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STRIVING FOR NATIONAL AUTONOMY:
CIVIL CONTROL AND NATIONAL COMMAND
OF CANADIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

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This paper was written by a student attending
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ABSTRACT

The Canadian military legacy from the First World War until recently saw Canada most often as a force contributor of troops at the tactical level to allied or coalition military efforts. Operating within coalitions and alliances created a tension between the demands of national autonomy and the demands of coalition or alliance efficiency. To maintain national autonomy, politicians have a responsibility to exercise civil control, and military officers at each level in the chain of command have a responsibility exercise national command and support the premise of civil control.

This essay concludes that Canada’s history of civil control of the military and national command has been evolutionary with a recurring theme of national autonomy throughout. But with recent government policy and Canadian Forces transformation, a strong national command structure has begun to take shape that can support the principle of civil control of the armed forces. This has placed a renewed emphasis on the military strategic and operational levels of command overseeing the employment of tactical forces in comprehensive operations.
CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

The essential purpose of the profession of arms in Canada is “. . . the ordered, lawful application of military force pursuant to governmental direction.”\(^1\) It is the idea of unlimited liability, which “. . . sets the man who embraces this life somewhat apart. He will be (or should be) always a citizen. So long as he serves, he will never be a civilian.”\(^2\) It is a fundamental truth that the military serves the state, and that “[a]rmed forces in Western democracies are subordinate to the elected civilian authority and prohibited from operating outside the boundaries that authority sets.”\(^3\) As a result, there must be a strong bond between those who send military personnel to war or conflict and those who serve in their country’s armed forces.

Carl von Clausewitz in his work, \textit{On War}, put forward that “[w]ar is merely the continuation of policy by other means.”\(^4\) To that end, he declared that “[t]he political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.”\(^5\) Clausewitz provides an initial foundation upon which to build the relationship between governments, who formulate policy, and militaries, which carry out that policy. In his “Memorandum on a Canadian Organization for the Higher Direction of National Defence” dated 8 March 1937, Colonel Maurice Pope offered three

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\(^{1}\) Department of National Defence, A-PA-005-000/AP-001 \textit{Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada} (Ottawa: Published under the auspices of the Chief of the Defence Staff by the Canadian Defence Academy - Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2003) 4.


\(^{3}\) Department of National Defence, A-PA-005-000/AP-001 \textit{Duty with Honour…}, 9.


\(^{5}\) \textit{Ibid.}, 87.
guiding principles on which higher direction of national defence should be based: “War, including defensive war, is an instrument of national policy. National policy is a responsibility of government. Government, in Canada, must obtain the consent if not the support of the majority of the people.”

A consistent feature in the last century of Canadian military history, from the First World War until recently is that Canada was largely a force contributor of troops at the tactical level to allied or coalition military efforts. Canada’s way in war then for the past century has been to operate as a part of a larger coalition or alliance, ideally in the pursuit of national objectives and in accordance with the national interest. But, Canada’s military legacy has often been described as one “. . . of command subordination, especially during the First and Second World Wars and later in NATO, NORAD, and the UN.” As this paper will show, Canada has had a growing, but inconsistent national autonomy in its expeditionary operations.

Operating within a coalition or alliance can present both benefits and challenges. There is a constant tension between maintaining national autonomy within a coalition or alliance and achieving efficiency in the conduct of military operations. But for the sake of all parties, achieving this balance is both fundamental and necessary. The advantages of multinational command are many and the reasons that nations join coalitions are


7 An alliance is defined as “[t]he result of formal agreements between two or more sovereign nations for broad, long term objectives.” A coalition is defined as “[a]n ad hoc agreement between two or more sovereign nations for a common action.” (Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 Canadian Forces Operations (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2005), GL-2, GL-3).

8 Douglas L. Bland, Chiefs of Defence: Government and the Unified Command of the Canadian Armed Forces (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1995), 177
varied. Often it allows nations to accomplish aims or objectives that it could not reach on its own. Other times, nations join for political advantages such as sharing risks, providing diplomatic support, or influencing opinions at home and abroad. Other recent factors that have emerged though revolve around the legitimacy that a coalition offers to those who opt for the use of force. Regardless of reasons for joining, in coalition operations, nations “. . . should strive to achieve unity of command for the operation to the maximum extent possible. . .” Coalition warfare is complex, though, as “[s]overeign states rarely share identical interests in a coalition situation: even if they agree that common military action is necessary, they may disagree about the means used to achieve that end.”

Because of its reliance on coalition and alliance operations, as this paper will show, Canada has often struggled with this notion of national autonomy during the last century. This could be seen at varying times at the political level in the civil control of the military, at the realm of civil-military relations, where politics and military strategy mix, and within the purely military domain. To alleviate this, deployed Canadian forces need an overarching national strategy and guidance when operating as part of a coalition

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in order to guide the actions and decisions of military commanders and to safeguard national interests.\textsuperscript{13}

In recent years, there has been a growing consciousness in Canada of the importance of national autonomy of deployed forces.\textsuperscript{14} This has manifested itself in many forms since the mid-1990s. The Minister’s Report to the Prime Minister in 1997 by then Defence Minister, Doug Young, provided renewed focus onto the inviolable tenet of civil control of the military and the accountability of the military chain of command. The aftermath of the Somalia Inquiry led to a number of organizational, cultural, and professional development changes in the institutional Canadian Forces, including the publication of Canadian Forces keystone documents such as \textit{Duty with Honour} and \textit{Leadership in the Canadian Forces}.\textsuperscript{15}

More recently, the onset of Canadian Forces transformation has brought a renewed energy to the importance of operations and a new significance for the role that the Canadian Forces can provide in the world in delivering a strategic effect.\textsuperscript{16} The current transformation is completing unfinished business from the Glassco Commission in 1961 and unification in 1968, and it has been the catalyst that propelled evolutionary changes in national command that had surfaced in the 1990s. By overcoming inertia, the Canadian Forces have placed operations at the centre with operationally focussed


\textsuperscript{14} This applies as well to the institutional Canadian Forces as well as forces deployed on domestic operations, but for the purposes of this paper, the focus is on deployed military operations.

\textsuperscript{15} Department of National Defence, A-PA-005-000/AP-006 \textit{Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading the Institution} (Kingston, Ontario: Published under the auspices of the Chief of the Defence Staff by the Canadian Defence Academy – Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2007), 6.

command and control structures at the strategic and operational levels. It has also reinforced the civil control of the military through its emphasis on the integrity of unambiguous command and control and restoration of civil-military balance at the strategic level.

Since the First World War, Canada has played a largely supporting role, or as some may contend, a subordinate role, in coalition and alliance efforts. Canada’s commitment of military forces and influence has been tempered by its perceived place in the world – whether that was as a colonial nation, an emerging or established middle power, or dutiful alliance member. This has affected the degree of authority that Canada exerted over its deployed forces and the responsibility it showed for it. The reliance on coalition or alliance operations has created a tension between the demands of national autonomy and the demands of coalition or alliance efficiency. Both politicians and military commanders have a role to play in assuring Canadian autonomy and ultimately, civil control of the military. The thesis of this essay, therefore, argues that Canada’s history of civil control of the military and national command in the past century have proven to be evolutionary with a persistent theme of national autonomy; yet the complexity of the operating environment has often outpaced that evolution, sometimes to the detriment of the civil and military institutions. Though it has taken over forty years since the Glassco Commission and unification to substantially align the political responsibility to exercise civil control of the armed forces and the military responsibility to exercise national command, the future is optimistic. With the onset of Canadian Forces transformation, there is finally a strong national command structure to support recent policy initiatives and reinforce the principle of civil control of the military.
This essay is thus divided into five chapters, including introductory and concluding chapters. The second chapter will provide an overview of the foundation for civil control of the military, including its legal basis. Then, the political and military responsibilities will be broken out along the five distinct levels of politics and command. The aim of this introductory chapter is to establish the hierarchy between politicians and military officers and to articulate the link between them that will provide the foundation for the discussion in this paper on civil control of the military and national command of deployed forces.

The third chapter will outline the concept of civil control of the military at the purely political level with the formulation of policy objectives and the interaction between the political level and the military strategic level. The aim of this section is to highlight the fundamental importance of civil control of the military and the subsequent military responsibilities that support it, and accordingly provide a frame of reference from which to view national command. Historical and contemporary examples will place the application of policy and civil-military relations into context.

The fourth chapter will discuss the purely military aspect of national command from the military strategic and operational levels, providing historical and contemporary views. The aim of this section is to establish the fundamental basis and responsibility of the military chain of command to exercise national command and in turn support the premise of civil control of the military. This leads to the current challenges faced by transformation and the complexity of operating within a whole of government approach in a counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan. Such a complex operating environment

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17 This essay uses the continuum of levels from the political (where policy is formed), the political-military strategic (which is the domain of civil-military relations), the military strategic, operational, to tactical levels. These will be described in Chapter 2.
is placing stress on the levels of command, particularly at the military strategic and operational levels, which this paper shows, are critical to exercising national command.
CHAPTER 2 – BACKGROUND

LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR THE ARMED FORCES

Canada’s national armed forces were established through the authority of the Constitution Act of 1867. The National Defence Act was first enacted in 1923, and when updated in 1950, established the Department of National Defence as “... a department of the Government of Canada ... over which the Minister of National Defence appointed by commission under the Great Seal shall preside.” Additionally, the National Defence Act provided that “[the] Canadian Forces are the armed forces of Her Majesty raised by Canada and consist of one Service called the Canadian Armed Forces.” The Minister of National Defence is thereby charged with “... the management and direction of the Canadian Forces and of all matters relating to national defence ...” Through acts of legislation and direction from the Cabinet, the Government of Canada is responsible to establish the mandate and policies of the Canadian Forces in order to provide national security.

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18 Department of National Defence, A-PA-005-000/AP-001 Duty with Honour..., 37. The Militia Act as well as the National Defence Act defined more clearly the organization and command and control of the forces; a small regular force (army) was established in 1871, the Royal Canadian Navy in 1910, and the Royal Canadian Air Force in 1924.


Fundamentally though, Canadian citizens, Parliament, and the Canadian Forces all have a share in national defence. Though it is often seen that government, or the Cabinet, is primarily responsible for defence policy, Chair in Defence Management Studies in the Queen’s University School of Policy Studies and noted Canadian military analyst, Dr. Douglas Bland contends that Members of Parliament are also responsible for national defence and defence policy and have a responsibility “. . . to provide resources for necessary roles and missions, and to continuously supervise the Canadian Forces and, more generally, the broader defence establishment.” In this context the civil-military relations governing defence in Canada take on a much larger, non-partisan function with Parliament as an instrument of oversight over national defence.

CIVIL CONTROL OF THE MILITARY AND NATIONAL COMMAND

Dr. Ross Graham differentiates between civil control and national command in the separate contexts of the business of national defence and the conduct of operations. He refers to the formulation of defence policy and the civil control of national defence as national direction to the Canadian Forces. This paper will not discuss the broad formulation of defence policy and how that translates into national direction to the military. Instead, this paper is concerned with the civil control of the military in the narrow sense of the role of the civil authority in determining policies and issuing direction related specifically to the conduct of war or deployed military operations. Thus civil control refers to both the responsibility of government to control the military

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24 Ibid., 35.

through the assignment of roles, objectives, and resources, and the commensurate accountability on the part of the armed forces to the civil authority to carry that out.

In Canada, the armed forces serve the state, operating within boundaries set by the state, thereby establishing the precedence of civil control of the military. The idea of civil control of the military is fundamental to a democracy like Canada, and it is the anchor from which the armed forces receive their legitimacy. It is essential that there is a clear link between the government and the military. In Canada, this starts with the Crown, or Governor General as the Commander-in-Chief of the Canadian Forces with a direct line of command to the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS). In practice though, the Minister of National Defence is responsible to Parliament and the citizens of Canada, through the Prime Minister and Cabinet, to oversee a department with a civilian deputy minister responsible to administer it and a CDS “. . . charged with the control and administration of the Canadian Forces.” There is an unambiguous chain of command from the CDS to all officers and members below him. This is the military chain of command and is defined as “[t]he succession of commanding officers from a superior to a subordinate through which command is exercised.”

The link between military and the government and the integrity of this military chain of command lie at the heart of civil control and effective national command. The National Defence Act provides the basis for this integrity such that:


28 Department of National Defence, A-PA-005-000/AP-001 Duty with Honour..., 38.

29 Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 Canadian Forces Operations (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2005), GL-3.
[u]nless the Governor in Council otherwise directs, all orders and instructions to the Canadian Forces that are required to give effect to the decisions and to carry out the directions of the Government of Canada or the Minister shall be issued by or through the Chief of the Defence Staff.  

The CDS provides a focal point in civil-military relations, and the appointment is critical to exercising national command. The position of the CDS delves in both political and military spheres, providing both the civil authorities and the civil service with the military advice that is necessary to help shape Canada’s defence policies, and at the military strategic level, coordinating the functions of defence with military and civilian alike within the department. In this essay, the idea of national command is a purely military function that in principle starts with the Commander-in-Chief, but in practice starts with the CDS and flows through the chain of command, with responsibility and authority at each level.

POLICY AND THE LEVELS OF COMMAND

Canadian Forces operational doctrine establishes three levels of command, which correspond to the three levels of conflict: strategic, operational, and tactical. Dr. Bill Bentley discusses these levels in the context of war and warfare, where war is in the realm of politicians and the military strategic level and warfare is in the realm of the profession of arms at the operational and tactical levels. To that end, he has proposed that the conduct of war occurs at the level of politics and policy, which is primarily at


31 Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 Canadian Forces Operations..., 2-6. The strategic level of command is defined as “[t]hat level of command through which control of a conflict is exercised at the strategic level and overall direction is provided to military forces, advice is given to political authorities, and co-ordination is provided at the national level.” Operational level of command is defined as “[t]hat level of command which employs forces to attain strategic objectives in a theatre or area of operations through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations. At the operational level, sea, land, and air activity must be conceived and conducted as one single concentrated effort.” The tactical level of command is defined as “[t]hat level which directs the use of military forces in battles and engagements designed to contribute to the operational level plan.”
political and military strategic levels. He then articulates the conduct of warfare as primarily through military means at the tactical and operational levels. These concepts establish the links in civil-military relations.\textsuperscript{32} As a result, Bentley builds upon the three levels in Canadian Forces operational doctrine and outlines four levels – political, strategic, operational (or theatre), and tactical.\textsuperscript{33}

The Canadian Forces keystone document, \textit{Duty with Honour}, differentiates between policy, which is articulated by the civil authority and military strategy, which incorporates political realities into strategic plans. However, it also clearly depicts that though each is separate, there is an overlap, which is the domain of civil-military relations.\textsuperscript{34} Though it is not clearly defined in operational doctrine, both Bentley’s article and \textit{Duty with Honour} provide a clearer articulation of the political and military responsibilities. \textit{Leadership in the Canadian} Forces also outlines four areas: policy, strategic, operational (theatre), and tactical. For the purposes of this essay, the strategic level will further be broken down into the political, political-military strategic, and military strategic levels. Thus the five levels incorporating both policy and command are: political (or policy), military-political strategic, military strategic, operational, and tactical.\textsuperscript{35}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{33} \textit{Ibid.}, 86.
\item \textsuperscript{34} Department of National Defence, A-PA-005-000/AP-001 \textit{Duty with Honour}..., 41 – 42. Within the realm of civil-military relations, there are three distinct aspects between the armed forces and society (through Parliament), the government of the day, and the civil servants who manage government bureaucracy.
\item \textsuperscript{35} \textit{Duty with Honour} does not clearly articulate the different strategic levels; however, it does reference military strategic and political-military (policy) levels (page 17) as well as military strategy and political-strategic level (pages 46 – 47) in articulating the necessary interaction that must occur in civil
\end{itemize}
CHAPTER SUMMARY

The legitimacy of the armed forces is founded in law. Civil control of the armed forces is a fundamental principle that sees the civil authority overseeing the policies of national defence and directing control of the armed forces accordingly, as the duly elected representatives of the citizens of Canada. Within the military, the CDS has a critical role as both advisor to the civil authority and as commander of the Canadian Forces to facilitate both civil-military relations and command. The separate levels of policy, political-military strategic, military strategic, operational, and tactical provide a continuum, such that there are political domains, military domains, and a common domain; but anywhere along that continuum, there is the potential to have a breakdown in civil control due to lack of political oversight, poor civil-military relations, or a fracture in national command from any one of the three levels of military command.

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military relations. For simplicity, the terms that I have adopted are civil control to denote the link from Canadian society through their elected officials, the political-military strategic to denote the military and political interaction in devising national defence policies, and the military strategic to denote the purely military actions that are undertaken by the chief of the defence staff and his senior advisors and commanders in carrying out government policy.
CHAPTER 3 – POLICY AND POLITICAL MILITARY STRATEGIC LEVELS

In the general system of war and conflict, policy is termed as either ‘unlimited war’ or ‘limited war’ (or conflict resolution). A policy of unlimited war leads to a strategy of annihilation or decisive battle; whereas, a policy of limited war leads to a bipolar strategy with both battle and non-battle elements.36 One definition of policy is “. . . the expression of the desired end state sought by the government . . . [it] is the clear articulation of guidance for the employment of the instruments of power . . . policy dominates strategy by the articulation of the end state.”37 Current strategic thinking in the Canadian Forces views policy as ‘fundamental policy’ which is the realm of politicians, and ‘policy in execution’ which is largely the responsibility of the military to formulate how to carry out that policy.38 Policy legitimizes and sets the parameters for military action, and thereby sets the foundation for civil control.

In principle, the idea of civil control of military forces deployed to war or on operations is straightforward in the context of a single nation. However, Canada’s way in war has largely been conducted through participation in alli5 0gy a0.005--c2.3o01 e coal-
coalitions of the moment.” It is a responsibility that Canada must “... insist on a firm national voice in any coalition decisions that directly affect Canada and Canadians.” Canada must have the political will and the military force to influence national interests.

The difficulties associated with national autonomy and thus civil control of the military is greatly complicated when the aspect of alliance or coalition warfare is introduced. Based on the experience of the First World War, Colonel Maurice Pope in 1937 realized that should the Empire be compelled into war again:

... it [will be] important that the Imperial machinery for the conduct of the war shall be such that Canada from the beginning will be able to exert an influence on the conduct of the war commensurate with her vital interests and the military effort she may make ... [and] any Canadian organization for the higher direction of national defence which fails fully to embrace the Imperial aspects of defence must be unsound.

Bland reinforces Pope’s argument that it “… is not whether acting through coalitions ought to remain central to Canada’s foreign policy, but how can Canada influence the shape and operating expectations of established and emerging coalitions to best benefit Canada’s national interests.”

THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL AUTONOMY

Canada has evolved in its national autonomy throughout the last century. During the First World War, Canada was very much at the mercy of its colonial obligations to

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39 Bland, Canada and Military Coalitions: Where, How, and with Whom, 8.

40 Bland, Canada and Military Coalitions: Where, How, and with Whom, 10.


42 Bland, Canada and Military Coalitions: Where, How, and with Whom, 8.

43 This starts with the First World War and does not discuss civil control and national command during the Boer War. For a discussion on the early roots of national autonomy during the Boer War, see Major General Daniel Gosselin’s essay, “Canada’s Participation in the Wars of the Early 20th Century: Planting the Seeds of Military Autonomy and National Command” in the Canadian Military Journal, Summer 2006.
Great Britain. When Britain declared war on Germany on 4 August 1914, the Governor General dispatched to the King, “Canada stands united from the Pacific to the Atlantic in her determination to uphold the honour and tradition of our Empire.” Essentially, Canada automatically went to war as well. Notwithstanding this colonial reaction, the Canadian government of Prime Minister Robert Borden determined the extent of the contribution and the manner in which its forces would support Britain. Even though strategic direction and operational policy of Canadian expeditionary forces were to be directed by British higher command, the Canadian government refused to allow its forces to be subsumed within the British Army, thereby ensuring a uniquely Canadian
Legal advice to Borden at that time underscored the concept of civil control of the military, and Canada’s responsibility over its forces. Military power:

... must be based upon and emanate from the civil power; the commands of the Sovereign to the army can only be conveyed to the Commander in Chief through the channel of responsible ministers, and the army is thus brought into accord with the civil institutions.50

However, legal provisions were also made to allow Canadian forces to serve conjointly with His Majesty’s Regular Forces, such that “... His Majesty may ... place in command a senior general officer of His Majesty’s regular army, and this must necessarily be done, for it is essential to have an undivided command.”51 The result of this achievement was that Canada retained administrative control and higher commanders (whether British or Canadian) were expected to also be held to account by the Canadian government.52

Though the relationship between the Dominion of Canada and Great Britain played a role in the decision to join the war effort, it was a decision made by the civil authority in the national interest of the country. The Borden government passed the Emergency War Measures Act, which enabled the governor-in-council to use the power it deemed necessary to mobilize and sustain the war effort.53 On 18 August 1914, Borden vowed in Parliament, “[a]s to our duty, all are agreed, we stand shoulder to shoulder with


50 Department of External Affairs, Documents on Canadian External Relations…, 139. Memo from the Deputy Minister of Justice to Borden, 18 September 1916.

51 Ibid., 139. Memo from the Deputy Minister of Justice to Borden, 18 September 1916.


Britain and the other British Dominions in this quarrel.”

The primary objective that Borden articulated to Canadians was that there were no bounds to Canada’s contribution to victory. In 1917 at the Imperial War Conference, Borden sided with the British Prime Minister that there could be no other aim than victory in Europe. From the perspective of national objectives, Canada was a nation at war, and this commitment was very clearly articulated to the Canadian people and to its military forces.

Canada had no real model upon which to base national control of its expeditionary forces. Minister of Militia and Defence, Major General Sam Hughes, attempted to direct affairs from Ottawa, and he established his own staff in London, which served only to confuse the British War Office about the Canadian chain of command. Canadian historian Desmond Morton noted that “[g]enerals, pilots and privates could agree on one thing: their contempt for Canadian military administration, especially in England.” Confusion had reigned under Hughes with three generals in


57 Stacey, Editor, *Historical Documents of Canada …*, 551.

58 Brown, *Robert Laird Borden: A Biography…*, 16. Colonel John Wallace Carson and Sir Max Aitken (Lord Beaverbrook) established a liaison office in London and reported to Hughes. By mid 1916, it was clear that the political oversight established through Hughes’ liaison office was not working adequately, and he went to London in the summer 1916 to find a solution to propose to Borden, who by this time was wary of Hughes. Hughes made a quick study, and without informing Borden, he established an Army Council for Canadian Forces under Major-General John Wallace Carson. Borden found out through the press and decided that this time Hughes had overstretched his authority; Borden summoned him home and demanded his resignation. Edward Kemp was then named the new minister of militia and defence.(56 – 58).

England who thought that they were in charge. But with Borden’s dismissal of Hughes for acting beyond his authority, Morton states that “[t]he amateur era of Canada’s war effort largely ended . . .” 60 Borden worked out a more suitable form of political oversight with his high commissioner to the United Kingdom, Sir George Perley. He implemented a new portfolio under the War Measures Act – a minister of overseas service to administer the Canadian forces in England. 61 This ministry provided the Canadian government a means of exerting its authority “. . . with despatch and in harmony with the policy of the administration.” 62

Canadian politicians were not naïve about the lack of control that they exerted over their expeditionary forces, and Borden not only employed the oversight mechanisms just described, but he also sought to exert political influence with Britain on the overall direction of the war. Initially it could be said that “[t]he British treated Canada not as a partner but as a junior clerk in the imperial firm conducting the business of war.” 63 Borden and his government usually heard about war activities through the daily press. When Borden raised the size of the Canadian commitment to 250,000 men in October 1915, he told the colonial secretary that Canada was entitled to be consulted and kept more fully informed with regard to the conduct of the war. 64 Borden realized the

60 _Ibid._, 67.


62 Department of External Affairs, _Documents on Canadian External Relations_. . . , 140. Memorandum from the Deputy Minister of Justice to the Prime Minister. The purpose of the Ministry was to “. . . relieve the Department of Militia and Defence of the administration of the forces overseas and to establish a ministry in London, immediately in touch with His Majesty’s Government and conveniently situated with relation to the theatre of effective operations, to be charged with the administration of the military affairs overseas. . .” (Order in Council P.C. 2651 dated 28 October 1916.) (147).

. . . necessity [of] central control of [the] Empire’s armies but Governments of Overseas Dominions [had] large responsibilities to their people for the conduct of war and . . . [were] entitled to further information and to consultation respecting general policy on war operations.  

However, he did not have any success readily with the colonial secretary regarding further consultation.  

When the British government changed in December 1916, David Lloyd George’s new coalition government recognized the importance of engaging the Dominions in the war effort.  

In the spring of 1917, Lloyd George convened an Imperial War Conference and an Imperial War Cabinet, inviting the Dominion Prime Ministers to consider the “. . . urgent questions affecting the prosecution of the war.”

As a junior alliance partner in the First World War, Canadian policy was conscious of the Commonwealth demands for alliance effectiveness and an ‘undivided command,’ to the detriment at times of national autonomy. Bland characterizes Canada’s First World War experience as follows:

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64 Brown, Robert Laird Borden: A Biography..., 33.

65 Department of External Affairs, Documents on Canadian External Relations..., 93 – 94. Telegram from Borden to the Acting High Commissioner in the United Kingdom, 30 October 1915.

66 In fact, Colonial Secretary Bonar Law replied on 3 November 1915 that he was “. . . not able to see any way in which this could be practically done . . . that if no scheme is practicable then it is very undesirable that the question should be raised.” (Department of External Affairs, Documents on Canadian External Relations, 96). Borden replied through his high commissioner, but later told him not to act on it. However, Borden’s reply provides insight into the importance that he attached to this matter. In January 1916, Borden wrote: “As to consultation, plans to campaign have been made and unmade, measures adopted and apparently abandoned and generally speaking steps of the most important and even vital character have been taken, postponed or rejected without the slightest consultation with the authorities of this Dominion . . . Is war being waged by the United Kingdom alone or is it a war waged by the whole Empire?” (Department of External Affairs, Documents on Canadian External Relations, 104).

67 Brown and Ramsay Cook, Canada 1896 – 1921..., 282.

68 Stacey, Editor, Historical Documents of Canada ..., 365. The War Conference was convened from 20 March – 2 May and met fourteen times. The Imperial War Cabinet was comprised of the War Cabinet and the Dominion Prime Ministers and would look at issues regarding the conduct of the war and policy issues related to the war. The Imperial War Conference was comprised of Dominion representative and was presided over by the Secretary of State for Colonies; it considered questions and issues not directly related to the war effort. (Stacey, Editor, Historical Documents of Canada ..., 366.)
[t]he Canadian government had no understanding of the idea of national command at the beginning of World War I. Nevertheless . . . The Army was sent overseas . . . under instructions to maintain its Canadian identity and, whenever possible, to retain in Canadian hands operational and logistical control over deployed units.69

Yet within the limits imposed by the colonial realities of the time, Canadian policy allowed a remarkable degree of autonomy for the Canadian forces. Major General Dan Gosselin notes that Canadian autonomy clearly improved during the war such that “. . . by 1917, Canada combined most of the elements necessary for the government to ensure that its imperatives and strategic objectives were addressed, and its military contribution optimized.”70

During the inter-war years, Canadian military planners were fixated on establishing “. . . order, organization, regularity, and routine to legitimize their position as the advisers to government on matters of national defence.”71 Historian Stephen Harris asserts that this inward focus in the department was meant to legitimize the institution, but it came at the expense of preparing the army for war.72 Chief of the General Staff, General A.G.L. McNaughton foreshadowed Canadian Army policy, when he wrote that “. . . while the Canadian Commander will probably be under the orders of the [British]
commander-in-chief, he will not be free from responsibility to the Canadian Government for the safety of his troops.”\textsuperscript{73}

Canada did not immediately join the Second World War as it had the first. After a week of neutrality, Canada declared war on Germany on 10 September 1939.\textsuperscript{74} Until the Statute of Westminster established Canada as a sovereign dominion within the British Commonwealth in 1931, Canada was automatically allied with Britain in any wars. After the statute, “. . . Canada exercised some discretion as to the degree of its involvement, if any.”\textsuperscript{75} The Visiting Forces (British Commonwealth) Act was passed in 1933 and used during the war; however, it had not been intended to facilitate wartime command and control as it was more of a peacetime construct to manage exchanges between Canada and Great Britain.\textsuperscript{76} Although they were governed by the Visiting Forces Act, detached Canadian commanders were also provided with directives that outlined the relationship with British or Allied forces; this normally included a right of appeal to the Canadian government.

Bland noted that the Visiting Forces Act “. . . really passed Parliament’s control over Canadian policies into British hands.”\textsuperscript{77} The command and control of Canadian expeditionary forces was essentially the same as it was in the First World War, with “. . .


\textsuperscript{74} Stacey, Editor, \textit{Historical Documents of Canada} …, 601.

\textsuperscript{75} Middlemess and Sokolsky, \textit{Canadian Defence: Decision and Determinants}, 10.


\textsuperscript{77} Bland, \textit{Chiefs of Defence}…, 178.
the principles laid down in 1918 . . . still applicable in 1939 – 45.” 78 An order in council established the command relationship for Canadian air and land forces serving alongside British and Commonwealth forces, such:

[t]hat all Military and Air Forces of Canada present in the United Kingdom serve together with the Military and Air Forces, respectively, of the United Kingdom . . . That all Military and Air Forces of Canada serving on the Continent of Europe shall act in combination with those forces of the United Kingdom . . . 79

The intent was that Canada would be able to reject questionable operations, but in reality, Canadians were not always part of the planning or decision-making process and thus were not well placed to make such judgements. 80

In September 1939, authority was granted to establish a Canadian Military Headquarters in London. Unlike the First World War, there was no overseas ministry established; the high commissioner in London was the senior civilian (not a minister of the government). To provide higher political direction necessary to run the war, Prime Minister Mackenzie King established nine Committees of the Cabinet with the War Committee as the central committee. The War Committee allowed a small group of Cabinet ministers discharge executive authority. 81

78 Stacey, Arms, Men, and Government…,” 205.


80 Bland, Chiefs of Defence…, 178.

81 Stacey, Arms, Men, and Government…,” 113 – 115. From the original six committees, the Emergency Council transformed into the war Committee when it was formed, and membership included the Prime Minister as chairman, Ministers of Justice, National Defence, Finance, Mines and Resources, and the Government Leader in the Senate. The War Committee was enlarged in May 1940 to include Minister of Munitions and Supply and the Minister of national Defence for Air. It was enlarged again in July 1940 to include the Minister of national Defence for Naval Services. Military officers were rarely invited in the first three years of the war.
Despite the commitment of over a million Canadians to the Allied effort, Canada remained largely a contributing nation and was not involved in Alliance decision-making. Stacey noted that Mackenzie King did not press hard to have a say in the direction of the war. At the Quebec Conference in 1943, Churchill relayed to Mackenzie King that Roosevelt did not want him or the Canadian Joint Chiefs of Staff at any of the meetings; but again Mackenzie King did not seem to mind. He told Churchill that he had no qualms in letting Britain take the lead. He thought it best that an Empire War Council not be formed. To Mackenzie King, as long as Canada was consulted and informed of new policies with opportunities for input, he was content.

The British took advantage of the Canadian disinterest in higher political and military strategic oversight which set a precedent and many Canadian officers likewise were subordinated to British higher direction in the war. As an example, Canada was virtually ignored by the United States and Britain in the planning for the Normandy landings; there were no Canadian officers assigned to higher staffs, nor was the Canadian government consulted regarding key command positions, such as General Dwight Eisenhower or Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery. As Stacey noted, some likely felt that Canada was “. . . pouring out blood and treasure in accordance with plans which it had no share in making and over which it ha[d] little or no control.”

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82 Stacey, Editor, *Historical Documents of Canada* …, 606.
86 Stacey, *Arms, Men, and Governments*…,” 186 - 188.
DEFENCE POLICY DURING THE COLD WAR

Third generation warfare (massed manoeuvre), and the ‘strategy of annihilation’ was the operating environment in the Second World War and into the Cold War, including United Nations peacekeeping operations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and North American Air Defence (NORAD) operations. Here, though, it was characterized by a multi-lateral framework, with static forces prepared for a full-scale war. The primary focus of military forces in this era was still decisive military victory. As well, the Cold War saw Canada participate in military alliances, for the first time while at peace, as opposed to war.

Historian Denis Stairs identified the three years following the Second World War as the Period of Retrenchment, which saw a substantial downsizing in the Canadian military. He argued that with no real external threat to Canada, and no “. . . serious need for military support for the conduct of Canadian diplomacy, little real importance was attached to the continuation into the peace of a strong military posture . . .” As such, the Canadian government reverted to a traditional stance of keeping a core capability in

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87 Ibid., 137.


89 Harris, Canadian Brass: The Making of a Professional Army, 1860 – 1939, 213.

each of the services, as the foundation for mobilization should it be required for overseas services.\(^91\)

National strategy generally has foreign policy objectives and defence policy objectives as the two essential components that must guide a nation’s entry into coalitions or alliances; but, a lack of strategy may force officers to look to alliances for direction, and changing policy goals may see politicians commit military forces to situations for which they are not prepared.\(^92\) Brooke Claxton established the broad objectives of Canadian defence policy in 1949. But the underlying assumption in the formulation of defence policy at the end of the Second World War was that the most likely war that Canada would become involved in was a war against communism, which would be conducted along with its allies, most notably the United States.\(^93\) Aside from general war, and in the absence of a direct military threat to Canada, most military operations in the Cold War were aimed at the containment of communism, or the pursuit of international security. Whether operating in an established alliance or in a coalition, many of the procedures and considerations were likely to be the same. Many of the problems noted above could be alleviated on the front end by thorough planning and firm direction at the political and military-levels.

The result following the Second World War was Canada’s defence policy during the Cold War was effectively a ‘strategy of commitments.’ There was no truly national defence strategy that guided policy, procedures, or planning.\(^94\) Operating under this

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\(^91\) Ibid., 94.


\(^93\) Denis Stairs, “The Military as an Instrument …,” 96 - 97.
strategy of alliances, Canada was concerned about international peace and security in the aftermath of the Second World War, and the effectiveness of NATO to prevent future conflict was a key national interest to Canada. Canada provided troops to NATO for a seat at the decision-making table.\textsuperscript{95} Canada saw alliance membership and peacekeeping as two important ways in which Canada could further international order and stability.\textsuperscript{96} From a civil control perspective, it seemed that it was enough for Canada just to participate; there was no requirement to exercise command and control of its assigned military forces; participation achieved an objective. Bland argues that Canada neglected its national interests by actually subordinating command of its forces to allied command even despite NATO’s policy that participating countries retain national control over their forces assigned to allied commands.\textsuperscript{97} The end result was that during the Cold War, “[t]he Canadian government never had direct control over operations of the CF in NATO Europe, but that was a Canadian choice and not . . . a consequence of alliance.”\textsuperscript{98}

The expenditure of defence resources on international peacekeeping met Canada’s post World War II foreign and defence interests.\textsuperscript{99} Notwithstanding that participation in peacekeeping can often be viewed as a voluntary commitment for nations, Professor Sean


\textsuperscript{96} Middlemiss and Sokolsky, \textit{Canadian Defence: Decision and Determinants}, 24.

\textsuperscript{97} Bland, \textit{Chiefs of Defence}…, 180. NATO only had command of forces once authority was transferred to NATO for specific operations. Nations still retained responsibilities for logistics, training, force development, as well as force capabilities that may be assigned.

\textsuperscript{98} \textit{Ibid.}, 183.

\textsuperscript{99} Middlemiss and Sokolsky, \textit{Canadian Defence: Decision and Determinants}, 23 – 24.
Maloney argues that Canada committed its forces to United Nations peacekeeping as part of its overall prosecution of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{100} For the Korean War, Canada participated in order to “...honour her obligations under the [United Nations] charter...”\textsuperscript{101} Canada eventually established a Canadian Military Mission Far East, commanded by a brigadier in Tokyo, which had ready contact with the United Nations Command Headquarters.\textsuperscript{102} Canadian policy on commitments after the Korean War essentially came to include “...any undertaken made by Canada under the Charter of the United Nations...”\textsuperscript{103}

Although the Canadian commitment to peacekeeping was strong in terms of participation and its advancement of its international security agenda, from a policy perspective, there seemed to be little effective interest on the part of the government. Canada did have guidelines established in this period for participation in peacekeeping operations.\textsuperscript{104} But, in the 21 peacekeeping missions in which Canada participated from 1947 – 1989, only six Parliamentary debates were held regarding six of those missions.\textsuperscript{105}

\textsuperscript{100} Sean M. Maloney, \textit{Canada and UN Peacekeeping: Cold War by Other Means, 1945-1970} (St. Catherine’s, Ontario: Vanwell Publishing Limited) 2002, xii – xiii. Louis Delvoie also says that concerns over international security and the potential for escalation of regional conflicts; to maintain the integrity of NATO; and to limit the spread of communism were all prime motivators for Canada to become involved in United Nations peacekeeping operations during the Cold War. (Louis A Delvoie, \textit{Canada and International Security Operations: The Search for Policy Rationales} (Kingston: Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, 1999), 4 – 7.)


\textsuperscript{102} Denis Stairs, \textit{The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War and the United States} (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), 211 – 213. The commander attended daily briefings for situational awareness and reported directly to the chief of the general staff in Ottawa. He also met weekly with the Canadian diplomatic mission in Tokyo, where Canadian diplomatic and military views were exchanged.

DEFENCE POLICY IN THE POST COLD WAR ERA

At the heart of civil control of the military during deployed operations is the promulgation of national direction, including goals and the national interest that demands the commitment of military forces. Colonel Jon Vance noted Canada’s propensity for what he called ‘contribution warfare,’ or deploying forces with little regard to the national interest. 106 Or as Bland has argued, “Canada must resist the habit of merely lending troops to others, leaving them unattended to serve some communal interest while assuming it is a common interest.” 107 Despite its vast experience working in an alliance or coalition setting, neither the alliances in the World Wars nor the strategy of commitments in the Cold War prepared Canada for the coalition and alliance operations of the post Cold War era. Canadian contributions to coalition and alliance operations in the 1990s revealed recurring difficulties including:

. . . weak mandates and directions; uncertain international command; confused civilian and military relationships, especially between international commanders and international officials; overtasking of individuals and some types of units; incompatible communications and logistics systems; and contradictory force protection orders and rules of engagement. 108

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104 Louis A Delvoie, Canada and International Security Operations: The Search for Policy Rationales (Kingston: Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, 1999), 7 – 8. In the early 1970s, the Sharp Principles, named after Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mitchell Sharpe, outlined general guidelines for Canada to follow and use as a basis for negotiating with the United Nations Secretariat before committing troops to peacekeeping missions.


Authors Janice Stein and Eugene Lang have contended that “Canada has a very shallow and closed process of debate and discussion on issues of national security.”¹⁰⁹ For peace support operations of this period, there was usually “. . . a degree of discretion for the government about whether or not to become involved.”¹¹⁰ Often defence policy in Canada could be described as “. . . whatever the prime minister of the day thinks it is, or say[s] it is.”¹¹¹ The commitment of Canadian Forces personnel for peace support operations was done even if it was not central to Canada’s national interest, as peacekeeping policy was gradually expanded to commit forces to a variety of disparate conflict areas in the former Yugoslavia under UNPROFOR, and elsewhere.¹¹²

Throughout the Canadian contribution to UNPROFOR, “[n]either the United Nations nor the Canadian government ever defined precisely what UNPROFOR was supposed to achieve in Bosnia.”¹¹³ When United Nations Security Council Resolution

¹⁰⁹ Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, The Unexpected War, Canada in Kandahar (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2007), 78.

¹¹⁰ Board of Inquiry Croatia, Reports and Studies: Board of Inquiry Croatia (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2000), 24. This post Cold war peacekeeping reality was much different from that which existed during the Cold War. From 1991 – 1995, over 10,000 Canadian Forces personnel served in peace support operations under the United Nations in the Balkans (1).


¹¹² Delvoie, Canada and International Security Operations . . . , 10 – 14. Delvoie speaks to the murkiness of Canadian policy in deployments to Haiti, Somalia, and Rwanda. He argues that with virtually no national interest in Haiti aside from a large Haitian Diasporas in Montreal, the government employed military force to restore democracy after the overthrow by military force. This opened up inconsistencies in policy, as this happened routinely elsewhere in the world without prompting a response from Canada. Likewise, in Somalia, the question remained – what national interest had Canada in the humanitarian intervention in Somalia, especially a mission that evolved from peacekeeping to humanitarian assistance to peace enforcement? He says that it was for instances such as these that the Sharp principles were to guide Canada, yet successive governments allowed Canadian troops to get further embroiled in these conflicts without clear national interests.

¹¹³ David Bercuson, Significant Incident: Canada’s Army, the Airborne, and the Murder in Somalia (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Inc., 1996), 138.
776 was adopted to support the expansion of size and mandate for UNPROFOR; there was no commensurate authorization to operate under Chapter VII, and use of force was only authorized in self-defence.\textsuperscript{114} It was Canadian policy that a “... peacekeeping mission should have a clear mandate, adequate to permit it to carry out its assigned function.”\textsuperscript{115} Yet, the policy was seldom enforced. In June 1993, outgoing deputy commander of UNPROFOR, Canadian Major General Bob Gaudreau felt that the Canadian government was not behind the mission and did not provide needed political guidance.\textsuperscript{116} The decisions to commit forces, especially on dangerous missions, must be firmly rooted in policies derived from national interests and capabilities.\textsuperscript{117} Recently, Bland criticized the government of the day based on reports suggesting:

... that the facts about casualties and dead and severely wounded soldiers incurred in the Balkans wars were hidden from Canadians, for fear that the information would prompt a public outcry to properly equip the Canadian Forces for the battles the government had sent them to fight.\textsuperscript{118}

With little top down direction on the aim or objectives of missions throughout the 1990s, deployed Canadian forces were often left on their own. A weak United Nations command structure as well as rampant mission creep left military forces to carry out


\textsuperscript{115} Board of Inquiry Croatia, \textit{Reports and Studies: Board of Inquiry Croatia}, 44. Underlined in the original.

\textsuperscript{116} Carol Off, \textit{The Ghosts of the Medak Pocket: The Story of Canada’s Secret War} (Toronto: Random House Canada, 2004), 113.


higher intensity operations than originally envisaged. In Canada, government oversight of peace support operations was ineffective; neither the Canadian Parliament nor the Canadian public were interested in being informed of matters. Parliament at times did not fulfill its mandate; as an example, peace support operations had not been classified as active service since that would require a debate on the issue in Parliament. Despite this, military commanders demonstrated a ‘can do’ attitude and did not “. . . erect stumbling blocks in the way of government policy.”

The Report on the Special Review Group for Operation HARMONY Rotation 2 outlined two major factors that were endemic in Canadian Forces peace support operations in the 1990s – the primacy of force protection over the mission and trust and confidence in higher headquarters.

In conventional operations it is accepted doctrine that the priority in descending order is mission, own troops, self. This pre-supposes a clearly understood mission supported not only by the chain of command but also to some extent the Government and ultimately the people of Canada.

Unfortunately, the operations of the 1990s, most notably those in the Balkans, were characterized by ambiguous missions and rules of engagement, coalition chains of command, and tenuous support by the Canadian government and population at large. In surveys conducted throughout the decade of the 1990s, 30% of the leaders thought that force protection was more important than the mission.

119 Board of Inquiry Croatia, *Reports and Studies: Board of Inquiry Croatia*, 46.
122 Special Review Group Operation Harmony (Rotation Two), *Detailed Report of the Special Review Group Operation Harmony (Rotation Two)* (Ottawa: Department of national Defence, 2000), 9.
Political oversight of operations during the post Cold War period was largely non-existent. From 1989 – 2004, Canada was involved in 21 operations and there were 18 debates in the House of Commons regarding six of those missions; the National Defence Act does not require stringent Parliamentary oversight, as “Cabinet only requires Parliament’s approval in the event of conscription or states of emergency and can deploy troops by Order in Council without consulting Parliament”\textsuperscript{124} Operations to the former
With few exceptions, the Canadian government did not begin to provide clear, written direction to the Canadian Forces until the Campaign Against Terrorism commenced in 2001 with Operation APOLLO. The lessons learned report for that operation noted that “[t]he level of political guidance and direction for OP APOLLO was unprecedented. No other recent operation has received such comprehensive written direction.”\(^{128}\) The operational planning process requires political and strategic guidance, but it is seldom given, except sometimes verbally, and this political guidance in 2001 was “. . . the only known formal written guidance provided to any operation in the last decade.”\(^{129}\) However, political and strategic guidance were still not issued until after initial Canadian Forces elements were committed, and hence was not issued in time to guide force generation.\(^{130}\)

In 2005, the Government of Canada issued its *International Policy Statement*, harmonizing the key functions of diplomacy, defence, and development (3D) in a unified manner. Acknowledging that there was general erosion in these capabilities for decades, the government asserted that it was “. . . now in a position to reinvest in [its] international  


\(^{129}\) Ibid., B-4/42. A letter from the minister of national defence, Art Eggleton, on 22 November 2001 outlined the national aim to “. . . protect Canada from, and to prevent further attacks on Canada or its allies, by eliminating the threat of terrorism.” National objectives were enunciated as “Eliminate the Al Qaeda organization as a continuing threat; take appropriate military action to compel the Taliban to cease harbouring, and cooperating with Al Qaeda; isolate the Taliban regime from all international support; bring Osama bin Laden and other leaders of the Al Qaeda organization to justice; address immediately the humanitarian needs of Afghans ensuring, where possible, it complements existing humanitarian operations; assist in the reconstruction of Afghanistan.” The military mission issued by the CDS, General Ray Henault, stated that “. . . the [Canadian Forces] will contribute to the elimination of the threat of terrorism by contributing the Joint Task Force South West Asia (CJTFSWA) to [Commander-in-Chief Central Command] in support of the [United States] led campaign against terrorism, in order to protect Canada and its allies from terrorist attacks and prevent future attacks.” (B-2/41).

\(^{130}\) Ibid., A-1/7.
The defence statement emphasizes the role of defence and security as a critical component of international strategy, with the Canadian Forces singled out as “... a critical element in responding to threats and other emergencies both at home and abroad.” This policy establishes that in Afghanistan and on other missions, both the department and the Canadian Forces will:

... work more closely with other government departments and agencies, including Foreign Affairs and the Canadian International Development Agency, to further develop the integrated “3D” approach (defence, diplomacy, and development) to complex conflict and post-conflict situations.

This comprehensive and consolidated effort by government departments both in Ottawa and in the theatre of operations has meant operations are on a much wider spectrum than in the strategy of annihilation, with security being just one line of operation. Prime Minister Stephen Harper reaffirmed his government's commitment to Afghanistan, declaring that:

... You can't lead from the bleachers. I want Canada to be a leader ... [the work of the Canadian Forces] is about more than just defending Canada's national interests. Your work is also about demonstrating an international leadership role for our country.

Canada has harmonized its objectives with the coalition and provided the strategic direction and operational oversight to ensure that they are achieved. The promulgation of

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131 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada’s International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Overview (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2005), Foreword from the Prime Minister.


133 Ibid., 26.

this policy has meant that there is much closer cooperation between government departments, and there are goals and objectives for Canadian Forces deployed on operations.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

The connection between the politicians and the military levels of command must be seamless and it provides the basis for both civil control, a political responsibility and national command, a military responsibility. However, there is no clear line separating political from military; instead, there is an overlap in the political-military strategic realm to define policies for defence. The realm of the political-military strategic level borders policy and military strategy and is where civil-military relations allow the formulation of military means to meet political ends, and thus enable the military to issue strategic direction or objectives. Therefore, this requires a civil-military interface, and a political savvy amongst the strategic officer corps to be able to work within a political domain that is often short on objectives or long term strategic thinking.

In the First World War, the Borden government took action to exert civil control and smooth out civil-military relations by establishing an Overseas Ministry in London. Minister Edward Kemp largely gave military officers latitude in military matters; in the First World War, senior Canadian officers “. . . had defined their professional status in relation to the civil power, and they had begun to set their professional expectations accordingly.” With military and political staffs on both ends, this allowed for parallel civil and military channels between London and Ottawa. In the Second World War, a

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136 Ibid., 57.

Chiefs of Staff Committee was established in September 1939. Yet the military officers played a minor role in the formulation of policy, as often the legitimacy of their advice was not trusted by politicians or civil servants; they did not attend the Cabinet’s War Committee until three years into the war. Mackenzie King held a distrust of military officers and relied, not on his Chiefs of Staff, but upon his Under-secretary of State for External Affairs, O.D. Skelton, to draft Canadian war policy. In September 1944, a military secretary (Major General Pope) was added to the War Committee to provide closer coordination between the War Committee and the Chiefs of Staff.

Civil control of the military is the responsibility of many – both the civil authority as well as those holding the Queen’s commission. Each has a critical and overlapping role. Brooke Claxton, defence minister from 1946 – 1954, created the Department of National Defence with one deputy minister and a committee of service chiefs that formed a Chiefs of Staff Committee. From 1946 – 1950, numerous studies and papers looked to form a chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. By 1951, the formation of NATO in 1949 and the commencement of the Korean War, demanded changes and Claxton established a Chairman for the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

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138 Stacey, *Arms, Men, and Governments*…,” 126. It met 264 times until the end of the war in August 1945.


140 Stacey, *Arms, Men, and Governments*…,” 117 – 118.

141 Department of National Defence, *The Impact of Integration, Unification and Restructuring on the Functions and Structure of National Defence Headquarters* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1985), 4 – 11. After the Second World War, the Canadian government had adopted a single minister of defence responsible for all three services. Regarding the position of the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, the service chiefs were not interested, acknowledging that one may be necessary in wartime, but not in a peacetime construct, as it would hinder their functions; politically. The chairman was primarily
Bland is critical of the decline in civil-military relations during the Cold War. Poor civil-military relations within the Canadian NATO commitment were such that “. . . Canadian commanders tended to believe that they owed allegiance to the alliance first and Canadian governments second.” Likewise, he is critical of the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 as a low-point in civil-military relations. This event revealed the federal government’s failure to provide for the civil control of its military forces in an emergency situation. Relying extensively on alliances commitments, the Canadian government did not develop an effective national framework to provide command and control over its forces. The failure of both military officers and the government was based on a widespread perception that Canada had “. . . no direct control over its armed forces in emergencies or war.”

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142 Douglas L. Bland, “Military Command in Canada,” in Generalship and the Art of the Admiral: Perspectives on Canadian Senior Military Leadership, ed. Bernd Horn and Stephen J. Harris, 121 – 136 (St. Catharines, Ontario: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2001), 129. In 1971, when Prime Minister Trudeau changed the front line role of Fourth Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group with Northern Army Group to a reserve role at Central Army Group, many in the military were not happy with the decision, and a series of incremental adjustments to the mission effectively reversed his decision by the mid-1980s. Trudeau made an unpopular, yet legitimate political decision. The series of low level adjustments that had the brigade once again in a forward role facing Czechoslovakia did not occur as a consequence of government policy. (Bland, Chiefs of Defence…., 180 – 181).

143 Bland, Canada’s National Defence…., 407. Bland has stated that a lack of national armed forces command structure in part caused the civil-military crisis. “During the early stages of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis major elements of the Canadian Armed Forces went on alert or deployed under allied command without the formal approval of the Canadian government.”

144 Commander Peter T. Haydon, RCN (Retd), The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1993), 5.

145 Bland, Chiefs of Defence…., 185. In 1962 much divided the three services. Each had its own war book and each alliance or coalition operation had its own separate command and control arrangements. The service commanders were content with the ambiguity surrounding national command. The surrendering of national command gave the service chiefs greater flexibility in dealing with alliance commanders, specifically with NATO and North American Air Defence Command (NORAD). As such, the default for decision –making became allied commanders and not the Canadian government. There was
Prime Minister Diefenbaker stated in Parliament that the United States had not properly consulted Canada and that he did not have the information that he needed to take action, and he did not put the Canadian military on alert until 24 October. However, Canadian naval commanders interpreted Canadian obligations to its allies and committed forces prior to 24 October without the express direction of the Canadian government. When tactical commanders had tried to sort through the confusion, they relied on their allied commitments, especially as there was no coherent direction from the national chain of command. As Bland says, “Prime Minister John Diefenbaker was particularly uninterested in military affairs until the crisis arrived and then he was most interested in exercising through Canadian offices the control and direction of the Canadian Forces.”

In the World Wars, Canadian policy reluctantly surrendered vestiges of national autonomy. Yet in the Cold War, the forfeiture of national autonomy seemed to be largely unsolicited.

THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF – ADVISOR

As we have seen, the CDS holds a crucial position as the commander of the Canadian Forces and as the sole military advisor to the government. Paul Hellyer, Defence Minister from 1963 – 1967, unified the command of the Canadian Forces under a single officer, combining the function of the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee

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146 Haydon, The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis…, 176, 227 – 230. On 22 October, prior to Kennedy’s announcement of the blockade, the American Ambassador briefed Diefenbaker and his defence minister on American intentions. However, Canadian government decision-making was paralyzed by the crisis.

147 Bland, Chiefs of Defence…, 187 – 188. A number of factors contributed to the breakdown in civil-military relations, including poor government decision-making, and a reflex of Canadian military officers to follow allied direction in the absence of any national direction.

and the three service chiefs. Hellyer saw that Canadian defence policy consisted largely of disjointed actions contributing forces to alliances and to the United Nations with no central defence policy. It largely revolved around the operational capabilities of the three services. The creation of a single chief of the defence staff in 1964 meant that “. . . military command and management came into line with the unified policy direction which was established with the appointment of a single minister responsible for defence in 1946.”

Hellyer wanted a more operational focus because “[t]he need for fast decision-making and quick reaction is synonymous with modern warfare.” His changes created Canadian Forces Headquarters and kept the unified Canadian Forces and the department as separate entities. Unification saw the organization of the Canadian Forces into commands along functional lines. But, changes such as the creation of the CDS and Canadian Forces Headquarters, as well as the initial unification of the commands were derailed by the emotional uproar over the unification of the services into one force, and any advantages Hellyer gained in streamlining or operational effectiveness were quickly lost.

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149 Paul Hellyer, “Address on the Canadian Forces Reorganization Act, 7 December 1966,” in Canada’s National Defence Volume 2: Defence Organization, ed. Douglas L. Bland, 101 – 157 (Kingston, Ontario: School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University, 1998), 116 – 118. Hellyer also reformed the Defence Council to have three key advisors – the chief of the defence staff (military advice), the deputy minister (financial and policy advice), and the chairman of the Defence Research Board (scientific advice).

150 Brigadier General (Retired) G.E. Sharpe and Allan D. English, Principles for Change in the Post Cold War Command and Control of the Canadian Forces (Kingston: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute and the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff Group, 2002), 7.


152 Ibid., 141.

153 Department of National Defence, The Impact of Integration…, 69 – 70. The functional commands were: Maritime Command, Mobile Command, Air Defence Command, Air Transport Command, 1 Air Division and 4 CIBG (NATO), Training Command, and Materiel Command.
Within civil-military relations, the civil authority must set policy, political objectives, and allocate the necessary resources to meet those objectives. The CDS can advise on the integration of capabilities and national security strategy, but the decision in setting these is firmly within the purview of the civil authority. Once decisions on policy are made, the CDS sets strategic military objectives and the military develops the force to achieve this, including military effectiveness, doctrine, and training. At the strategic level, the military advice given to the government on military requirements and capabilities is essential, and must be grounded in a firm understanding of the political realities, both domestic and foreign. The CDS is further mandated to provide the government with non-partisan, honest advice, not only on the commitment of military force, but the risks that may be associated, especially if inadequately resourced.

The outcome of the Somalia Inquiry revealed instances where some senior officers “. . . had surrendered easily and routinely to mere public servants matters requiring professional [military] competence and judgement . . .” For example, when the Somalia mission changed from a humanitarian assistance operation under the United Nations to a peace enforcement mission led by the United States in December 1992, the government presented an order in council to place Canadian forces on active service with the multi-national force, and Parliament approved it. But, it was not until four days

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154 Bland, Canada’s National Defence..., 408.

155 Department of National Defence, A-PA-005-000/AP-001 Duty with Honour..., 42.

156 Ibid., 46 – 47.


after the Canadian Commander, Colonel Serge Labbé arrived in Somalia, that they learned what the Canadian task would be. Regarding higher direction, “[t]he CDS and NDHQ staff provided no guidance about what type of mission the CF would accept, except to urge Colonel Labbé to move as quickly as possible to secure a high-profile mission.”

**AUTHORITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY**

To achieve harmony at the political-military strategic level requires understanding among politicians, civil servants, and military officers. There is a requirement for mutual respect and understanding between politicians and military officers, such that:

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> . . . political authorities must themselves have a good understanding of military factors and decisions. Similarly, military commanders must gain a keen appreciation of the political factors without sacrificing their spirit and their competence in the use of military force in combat.

For officers, Bland articulates nine ‘facts of national life’ that officers need to take into consideration in the formulation of defence policy. Problems can occur in civil-military relations when senior officers in the Canadian Forces do not take into account the national facts of life.

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*Ibid.*, 752. In three weeks, and his staff effectively sorted out the new mission; but did so with no guidance or support from the CDS, who never met with Labbé before he deployed. The mission developed by Labbé was never directly confirmed by the CDS or anyone else at NDHQ. (762 – 763).


**Bland,** “Everything Military Officers Need to Know…,” 17 – 24. Some of these facts officers must understand are: there is no real credible threat to Canada; the public service, like the political leadership does not see a purpose in defence policy; generally politicians have had a poor relationship with the officer class; the government has always seen the military in terms of one service and not in separate services; officers cannot force military principles onto politicians.
There is a commensurate requirement for increased engagement by Members of Parliament. A commonly held belief is that the defence of the nation should rise above partisan politics, and the Special Joint Committee of the House and Senate in its 1994 report noted that Parliament must take a greater role in national defence – both in policy and oversight.\(^\text{162}\) Especially when decisions are largely made by Cabinet or the government, Parliament has a crucial role in exercising civil authority over the armed forces. As a consequence, “... the most critical function of parliamentary oversight requires senators and MPs to recognize the actions and decisions of ministers, senior officers and officials that must be rewarded or sanctioned.”\(^\text{163}\)

Following the Cold War era, the Somalia inquiry was the catalyst for much of the change along with events already described in Bosnia. A study on command and control prepared for the inquiry asserts that:

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\text{[i]n Canada, the three principal aspects of national defence – political direction, command and administration – necessarily overlap to some degree, but Parliament has set out, in law, boundaries that act as a check and balance between those charged with each function.}\(^\text{164}\)
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Bland argues that the structure of National Defence Headquarters should be a focal point for study regarding both defence policy and operational issues as it is central to all three aspects such that “[i]f the areas of political control, command and administration were structured differently in NDHQ, then decisions and policies would be different.”\(^\text{165}\)


\(^{163}\) Ibid., 40.


\(^{165}\) Ibid., 4 – 5.
Bland cites two serious obstacles for the office of the chief of the defence staff. First the propensity to lend troops to alliance command has weakened the authority of the CDS. As well, the strategy of alliances throughout the Cold War negated the requirement for a national commander and staff to direct operations. This caused many officials and bureaucrats to regard the position of CDS as a senior defence administrator. The second issue is that the CDS has not always given non-partisan military advice, and have at times told politicians what they wanted to hear, not the frank advice that they should give.\textsuperscript{166}

The document, \textit{Authority, Responsibility, and Accountability} clearly lays out the roles and responsibilities of the minister, the role of National Defence Headquarters, and the responsibilities of the deputy minister and the CDS, and further delineates reporting between senior staff to either the deputy minister or the CDS, or both.\textsuperscript{167} The report confirmed the inviolability of the military chain of command as “. . . clearly central to the nature and purpose of the Canadian Forces, and to the effective exercise of operational command.”\textsuperscript{168} The report established the fundamental basis for civil-military relations that had been lost, and it set the conditions to focus on command of operations.

Regarding senior military officers, Bland has argued recently that there is a renaissance in the professional spirit of the officer corps. Officers formed in the last three decades have learned that “. . . the Canadian governments and most Canadians cared little about what they were doing or the effects the wars were having on them or their

\textsuperscript{166}\textit{Ibid.}, 34.

\textsuperscript{167} Department of National Defence, \textit{Authority, Responsibility and Accountability: Guidance for Members of the Canadian Forces and Employees of the Department of National Defence} (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1997), 4 – 10.

\textsuperscript{168} \textit{Ibid.}, 18.
soldiers.” These officers also came to appreciate the difference between loyalty to the
civil authority and the upholding of military professional standards in the face of partisan
political interests.  

CHAPTER SUMMARY

Certainly in the mindsets of military strategists, the strategy of annihilation
dominated most of the last century. Canada established initial national autonomy during
the First and Second World Wars against strong colonial pressures to the contrary,
operating within the grand alliances based on Britain, the Commonwealth and the United
States. Fortunately, such allegiance-based warfighting had fairly linear aims which were
commonly agreed to, and national command could oversee the government’s policy that
Canadian units and formations not be broken up, unless absolutely necessary for alliance
unity of command. During the Cold War, the mindset of total victory in a full scale war
continued. Yet it was a largely peacetime construct with an alliance-based deterrence as
the focus. The aims and the reasons for joining such alliances were quite clear, but the
reality was that in a peacetime setting, there was little interest or oversight in actively
directing affairs within the alliances. The increased complexity of maintaining these
alliances in peacetime started to show through with inadequate command and control
structures that were tested by several crises and found wanting.

The Post Cold War era saw the United Nations-based peace support operations
dominate the operating environment. In hindsight, it is clear that the strategy of
annihilation had been replaced by the bi-polar operating environment, requiring a
different approach from both governments and militaries. Canada did not adapt well to

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170 Ibid., 57 - 58.
this change in environment and though its national autonomy had evolved from the World Wars, it did not evolve in step with the changing operating environment, and the added complexities overwhelmed the political and civil-military structures. The mid-1990s marked a turning point, as it was evident to all Canadians that there were fundamental issues that had to be resolved. Numerous inquiries and the Minister’s Report were catalysts for change in both the political and military realms.

Each step in this evolution increased with complexity such that by the time Canada became involved in the Campaign Against Terrorism in 2001, many changes at the political – military level were advancing. The engagement of the government in Operation APOLLO, the introduction of an aligned 3D approach with the International Policy Statement, and the current government’s commitment to Afghanistan, are all signs that this new era of coalition-based and whole-of-government operations will be met head on. The changes made to establish civil control since the mid-1990s have been instrumental in setting the conditions to deal with this new complexity.
CHAPTER 4 – NATIONAL COMMAND

National command is a military function that is defined in Canadian joint doctrine as “[a] command that is organized by and functions under the authority of a specific nation. It may or may not be placed under an alliance or coalition commander.”171 Bland further states that “[n]ational command involves the direction of national forces according to the principles, laws, and interests of Canadians and it is not something that can be passed to foreign leaders.”172 These definitions do not articulate the full scope of what must be considered when one speaks of national command, and the concept of full command provides further context. Full command is:

> [t]he military authority and responsibility of a superior officer to issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and administration and exists only within national Services. The term command, as used internationally, implies a lesser degree of authority than when it is used in a purely national sense. It follows that no alliance or coalition commander has full command over the forces assigned to him. This is because nations, in assigning forces to an alliance or coalition, assign only operational command or operational control.173

Building upon these definitions, and for the purpose of this paper, national command of deployed forces on operations starts with the CDS and permeates each level in the chain of command, such that strategic, operational, and tactical levels each have a distinct role to play. The concept of national command is fundamentally important because a breakdown at any level could compromise the premise of civil control of the military, and the very legitimacy under which the armed forces operate. Bland aptly describes this command as:


173 Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 Canadian Forces Operations …,GL-5.
the legal authority to issue orders and to demand obedience, [which] must be sharply defined in law, unambiguously delineated in organization, and obvious in execution. If any one of these conditions fails, then accountability and parliamentary control of the armed forces fails also.\footnote{Bland, \textit{Chiefs of Defence…}, 177.}

Dr. Graham refers to national command as the civil control of Canadian Forces operations.\footnote{Dr Ross Graham, “Civil Control of the Canadian Forces…,” 4.} However, in this paper, civil control is the overarching concept to which national command of deployed forces is a subordinate, military function. This is done to show that national command is in the purely military domain, starting in theory with the Governor General, but in practice with the CDS, and is subject to the control that is exercised by the civil authority.\footnote{The doctrinal definition of command is “[t]he authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, coordination, and control of military forces.” (Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 \textit{Canadian Forces Operations} …, GL-3). Thus it denotes a purely military activity.}

**EARLY NATIONAL COMMAND**

In the First World War, the Canadian army contribution to the war effort was placed under the command of the British commander-in-chief, Field Marshal Sir Alexander Haig, and when the First Canadian Division deployed overseas, it was commanded by a British officer, Lieutenant General E.A.H. Alderson. Even for its own formations, Canada did not have final say over the selection of senior commanders. When Canada sent a second division to Europe in 1915, Sam Hughes was adamant that the division commander, Major General Sam Steele, would continue to command the formation on arrival in England. However, the British war secretary, Lord Kitchener wanted to have a say on the naming of division commanders.\footnote{Department of External Affairs, \textit{Documents on Canadian External Relations}…, 66. Telegram from the acting high commissioner in London to Prime Minister Borden on 3 April 1915.}
requirement for unity of command, Borden decided that he would not go against the wishes of the war secretary but in the end, Brigadier Arthur Currie was selected out of the first division in France and promoted to divisional commander.\(^{178}\) In 1916, command of the Canadian corps went to another British officer, Lieutenant General Sir Julian Byng, until June 1917 when Currie, then a lieutenant general, was appointed as the first Canadian corps commander.\(^{179}\)

With the establishment of the overseas ministry, on the military side, Major General Richard Turner, V.C. became the military commander of all Canadian forces in the British Isles.\(^{180}\) With these steps, the Canadian government had established a single control authority for its military forces in the British Isles.\(^{181}\) To facilitate the administration of its deployed troops in France, Canada formed a Canadian Section of General Headquarters of the British Armies in France such that “. . . the full control of the Canadian Government over matters of organization and administration within its forces was rendered capable of fruition.”\(^{182}\)

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\(^{178}\) *Ibid.*, 75 – 77. Borden’s intent is revealed in a telegram to his acting high commissioner: “Steele thoroughly understood [the] condition on which he went forward and we must abide by [the] decision of Lord Kitchener with regard to him . . . We would have been more than glad if Kitchener had thought him capable of taking command.” (75). In a reply telegram, the acting high commissioner informed Borden that “[f]ailing Steele, I urged on Lord Kitchener [the] wisdom and propriety in appointing [a] Canadian if one could be found suitable [for] taking command, and asked him consult French regarding our Brigadiers in France . . . [French] recommends General Currie as most suitable and Kitchener will appoint him [to] command [the] Division if you concur.” (77)

\(^{179}\) Stacey, Editor, *Historical Documents of Canada* . . . , 552 – 553. In a memo from deputy minister of militia to Borden in August 1916 to Borden regarding senior appointments is instructive in enunciating Canada’s growing autonomy in the war: “. . . there being many members of the Canadian Force who are well qualified for [senior command], it would be most desirable that consultation [with Canada] and agreement [by Canada] should take place in the preliminary stages . . .” (Department of External Affairs, *Documents on Canadian External Relations* . . . , 134.)

\(^{180}\) Morton, *Canada and War* . . . , 68.

\(^{181}\) Stacey, Editor, *Historical Documents of Canada* . . . , 554.
Despite these advances in national autonomy, there were still tangible concerns that British high command was taking decisions without due regard to consultation with Canadian officials. In the spring of 1918, 16,000 Canadians were killed at Passchendaele, and Borden demanded answers to the failures that led to this disaster. He summoned Currie to London for an account of what happened. Currie’s appraisal of the war situation, especially regarding the ineffectiveness of British high command “shocked Borden.” On 13 June 1918, Borden lambasted the British high command for lack of foresight, preparation, and intelligence in a lengthy speech to the War Cabinet that has been described as “…probably the strongest criticism of the British conduct of the war ever delivered in the Imperial War Cabinet.” Borden was highly critical of British pandering to its professional army corps at the expense of capable officers in the new army recruited for the war. Borden’s criticism of the British high command was welcomed by Lloyd George and led him to form the Prime Ministers Committee, giving the Dominion Prime Ministers direct access to military advice as well as greater civilian oversight of the military in the formulation of war policy.

182 Ibid., 555.

183 Brown and Ramsay Cook, Canada 1896 – 1921…, 283 – 284.

184 Stacey, Editor, Historical Documents of Canada 01 Tma
In the Second World War, Canadian Military Headquarters was established in London separate from the Canadian High Commission (Canada House), and it reported to the Minister of National Defence in Ottawa through the Chief of the General Staff. It served as a conduit for routine administration between defence headquarters in Ottawa and the British War Office.\textsuperscript{190} When the First Canadian Division was dispatched to Great Britain in 1939 under Major General A.G.L. McNaughton, there were no formal instructions to outline its employment. It had been initially assumed that it would be trained and then sent to France under British higher command.\textsuperscript{191}

On 7 December 1939, the Chief of the General Staff issued McNaughton a directive entitled ‘Organization and Administration of Canadian Forces Overseas.’ This directive instructed McNaughton that all matters of military operations and discipline were to go from the General Officer Commanding First Canadian Division to the Commander-in-Chief of the British Army in the Field. The directive also established that policy matters would be dealt from Canadian Military Headquarters through the High Commissioner back to the Chief of the General Staff in Ottawa (with detailed work being conducted directly between the two military staffs). Canadian Military Headquarters would have no command authority over First Canadian Division.\textsuperscript{192} McNaughton, as general officer commanding the division, had responsibility for both divisional and non-divisional units, and “[t]o C.M.H.Q. fell the task of caring for such matters as did not

\textsuperscript{190} Stacey, \textit{Arms, Men, and Governments}…, 206 - 207.


properly fall to the Corps . . .”193 When Crerar was appointed to command the First Canadian Army on 20 March 1944, the directive to him stated that he could withdraw his forces from an operation and he also had “. . . the right to refer to the Government of Canada in respect to any matter in which the said Canadian Forces are, or are likely to be, involved or committed or in respect of any question of their administration.”194

The Canadian government also established a Canadian services representative in Washington under Major General Pope. The Canadian staff kept situational awareness through a docket of papers from the British Secretariat and the Combined Joint Chiefs that allowed Canadian officers “. . . to keep in pretty close touch with what is going on, though by this statement it is not to be inferred that we are shown all papers going through the office.”195 But generally, any matters that affected Canadian interests could then be brought up with either British or American officials.196

In the Korean War, initially there was no overarching command structure to act on behalf of tactical level commanding officers and commanders. When Second Battalion Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry deployed to the Korean War in


194 Stacey, Editor, Historical Documents of Canada . . ., 612.

195 Major General M.A. Pope, “Report by Canadian Joint Staff, 30 July 1942,” in Stacey, Arms, Men, and Governments . . ., 555. In Pope’s report, he noted that “. . . the only effective way of safeguarding Canadian interests is by keeping as close contact as possible with the work of the combined chiefs of staff organization, particularly in the early stages.”

196 Ibid., 555. Pope sums up the situation in Washington like this: “It is not in the least our desire to convey the impression that all is well as it can be in respect to the Canadian representation to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. We have, however, endeavoured to point out that we have been afforded a number of facilities and courtesies in the discharge of our duties; that these duties can best be discharged by establishing friendly contact with every bit of the organization useful to our purposes and by gradually building up that measure of confidence in the minds of both British and United States officers without which we could accomplish little.”
December 1950 under the United States Eighth Army, it still had to undergo training on arrival in Korea. Canadian authorities provided the commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Jim Stone, a directive that he was not to engage in operations until he was satisfied that he had completed the requisite training to be fit for operations. He also had a ‘national card’ up his sleeve, as his command instructions:

“... included the provision that ‘No limitation is placed on your direct channel of communication on any matter with the Chief of the General Staff,’ ... [Lieutenant-General] Simonds had taken this precaution largely because of the experience of Canadian commanders in the two World Wars, who had some difficulty in working simultaneously under both foreign and Canadian chains of command.”

Soon after the deployment of Brigadier Rockingham’s Brigade to Korea in 1951, the Commonwealth brigades were formed into a Commonwealth division. Prior to this, Rockingham had the status of a brigade group and commanded all Canadian administrative units, including administrative and reinforcement units in Japan. But, when the 1st Commonwealth Division was formed in July 1951, the administrative units were allocated to the division or the Commonwealth lines of communication structure. In order to maintain control over Canadian units on behalf of the government, Canadians “... serving in integrated units [were formed] into all-Canadian accounting units whose commanders were responsible to Brigade Headquarters.”

197 Stairs, *The Diplomacy of Constraint...* 206 – 208. Stone was forced to produce the letter to his American superiors in order not to be sent directly to the front by his American commander. Likewise when 25 Canadian Brigade was deployed in 1951, it was initially directly under American command. The American commander tried to employ brigade onto the line before they were adequately prepared for combat. The commander, Brigadier J.M. Rockingham, threatened resignation over the issue, and the brigade was not sent.


Canada’s Joint Staff Mission in Tokyo was to provide oversight to the forces deployed to Korea. When a Canadian infantry company was ordered detached from its brigade to guard a military prisoner of war camp at Koje-do with other Commonwealth forces in order to give it an international, vice American make-up, the Canadian brigade commander authorized it, and though the Canadian brigadier at the Joint Staff Mission in Tokyo was aware, he neglected to inform the Chief of the General Staff. Clearly the separation of the company from its battalion broke the unity of command principle which was outlined in the command instructions, and was consistent with policies from the Second World War. The Canadian government protested to the United States, asserting its national autonomy; the brigadier was soon recalled and forced into retirement.\textsuperscript{201}

Military command and control structures during the Cold War did not foster a seamless civil-military link to allow national command to be exercised. Bland noted that the sub-culture of military and political subordination was evident in the 1950s when Canada made almost no effort to form a national contingent when its forces deployed to Europe to serve in NATO.\textsuperscript{202} It did not group its army, navy, or air assets under a

\textsuperscript{200} Canadian Army Historical Section, \textit{Canada’s Army in Korea}…, 80 – 81. The title of the Colonel in Charge of Administration position was changed to Commander Canadian Base Units Far East in July 1953. These commanders were responsible to Brigade Headquarters on national matters, and in July 1952, a colonel was added to the Brigade Headquarters establishment as Colonel in Charge of Administration. This commander was the administrative link between the Brigade Headquarters, the Headquarters British Commonwealth Force Korea, and Army Headquarters in Ottawa.

\textsuperscript{201} Denis Stairs, \textit{The Diplomacy of Constraint}… 249 – 253. Neither Simonds nor the minister of defence, Brooke Claxton, was pleased that American authorities had ordered the separate employment of Canadian troops without consultation with the Canadian government. Furthermore, they were not pleased that the Commonwealth division had passed on the orders or that the Canadian Joint Mission had not immediately notified authorities in Ottawa. The Canadian government expressed its concern to the United States, which Secretary of State Pearson later read out Parliament against the despatch of a Canadian company without prior consultation with the Canadian government; nevertheless, Canadian forces would carry out the order, but it was hoped that it would be possible to reunite the company to its battalion soonest.

\textsuperscript{202} Bland, \textit{Chiefs of Defence}…, 179.
national commander when it despatched them in 1951. Naval assets, the brigade, and the air division each reported to its respective service chief in Ottawa as well as to its NATO commander. The Canadian contribution to NATO was stove piped along service lines; there was no defence planning strategy, and all three were separate organizations under the operational command of NATO with little national command oversight from Ottawa.203

The army, navy, and air force elements operated under their NATO commanders, but not with each other. Supreme Allied Commander Europe continued to provide strategic direction; National Defence Headquarters provided administrative and force generation support.204 In numerous Canadian NATO exercises, “... the command, control, and administration of the CF in field were cited as incoherent, ineffective and utterly disconnected from critical plans for mobilization, communications, logistics, and reinforcement.”205 Commander Canadian Force Europe, Major General Charlie Belzile endorsed the creation of a Canadian NATO theatre; from his perspective Canadian Forces command and control arrangements in Europe were inadequate. It had a divisive command based on environment, inefficient logistics, inadequate planning, and long lines

203 Bland, “Canadian Forces in Europe: The End Game?” 82 – 85. In 1971 following reductions of Canadian Forces in Europe, the elements were co-located, but there was still no unified commander. Each organization had other missions and each commander was for all intents and purposes a national commander – there were up to five of them with no unified national command structure. In 1977, a national commander was finally installed, prompting Bland to remark that “[i]t has taken the CF nearly 25 years to rediscover that Canadian troops deployed outside Canada need an unambiguous national chain of command to link them to political authority at home.”

204 Sharpe and English, Principles for Change in the Post Cold War Command and Control of the Canadian Forces, 7.

205 Bland, Chiefs of Defence..., 182.
of communication back to Canada and it could “result in the breakdown of national command.”

The command and control for Canadian expeditionary operations was often ad-hoc. Unique solutions were sought for the challenges presented in the two World Wars and that provided a template as well for the Korean War. But the strategic situation of the Cold War with peacetime concerns provided challenges that were not present when the country was mobilized for war. As such, the expeditionary peace support operations in support of the United Nations had no ready template; often there was very little national supervision. In fact in 1960, the United Nations arranged to re-deployed two Canadian staff officers from the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization in Palestine to the Congo without the concurrence of the Canadian government.

However, it would be unfair to say that Canada was disengaged or disinterested. In recommending procedures to United Nations peacekeeping in 1970, it was noted that a number of items regarding the terms of reference for force commanders, such as relations with national contingent commanders, self-defence, use of force, which should be agreed to in advance for each particular mission. Canada sought to ensure that the Canadian contingent had a means of communication back to Canada for national matters, such as troop rotations, individual replacements, logistics, and other administration. In United Nations operations during this period, it was common to appoint a staff officer at the


207 Granatstein, Canada and Peacekeeping Operations, the Congo…, 14.


209 Ibid., 71.
United Nations force headquarters as the national contingent commander. But, for its deployment to the Congo in 1960, Canada formed an early example of a national command element with a headquarters to provide national oversight of the signal squadron assigned to operational duties with the mission.\footnote{Granatstein, \textit{Canada and Peacekeeping Operations, the Congo...}, 44 - 47. The mission was known as the \textit{Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo}, or ONUC. The contribution consisted of a signal squadron commanded by a major plus a headquarters commanded by a colonel. The signals squadron was under the operational control of the United Nations headquarters, and the Canadian headquarters was primarily to deal with national administration, but the commander, Colonel Mendelsohn, noted that the Canadian headquarters “... perform[ed] no apparent useful function for the benefit of ONUC ... on the other hand, by its intervention on behalf of [the Canadian signal squadron], the Canadian headquarters inevitably finds itself in the difficult position of appearing to criticize the handling of the Signal Squadron by its operational headquarters.” The two units were amalgamated into one commanded by a colonel, with a lieutenant-colonel as the chief signals officer in order to provide the effective oversight, support, and operational focus.}

THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF – COMMANDER

Armed forces exercise authority over nominal military affairs, such as doctrine, personnel and discipline policies, as well as internal organization and the conduct of military operations, particularly at the operational and tactical levels. Since the CDS is charged with ‘control and administration’ of the Canadian Forces, all orders and direction from the Minister of National Defence to the Canadian Forces are passed through the CDS.\footnote{Department of National Defence, A-PA-005-000/AP-001 \textit{Duty with Honour...}, 40 – 41.} In formal terms, the Governor General as the Commander-in Chief provides the direct line of command through the CDS “... to all officers who hold the Queen’s commission. ...”\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, 38.} This establishes that command starts with the Governor General as the representative of the Crown and proceeds to the CDS and then to all military personnel through the military chain of command.
There are no politicians in the chain of command, though in practice the prime minister, Cabinet, and the Minister of National Defence provide direction and orders to the CDS, they are not in command. As well, though it is not articulated in law, the CDS is recognized by custom as the commander of the Canadian Forces. The CDS does not draw his authority from the Minister of National Defence; neither the minister nor the prime minister may act in his stead. Thus the civil authority cannot exert civil control of the military without the cooperation of the CDS to give orders and direction to the Canadian Forces. Thus Bland argues that the CDS shares responsibility and accountability with the civil authority for the civil control of the Canadian Forces.  

This appears straightforward; however, the 1960s and 1970s witnessed a fundamental misunderstanding among politicians and military officers over roles in national defence, in particular who commanded forces on operations. The Royal Commission on Government Organization was commissioned in 1960 and chaired by J. Grant Glassco. Its purpose was “. . . to inquire into and report upon the organization and methods of departments and agencies of the government of Canada . . .” The Glassco Commission asserted that “Canadian defence arrangements do not envisage independent military action by the forces of this country.” It further justified the abdication of national command, and hence civil control, by stating that:  

Canada participates in the collective control and direction of these international commands [ie. NATO, NORAD, United Nations actions] but, once its forces are committed to their missions, exercises little direct control over operations . . . Consequently, the principal function of the

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214 Bland, Canada’s National Defence..., 21.  
headquarters organization in the Department of National Defence is one of support rather than operational command . . . \textsuperscript{216}

**STRATEGIC LEVEL**

In the Glassco Commission, there were several project teams for national defence, one of which (Project 16) was headed by retired Air Vice Marshal F.S. McGill. McGill advocated that “[t]he organizational structure in DND headquarters should be so designed that it will, without change, operate as efficiently in the emergencies of war as in peacetime.”\textsuperscript{217} Bland notes that the final Glassco report did not fully articulate this recommendation by stating that “[t]he forces to be used in meeting any major emergency must be organized, equipped and trained before the emergency arises.”\textsuperscript{218} McGill had meant that the most stringent wartime structures should be in place so that National Defence could effectively operate in both peacetime and wartime without change.\textsuperscript{219} McGill’s recommendation was prescient and would surface several times in the next four decades, but it would not actually be implemented until Canadian Forces transformation in 2005.

Additionally, Donald Macdonald, defence minister from 1970 – 72 formed the civilian directed Management Review Group in 1971 in order to transfer administrative functions from military officers to civilian assistant deputy ministers. The intention was to free up administrative functions from military officers so that they could focus on

\textsuperscript{216} Royal Commission on Government Organization, “Report 20…,” 66.


\textsuperscript{218} Royal Commission on Government Organization, “Report 20…,” 65.

\textsuperscript{219} Bland, Canada’s National Defence..., 52.
operations. It was reasoned that “. . . keeping the ‘sharp end’ sharp is the sole reason for the existence of the rest of the Department.” 220 Ironically, the Management Review Group’s recommendation that the department be amalgamated with the Canadian Forces as a single entity had a significant adverse impact on the operational effectiveness of the department. 221 The immediate effect was that “. . . NDHQ grew into a type of military command and civilian administration structure.” 222 It was indicative of a period when “. . . many officers and most officials had once again uncritically accepted the notion that the purpose of the national headquarters was to support, not to command, the Canadian Forces.” 223

In the mid-1980s, operational tests of defence plans revealed significant problems in command and control. After the government asked defence headquarters to prepare an estimate for the evacuation of Canadians from Haiti in 1988, the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (DCDS) joint staff drew up a plan, which was presented to the CDS and service commanders, who were upset that they had been bypassed. Since the plan was conceived in isolation, it did not have service input, and had to be redrawn. 224 The CDS


221 Bland, Canada’s National Defence…,” 163 – 164. Edgar Benson received the report as defence minister in 1972, and implemented some of the recommendations with reservations. However, Bland notes three critical shortfalls. The review group only considered peacetime activities and never considered operations in times of crisis or war. The report recommended an ‘office of the minister’ which effectively took over policy matters, yet it was not accountable to the public. Finally, recommendations further tried to circumvent civil-military relations by placing the deputy minister above the chief of the defence staff, effectively placing a civil servant between the chief of the defence staff and the government.

222 Douglas L. Bland, National Defence Headquarters Centre for Decision…., 40.

223 Bland, Canada’s National Defence…,” 408.

224 Bland, Chiefs of Defence…., 191.
and the deputy minister realized that National Defence Headquarters could not adequately plan or direct an operation and directed a study into the role of National Defence Headquarters in crisis and emergencies.\textsuperscript{225} The mandate for the study was given to the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS), Lieutenant General John de Chastelain, and his team of Major General W.E. Little and Mr. D.P. Hunter. Their mandate was “[t]o determine the functions of NDHQ in emergencies and war, the organization and resources required to undertake those functions, and the appropriate peacetime structure that would best facilitate a transition to wartime operations.”\textsuperscript{226} Many of their findings could be attributed to changes that were put in place by the Management Review Group, such as the fundamental conflict between peacetime efficiency and wartime footing.\textsuperscript{227}

The study group also identified confusion regarding the operational or wartime role of NDHQ due to “. . . an inadequate definition of the role of the environmental commanders and the responsibility of the DCDS vis-à-vis environmental commanders and environmental chiefs.”\textsuperscript{228} The DCDS Group had to provide both environmental advice and central unified advice, yet the services meddled in the former and the group was not staffed properly to do the latter. The DCDS provided an analysis to the

\textsuperscript{225} Bland, \textit{Canada’s National Defence…},” 410.

\textsuperscript{226} NDHQ Study S1/88, “The Functions and Organization of National Defence Headquarters in Emergencies and War. Final Report: February 1989, Volume 1 – Narrative Report,” in \textit{Canada’s National Defence Volume 2: Defence Organization}, ed. Douglas L. Bland, 417 – 509 (Kingston, Ontario: School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University, 1998), 429. The scope of the study was limited and the team did not have the mandate to look at fundamental issues such as the CDS and deputy minister diarchy. This mandate effectively ruled out the McGill principle; Bland considered that it was wrong to negate this principle and to look at command and control from the perspective of a transition from peacetime to wartime (Bland, \textit{Canada’s National Defence…}, 411 – 412).

\textsuperscript{227} Bland, \textit{Canada’s National Defence…},” 411.

\textsuperscript{228} NDHQ Study S1/88, “The Functions and Organization…,” 466.
organization and the relationship with service commanders and environmental chiefs in order to facilitate the transition from peacetime to wartime. However, the service commanders considered all proposals unsuitable. Effectively, it was decided that duplication between environmental chiefs and service commands would be reduced to free up personnel to bolster the joint staff to better provide joint advice. Environmental advice would then be given by the environmental chiefs as permanent representatives of the service commanders to advise the CDS and deputy minister. The DCDS would have his unified staff as joint coordinators and planners to provide joint advice on operations, plans, and doctrine. As Bland observes, the problem resulted from the conflict between strong service views and unified views. The service commanders essentially became equal to the CDS, as their concurrence would be required on plans prepared for war or operations.

The Little-Hunter Report also revealed that without a strategic concept, “... the command responsibilities for the CDS and NDHQ were compromised by the 1972 amalgamation of CFHQ with the departmental organization; and responsibilities for command and control were
would command.\textsuperscript{232} However, the resurgence of the service agenda favoured National Defence Headquarters as a force generator and the service chiefs as commanders on operations.\textsuperscript{233} As it turned out, the report was effectively shelved by the CDS and deputy minister; at the end of the Cold War, the leadership in the Canadian Forces and the department appeared to be short-sighted by failing to implement sound recommendations to change the command and control concepts of the Canadian Forces.\textsuperscript{234}

The early 1990s was characterized by national defence headquarters as a “...bloated organisation where staff officers had little access to decision-makers and where bureaucracy ruled – often for its own sake.”\textsuperscript{235} Bland noted that “[b]y 1995, it was plain to anyone who cared to look that the Canadian Forces did not have a concept of command nor a workable link between responsibility and accountability in the chain of command.”\textsuperscript{236} The Defence Management Committee formed a team of civilian and military personnel as the Management, Command and Control Re-engineering initiative from 1994 – 1997.\textsuperscript{237} But some of the changes that it made were criticized as it was based on management theory. In some ways, it modelled the management based reforms

\textsuperscript{232} Bland, \textit{Canada’s National Defence...}, 413.

\textsuperscript{233} Douglas Bland, \textit{Chiefs of Defence...}, 197.

\textsuperscript{234} NDHQ Study S1/88, “The Functions and Organization...”, 423. In a joint letter, the CDS and deputy minister stated that “[t]he subject of this report is an evolving issue, the thrust of which was unfortunately overtaken by events in the last months and will not likely be a departmental priority in the near future.”


\textsuperscript{236} Bland, \textit{Canada’s National Defence...}, 415.

\textsuperscript{237} Department of National Defence, \textit{Management, Command and Control Re-engineering Team (MCCRT) Historical Report} (Ottawa: Department of National Defence 1997), para 9.
of the previous 35 years, which tried to achieve efficiency, which is largely incompatible as a guiding principle within a military organization.\textsuperscript{238}

In the early 1990s, the environmental chiefs of staff, now in Ottawa continued to have a dual focus on both force generation and force employment. This ensured a continuation of duplication in roles for force employment of forces on operations. Lieutenant General Michel Maisonneuve notes that “[h]ad the pure principles of re-engineering been followed to their final conclusion, there would have been only one force employment process owner and the ECS’s role would not have them commanding operations unless specifically assigned.”\textsuperscript{239} In all of the studies throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the retention of powers and force employment responsibilities by the environmental chiefs of staff was never adequately addressed to resolution. Even in 2001, the ability of National Defence Headquarters to meet the McGill principle was still inadequate.\textsuperscript{240}

\textbf{POST COLD WAR NATIONAL COMMAND}

In the Gulf War, Somalia, as well as in subsequent NATO led operations in Bosnia, Canada employed an intermediate headquarters to take care of issues of national command. In order to deal with the grave threats that were posed, it was noted that Canadians must command their own troops to the extent possible, despite coalition objections.\textsuperscript{241} The Persian Gulf War provided a massive challenge to command and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{238} Sharpe and English, \textit{Principles for Change in the Post Cold War Command and Control of the Canadian Forces}, 91 – 92.
\item \textsuperscript{239} Maisonneuve and Bland, “National Defence Headquarters…,” 24.
\item \textsuperscript{240} \textit{Ibid.}, 31 – 32.
\item \textsuperscript{241} Board of Inquiry Croatia, \textit{Reports and Studies: Board of Inquiry Croatia}. 56 – 57. This headquarters became known as a national command element.
\end{itemize}
control in Canada. Initially, the naval task group reported to Maritime Command, with much of the requirements merely forwarded to Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel) in National Defence Headquarters. The air task group initially reported through Canadian Forces Europe and later Air Command. It did not take long for “... the Canadian contribution [to be] thrown into confusion because the CDS and officers in NDHQ had little idea about how to organize and command a unified combat force under a national command.” Further, the lack of a central coordinating authority to direct planning or operations meant that during the Gulf War, the government was not adequately able to “... assess information, to coordinate and control competing departments, or to manage foreign and defence policy comprehensively.” Forced to come up with a command and control structure, Canada decided to implement a national joint headquarters. The CDS, General John de Chastelain, retained full command, however, so did the respective environmental commanders back in Canada. The retention of full command by the environmental commanders allowed them to undermine de Chastelain’s command authority and interfere with operations.

242 Major Jean Morin and Lieutenant Commander Richard H. Gimblett, Operation Friction, 1990 – 1991: The Canadian Forces in the Persian Gulf (Toronto, Dundurn Press, 1997), 36 – 37. It was the first expeditionary operational test of the NDHQ joint staff, after the Little-Hunter report; senior members of that staff formed a crisis action team.


244 Bland, Chiefs of Defence…., 203.

245 Department of National Defence, Strategic Operational Management in the Gulf War: an NSSC Case Study: Supporting Documents (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1999), 14 – 17, 29 – 30. Despite the reluctance of Air Command and Maritime Command to have a deployed joint task force commander in theatre, a number of command and control structures were studied. The CDS sent staff to the Australian embassy to learn from their model of task force operations, and he accepted a command/task force structure that was modelled after an Australian one. (Bland, Chiefs of Defence…., 201 – 203).
In the peace support operations of the 1990s, the United Nations peacekeeping construct of the Cold War quickly proved to be inadequate.246 The Canadian contingent commander, with other primary United Nations duties, had no dedicated Canadian staff. Intelligence acquisition and support was frowned upon generally on peace support operations. With no intermediate headquarters, National Defence Headquarters often dealt directly with the tactical level issues.247 National Defence Headquarters was unable to adequately provide military direction to a deployed national headquarters, with the effect that the tactical level was forced to interpret strategic guidance because “... there is a gap between the political-military strategic guidance produced by NDHQ and the operational-tactical level concerns of the deployed force.”248

The United Nations has long been Canada’s preferred institution for coalition building and Canada has usually relied on it as an instrument in legitimacy. However, weak United Nations command and control structures often hindered the use of the requisite military force.249 It has been argued that “[s]enior [Canadian] officers,

246 Board of Inquiry Croatia, Reports and Studies: Board of Inquiry Croatia, 56. Continuing on from established procedure during the Cold War, Canada gave operational control of its assigned forces to the United Nations commander. The Cold War era of peacekeeping operations generally saw a battle group with the wherewithal to take care of other Canadian support elements and assets that may be in location. As well, there was usually a Canadian officer assigned as a staff officer at the United Nations force headquarters with responsibility as the Canadian contingent commander (primarily for administration and discipline), but there was seldom a superior Canadian headquarters in the theatre of operations. “In hindsight, the staff in the early 1990s did not realize the shift in peacekeeping that was happening with UNPROFOR and, thus, the traditional low-key organization of command and staff was deployed in the former Yugoslavia.” (54 - 56).

247 Ibid., 54 – 56. Canadian intelligence resources were under-resourced to deal with the complex UNPROFOR mission and uncooperative belligerents. There was no intelligence processing at any level – battle group, Canadian contingent, or National Defence Headquarters, and as such there was a perennial issue with a lack of situational awareness and assessment.

convinced that ad hoc methods are the UN way in warfare, have simply abandoned any attempt to learn from command in the UN . . . they have made little effort to record UN doctrine or to invent a UN system of command.”

It has been said regarding peace operations that Canada merely deploys its units, but does not employ them, such that “[c]ommanding officers and commanders have been left alone, accountable only to the UN system and usually without any decent support for even routine matters. It is the skill of commanders that made most operations a credit to Canada.”

Major General Lewis MacKenzie’s experience as commander of United Nations forces in Sarajevo in 1992, made him highly critical of the United Nations’ “. . . ability to command, control and support logistically its burgeoning peacekeeping forces in the field.”

The subsequent command and control arrangement for Implementation Force proved to be much superior to UNPROFOR, as it was a unified NATO command operating under United Nations authority.

However, in Somalia, unlike on previous United Nations operations, a national commander and headquarters was established as an acknowledgement of the complex nature of the Somalia operation, and the increased difficulty of such missions, and “the need to ensure that Canadian interests were being considered within the coalition.”

Commander Canadian Joint Force Somalia exercised national command over Canadian

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troops within the American led United Task Force. The chain of command for the Commander Joint Force Headquarters was that he would have operational command of Canadian forces, but operational control would be passed to the United States Combined Joint Task Force Somalia. Despite this, there were still problems with the chain of command. The operation revealed much confusion about who the Joint Force Commander reported to – the CDS or DCDS.255

**ADOPTING THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL**

Before Canadian Forces transformation in 2005, Canada did not have a separate joint operational level headquarters to direct the operations of its deployed forces. As early as the 1990s, the term operational was being used unofficially to denote that area between strategy and tactics. Colonel Keith Eddy noted that if Canada was to accept and develop the operational level of war, then it:

> . . . must have legitimate relevance to the nation’s needs, and must be thoroughly reflected within the keystone manuals . . . [and] be consistent with uniquely Canadian policies, and must reflect decision-making procedures at national political as well as at military levels.256

The MCCRT introduced the concept of three separate levels in the Canadian Forces organization: strategic, operational, and tactical.257 In 1994, Armed Forces Council had directed the development of an operational level command and control capability in the

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255 *Ibid.*, 418 – 420. The report of the commission further stated that for all intents and purposes, the DCDS was part of the chain of command, but “. . . neither doctrine nor custom allows staff officers to command units, and attempts to bend this concept, even (or especially) at the highest levels of command, distort and obscure responsibility and accountability.”


Canadian Forces, and by December 1998, it approved the creation of a Canadian Forces Joint Headquarters with a mandate to:

. . . establish the capability to generate a deployable operational level command and control capability for [Canadian Forces] contingency operations . . . in the role of a National Command Element (NCE) up to and including warfighting in low and mid-intensity operations.  

The stand-up of the Joint Operations Group in June 2000 with both the joint headquarters and a signals regiment, gave the Canadian Forces a deployable operational level headquarters solely dedicated to operations.

In 2000 Vice Admiral Garnett, the VCDS, directed a team to review a command and control option based on a single operational level headquarters. The centralized model put forward in this report recommended consolidating force employment from the nine operational headquarters into a single joint headquarters in Ottawa. This allow for operational command of all forces on domestic or international operations. However, there was still no obvious separation of the joint headquarters from National Defence Headquarters, resulting in some joint staff continuing to work at both operational and strategic levels. This concept called for the CDS to appoint a task force commander and to direct operations through the DCDS, who would provide operational direction to the designated commander.

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260 Ibid., 21 – 24.

261 Ibid., 36. Colonel Chris Little has argued that the limitations on command and control in at this time were “. . . due to a lack of harmonization between the functions of command and control and a structure that has evolved on management principles.” (Little, “Mason Crabbe – Worth Another Look?,”
The centralized model would provide separation in the chain of command between force employment and force generation. The team listed command and control of operations, as well as the ‘policy development, planning and execution of large scale operations’ as an advantage of the centralized option. The variation on the centralized model that sees a combination of strategic and operational levels under the DCDS would adversely affect the operational focus. Their view was that it would be overpowering to mix the political interface at the strategic level with the operational focus for operations. In the end, the team recommended not to adopt the centralized option despite the formidable advantages it offered for the employment of forces on operations.

DEFINING MILITARY STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL LEVELS

Critical to success in national command is to have a command system where each level of command has the responsibility and authority to carry out its function. Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann’s concept of command and dimensions of command provide a relevant context when discussing national command. Pigeau and McCann define command as “[t]he creative expression of human will necessary to accomplish the mission.” They denote command as a distinctly human endeavour with three dimensions that are essential for effective command: competency, authority, and

5.) The dual responsibilities of DCDS group staff in both strategic and operational level domains has led to criticisms of their ability to do either well. (Little, “Mason Crabbe – Worth Another Look?,” 23-24.).

262 Mason and Crabbe, A Centralized Operational Level Headquarters…, 40, 45.

263 Ibid., 52 – 53, 58. Though outside their mandate, they recommended a third option that kept the force employment advantages of the centralized headquarters yet made accommodations for force generation responsibilities to remain with the other dispersed operational headquarters that each of the environments had throughout the country.

264 Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann, “Re-conceptualizing Command and Control,” Canadian Military Journal 3, no.1 (Spring 2002): 56. They have also defined control as “[t]hose structures and processes derived by command to enable it and to manage risk.”
responsibility. Commanders must demonstrate competency in physical, emotional, intellectual, and interpersonal domains, must have been given the necessary authority that empowers a commander to accomplish the mission, and the commander must accept the responsibility for his command. This concept of command provides a full articulation of the responsibility and accountability inherent in each level of command.

There is an implicit responsibility to assure that Pigeau and McCann’s three dimensions of command, competency, authority, and responsibility, are balanced in order for command to function properly. The chain of command has a responsibility to foster competency and responsibility through ensuring professional development opportunities and fostering development of officers through selection for challenging command and staff appointments. However, it is in the realm of authority, where the chain of command is clearly accountable to establish the conditions for success in command by ensuring that each successive level of command is appropriately empowered to fulfill its mandate. Failure to provide the requisite authority at each level of command is essential to this discussion on national command, and has been at the centre of many of the Canadian national command problems.

Current CDS, General Rick Hillier has stated that, “[o]ur raison d’être is to conduct operations and at times in the past our structures have not reflected that.” To that end, on 1 February 2006, four new headquarters were established in Ottawa as the centrepieces of Canadian Forces transformation – Canadian Forces Expeditionary Force

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Command (CEFCOM), Canada Command, Canadian Special Forces Command, and Canadian Operational Support Command. Because of its focus on deployed operations, this paper will only look at CECFOM, which has a mandate in part “... to plan and conduct all [conventional expeditionary] Canadian Forces operations...”\textsuperscript{267} Essentially, as Commander CEFCOM, Lieutenant General Michel Gauthier, noted, the Canadian Forces evolved very quickly,

\begin{quote}
\ldots from a structure [with] \ldots a Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff responsible for many different things to four operational commanders, \ldots [each] exclusively focused on operations, unencumbered by all of the other distractions and challenges associated with a national defence headquarters.\textsuperscript{268}
\end{quote}

After more than four decades, the McGill principle has finally been applied to ensure a headquarters that is geared toward the conduct of operations. Essentially, transformation marks the transition from the post Cold War United Nations and NATO peace support missions and embarks on a new era of “... operations where Canadian objectives and the desired strategic effects are defined prior to the deployment.”\textsuperscript{269} In order to facilitate this, CEFCOM will take broad, strategic government objectives and translate those into operational objectives against which we will determine specific capability requirements for a particular mission, and then prepare the force so that they have what they need to achieve the strategic effect.\textsuperscript{270}

During the work by the transformation team on command and control for international operations, it was determined that there was a clear need to separate the


\textsuperscript{268} Thatcher, “Canadian Forces Transformation,” 10.

\textsuperscript{269} \textit{Ibid.}, 10.

\textsuperscript{270} \textit{Ibid.}, 12.
strategic aspect of the DCDS from the operational level responsibility to command international operations. As was noted by the Little-Hunter study and the Mason-Crabbe report in the last two decades, the DCDS Group was unsuited to the breadth of its responsibilities and was often consumed by immediate tactical issues at the expense of strategic and operational issues. The team also found that the structure of the Joint Operations Group, which bridged from high tactical to low strategic, was unsuited to sustained operations beyond an initial rotation.271 At the strategic level, the Strategic Joint Staff was created to assist the CDS with exercising strategic command of operations.272 Commander CEFCOM is an operational level commander with a joint staff that is dedicated to executing expeditionary operations and translating strategic direction into operational objectives.

NATIONAL COMMAND AT THE DEPLOYED OPERATIONAL LEVEL

The Lessons Learned Staff Action Directive for Operation APOLLO in 2002 asserted that the Canadian Forces must develop a command and control standard operating procedure for coalition operations outside of NATO.273 In 1999, the nations of United Kingdom, France, Germany, Canada, United States and Australia had formed a group which came to be known as the Multinational Interoperability Council in order to


272 Crabbe, Mason, and Sutherland, “A Report on the Validation of the Transformed….” 7. The chief of the defence staff has not had such a dedicated staff since the disbandment of Canadian Forces Headquarters at the hands of the Management Review Group. In fact, transformation is working in the way that Minister Hellyer’s unification concept had envisioned but did not get the opportunity to fulfill.

273 Department of National Defence. Operation Apollo Lessons Learned…, B-17/41.
exchange information relevant to coalition operations. In 2006, it released the

*Coalition Building Guide*, which supplemented doctrine and other policies in the

establishment and building of coalition forces. Some of the key assumptions that it

prefaced were that “[f]uture military operations are increasingly likely to be multinational

in character . . . [a] multinational operation may be carried out within an established

alliance framework or through the formation of a coalition . . .”

In coalition and alliance operations, influence must go down the national chain of

command but also across to the coalition/alliance structures at all levels of the spectrum

from political to tactical. A major lesson from Operation APOLLO was that:

> [w]hen the CF is contributing elements to a coalition . . . Canadian planning [must be integrated] with the coalition operational planning process, and [Canada must] not offer forces until the structure of the overall coalition plan is apparent and the likely role and tasks for Canadian elements can be identified . . .

There is a clear responsibility for national command, and the responsibility of the chain

of command to provide clear mechanisms of command and control is essential.

Even though national commanders transfer operational control of their forces to

the coalition, they must have a comprehensive understanding of operations. National

contingent commanders have a critical role in supporting the Coalition Force Commander

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274 Italy also joined the council after its inception.


276 Department of National Defence. *Operation Apollo Lessons Learned…*, B-10/42.

277 Operational control is defined as “[t]he authority granted to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control.” (Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 *Canadian Forces Operations…*, GL-7).
as well as his subordinate elements, all the while satisfying the requirements of the national authority. This includes holding the national ‘red card.’²⁷⁸ Not only does he represent his nation, he “. . . will be a conduit back to his nation on tactical incidents and operational developments; matters of support to, and [force protection] of, his contingent and media issues.”²⁷⁹ As mentioned, a drawback to alliances and coalitions is that nations often restrict or place limits on their assigned forces, creating problems for coalition or alliance commanders to properly employ those forces. It is often seen as a fact that “. . . national authorities attempt to relinquish the least amount of authority thereby retaining as much control over their forces as possible.”²⁸⁰

In order to facilitate national command, it is Canadian Forces joint doctrine to appoint a national commander.²⁸¹ As an example, during United Nations operations in the Cold War, it was common for a senior Canadian officer to be assigned to the force headquarters as a staff officer with secondary responsibilities as a national commander for Canadian troops attached to the force. In recent years, it has been common to form a national command element that is separate from the coalition or alliance headquarters and which retains national responsibility for Canadian Forces. Though it has always had a crucial function, it has not always been established for success. However, even when

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²⁸¹ The definition of national commander is one “. . . who has national responsibilities. For large scale commitments of CF elements, the national commander will not normally be part of the alliance or coalition chain of command, but will represent national interests and concerns to the coalition commander. For smaller scale operations, the national commander may be part of the chain of command.” (Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 *Canadian Forces Operations . . .*, GL-7).
national command elements had a comprehensive structure and the tools to carry out their mandate as in Operation APOLLO, there were still challenges, primarily from the perception that national command elements were administrative headquarters and were not operationally oriented.

Part of the issue regarding the relevance of deployed headquarters is the strategic culture in Canada that often centralizes decision-making, making it difficult for national commanders to function at the operational level. Major General Gosselin notes this tendency in complex coalition operations, where often deployed national commanders are not empowered to carry out their mandate:

. . . the requirement to maintain strong and “indivisible” Canadian national command in an era when coalition [command and control] arrangements are often complicated tends to quickly elevate many discussions about the scope of the mission, tasks assigned to Canada, command reporting relationships and even key logistical arrangements . . . to the strategic level.282

Effective national command is essential to integrate forces into the coalition or alliance and to safeguard Canadian interests, and the operational level is critical to that. The strategic culture is changing; General Hillier has stated that the strategic level must accept greater risk by devolving decision-making and authority to lower level commanders.283

Command and control structures are critical to ensuring that government direction and objectives are translated properly to deployed forces. Much of the problem with the Canadian Forces for the past half century rested with the problem that on the whole the


283 Ibid., 204.
forces and the department lacked a centrally driven operational focus, opting instead to consider the centre as an administrative and support apparatus that should not meddle in operations. We have already laid out the issues that stemmed from this as well as the various attempts to rectify it – some successful and some not.

**EXPANDING THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL**

As we have seen, in the World Wars, the Korean War, as well as in NATO commitments in the Cold War, Canada generally committed forces at the tactical level within a multi-national context without higher oversight, with the effect that:

> [t]he lack of strategic independence in Canada prompted many commanders to identify their professional responsibilities and institutional interests with strategies written outside Canada and that tendency, at times, places officers in conflict with their military superiors and political authorities.  

The Canadian military became fully capable at the tactical level primarily following a strategy of annihilation along with our allies, the United Kingdom, United States, and NATO. The challenge that has continued to face Canada is that its policies after the Second World War did very little to gain any military advances beyond the tactical level.

Having finally gained a distinct operational level headquarters with CEFCOM, the question remains as to whether there is still a requirement to have a deployed operational level headquarters for national purposes. Major General Dan Gosselin, writing before transformation, commented on the plight of deployed commanders, who were often, “. . . delegated limited authority to fulfil their responsibilities, [as] their role is largely restricted to one of senior Canadian administrator in theatre addressing national

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command issues, with most key decisions elevated to the strategic headquarters in Ottawa.”  

Has the compression of the levels of war resulting from centralized decision-making made the deployed national commander largely redundant?  

Or, has there been a shift in strategic culture to facilitate mission command and to further empower deployed commanders. It could be argued that the complexity of operations today demand that the operational level be expanded (not compressed) in order to bridge the upper operational level in CEFCOM and the lower operational level of deployed national commanders.

Mobilizing for war in a strategy of annihilation presents different demands than limited operations in a bi-polar strategic environment. Modern military operations in this bi-polar environment are just one of many activities of nations. Success is measured, not as an outcome of military victory, but over decades of nation building, and commitments may have to be sustained for almost an indefinite period. In this paradigm, acts of force are rarely decisive, as merely “. . . winning the trial of strength will not deliver the will of the people . . .”  

The Army Training Authority, Major General Stuart Beare characterizes this change as follows:

[c]ombat operations may be complicated but conceptually they are a simple process; whole-of-government interventions are conceptually much more complicated. We are learning to create new ways of doing a whole-of-government stability campaign . . . Intellectually we’re already there – we’ve been learning since 1992. But we did it from a combat baseline.

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287 Ibid., 194 – 195.


Major General Beare further offers the Balkans operations during the Implementation Force and Stabilization Force mandates as a point of comparison to the Afghanistan concept of comprehensive operations:

In the Balkans, for example, the mission was not to deliver a self-sustaining Bosnia but to enforce the terms of the General Framework for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina; it was looking in the rear view mirror instead of forward . . . [with] rotations of international forces . . . enforcing an old agreement . . . sustaining a version of the status quo . . . In Afghanistan, we have an international and Afghan agenda based on the Afghan National Development Strategy to get to a new endgame, a state where Afghanistan can go it alone.\footnote{290}

Looking at the operations in Afghanistan, it is clear that they are not merely security related operations. As Brigadier General David Fraser has attested, there has been a paradigm shift in peacekeeping with “. . . diplomacy and development within a security framework . . . Soldiers must deal with tactical issues, and they now must be cognizant of operational and strategic issues.”\footnote{291} The military must adapt not only to the realities of the operating environment, but also the demands of a comprehensive government policy like the 3D approach. An operating environment requiring close cooperation in conflict zones with interagency partners such as the Canadian International Development Agency, or other government departments such as Foreign Affairs and International Trade presents new challenges to deployed commanders. This is a fundamental change.\footnote{292} Viewed in such a context, even in a coalition context, national direction, facilitated by a national command system, is a fundamental requirement.

\footnote{290}{Ibid., 25.}
\footnote{292}{Bentley, “The Canadian Defence professional,” 77.}
Fundamentally, the bi-polar strategy of the Post Cold War era has a complexity that demands a comprehensive national command system from the strategic to the tactical level. Operation APOLLO was the first deployment that employed a properly established operational level national command element. The DCDS with his joint staff provided strategic command and control from Ottawa on behalf of the CDS. Commander Joint Task Force South West Asia was the operational level commander at United States Central Command Headquarters in Tampa, and the tactical level air, land, and naval forces in Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf region reported both to the national commander in Tampa and to the Central Command component commanders, to whom operational control had been transferred for force employment. A national support element in the theatre provided the necessary logistical and some national command and control functions. Even this construct presented command and control challenges because the commander was so far removed from his deployed units that he was constantly travelling; forward deployment of the commander and his staff would have facilitated national command.293

The commander of the first rotation in Operation APOLLO, Brigadier General Michel Gauthier, considered “. . . that the separation of the deployed elements and the operational level commander was a risky command structure, that it was inefficient and led to duplication of efforts between the [National Command Element] and [National Support Element].”294 It was also observed that “[a]s the operation matures, the national command and support function becomes the dominant factor.”295 The commander had

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293 Department of National Defence. *Operation Apollo Lessons Learned…*, B-14/41.

to strike a balance between interactions with operational level commanders in planning with providing effective national command oversight of deployed forces who were being employed under the operational control of coalition commanders.\textsuperscript{296} Even though the joint task force commander transferred operational control, he still retained the extensive national command responsibilities associated with operational command. While not directly in the coalition chain of command, the commander had a critical role as the Canadian national commander as did his headquarters as the national command element.\textsuperscript{297} So even though the joint task force commander for Operation APOLLO:

\begin{quote}
. . . was not functioning as an operational commander, the national command responsibilities assigned to him . . . required a robust, full operations spectrum headquarters [that] more closely approximated that required for functional command . . . than for administrative control . . . \textsuperscript{298}
\end{quote}

The national command element for Operation APOLLO allowed effective national command to be exercised at the operational level. Operations in Afghanistan today are even more complex, as Canada has made a clear political investment in Afghanistan, and in particular Kandahar. Building upon the operation APOLLO experience, the current Joint Task Force Afghanistan has a forward deployed national command headquarters; with the operational commander as the national commander with two staffs – one for tactical issues and one for national issues. The first deals primarily with the NATO coalition headquarters and subordinate units in the execution of operations. The national headquarters staff is also located in the operational theatre and deals with CEFCOM on national issues.

\textsuperscript{295} \textit{Ibid.}, B-15/41.

\textsuperscript{296} \textit{Ibid.}, B-15/42.

\textsuperscript{297} Department of National Defence, \textit{CF JOG Full Operational Capability}… 8.

\textsuperscript{298} \textit{Ibid.}, 9.
Such an arrangement eases unity of command within the coalition as the tactical commander is also the national commander, but this may not always be the case. Each coalition arrangement may have varying degrees of difference, including separate national and tactical commanders. At issue is whether there is a requirement for a commander and a staff located in the theatre of operations that deals with purely national issues. Or, can CEFCOM, as an operational level commander in Canada deal directly with tactical level units employed in coalition formations?

Based on government direction in the 2005 policy statement, there is a desire on the part of the government to have a strategic effect when it deploys military forces. The difference as Lieutenant General Gauthier has stated in comparing current operations to previous United Nations and NATO missions:

> Canada made a determination of a force package that was affordable and could be generated, and that was the essence of the strategic planning process with respect to operations . . . Now we want to be clear on what effect we want from a Canadian perspective.  

The onus is on the military to determine “. . . how to most effectively provide national command and support functions when part of a coalition.”

Canada must deploy more than just tactically relevant forces; it must also deploy influential commanders at the operational level in order to achieve a strategic effect. The application of the operational art holds the key to ensuring the operational level enables both the strategic and tactical levels. In Canadian joint doctrine, operational art is “[t]he skill of employing military forces to attain strategic objectives in a theatre of war or theatre of operations through the

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300 Department of National Defence. *Operation Apollo Lessons Learned…*, B-15/42.
design, organization and conduct of campaigns and major operations.” The lessons of the past two decades indicate that Canada needs a deployed operational level headquarters. The challenges faced on Operation APOLLO where national strategic level interest in tactical level information and activities, sometimes to the detriment of operations, was common. This can be mitigated through a strategic culture that adopts the Pigeau-McCann command model and allows the deployed operational commander and his headquarters to exercise its command authority.

This perspective is largely supported by multi-national coalition working groups. The Multi-national Interoperability Council recognizes formally that each troop contributing nation would generally establish a national headquarters primarily for national administration and logistics. Moreover, it states that national contingent commanders:

. . . must understand the operation to the same extent [as the coalition force commander] in order to provide effective advice. The role of the [national contingent commander] is to support both the [coalition force commander] and his national commanders, while informing his own national authority. He will hold the national ‘red card’ although may delegate elements to his contingent commanders within each component so that issues can be resolved early at lower levels with minimal impact on coalition cohesion.

There may be national caveats that accompany such forces that would require national contingent commanders to step in or to provide authorization. At any rate, coalitions will

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301 Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 Canadian Forces Operations…., GL-7.

302 Department of National Defence. Operation Apollo Lessons Learned…., B-17/42.


304 Ibid., 21.
likely operate in situations where countries have varying degrees of national interest, and demonstrate varying levels of trust in assigning their forces to coalition command. Such an environment, much like in Operation APOLLO, requires and engaged and empowered deployed operational level.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

National command has evolved in the Canadian Forces over the last century. During the World Wars, there were only strategic and tactical levels, and given the constraints of the policies within which the Canadian forces had to operate, national command consisted of mainly ensuring that Canadian forces operated under Canadian Command to the largest extent possible. Although, Canadian commanders rose in prominence (Currie and Crerar), they did not come to exert great influence in high command, and there was limited military scope to exercise national command. During the Cold War alliance-based strategy, with more disinterest at the political level and less oversight, the military at times sought direction from alliance commanders, to the detriment of national command.

Throughout, there has been a tension between competing views as to the function of National Defence Headquarters, as well as who commands operations – the CDS or the service commanders. This caused any advances in national command to be largely outpaced by the changes in the operating environment. The result was that the crash of national command in the mid-1990s caused a return to first principles. The Post Cold War 1990s saw increasing sophistication in mechanisms such as the national command element to provide the national command oversight to support civil control. The McGill

305 Ibid., 19 – 21.
principle, much ignored for the past forty years, has finally been adopted in Canadian Forces transformation in the stand-up of CEFCOM and the separation of distinct strategic level and operational level commanders and staffs that are oriented to operations. With the increasing complexity of whole-of-government operations, there is more of a requirement than ever for a functioning national command system, with separate strategic, operational, and tactical levels that can exercise national command and assure civil control. In fact, this paper has argued that the operational level must be expanded to operate on both national and deployed planes.
CHAPTER 5 – CONCLUSION

In the context of a single nation, the concept of civil control of military forces deployed to war or on operations is straightforward. However, as we have seen, Canada’s way in war this past century has largely been conducted through participation in alliances and coalitions, and this has created complexities for both civil control of the military and national command. Historian C.P. Stacey hit upon the crux of coalition operations when he stated that “. . . it usually seems necessary to make sacrifices of national sovereignty when war is being waged by a coalition . . . but [such sacrifices] are much less painful than defeat”\(^{306}\) He highlighted the tension between efficiency in military operations versus sovereignty, where middle powers like Canada:

\[\ldots\] must be prepared to make large concessions to the leadership of the great powers who are fighting on its side; but it must also raise its voice to assert its own interests and must seek to influence its great associates to take account of those interests. And yet it can properly do this only to the extent that it can be done without injury to the common cause.\(^{307}\)

This was largely the policy that was adopted by the Government of Canada during the Second World War,\(^{308}\) and it is an apt description of Canada’s approach to alliances and coalitions over the last sixty years. Canada must voice its views, as Borden did in the First World War, and as Pope articulated, such that our influence is commensurate with our commitment. Based on its current operations in Afghanistan, it could be said that Canada is now an active coalition member with its own aims and objectives. The lesson learned from Operation APOLLO to engage early with coalition forces in order to find

\(^{306}\) Stacey, *Arms, Men, and Governments*…, 138.


common objectives and ensure that there is parity between its national goals and objectives and those of the coalition, support this finding.

Canada’s history of civil control of the military and national command has evolved over the last century. Throughout, there has been an undercurrent of national autonomy, though at times inconsistent. Notwithstanding, it took over forty years, from Glassco Commission and unification to Canadian Forces transformation to achieve a consistent balance between the political responsibility to exercise civil control of the armed forces with the military responsibility to support it by exercising national command. The promulgation of the *International Policy Statement* in 2005 triggered a new era in civil control, backed up by a comprehensive government policy. Canadian Forces transformation has provided a national command structure to support the principle of civil control of the military. It will be necessary for that transformation to be institutionalized such that it is not rolled back by new leadership, either within the department or within the Forces. After a 40 year struggle between unified command and service primacy, it will be necessary to maintain this focus. Centrally commanded operations from the strategic level through all levels of command with a clear chain of command are essential to civil control of the military.

In the realm of civil-military relations, there is no clear separation of political and military. The overlap of policy and military strategy allows the formulation of military means to meet political ends, and thus enable the military to issue strategic direction or objectives. At the centre of this and the key to effective civil control and national command is the CDS. There has been discussion that the position of the CDS has too much power in civil-military relations, as one person is the sole authority to issue orders
to the Canadian Forces and as well is the sole advisor to the government.\textsuperscript{309} However, Bland contends that in general, the Chiefs of Defence Staff have executed the responsibilities of their office “. . . in a very nuanced and responsible way, mainly because they wholeheartedly support the principle that the civil authority must ultimately control and direct the Canadian Forces and Canada’s national defence.”\textsuperscript{310} As history has shown, problems with the office of the CDS and the strategic leadership of the Canadian Forces have had repercussions in both the military and political spheres.

With ‘control and administration’ of the Canadian Forces resting with the CDS, all orders passed from the Minister to the Canadian Forces go through the CDS to the military chain of command. It is essential to have a national command structure to ensure that this happens. Canadian Forces transformation has provided the CDS with a dedicated strategic joint staff for the first time since the department was integrated in 1971. The operational level of command, which came into Canadian Forces parlance in the early 1990s, has provided a capability both at the national level and at the deployed level, such that CEFCOM and deployed national commanders each have critical roles to play in achieving strategic objectives through the employment of tactical level forces.

The recent trend in liberal democracies, including Canada as we have seen with the stand-up of CEFCOM, sees a steady increase in the construction of mechanisms that facilitate political direction and control of military activities and decisions in accordance with national interest. As we have seen, Major General Gosselin argued before transformation that the centralization of decision-making at the strategic level was


\textsuperscript{310} Ibid., 56.
making the deployed operational commander irrelevant.\textsuperscript{311} To that end, with the recent increases in civil control of the military there has been a commensurate importance attached to national command requirements. The Pigeau McCann model of command and in particular its dimensions provide an effective means of mitigating compressed levels of command. As indicated, the current CDS has accepted greater risk in devolving decision-making and authority. A change in culture to embrace this strategically within the Canadian Forces, combined with commanders balanced in each of the dimensions of command are the best means to provide the deployed operational level of command with the authority and responsibility to carry out its function. Not just in the current operating environment, but also as history has shown, the operational level has been the missing element in national command for the last century. It is a fundamental link in the chain of command supporting the premise of civil control of the military.

National command is essential to facilitate direction and guidance down the chain of command with reporting on progress and situational awareness back up the chain of command to the operational, strategic, and political levels in order to facilitate strategic and political decision making and if necessary influence. Ideally, this should be done without duplication at the various levels. History provides a solid perspective. It would be a disservice to dismantle a national command construct that has evolved over a century. The inception of distinct strategic and operational headquarters in Ottawa finally provide a command and control construct that will enable deployed national command elements, not make them redundant. To that end, there is a fundamental requirement to maintain the distinct levels of war – tactical, operational, and strategic. In

fact, Canadian operational doctrine should add the political level in order to more fully capture that most important dynamic in civil-military relations, and thus fully articulate the complete civil-military link.

The complex operations characterized by fourth generation warfare and met by a whole of government approach are making huge demands on policy and national command structures. Clearly the best way to meet this challenge is through distinct political, strategic, operational, and tactical level actions that support the chain of command and reflect civil control of the military. Canada must maintain the option of deploying as a lead nation. It must also continue to be prepared to deploy forces within a coalition or alliance. But we must make sure that we have set the conditions for strategic success. Certainly, we can never turn back the clock to times when we committed military forces that were not properly tailored, resourced, or prepared to do what was asked of them on operations for which there was no political will, enforceable mandate, or clearly identified mission.
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