutually supporting with respect to national security, providing a coherent vision of the government’s intent. These policies are amplified where required by supporting strategy documents that give more specific and narrowly focused direction to organizations implementing policy. Legislation is up to date and establishes both sufficient mandates and appropriate constraints


for departments and agencies engaged in national security activities. Review agencies ensure that national security activities do not erode the rights and freedoms that national security is intended to protect. Finally, coordination and oversight organizations maintain focus, set priorities and direction and co-ordinate national security activities.

Even with a solid framework in place, the large number of organizations involved in delivering the national security program requires a well-integrated approach. The need for integration is further amplified by the diverse array of activities that has been designated in policy as contributory to national security. The next chapter will examine the meaning of integration in the context of the modern Canadian public service in order to provide a basis for an evaluation of the success Canada has achieved in integrating its national security activities.
CHAPTER 3: INTEGRATION OF PUBLIC SECTOR ACTIVITIES

In defining national security threats as broadly as the NSP does, addressing risks from terrorism to floods, it is clear that there is an expectation that a wide range of departments and agencies will be required to work together under the national security umbrella. Different components of the national security puzzle fall within the purview of different departments and agencies such that no one department can be said to carry total responsibility for national security. In order to achieve an integrated framework, departments must work in an integrated fashion.

The concept of separate government departments working towards common goals is not new within Canadian government. It can be said that achieving coordinated government has always been a core responsibility of Cabinet with Ministers responsible for resolving and coordinating competing departmental interests and approaches. As the issues to be coordinated have grown in complexity, government approaches to achieving coordination have evolved, giving rise to specialized committees, central coordinating agencies and initiatives designed to push coordination efforts further down the authority chain. Today, approaches that seek to coordinate activities across government departments are known variously as Horizontal Management, Joined-Up Government, or Whole of Government.

In the field of public administration, the phrases Joined-Up Government and Whole of Government are used somewhat interchangeably to denote a new approach to the long-

standing problem of co-ordination.\textsuperscript{90} The challenges of integration have also been a complimentary driving force behind the development of these processes.\textsuperscript{91} An approach to address the same issues is also clearly intended in the process of Horizontal Management, which has been defined as:

\begin{quote}
. . .the coordination and management of a set of activities between two or more organizational units, where the units in question do not have hierarchical control over each other and where the aim is to generate outcomes that cannot be achieved by units working in isolation.\textsuperscript{92}
\end{quote}

The literature regarding Horizontal Management, Joined-Up Government and Whole of Government approaches identifies similar challenges and strategies for success across the approaches. Given that each of the approaches shares similar aims and mechanisms, lessons from all three approaches can be drawn in consideration of achieving integration in national security. For simplicity, the phrase Whole of Government (WG) will be used generically to describe the approach to integration.

The WG approach to delivering government programs has emerged as a contemporary attempt “. . . to try to combat the pathology of departmental government.”\textsuperscript{93} This pathology has been identified as “departmentalism” or working in “policy chimneys”

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{90} Tom Christensen and Per Lægreid, The Whole of Government Approach -- Regulation, Performance, and Public-Sector Reform (Oslo: Stein Rokkan Centre for Social Studies, 2006), 8.

\textsuperscript{91} Ibid., 8

\textsuperscript{92} Bakvis and Juillet, The Horizontal Challenge: Line Departments, Central Agencies and Leadership, 8

\end{footnotesize}
which causes departmental personnel to seek to protect “. . . their turf and their own interests rather than advancing government programmes.”94 With departments focused inward and working towards their own particular objectives, there is an induced lack of coordination between departments. In this fragmented bureaucratic condition, programs and issues which span across the responsibilities of multiple government departments fall prey to poor coordination and competing departmental objectives.95

Reforms of public service bureaucracy, initiated in the 1980’s, which emphasized performance management methodologies, intensified these effects by increasing the focus of individuals on their own performance targets, within their own organizations.96 With performance auditing focused within traditional sector-based vertical hierarchies, difficulties in horizontal cooperation were exacerbated.97 In the performance management system, it is assumed that organizations have clearly defined boundaries and goals and no value is explicitly placed on horizontal cooperation. Such a system is inadequate to manage programmes and issues that span organizations.98

94 Ibid., 1


96 Ibid., 42

97 Christensen and Lægreid, The Whole of Government Approach -- Regulation, Performance, and Public-Sector Reform

98 Ibid., 19
A final driver behind the move to a WG approach is the desire to achieve better synchronization between departmental policies. The poor coordination between departments discussed above risks the development and implementation of contradictory policies. A WG approach seeks “to eliminate situations in which different policies undermine each other, so as to make better use of scarce resources, [and] to create synergies by bringing together different stakeholders in a particular policy area . . .”

OBSTACLES TO THE WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT APPROACH

As with any organizational change process, the implementation of a WG approach faces obstacles. Various studies over the last decade have sought to identify the challenges that governments face in implementing WG approaches and to make recommendations for successful implementation. At the highest levels of government, where the present study is focused, two major challenges have been identified: responsibility and accountability, and institutional structure and culture.

Ministerial responsibility is the basis of the system of Parliamentary accountability that underlies the Canadian Westminster model of government. In WG initiatives, this accountability can become diffused and shared across departments. This becomes more cumbersome when activity carried out in support of WG initiatives cannot be directly linked to the normal responsibilities of a department. “It will also likely be the case that existing


departmental programs will be altered or tweaked to fit the needs of the horizontal initiative, but in the process may no longer fit the strict criteria of the authorities under which under which funding for these original programs was originally approved.”

Such an erosion of the strict principles of accountability can degrade the ability of Parliament to hold Ministers and departments to account for the efficient delivery of their mandated programs.

While WG programs can push departments to pursue activities outside their strict mandates, WG programs themselves, if not carefully structured, can fall between the cracks of departmental responsibilities. “With authority and responsibility parceled out throughout the network, whom do you blame when something goes wrong? How do you achieve results when you have limited control?” Similarly, Christopher Pollitt argues that “… the management of cross-cutting issues and the use of partnership and network forms of governance not infrequently encounter problems on clarifying lines of accountability”.

A second major obstacle to the implementation of a WG approach lies within the institutional structure and culture of government and the Public Service. At the core of government business, “… departments remain crucial holders of resources and continue to

101 Bakvis and Juillet, The Horizontal Challenge: Line Departments, Central Agencies and Leadership, 24


103 Pollitt, Joined–up Government: A Survey, 42
dominate policy making and policy delivery.”104 This fundamental structure of government hinders the development of WG programs in that a WG approach would force departments to surrender or share some control over resources and policy. The structure that concentrated power over resources and policy along departmental lines has led to the development of cultures within departments that seek to protect that power.

The influence of the culture of departments remains evident even when sufficient accountability structures are put in place to enable WG initiatives. A 2004 Canadian study found that “traditional practices reinforce the view that public servants are essentially accountable for their own departmental lines of business.”105 In essence, engrained departmental cultures can remain dominant over new approaches.

A final element of institutional culture that challenges the implementation of WG approaches is the socialization and promotion of civil servants. “The ‘soft skills’ required to develop and manage joined up agreements are not generally valued and rewarded by traditional government systems and processes.”106 These required soft skills focus heavily on a broad set of communication skills: the ability to “communicate faster, earlier, and with a wider range of stakeholders.”107 These skills are necessary to assist in network and trust

104 Kavanagh and Richards, Departmentalism and Joined-Up Government: Back to the Future?, 17

105 Bakvis and Juillet, The Horizontal Challenge: Line Departments, Central Agencies and Leadership, 56

106 Johnson, Strategies for Successful Joined Up Government Initiatives, 5

107 Pollitt, Joined-up Government: A Survey, 42
building which is seen to be key to a successful WG approach.\textsuperscript{108} This means that, at the outset of WG initiatives, the senior bureaucrats within the involved departments are often ill-equipped to lead and champion the initiative. Their cultural approach and strategies for success, which have been appropriate to the climate and well-rewarded in the past, are not constructive vis-à-vis a WG program.

**STRATEGIES FOR IMPLEMENTATION**

Although traditional mechanisms of responsibility, accountability and institutional structures and culture can hinder the implementation of WG initiatives, strategies and systems have been identified to assist in overcoming these challenges. As with most human endeavours, leadership has been identified as a critical element of success. To support that leadership, appropriate coordinating mechanisms and well-designed accountability structures are required.

Among the conclusions of a 2008 survey on collaborative working across government was the assertion that leadership from the highest levels is essential to developing a collaborative culture. “Fundamentally this is about leadership, both ministerially and at the [Senior Civil Service] level, not about media or tools.”\textsuperscript{109} Leadership is seen not only as a catalyst for initiating WG programs, but also an important factor in sustaining the initiative

\textsuperscript{108} Johnson, *Strategies for Successful Joined Up Government Initiatives*, 34

over time.\textsuperscript{110} Part of this sustaining role is to establish a WG-friendly climate, setting conditions for the initiative to succeed. As one study asserted, “Strong central leadership is vital to ensuring that the necessary cultural, structural and accountability shifts are made to support a whole of government approach.”\textsuperscript{111}

An important aspect of the leadership of WG initiatives is the influence that Ministers exercise over senior departmental officials.\textsuperscript{112} Ministers’ directions with respect to the priority that they assign to WG programmes and the degree of commitment they show to the initiatives strongly influence and motivate senior officials. Signs of tension or competition rather than cooperation between Ministers engaged in WG programmes will infect the attitudes, and thus steer the actions, of departmental personnel.

One frequently used method of establishing leadership in WG initiatives is the involvement of central agencies that can provide a degree of high-level direction, oversight and focus to the program. It has been noted that, “Simply having a department taking the lead or primary responsibility . . . may be insufficient. More often than not the support and, above all, the authority of central agencies may be required.”\textsuperscript{113} The central agencies may be existing government mechanisms, such as Cabinet committees, the PCO or the Treasury.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{110} Bakvis and Juillet, \textit{The Horizontal Challenge: Line Departments, Central Agencies and Leadership}, 19
\item \textsuperscript{112} Johnson, \textit{Strategies for Successful Joined Up Government Initiatives}, 35
\item \textsuperscript{113} Bakvis and Juillet, \textit{The Horizontal Challenge: Line Departments, Central Agencies and Leadership}, 63
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Board Secretariat, or units established exclusively for the purpose of pursing the WG initiative. Such oversight bodies can be useful in assisting to provide a “broad overview of the direction of general government policy” which can counter departmental reformulations and assertions of policy.

Though standing coordinating structures, such as Cabinet committees and the PCO, can take a lead role in horizontal coordination, it has been argued that the use of these structures is more suited to crisis response than to ongoing WG programs. With a broad range of responsibilities, PCO often lacks the depth to be able to penetrate substantively enough into issues to be able to engage departments with good effect. Likewise, Cabinet committees tend to be highly transactions-based and do not often develop the depth of understanding necessary to provide good leadership to WG efforts.

Another approach is to establish new central agencies, specifically tasked with improving coordination between government units. Such agencies could include lead agencies or interdepartmental units assigned to work in a particular WG program area. This was the approach adopted by the United Kingdom (UK) in 1997 when they created the

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114 Ibid., 16

115 Kavanagh and Richards, Departmentalism and Joined-Up Government: Back to the Future?, 4

116 Bakvis and Juillet, The Horizontal Challenge: Line Departments, Central Agencies and Leadership, 54

117 Ibid., 55

118 Christensen and Lægreid, The Whole of Government Approach -- Regulation, Performance, and Public-Sector Reform, 11
Social Exclusion Unit to coordinate efforts to combat poverty and deprivation.\textsuperscript{119} Looking more broadly across government, the UK also established, in 1998, the Policy Innovation Unit to bring together “all the policies that might relate to the problem under consideration as well as the units that deliver the policies.”\textsuperscript{120}

No matter which leadership approach, lead department or central agency, is selected to support a WG program, the leadership needs to be supported by appropriate accountability structures that recognize the shared nature of responsibilities and value the activities that are necessary to enable WG approaches. Such accountability structures must “clearly define shared outcomes and budgets, balancing vertical and horizontal accountabilities.”\textsuperscript{121} Without such clearly defined accountabilities, the WG initiative can suffer as departments continue to focus only on those goals for which they are clearly accountable. For personnel working in integrated programs, measures aimed at improving accountability could include explicit inclusion of horizontal objectives in performance contracts.\textsuperscript{122} From the perspective of ministerial accountability to Parliament, efforts to improve accountability have included work by the TBS to incorporate horizontal initiatives in department reporting.\textsuperscript{123}

\textsuperscript{119} Kavanagh and Richards, \textit{Departmentalism and Joined-Up Government: Back to the Future?}, 10

\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., 11

\textsuperscript{121} Humpage, \textit{Experimenting with a 'Whole of Government' Approach}, 50

\textsuperscript{122} Bakvis and Juillet, \textit{The Horizontal Challenge: Line Departments, Central Agencies and Leadership}, 56

\textsuperscript{123} Ibid., 58
One final observation with respect to the implementation of WG approaches is worth noting: it takes time. Developing the leadership skills to function well in a horizontal coordination environment, adapting organizational cultures, creating useful accountability structures and even correctly defining mandates for WG initiatives are all long-term projects that require patience.

Though this is by no means an extensive study of the intricacies and methods of horizontal coordination between government departments, it adequately informs the present study of the integration of national security in Canada. The discourse surrounding national security clearly sets this policy area as one targeted by a WG approach. It follows that the success of integration can be viewed in terms of the extent to which WG strategies have been effectively implemented in respect of national security. This analysis is pursued in the next chapter.

124 Christensen and Lægreid, The Whole-of-Government Approach to Public Sector Reform, 1063
CHAPTER 4: NATIONAL SECURITY FRAMEWORK INTEGRATION

The NSP is explicit in calling for an integrated approach to national security: “The increasing complexity of the threats facing Canadians requires an integrated national security framework to address them.” The policy is not explicit in defining the way in which that integration is to be achieved. Given the broad spectrum of activities addressed and the diversity of departments and agencies assigned responsibilities in the policy, the question of integration is, in itself, complex, demanding a range of solutions. Both structural reorganization, to create new vertical accountabilities, and a WG approach have been employed in the integration of national security activities.

The 2003 creation of the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness was clearly a reorganization designed to unify many of the primary national security actors in a single department. Though this reorganization pre-dated the release of the NSP, the effect was clearly in-line with the intent of the policy. This reorganization, presumably, side-steps the difficulties of the horizontal coordination required for a WG approach by creating vertical accountabilities. Through the line relationship with agencies, the Minister, supported by the department, has the opportunity and mandate to ensure that the policies, objectives and activities of each of the subordinate agencies are aligned with the overall objectives of the national security framework, thereby ensuring integration.

Through this vertical accountability structure, the activities of PS, CBSA, CSIS and the RCMP are should align seamlessly. However, as Kavanagh and Richards have noted, it

125 Canada. Privy Council Office, Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy, 9
is unwise to assume that the vertical structure of a department necessarily diminishes the problems of coordination. “Departments are internally differentiated bodies, containing their own units, networks and subcultures.”\textsuperscript{126} This effect can be even more pronounced when the department encompasses distinct operating agencies as is the case with PS. The achievement of integration, even within a department requires careful attention.

The current organization of PS shows mixed results with respect to integration of national security. On the one hand, the department very clearly acknowledges that it was established to achieve “better integration among federal organizations dealing with national security, emergency management, law enforcement, corrections, crime prevention and borders.”\textsuperscript{127} On the other hand, PS shows incongruence with the NSP by distinguishing between national security, emergency management, and border management since all of these activities are considered in the NSP to be components of national security. This creates the potential that organizations involved in emergency management and border management under the leadership of PS may not see themselves as performing functions explicitly related to national security.

Despite this apparent dilution of the concept of national security within PS, all of the agencies that fall under PS do make reference to their roles in supporting national security. With these national security roles also well-established in the legislative mandates, as discussed earlier, there can be no question that PS governed agencies understand their

\textsuperscript{126} Kavanagh and Richards, \textit{Departmentalism and Joined-Up Government: Back to the Future?}, 15

national security responsibilities. Still, integration can demand that each agency understand, not only their own mandates, but how those fit into the larger sphere of national security activity. In its characterization of national security PS may be creating an opportunity for lapses in integration.

For the remainder of the departments, integration of national security activity is a horizontal coordination issue. To determine a structural understanding of the degree to which integration, or WG approach, has been enabled among the departments responsible for national security activities, the paper will examine the areas highlighted in the review of WG implementation strategies: leadership in the program and the accountability structure in place.

**LEADERSHIP**

While the creation of PS was a significant step in establishing leadership over national security in Canada, it does not encompass all of the agencies involved in the provision of national security. Notably, CSEC and FINTRAC, both performing security intelligence functions not unrelated to those of CSIS and the RCMP, remain outside the PS sphere. Likewise most aspects of transport security were not coordinated into PS. Further, PS’s mandate does not extend to exercising authority over the national security activities of other departments and agencies. The mandate for the Minister is specific in restricting authority over functions that have been assigned to other departments: “The

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powers, duties and functions of the Minister extend to and include all matters over which Parliament has jurisdiction — and that have not been assigned by law to another department, board or agency of the Government of Canada — relating to public safety and emergency preparedness.” As a result, PS cannot be considered a lead department for national security, nor can the Minister truly be considered a lead Minister.

The NSP does include measures intended to enhance leadership in the national security policy area and enable a WG approach. In particular, the policy announced two new initiatives conceived to enhance coordination and enable leadership in national security. A new position, the National Security Advisor (NSA), was created within the PCO and a new Cabinet committee was established, the Cabinet Committee on Security, Public Health and Emergencies. Both of these mechanisms seek to provide advice in the coordination of national security activities.

The role of the National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister is defined by the PCO as the provision of “. . . information, advice and recommendations to the Prime Minister . . .” and to ensure “. . . the effective coordination of Canada's security and intelligence community . . .” While this role clearly assigns the NSA influence over the coordination of national security activities, it does not establish the NSA as an authoritative central agency that can direct the national security activities of departments. The NSA’s influence, rather, is directed at the Prime Minister, an appropriate circumstance given that the

129 Canada, Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Act, Sect 4

NSA is a bureaucratic vice politically accountable office established within PCO. As a result, the NSA cannot be considered to provide significant leadership to departments in advancing a WG approach to national security. The leadership must remain with the elected officials receiving the advice, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet.

The cabinet committee established to oversee national security matters, which in 2004 was the Cabinet Committee on Security, Public Health and Emergencies but is now reconstituted as the Cabinet Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security, holds more potential for provision of leadership on national security. As a committee of elected Ministers, there is more scope for the committee to assume responsibility for the direction of departments involved in national security. The Ministers of involved departments participate in the committee and can use the forum to come to agreement on crosscutting issues and then provide direction to their departments to implement the committee’s decisions. The reality of Cabinet committees, however, often falls short of this ideal.

The first obstacle to the enduring effectiveness of Cabinet committees is their relative impermanence. As noted earlier, Cabinet committees are formed by the government of the day and thus have no permanent mandate. Thus they cannot effectively become the key coordinating mechanism of any policy effort. Their leadership can disappear quickly as the focus of Cabinet changes. Even if a committee mandate continues, it can evolve away from a single policy area. This is evident in the change in the current committee responsible for national security. Originally very focused on national security as it was defined in the NSP, the mandate of the committee has changed to include both national security and foreign

131 Canada. Office of the Prime Minister, Cabinet Committee Mandates and Membership
affairs, the latter being, in itself, a very broad and demanding national policy area. Even without access to documentation of the committee’s deliberations, which is restricted as Cabinet confidence, it is plausible to assume that the expanded mandate of the committee must necessarily reduce its focus on national security issues.

More generally, as was noted earlier, Cabinet committees tend to be highly transactions-based. What this means from the perspective of providing leadership to WG initiatives is that Cabinet committees are not generally focused on creating and sustaining the WG initiative, in this case national security. Ministerial interaction in committee must necessarily address a broad spectrum of political issues including actions to enhance the power of the Ministers, decisions to benefit constituents of Ministers and competition between departments for funding. Thus issues unrelated to national security have the potential to impact negotiations between Ministers in committee and detract from the overall leadership that the committee can provide with respect to national security.

Even when a Cabinet committee remains attentively focused on a particular policy issue, their ultimate authority is somewhat limited. As with the NSA, cabinet committees ultimately provide advice to the Prime Minister. They may achieve some level of coordination through Ministers’ voluntary compliance with committee decisions, but the only real enforcement a committee can bring is through the Prime Minister.

With both of the coordinating bodies providing advice, the real nexus of leadership on national security is the Prime Minister. While the importance of national security is such that

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132 Bakvis and Juillet, *The Horizontal Challenge: Line Departments, Central Agencies and Leadership,*
it demands the attention of the Prime Minister, focusing the leadership of the WG national security effort in the Prime Minister is risky. There are a great many issues that demand the attention of a Prime Minister, meaning that any single issue can be left aside while other more pressing issues receive attention. The leadership of a Prime Minister is necessary to a WG imitative, but not sufficiently focused to sustain it.

Though not an element of strategic leadership for long-term planning or policy development, the government has established, as proposed in the NSP, two strategic centers that assist in the national security leadership effort in a more operational way. The Government Operations Centre (GOC), for which PS is responsible, and the Integrated Threat Assessment Center (ITAC), under the leadership of CSIS, were established as part of the solution to integrating national security efforts. Though not strategic in the sense of setting a long-term vision, these centers are an essential part of the strategic level leadership effort to integrate national security activities, particularly efforts in the response and recovery phases of a national security incident.

The focus of the GOC is to coordinate the government of Canada response to incidents as they arise. “As Canada's strategic-level operations centre, the GOC's primary function is to provide coordination and direction on behalf of the federal government.” Responding to any incident that has the potential to threaten the safety or security of Canadians, the centre aids in integration of the strategic national security response by fusing

133 Kavanagh and Richards, Departmentalism and Joined-Up Government: Back to the Future?, 15

the information available into a single comprehensive picture and coordinating response with the departments that are, or should be, involved.

The ITAC, as its name implies is the government’s integrator of intelligence information. “ITAC analyzes security intelligence from its various partner agencies and pieces together a picture of potential threats.”135 After consolidating the information it receives, the centre distributes reports to government and private sector agencies. By preparing and distributing an integrated assessment, ITAC assists agencies in priority setting and in focusing their national security efforts in areas of nationally agreed risk. Like the GOC, this is a functional level of integration that supports the government in providing leadership in national security.

A final element of the leadership of the government’s national security activities that should not be overlooked is found in the Parliamentary committees. Both the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security and the Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence conduct in-depth reviews of matters relating to national security. Although they do not perform a direct leadership role in terms of directing departmental activities, they influence Parliament through their reports and observations. The work of these committees, while largely an accountability function that will be examined further in the next section, can help to shape the views of Parliament, and thus indirectly the views of the Cabinet Ministers, on national security.

The overall federal government leadership effort to support the implementation of a WG approach to national security remains diffuse. The coordination centers, ITAC and the GOC, are narrowly focused and manage incidents limited to a short-term horizon only. The Cabinet committee and the NSA have some role to play in advising departments on integration issues, but ultimately serve to advise the prime Minister. Finally the Parliamentary committees serve primarily a review, rather than directive, function.

What is truly lacking from a leadership point of view is a single entity that can maintain a long-term and unique focus on national security issues and that has the authority to compel integration among departments. As Reg Whitaker noted in his 2006 review on spending in Canadian national security, “[w]aning bureaucratic enthusiasm for change and reversion to old patterns of behaviour is more likely when the attention of the political leadership has drifted elsewhere.” Without consistent and persistent leadership to ensure that national security remains a visible priority for all of the departments involved, there is significant risk that departmental focus will drift as other issues arise.

**ACCOUNTABILITY FRAMEWORK**

However well supported by leadership a WG initiative is, it also benefits from an accountability structure that recognizes the need for horizontal coordination and reinforces program objectives. At the departmental level in Canada, accountability is most-often assessed through the estimates process:

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136 Whitaker, *Made in Canada? the New Public Safety Paradigm*
Each year, federal departments submit departmental performance reports (DPRs) summarizing their results in meeting the objectives outlined in departmental reports on plans and priorities. These two sets of documents help strengthen departmental accountability to Parliament by establishing a clear link between commitments and the progress made in delivering on them.\textsuperscript{137}

At the top level of the estimates process, the government of Canada outcome areas define broadly what the government intends to achieve through its spending program.\textsuperscript{138} Of the thirteen outcome areas in the government program, none is dedicated to national security. Instead, the key national security activities, as defined in the NSP, contribute to diverse government of Canada outcome areas including “Healthy Canadians”, “Safe and secure Communities”, “A safe and secure world through international co-operation”, and “A strong and mutually beneficial North American partnership”.\textsuperscript{139} That the goals of the national security policy are spread across the government spending program reinforces the requirement for the policy to be pursued as a WG initiative.

In similar cases where program spending spans a number of outcome areas and departments in order to deliver a focused program, Treasury Board has a mechanism in place to designate and track the WG activity. By designating a program as a horizontal initiative, spending, and hence performance in achieving results in the policy area, can be coherently tracked. Current horizontal initiatives designated by Treasury Board include, for example,


\textsuperscript{138} \textit{Ibid}.

\textsuperscript{139} \textit{Ibid}.
the National Child Benefit Initiative, the Clean Air Agenda, and the Urban Aboriginal Strategy. Notable in its absence in the horizontal initiatives database is national security or any component of the national security framework. Given the lack of designation as a horizontal initiative, accountability for national security activities is achieved through individual departmental reporting of their national security responsibilities.

In their annual Reports on Plans and Priorities (RPP) and Departmental Performance Reports (DPR), departments articulate their departmental strategic outcomes and the program activities that contribute to them. This structure provides “... a standard basis for reporting to citizens and Parliament on the alignment of resources, program activities and results.”

A review of the 2009-2010 RPPs for departments and agencies playing a role in the national security program as outlined in the NSP shows only one reference to national security. Under its sole strategic outcome, “a safe and resilient Canada”, PS includes national security as a program activity. The remaining departments and agencies all refer obliquely to their national security responsibilities. For example, the Department of Transport lists “a secure transportation system” among its strategic outcomes, which relates


141 Ibid.

fairly clearly to the NSP key activity of transport security. While this strategic outcome forms an intuitive link between the Department of Transport and national security, it does not firmly entrench a national security responsibility in the accountability framework for the Department of Transport. Further, no other agency shares in the strategic outcome, identifies a similar outcome or acknowledges in their accountability framework a firm link to the Department of Transport for the attainment of transport security. In an integrated accountability structure, one might expect to see, for example, a link between the marine transportation safety responsibilities of Transport Canada and the Canadian Coast Guard. As a tool for identifying interdependencies between departments in the execution of national security responsibilities, the standard accountability framework fails to adequately reinforce a WG approach.

A clear example of the lack of coordination in the accountability framework is seen in the area of border security. As summarized in table 1, at least five different entities address border security in their RPPs. PS identifies boarder management as one of its program activities. The RCMP discusses border management as a component of the program activity “Federal and international operations”. CBSA makes a clear link to border

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security through its strategic outcome “Canada’s population is safe and secure from border-related risks”.

Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada indicates involvement in a WG approach to managing the Canada – U.S. border through its “diplomacy and advocacy” program activity. Finally CIC identifies that it will “contribute to national and border security through the Permanent Resident Card program” as a component of its program activity entitled “immigration program”. Departmental strategic outcomes and program activities, defined to assess the performance of single departments do not easily relate between departments.

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Table 1: Departmental Activities Contributing to Border Security\textsuperscript{149}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department / Agency</th>
<th>Strategic Outcome</th>
<th>Program Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>A Safe and Resilient Canada</td>
<td>• Border Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCMP</td>
<td>Quality Federal Policing</td>
<td>• Federal and international operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBSA</td>
<td>Canada’s population is safe and secure from border-related risks</td>
<td>• Risk assessment • Enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFAIT</td>
<td>Canada’s International Agenda</td>
<td>• Diplomacy and Advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIC</td>
<td>Migration that significantly benefits Canada’s economic, social and cultural development, while protecting the health, safety and security of Canadians</td>
<td>• Immigration Program • Temporary resident program</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Even within a single department, the accountability structure shows incoherence in relation to the activities advocated in the NSP. In the PS program activity architecture, national security, emergency management, and border management, are defined as separate program activities.\textsuperscript{150} This reinforces the earlier observation that PS is using a working definition of national security that differs from that advanced in the NSP, which sees border and emergency management as components of national security rather than separate activities. Further evidence of PS’s narrow interpretation of national security is found in the description of the program activity: “National Security strives for a safe and resilient Canada by working to ensure that Canada is better able to combat espionage, terrorist activities

\textsuperscript{149} Data derived from 2009-2010 departmental RPPs for the departments and agencies indicated. It is possible that other departments or agencies have referenced border security in their RPPs as only RPPs for departments and agencies identified in the national security framework were reviewed.

and foreign-influenced activities” (emphasis in original).\textsuperscript{151} This description would seem to imply a regression away from the broad, integrated concept of national security advanced in the NSP back towards the earlier conceptions as advanced by the MacDonald Commission. The accountability structure does not support integration of the NSP concept of national security within the department.

While it would be entirely natural for departments to focus on their own contributions to national security and include only those elements for which they are responsible in their program activity architectures, the lack of a coherent link to defined national security activities and the use of competing definitions of national security signal poor integration between departments. None of the departments reference the NSP to describe their responsibilities or activities. Only DND, in referring to implementation of the CFDS, makes reference in its RPP to any of the policy documents forming part of the national security framework.\textsuperscript{152}

With the national security framework nearly indiscernible in the government’s routine accountability framework, and no separate framework implemented, it would appear that no effective accountability framework has been established to support a WG approach to national security. This, coupled with diffuse and indirect leadership, would seem to indicate that integration of national security activity across federal departments is not being vigorously pursued as a WG initiative.

\textsuperscript{151} Ibid.

That robust supporting structures have not been adequately developed to implement the WG approach does not imply that the government will necessarily fail in delivering national security, only that efforts risk being poorly integrated. The next section will review current Canadian national security activities and outcomes to determine the strength of integration of the framework in implementation.

FUNCTIONAL ASSESSMENT

The Auditor General of Canada has examined various aspects of national security, publicly publishing findings and recommendations and performing follow-up audits to ensure progress in areas where deficiencies are identified. The March 2004 report was cited in the NSP as a driver behind the thrust for greater integration in the national security effort. In that report, the Auditor General made a number of observations and recommendations related to national security that focused primarily on management and coordination between agencies. The 2004 audit was conducted before the creation of PS and before the release of NSP, so it can serve as a reasonable baseline indication of challenges facing national security.

The examination of management issues was largely tied to a review of activities resulting from the 2001 Public Security and Anti-Terrorism initiative (PSAT), announced as part of the 2001 federal budget. The initiative included an allocation of $7.7 billion over five years “to enhance security for Canadians” and had five objectives: “keep terrorists out of Canada; deter, prevent, detect, and prosecute and/or remove terrorists; facilitate Canada-U.S.

relations; support international initiatives (such as UN, NATO, NORAD); and protect our infrastructure and support emergency planning.” The strong similarity between this initiative and the current national security framework is notable. Numerous departments and agencies sought and received funding under the initiative.

The audit found that the majority of the activities funded under the initiative were connected to the stated objectives. An extensive process, led by the PCO, was employed to ensure that departments’ requests were justified in terms of the initiative objectives, however, the staff of the Auditor General’s Office “ . . . found no evidence that officials . . . had based their review of departmental proposals on a national threat and risk assessment.” Fundamentally, this suggests that proposals were well judged in their individual merit vis-à-vis the program objectives, but a basis for comparative judgments was lacking. As a result, some projects with only limited effect on post 9-11 security requirements, for example a Solicitor-General project focused on First Nations illicit drug trade and organized crime, were funded while others more directly related to the new security requirements, improvements in maritime security for example, were only partially funded.

The overall finding that “the government did not have a management framework that would guide investment, management, and development decisions and allow it to direct


155 *Ibid.*, 10

156 *Ibid.*, 11
complementary actions in separate agencies or to make choices between conflicting priorities” speaks directly to the elements of leadership and accountability necessary to effective implementation of a WG approach. One would expect to see an improvement in this area if the current national security framework was operating in a truly integrated way.

The Office of the Auditor General has not addressed the management of national security as a whole again since the 2004 audit. Other writers, however, have tackled the subject. The Senate Standing Committee on Security and Defence has produced a number of reports examining the state of Canadian national security and individual elements thereof. In their 2008 report, Emergency Preparedness in Canada, the committee “examined governments’ efforts to improve Canada’s disaster preparation and disaster response capacity”. This is an area clearly related to the NSP-identified key security activity, emergency planning and management. Throughout the report, the committee identified deficiencies in a number of specific areas from a lack of funding for equipment and training to lack of interoperability between first responders. Permeating the report is a sense of a lack of leadership and coordination. While the report concentrates primarily on poor or lacking interaction between the federal government departments and provincial and municipal agencies, it does provide some insights into integration at the federal level. It highlights that

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157 Ibid., 1

PS has not yet reviewed or tested departmental emergency plans, as it is mandated to do.\textsuperscript{159} This hints that PS has been unable to exercise part of the basic leadership role it was intended to take within the federal government in national security.

The committee was even more direct in its findings with respect to integration of national security activities in its Canadian Security Guidebook, 2007 Edition. In the volume focused on security of Canada’s coasts, the committee examined topics ranging from the capabilities of the Canadian Coast Guard, to radar control, to policing on the Great Lakes. These activities inherently involve coordination and cooperation between a number of agencies and departments. In assessing the level of integration of these activities, the committee concluded:

There is no vision here – no sense that Canada needs a sizable combination of people and resources from the Navy, Coast Guard, RCMP and local police forces acting in coordination to surveille and defend our perimeter. Nobody is sitting down and articulating what kind of layered approach Canada really needs to defend its coasts.\textsuperscript{160}

There is evidence as well that the lack of integration and leadership in the government’s management of national security is apparent to leaders further down the chain. In 2007, the Conference Board of Canada conducted a study of governance for national security and public safety, interviewing involved public and private sector leaders as part of the process. The consensus of the people interviewed is captured in a key finding of the study: “Canadian leaders believe that the greatest threat to national security and public safety

\textsuperscript{159} Ibid., 6

is a lack of clarity around governance.”^{161} While this insight was directed primarily at difficulties with governance of first response agencies, it was traced back to problems with leadership and accountability structures at the federal level. Poor integration at the top was seen to impact front line response coordination.

The news with respect to integration has not all been bad. The March 2009 status report from the Auditor General found that there had been improvements in the management of security intelligence. This audit was a follow up to 2004 observations on the management structure for security intelligence which stressed that the committee-based, consensus-driven approach to directing intelligence efforts created significant risk of delay in establishing overall government security priorities.^{162} In addition, “some redundancy in the organization and development of strategic intelligence” had been observed.^{163} The 2009 report found that the introduction of the ITAC has streamlined integration and distribution of intelligence assessments. Additionally, the creation of a committee of deputy Ministers focusing on intelligence, though still consensus-based, has been somewhat effective in establishing intelligence guidance.

In another review of the integration of Canada’s intelligence efforts, Commodore (retired) Eric Lerhe notes that, although the integrated teams have been created, departments

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^{163} *Ibid.*, 11
have not followed through in filling the positions on those teams. He attributes this lapse to government leadership. Since release of the NSP, Prime Ministers and Cabinets have not, he argues, “ensured departments . . . sent their personnel to the combined centers and enforcement teams that the policy ordered.”

Lerhe sees in this a sign that the highest levels of government have not been active in pursuing integration in the security intelligence effort. He notes that “Prime Minister and Cabinet thus continue to follow the earlier pattern in which the responsibility for coordinating departments, and ensuring their compliance, is left to the bureaucracy.”

As noted in the earlier discussion of methods of enabling WG approaches, political – Ministerial – leadership is essential to advancing a WG effort; without it integration will fall short.

A 2008 study that assessed integration of national security efforts in areas involving the CF also found that that the integration effort was falling short. Citing unresolved challenges of technical and organizational interoperability, the paper found, in part, that the leadership required to drive the WG approach was lacking. The author noted that the framework, with appropriate departmental mandates and structures, had been established to enable a WG approach but that “in implementation, the initiatives fall short of achieving this

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165 Ibid., 11

An ad-hoc approach to leadership, establishing lead agencies on a case by case basis, in both the Government Operations Centre and the Maritime Security Operations Centres is cited as preventing the true organizational integration within those structures that the centers were intended to achieve. Without focused leadership and a compelling accountability structure, departments have not applied the resources necessary to make these centers function in a truly integrated way.

The reticence of departments to completely fulfill their national security mandates may also reflect a declining government interest in the area. In the aftermath of the attacks of 9-11, national security was the central concern of government. With the PSAT initiative came a focused accounting structure that ensured departments were taking action on national security issues. When that initiative ended, no other accountability structure was established to monitor national security objectives. After the initial establishment of instruments announced in the NSP, such as the GOC and ITAC, follow-up activity to ensure the effectiveness of these tools has been limited. It would appear that the national security framework as a whole is suffering the neglect that Eric Lerhe identified with respect to counter-terrorism efforts: “. . . there is mounting evidence that progress has stalled in the coordination of this massive counter-terrorism effort”.  

This sentiment is echoed by the Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence, which concluded in their 2008 emergency preparedness review that “members do

\[167\] Ibid., iv

\[168\] Lerhe, "Connecting the Dots" and the Canadian Counter-Terrorism Effort - Steady Progress Or Technical, Bureaucratic, Legal and Political Failure?, 1
not believe that Canadian governments have been doing their job in preparing for the kinds of major national emergencies that are bound to confront Canadians in the coming years.¹⁶⁹

These reviews of progress in key national security activities have all come to similar conclusions: good structures have been established, but departments have not supported the structures with the people and resources needed to make them function as effectively as they could. The federal government has not instituted an effective leadership and accountability regime to keep national security efforts on track.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

Canada is building an integrated security system to ensure that all necessary government resources are brought to bear in a coordinated way to protect the security of Canadians. This “whole-of-government” approach to national security enables us to do more with the resources committed to security, and to do it better.170

*Securing an Open Society* set forth an ambitious plan to unite government efforts to ensure the safety and security of Canadians under the banner of national security. Strongly influenced by the effects of 9-11, the policy advanced a very broadly based conception of national security that is fundamentally aimed at preventing, mitigating, and improving the response to a terrorist attack in Canada. This approach is evident in the six key security activities elaborated in the policy: intelligence, emergency planning and management, public health emergencies, transportation security, border security, and international security.

Such a broad conception of national security demands a significant coordination effort to integrate the activities of the various departments and agencies that work in the array of security areas. A solid framework has been developed to underpin that integration effort. The NSP forms the foundation of the framework and is well supported by related policies, such as the 2005 *International Policy Statement* and the 2008 *Canada First Defence Strategy*, which set goals consistent with the NSP. Legislation has been created and updated to reflect the national security activities of various departments and to ensure appropriate

oversight of those activities. The federal departments, operating agencies, review bodies, and oversight organizations complete the framework. In total, the elements of the framework are well defined, methodically aligned, and functionally unified to achieve national security objectives.

A framework alone, however, cannot maintain integration among so many organizations involved in such a complex endeavour. The tools of an effective whole of government approach are essential to ensuring that departments and agencies engaged in national security activities maintain focus, continue to interpret their mandates in a consistent and coordinated manner and do not retreat from the constant liaison that is essential to preventing redundancy, lacunae, or incoherence between organizations. It is in this area that the government’s progress in national security is uncertain.

Two key elements identified in WG literature, leadership and supporting accountability structures, which would contribute to the maintenance of integration in national security efforts are seen to be lacking. While the creation of a Cabinet committee that examines national security issues and the position of the National Security Advisor have strengthened the national security analysis and advice available to the Prime Minister, no central political leadership, beyond the Prime Minister, has been established to guide the effort. Given the extensive demands on a Prime Minister’s attention, this office cannot effectively be the continuous source of leadership on a single issue.

Admittedly, it is unlikely that the RCMP will cease national security investigations, CSEC will give up collecting security intelligence, or PHAC will stop monitoring health threats in the absence of dedicated strategic leadership in national security. The risk, however, lies in lapses in coordination between the agencies, changing priorities within the agencies or a drift in agency understanding of national security and how they contribute to it. This risk is enhanced by the lack of an accounting structure that clearly links together national security activities.

The government has not established a horizontal accounting structure to capture national security activities. Without such a structure, individual department and agency program activity architectures do not readily reflect their roles in national security. Even the government of Canada outcome areas, which sit at the top level of the accountability program and to which all departmental activity must relate, do not clearly link to national security as defined in the framework. Should conflicts arise, it is likely that departments will focus their efforts on those activities that are reflected in their accountability structures rather than those non-core activities required to maintain integration in the national security framework. Again, this does not indicate that departments and agencies will entirely cease their national security activities, rather that the coordination and integration activities may suffer. The framework as established leaves significant scope for departmental drift in their national security efforts.

That the government has not succeeded in creating focused leadership and a supportive accountability structure is a sign that the government’s emphasis on the national security file has waned. Further indication that focus on the NSP as a foundation for the framework for the integrated pursuit of national security may be in decline is seen in the fact
that no follow-up reporting on the implementation of the policy has been published since the 2005 Securing an Open Society: One Year Later.

This lack of vigour in sustaining the integration of the national security framework propagates through to the level of the federal departments and agencies engaged in security activities. Various reviews have found that departments have not followed through completely in implementing all aspects of the national security framework. Failure to staff positions in combined centers, such as ITAC and the MSOCs, shows that the desire of departments to engage in national security activities does not transcend the boundaries of their established accountabilities. The absence or impermanence of key departmental players in these combined centers lessens their integrative capacity and undermines the national security framework as currently established.

Despite these lapses in integration, Canada’s national security apparatus remains robust. To quote the Senate Standing Committee on Security and Defence, “the sky is not falling!”172 Canada has a comprehensive and well-aligned national security framework. The framework is operating, largely as intended. What is questionable is the degree to which efforts of departments and agencies working under that framework are integrated. Further there is risk that the significant momentum generated after 9-11 and increased by the release of the NSP is stalling. The combination of decreasing momentum and incoherent leadership and accountability structures is straining the overall integration effort.

For these reasons, it is time for the government to initiate a review of Canada’s national security framework to ensure that it still reflects the needs of Canada. In view of the

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172 Canada. Senate. Standing Committee on National Security and Defence, Emergency Preparedness in Canada, 1
current posture of Canada’s national security system, there are some questions that this review should seek to answer. First, noting that PS has separated emergency preparedness and border management from national security, does this imply that grouping so much together under a single policy was too much? Is the current conception of national security too broad and too difficult to integrate effectively?

A second related question for further research concerns how national security and the impact of national security incidents are measured. Most of the literature reviewed for this study, while acknowledging the desire to preserve the safety of Canadians, placed a stronger emphasis on the economic impacts of security incidents, fundamentally equating security to dollars. Further analysis of this approach could seek to determine if economics is an effective model for the conceptualization of “threats that have the potential to undermine the security of the state or society”.173

As highlighted at the beginning of this chapter, “Canada is building an integrated security system”. This remains very much a work in progress. While a comprehensive framework has been firmly established, integration across federal departments and agencies remains tenuous. To ensure that the nascent integration continues to grow, a new infusion of energy is needed. The time is nigh for review.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


