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New Horizons

A Canadian Marine Corps: *Semper ethologus?*

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Abstract

From an organizational viewpoint, the most seductive aspects of the amphibious construct, as practiced by the United States Marine Corps (USMC), is the focus on tenets that are shared with Canadian Forces (CF) Transformation: culture, integration and mission command. As an organization that presents itself as typifying 'beyond joint', the Marines provide an appealing model for the future CF force structure.

This paper argues that the pursuit of an amphibious capability is warranted by both past and future CF operations. While, it is shown that neither the Chief of Force Development (CFD) nor the Director General Maritime Force Development (DGMFD) can dismiss 'manoeuvre from the sea' either intellectually or in practice, the paper stresses that while Canada's forces and the USMC were once comparable they no longer are and, thus, Canadian doctrine must be developed as opposed to being imported directly from the USMC.

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Semper ethologus?

Ever the mimic?

Introduction

Nations, and even services within nations, conceive, design, build and manage their forces within a number of different frameworks. The cause of this disparity can be attributed to doctrinal differences, which in turn can be ascribed to each nation's unique set of circumstances. Thus can it be postulated that the lock, stock and barrel transfer of capabilities and/or doctrine from one nation to another, regardless the level of intimacy that exists in the defence relationship, will not necessarily benefit either the nation nor the borrowed component, regardless the apparent logic of the situation.

With this hypothesis in mind, the idea that Canada might be well-served by adopting the United States Marine Corps (USMC) model and *ethos*, as well as a scaled down model Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE), will be examined.¹ Conversely, the suitability of Canada as a host-nation to a hypothetical Canadian Marine Corps (CMC) will be examined, contingent upon the assumption that Canadian Marines would, initially at least, resemble their American cousins.

The framework for this discussion will be largely historical, partly contemporary and slightly futuristic. The founding and development of the USMC will serve to illustrate its *raison d'être* while the historical employment of Canada's armed forces will serve to establish when a CMC might have been employed in Canada. At that point, Canada's current transformation will be discussed as it pertains to expeditionary forces, specifically

¹ There are nearly three times as many Marines on active duty as there are personnel in the CF (regular force).

the Defence Policy Statement's Standing Contingency task Force (SCTF), also known as a Standing Contingency Force (SCF), also known as Integrated Rapid Response (IRR). Finally, a consideration of Canada's future security environment (FSE) will determine whether the CMC would provide the Government of Canada any utility in the future; the effect of today's post-9/11 world on the FSE will be tempered by projecting future employment based not only upon current employment, but also upon past employment trends.

In the end, this paper is intended to serve as a platform for debate that spans the realms of force development and employment, the future force structure and doctrinal requirements and development. While I will argue that Canada should pursue an amphibious capability, based upon factors easily discerned in the FSE, I will also contend that a headlong rush into the littorals, without suitable Canadian doctrine and CF force structure, would be the Force Development (FD) equivalent of staging an amphibious assault without considering if the target area might be mined.

The United States Marine Corps

The fact that the future is uncertain is no excuse for failing to make adequate preparations.²

In order to understand whether Canada could buy or force develop a marine corps of its own, it is necessary to understand how the USMC became what it is today.

² Department of Defense. United States Marine Corps, *Operational Maneuver from the Sea: A Concept for the Projection of Naval Power Ashore* (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, Headquarters US Marine Corps, 1996), p. 5.

Origins

Although the label ‘marines’ can be applied to any infantry force associated with either a naval or amphibious force, the two modern forces most notably associated with capital-m Marines are the United Kingdom’s Royal Marines and the United States Marine Corps (USMC). The fact that these two forces have had different experiences, their concepts of operations and their organizational structures differ. While the Royal Marines have evolved into a sea-friendly Special Forces branch with an imbedded Special Operations Forces capability, the USMC has come to incorporate the three combat arms branches, special forces, as well as air support wedded to the amphibious assault concept of operations. Indeed, were the United States Navy (USN) to be subjugated to the USMC, rather than the opposite, the USMC would encompass the whole of the capability spectrum.

Born of the American Revolution, the expeditionary nature of the USMC dates to 3 March 1776 when Captain Nicholas assaulted Nassau and captured powder that would later be used by George Washington’s armies against British forces on the continent.³

This expeditionary nature is incorporated into the first verse of the Corps hymn.

*From the halls of Montezuma
To the shores of Tripoli,
We fight our country's battles
In the air, on land, and sea.
First to fight for right and freedom,
And to keep our honor clean,
We are proud to claim the title
Of United States Marines.*

³ Kenneth W. Estes, *The Marine Officer's Guide*, 6th ed. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996), 88.

While the pairing of amphibiousness and expeditionary capabilities proved invaluable to extending American influence and power into Asia, South America and the Caribbean, it was on the battlefields of the First World War that the 4th Marine Brigade cemented the reputation of the marine as a voracious fighter.⁴ Indeed, while Canada was earning its seat at Versailles, the USMC was inflicting itself upon enemy forces at Belleau Wood, Soissons and Saint-Mihiel.⁵

The Modern USMC

The modern USMC was born of necessity. The interwar years saw the Corps split into two main camps, those who agreed with John A. Lejeune and John H. Russell that the role of the Marines was to create and defend overseas naval stations and bases versus those who saw their future as providing detachments to the Navy, in line with Charles Heywood and George F. Elliot.⁶ Regardless the fact that Heywood and Elliot were former-Commandants, they still influenced the development of the Corps; the decision to change the path of the Corps would only come after Lejeune's tenure as Commandant (1920-29) when Commandant of Marines General Ben H. Fuller felt sufficiently threatened by the U.S. Army's Chief of Staff, General Douglas MacArthur, to end the debate and direct his assistant – and future Commandant – General Russell to make the Corps unique, thus indispensable, by virtue of amphibiousness.⁷

⁴ Estes, *The Marine Officer's Guide*, 95-99.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 100.

⁶ Victor H. Krulak, *First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps*. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1984), 79.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 80.

The first step to becoming amphibious was to generate the doctrine required such that the Navy would support the USMC. There had already been a body of work put to paper, most significant amongst the authors was the late Earl H. Ellis whose *Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia* would prove an uncanny forecast of the Pacific campaigns of the Second World War.⁸ Russell's great innovation tying together the various bits of operational and tactical knowledge concerning amphibious operations, then drafting all the missing pieces such that a whole body of work supported his Commandant's pitch to the Navy and Congress. Significantly, he tasked all staff and students of both the Company Officers' and Field Officers' Schools to produce this single volume of work;⁹ in the end, the 127,000 word *Tentative Manual for Landing Operations, 1934* revolutionized Marine training. This first volume was then republished by the Navy as their *Manual for Naval Overseas Operations*;¹⁰ the Corps now had a purpose in the eyes of the Navy and, thus, a defensive counterweight to the Army's ambitions.

Thus stabilized, the USMC began revolutionizing amphibious warfare. At their request, the Navy committed itself to the design and construction of landing craft for both personnel and tanks. Andrew Jackson Higgins' 'Eureka' hull design was adapted such that, by the entry of the US into the war in 1941, there was a production model upon which future landing craft designs would be based.¹¹ Coming out of the Second World War, the Marines would look to acquire the tools that would lead to their becoming the

⁸ Krulak, *First to Fight*, 76-77.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 80-81.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 81-82.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 92.

complete, integrated package that they are today when, even though they might on occasion land and fight without USN assistance, amphibiousness retains a significant role. Although even after the war, US Army Generals would continue to snipe at the Marines, with Eisenhower stating that “an amphibious landing is not a particularly difficult thing,”¹² and Bradley openly musing whether there would ever be “another large-scale amphibious operation” less than a year before the Marines landed in Korea,¹³ their threats towards the Marine Corps had been neutralized.

Although Marine Aviators and Artillerymen had played a significant role during the Second World War, it was a small group of these officers and men that would provide the technological advance that led to the integration of their air forces into ground operations.¹⁴ While attempting to adapt captured German rocket technology to their own ends, they instead came up with the method and means to bomb enemy positions accurately from great heights and/or at night, thus increasing both the utility and effectiveness of their organic air power.¹⁵ With a new understanding that, in emergency, Marine Aviators could be trusted to drop their ordinance within 50m of friendly positions,¹⁶ came a closer cooperation than had ever been before and, helped by the fact that the aviators were, themselves, Marines, over 50 years of close cooperation and close ground support has ensued. Indeed, today’s Corps leverages both F/A-18 and Harrier attack aircraft, as well as EA-6B Electronic Warfare aircraft, but they have now the

¹² Krulak, *First to Fight*, 71.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 114.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 114–119.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 119.

capabilities of the MV-22 Osprey integrated into their planning process which, in essence, provides for 3-dimensional envelopments.

Canada's (Armed) Forces

Since before its own government controlled a viable military forces,¹⁷ Canadians have fought and died in the service of war and peace. Though early, so-called Canadian Regiments were more likely to be manned by British soldiers and officers, the years following the establishment of the Royal Canadian Rifle Regiment in 1840 saw this, and subsequent regiments naturalized. Though traditions still point to a distinctly British ancestry, these regiments were largely home-grown by the time of the Second Boer War in 1899 and were thoroughly Canadian by the outbreak of the Great War in 1914. During that First World War, once the war of attrition was past, Canada was served remarkably well by her sailors and soldiers, officers and even, occasionally, her Generals.

Although the interwar years of 1918-1939 were a time of decaying capabilities, Canada did manage to reengage a now familiar enemy during the Second World War. Though arguably less successful during the Second World War than when they finished the previous Great War, by 1945 Canada had none-the-less fielded the 3rd and 4th largest Navy and Air Force (respectively) and had put 10 percent of its population into uniform.¹⁸ Decimation would have been kind considering the defence cuts that followed

¹⁷ Canadians fought as colonial forces under British command until the turn of the 20th century.

¹⁸ Allan Lynch, "On Juno Beach," *Imperial Oil Review* 88, no.450 (2004), <http://www.imperialoil.ca/Canada-English/thisis/publications/2004Q2/pages/onJunoBeach.html>; Internet; accessed 2 April 2008.

the Second World War,¹⁹ though all services were hit hard, the most poignant example of this loss of capability lies in the reduction of the RCAF from its wartime peak of 215,200 in January 1944 to 11,569 officers and men by 31 December 1947, just over one twentieth its previous strength²⁰

Employment 1945-2000

Since the Second World War, Canada's military forces have proven to be somewhat uneven in all of capability, capacity and character. Two separate but complementary Operational Research Division (ORD) reports, originating from within the Directorate of Operational Research (Joint), facilitate the consideration of the numbers and types of missions that have been assigned to, and executed by the Canada's armed forces. The first volume covers the period of 1945-1969, the second volume covers the period of 1970-2000.^{21, 22} As the military has been somewhat transformed in recent years, it can be inferred that some things that these reports reveal may have already changed but, likewise, it must be accepted that people and politics necessarily lag in their ability to adapt to a changed security environment.

Much of the employment detailed in the two ORD reports might have been excluded or tagged with an asterisk had the Defence Policy Statement of 2005, and subsequent

¹⁹ The essence of 'decimation' is a reduction of 1/10th, not annihilation as it is often (mis)used.

²⁰ RCAF.com. "The Cold War," *History of the Royal Canadian Air Force*, http://www.rcaf.com/archives/archives_features/history/cold_war.php; Internet; accessed 2 April 2008.

²¹ Department of National Defence. *ORD Project Report PR 2002/11: Canadian Forces Operations 1945-1969*. (Ottawa: DOR(J), 2002).

²² Department of National Defence. *ORD Project Report PR 2002/01: Canadian Forces Operations 1970-2000*. (Ottawa: DOR(J), 2002).

government policy of the Conservative Government, not placed such emphasis upon the Defence of Canada and the *Canada First* philosophy.^{23, 24} Accepting the realities of the times, however, it must be noted that the response of Canada's military forces to domestic emergencies is growing more rare with time; the darker side of progress is, on the other hand, the increasing likelihood of an intentional, man-made disaster.

The ORD report PR 2002/11, covering the years 1945 through 1969, provides insight into the tempo of Canadian military operations during the Cold War. Of 59 separate deployments and/or executed missions, ten might be seen as not just opportunities to deploy amphibious forces, but opportunities that could not be fully exploited because no amphibious capability existed. Of these ten events, five involved the evacuation of Canadians from states that were failed and/or fragile; events in China (1959), Egypt (1952), St Lucia (1957), Haiti (1963) and Egypt again (1967) were sufficiently fluid that a strong Canadian presence might have provided the stability required such that sober second thoughts were considered.²⁵

Of the remaining five events, the impact of amphibious forces would have been even more dramatic. Starting with the Korean War, an amphibious capability at that time might have allowed for Canadians going ashore with the USMC at Inchon in 1950.²⁶

Post-Korea, amphibiousity would have meant that HMCS *Magnificent* could have

²³ Government of Canada, "A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Defence," in *Canada's International Policy Statement*, (Ottawa: Queen's Printers, 2005).

²⁴ Martin Shadwick, "Defence and the Conservatives," *Canadian Military Journal* (Spring 2006): 72-73.

²⁵ DND. PR 2002/11, A-11 – 83.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, A-14 –15.

operated as an aircraft carrier rather than the logistics mule she became in transporting to Egypt, under the auspices of UNEF, more than 200 land vehicles on her now unusable flight deck.²⁷ In 1958, the Middle East might again have benefited from an afloat Canadian presence when the newly formed United Arab Republic (UAR) sponsored pro-UAR factions within the coastal state of Lebanon.^{28, 29} Finally, the deployment of an amphibious group to Cyprus in 1964 might have saved HMCS *Bonaventure* the indignity of being used as a transport vessel, like *Magnificent* eight years earlier.³⁰

The ORD report PR 2002/01, covering the years 1970 through 2000, completes the events of the 20th century. The report reveals that the period of 1970 to 2000 was as busy as the period of 1945 through 1969 and, most importantly, busier than it is currently remembered as being. A continuing need to plan and execute Evacuation Operations in coastal states was evident with separate events in West Pakistan (1971), Grenada (1974), Portugal (1974), Iran (1978/9), and twice in Haiti (1987/8, again in 1993).³¹ Also continuing during this period was the need for Canadian forces to contribute to Middle East and Mediterranean stability. UNEF II (1973-79), UNDOF (1974-2006), Cyprus (1974), the collapse of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (1991-95, 1999-2004), events in Somalia (1992-94), Haiti (1993-94, 1995-97), East Timor (1999-2000) and Sierra Leone (1999-2005) each, in hindsight, support the requirement for a Canadian

²⁷ DND. PR 2002/11, A-34.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, A-36.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, A-52 – 53. At times it is fortunate to lack capabilities, next in the chronology after 1958 was the Cuban missile crisis. An amphibious capability in 1962 might have meant that civilian control of the Canadian navy in 1962 would have slipped even further. Had a Canadian platform joined an American amphibious group, unification might have been even more painful than it proved to be.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, A-69 – 70.

³¹ DND. PR 2002/01, A-8 – 111.

amphibious capacity.³² Amongst all these operations, the fact that Canada planned then scrubbed a unilateral intervention into Jamaican affairs in 1979 makes the deepest impression; had an amphibious ship been in the inventory of the CF, would Canadian capability and doctrine have dictated that Canada take action?³³ Indeed, perhaps most topical is the impact that a floating military command and control (C2) centre could have made had it been available in Montreal during the 1976 Olympics, then ten years later for EXPO in Vancouver. The impact of having an amphibious vessel there to facilitate both C2 and troop berthing resonates loudly today, two years prior to the 2010 Vancouver Olympics.

The Canadian Forces 2001-2008

Today, Canada maintains a military force capable of operations across the spectrum of conflict with the notable exception of an offensive nuclear capability, both tactical and strategic. The same organizational changes that saw the standing-up of operational commands for both domestic and expeditionary forces in 2006, the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command also came into being.³⁴ On that day, Canada came to possess, perhaps not the full capability, but certainly the framework for operations at home and abroad across the realms of sea, land, air and space. Since February 2006, the Canadian government acquired strategic airlift,³⁵ while pursuing tactical airlift,³⁶

³² DND. *PR 2002/01*, A-8 – 111.

³³ *Ibid.*, A-31 – 33.

³⁴ 1 February 2006.

³⁵ 4x C-17. Department of National Defence. “‘Canada First’ Defence Procurement - New Strategic & Tactical Airlift Fleets” http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1971; Internet; accessed 14 April 2008.

³⁶ Up to 17 tactical lift airframes. *Ibid.*

medium- to heavy-lift helicopters,³⁷ as well as operational sealift vessels.³⁸ In addition to these purchases, operational requirements in Afghanistan have resulted in the purchase of a significant number of South African Nyala Armoured Personnel Carriers and British M777 towed howitzers.³⁹ In essence, while increasing the baseline funding of the Canadian Forces substantially, the current and former governments have, since 2004 also embarked on a substantial recapitalization program.⁴⁰ It is important to realize that this recapitalization has resulted in no small amount of concern on the part of the Canadian public. Granted, the coffers are full; with an economy that is unlikely to falter – too far – anytime soon, Canada is well positioned to invest in her own future. In large part, however, the public discussion is centred not on the need for the equipment but, rather, on the offensive nature of the modern force. Having participated to a limited extent in the first Persian Gulf War, and to a much greater extent a few years later in the former-Yugoslavian theatre and, now, fully engaged in Afghanistan, the Canadian public is being forced to come to grips with the fact that, as the Canadian Chief of the Defence Staff

³⁷ Up to 16 airframes. Department of National Defence. “‘Canada First’ Defence Procurement – Medium- to Heavy-lift Helicopters,” http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1968; Internet; accessed 14 April 2008.

³⁸ 3x Joint Support Ships (JSS). “‘Canada First’ Defence Procurement – Joint Support Ship,” http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1958; Internet; accessed 14 April 2008.

³⁹ Assembled in the US and in service with US Army and Marine units, the M777 was developed in the UK.

⁴⁰ In his address to the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) on 16 February 2007, General RJ Hillier, the Chief of the Defence Staff referred to the period of 1994-2004 as the “decade of darkness” given the defence budget cuts of that 10 year period. Mike Blanchfield, “Top General Calls Liberal Rule ‘Decade of Darkness’,” *The Ottawa Citizen*, <http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/story.html?id=d569d0fb-d9cf-4119-84cb-39dd89571625>; Internet; accessed 2 April 2008.

stated on 14 July 2005, the Canadian Force's job is to kill "detestable murderers and scumbags."⁴¹ Canadians are seeing a transformed and/or transforming force at work.

CF Transformation

Transformation is "a process that shapes the changing nature of [the] military through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations."⁴² While

Transformation is the latest engine of military evolution and evolution, it is unique that it is, essentially, change for change's sake. Transformation is global in its reach as it has been embraced by the world's last remaining superpower; neither competitor nor Allie can afford to have the US transform beyond their own understanding if they wish to remain engaged in a world where militaries can "[accomplish] military missions that were previously unimaginable or impossible except at prohibitive risk and cost."⁴³

Less than three years after a Minister of National Defence (MND) sponsored a detailed report on how the CF and DND could become more 'administratively efficient', the coming into being of the Operational Commands on 1 February 2006 signalled that CF Transformation had begun and that effectiveness would be employed as the new gold standard for operations.^{44, 45} Using six simple principles, Transformation addressed not

⁴¹ CTV News. *Canada's JTF-2 to hunt al Qaeda in Afghanistan*. http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/112143377212_154; Internet; accessed 29 March, 2008.

⁴² Department of Defense. *Transformation Planning Guidance*, (Washington DC: USGPO, 2003), 3.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 3-4.

⁴⁴ Department of National Defence, "Minister of National Defence Announces \$128M in Internal Savings," http://www.mdn.ca/site/Newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1225; Internet; accessed 7 April 2008.

⁴⁵ Nowhere in the *Defence Policy Statement* was the CF asked to reorganize to become more fiscally responsible; the calls for efficiency stretch back to 1945 and manifested themselves most obviously during the 1960s and 1990s.

only the operational aspects of the CF, it also re-aligned force enablers, and DND itself, to ensure that the operational construct would not fail. The fourth phase of Transformation was to address what, if any, changes that would be required of Force Generators in order to optimize the future force structure; the phase has been delayed for the time being, which is reasonable given the demands that the Afghanistan Campaign is placing on the Army specifically, and the CF as a whole.

Transformation Principles

The CDS Transformation principles, now referred to as CF Transformation Principles, were in fact distilled by the Canadian Forces Transformation Team (CFTT) from the many CDS speeches and comments that had been recorded and published since General Hillier was appointed CDS. These principles were published as an Annex to the second of the CDS' Transformational Sitreps; the principles concern themselves with:

- a. the creation of a CF identity to compliment strong service ties;
- b. the development of a command centric imperative;
- c. the re-levelling of authorities, responsibilities and accountabilities;
- d. the development of a strong operational focus;
- e. an emphasis on mission command; and
- f. the continued integration of the regular and reserve force, along with civilian CF personnel.⁴⁶

While all of the principles are of significant importance to Transformation, it is the first, fourth and sixth of the principles that are of specific importance to the central theme of

⁴⁶ Department of National Defence. "CDS Principles: Definitions," *Annex A to CDS Transformation SITREP 02/05*. (Ottawa, Queen's Printers, 2005), 1-2.

this paper: amphibiousness, specifically the Canadian pursuit thereof. From its first mention in the CDS Action Team 3 report, the idea that all three services might be integrated in a single platform, and that integration would then spread naturally, had pointed Transformation towards what would be called “the big honking ship” by the CDS, the “Flagship of Transformation” by others.^{47, 48}

CDS Action Teams (CATs)

The formation of four ‘action teams’ by order of the CDS sent a loud signal that CF Transformation would not be a half-hearted effort at patching minor organizational problems. Four specific areas would be studied, the first being Command and Control, the second being Force Development and Generation, the third being Operational Capabilities, and the fourth being Institutional Alignment. Transformation would later be described as having four phases of which the work done by the Action Teams represented the first phase. The report of the most significance to this paper is the CDS Action Team 3 Report, dated 2 August 2005, simply titled *CDS Action Team 3 Final Report: Operational Capabilities*. Part 4 to this report provides a Concept of Operations (CONOP) specifically tied to a “level of ambition” that paints Canada as a “nation with the will, capability, competence and influence to provide the essential elements of political and military leadership to coordinate the planning, mounting and execution of a Coalition Campaign.”⁴⁹ Within the report, the Standing Contingency Task Force (SCTF)

⁴⁷ Sharon Hobson, “Plain Talk,” *Canadian Naval Review* 1, no.4 (Winter 2006), 28.

⁴⁸ Department of National Defence. Standing Contingency Task Force Concept of Operations (Draft) Version 3, CDS Planning Guidance – CF Transformation October 2005. 10.

⁴⁹ Department of National Defence, *CDS Action Team 3 Final Report: Operational Capability*, (Ottawa, Queen’s Printer, 2005), 11.

is being employed by Canada, under the lead-nation construct, even before it is fully-described in later sections.⁵⁰

SCTF, SCF, ITEE and IRR

In November 2006, the navy conducted the Integrated Tactical Effects Experiment (ITEE) with the participation of more than 1,000 CF members. Support was provided from the United States Navy, consisting of mentors and the participation of USS *GUNSTON HALL* ... and USS *DOYLE*

The ITEE helped the CF assess the challenges associated with developing a maritime expeditionary force. **Due to operational and fiscal pressure, work on the SCF has been stood down.** CMS, supported by CLS and CAS, will continue, however, to sponsor the development of operational and tactical joint littoral manoeuvre integrated effects and amphibious warfare concepts through the CF Maritime Warfare Centre.⁵¹

Though the above bold-faced text was not a part of the original government release, it does sum up the message nicely. What began as the SCTF, was redefined as the SCF, was trialed during the ITEE and was suspended due to competing priorities two years after the 2005 Defence Policy Statement (DPS) was released.⁵² In *CANFORGEN 059/07*, the responsibility to further develop the concept of integrated effects was further devolved in pairing the Chief of Force Development (CFD) organization teaming with the Chief of the Maritime Staff (CMS) organization; this would seem to, within CFD, free the concept from its amphibious roots. The statement that the CF will, “[move] forward from the SCF to the Future of IE within the CF, it is important to acknowledge the excellent

⁵⁰ DND, *CDS Action Team 3 Final Report*, 14.

⁵¹ Ministry of Public Works and Government Services. *Estimates: Performance Report for the Period Ending March 31, 2007*, (Ottawa: Queen’s Printers, 2007), 25.

⁵² 31 March 2007.

efforts made by numerous staffs in working to operationalize the vision of a transformed CF,” seems out of step with the follow-on idea that “the CF remains fully committed to the concept of integrated and unified forces and to the growing importance of the world littoral operating areas.”⁵³

If, on the other hand, the future of a Canadian amphibious capability is out of step with developing policy, it is reassuring to know that its future will lie in the realm of the force developers within the CMS and CFD organizations. With this capability representing a significant diversion from the path that the navy is currently on, there is no doubt that CMS, as a force generator and developer, will remain engaged in the decision-making process. Because the development of this joint capability can only move ahead after rigorous examination vis-à-vis the Future Security Environment (FSE) and the Future Force Structure, CFD has been rightly identified as the new home of the IRR concept.

The Future Security Environment

The FSE is designed to provide a future security environment review spanning the next twenty years. Part I is the heart of the FSE in that it examines the security environment as expressed by current and emerging trend analysis. Part II of the FSE, the classified portion, shall identify real and potential threats to the projected security environment ...⁵⁴

As advertised, the FSE is intended to inform the FD process by looking not only at trends, the past, but also the future as can be described by projecting trends forward and,

⁵³ Department of National Defence. *CANFORGEN 059/07 CDS 13/07*, NDHQ CDS OTTAWA 051855Z APR 07.

⁵⁴ Department of National Defence. Chief of Force Development. *Force development and Capability Based Planning 2900-1(DGFDA) v4.2 (Draft)*, (s.l.: s.n., 2007), 4.

as well, by tracking the whole gamut of scientific and social advancements in order to identify emerging trends and potential shocks. As concerns amphibiousness, the most telling projection from the FSE, also confirmed elsewhere, is that in just another two years, four of five persons on earth will reside within 100km of an ocean.⁵⁵ When taken in concert with other forecasted trends, the manoeuvre from the sea concept supports the capability-based development of littoral and landing ships.

Within the Pandora's box that is the FSE, much has been made of the forces that has seen humanity mass upon the shores of the oceans. In *Future Security Environment 2025*, Peter Johnston and Michael Roi cite urbanization, climate change and resource conflict as major drivers of the movement of peoples out of their traditional domains.⁵⁶

Furthermore, Johnston and Roi detail some of the many destabilizing influences that will affect peoples as they mass near the coasts; they cite criminalization and the increased likelihood of pandemic disease as grounds that will continue to undermine fragile and failed states.⁵⁷

Force Development and Employment

Having arrived at a point in time where it has been established that the USMC is a fully integrated, amphibious-capable force while the CF remains service-oriented and striving for 'jointness', the first of two questions that remain is this: were Canada's commitment

⁵⁵ SavetheSea.org, Help Save the Sea, *Interesting Ocean Facts*, http://www.savethesea.org/STS%20ocean_facts.htm; Internet; accessed 7 April 2008.

⁵⁶ Department of National Defence. Directorate of Operational Research (CORP). *Future Security Environment 2025*. (Ottawa: DOR(J), 2004), p 53-67.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p 68-77.

to Afghanistan to end tomorrow, would-should-could the CF Transform itself into a Marine Corps-like force in order to best develop and leverage its capabilities and capacities? While the answer to this question might appear to be obvious, does the 'should' aspect of the response change when the second question is asked: should Canada integrate its forces into a single, though total force given the historic employment of Canada's forces from 1945 to 2000?

The relationship between Force Development (FD) and Force Employment (FE) is complicated; it becomes even more complicated in a small force that shifts its people back and forth between the two areas of expertise, adding Force Generation (FG) postings into the mix for good measure. In the Canadian 'system', much of the heavy lifting of Force development is in fact done by Force Generators, coordinated by central staff Force Developers, with an understanding that postings to those environmental and central staffs are often understood to be little more than a break from operations. The integration of FD and FG (separately) and Coalition Advocacy, an FE function, was a significant thrust of Transformation. The CDS Action Team 2 report, *Enabling Transformation*, deals specifically with these issues but while the FD issue has been advanced, the fourth phase of CF Transformation, the FG piece, has not been dealt with, meaning that the overall effect has not been achieved with regards to FD, FG or FE. The FD work that has been done has focussed on capability-based planning through the examination of the Force Planning Scenario (FPS) set, as informed by the Future Security Environment (FSE).

Conclusion

As initially stated, armed services conceive, design, build and manage their forces across a number of different frameworks. It is the unique set of circumstances encountered, historic and contemporary that determines not only which framework is selected, but also influences the doctrinal development that accompanies capabilities and capacities. Thus has it been shown why it is that capabilities and/or doctrine do not easily pass from one nation to another. With this in mind, taking the position that Canada might be well-served by adopting the USMC model and culture is highly suspect not only on doctrinal grounds but, as well, for cultural reasons. The idea that a CMC might have proved useful historically or might be favourably viewed within the framework of the current FSE is not contested; it is only the ability of the CF to adopt the accompanying alien technology that is in doubt.

In the end, this paper reinforces ongoing FD efforts with regards to IRR, future force structures and doctrinal development, for without this piece neither transformation, nor revolution, nor evolution can continue. As with past Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMAs) and Military Revolutions (MRs), it has often been shown that any attempt to buy into the doctrine and tools of the RMA/MR after the fact can be disastrous. Lessons learned from the past cannot be forgotten, as when Grand Vizier Mustafa's modernized force failed to take Vienna in 1683, it was not a lack of tools that failed him – it was imperfectly applied Western doctrine and tactics that, in the end, saw him fail.⁵⁸ In terms

⁵⁸ Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 126.

more applicable to the original SCTF model, acquiring an amphibious platform without suitable doctrine would be akin to launching an amphibious assault without first securing the sea lines of communication, right up to the beaches.

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