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Reconciling the Navy, Formal Education and Officer Professional Development

By Commander Brian A. Costello, 25 April, 2008

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines the conventional wisdom that “traditionally, the Navy has placed little emphasis on the need for higher education” and is “anti-intellectual.”

It first uses the historical record to show that it is not simply a polar issue of the RCN being ‘for’ or ‘against’ formal education, but rather of the priority being production of sufficient officers to maintain a Navy and put a capable fleet to sea – in essence a quantity versus quality decision.

Having thus framed the issue as a question of force generation vice cultural inclination, the paper argues that in order to reconcile the Navy’s perspective with that of the contemporary pressures for Transformation and a degreed officer corps, education within the overall Officer Professional Development System (OPDS) must be shown to have operational value.

The paper concludes that a potential bridging logic exists in the compelling parallels between the Canadian Defence Academy (CDA)’s professional development construct and the Army’s fighting power construct. This has not been fully recognized to date, but could prove key to resolving an otherwise polarized and confrontational debate by operationalizing formal education.
The direction in which education starts a man will determine his future life.1
- Plato -

INTRODUCTION

In March 1997, the Minister of National Defence (MND) submitted a sweeping report to the Prime Minister (PM) regarding the leadership and management of the Canadian Forces (CF). Within it, advice received from several noted academics highlighted perceived deficiencies in the formal academic education of the Canadian officer corps and would underpin one of the key recommendations concerning training, education and professional development: that in light of the fact that “the CF [had] a remarkably ill-educated officer corps, surely one of the worst in the Western world,”2 henceforth all officers should hold at least an undergraduate degree.3 Widely touted as finally “completing a reform process first mooted in 1946,”4 the edict became policy the next year, with the phasing out of the non-degree entry plans by 2001.

In practice however, implementation proved problematic in the contemporary recruiting environment, with many operational occupations critically short of personnel due to the loss of a significant recruiting pool, and the concurrent requirement to have

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1 In The Republic


3 Hon M. Douglas Young, Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces (the Young Report) (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1997); http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/minister/eng/pm/mnd60.html; Internet; accessed 17 January 2008.

those officers already serving obtain degrees. Limited entry to non-degreed recruits was re-instated on a case-by-case basis over 2002-2004, and more permanently re-established as an entry programme in 2005, causing one of the MND’s advisors to bemoan that “the great Canadian military experiment in officer education … is in danger” and that the CF had again taken “a backward step in education.” At the same time, another of the MND’s advisors, aghast at how those officers already serving were pursuing ‘professional’ vice ‘academic’ degrees, said that he would never have made his recommendations if he had known they were going to be mocked in implementation.

While the Navy had been identified as being “the most professional” of the Services (with the 1997 report focusing more on shortcomings in the Army), the fact that it has since been the Navy driving the initiatives described above has breathed new life into the enduring opinion that the Navy is simply “anti-intellectual,” a trait inherited wholesale from the Royal Navy (RN) at birth and steadfastly maintained by the Royal

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Canadian Navy (RCN) until first the Mainguy Report and then MND10 forced a resistant Navy to change.9

This paper will not deny the obvious and understandable influences of the RN, nor argue against the established facts of what the RCN’s past training and education programmes have consisted of. Rather, it will use the historical record to show that it is not simply a polar issue of the RCN being ‘for’ or ‘against’ formal education. Neither is it a question that can be considered in isolation from the wider political-military context in which the various training schemes were set. In fact, there is ample evidence to show that it was not a dogmatic position, but rather a consciously considered one adopted in light of the pressures the RCN leadership faced in simply maintaining a Navy and putting a capable fleet to sea.10

This is an important distinction, because dispelling the simplistic myth that the RCN’s officer corps were nothing more than mindless “toadies to the RN”11 permits that there was rational decision-making behind the training schemes, regardless of whether they are judged to have been correct or not. In that vein, it then becomes considerably more accurate to instead say that historically “the RCN … did not place a premium on formal education”12 and then ask ‘what did they place a premium on?’ This paper argues

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that this line of inquiry, supported by evidence of the Navy’s position within later CF-
common educational strategies, is key to defining the terms on which contemporary
arguments for change and evolution in Officer Professional Development (OPD) can be
based such that they may be more readily perceived and adopted by the Navy’s
leadership.

The conclusion is made that, in order to be adopted by an operationally-focussed
navy short of personnel, the subject of OPD must be framed in terms of modern
operational force generation and that in fact, a ready construct for accomplishing this
already exists. However, it is found within the evolving operational manoeuvre doctrine
of the land forces and their transformational concept of ‘fighting power.’ As such, the
compelling parallels between this operational model and the professional model of the
Canadian Defence Academy (CDA) have not been exploited to date in bridging an
otherwise polarized confrontational debate by simply ‘operationalizing’ formal education,
thereby meeting the MND’s aim while remaining true to the proud tradition of dedication
to duty that has underpinned the RCN from its beginnings.
Training is everything...
Cauliflower is nothing but cabbage with a college education.\textsuperscript{13}
- Mark Twain (Samuel L. Clemens) –

THE HISTORICAL TRADITION

The Canadian navy’s approach to the training and education of its officer corps is rooted in the 1910 Naval Service Act itself, which included a requirement for an independent Canadian naval college to impart “a complete education in all branches of naval science, tactics and strategy.”\textsuperscript{14} While the PM originally thought to model the Royal Naval College of Canada (RNCC) upon the Royal Military College (RMC), the reality, in the Minister of Militia’s words was “entirely different.” Consciously modeled on West Point as an establishment “designed to produce nation builders as much as soldiers,”\textsuperscript{15} RMC’s broad purpose was to “give the opportunity for military training and a course of teaching which would fit young men to enter civil life, or the engineering professions” with neither promise of, nor requirement for, any uniformed service in even the Militia.

By comparison, the cadets trained at the RNCC were “for the naval service and that only,”\textsuperscript{16} in order to man the ships of the fleet and were in fact obliged to serve in such capacity upon graduation. While both ships and experienced officers were initially

\textsuperscript{13} In \textit{The Tragedy of Pudd’nhead Wilson}, Chapter 5

\textsuperscript{14} Sections 32 to 36 of An Act Respecting the Naval Service of Canada: 9-10 Edw. 7, c. 43, as quoted in Gilbert N. Tucker, \textit{The Naval Service of Canada: Its Official History}, vol 1, \textit{Origins and Early Years}, (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1952), 155.

required of the Royal Navy (RN) to stand up and train the nascent Canadian force, the government intended “to reduce the presence and influence” of RN officers in short order by producing their own supply of well-trained Canadian officers. 17 Clearly, a different mandate had been given to the RCN from the outset. The inherent reflection of RN customs, traditions and doctrine in the RCN was neither a new nor a distinctly naval phenomenon that was worthy of alarm either. Such standardization was in fact common and made sense between all of the commonwealth nations’ armed forces and their unwritten alliance. 18

Further, in the Canadian case it may have represented a sage strategy to protect the nascent professional body from the manic shifts in public policy by ensuring an interchangeable training and education system, and thus employment portability with the RN, throughout the RCN’s precarious existence in the face of tenuous political commitment, where a settled foreign policy and role for the Navy was by no means assured. 19

The RNCC opened in 1911 and delivered a “systematic and intensive instruction” in engineering, applied electricity, physics, chemistry, mechanics, mathematics, English, history, geography, French and German. 20 Cadets also received practical training in boatwork and engineering in Halifax naval facilities and went to sea in ships for


navigation and pilotage. Though some are dismissive of the quality of the curriculum,\textsuperscript{21} it is worth noting that when the RNCC was briefly relocated to RMC after the 1917 Halifax Explosion, it was found wanting and staff feared that “the instruction of engineering [would] not be of such high standard as that obtained at Halifax.”\textsuperscript{22}

Re-established by 1918 in more permanent facilities in Esquimalt, the calibre of RNCC instruction remained equal to university in the eyes of some. The Minister of the Naval Service’s opinion that the program was excellent “for the purpose of furthering the cause of scientific education and of providing … [the] opportunity of entering the Naval Service”\textsuperscript{23} was echoed by Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Jellicoe during a rare visit and inspection.\textsuperscript{24} However, despite its many strengths, the RNCC’s future remained firmly tied to naval policy and the navy’s first foray into professional development would never be very secure and the college would be closed after severe budge cuts in 1922.\textsuperscript{25}

In a scathing assessment of the period that hauntingly foreshadows the present day, RCN officers of the 1920s have been pronounced “educated, but not thinking” and

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“unable to think for themselves.”  

However, a more accurate summary of this early period would be that for the fledgling RCN, “the real threat was not the adoption of a ‘foreign’ or ‘British’ ethos, but the likelihood of extinction.”  

While true that British influence dominated, even at this early stage the RCN leadership fully realized the requirement to ‘Canadianize’ and any failure to do so was as much because of political imperatives and the service’s tiny size and lack of funds rather than a lack of Canadian views on training and education.

When the country next called for its navy in 1939, attention was on the long-term and quickly turned to the re-establishment of a Canadian naval college. In early 1941, even before the fate of England had been assured, the RCN leadership was planning for the post-war navy, determined to ensure the post-war RCN would not face the possibility of extinction and be found wanting again. Thus, “the Battle of the Atlantic was not the first priority… [as] the war offered an opportunity to build a larger post-war


Plans were made and the MND’s sanction for establishment of the Royal Canadian Naval College (RCN) was sought and obtained. In doing so, once again “the main object of a Naval College, to provide officers for the Navy, [was not] lost sight of.” Though this entailed training to the same standard as the RN, it was the RCN’s well-intentioned dedication to duty, as opposed to a lack of Canadian independence, that underpinned the view that “the inter-changeability of our officers with the Royal Navy … must be maintained.” In fact, it has been remarked that strong nationalist tendencies already existed in the RCN of the 1940s and, although still reflecting the RN in dress, training and ships, it was already developing a distinctive Canadian personality.

However, the Navy’s efforts to press forward from the war years were hindered once again by national policy whereby the Navy had to concurrently engage in demobilization and expansion through managing a mixed Interim Force. As before, the post-war RCN “struggle[ed] for survival against the retrenchment policies in effect, all


the while striving to do its duty.”38 These struggles would boil over in 1949 with an official inquiry and report into several ‘mutinies’ in Canadian ships that were born of this “peculiar schism” in the RCN officer corps.39

The Mainguy Report would conclude that the RCN was “a pallid imitation and reflection of the Royal Navy … and lacked Canadian naval traditions.”40 However, more recent assessments are that “the mutinies had nothing to do with a lack of Canadian identity or too much Britishness. They stemmed … from a simple failure of leadership.”41 Nonetheless, in another haunting foreshadowing, questions of leadership were still quickly linked to formal education with the mutinies attributed to a “narrow, blinkered perspective [on the part of] the senior officers [that] was certainly a consequence of their lack of broad education.”42 In fact though, a 1947 RCN survey and set of recommendations to the Naval Board had already included “that officer training be made more consistent and be undertaken in Canada rather than with the Royal Navy.”43


41 Marc Milner, Canada’s Navy: The First Century (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 195.


This had not been done due to lack of resources rather than a lack of support with the Board, and the process of Canadianization that was already underway was merely accelerated by the Mainguy Report.\textsuperscript{44}

These events would play out just as the Korean War erupted, driving another military expansion within which the MND would direct the unification of officer training between all three services for simple reasons of standardization and efficiency. Thus, though the effect of the Mainguy Report was “more psychological than actual,”\textsuperscript{45} the Navy would not get the opportunity to fix its own problems and any further pursuits of a naval approach to training and education would have to occur from within the common CF framework. However, as RCN cadets began to follow same stream as the other two services, all of the foundations for the Navy’s position on training and education had already been laid. As would be seen, this didn’t necessarily preclude formal education to the degreed level and beyond – provided that it was given commensurate priority and did not detract from the ability to put a manned and capable fleet to sea.

\textsuperscript{44} Wilfred G.D. Lund, “Commentary on the Gimblett and Haydon Papers,” in \textit{Canada's Pacific Naval Presence: Purposeful or Peripheral?}, eds. Peter T. Haydon and Ann L. Griffiths (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 1999), 133.

Other things being equal, there can be no doubt that the better educated man will make a better commander...  

- Field-Marshall Wavell -

COMMON CANADIANIZATION AND EVOLUTION

Entering into the era of CF-common training and education for officers, the Navy’s philosophical position has been summarized as: (1) acquire officer at as young an age as possible; (2) train and educate them along strictly naval lines; and (3) send them to sea as quickly as possible. True enough perhaps. However, these points of training style and technique miss the over-riding priority: to actually get the right people into the training stream in the first place. Whether the Canadian government or people realized it or not, the day would come again when they would need their navy to be there. And that often left the Navy diametrically opposed to academic reformers on the perennial question of quality versus quantity. Thus, the final RCNC years and the Navy’s first interaction with CF-common policy in 1948 has been described as the Navy simply realizing that they couldn’t have what they wanted in a naval college in the contemporary policy environment. Thus, they would just have to make do with what they got from the new Canadian Military Colleges (CMCs) or civilian universities through the new single

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entry plan, the Regular Officer Training Plan (ROTP). In essence, they had been beaten, not converted to the idea of a degreed officer corps.\footnote{48} Within a few short years it became obvious that the ROTP was incapable of producing enough naval officers, regardless of what it might be achieving for the rest of the Services. By the end of 1952, the situation had become “alarming,” with the RCN short 34% of its mandated officer strength and unable to meet officer complements for ships commissioning, let alone meeting new commitments arising from the Cold War.\footnote{49} Thus, the Naval Board decided in 1953 to take “emergency measures” and ‘The VENTURE Plan’ was created, which established a school that would take in students from the junior matriculation level for a five year course of studies and professional training prior to their naval career.

It might seem that the Navy had thus managed to re-establish the independent naval college that the MND had specifically opposed just years earlier.\footnote{50} But the fact must not be lost sight of that the existing streams were not judged unworthy or wasteful on the basis of any pre-disposition to education. Rather, they simply did not provide a sufficiently reliable stream of new officers to man the fleet in the years to come.\footnote{51}


\footnote{51} Minutes of the 389th Meeting of the Naval Board, 7 October 1953, \url{http://hmcsventure.com/}; Internet; Accessed 20 March 2008.
their stream – but all else was not equal, and that is the problem that has been misinterpreted time and again as being ‘anti-education.’

Of note, the Navy’s Tisdall Report of 1957, while affirming that the best way to train naval officers was still in a naval environment, concluded tri-service education should be the rule – including four-year degree programmes as “we are of the opinion that a fundamental knowledge of the sciences and humanities is an essential requirement for command of a modern ship.”52 It was also a naval flag officer who headed the 1957 CF-wide Landymore Committee examining the ROTP which recommended not to move away from but rather strengthen it, including seeking degree-granting status.53 So, regardless of what harsh practical measures had to be taken, the Navy was not oblivious to the changing times or opposed (in theory) to the requirements for higher formal education, even saying in a 1964 manual for officers that “in the modern Navy, advancement and promotion are no longer possible without education.”54

Overall, while the late 1940s/early 1950s were something of a “golden age” for the RCN as it was “rescued from oblivion” by the Cold War, the growth spurt was to be short-lived.55 There then followed another “sickly season” from the late 1950s to late

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54 Canada, Chief of the Naval Staff, BRCN 3059 Divisional Officer’s Handbook (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1963), 81.
1960s, characterized by fiscal constraints, doctrinal debate and administrative upheaval.\textsuperscript{56} The Mainguy Report itself conceded that Navy had “grown and shrunk in a manner unparalleled” and allowed that the “stresses and strains … accompanying every such process … need no verbal comment.”\textsuperscript{57} The Naval Staff once again tried to ensure the very survival of their service through creation of a capable balanced fleet when they had neither the people nor the time to train them properly, leading to a “manning crisis of staggering proportions.”\textsuperscript{58} In fact, it was probably more accurate to just to say that “personnel and training policy [in] the RCN was in perpetual crisis.”\textsuperscript{59} In practicality, pursuit of formal education and a universal degree officer corps continued to prove elusive, or at least of lower priority.

In the end, the ROTP remained as it was, and alternate non-degreed intake via the training establishment HMCS Venture would continue with the transition to the Short Service Officer Plan (SSOP) in 1963 and thence to the Officer Candidate Training Plan (OCTP) in 1968, which by then was being used for CF officers for all occupations that found themselves critically short.\textsuperscript{60} This contradictory state of affairs would in essence

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  \item \textsuperscript{58} Richard Gimblett, “Prism to the Past: The Post-WWII Royal Canadian Navy Seen Through the Cruise of HMCS Crescent to China, 1949,” in \textit{Canada's Pacific Naval Presence: Purposeful or Peripheral?}, eds. Peter T. Haydon and Ann L. Griffiths (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 1999), 105.
persist CF-wide, not just for the Navy, for the next twenty years until specifically highlighted in the MND’s report and brought to an abrupt end with MND10.

The nation that will insist upon drawing a broad line of demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to find its fighting done by fools and its thinking by cowards.\textsuperscript{61} - Sir William Francis Butler -

THE TRIUMPH OF THE ACADEMICS

Many may see the MND’s 1997 Report as finally implementing the 1969 Rowley Report’s concept “for academic and professional education that would provide officers with a coherent suite of learning programmes spanning their careers, all provided for by an integrated single military-civilian teaching engine.”\textsuperscript{62} However, one can also return to the 1975 MOPS Report to find the Navy’s concerns and rebuttals to the concept. The current implementation of the OPD 2020 system shows that neither the MND’s advisors nor the CDA have considered or adequately addressed them.

Key is the ignorance of the simple fact that “about three-quarters of the annual entry to commissioned ranks, especially to the MARS occupation, [comes] from … alternative programmes, mainly through the OCTP.”\textsuperscript{63} The simple elimination of the OCTP by policy edict without any supporting replacement amounted to removal of a large part of the Navy’s recruiting stream. By comparison, the Rowley Report actually called for a Canadian Military Academy, running an “expanded and improved OCTP,” to


produce a stream of non-degreed officers until it was eventually phased out when the CMCs and civilian universities were able to reach full production via the ROTP. 64

The bluntness of the current policy harkens back to the caution that:

There is a danger that the degree, and thus academic excellence, will replace former leadership criteria as the basis for determining the acceptability of an officer, while the important attributes of motivation and commitment are given positions of secondary importance. 65

One of the MND’s advisors seems to agree in that, while pleased to see movement toward “an educated officer corps,” he was “alarmed” that “measures [had] been implemented with a meat cleaver rather than a scalpel” on the basis of his recommendations. 66 The rest of his recommendations had actually said:

Do not close off entry to bright high school educated candidates. If they are good officer material, if the can pass successfully through the leadership training of OCTP, then send them to university for a degree or give them a period of years in which to secure one. (emphasis in original) 67

The Navy would agree and its position on this is not new. It was lucidly articulated in the MOPS Report over thirty years ago, and would likely be written the same today: “The present CF education system is the antithesis of the principle that we should educate the

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66 J.L. Granatstein, Personal Letter to Hon. Art Eggleton, Minister of National Defence Dated 26 February 1998 at York University, Faculty of Arts, Toronto.

67 J.L. Granatstein, Personal Letter to Hon. Art Eggleton, Minister of National Defence Dated 26 February 1998 at York University, Faculty of Arts, Toronto.
motivated rather than motivate the educated and is neither cost effective nor relevant for officers of the Naval Operations Branch.”^68

Further, the Navy cautioned that “while the aim of an all-degree officer corps may be a commendable one, the baccalaureate to which an officer aspires must be relevant to his branch or classification and not simply his badge of office” reflecting instead the lofty belief that the fact “degrees may have little or no application to their military classification is generally considered irrelevant, under the rationale that the acquisition of the degree, and hence the enlightened perspective, is the important thing.”^69 This runs completely contrary to one of Rowley’s central aims of “ensuring that courses taught were relevant to the technical and operational requirements of the military and permit[ed] no degradation of operational effectiveness.”^70 This last qualifier is what defines the essential dichotomy the Navy faces with the current OPD construct.

The Navy needs sufficient people to man the ships who are motivated and committed to operational service. The academic reformists place importance first on a high-quality liberal academic education, in whatever numbers are possible. This dichotomy is revealed in a contemporary briefing note to ADM(HR-Mil) regarding adjudication of the central manifestation of the conflict, the status of the CEOTP programme:

Assuming that previous direction [MND10] regarding [a] degreed officer corps is immutable, then holding the line on non-degreed officer entrants is

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the course of action to take, knowing that at some times, some of these MOCs will experience shortfalls. … If shortfalls are not acceptable, then a measure of flexibility would be the most prudent action to take.\footnote{LCol L.J. Grandmaison, DMHRR Project Director Recruiting, \textit{Continuous Education Officer Training Plan Briefing Note to ADM(HR-Mil)}, Dated 28 January 2003.}

To the Navy, the first option amounts to self-defeat and is nonsensical; at least on the strength of such a weakly justified and poorly executed policy. However, the most succinct condemnation of the simplistic policy panacea of declaring a degreed officer corps fiat comes from a former member of the team who wrote the OPD 2020 document who now refers to “the problem of today’s university-educated, if not intellectual, officer corps.”\footnote{William Glover, “From the Editor,” \textit{The Northern Mariner} XIII, no. 2 (April 2003).} Clearly something isn’t working.

The Navy as the end operational user has not fully embraced education within the modern concept of the profession of arms; the CDA as the governing body has not put in place a system to allow for the development of that operational profession. The lofty academic goals of CDA and the coal-face dedication of the Navy need to be reconciled and move toward each other.
Human force is threefold:
It is mental, moral and physical; and no one of these forms of
force can be expended without influencing the other two.\(^73\)

- MGen J.F.C. Fuller -

RECONCILIATION THROUGH OPERATIONALIZATION

The 2005 Defence Policy Statement (DPS) stated that, “for transformation to be successful, our military personnel must possess the skills and knowledge to function in complex environments where operations and technologies are changing at breakneck speeds.”\(^74\) However, this lofty but vague reasoning is cast aside by a key member of the CDA’s own OPD team in questioning the assertion that “today’s environment [is] so much more chaotic, complex, and different from that of our predecessors.” He responds simply “but is it? Ambiguity, chaos, fear, friction on the battlefield, self-doubt … in a moment of crisis are all issues commanders and military leaders have faced in the past and still face today.” He suggests that it is exactly this timeless nature of war and conflict that demands the military profession steadily evolve and strive for “expertise that can only be attained through continual professional self-development.”\(^75\) This serves to redirect to the core of the issue that both the Navy and the academic intelligentsia need to acknowledge and meet over: operational professional development.

The Commander of the CDA himself holds that the CF must “strengthen the concept of military professionalism, thus assisting member[s] … to overcome the diverse


security challenges of the 21st Century”76 with the CDA “linking the three thrusts of CPD – the environments, the occupations and the common elements – and integrat[ing] them.”77 Clearly, such integration has not occurred.

The Navy, while admitting their primary manning challenges, needs to accept that formal higher education within OPD is not a recruiting or retention strategy; it’s a genuine operational requirement.78 Put simply, naval officers need education so that they “don’t look for answers on how to conduct anti-submarine warfare or whatever [but] instead for methods of approaching anti-submarine warfare problems.”79

On CDA’s part, they need to descend somewhat to realize the operational requirement for an ‘Intellectual Officer’ who “brings an intellectual dimension to his profession but with that intellectual quality held in check by the needs of the profession,” vice a ‘Military Intellectual’ whose attachments and identifications are primarily with intellectuals and intellectual activities.80 This sort of reconciliation to the fact that “we need military scholars, not academics”81 has already been achieved elsewhere, though perhaps not recognized as such. It needs to be in order to operationalize education and OPD.


81 Cmdre James Goldrick, ADFA Cmdt. In Murray Simons, Professional Military Learning – Next Generation PME in the NZDF.
The MND’s academic reformers argue that higher education is required because “officers today must deal, in operations and at home, with complex situations requiring judgment and intelligence; … situations where their judgment, knowledge, and ethical standards will be tested.” Thus, the CDA was created with the aim to “meet the challenges of the post Cold War security environment” through “a revitalized professional development program” across its professional development (PD) pillars of training, education and experience. This sort of language likely rings true with army and air force officers as, by no coincidence, their transformational doctrine is replete with the same terms.

However, the Navy is not as doctrinally oriented as the other services. Navies have not been rocked to the foundations by the emergence of the Operational Art, Effects-Based Operations (EBO), Manoeuvre Warfare, Asymmetric Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) or Transformation the same way the other services have. With a traditional focus on technology and the employment of single platforms or weapons systems, they have not been called to make the same leaps of doctrinal ‘renaissance’ that have overtaken the air and land forces.

For the Army, mission command and its foundation in fighting power, is all about the ability to handle complex, dynamic and adversarial situations. Force generation of

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that fighting power is about producing forces sufficiently strong in the moral, physical and intellectual components to win campaigns and operations. Perhaps the Navy’s traditional lack of detailed keystone operational doctrine has blinded them to the simple fact that this theory should likewise be applicable to the development, maintenance and actions of the professional body whose very purpose is to be a fighting force. In the world of training and education, they speak of personnel production; in the operational world they instead speak of force generation. In fact they are the same, and there is a construct in use within the CF today that shows it.

J.F.C. Fuller’s seminal work outlined three “spheres of force” – the ‘trinity’ of fighting power, thinking power, and staying power.85 These mental, moral, and physical dimensions of war are the foundation for the concept of ‘fighting power’ embraced by Commonwealth land forces.86 Transformational air force doctrine has its own parallels in John Boyd’s ring theory whereby you isolate your enemy across three essential vectors while at the same time improving your connectivity across those same vectors. These vectors should seem familiar by now: the physical, the mental, and the moral.87

Just as the new threat environment has driven operational transformation for the army and air force, the arguments for education and the other pillars of OPD in the new environment being advanced by CDA are largely synonymous. Though they haven’t


been articulated that way to date, without such an operationalization process the arguments are quickly reduced by the Navy to pursuing education for its own sake and are easily dismissed due to manning pressures.

Consider how the elements of both fighting power and the pillars of OPD are represented in figure 1 below:

![Diagram of OPD pillars]

**Figure 1 - OPD pillars represented within the “Fighting Power” Construct**  
Source: Adapted from DND, *Land Power*, 4-3.

Within this construct, it can be seen that the CDA and its academic reforms are focussed largely on the intellectual component, while the Navy’s focus on recruiting and early technical experience at sea focuses on the physical component. Without an integrated approach, as well as a mutual focus on the moral component, transformational efforts by either the Navy or the CDA will not only be confrontational, but may actually work at cross-purposes. Instead, they need to be harmonized as all contributing to the whole as depicted in figure 2.
By such methods, the Australian army has accomplished the operationalization of education by some eminently simple logic: Where the intellectual component is an important constituent of fighting power, and manoeuvre theory as a way of thinking about warfare is an important element of the intellectual component, then logic dictates that successful implementation of manoeuvre theory requires a highly developed professional military education system. Should not what is being embraced on the conceptual level of the fighting force hold true for developing the profession that is at the heart of that same force? Both the CDA and the Navy’s leadership need to consider this question.

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CONCLUSION

Even a cursory historical review shows that the Navy is not anti-intellectual or anti-education per se. The RCN did in fact did pursue both the training and education of its officer from its genesis, but firmly derived from internally assessed professional requirements and standards. Richard Preston, perhaps the foremost historian on military education in Canada, holds that the essence of what the RCN inherited from the RN is not an anti-intellectual culture, but rather the core professionalism of sea service and leadership.90

As the Navy has struggled to adapt to rapid social and technological change, it is this that has both helped and hindered its efforts. For a long time, the RCN’s apprenticeship style system was maintained, not out of un-Canadian class prejudice, but because “it was considered to be the finest such system in the world.”91 It was leery of dismissing a proven experiential scheme on vague pedagogical grounds, only to be substituted by a weakly executed OPD process with no direct relation to immediate operational capabilities.

It is admittedly true that, in more recent times, “Canadian military education has responded to and been more influenced by the demands and criteria of higher education

89 Jack Hawkins’ character of Roman Admiral Quintus Arrius in MGM Grand’s Ben Hur, 1959.
generally than by those of professionalism and defence policy.”

However, for the Navy it is no longer a question of social responsiveness, academic experimentation or even legal compliance. The Navy needs to re-think and harmonize training and education; not via continued work-arounds but within the CDA’s OPD 2020 framework. Grudging lip-service does justice to no one and fails in achieving the long-term aim. For their part, the CDA must take on their true leadership role and integrate all aspects of PD, while imparting operational focus. Authoritative edicts that are ignorant of, or at least dismiss, the implementation challenges represented in the current operational environment and the force generation context are unproductive at best.

One of the MND’s academic advisors rightly observes that “the Canadian Forces have [re-instituted CEOTP] because they face a recruiting and retention crisis that has the potential of further hollowing out the military,” but then trivializes the military profession and dismisses the challenges faced by CF leaders in building a professional force by saying that “it ought to be no trick at all to maintain a military force of 65,000 regulars and 35,000 reservists… Is [it] so hard to figure out?” Actually it is, and the Navy’s leaders need to make use of intellectual constructs such as that of ‘fighting power’ to do so. To do anything less increasingly risks the “intellectual collapse” of the officer corps.

Further, so long as the Navy’s approach to education as part of an overall OPD

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94 Cdr Kenneth Hansen, Defence Fellow Centre for Foreign Policy Studies Dalhousie University, Email to author 14 December 2007.
programme is simply a coerced compliance with an external edict, it will remain less than a profession and more of a trade.
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