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EXERCISE NEW HORIZONS

A Case for Multi-National Force Operations

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Abstract

Recent Multi-National Force peacekeeping missions have reflected the original weight given in the UN Charter to regional associations such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Moreover, non-UN commanded missions have more closely reflected the desire expressed by the Canadian government in its international policy statement of 2005 to intervene quickly to prevent large scale loss of life or ethnic cleansing under the Responsibility to Protect. Forces working with a common understanding of the employment of military forces can more easily overcome situations such as those which confronted UN commanders in Bosnia or Rwanda. Working with Multi-National Forces ensures the advantages of common doctrine, tactics, logistics and communications systems to support effective operations. Canada should commit its forces only to operations which employ shared doctrine, equipment and logistic support such as the NATO led Implementation Force rather than the UN commanded UNPROFOR.

“You can safely appeal to the United Nations in the comfortable certainty that it will let you down.” – Conor Cruise O’Brien¹

INTRODUCTION

While the Blue Beret provides easy recognition of United Nations (UN) commanded military forces, non-UN commanded actions in Bosnia, East Timor and Haiti have also supported UN mandates and have been more effective in circumstances involving ongoing conflict. Moreover, these missions have reflected the original weight given in the UN Charter to the importance of regional associations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the Organization of American States (OAS). Multi-national Force (MNF) operations have been and continue to be more valuable as an enforcement resource than traditional Chapter VI² mandated operations which remain reliant upon the goodwill of disputing parties to permit a UN force deployment and the often difficult to obtain Security Council Permanent Five (P5) agreement to deploy forces to a region of conflict.³ Sudan is one current example of a paralyzed decision-making process. Moreover, non-UN commanded missions have more closely reflected the desire expressed by the Canadian government to intervene quickly to prevent large scale loss

¹ Carol Off, *The Lion, the Fox and the Eagle*, (Canada: Random House, 2000), frontispiece. An Irish politician and diplomat, O’Brien was the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) to the Congo in 1961.

² United Nations, United Nations Charter, <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/>. Internet; accessed 27 March 2007. The UN Charter distinguishes between Chapter VI – Pacific Resolution of Disputes through negotiation and arbitration and Chapter VII - Operations to enforce the will of the Security Council with respect to threats and aggression.

³ The Five Permanent and Veto-Wielding members – China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States.

of life or ethnic cleansing.⁴ MNF operations have done so by acting rather than standing by when the UN cannot come to a consensus.

Narrow mandates and often restrictive or unclear rules of engagement associated with Chapter VI missions have made participation by Canadian Forces unnecessarily dangerous in violent areas. “Conflict prevention [is] no longer largely a passive activity fulfilled by the presence of blue beret soldiers... seeking peaceful resolution of disputes.” Officers must work directly with local authorities and sometimes threaten military action, which must be carried out to ensure credibility, rather than simply monitor an agreed ceasefire line.⁵ Decisions to deploy Canadian forces on expeditionary missions in support of UN peacekeeping should be made with a clear view to working within coalitions of like minded nations with forces of equal competence and capability to enhance both force protection and the probability of a successful outcome.

Following a short section regarding the background of Canadian involvement in peacekeeping, the paper will briefly review concerns arising from the development of UN peacekeeping, consider issues arising from selected missions and, finally, consider non-UN missions in Bosnia and Haiti. This paper will demonstrate that Canada should focus on participation in UN sanctioned MNF operations such as the NATO led Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia to better support our foreign policy focus on using our resources to protect

⁴ Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Diplomacy*, (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2005), 10.

⁵ John English, “*Canadian Peacekeeping Is Not What It Used To Be*”, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2003, <http://cdfai.org/PDF/Canadian%20peacekeeping%20is%20not%20what%20it%20used%20to%20be.pdf>; Internet; accessed 1 March 2007.

external populations most at risk.⁶ Working with such multinational forces ensures the advantages of common doctrine, tactics, logistics and communications systems to support rapid employment and transition to effective operations. Ideally, these missions will be approved by the UN, but will be led by either an existing alliance or a multinational force of military personnel that have a history of working together. Further, the deployment need not hinge upon a UN resolution lest it be at risk of participation (or the lack thereof) in another failed mission such as that in Rwanda in 1994.

BACKGROUND

As the only country in the world with a monument to the “peacekeeper” there was a period during which it appeared as though this country’s military was only occupied with that role. In reality, despite the participation of Canadian military personnel in a wide variety of UN led Chapter VI missions, throughout the Cold War only a fraction of our military resources were focussed on peace support operations. Further, these Chapter VI missions only occurred when the P5 agreed such missions would prevent their proxies from engaging in conflicts they did not want to support.⁷ The first of these “classic” missions involving Canadians was established in the Middle East.

The 1956 Suez Crisis gave Canadians the impression that a Canadian Prime Minister, Lester Pearson, had invented peacekeeping on his own, forgetting the desires of the French and British to extricate themselves from a compromising position and the active assistance of the United Nations Secretary General. Canadians also forget that when the Egyptians went to back

⁶ Canada, *A Role of Pride and Influence...*, 10.

⁷ English, *Peacekeeping is not...*, Internet; accessed 1 March 2007.

to war in 1967 they simply requested the peacekeepers leave to allow them to get back to fighting and the UN complied.⁸ Peacekeeping in the traditional sense has only a limited application and relies too much on uncertain agreements with belligerents.

Recognizing the dangers of being involved in ill-defined missions, in 1964 Pearson warned his Foreign Minister, Paul Martin, then initiating the process for Canadian involvement in Cyprus:

...that [it] looked to be a permanent commitment and that... the role of peacekeepers was to still turbulent waters, not to stand by when they remained stagnant. Their presence, ... could be an antidote to meaningful discussions rather than a catalyst.⁹

The point was that involvement should not be automatic simply because the UN had requested assistance under Chapter VI and that it should occur only when there was a serious likelihood of successful resolution within a reasonable period of time.

The UN is still, however, the only organization to have effectively been able to prevent the outbreak of another “World War” and very much has a role in the continuing development of global stability. While the UN has a place in assisting in the development of peaceful resolution of disputes, as a large, bureaucratic organization it is not well suited to dealing with conflicts about to occur or those that are well underway. This is largely due to areas of weakness that have affected operations and hindered the flexibility necessary to achieving rapid results.

COMMAND, CONTROL (C2) AND LOGISTICS

⁸ English, *Peacekeeping is not...*, Internet; accessed 1 March 2007.

⁹ English, *Peacekeeping is not...*, Internet; accessed 1 March 2007t.

Although the founders of the UN provided for the establishment of a military structure to direct operations under Article 47 of the UN Charter, the Military Staff Committee has yet to perform effectively because it still functions only as an advisory staff and not a command element.¹⁰ Although Article 43 intended that member states hold forces at the ready for employment by the UN¹¹, peace-keeping forces have been composed of *ad hoc* contingents provided at the last minute by member states. This has resulted in consistent problems regarding disparate doctrine, equipment and command structures.¹² Critical issues that have affected deployments of UN forces such as the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia have included the inability of UN Headquarters (UNHQ) to remain focussed on a single mandate and issue clear directives.¹³ Dealing with multiple subordinate national commanders adds to the burden for the force commander, particularly when the values and agendas of different forces are not compatible and national HQs become involved.¹⁴ To try and resolve these issues, the UN developed a new process for the development of mission C2 with limited success.

C2 arrangements have been more often based on "...wishful thinking than a genuine agreement..." with Troop Contributing Nations.¹⁵ The SRSG for Somalia in 1992 commented that it was almost impossible to coordinate UN activities in the field and that it took considerable

¹⁰ Hilaire McCoubrey, and Justin Morris, *Regional Peacekeeping in the Post Cold-War Era*, (The Hague: Netherlands Kluwer Law International, 2000), 29.

¹¹ United Nations, United Nations Charter... Internet; accessed 27 March 2007.

¹² Romeo Dallaire, "End of Innocence: Rwanda 1994" in Jonathan Moore, (editor), *Hard Choices: Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention*, (Lanham, Maryland: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998), 76.

¹³ McCoubrey, *Regional Peacekeeping...*, 41.

¹⁴ McCoubrey, *Regional Peacekeeping...*, 42.

¹⁵ Maurice Baril in Alex Morrison, Douglas Fraser and James D. Kiras, Editors, *Peacekeeping With Muscle: The Use of Force in International Conflict Resolution*, (Clementsport, NS: Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1997), 119.

time for the UNHQ to approve deployments requested to support agreements made in theatre with the warring factions. UNHQ made announcements regarding troop deployments without coordinating with the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) delegation on the ground which only served to make the situation that much more difficult.¹⁶ Boutros-Ghali in his Supplement to an Agenda for Peace noted "...that several missions had combined to demonstrate that issues of unity of command had to be resolved in advance of a crisis occurring during the conduct of a mission." He was concerned with the tendency, understandable as it was, for governments to meddle in the conduct of a mission, often without informing the Force Commander particularly with respect to conduct of operations and logistic support.¹⁷ UN missions by the early 1990's were demonstrating the strain of new and complex operating environments.

Former Secretary General Boutros-Ghali recognized that it would be impossible to prevent national "conversations" with troops on the ground from occurring. He hoped that by having the Force Commander deal directly with the National Command Elements a clearer understanding of the "...the Security Council's overall approach, as well as the role assigned to their contingents" would develop and reduce the level of interference with the conduct of operations.¹⁸ Although Boutros-Ghali is clear in expressing the need to respect unity of command and purpose on critical issues such as Rules of Engagement, national policy still

¹⁶ Clement E Adibe, "Learning from Failure in Somalia", in Edward Moxon-Browne (editor), *A Future for Peacekeeping?*, (New York, NY: St Martin's Press, Inc. 1998), 125-126.

¹⁷ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, A/50/60 - S/1995/13 January 1995 Report Of The Secretary-General On The Work Of The Organization - *Supplement To An Agenda For Peace: Position Paper Of The Secretary-General On The Occasion Of The Fiftieth Anniversary Of The United Nations*, <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agsupp.html>; Internet; accessed, 23 February, 2007.

¹⁸ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Supplement To An Agenda For Peace...* Internet; accessed, 23 February, 2007.

trumps the UN for domestic political reasons.¹⁹ This has resulted in confusion in the field particularly with forces not familiar with one another. Coordination with civilian UN and Non-governmental (NGO) operations can also be challenging although the UN has long had the office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) to assist in this area.²⁰ This office, intended to coordinate military and civilian efforts, has also had difficulties.

While the UN Secretary General will normally appoint a SRSG for a mission, the SRSG's relationship with the force commander may be contentious if they don't share a common view of the Secretary General's intent nor how to accomplish the mission.²¹ Regardless of the relationship, because the UN lacks an effective operational HQ, field force commanders and SRSG's can be relatively autonomous or even orphaned due to a lack of oversight thereby prolonging disputes and further degrading mission performance.²² As a result, C2 arrangements for forces deployed on UN missions remain challenging. Logistic realities are little different for UN commanded forces.

“It would have been astonishing if by 1994 the UN's peacekeeping capacity had not been creaking.”²³ Not simply because of the growing demand for services, but also because financially, politically and organizationally it was in no way prepared for the change in context for its new operations. Members and prospective members of large organizations such as the UN

¹⁹ McCoubrey and Morris, *Regional Peacekeeping...*, 42.

²⁰ United Nations, Department Of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), *Note of guidance on relations between Representatives of the Secretary-General, Resident Coordinators and Humanitarian Coordinators*, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/milad/oma/Guidance_Note.pdf ; Internet; accessed 16 April 2006.

²¹ United Nations, Department Of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), *Civil-Military Coordination Policy*. http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/milad/oma/DPKO_CMCOORD_Policy.pdf ; Internet; accessed 16 April 2006.

²² Trevor Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Operations*, (New York: SIPRI, Oxford University Press, Inc., 2002), 11.

²³ McCoubrey and Morris, *Regional Peacekeeping...*, 5.

must sometimes accept a modest level of capability in their partners. In achieving consensus, this lowest common denominator approach results in compromise regarding the development of effective and efficient operational structures.²⁴ As occurred with national governments, in the interest of efficiency contracting out for peacekeeping services became the new norm as UN missions had changed in role and scope.

Peacekeeping operations since 1988 are very different from earlier missions. Larger, more complex and with far-reaching objectives, they go beyond traditional tasks associated with keeping two relatively cooperative sides apart.²⁵ Key principles of old operations included non-use of force, impartiality, consent, UN commanded deployment and non-interference in sovereignty.²⁶ These characteristics have not disappeared but the emphasis is now on Chapter VII enforcement operations with more robust mandates executed most often by coalitions or regional associations such as the NATO, the European Union (EU), African Union (AU) or the Organization of American States (OAS). To allow more effective responses to developing crises “the UN has [now] contracted out” C2 to willing nations or alliances such as NATO that are able to react quickly enough to save lives.²⁷ Recent operations in Haiti have been contracted to US leadership under UN authority in part due to geographic proximity, but also because of the US Military’s ability to react swiftly.

Whereas the practice of allowing the UN to coordinate the administrative, logistic and financial system for missions was effective for its earlier operations it has proven inadequate for

²⁴ McCoubrey and Morris, *Regional Peacekeeping...*, 5.

²⁵ Claus Heje, “United Nations Peacekeeping: an Introduction” in Moxon-Browne, *A future...*, 1.

²⁶ Heje in Moxon-Browne, *A future...*, 2-3.

²⁷ Findlay, *Use of Force...*, 9.

modern missions with their dynamic environment and requirement for more aggressive deployments. By the mid-1980's, Brian Urquhart, then the UN executive in charge of peacekeeping, "...had concluded that the UN could at best freeze conflicts or contain their impact; it could seldom... prevent them."²⁸ In Rwanda, the UN created a situation into which no nation would have put forces on a national mission without logistics, communications or even vehicles to support the mission which proved ill-suited for the situation it eventually faced.²⁹ "Contracting" a coalition of nations comfortable with working together and sharing similar doctrine and equipment can be more responsive and provide quick early results. Many of these coalitions have been made up of countries which already have working arrangements through organizations such as NATO or the OAS. Unfortunately the UN forces in both Bosnia and Rwanda were traditional missions.

SELECTED UN MISSIONS

Lieutenant General Roderick Cordy-Simpson,³⁰ noted that "[he] was able to pick up and move [his] [NATO] Headquarters to Bosnia...."³¹ This provided him and his staff with huge advantages in a common working language, common operating procedures, and no dependence on a bureaucratic logistic system to initiate the deployment. Being independent of UN logistic support meant that NATO nations provided self-sufficient forces able to conduct operations

²⁸ Rosemary Righter, *Utopia Lost: The United Nations and World Order*, (New York: Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1995), 314.

²⁹ Dallaire in Jonathan Moore (editor), *Hard Choices...*, 76-77.

³⁰ LGen Roderick Cordy-Simpson was the first Chief of Staff for UN forces in Bosnia from October 1992 - September 1993.

³¹ Roderick Cordy-Simpson in Alex Morrison, James D. Kiras and Stephanie A. Blair, (editors), *The New Peacekeeping Partnership*, (Clementsport, NS: Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1995), 50.

immediately. Despite some advantages things were no different in Bosnia than they were in Rwanda regarding the sharing of information under the UN - “The day [Cordy-Simpson] took off [his] NATO hat and put on [his] UN Blue Beret the [NATO] intelligence world was closed.”³² Further, because UNHQ lacked an effective staff of military advisors and communications system, UNPROFOR had no effective C2 system to support the UN command structure.

With the lack of cohesion in the UN regarding UNPROFOR’s role adding to the command burden, the organization proved incapable of responding effectively to crises such as the Croat attack on the Medak Pocket in Bosnia in 1993 or the events that led to the Srebrenica massacre of 1995.³³ Similar but worse challenges affected the 1994 mission in Rwanda.

The chronic inability of the UN to raise and deploy effective troops created a situation in Rwanda into which no individual state would have normally put its forces. The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was hindered from the outset by lethargy and lack of direction in the UN that paralleled the situation in Bosnia. With even fewer forces available, it should have been easier to support the mission but Lieutenant General Dallaire found that his troops lacked adequate logistics, vehicles, and secure communications even when the force consisted of only 2,500 soldiers.³⁴ The C2 structure remained equally ill-defined.

Dallaire was astonished at the initial absence of a SRSG to provide political advice in a complex situation. Intelligence information was non-existent - “Not one country was willing to

³² Cordy-Simpson in Morrison, *New Peacekeeping...*, 50.

³³ United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/35: The fall of Srebrenica*, <http://www.un.org/peace/srebrenica.pdf>; Internet; accessed 12 April 2007.

³⁴ Dallaire in Moore, Jonathan (editor), *Hard Choices...*, 76-77.

provide the UN...with accurate and up to date information...and [He] had to build [his staff] ...from scratch with a group of officers who not only adhered to different doctrines of peacekeeping but did not share a common language....”³⁵ The Bangladeshi contingent had national caveats ordering their commander to hand over to the death squads anyone asking for protection to avoid endangering his personnel.³⁶ Furthermore, the UNAMIR mission in Rwanda never received approved Rules of Engagement (ROE) which, in any event, required soldiers to request HQ authority before firing their weapons.³⁷ Dallaire faced issues that appear to be more common to descriptions of UN missions than of others.

Despite news of a deepening crisis, the deputy Director of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Iqbal Riza, directed that “UNAMIR [was] not, repeat not, to fire unless [directly] fired upon”, further the DPKO directed that UNAMIR was”...above all else to avoid conflict.”³⁸ In the end, the UN opted to simply withdraw and leave the Rwandans to sort themselves out, with spectacularly appalling results.³⁹ The UN had failed in many ways, but primarily because of an outdated command and control model for conducting operations and an urgent desire to remain neutral. A different approach might have achieved better results.⁴⁰

³⁵ Romeo Dallaire, *Shake Hands With the Devil*, (Canada: Random House, 2003), 101.

³⁶ Off, *The Lion...*, 92.

³⁷ Findlay, *Use of Force...*, 278.

³⁸ Dallaire, *Shake Hands...*, 229.

³⁹ Dallaire, *Shake Hands...*, 312.

⁴⁰ Scott R. Feil, *Preventing Genocide: How the Early Use of Force Might Have Succeeded in Rwanda*. A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, (New York: Carnegie Corporation, April 1998), <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/rwanda/frame.htm>; Internet; accessed 21 March 2007. Dallaire’s proposed plan to stop the genocide was later studied at Georgetown University and in the judgement of

The contrast with the parallel, French led, mission to Rwanda, OPERATION Turquoise, is remarkable. A small military force with a clear mandate and robust, well advertised ROE willing to act with vigour was able to establish a safe zone in Rwanda while UNAMIR, present at the time the killings began was unable to stop the massacre.⁴¹ The French led MNF demonstrated the effectiveness of contracting out enforcement to well led coalitions, capable of accomplishing a mission under Chapter VII that saved thousands of lives and began to re-establish stability.

Early missions in Haiti met with similar difficulties. The October 1993 attempt to deploy United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) personnel in to reinstate President Aristide was met with hostile demonstrators on the docks of Port au Prince, who were able to turn back the UN force. With the deployment halted, Haitian militants assessed that UNMIH had no teeth and seized control of the island state once again. The incident also made UN and NGO civilians on the ground vulnerable to attack.⁴² The UN was unable to effect a transition of power without contracting out to a US led MNF under Chapter VII.⁴³ It was only after the UN authorized, under Chapter VII, the deployment of a multi-national force (MNF) using all necessary means to turn out the “rebels” that the US led a successful landing almost a year later. Haiti was proving to be a complex and challenging mission and the personnel required to carry out the subsequent Chapter VI UN mission were to find it difficult to succeed.

several senior officers, would likely have succeeded. “The hypothetical force described by General Dallaire...could have made a significant difference in Rwanda in 1994.”

⁴¹ Findlay, *Use of Force...*, 284.

⁴² Colin Granderson, “Military-Humanitarian Ambiguities in Haiti” in Jonathan Moore (editor), *Hard Choices: Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention*, (Lanham, Maryland: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998.), 107.

⁴³ Findlay, *Use of Force...*, 274.

The UN missions in Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Haiti in the 1990's provide evidence of the inability of the UN to rapidly mount and sustain effective missions to deal with developing or existent crises. The success of NATO's IFOR mission as well as Multi-National Force achievements in establishing initial stability in Haiti demonstrated the potential for regional or multi-national arrangements to fill the gap.⁴⁴ The momentum for change began to grow as pressure built for interventions based on humanitarian reasons.

REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

The ineffective UN responses to crises in the 1980's and early 1990's caused other organizations to intervene to contain conflict. The Commonwealth supervised Zimbabwe's election in 1980, the US intervened in Grenada, and Britain dealt with Argentinean aggression alone. NATO responded in Bosnia, the US led Multi-national Intervention Forces (MNF) into Haiti, Australia did the same in East Timor and France in Africa. Article 53 of the UN Charter makes the use of regional organizations for peace support operations a legitimate option for the Security Council (UNSC) as long as they respect the principles of the UN.⁴⁵ In addition, with UNSC approval the UN can make use of these arrangements for the purpose of promoting peace and stability including enforcement action if necessary.

Not all regional organizations are equal and most have different perspectives on their role in their region and in the world. As with the UN, challenges exist regarding the gaining of

⁴⁴ McCoubrey and Morris, *Regional Peacekeeping...*, vii.

⁴⁵ United Nations, UN Charter....

consensus regarding decisions to act and how to do so. The OAS, for example, still has difficulty with the use of force. South American nations believe the OAS' role to be based on persuasion rather than coercion. It emphasizes the importance of peace building rather than enforcement and it is more likely to resist use of force than a combined joint task force (CJTF) based on US forces.⁴⁶ It has on occasion been able to react effectively in response to threats to democracy, although primarily in the diplomatic arena, to deal with crises in the region, including Haiti in 1991, Peru in 1992, Guatemala in 1993 and Paraguay in 1996.⁴⁷

The nature of peacekeeping forces assembled by the OAS will always be affected by the somewhat limited capabilities of Central and South American militaries. It will also be affected by their views regarding US participation in regional activities and those of their internal populations considering their experience with military interventions. This does not mean they cannot develop improved capabilities but that they will remain reluctant to engage too heavily or forcefully in regional stability missions.⁴⁸ The African Union (AU) is also beginning to develop a capacity for intervention although with less success than NATO to date.⁴⁹ Given time, training and resources these organizations should also become relatively effective within their regions.

NATO, as a relatively cohesive unit, has effectively become a security exporter as, for example, Bosnia and Afghanistan do not fall within the boundaries established in its charter. While NATO also faces political challenges, the consistency of doctrine, common tactics, effective communications systems and an integrated logistic system provide NATO with

⁴⁶ McCoubrey and Morris, *Regional Peacekeeping...*, 54.

⁴⁷ McCoubrey and Morris, *Regional Peacekeeping...*, 109.

⁴⁸ McCoubrey and Morris, *Regional Peacekeeping...*, 120 -121.

⁴⁹ McCoubrey and Morris, *Regional Peacekeeping...*, 223-224.

considerable advantages that have allowed it to overcome challenges affecting UN commanded missions.

Perhaps because the balance of power is somewhat more equal in NATO, it was able to respond quickly to contain the crises in the Former Yugoslavia and especially to deal with Afghanistan, whereas the OAS has traditionally had more difficulty. Haiti, although clearly within the sphere of the OAS, continues to suffer from a lack of attention and aid, in part because its members fear being dominated by the US.⁵⁰ While Haiti remains a challenging situation for the international community, the MNF deployments to that country have demonstrated the advantages of deploying forces with a common understanding of their role and more fully integrated forces than typically exist in UN commanded missions.

“CONTRACTED” MISSIONS

With US urging consistency with its national doctrine, NATO developed the CJTF concept to provide the necessary structure for out of area operations.⁵¹ A CJTF provides the ability to use NATO and non-NATO forces to carry out joint operations beyond the historic boundaries of the Alliance under NATO’s integrated military structure.⁵² It also facilitates implementation of an effective force if the components are familiar with doctrine, share common communications capabilities and clearly understand each other’s strengths and weaknesses as

⁵⁰ McCoubrey and Morris, *Regional Peacekeeping...*, 17.

⁵¹ Thomas Cooke, “NATO CJTF Doctrine: The Naked Emperor”, From *Parameters*, Winter 1998, pp. 124-36, <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/98winter/cooke.htm>; Internet; accessed 18 April 2007.

⁵² McCoubrey and Morris, *Regional Peacekeeping...*, 79.

nations in NATO do. As a result, NATO was in good position to take on the task of replacing the ineffective UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) mission in Bosnia in the early 1990's.

NATO's Implementation Force (IFOR) deployed to Bosnia following the failure of UNPROFOR 1995. IFOR had a clear mandate and effective ROE supported by an excellent C2 system.⁵³ Canada joined IFOR as an active member of NATO and because the government felt the presence of the US would provide a deterrent effect to protect IFOR that had been missing under UNPROFOR.⁵⁴ NATO had outstanding intelligence, communications and logistics capacity, common joint doctrine and experience working with its allies. IFOR proved to be an exemplar for the conduct of effective operations by a regional organization in support of UN mandated operations. The worsening situation in East Timor in 1999 provided another example of a contracted mission.

East Timor illustrated the continued emergence of an international norm favouring intervention by a coalition with a UN mandate and instead of UN forces.⁵⁵ The 1999 International Force East Timor (INTERFET) mission provided a rapid response to stabilize the situation while using a coalition of willing partners, including Asian nations, to limit the

⁵³ Moxon-Browne, *A Future...*, 198.

⁵⁴ Albert Legault, with Manon Tessier, translation George Tombs, *Canada and Peacekeeping: Three Major Debates*, (Clementsport, NS: Canada. Lester B Pearson Peacekeeping Training Centre 1999), 85-86. The US is very careful about choosing which missions in which to participate and may not participate in some UN missions. The 2002 Servicemembers Protection Act proscribes the requirements for Congressional Approval for participation in UN missions. It requires that the President certify that the Host Nation has entered into an agreement with the US that it will not allow the International Criminal Court from taking action against US personnel stationed in a Host Nation (ie one being entered by UN forces) before allowing US participation. United States. American Servicemembers' Protection Act of 2002 Internet; Accessed: 16 April, 2007. <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/othr/misc/23425.htm>

⁵⁵ Nicholas J. Wheeler and Tim Dunne, "East Timor and the New Humanitarian Interventionism," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, Vol. 77, No. 4. (October., 2001):805-827; <http://www.jstor.org>; Internet; accessed March 28 2007.

appearance of undue “western” influence. The force used robust ROE, well announced, to ensure compliance which helped minimize casualties all round.⁵⁶ The UN “peacekeeping force led by Asian states, would take months to put together” but in the meantime INTERFET created a stable environment with UNSC support.

The success of this “contracted” mission can be measured by the End of Mandate report for the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) in 2005. UNAMET, which had inherited the security and stabilization tasks from INTERFET, was shut down because of considerable progress in the region and absence of continued need for a UN security presence. Despite the absence of a common C2 arrangement such as that of NATO, the potential for success had been established by the rapid intervention of this international force focussed on providing a credible deterrent to the escalation of violence. Both in terms of C2 and logistics the force was unhindered by normal UN bureaucracy and thus able to execute create the conditions for mission success quickly.

BOSNIA, HAITI AND BEYOND

Only a delegated form of collective security is likely to work considering the limitations of the UN. Troop Contributing Nations want more professionalism from the UN and the forces they are working with to best protect their own soldiers.⁵⁷ For example, during the 2004 mission in Haiti, while Canada, France and the US were able to communicate effectively based on common NATO systems and brought their own supplies, the Chileans were very limited in

⁵⁶ Wheeler and Dunne, “East Timor....”

⁵⁷ Righter, *Utopia Lost...*, 338.

communications and logistics, initially relying on the US to supply them with assistance.⁵⁸ Although a standing UN reaction force might prove to be capable of intervening in moderate crises, potential Troop Contributing Nations need to be convinced that the financing, organization and command of such an organization would be capable of effectively employing a truly professional force able to accomplish the missions assigned.⁵⁹ Troop Contributing Nations want other forces to be interoperable with their own and as capable of defending themselves. Although the Standing High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) has existed for some time, it has somewhat limited capabilities and has seen only limited service.⁶⁰ Until it becomes operationally effective and politically supportable, Troop Contributing Nations will hesitate to assign scarce resources to an uncertain mission.

UNPROFOR, with the occasional use of air strikes to support its mission, represented the development of support for the use of heavy weapons to ensure compliance under Chapter VI but it was IFOR that demonstrated the advantages of using a regional body to lead a mission in a volatile region.⁶¹ NATO, as an established alliance with common doctrine, communications, logistics and training, provided a much more robust and capable force able to overcome bureaucratic obstacles through the application of approved doctrine and shared resources. Using organizations such as NATO for peace enforcement "... the [UN] may be able to distance itself

⁵⁸ The author shared accommodations and a Headquarters location with US, French and Chilean forces in Haiti in 2004. While the Chilean forces remained professional they were limited in long range communications and required US logistic support after their arrival. While neither factor precluded their participation in long range operations, they were not equipped to the same level as the other three forces present and were limited in other areas.

⁵⁹ Righter, *Utopia Lost...*, 343.

⁶⁰ Ugo Bani, *SHIRBRIG: In Service for the United Nations*, http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2007/webArticles/022807_shirbrig.htm; Internet; accessed 30 March, 2007.

⁶¹ Heje in Moxon-Browne, *A Future...*, 5.

from enforcement” thereby retaining its status as a neutral party, an added benefit.⁶² For some the prospect of the UN acting beyond the bounds of “traditional” unarmed peacekeeping is unpalatable as it risks causing the UN to take sides rather than remaining neutral and using “third” parties provides a useful option.

The risks of relying upon more traditional methods of conducting peacekeeping in Haiti demonstrate the risks of potential mission failure. The two UN missions⁶³ that followed successful MNF deployments into Haiti have been incapable of dealing with the security situation in that volatile state. Three years after the last MNF intervention, the security situation in the capital remains critical, gang violence remains rampant, the police are not operational and basic services remain absent 14 years after the first intervention.⁶⁴ Colonel Jacques Morneau noted the lack of intelligence provided to the force, the inability of certain contingents to fulfill their tasks, lack of air support in Port-au-Prince and lack of staff for the military Headquarters as being critical features of the lack of UN capacity in the country.⁶⁵ The latest reports from Haiti indicate that although the MNF handed over a *relatively* stable situation in the summer of 2004 “...the security situation in Haiti [remains] ... fragile ...” and worse, the general public continues to blame the “...inadequate response to the issue [on] the Government and

⁶² Heje in Moxon-Browne, *A Future ...*, 9.

⁶³ UNMIH 1995-1999 and now the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) 2004 - .

⁶⁴ M. Saint-Yves, “Defining Canada’s Role in Haiti”, (Toronto: Canadian Forces College Master of Defence Studies Research Project, 2006), 18.

⁶⁵ Colonel Jacques Morneau, “Reflections on the Situation in Haiti”, unpublished, March 2006, in Saint-Yves, *Defining Canada’s Role ...* 19. Colonel Morneau was the MINUSTAH chief of staff from January to July 2005.

MINUSTAH.”⁶⁶ Armed attacks have begun to occur against the UN force, a clear indication that the mission is losing credibility.⁶⁷

Morneau indicated that the lack of robust intelligence support so characteristic of UN led missions is contributing to instability as the Haitian and UN security forces are unable to effectively target destabilizing elements. If such intelligence was available, due to national caveats, the nation providing the intelligence needs to deploy a combat element able to receive and act on the information developed to ensure effective operations against de-stabilizing elements.⁶⁸ Haiti is just the latest example of a force lacking NATO’s capabilities proving unable to positively influence the local situation. While improvements are being made in DPKO, particularly in the area of mission planning and arrangements for logistic transportation, resistance continues to the establishment of an effective intelligence analysis capability to improve force employment.⁶⁹ Without implementation of significant improvements to the C2 and Intelligence functions, it is unlikely that new missions commanded by the UN will prove to be any more effective than those of the past.

CONCLUSION

Criticism of the UN regarding the pace of decision making, the willingness to act forcefully and the ability of the P5 to agree on action for the betterment of the international

⁶⁶ United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti S/2006/592 28 July 2006*; <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/441/61/IMG/N0644161.pdf?OpenElement>; Internet; accessed 22 March 2006.

⁶⁷ United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti S/2006/1003 19 December 2006*; <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/661/77/PDF/N0666177.pdf?OpenElement>; Internet; accessed 22 March 2006.

⁶⁸ Saint-Yves, *Defining Canada’s Role...*, 50.

community when the interests of one member of the P5 may be affected will continue. While coalitions of the willing may also have difficulty achieving consensus, a critical difference is that one nation will lead with others joining as they see the situation meeting their national interest. While NATO must also work through consensus, a critical advantage lies in the use of common doctrine, equipment and, once consensus is achieved, the willingness to act.

Peacekeeping missions since 1991 have been more frequent and more violent than those experienced from the end of the Korean War through 1990. Canada signed up for many of these new UN “peacekeeping” missions following the Gulf War in keeping with our internationalist tradition. However, as identified in accounts of missions in Bosnia and Rwanda, Canada had committed forces to missions more likely to involve combat than traditional UN operations. Questions regarding effective C2, logistic, communications, intelligence and medical support have become much more pertinent to those engaged in planning and executing operations abroad. While the UN continues its efforts at reform, more timely and effective responses to emerging crises can be made through participation in coalitions of nations committed to acting as quickly as possible on behalf of the UN.

Although these issues may someday be resolved within the UN, it remains in the best interests of Canada and of Canadian Forces deploying on missions abroad to do so as members of a like-minded coalition rather than UN commanded effort. Ideally these missions will be based substantially around NATO or other allied forces as part of a “contracted” mission. As members of such forces, they will have better access to C2 systems, intelligence, and logistic support. Working with forces with shared doctrine, ROE and experience, our forces can more easily overcome situations such as those which confronted UN commanders in Bosnia or

⁶⁹ Findlay, *Use of Force...*, 364.

Rwanda making the outcome of expeditionary missions in the name of peace more likely to be successful.

Allowing the UN to make full use of the tools available to it through regional organizations and coalition operations will support more effective and timely action. Canada should, therefore, continue to commit its forces only when an effective and capable command structure is in place, with compatible forces that share common understanding of doctrine, tactics and logistic support. Doing so will contribute to increased global stability through the UN while supporting our own national foreign policy goals.

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