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NATO POST-9/11: A NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT

By LCol M.J. Gilmore

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ABSTRACT

After the North Atlantic Treaty, the Strategic Concept is the cornerstone of NATO policy. It defines its purposes and missions and provides the strategic guidance for Alliance defence planning and force development. NATO’s current Strategic Concept was adopted in 1999, prior to the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington. This essay will show that the global security environment has fundamentally changed since 9/11. With the advent of the ‘war on terror’ and globalization, NATO faces new threats and challenges that demand new capabilities. Moreover, NATO must adapt its strategy to changes in the international system and incorporate important actors in a broader approach to security. Lastly, the 1999 Strategic Concept does not adequately reflect the transformation of the Alliance and the new missions it has embarked upon in the 21st century. This essay will demonstrate that NATO requires a new Strategic Concept to remain relevant in the post-9/11 era.
NATO POST-9/11: A NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT

...the new strategic environment means that NATO not only has to do things differently, but that it also has to do new things. Responding to this reality and preparing the necessary changes in terms of the political and military transformation of the Alliance certainly would require a new reference framework or Strategic Concept to be drawn up.¹

INTRODUCTION

At the 2008 Munich Conference on Security Policy, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), declared that NATO required a new Strategic Concept. He outlined changes to the global security environment since the 1999 Strategic Concept. He offered that lessons learned from recent ‘out-of-area’ operations should be incorporated into NATO strategy and defence planning. He explained NATO’s enlargement and its engagement with global partners and that the Alliance should be better integrated into the emerging network of international institutions.² In a recent article, he concluded that as NATO approaches its 60th anniversary, it must adapt to the challenges of the 21st century and revise its Strategic Concept. “It will strengthen our common purpose, and it will ensure that NATO remains understood by our publics, and relevant to their security needs.”³


Some pundits consider that transatlantic tensions have reached a critical threshold and that NATO is no longer relevant without a unifying external threat.\(^4\) This position overlooks the internal debates and discord since the Alliance’s inception and belies the nature of transatlantic cooperation during the Cold War. Throughout its history, NATO has faced numerous crises, many related to ‘out-of-area’ issues; each time it has adapted to incorporate new security threats and geo-political realities.\(^5\) The history of NATO’s evolution can be traced through the six versions of its Strategic Concept.

After the North Atlantic Treaty, the Strategic Concept is the cornerstone of Alliance policy.\(^6\) It is a defence planning document that defines NATO’s purposes and missions; it provides strategic guidance to NATO force planners on the military capabilities required for these missions and guidelines for the future orientation of its members’ armed forces.\(^7\) The Strategic Concepts adopted since the Cold War have also played a vital public diplomacy role explaining NATO’s political objectives, raison d’être, and relevance in the new strategic environment.\(^8\)

Historically, achieving consensus on the Strategic Concept has been a lengthy process of negotiation and compromise, occasionally causing significant friction between


\(^8\) Bardaji, *Prospects for a New NATO…*: 1.
Alliance members. Consequently, it is important to determine if the global security environment has changed so radically that NATO requires a new Concept. NATO’s structures, partnerships, and orientation have evolved significantly in the last decade; however, transatlantic relations are arguably at an all-time low; it is not certain that Allies could overcome the strategic divergences necessary to draft an unambiguous Strategic Concept.9

Some defence officials believe that the Alliance has not fully recovered from crisis precipitated by the Iraq War.10 Attempts to revise the Concept could divert attention away from more pressing concerns, renew harmful internal debates, and have disastrous consequences should they fail. Furthermore, many consider that the 1999 Strategic Concept, the Summit Declarations since 2001, and the 2006 Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG) provide an adequate framework and sufficient strategic direction for the Alliance.11 Yet, this perspective underestimates the challenges facing NATO today.12 “A formal restatement of NATO’s purposes, agreed to by its members, is necessary and, [seven] years after 9/11, overdue.”13

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9 Ibid., 2-3.


12 van Ham, “NATO and the Madonna Curve….”

“NATO … suffers from a deficit of strategic vision … [it] has yet to produce a long term strategy that everyone can coalesce around.”

This essay will argue that NATO requires a new Strategic Concept for the following reasons:

- NATO faces new threats and challenges in a global security environment that has fundamentally changed since 9/11.
- NATO must adapt its strategy to changes in the international system and incorporate important actors in a broader approach to security.
- The 1999 Strategic Concept does not adequately reflect the transformation of the Alliance and the new NATO missions in the 21st century.

The first part of this essay will consider the evolution of NATO’s Strategic Concept, highlighting factors that shaped its development during and after the Cold War. The second part will consider the new strategic context within which the Alliance exists. First, it will underline the new threats to Euro-Atlantic security. Second, it will consider the emerging international system and emphasize the potential impact on NATO strategy. Third, it will examine NATO’s transformation and the new missions it has embarked upon over the last decade. Finally, it will identify some of the important issues to be resolved in order to develop a new Concept. This essay will not consider how the Concept should be modified or whether it is achievable.


15 For discussions on modification the Alliance could make to its Strategic Concept, the likelihood of success, and the potential benefits to NATO to go through the process of revising its Strategic Concept see Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier, “Global NATO,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 5 (September/October 2006); http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060901faessay85509/ivo-daalder-james-goldgeier/global-nato.html; Internet; accessed 15 January 2008; Michael Rühle, “NATO after Prague: Learning the Lessons of 9/11,”

The Marshall Plan committed the United States (US) to the economic reconstruction of Europe to ensure stability on the continent. However, by 1948, it was clear that a transatlantic alliance was necessary due to the inability of the United Nations (UN) and the Western Union\(^\text{16}\) to provide security for Western Europe and the growing Soviet threat. Without an American guarantee of European security, the Marshall Plan could not succeed.\(^\text{17}\) The North Atlantic Treaty created NATO as a collective defence institution designed to contain the Soviet Union and ensure a US commitment to defend Western Europe against the Warsaw Pact.\(^\text{18}\)

First Strategic Concept - 1949

NATO quickly established structures to facilitate strategic and operational defence planning; “a key aspect of which would be the development of an overall Strategic Concept for the Alliance.”\(^\text{19}\) Military planners assessed that Soviet conventional forces were numerically superior to NATO’s and that the pre-eminence of American nuclear

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\(^\text{16}\) The Western Union Defence Organization (WUDO), formed under the 1948 Treaty of Brussels, included Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (UK). In 1954, it was expanded to include West Germany and Italy and renamed the Western European Union (WEU). It plays a role in the European Security Defence Policy (ESDP) within the EU. See Stanley R. Sloan, *NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 167-170.


technology would produce a transatlantic capability gap. These two factors dominated NATO strategy and planning during the Cold War.\textsuperscript{20} The first Strategic Concept, \textit{DC 6/1 – Strategic Concept for the Defence of the North Atlantic Area}, approved December 1949, was intended “to establish an effective defence posture for NATO in the face of a clearly perceived threat from the Soviet Union.”\textsuperscript{21} Alliance planning focused on providing collective defence in the Euro-Atlantic area while minimizing defence expenditures by depending on US strategic bombing to defend Europe.\textsuperscript{22}

**Second Strategic Concept - 1952**

This Concept was intended to guide detailed contingency planning until 1954; however, the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 compelled the Alliance to react sooner. NATO assessed that the North Korean invasion was supported by the Soviet Union and that Europe would be the next target of Soviet-sponsored aggression.\textsuperscript{23} NATO responded by improving its organizational structure\textsuperscript{24} and establishing an integrated military command structure; it was the catalyst that transformed NATO into a genuine military organization.\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{20}\textit{Ibid.}, xi.

\textsuperscript{21} Schneider, “The Evolution of NATO…:” 15.

\textsuperscript{22} NATO, \textit{DC 6/1 - The Strategic Concept for the Defence of the North Atlantic Area} (Brussels: NATO, 1949) [document on-line]; available from \url{http://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a491201a.pdf}; Internet; accessed 9 March 2008, 5. Specific reference to nuclear weapons was removed from the final draft, but their use was implicit in NATO planning. See Pedrow, “The Evolution of NATO…:” xiii.


\textsuperscript{24} Instead of periodic meetings of Foreign and Defence Ministers, a permanent session of the North Atlantic Council was established along with the position of Secretary General. See Pedrow, “The Evolution of NATO…:” xiii, xv.

\textsuperscript{25} Kaplan, \textit{NATO Divided, NATO United…}, 9-10.
Greece and Turkey joined the Alliance in 1952, prompting the first review of the Strategic Concept. The result was *MC 3/5 – The Strategic Concept for the Defence of the North Atlantic Area*, approved December 1952.\(^ {26}\) Apart from structural changes to NATO, this Concept was very similar to its predecessor. However, subsequent military guidance concluded that the impact of nuclear weapons and improved delivery technologies combined with the significant shortage of conventional forces would require a re-evaluation of the military requirements to defend the expanded Alliance.\(^ {27}\)

**Third Strategic Concept - 1957**

It was financially and politically impossible to increase defence spending to defend Europe with conventional forces as envisioned in *MC 3/5*. In 1953, US defence policy sought to improve military effectiveness and reduce defence spending through greater reliance on nuclear weapons to overcome Soviet conventional superiority. This policy evolved into the doctrine of ‘massive retaliation.’\(^ {28}\) “It emphasized deterrence based on the threat that NATO would respond to any aggression against its member countries by every means at its disposal, specifically nuclear weapons.”\(^ {29}\)

Key developments in the mid-1950s convinced NATO to revise its Strategic Concept. In 1954, the French surrendered their colonies in Indochina; after the collapse of the European Defence Community, West Germany joined NATO. In 1956, the Suez Crisis paralyzed the Alliance and the Soviet Union invaded Hungary while NATO was

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unable to formulate an effective response. These events exaggerated transatlantic tensions and made NATO aware of the indirect, but significant, impact that Soviet activities outside of the NATO area had on Euro-Atlantic security. Consequently, the Alliance integrated the ‘massive retaliation’ doctrine into its Strategic Concept.

In May 1957, *MC 14/2 – Overall Strategic Concept for the Defence of the NATO Area* was approved. Intended to create an effective deterrent to any possible Soviet aggression, NATO’s conventional forces would serve as a trip-wire for an immediate massive retaliation with US nuclear weapons in response to a major Soviet attack. Additionally, the new Concept identified military capabilities necessary to respond to lesser contingencies “without necessarily having to recourse to nuclear weapons.”

**Fourth Strategic Concept - 1968**

The first Sputnik launch in October 1957, combined with other developments in Soviet military technology – long-range bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles – demonstrated that the US could be attacked directly. It undermined the credibility of the

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30 “Although NATO defence planning is limited to the defence of the Treaty area, it is necessary to take account of dangers which may arise for NATO because of developments outside that area.” See NATO, C-M (56)138(Final) - Directive to the NATO Military Authorities from the North Atlantic Council (Brussels: NATO, 1956) [document on-line]; available from [http://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a561213a.pdf](http://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a561213a.pdf); Internet; accessed 9 March 2008, 7.


33 This was also referred to as a ‘forward defence’. The conventional forces were considered as the ‘shield’ and the nuclear forces as the ‘sword.’ See Schneider, “The Evolution of NATO….” 15, 31.

‘massive retaliation’ doctrine. America was no longer invulnerable; the Europeans feared that the US would not use its nuclear arsenal to defend Europe in all circumstances.\textsuperscript{35}

The start of the 2nd Berlin Crisis in 1958 also caused Allies to question the effectiveness of this strategy and seek alternative responses to Soviet threats below the threshold of an all-out attack. America was concerned that an accident or miscalculation could trigger a major conflict. This was reinforced by the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Consequently, America wanted NATO contingency planning to focus on scenarios below a nuclear or large-scale conventional attack.\textsuperscript{36}

Attempts to advance a ‘flexible response’ strategy based on a graduated response with a combination of tactical and strategic conventional and nuclear forces were strongly resisted by the Europeans, particularly the French who saw this as a “betrayal of Europe.”\textsuperscript{37} Others were concerned that Europe could become a battlefield in a limited nuclear exchange between the Soviets and Americans. The debate lasted a decade. Only in 1966, when France withdrew from NATO’s integrated military command structure and the Defence Planning Committee (DPC), was the impasse resolved.\textsuperscript{38}

In January 1968, the ‘flexible response’ doctrine was enshrined in \textit{MC 14/3 – Overall Strategic Concept for the Defence of the NATO Area}. This strategy would “prevent the potential aggressor from predicting with confidence NATO’s specific response to aggression, and … lead him to conclude that an unacceptable degree of risk

\textsuperscript{35} Schneider, “The Evolution of NATO…” 15.

\textsuperscript{36} Pedrow, “The Evolution of NATO…” xxix-xxiii.

\textsuperscript{37} Kaplan, \textit{NATO Divided, NATO United…}, 32.

\textsuperscript{38} Schneider, “The Evolution of NATO…” 39-40. For more information on France’s withdrawal from NATO’s military command and force planning structures and the impact on NATO, see Kaplan, \textit{NATO Divided, NATO United…}, 33-35.
would be involved regardless of the nature of his attack.”

That same year, the Alliance accepted the Harmel Report’s recommendations for a dual emphasis on defence and constructive dialogue, including arms control, to de-escalate the Cold War – “détente became the second pillar of NATO.”

This flexible Concept remained relevant for two decades, longer than any previous strategy. It survived various crises and disputes – the Vietnam War, strategic nuclear disarmament negotiations, disillusionment with détente, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the Strategic Defence Initiative. However, the end of the Cold War and the East-West division of Europe would force the Alliance to completely revise its Strategic Concept.


With the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the unifying threat that shaped NATO strategy disappeared; many predicted the demise of the Alliance. Subsequently, NATO decided to adapt its purpose, expand its political role, and assume new missions in transatlantic security in addition to its core tasks. Allies realized that collective security

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41 Schneider, “The Evolution of NATO…” 16; and Cragg, “A New Strategic Concept …” 22.

42 Pedrow, “The Evolution of NATO…” xxv.


and safeguarding the principles of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law could no longer be achieved solely by military means.\textsuperscript{45} Moreover, NATO needed to demonstrate that it was still relevant and necessary despite developments in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and “clearly articulate to the public its new missions as they [had] evolved.”\textsuperscript{46}

**Fifth Strategic Concept - 1991**

In November 1991, NATO approved a new Strategic Concept based on three mutually supporting elements: collective defence, pan-European cooperation, and dialogue with the countries of the former Soviet Union and CEE.\textsuperscript{47} It maintained collective defence as the Alliance’s fundamental purpose combined with a commitment to improve security and stability across Europe. To reaffirm NATO’s continued relevance, the Concept “differed dramatically from its predecessors; it was issued as a public document, open for discussion and comment by parliaments, security specialists, journalists and the wider public.”\textsuperscript{48}

This Concept encompassed a broader approach to security through political and military means. It placed important emphasis on arms control, nuclear disarmament, and reducing conventional forces in Europe. It considered a wider range of military tasks, including conflict prevention and crisis management, and prescribed new capabilities and

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\textsuperscript{47} Woodliffe, “The Evolution of a…” 175.

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\textsuperscript{48} Cragg, “A New Strategic Concept…” 22.
structures to accomplish these tasks. It also identified a distinct European role in regional stability through the European Security Defence Identity. This Concept effectively transformed NATO into a collective security organization.

The Soviet Union collapsed soon after the 1991 Strategic Concept was adopted; nonetheless, it was a viable policy as NATO’s perception of the new security environment evolved. The threat of general war was replaced by vague and indirect threats resulting from regional instability around the periphery of Alliance territory due to ethnic conflicts, widespread abuse of human rights, political volatility, and economic fragility. Further, Euro-Atlantic security could be jeopardized through the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and other sophisticated military technologies.

Latest Strategic Concept - 1999

The violent dissolution of Yugoslavia forced the Alliance to adjust to the new global security environment and revise its Strategic Concept sooner than anticipated. Crisis management needed a credible military response, but the required capabilities were incompatible with those outlined in the 1991 Concept; these missions did not fit into the simple spectrum of operations conceived in the aftermath of the Cold War. To ensure security and stability, NATO needed to modify its structure and strategy.

At the 1994 Brussels Summit, NATO established a formal framework for cooperation between the Alliance and CEE countries. It also agreed to make Alliance


50 Cragg, “A New Strategic Concept …:” 20.


52 Schneider, “The Evolution of NATO…:” 58-60.
forces available for crisis response operations under a UN or a CSCE mandate. The following year, NATO deployed military forces to the Balkans under a UN mandate. This was an important precedent for NATO; the North Atlantic Treaty had no provision to conduct operations outside Alliance territory to defend a third party.

In 1997, NATO made three important decisions to increase cooperation and establish formal relationships with former Warsaw Pact states. First, NATO and the Russian Federation signed the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security. Second, NATO and Ukraine signed the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine. Third, and most importantly, the Alliance invited the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to join the Alliance. Subsequently, Allies amended the Strategic Concept in 1999 to reflect the changes in NATO policy and membership, its commitment to crisis management and conflict prevention, and the changes in Europe.

53 NATO, The Brussels Summit Declaration (Brussels: NATO, 1994) [document on-line]; available from http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b940111a.htm; Internet; accessed 19 February 2008. Crisis Response Operations are called non-Article 5 operations. In Article 5, the “Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.” There are no articles in the North Atlantic Treaty for the use of military force other than for self-defence. See NATO, The North Atlantic Treaty (Washington: NATO, 1949) [document on-line]; available from http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm; Internet; accessed 19 February 2008. The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was renamed in 1995 as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

54 The General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

55 Bardaji, Prospects for a New NATO…: 2.


57 Wittman, “NATO’s New Strategic Concept;” 10; Cragg, “A New Strategic Concept…;” 22; and Hatfield, “NATO’s New Strategic Concept;” 2.
Collective defence, the transatlantic link, and a commitment to the UN Charter and international law remained the foundation of the 1999 Strategic Concept. However, enhancing security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area was formally added to the core defence tasks of the Alliance – security, consultation, deterrence and defence. The Concept also recognized that Alliance security could be affected non-traditional military threats – including terrorism. A more comprehensive approach was developed to address security concerns by emphasizing cooperation and partnership with the EU, other international organizations, and non-NATO states. This Concept transformed NATO from a collective security organization into one that attaches more importance to the political dimension and expanded its focus beyond the Euro-Atlantic area.

Summary

The first part of this essay examined the global context and the principal factors that shaped the Alliance’s Strategic Concept since 1949. It demonstrated that key events, such as the Korean War and the first Sputnik launch, radically changed the Alliance’s perception of the threats and challenges it faced. Further, to develop the necessary military guidance and capabilities to tackle these new threats and incorporate its structural evolution, NATO has had to periodically adapt its Strategic Concept. The remainder of the essay will consider the new global security environment, the evolving international system, Alliance transformation, and NATO operations to demonstrate that NATO must revise its Concept again. It will also identify some of the outstanding issues that need to be resolved in order to revise NATO’s Strategic Concept.


THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’ – NATO AND GLOBALIZATION, POST-9/11

Like the Korean War five decades before, the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon provided a similar catalyst for the rapid transformation of NATO.\(^{60}\) For the first time, NATO evoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty; however, under circumstances unforeseen by the drafters of the original treaty – a non-conventional attack launched from outside the Euro-Atlantic area by a non-state actor. It changed the Alliance by redefining collective defence and effectively made “combating terrorism an enduring NATO mission.”\(^{61}\) Equally significant, like the Sputnik launch, it made the US acutely aware of its vulnerability to external threats.

**New Global Security Environment**

In the post-9/11 era, with the advent of the war on terror and globalization, there is a realization that the global security environment has fundamentally changed since the last Strategic Concept. The Cold War paradigm of an East versus West competition has been replaced by a conflict between the ‘functioning core of globalization’ and those states that cannot benefit or participate in it.\(^{62}\) This disparity can cause greater instability and lead to resentment, WMD proliferation, terrorism, and conflict.\(^{63}\)

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\(^{60}\) Goodpaster, “Pillars from the Past…:” vii; Kaplan, *NATO Divided, NATO United…*, 134; and Daalder and Goldgeier, “Global NATO.”

\(^{61}\) Rühlé, “NATO after Prague …:” 93.


\(^{63}\) Steinberg, “An Elective Partnership…:” 131.
Greater interdependence and interconnectedness worldwide has led to the globalization of security.\textsuperscript{64} Local instability can quickly destabilize a region and adversely affect security elsewhere. Consequently, weak states can threaten Euro-Atlantic security as much as strong ones. States no longer have a monopoly on force and non-state actors have a greater influence and role on the world stage.\textsuperscript{65} Globalization “facilitates the global reach of terrorism and proliferation and makes societies everywhere sensitive to the consequences of extremes attacks in other parts of the world.”\textsuperscript{66}

States have redefined national security to include concepts like human security, energy security, and homeland defence.\textsuperscript{67} They are concerned with multi-dimensional, transnational threats to security such as climate change, environmental degradation, pandemics, international crime, WMD proliferation, and terrorism.\textsuperscript{68} Moreover, traditional deterrence and collective defence mechanisms are insufficient; new military capabilities and tactics are required in response to these emerging threats.\textsuperscript{69}

Only a multi-lateral and comprehensive approach, involving non-traditional partners and an increasing number of non-state actors, can effectively address the root causes of these threats and avoid the growing disparity and future instability fuelled by


\textsuperscript{67} Shen, “Can Alliances Combat Contemporary…:” 166.

\textsuperscript{68} Steinberg, “An Elective Partnership…:” 114.

\textsuperscript{69} McCaskill, “An Alliance Divided…:” 105.
globalization. Accordingly, NATO must expand its scope and develop new institutional skill sets in order to participate in the ‘global governance’ of security. Conversely, Allies must answer an important question. Given the tremendous diversity and scope of these challenges, can a primarily military organization transform sufficiently to participate in this new approach independently or must it be part of a broader entity?

**Emerging International System**

The 1999 Strategic Concept is insufficient in light of the considerable changes to the international system since 9/11. One of the most important changes is the re-emergence of Russia as a global power and the impact on its relationship with NATO. “The West’s relations with Russia are increasingly marked by a mix of cooperation and competition.” Russia is the foremost energy supplier to Europe and European Allies do not want to antagonize Russia needlessly. Russia is unlikely to threaten European security like the Soviet Union during the Cold War, but it has become more belligerent in

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72 For more information and discussion on why NATO, or any alliance, may or may not be an effective institution to address these transnational security threats see Sabeel Rahman, “Another New World Order?” *Harvard International Review* 23, no. 4 (Winter 2002): 40-44; [http://www.proquest.umi.com](http://www.proquest.umi.com); Internet, accessed 1 February 2008; Shen, “Can Alliances Combat Contemporary…:” 165-170; and Steinberg, “An Elective Partnership…:” 125-140.


74 At the recent Bucharest Summit, France and Germany blocked a US initiative to invite Ukraine and Georgia to join NATO. One of the key reasons was Russia’s negative view of previous NATO expansion into Eastern Europe and the perception that the Alliance is attempting to surround and contain the Russian Federation. See Bruno, “The NATO Alliance at War.”
response to NATO enlargement and missile defence plans.\textsuperscript{75} Equally, NATO will need Russian cooperation on a wide number of shared threats such as international terrorism and nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. NATO needs a new strategy to address these challenges and develop a more equal relationship with Russia.\textsuperscript{76}

The EU has a crucial role to play in transatlantic and global security. It has become an important security actor in Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia and it has access to resources and capabilities necessary for post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction.\textsuperscript{77} The nascent Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security Defence Policy (ESDP) can alter the framework for NATO-EU cooperation substantially.\textsuperscript{78} However, neither the 1999 Strategic Concept nor the CPG “adequately accommodate the advent of the EU as a security player.”\textsuperscript{79} NATO and the EU have successfully cooperated at the tactical level in operations in the Balkans and Sudan, but a fundamental shift in structure and approach is required to enable substantial cooperation at the strategic level.\textsuperscript{80}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{76} Kaplan, \textit{NATO Divided, NATO United…}, 148.
\item \textsuperscript{78} Bardaji, \textit{Prospects for a New…}: 2. In June 2007, the EU launched a new EU Treaty subsequent to the aborted 2005 EU constitution. It should be ratified by 1 January 2009 and will come into effect in mid-2009. It is not clear if this will produce a new impetus to the CFSP and ESDP.
\item \textsuperscript{79} Burwell, \textit{et al.}, \textit{Transatlantic Transformation: Building a …}: vii.
\item \textsuperscript{80} For more information on ESDP and EU-NATO cooperation, see \textit{ibid.}, 5-20; and Alexander Moens, “European Defence and NATO: The Case for New Governance,” \textit{International Journal} 56, no. 2 (Spring 2001) [journal on-line]; http://www.proquest.umi.com; Internet: accessed 25 January 2008.
\end{itemize}
Another important consideration is the announcement at the 2008 Bucharest Summit that France intends to re-integrate into NATO’s defence and force planning structures by the end of this year.\(^1\) France is a nuclear power with one of the most capable armed forces in NATO and a major contributor to Alliance operations.\(^2\) France is also a strong proponent for a distinct European defence capability and a balanced NATO-EU relationship. Rejoining the DPC, the Nuclear Planning Group, and the integrated military command structure will influence NATO strategy and decision-making considerably.

In addition to these three key actors, there are other developments in the international system that NATO must also consider – the rise of China and India as global economic and military powers, Iranian nuclear ambitions, and a nuclear-armed North Korea. They are potential threats to regional stability and can therefore threaten transatlantic security indirectly.\(^3\) NATO must determine how the transatlantic political and security architecture will evolve and the Alliance’s position within the emerging international system.\(^4\) Subsequently, NATO must modify its Strategic Concept to meet this vision to remain relevant in view of these important developments.


\(^3\) CIIA. “NATO – A Future or Demise?” [http://www.igloo.org/ciiia/Programs%20and%20Activities/conferen/natoafut](http://www.igloo.org/ciiia/Programs%20and%20Activities/conferen/natoafut); Internet; accessed 1 February 2008.

\(^4\) Schneider, “The Evolution of NATO…” 110.
NATO Transformation

Since 9/11, NATO has transformed from a collective defence organization to one primarily involved in post-conflict operations. The Alliance identifies the key threats to transatlantic security as international terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, and instability resulting from failed and failing states. Furthermore, these threats emanate from a far wider area outside Europe – “concentrated in an arc of crisis that stretches from Northern Africa through the wider Middle East to Afghanistan and Pakistan into Central Asia.”

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon and NATO has previously considered it a danger in earlier Concepts, but it has become a more powerful and widespread threat of global proportions that affects the security of all members.

To adapt to these threats, NATO transformed its structures and capabilities to tackle them at their source. It renovated its integrated military command and force structure from a Cold War static defensive model to an expeditionary model with greater mobility, deployability, and usability. Through the Prague Capabilities Commitment and other initiatives such as the NATO Response Force, the Alliance continues to adapt its forces and develop capabilities necessary for the challenges and threats it faces.

Importantly, NATO has also continued to enlarge its membership and expand its global cooperation initiatives. At the 2002 Prague Summit, it invited seven countries to

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join the Alliance and there are strong indications that NATO will continue to expand. At the Bucharest Summit, two more countries were offered membership and a third invitation is pending. NATO also sent positive signals to other CEE countries that they might be considered for future membership. NATO has expanded its global outreach and cooperation programs with the Mediterranean Dialogue countries and launched the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative in 2004. It has also established a formal dialogue with democratic countries in the Pacific region that are contributing to NATO operations.

At the 2006 Riga Summit, the Alliance agreed on a CPG “which provides a framework and political direction for NATO’s continuing transformation, setting out, for the next 10-15 years, the priorities for all Alliance capability issues, planning disciplines and intelligence.” However, while the CPG and the Summit Declarations since 2001

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89 Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia were formally invited to join the Alliance at Prague. All acceded to NATO on 29 March 2004. See NATO, Prague Summit Declaration.

90 Albania and Croatia were invited to join NATO and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) may receive an invitation if it can resolve the difficulties with Greece over its constitutional name. See NATO, Bucharest Summit Declaration.

91 NATO has expanded its cooperation with Ukraine and Georgia and the US wanted to offer a Membership Action Plan (MAP); however, France and Germany blocked this. NATO has left the door open for these two countries to seek future membership if they wish to, but it is uncertain what the limits of NATO enlargement are. See Steven Erlanger and Steven Lee Myers, “NATO Allies Oppose Bush on Georgia and Ukraine,” New York Times, 3 April 2008, [newspaper on-line]; available from http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/03/world/europe/03nato.html; Internet; accessed 12 April 2008.

92 The MD was established in 1996 with Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia and has since launched the NATO Cooperation Training Initiative to pursue military to military cooperation and defence reform with these countries. See NATO, Final Communiqué - Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council (Berlin: NATO, 2006) [document on-line]; available from http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1996/p96-063e.htm; Internet; accessed 29 March 2008. ICI targeted the six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Four countries have agreed to participate in the ICI, Saudi Arabia and Oman declined. See NATO, Istanbul Summit Declaration.

93 Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea are referred to as Contact Countries. See NATO, Riga Summit Declaration.

94 Ibid.
acknowledge the new threats in the global security environment and justify the continual transformation of the Alliance, they do not substantially define NATO’s position in the emerging international order. NATO requires a new Strategic Concept to incorporate all aspects of its transformation within the context of an agreed vision of the international system and explain how NATO will operate within it.

**NATO Operations**

Since 1999, the geographical and functional scope of NATO operations has expanded significantly beyond stabilization and reconstruction missions in the Balkans. “The Alliance now takes on jobs that are no longer strictly related to territorial integrity and security, but pertain to international stability more broadly.”\(^{95}\) The first new mission that it embarked on was counter-terrorism. Soon after 9/11, NATO deployed AWACS\(^{96}\) assets to America under Operation Eagle Assist and launched Operation Active Endeavour to help detect and deter terrorist activity in the Mediterranean Sea. NATO routinely provides AWACS assets to member nations throughout Europe to prevent terrorist attacks during high profile events.

The Alliance has also become involved in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions. In 2005, following a request by the African Union (AU), NATO supported the expansion of the AU peacekeeping mission in Darfur by providing airlift support for additional AU peacekeepers and training AU personnel. That same year, NATO also helped to transport humanitarian relief donations to south-eastern US after Hurricane Katrina; it provided airlift, medical and engineering support following the

\(^{95}\) Daalder and Goldgeier, “Global NATO.”

\(^{96}\) Airborne Early Warning and Control.
devastating earthquake in northern Pakistan; and it made transportation and logistics support available to Indonesia in the wake of a major tsunami.  

However, the most significant NATO operation is the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) which has been ongoing in Afghanistan since 2003. ISAF marks the effective end of NATO’s ‘out-of-area’ debate and sees the emergence of important new roles for NATO. In addition to security and stability tasks, ISAF is responsible for civilian and government activities – promoting good governance, establishing civilian institutions and the rule of law, training security forces, and capacity building. Controversially, NATO is also conducting counter-insurgency operations against non-state actors. As a result, ISAF has highlighted significant challenges for NATO; de facto ‘coalitions of the willing’ in higher threat areas has renewed debates on Alliance burden sharing, unity, and cohesion. NATO has staked its future on success in Afghanistan. Allies need to understand collectively the implications of the ISAF strategy for NATO and the security environment and adapt its Strategic Concept accordingly.


99 CIIA. “NATO – A Future or Demise?” This is not the first instance that NATO has trained security forces. While the debate on the Iraq War caused a significant rift between the US and some of the major European allies, in 2004 NATO agreed to provide ‘out-of-area’ training for the Iraqi security forces. See NATO, The Istanbul Declaration.

100 At the 2008 Summit; NATO announced the Comprehensive Political-Military Strategy for Afghanistan. This may become the blueprint for NATO strategic cooperation with the UN, the EU, the World Bank and other international actors in future post-conflict and stabilization operations. See NATO, ISAF’s Strategic Vision (Bucharest: NATO, 2008) [document on-line]; available from [http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-052e.html](http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-052e.html); Internet; accessed 4 April 2008.
Outstanding Issues

There are several critical issues that the Allies failed to achieve consensus on while drafting the 1999 Strategic Concept. First, they could not define the geographical limitations of NATO’s authority and potential ‘out-of-area’ operations. Second, they failed to specify the circumstances under which NATO could engage in these operations. Third, they could not concur whether NATO required a UN mandate to conduct such operations and still maintain its commitment to international law. Fourth, they differed on how NATO should interact with other institutions in the post-Cold War international system. Lastly, they could not agree to update NATO’s nuclear policy. None of these issues have been addressed in the Summits since 1999.

Since the Kosovo campaign, there has been a gradual acceptance that the International Community has the right and responsibility under international law to interfere in intra-state affairs to defend human rights and individual security; however, NATO has yet to clarify its position on this issue. NATO must consider its future as a military alliance “in an era where energy cut-offs and cyber-terrorism are the preferred lines of attack.” Most importantly, NATO needs to clearly define the meaning and scope of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty with respect to ongoing operations and

101 For more information on the internal debates and the discussions on the UN mandate issue and other internal debates during the lead up to the 1999 revision of the 1991 Strategic Concept, see Hatfield, “NATO’s New Strategic Concept:” 4-5. It is ironic that the 1999 Strategic Concept was approved in the midst of the Kosovo bombing campaign – a NATO operation conducted without a UN mandate and based on the controversial principle of humanitarian intervention and. See Hatfield, “NATO’s New Strategic Concept:” 3-4; and Schneider, “The Evolution of NATO…” 73.

102 NATO’s nuclear policy has not changed since the 1991 Strategic Concept. See Schneider, “The Evolution of NATO…” 101-103.


104 van Ham, “NATO and the Madonna ….”
collective defence commitments in response to attacks by non-state actors. The Alliance must address these issues in order to develop a new Strategic Concept.

CONCLUSION

NATO has evolved in three distinct eras: the Cold War era, the ‘Interwar’ era, and the post-9/11 era. During the first era, NATO strategy focussed on the Soviet threat to Europe. It ended with the collapse of the communist system. In the second era, NATO adapted to a new strategic environment as demonstrated by its interventions in the Balkans and expansion into Eastern Europe. This era ended on 9/11. In the third era, NATO continues to adapt, but has yet to agree to revise its Strategic Concept. “The generally accepted view at NATO today does not revolve around whether the Alliance needs a new Strategic Concept or not, but around when it should be formulated.” At the Bucharest Summit, Allies pledged to prepare a “Declaration of Alliance Security” for the 2009 Summit. It is not clear what the scope of this new declaration will be, but it is considerably less than an agreement to revise the Strategic Concept.

There are several reasons why NATO must revise its Concept. One, the global security environment has fundamentally changed. There are new and emerging threats that require adaptive structures and a global, comprehensive approach with a broader range of international actors. Two, the 21st century international order is dynamic and the Alliance needs to adapt its strategy in consideration of the new challenges and actors in the ‘global governance’ of security. Three, the 1999 Strategic Concept and the various Summit Declarations issued since do not sufficiently encapsulate the entirety of NATO’s

105 Bardaji, Prospects for a New NATO…: 5.
106 Ibid., 1.
107 NATO, Bucharest Summit Declaration.
transformation in the 21st century. NATO has conducted a broad spectrum of non-traditional ‘out-of-area’ operations in the US, the Mediterranean Sea, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and Sudan. It has effectively assumed a global area of operations that extends well beyond the Alliance’s area of responsibility as defined in the North Atlantic Treaty. “Explaining this scope to the public is no trivial task.” 108

Before NATO can revise its Strategic Concept, it must resolve some important issues. Is transforming a military alliance the most effective way to address the security challenges of the 21st century? What is the vision of the future security architecture and NATO’s role within it? What are the implications for the use of military force in ‘out-of-area’ crisis response and post-conflict operations and what is NATO’s legal mandate, particularly against non-state actors? Finally, Allies have to agree on a revised definition of Article 5 and collective defence in the era of globalization and globalized security. 109

The evolution of the Alliance’s strategy needs to be more than just a collection of Summit Communiqués and Declarations. To remain relevant, NATO’s ongoing transformation, persistent enlargement, and global outreach to non-European partners needs to be incorporated, explained, and justified in a new and overarching Strategic Concept as the “core mission statement of the Alliance.” 110 NATO needs a new Concept to codify the expanded range of its missions since 2001, redefine the organization in a global context, and “re-align the Alliance to meet new, more uncertain challenges.” 111


109 van Ham, “NATO and the Madonna ….”

110 Ibid.

111 Goodpaster, “Pillars from the Past…:” vii.
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